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Transcript of Sea Raiders of Malaya
THE SEA-RAIDERS OF MALAYA
Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914
By Scott Abel
A Thesis submitted to the
Graduate School-Newark
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
In partial fulfillment of requirements
For the degree of
Masters of Arts
Graduate Program in History
Written under the direction of
Professor Amita Satyal
and approved by
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
_______________________
Newark, New Jersey
May, 2011
Abstract of the Thesis
The Sea-Raiders of Malaya
Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914
By Scott Abel
Thesis Director: Professor Amita Satyal
For centuries ‘piracy’ and ‘marauding’ plagued the Straits of Melaka causing the
capture of countless vessels, along with the death or captivity of many passengers and
seafarers. The practice and suppression of piracy in the context of Malay society and
British imperialism during the 19th century reveals its impact on British and Malaysian
history. The study employs secondary historical sources for the argument regarding
imperialism and piracy in the Straits of Melaka during the 19th century. The
decentralized structure of authority and reliance on maritime trade in Malaya during the
19th century contributed to the flourishing of piracy. Previous studies on piracy in
Malaya by Tarling and Anderson focused on its political and economic impact, but
generally neglected the pirates themselves and the development of a colonial economy.
The pirates were economically and politically powerful by raiding throughout Southeast
Asia. The marauders from Malaya composed of diverse socio-economic and political
backgrounds contributing to extensiveness of the plundering throughout the region. By
the 19th century Great Britain became an established power in Malaya with an interest in
suppressing what its administrators perceived as piracy to protect the lives and property
of British subjects, but the diversity of the pirates made that difficult.
2
Perceptions on authority varied in each ethnic and political group, but the 19th
century witnessed the transformation from a decentralized political structure to a more
centralized one under British domination. British authorities actively suppressed piracy
and marauding more than the Malay sultans. Piracy preyed on maritime trade, but also
existed because of trading and societal conditions. Malay and Chinese seafarers seized
vessels for supplemental income without consequence because a lack of centralized
political leadership. Furthermore, many seafarers possessed the maritime and martial
skills necessary to become marauders during times of strife and conflict. Great Britain
reduced the amount of piracy in the Straits of Melaka through a variety of methods
including extending political control along the straits, creating state mechanisms for
limiting piracy, sustaining economic development, and deploying military power to the
region. British domination shook Malaya from its traditions into a territory with a
radically different economic and political system.
3
Introduction
The Malays of the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed an unprecedented
transformation of their land and society with changes for most of the population ranging
from a more structured system of authority to alterations in the ethnic makeup of the
population. ‘Piracy,’ ‘sea-raiding,’ and ‘marauding’ restricted trade when left unchecked
by authorities. European authority crept over the previous state structures in Southeast
Asia over a period of centuries, lacking a single cause for expansion throughout the
centuries. Rather, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British held portions of Southeast
Asia from 1511 to 1974 with different ideas about administration and trade than
indigenous powers. The pirates and sea-raiders of the Straits of Melaka and the South
China Sea came from a variety of socio-economic and political backgrounds and acted
outside European authority. The study will focus on the British presence on the Malay
Peninsula from the establishment of British Singapore in 1819 to 1914, along with the
effects and responses to piracy by the British authorities. During times of political
uncertainty and weakened state authority, pirates and sea-raiders grew in numbers and
influence. The campaign against piracy by Great Britain was merely the first step in
turning the various Malay states into European-style Industrial Age colonial states with
some adjustments based on the British perception of the Malays’ culture. The sea-
raiders’ influence in Malaya declined significantly by the 20th century in large part
because of the establishment of British-influenced institutions.
‘Pirate,’ ‘sea-raider,’ or ‘marauder’ describes an attacker of unknown and known
support from a sultan or legitimate political leader in the study. The term “pirate” will
not necessarily reflect the morality of the action at sea in the study, but the lack of
4
support from a sultan or other significant state leader. Pirates and sea-raiders sailed
along the coast, pillaging trade in search of slave labor for sale elsewhere causing
disturbances throughout Southeast Asia.
1.1 The Argument
The pirates and sea-raiders impacted Malaya immensely during the 19th century,
contributing to shifts in native populations by displacing coastal villagers and sea-traders
through raiding. Native states in Malaya employed sea-raiders to patrol the coasts and
collect additional revenue for the local rulers. The sea-raiders became symbols of
authority in some instances, patrolling the sea for the state in maintenance of a local
ruler’s power. Sometimes distinguishing between a pirate acting without the consent of
the sultan or a legitimate agent of the state was difficult.
The development of the British Straits Settlements altered the economic landscape
of the region and brought naval forces into action against native seafarers. British
authorities employed incidents of piracy as excuses for an intervention within the affairs
of indigenous states in the name of fighting piracy. British authorities differentiated
rarely between the sea-raiders acting on orders from a legitimate authority and those
acting on their own. “Counter-piracy” denotes the British attempt to monopolize
violence at sea against any action perceived as piracy by them regardless of native
perceptions. The British perception generalized all sea-raiders as pirates, while British
forces assaulted suspected pirate stronghold without discrimination between those
responsible for raiding and those apart of the raiding economy. The virtual elimination of
sea-raiding either supported or abetted by native states restructured the authority of the
Malay states in favor of Great Britain.
5
Aside from the cause of piracy on the part of British intervention in British Malay
in of itself, the condition of the Malay states encouraged sea-raiding during the 1860s and
1870s and also contributed to the intervention by Great Britain into the same territories.
Piracy flourished during periods of weak states, conflict, poor interstate cooperation, and
immense poverty. Malaya’s geography made piratical behavior much easier and
provided plenty of hiding places for sea-raiders along the coasts. The social, economic,
political, and geographic conditions of the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century made
the ‘suppression of piracy’ by any power difficult. For the weakening of sea-raiding a
regional or global power required a strong political presence, while also creating
economic development and a social policy that discouraged piracy. The Royal Navy’s
attempt to destroy pirates within the Straits of Melaka marked the first step in the British
government’s attempt, not necessarily consciously, to consolidate control over the Malay
Peninsula.
The military policies of the British and East India Company governments sought
the destruction of the sea-raiders through armed force. The Royal Navy and private
navies in coordination with land forces assaulted marauder strongholds, along with firing
upon suspected sea-raiders throughout the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea.
The navies patrolled the seas to protect commerce and coastal populations from
marauders throughout the 19th century. The Royal Navy bombarded fortifications and
British infantry attacked local rulers for allegedly harboring suspected pirates. The
military operations made sea-raiding more difficult but failed to stop its perpetrators
completely because of the marauders integration within Malaya’s political, economic,
6
and social structure. The employment of nonmilitary means by British authorities to
weakened the sea-raiders and their supporters to find income through other means.
The nonmilitary policies enacted by British authorities included the establishment
of various institutions that strengthened the British colonial system in Malaya at the
expense of the sea-raiders’ influence. The limits of military action became apparent
through the hit-and-run tactics of the sea-raiders and the inability of the naval forces to
kill or capture more of them. Even the destruction of entire marauder villages and fleets
simply pushed the marauders to hide elsewhere throughout the East Indies Archipelago.
The Malay Peninsula possessed plenty of hiding spots in mangroves and forests along its
coast for sea-raiders. To eliminate the sea-raider threat, Great Britain and other European
powers needed the full cooperation of local rulers. Civil administrators convinced local
rulers to adopt policies favorable to British interests and enhance economic development
through public policy. The development of various institutions in Malaya connected
segments of society to the British authorities through political, economic, and social
policy.
Diplomatic and political pressure on Malay states and Chinese factions weakened
the support for marauders. British authorities employed strategies of gunboat diplomacy
for the application of political pressure on native leaders, along with cooperation with
native leaders through advisers and official residents as state administrators. Alliances
with pro-Great Britain leaders in Malaya developed British authority there. The British
intervention in Malay politics reformed the government through centralization and
weakening piracy. Advisers’ and residents’ tax collection reform redirected state revenue
from tribute, marauders, and stockades to centralized European-style custom duties. The
7
political and diplomatic actions of British authorities isolated marauders effectively from
the rest of society despite their previous significance in society.
British economic and social policy turned Malay society away from its reliance on
piracy for income to more peaceful and compliant toward British to earn a living.
Chinese firms grew through exports of tin to the West and improved efficiency with the
importation of European and Australia techniques. The development of infrastructure by
British colonial authorities permitted the shipment of greater quantities of natural
resources from Malaya. The importation of rubber tree seedlings came through the
British government, which also encouraged their growth before the en masse
development of rubber plantations. The development of an English-style education
system brought the youth of Malaya under the influence of British authorities. The
development of civil administration more centralized than prior to the British intervention
weakened sea-raiding as an institution.
The development of a legal system with English influences prohibited sea-raiding
by severing the bonds between marauders and native rulers. The sea-raider became a
pirate in the eyes of the law because the state no longer sanctioned their actions. Stricter
laws and regulations of maritime commerce, along with stricter enforcement contributed
to the decline of piracy within the Straits of Melaka. Judicial reforms for the Straits
Settlements for piracy trials resulted in higher conviction rates. Political alliances and
anti-piracy clauses in treaties with native states assisted British authorities weaken their
political opponents and the institution of sea-raiding in Malaya. British authorities in
Malaya also weakened the Chinese secret societies significantly through the development
8
of police stations and anti-secret society laws. British law and its enforcers weakened the
once-powerful marauders throughout Malaya.
1.2 Organization and Structure of the Study
The study contains four main sections, each with a subject important to the history
of maritime Malaya. Authority throughout the Malay Peninsula, the first chapter,
decentralized gradually after the collapse of the Melaka Sultanate in the 16th century until
the consolidation of British power in the 19th century. The second chapter on trade and
society establishes the important links between piracy and the economy. Explanations of
piracy and marauding within the third chapter will contend that various segments of
society committed piratical acts for additional income. The fourth chapter will explain
the counter-piracy strategies employed by the British authorities during the 19th century.
The first chapter examines how a legitimate faction wielded its power into rightful
authority and perception differentiated between pirate and official state warship. The
decentralized and fractious nature of indigenous Malay politics increased the amount of
piracy often because of conflict. When no clear leader emerged after the death of a
sultan, factional splits in the state left the Straits of Melaka vulnerable to piratical
assaults. The transition to British authority took decades while elements of the old
political system remained in place. Eventually British officials dominated Malaya
politics through treaties and force, deploying armed forces and other colonial machinery
to clear the Straits of Melaka of opponents to British authority including suspected
pirates.
The second chapter on trade in Malaya will examine the trading patterns and their
influences on the region. Maritime trade sailing through the Straits of Melaka tempted
9
seafarers into becoming sea-raiders even though sea-raiders were often traders
themselves. The sea-raiders targeted vessels and their crews usually of non-European
origin because of their numbers and vulnerability. Alterations in trade patterns also
shifted toward and away from piracy, which ultimately pulled many inhabitants of
Malaya away from work at sea to work on land. Developments in infrastructure and the
exploitation of the land resulted in the profitability for working within the British system.
Malaya as a British colony instituted secular education to prepare children for the
workforce and maintain loyalties to the British crown. The employment of economic and
social strategies made Malaya more valuable to Great Britain as a colony by making it
wealthier and more powerful.
The third chapter on sea-raiding will examine the reasons why seafarers risked
their lives in capturing other vessels and their implements to accomplish such tasks. The
political context revealed a relationship between marauders and political leaders.
Marauding possessed a long history within Southeast Asia stretching into the colonial
era, but the early decades of the 19th century witnessed particularly brutal raids. The
increase of sea-raiding during this period related to the policies of British colonies along
the Straits of Melaka. The rampant poverty and intermittent conflicts exacerbated
piratical trends resulting in the capture and deaths of an untold amount of people. Pirates
within the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea became the first serious resisters of
British expansion into Malaya, although their goals were primarily economic rather than
political. The marauders in that region came from a variety of backgrounds, whether
poor fishermen in need of supplemental income or the members of the ruling class
desirous of extra income.
10
Great Britain and other nations developed their counter-piracy policy to protect
their interests. The counter piracy chapter will examine the methods employed by the
British authorities to minimize piracy in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Seas.
British authorities employed military and non-military means to weaken the marauders
that ultimately reduced the impact of sea-raiders on Malaya. The Royal Navy and private
navies hunted pirates in defense of maritime commerce, while administrators and law
enforcement made piratical activities more difficult. British authorities employed
military strategies to destroy the marauders and their bases of power while isolating them
from native rulers. Civilian officials promoted non-military means such as the
development of a more effective justice system and developing infrastructure to deter
potential pirates. Although British authorities never fully destroyed the pirates of the
Straits of Melaka, they diminished the strength of the marauders until their impact was
minimal.
1.3 Historiography of 19th Century Malaya and British Colonialism
The historiography of the British involvement in Malaya tended to explain that
British forces intervened in Perak and Selangor to end the civil disorder and eliminate
“anarchy,” within a global trend in colonization.1 The disorder of the conflict spread 1 Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006); C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961); J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1962); Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907); C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964); K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964); Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969); Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963); Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007); Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); ? J. L. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997).
11
from land unto the sea, disturbing people of various backgrounds and means with piracy
causing the suffering of innocent people. According to Sugta Bose, the British and
Chinese capitalists lobbied the Colonial Office to alter policy to allow for greater
protection of their tin-mining investments.2 Charles D. Cowan wrote specifically about
the reasons for British intervention in Malaya, arguing that the British abandoned the
policy of non-intervention because the potential for economic development with trade
shifts in Malaya’s favor, the fracturing of the native Malay authority, along with the need
for protection of British property and trade. Cowan also argued that Whitehall
considered the previously mentioned issues, along with the actions of foreign powers.
Finally, Cowan argued that Straits Settlements officials and governors acted on their own
volition against the will of the policymakers in London, but upon the action of those
officials, London did not concede its political gains.3 The mentioned historiography
discussed the importance of political and economic factors that contributed to the British
intervention in Malaya, but neglected the social aspects of the period that are important to
understanding piracy in the Straits of Melaka.
The British expansion throughout the Malay Peninsula resulted from a series of
rapid economic, political, and social changes from the mid to late 19th century that shook
the fabric of Malay society. The Malay Peninsula witnessed great change during the 19th
century in large part because of the Industrial Age and the demand for goods that
prompted a change in Malay society. The land witnessed an enormous influx of
immigrants moving to Malaya and capital for development, exacerbating the societal
2
? Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 50-51.3
? C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961), 263.
12
problems and political tensions.4 Such issues, along with economic grievances
contributed the flourishing of piracy in the region. Aspects of Malay society and cultural
constructions contributed to the forcible seizure of vessels as part of a larger historical
context of traditional sea-raiding. Pirates composed of no single group, but rather
composed of a variety backgrounds and professions.
The historiography in regard the history of Malaysia initiated with little focus on
social history but included gradually more historical works with social history. Initially,
social history of British Malaya and modern Malaysia initiated with the anthropological
perspective because historians wrote about their own experiences during their stay in the
territories. Frank Swettenham wrote about Malays during his time with them in Malaya
through an anthropological manner. Charles Donald Cowan in 1961 and C. Northcote
Parkinson in 1964 focused mostly on the politics and economics of the British
intervention in Malaya, neglecting any significant note toward social history. That trend
changed slowly as historians included more social history in their studies of Malaya such
as K. G. Tregonning in 1964, who wrote about aspects of social. Philip Loh focused on
British efforts to make Malaya a peaceful and productive colony by establishing a social
framework through a variety of policies. Although social history became an important
aspect of the historiography in time, the social history approach to piracy remained rare.
The pirates and marauders operating from Malaya received some attention almost
entirely within the context of British imperialism within the 18th and 19th centuries.
Cowan and Parkinson focused on the domination of Malaya through the British
perspective with piracy as a means for native factions to gain an advantage over the
others. Cowan and Parkinson regarded piracy within the context of British imperialism
4 J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1962),187-188.
13
but not as a topic in itself. Nicholas Tarling wrote about piracy mainly within the
political context of the native Malay states and the encroaching British imperialism.
Tarling examined piracy within a social and economic context by placing first-hand
accounts within his work, but provided little analysis on the social impact or causes of
piracy and marauding. Eric Tagliacozzo focused on piracy as a means of resistance
against the European-style state and colonial mechanisms. Pirates freed themselves from
the constraints of the modern state by operating outside of it according to Tagliacozzo.
Carl Trocki defined the Malay perception of piracy effectively, but focused mainly on
their relationship with Johor and Lingga rather than the pirates themselves. The
aforementioned works placed piracy within relation to the presence of British authorities
because the primary sources were mostly within that context.
Other historians focused more on the economic impact regarding piracy and how
changing economies eventually weakened the prominence of pirates within Malaya.
Leonard and Barbara Andaya placed marauding in the Straits of Melaka within the
economic context of shifting demand for goods from Southeast Asia from China to
Europe. Also, the Andayas wrote about the weakening marauding through political
changes regarding the increased power of British Singapore and the shifts away from
trade through native merchant vessels toward an increase of trade with Chinese and
European vessels. J. L. Anderson evaluated the economic costs of piracy overall
weakening the economy of the region through the massive inefficiencies brought about
through forcible redistribution of goods and labor without adding any value to them. The
Andayas and Anderson examined the British authorities’ efforts to counter piracy
effectively through a combination of military operations and administrative actions.
14
Much of the historiography neglected the pirates themselves and their personal
origins in much detail. Although a few historians explained the causes of piracy, only
Tarling and Anderson to an extent looked extensively at the variety of ethnic and socio-
economic identities of the pirates and marauders but neither really focused on the reasons
for the variety groups to risk their lives to loot other vessels. The socio-economic
statuses and ethnic backgrounds of pirates were evident from the types of vessel and
equipment they used to attack merchant and fishing vessels. Pirates rarely left witnesses
to reveal their actions, so many accounts were witnesses of piratical attack from other
vessels. Although Tarling most precisely placed the significance of piracy within the
context of British imperialism through the deployment of naval forces, British authorities
used a variety of administrative and economic tools to minimize piracy and other
nuisances throughout British Malaya. The expansion upon the state social and economic
mechanisms of control written by Loh and Tagliacozzo would reveal more about counter-
piracy strategies.
1.4 The Geography of the Malay Peninsula and the Establishment of the
Melaka Sultanate in Relation to Foreign Powers
The geography of Malaya greatly influenced its politics, warfare, and economy
throughout its history. A series of hills arose throughout the north and center of the
Malay Peninsula forming the river valleys. Most inhabitants resided within the coastal
flat areas along the river banks and the land between the sea and hills. Throughout the
Malay Peninsula average rainfall ranged between 75 and 125 inches, although Perak
witnessed around 175 inches of rain a year. A tropical rainforest covered the land from
the coastal mangrove swamps to the hills further inland. The rainforests were so thick
15
that walking through them required immense amounts of effort making travel by river
preferable particularly before 1870. Once people removed the forest cover, rain quickly
eroded the soil often pushing into pockets of fertile land.5 With the thickness of the
rainforest residents of Malaya looked to the sea to make a living. The rivers and sea
provided more opportunities for most of the people of the Malay Peninsula, whereas
rainforest restricted movement and made grain agriculture more difficult.6
Prior to the presence of the European powers, the Malay Peninsula cradled one of
the great kingdoms of Southeast Asia, the destruction of which and others similar to it
contributed to the shaping of the development of the archipelago’s seafaring peoples.
Parameswara established the port-state of Melaka circa 1400 CE from a small village on
the Melaka River populated by fishermen, who reputedly pirated foreign vessels on
occasion. Melaka’s strategic location offered arable and defensible land, while being
along the shortest oceanic route between Indian Ocean and China at a potential
chokepoint in the Straits of Melaka.7 Threatened by foreign powers in the region such as
Sukhothai and Majapahit, Parameswara negotiated with the Yongle emperor of Ming
China after Admiral Zheng He’s 1403 expedition becoming a tributary state to Ming in
1405 in return for protection.8 Parameswara converted to Islam around 1409, assuming
the name Muhammad Iskander Shah, although his descendants used both the Indic and
5 J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 3-5.
6 See map (Figure 1).
7 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 2; Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Expansion and Crisis, Vol. 1, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 205.8
? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 206; Lea Williams, Southeast Asia: A History (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 47.
16
Islamic names until 1446.9 Melaka established itself with Ming protection in its early
years as a regional power that eventually became extraordinarily wealthy.
Melaka became the dominant power of the straits during the 15th century as trade
flourished throughout the region. At the peak of its domination of the straits, Melaka
annually imported Indian cloth valued at 460,000 cruzados, nearly the value of twenty
tons of silver according one estimate. The city’s population swelled to between 100,000
and 200,000 inhabitants according to contemporary accounts with 45 kilometers of
continuous settlement from the Melaka River to the River Muar.10 Melaka’s power and
the mass of trading vessels floating through its surrounding waters proved that the region
once possessed a stable trading system where are a majority of merchants could trade
peacefully without the harassment of state or piratical powers. Melaka provided political
stability and economic influence that limited the effect of pirates in the straits.
1.5 The Arrival of the Europeans and the Disintegration of the Melaka
Sultanate
The fall of Melaka to a new power to the region sent shockwaves throughout the
region, contributing to a gradual political disintegration on the Malay Peninsula and
around the Straits of Melaka. Alfonso de Albuquerque brought new tactics and strategies
from the Mediterranean Sea regarding warfare and trade. As the Portuguese governor, he
conquered Melaka in 1511 in an attempt to control the Indian Ocean with its trade for
Portugal by capturing key ports.11 The Portuguese failed to maintain the economic
control of the Straits of Melaka that their predecessors managed, resulting in a fracturing
9
? Williams, Southeast Asia: A History, 48.10
? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 27, 69-7011 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985), 64, 69.
17
of political power and the strengthening of their opponents’ power. Johor, Pahang,
Pantani, and Aceh replaced Melaka as regional powers with Aceh in particular
challenging Portuguese authority in the region with the assistance of the Ottoman
Empire.12 Sultan Mahmud formerly of Melaka sought the conquest of his old capital with
Malay help from his state of Johor. The sultan retreated from the Portuguese to Pahang
and lived as his old vassal’s guest, to make matters worse, Ming China refused to help
restore him to his capital. Mahmud campaigned from Bintang and later from an advance
position by 1517 from a stronghold on the Muar River, assaulting Melaka from 1515 to
1519, 1523, and 1524 with no success. Portuguese forces retaliated, capturing the Muar
stronghold and Bintang in 1526.13 Portugal shattered the power of old Melaka and its
sultanate never recovered its prestige or control of the straits with the fall of its
cosmopolitan capital.
Unfortunately for Johor with the old Melaka dynasty at its head, the Portuguese
were not the only threat the sultanate as other indigenous empires sought to take
advantage of the power vacuum. Sultan Ala’ud’din, Mahmud’s son and heir, made peace
with Portugal in 1536 and sought Aceh’s defeat through alliances of convenience with
various other powers. Conflicts composed of brutal seaborne assaults on the enemy,
during one of which Johor, allied with Perak and Siak defeated an Achinese fleet of 160
vessels in 1540 in the Straits of Melaka. Aceh revived, destroying Johor Lama and
taking the sultan prisoner in 1564, but failed to dominate the region.14 Despite it naval
power, Portugal failed to command the seas around Southeast Asia.15 The collapse of
12
? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 146.13
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 35, 44.14 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 46-47.15
18
Melaka’s power resulted in the inability for the sultans to command formerly loyal and
obedient vassals and high ministers.16 Neither Portugal nor any of the indigenous powers
brought peace to the Straits of Melaka, leaving it plagued with decades of war and
discouraged trade. Without a sustained peace, the Malay Peninsula could not regain its
position as the home to a great trading entrepôt.
Even the entrance of a new power, the Dutch, in the region failed to fully
consolidate power over the Straits of Melaka, rather, actions by the Dutch contributed to
the addition of the migrants making a permanent home on the Malay Peninsula. Johor
made a treaty with the Dutch to force the Portuguese from Melaka in 1606, but failed to
do so for a few decades. Eventually under the leadership of Governor General Antonio
van Diemen, Dutch forces captured Melaka in January of 1641 from the Portuguese.17
The Dutch controlled the old entrepôt, but actions in Sulawesi, otherwise known as
Celebes, such as the capture of Makassar contributed to the arrival of a new group, the
Bugis who the local Malays hired them for their seafaring and martial skills, despite
being initially disliked as newcomers. By 1680, some of the Bugis settled in Selangor on
the Malay Peninsula and survived through piracy, along with trading tin and gambier. In
the 18th century the Bugis gained power over various Malay sultans and despite being
nominally Johor vassal, they became so powerful that the Dutch generally left them in
peace.18 Dutch did not unify the region under single authority or create a regional
entrepôt open to all trade, leaving the Malay Peninsula politically fractured.
? K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964), 47.16
? Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 112.17
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 48; Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, 84-85.18 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 58-61.
19
1.6 The Arrival of the English East India Company in Malaya
The Malay Peninsula had a British presence since the later 18th century given its
strategic significance, but limited its foreign policy in regard to native affairs. The
ancient Malay State of Kedah ceded the first bit of territory on the Malay Peninsula to the
British in hope of protections from foreign powers, particularly from the Kingdom of
Siam on its northern border. Sultan Mohammed Jiwa of Kedah negotiated with Francis
Light in 1770 to gain military support from the English East Indian Company, although
initial attempts failed to reach an agreement for any company support. Francis Light
befriended the new sultan, Abdullah, who hired Light to lobby the East India Company
for their military support. The East India Company annexed Penang on August 11, 1786
for a settlement in the region, commencing the era of the British presence in Malaya.19
The East India Company intended to use Penang as a base that would not likely come
under a large attack from the Dutch to assist in trade with China for the tea. Soon after its
establishment, Penang attracted trading vessels from prahus to East Indiamen.20 Thus
began the British territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula that eventually consumed it
territorially.
British intervention in the region did not automatically bring security to the region
for all trade, but started their territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula. The transition
of power over to the East India Company did not go over well given certain
misunderstandings and perceived or actual breaking of agreements, making the
Honorable Company’s initial territorial acquisitions more forceful than perhaps originally
19
? D. J. M. Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Vol. 1 European Conquest, (New York: Oxford UP, 1971), 102, 104-106.20
? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 70-75.
20
expected. Light fought against an alliance of various Malay and Bugis factions, defeating
them in battle and later acquired more territory from Kedah in 1800, which became
known as Province Wellesley.21 The Directors of the East India Company created a non-
interventionist policy for the Malay Peninsula that lasted for decades and aimed to
maintain the presence on Penang on the cheap.22 The East India Company sought a
trading post at Penang and generally neglected taking on a stronger role in the Straits of
Melaka, permitting most of the Malay states to remain sovereign and resulting in a
general lack of centralized authority in the region.
The leasing of Singapore in January 1819 by Temenggong Daing Abdul Rahman
of Johor permitted for the establishment of a British factory there. Stamford Raffles
ensured that Singapore remained a port administered through free trade policies with
William Farquhar stayed in Singapore as a British administrator. Generally, the East
India Company gave substantial freedom to its territories along the Straits of Melaka,
while foreign powers left the colonies alone. The Honorable Company wanted to
minimize the cost of the territories in the Straits of Melaka, but Singapore grew anyway
to become a major trading entrepôt for global trade routes. Penang, Melaka, and
Singapore became the Straits Presidency in 1826 as an effort to consolidate
administrative control.23 Despite the increase in trade, the straits trade remained
vulnerable to piracy without significant political control along the coasts.
Penang and Singapore were not the only British settlements on the Straits of
Melaka, but even with additional trading ports, no one power possessed the willpower
and ability to unify the peninsula yet. British forces captured Melaka from the Dutch in 21 Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, 105, 107.22
? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 83, 87-88.23 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 100-104, 106, 113-114.
21
August 1795 without casualties and administered it until 1804 when Penang took over,
whose officials wanted to destroy the port to eliminate competition. Ultimately,
Stamford Raffles convinced the authorities otherwise, who ultimately demolished the fort
in 1807 but spared the town. The 1814 Anglo-Dutch Convention returned Melaka to
Dutch control, but the city reverted to British authorities because of the Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of 1824 exchanged Melaka for Fort Marlborough on the Sumatran side of the
straits and declared that the two nations would not intervene on their counterpart’s side of
the Straits of Melaka. In the Naning War of 1831 to 1832, Governor Fullerton engaged
in an absurd conflict, although ultimately accomplished his mission in subduing his
opponents ultimately cost the East India Company ₤100,000 with little gain.24 The treaty
effectively limited Dutch control in the Straits of Melaka, granting security for the British
possessions from the only other European power along the straits. The East India
Company learned from the futility of the land military operations and avoided them when
possible.
24
? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 93-97, 102, 111-112.
22
Map of Modern Western Malaysia (Figure 1)
McGinley, Mark. “Mark McGinley’s Fulbright in Malaysia: Penang-‘The Pearl of the Orient, ’” January 3, 2011, http://markinmalaysia.blogspot.com/2011/01/penang-pearl-of-orient.html (accessed April 2011).
23
Map of the Straits Settlements: Extent of British Influence Prior to Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 (Figure 2)
Bartholomew, John and Company, “Straits Settlements,” The British Empire, http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images3/straitsmap.jpg (accessed April 2011).
24
Chapter 1: Authority in 19th Century Malaya: The Establishment of Centralized
Authority through British Influence
Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation because of the
British intervention in the 19th century as part of its transformation from a traditional
Malay political system to a more Europeanized governmental organization. British
domination facilitated the transformation of the peninsula, while also creating
mechanisms for the ‘suppression of piracy.’ People throughout Malay society felt the
new system of authority in Malaya from common peasants to the sultans. Various Malay
institutions and professions possessed no place in British Malaya according to the
bureaucratized administrators who replaced the indigenous Malay authorities. New
authorities gained legitimacy as state administrators while the old authorities faded but
often did not fully disappear. Maritime marauders lost the most legitimacy of any group,
those formerly in the service of a chief or sultan became villainous pirates in the eyes of
Europeans.
1.1 The River State: Malay Geography and Politics
The indigenous Malay political system relied upon the river as its geographical
focus, political authority flowed outwards from the rivers because of the mobility allowed
from them. The mouth of the river possessed the capital of the Malay state because of
strategic nature of the location as a place to collect tolls and taxes while controlling
communication to the sea and beyond. The capital usually had a palace and a mosque as
the two most dominant structures. Command of the river gave the ruler the ability to
marshal forces in conflict and control his subjects, while the mountains and jungles
provided for boundaries with other realms. In 1850, the population of Malaya remained
25
only around 300,000 inhabitants scattered throughout the peninsula, usually answering to
a high degree of decentralized authority.25 The geography and politics of Malaya made
its inhabitants highly reliant on the river and sea for survival. The rivers were the means
of authority, whoever possessed its mouth controlled transportation and communication
throughout the river valley.
The hierarchy of the Malay political system relied heavily on the power on a few
individual officials with the sultan usually as the leader of the state with a variety of
supporting chiefs. In the early 19th century, autocratic politicians led Malay states
through their personal power with their sultan as the leader who usually came from the
royal family and appointed the major state officials. Negri Sembilan and Pahang were
the two Malay states without a sultan, with a yang-di-pertuan besar and a bendahara as
their respective heads of state. The sultan possessed power over life and death while
unifying the state under his rule.26 The yellow umbrella composed of either silk or
cotton, symbolized the power of the Malay sultans. The sultan, rajah class or the Malay
nobility, and the chiefs commanded absolute power over the common people and
commanded them to do their bidding.27 The leaders in society possessed absolute power
over the common Malays, creating a society with immense political stratification.
The sultan distributed authority throughout some of his constituents who became
his officials, but the sultan lacked complete authority in matters of succession. The
concept of kingship was not native to the Malays, but rather imported from India
centuries before European contact. The Indian travelers conferred the hereditary title of
25 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 123.26
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124-125.27
? Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907), 135, 142, 142.
26
“rajah” upon the river-state chiefs of the Malay Peninsula who formerly ruled by
consensus, but a tenet of the ancient consensus system remained within the 19th century
Malay system of kingship in regard to the succession of the ruler. The chiefs possessed
the right to pass over the rajah muda, or heir apparent, to a candidate deemed more
competent to rule. Such debate in regard to the succession of the ruler had potential for
an armed dispute upon the old ruler’s demise, but despite such risks the system endured
for centuries.28 The Malay kingship left a structure that granted power based on a
hereditary succession in combination with political and military skill. The decentralized
Malay political system mixed with a geography that emphasized the use of waterways for
travel created a system that partially enabled maritime maundering.
A cadre of royal officials helped sultan in the administration of his state dating
back to more centralized administrations. The chief minister to the sultan was the
bendahara, a Sanskrit title that translated to prime minister or commander-in-chief, who
wielded significant power in government affairs. During the period of interregnum, the
bendahara became the caretaker to the royal regalia until the new sultan ascended the
throne. The temenggong, an ancient Malay title translated as chief of police or chief
judge enforced laws, oversaw prisons, and even enforced the standardization of weights
and measures during the Melaka Sultanate years.29 The sultan had other high officials at
his disposal, including the laksamana or admiral, who defended the sultanate from the
sea and guarded the river from state navies and pirates alike. The laksamana advised the
sultan how far up the river to build his capital depending on the threat from invasion.
Another maritime position was the shahbandar, which translated from Persian to harbor 28 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 15, 38.29
? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 39; C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964), 43.
27
master, who collected tolls and customs duties from vessels.30 Malay heritage
bequeathed a framework of titles to the various leading subjects in the typical Malay
sultanate. The significance of the most powerful officials below the sultan often related
to maritime control, whether it was defense or revenue collection.
The powerful ministers and other officials revealed the organization within the
Malay political system as an essentially decentralized with significant amount of power
placed within the hands of lesser authorities. Other important ministers to the sultan
included the maharaja lela or “general” in English, the orang kaya besar meaning
“treasurer” and the mantri, which translated to “adviser.”31 To assist the sultan in daily
affairs the penghulu bendahari, or chief secretary, dealt with court correspondences and
managed the royal household. The term “penghulu” derived from an earlier Malay
administrative officer of the kampong, the most basic administrative unit in Malay
society. Other important posts included the mandulika or governor, who possessed
jurisdiction over local issues including the administration of justice and paid tribute to the
sultan with the assistance of his chiefs.32 The Malay political system organized along
administrative units each controlling various parts of the state, but the state generally
remained decentralized with the sultan unable to command sufficient taxation or military
might as displayed by the payment of “tribute” and the lack of direct control throughout
the sultanate by the 19th century. In reality, the sultan was usually the most powerful
chief rather than the executive or supreme authority of a centralized government.
30 Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 40.31
? Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 43.32
? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 5, 40.
28
Political decentralization altered the previously mentioned state structure, making
it more factional than during the height of the Melaka Sultanate. By the 19th century the
old offices of the Melaka Sultanate that once consisted of a structured hierarchy became
decentralized system with former high offices becoming the de facto rulers of a
designated territory. The old title positions became virtually irrelevant to their actual
duties by the time of the British intervention.33 The sultan still conferred the old titles to
the aristocrats, which in combination with military power gave the holder significant
status within Malay society. Although members of the aristocracy usually knew each
other even when distantly related, the old unified Melaka Sultanate nonetheless
decentralized over centuries.34 The decentralized political systems of Malaya fractured
the military power of the old sultanate permitting chieftains to wield significant military
power. Marauders either worked with permission chieftains or operated outside the
political influences because of the weakness of the central state.
1.2 Political Administration within the Malay State
The Malay system of taxation in the mid 19th century was informal and irregular
with the rajah or chief making arbitrary demands from his populace regarding revenue
while expecting absolute obedience and loyalty from his people. According to Frank
Swettenham, the rajah expected absolute loyalty and obedience from his people as part of
Malay tradition, failure to do so result in drakha, which translated to “treason.” The
rulers taxed irregularly and possessed no accounting of the revenues. The rajahs taxed
the people on their land as they pleased and charged a percentage of minerals from
mining communities. The taxation method discouraged common folk from saving
33 Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 19,34
? Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 134.
29
because the rajah could simply seize any savings of food or material.35 Much of the
taxation to support the state was tribute collected by the orang laut or “sea people” from
vessels passing by the coast. Europeans often viewed these taxation methods as piracy.36
Malay chiefs and rajahs took materials within their territory expecting absolute
compliance in a state system that many Europeans described as piratical.
Chiefs and rajahs exercised great amounts of authority over the rest of society in
regard to people’s lives on land, which left the commoners with virtually no opportunities
to improve their lives. The rights between the rajahs and the raoyat or peasant class of
subsistence farmers and fishermen were immensely disparate. Authorities had the right
to demand labor from their people, called kerah, who worked on a variety of projects
from constructing houses, mosques, and even accompanying their leader on long
voyages. The village headmen usually brought the laborers to the work site, while Malay
tradition suggested the laborers receive compensation through food, but this was not
always the case.37 The common Malays possessed few rights, authority rested with the
chiefs and rajahs who ruled with limited state structure often convincing people to live
outside of their authority in regard to a life at sea.
The Malays used debt-bondage as another means for a rajah or sultan to have the
labor needed for various tasks. The Malay ruling class had the right to hold a debtor in
bondage, which the formed the ranks of the rajahs’ retainers and servants because nobody
received regular wages. Islamic law prohibited the enslavement of fellow Muslims so
35 Swettenham, British Malaya, 136-137, 142-143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.36
? J. L. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 89.37
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.
30
rajahs captured aboriginals or purchased Africans as slaves, but their numbers were few
and treated little differently from debt-bondmen.38 The bondman remained such until he
could pay off the debt, while carrying out the orders of the rajah or chief he owed. The
debt also passed to his wife and descendants until paid, but the services rendered did not
count toward eliminating the debt. If the debtor proved to be particularly valuable, the
chief could provide him with food and clothing making it virtually impossible to pay off
the debt. The chiefs also reserved the right to trade the bondman to other chiefs,
requiring the bondman and his family to move elsewhere.39 The common Malay, the
raoyat, possessed few rights and had the possibility of living as a virtual slave with little
chance of ever becoming free. The treatment of the common Malays demonstrated the
relative indifference Malay rulers and administrators had often toward their people and
the vast amount of power they possessed over their people.
There was an option of passive resistance for the common Malay to escape the
chiefs or rajahs should conditions become unbearable. If the chiefs or other authority
figures oppressed the common Malays by demanding too much or were unable to
respond to a disaster, the chief risked losing his labor. Sometimes in the event of war or
some calamity, the common folk left en masse to another district and the chief lost his tax
base without labor or food.40 Moving was not as difficult prior to the presence of the
British authorities because land was open to settlement. Land possessed little or no
commercial value, if a particular plot was more productive than others, a chief could
claim it for himself. Otherwise most Malays simply settled on unclaimed lands to grow
38 Swettenham, British Malaya, 141-142.39
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.40
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.
31
palm trees, fruit trees, and an acre or two of rice.41 Common Malays essentially
expressed their power or rejected the legitimacy of authority with their feet by moving to
a new district. Relocating to another district did not require the purchase of new
property, making the move less difficult than with fixed properties.
1.3 The Autonomy of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya
Not all authority rested within the traditional Malay authority by the 19th century
because a new wave of immigrants refused to integrate within the traditional Malay
societal structure. Chinese secret societies refused to add a layer to the diverse political
heritage of Malaya, but rather developed their own relatively sovereign sphere of parallel
political structure. The waves of Chinese immigration in the nineteenth century
answered not to their Qing emperor, but to ritualistic secret societies that combined
spiritual fulfillment with militancy. The Triad Brotherhood was the basis of the
Chinese-Malay secret societies and had its basis in the 17th century as a group of rebels
bent on overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. These societies eventually turned into bullies
who extorted businessmen and traders of all levels to gain funds. Such groups became
popular in the immigrant communities of Malaya with the offers of kinship to those of
the same linguistic dialect in replacement of their old clan life that sometimes included
non-ethnic Han Chinese.42 The parallel authority within each immigrant community
throughout Malaya created new powers within the Malay Peninsula that challenged the
status quo and ultimately threatened to derail the system of authority within the Malay
states.
41 Swettenham, British Malaya, 136.42
? Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1, 21.
32
Chinese immigrants in Malaya joined secret societies that rejected the Malay
power structure and gave authority to their secret society leaders, which accepted their
authority as the most legitimate. Taking a blood-oath of loyalty in a secret ritual for
membership in a secret society offered protection and kinship in a foreign land with
different customs, languages, and religion. Even if the immigrant initially refused to join
a secret society, the societies often compelled an individual to do so. The secret societies
possessed great power, even to execute an individual within the Chinese community,
which accepted the secret societies authority. The Chinese secret societies fought each
other for economic gains and territory usually in preference to fighting with other parallel
authorities such as the British administrators, whom they did not generally carry a
personal grudge against.43 The development of the Chinese secret societies as a parallel
system of government and justice alongside that of the Malay and British factions
showed a territory where no single power controlled the others completely.
1.4 The Development of British Authority in Malaya
Emanating from Singapore, Melaka, and Penang, British influence in native
Malay states generally increased since the establishment of the Straits Settlement as a
Crown Colony in 1867 until the outbreak of World War I. The Malay Peninsula states
fell into three political categories depending on foreign influences with the transfer of the
Straits Settlement to the Colonial Office. The first group of states fell under Siam’s
sphere of influence such as Kelantan and Terengganu, along with Kedah and Perlis to a
lesser extent given their proximity to Penang. Johor fell into the second group of being
under the British sphere of influence because of its proximity to Singapore and its
maharajah’s anglophile tendencies. The third group composed of independent states that
43 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 2-3.
33
Great Britain had influence over at times but maintained sovereignty in a de jure sense.44
No native Malay state on the peninsula clearly dominated the rest by the mid 19th century
permitting foreign powers to vie for influences within the indigenous states.
After a few decades since the establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown
Colony, the British administration gained authority over the Malay Peninsula. By 1875
the British established the first residency system in the region, which left nominal
sovereignty with the sultan or state leader while letting the British resident govern in all
manners except those of native religion and customs. The process of taking over
governing was gradual until authority in most issues shifted to the residency. By 1895,
the four Malay states with residents, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan
formed the Federated Malay States. A year later, authorities instituted the Straits
Criminal Procedure Code as the laws of the federation. The Resident General led the
Federated Malay States and answered to the Governor of the Straits Settlements.45 The
1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty transferred Siam’s authority over Kelantan, Terengganu,
Kedah, and Perlis to Great Britain. Johor fell into the British sphere of influence
officially and received a General Adviser in 1914, but Johor and the other states
maintained a degree of independence while under British protection.46 Great Britain
dominated Malaya by 1914, removing all other foreign claims to the territory and making
it the dominant authority there.
1.5 Conflict over Authority in Malaya between the Factions
44 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 41.45
? Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 22, 23, 40, 42. 46
? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 171-173.
34
By becoming the greatest power within the Malay Peninsula and by exerting
pressure on indigenous states, Great Britain gained a high degree of de facto power
within the region. Great Britain exercised power in states before taking actual control
over them through sympathetic princes within the Malay world. Tengku Zia’u’ddin or
Kudin, the younger brother of the Sultan of Kedah, married Arfah the daughter of Sultan
Abdul Samad of Selangor after Raja Mahdi, her former fiancée, failed to pay tribute to
the sultan. Sultan Abdul Samad appointed Tengku Kudin as the Representative of the
Sultan, which Europeans interpreted as the “Viceroy,” much to the chagrin of Selangor
chiefs.47 The appointment of Tengku Kudin, despite being from Kedah, as an important
figure in Selangor politics brought him into the complex political system without many
allies. To help finance his participation in the Selangor Civil War, Kudin received
support from his friend and financial backer J. G. Davidson of Singapore. Kudin used his
financial backing in the assistance of Rajah Ismail to besiege the port city of Klang,
employing five hundred supporters from Kedah. The assistance of Lieutenant De
Fontaine, former French navy midshipman, provided expertise in the deployment of
eighteen pounder carronades through dense jungle, which help annex the city in 1870.48
Kudin owed much of his success to foreign powers rather than native support, eventually
foreigners with Kudin’s support played a much larger role in the state.
The role of the British as an authority in Selangor increased because of Kudin’s
successes during the war. Sultan Abdul Samad confirmed the opening of his territory to
formal British influence on November 18, 1874. Governor Andrew Clarke recommended
Frank Swettenham to the position of Resident to Selangor, but Lord Carnarvon overruled
47 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 70-71.48
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 73, 76.
35
the installment because Swettenham was only 24 years old and nominated J. G. Davidson
as resident on December 30. The appointment delighted Kudin because it secured
Selangor from further war and probably his position, too.49 His appointment in Selangor
was short-lived and Blomfield Douglass replaced him despite his need for a translator
with Malay-speakers in 1876. Kudin became the dominant figure in politics as the
President of the State Council formed in 1877, but resigned within year for a pension for
him and his wife. Rajah Muda Musa, the son of Sultan Abdul Samad, took Kudin’s place
as president, pleasing the chiefs of Selangor. Musa worked well enough with Douglass
and remained in Langat with the sultan.50 The transition from native sovereignty to
becoming a British residency took years and was complex but the perception of
legitimacy or at least the passive acceptance on the behalf of chiefs consolidated British
authority while minimizing armed conflict.
The Malay opposition faltered against British domination throughout the Malay
Peninsula, resulting in the establishment of British authority in certain states. In
Selangor, years of war wore down the populace and the placement of a resident did not
face much resistance. Rajah Mahdi gave up the war, spending his days in Singapore with
tuberculosis. In Negri Sembilan, the state of Sungei Ujong received a resident for the
whole of the confederation after the defeat of the Dato Bandar and the establishment of
the Dato Klana as the undisputed ruler of the state.51 In these instances, Malay chiefs
played a role in the establishment British authority without the Straits Settlements
resorting to a full-scale British invasion.
49 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 184-185, 193-194.50
? Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969), 13-20.51 Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 197.
36
The Malay state of Perak, however, experienced the wrath of the British Empire
in ways that the other Malay states did not. The Pangkor Engagement of January 20,
1874 established the residency system in Perak, which gave the right of the British
resident to collect taxes. The assassination of Resident James Birch on November 1,
1875 and the subsequent conflict nominally led by Sultan Abdullah prompted the Straits
Settlements Governor William Jervois requested reinforcements that helped end the
conflict by February.52 After the war, Davidson became Perak’s resident but resigned
shortly thereafter in March 1877. Hugh Low replaced him and sympathized more with
Malay culture more than Davdison. Low attempted to make Yusuf, who Malay chiefs
passed over twice for becoming sultan, an effective ruler for both the Malays and the
British authorities. The Perak government also contained other Malays such as Rajah
Dris and Dato Rajah Makhota who helped make decisions in what became a
constitutional monarchy, but with the resident clearly in charge of state affairs by 1880.53
After the Perak War, the British colonialists possessed authority over the local
government and rulers.
The Chinese secret societies evaded the authority of the British administrators
over a long period of time and through a variety of techniques. Making a deal with a
central governing organization was impossible because the only centralized secret society
existed in Singapore under the Ghee Hin Triad, but even that society left room for public
disputes. Most organizations fought through murders, street riots, and other acts of
violence for territory and economic gains making it impossible for the British authorities
to deal with a single secret society to resolve the violence. Chinese secret societies often 52
? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 36, 68,53
? Loh, The Malay States, 3-13.
37
avoided the criminal justice system by making court testimonies difficult and subjecting
potential opponents to pressure. The Chinese community feared the repercussions of the
secret societies. The Malay states taxed the Chinese societies but could not control them
as displayed by the civil wars.54 The secret societies managed to remain fairly
independent from British control for years, but maintaining such abilities proved difficult.
The British administrators gained a degree of authority over the Chinese secret
societies, bringing the Chinese community in line with English Common Law. Initially,
Straits Settlement governors considered the secret societies an issue for local police, but
by 1866, Governor Cavenagh decided that dismantling the secret societies required more
effort than that of the municipal police. An 1867 Penang riot resulted in the enactment of
the “Act for the Better Preservation of Peace,” which prohibited the carrying of weapons
and gave the governor the right to expel non-British subjects from the colony, along with
other powers to disperse mobs. W. A. Pickering arrived in Singapore in 1872 as a
translator for the Chinese and a year later became the “protector” who intermediated
between the Chinese community and the colonial government. Pickering had some
success, but the societies went underground. In 1888, Governor Clementi-Smith required
all societies with ten or more people to register with the government and reserved the
right to declare certain societies unlawful. Membership in an illegal secret society was
punishable by six months in prison and three years in prison for managers. The
government banned ownership of Triad paraphernalia and set up branches throughout
Malay to settle disputes among the poor for the reduction of conflict. Despite such
efforts, the secret societies continued to extort businesses.55 The colonial forces
54 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 1-4.55 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 4-7.
38
consolidated their authority within the cities with a degree of success that controlling
secret societies remained important to maintaining British power.
A degree of authority from the British administrators came from a lack of
personal bitterness that inhabitants of Malaya felt at the time in regard to falling into the
British Empire. The Chinese secret societies living in British territory usually did not
personally resent the British government, but wanted to be left alone.56 During the
bombardment of Kuala Selangor in 1871 by HMS Rinaldo, British targeted Rajah
Mahmud and later British officials requested Sultan Abdul Samad hand him over to
them.57 Rajah Mahmud fought against British forces in service of the Dato Bandar.
Despite fighting against British forces, Rajah Mahmud joined the services of the
Englishman Frank Swettenham and probably saved his life in the aftermath of Resident
Birch’s assassination in Perak. For his complicity in Birch’s murder, the British
government banished former Sultan Abdullah to the Seychelles, but he relocated
eventually to Singapore.58 Mahmud and Abdullah lived amongst British subjects even
after fighting them, and therefore they probably did not hate the British authorities. If a
majority Malays and Chinese personally resented British authority, the colonial
government could not have established a successful colony in Malaya.
1.6 Identity and the Civil Service within the Politics of Malaya
British authority stemmed from its administrators and members of the armed
forces who turned Malaya into a territory developed along European lines. The Malay
Civil Service played an essential part in making Malaya a success story by acting
56
? Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 3.57
? C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-88.58
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 203.
39
independently to a large degree from Whitehall. The backgrounds of members of the
Malay Civil Service were from relatively diverse social backgrounds. Her Majesty’s
government dispatched Hugh Clifford, the nephew of the Seventh Lord and Governor
Weld’s cousin’s son, to Perak. Frank Swettenham and William Maxwell graduated from
minor Public Schools, whereas Tristram Speedy was the son of soldier serving in India
before becoming a Sergeant Major in the Penang police force with Sikhs. Most of the
Malay civil servants admired the Malays and their culture.59 Frank Swettenham advised
Malay civil servants to participate in Malay culture and learn from it by participating in
everyday life and speaking the Malay language in efforts to understand the culture while
listening to opinions to earn the trust of the Malay people. In return, Swettenham
explained, Malays placed loyalty, generosity, and hospitality to person who earned it
even if they were a foreign agent.60 A significant degree of authority and legitimacy with
the Malay people came from the ability of the Malay Civil Service to listen and work
with them on the issues they cared about.
A part of giving the British colonialists authority required a sense of common
identity or purpose in Malaya. During the era of British colonialism in Malaya, the
inhabitants of the land became British subjects in law when born in British Crown
territory, but being born legally a British subject did not necessarily equate to being
British culturally. The British Empire tied diversity of ethnic groups, especially in
Malaya, in a manner much more challenging in nation-state system because the imperial
system gave a sense of legal equality under the crown. A subject in a British protectorate
allowed the individual to own a British passport. Though many Englishmen rejected 59 J. de Vere Allen, “Malay Civil Service, 1874-1941 Colonial Bureaucracy/ Malayan Elite,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970), 149, 155-156, 157; Loh, The Malay States, 72.60
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 133-134, 140.
40
concepts of equality, a number embraced Malay culture such as police inspector Hubert
Berkeley of Perak, who rode elephants, wore traditional Malay clothes, spoke fluent
Malay, and often attended Malay shadow puppet shows. By 1907 in Singapore, the
nationalism of Chinese-British subjects pleased the Duke of Connaught who was glad to
see unity with the crown. In Perak and Singapore, pride in accepting British authority
took some time to develop as during Queen Victoria’s Jubilee in 1887, the populace
appeared less enthused regarding the event than ten years later during the Diamond
Jubilee. The 1897 celebration showed greater national pride in Singapore, Penang, and
Perak with parades, Union Jacks, fireworks, and Jubilee memorabilia.61 The acceptance
of a British identity legitimized British colonial authority and integration within the
empire.
Conclusion
Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation from the
establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony in 1867 to the domination of
Malaya by Great Britain by the end of the century. The independent Malay states
possessed decentralized governments with local chiefs having a great deal of autonomy
and independence from their leaders. With such a large number of relatively independent
chiefs, pirates thrived in the Straits of Melaka when tolerated by the local rulers. British
authority united the land in an unprecedented manner, placing constraints on local power
while strengthening the central governments. Restrictions on factional power did not
limit themselves to the Malay indigenous states, but also affected the Chinese secret
societies, whose power weakened over the years. According to Emily Sadka, the newly-
61 Lynn Hollen Lees, “Being British in Malaya, 1890-1940,” The Journal of British Studies 48, no. 1 (2009): 76-101.
41
centralized authority based in Kuala Lumpur with executives focusing more on economic
development rather than preserving the traditional way-of-life.62 The movement of the
capital away from the mouth of a river symbolized the loss of authority once enjoyed by
the river-state chiefs to the imperial administrators of the British Empire.
The decentralized manner of native Malay politics and the harshness of political
rule by the ruling class contributed greatly to the prevalence of marauding around
Malaya. Political decentralization mixed with internal strife or conflict created
conditions where marauding thrived, whereas coordination between various rulers and
peace limited the extent of piracy. The increased power of British authorities in Malaya
weakened the strength of the marauders greatly by the 20th century through greater
centralization and coordination within the British political structure. British
administrators managed political relationships with the relatively autonomous Chinese
community through intermediaries and the ruling class of Malaya through residencies and
councils. The management of formerly independent states in Malaya by British civil
servants eroded the support marauders once enjoyed. A collective British identity
emerged in Malaya during the late 19th century altering many perceptions regarding
authority and consolidated British power. The increased centralization and coordination
brought about by British authorities in Malaya weakened the marauders’ base of support,
decreased the opportunities available to them during periods of conflict, and increased the
opposition to the marauders until they became much less consequential by the 20th
century.
62 Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States: 1874-1895, (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968), 373, 380.
42
Chapter 2: Trade and Society in Malaya: The Development of a Colonial Economy
through Resource Extraction and Education
Malay society composed of many different ethnic groups and possessed a
tradition of maritime trade in region at an important crossroads of the world. Seafaring
was an essential form of travel throughout the Malay Archipelago as an important form
of transportation. Therefore, many Malays possessed the seafaring skills necessary to sail
effectively, along with the martial experience and equipment necessary to seize vessels.
Traditional professions within the Malay world such as fishing and agriculture relied on
nature, which was not always reliable. There was no single trade or societal issue that
pushed people toward violence at sea rather an amalgamation of issues drove people to
piratical activities, but changes in authority incurred punishment for committing such
actions. Trends in the global economy and politics turned many Malays and other groups
to new work within the sphere of British authority corresponding to its ascendancy in
Malaya as it became more integrated into the British imperial system.
The economy and society of Malaya during part of the 19th century created an
environment where piracy thrived because the types of skills required for the economy
and the variety of societal factions fighting for their interests. An economy dependant on
fishing and sea trade gave seafaring skills to a large proportion of the workforce.
Ethnicity partially delineated various factions with in Malaya’s politics and economy,
which played an important role in determining the dominant political powers within
Malaya. The economic development of Malaya came with increased foreign intervention
ultimately leading to a degree of unification among the various Malay states. The
economies of the British Straits Settlements altered the economy of the mainland by
43
increasing demand for native products creating imbalances within the societies of the
Malay Peninsula. The imbalances created fertile ground for conflict between the various
factions. The British economic policy and foreign-born businessmen influenced Malaya
through improved mining, large plantations, and a secular education system built on
imperial values. The increased economic and social influence of the centralized authority
weakened the strength of pirates until they became a mere nuisance.
2.1 Early Malay Economy: Subsistence Farming, Trade, and Fishing
Malays relied much of their economy prior to the 19th century on the growth of
crops for subsistence agriculture as part of a centuries-old tradition. By the 15th century
rice became the dominant staple crop of Southeast Asia, with Melaka importing large
quantities of rice during its days as a great entrepôt. At the end of that century, thirty
Siamese junks transported rice to Melaka a year, while Java exported between fifty and
sixty junks with cargoes of rice a year as the region’s largest producer of rice. The
Malays of the region, especially after the fall of Melaka, became less reliant on rice as
staple crop. Sumatrans consumed wild roots, leaves, and herbs when their rice crops
failed, making them less vulnerable to famine than other more stratified cultures in China
and India.63 For some of the other agriculture on the Malay Peninsula prior to the 19th
century, farmers sold crops for export such as in Kedah that produced pepper during the
17th century for export.64 For Malays, rice remained an important staple in their diet and a
significant part of their agricultural economy, but also relied on the maritime trade of
agricultural products for their economy.
63 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680: Vol. I The Lands Below the Winds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 18-23.64
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 201-202.
44
Besides agriculture, fishing was of great importance as the Malay fishermen
remained the most renowned part of the economy of the Malay Peninsula for centuries.
Fish and rice were the two most important staples in the Malay diet and Malays often
drank fresh water as their chief drink.65 In John Crawfurd’s 1820 History of the Indian
Archipelago, he noted the significance of fish, usually either dried or pickled for storage
and commerce as part of the Malay daily diet. Crawfurd praised how effectively Malays
caught their fish and the fishing trade’s importance to the overall economy. Malay
fishing boats worked in teams by dragging seine nets together and in another technique
set up nets on bamboo and cane enclosures to trap fish. Virtually all coastal families
possessed small nets and lines for fishing. The extent of fishing astonished foreigners,
even the Zheng He expedition noted the inexpensiveness of fish and that fishing was the
most common male profession in Melaka.66 The importance of fishing was essential to
the daily lives of the coastal and riverside settlements of the Malay Peninsula,
contributing the seafaring ability of many Malays. With many Malays capable of sailing
along an important trade route, there remained the possibility that fishermen in need of
supplemental income resorted to piracy.
2.2 Ethnicity in Malaya: Power through Trade and Warfare
Halfway through the 19th century, variety of ethnic groups from throughout the
world inhabited the Malay Peninsula and sometimes allied with each other in various
political struggles. Various groups composed of what became a collective Malay
identity, composing of foreign Malays from Sumatra and natives alike. Some of the
Sumatrans belonged to the Minangkabau people, who formed the confederacy of Negri
65 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 5, 36.66
? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 29, 243.
45
Sembilan.67 The Bugis, formerly of Celebes or Sulawesi, migrated to the Selangor
estuaries by the 1680s and established their own sultanate in 1742 with its capital at
Kuala Selangor.68 Other influential groups included the Arabs and the resurgent Chinese
who established mining settlements starting in the 1820s. Indians remained a small
community on the peninsula’s west coast at the time.69 The ethnic groups of Malaya
were not usually unified but usually then in turn divided into further groups, which
sometimes fought each other despite relatively similar heritage. In many instances,
friction between various groups led to conflict that often spilled over into the sea.
The sea traders of the Straits of Melaka and beyond relied on maritime trade to
survive, relying mostly on their own labor to collect goods. Much of the population
composed of linguistic Malays, orang laut, and Bugis who relied upon the sea for their
economic, social, and political way-of-life. These maritime peoples sailed in search of
trading commodities along the various rivers, straits, islands, and swamps up to the
coastline to live through maritime trade of various small goods.70 Maritime traders
generally collected goods for trade between February and May financed if necessary
through local chiefs who provisioned them in exchange for a percentage of their profit
from trade with China.71 Traditionally, relatively small-scale trade for the orang laut and
other maritime groups provided for relatively little demand without excessively depleting
natural resources for long-distance trade over several months. The orang laut, Malays,
67 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124; Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 156.68
? Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 270-272.69
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124.70
? Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), 58.71
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.
46
and Bugis were remarkable seafarers capable of sailing long distances with great skills at
sea.
Groups formed makeshift alliances to leverage their power for economic and
political advantages, sometimes repeatedly switching sides within the same conflict. One
group of Sumatran miners switched sides twice during the seven year Selangor Civil War
seeking better conditions. The miners sided with Rajah Mahdi when he revolted against
Rajah Abdullah in hopes of better mining conditions in 1866. Rajah Mahdi and his allies
besieged the port city of Klang for control of the mines upriver taking it within the year.
The Sumatran miners deserted Rajah Mahdi because of the equally poor conditions under
his rule. During the second siege of Klang in 1869, the Sumatran miners allied with
Tengku Kudin to attack Rajah Mahdi and his forces. Kudin allied with Yap Ah Loy, the
Capitan China or leader for the Hai Sen Chinese of Kuala Lumpur, who also once allied
with Mahdi.72 The Sumatran miners fought in their own interests but pledged loyalty to
the faction that offered the best deal, fighting for their own interests as a group. The
Sumatrans also displayed their independence with Malay society overall by pledging
allegiance to the most favorable leader.
2.3 Singapore: The Emergence of an Entrepôt in Malaya
The re-emergence of Singapore as a trading entrepôt brought the shifts in trade
and in Malay society that brought British authority deeper into Malay affairs. Singapore
developed along the lines of the traditional commercial port like Melaka, but with
different political loyalties. Thomas Stamford Raffles wanted an open a route to China in
the hopes of reaching that market for British exports. Singapore offered an abundance of
drinking water and being at the opening of the Straits of Melaka, its establishment in
72 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 284, 285.
47
1819 prevented any revival of native Malay kingdoms through its competition as an
entrepôt. Raffles created an economic policy that ensured free trade in Singapore, which
made the port competitive in a world with protectionist tariffs commonplace.
Furthermore, the perception of legitimacy regarding the acquisition of Singapore made it
more difficult to justify its destruction through military action by native forces.73
Singapore offered great prospects for its inhabitants, bringing trade from throughout the
world under the auspices of British authority. The presence of the port in British hands
greatly shifted the balance of power in the region.
The development of trade through Singapore brought British trade interests,
among others, into the Malay world but did not intervene extensively within its societal
and political structure for a few decades. At the time of its annexation in 1819 in accord
with the Johor Sultanate, Singapore possessed between one hundred and two hundred
inhabitants who were not numerous enough to transform the small fishing hamlet into a
bustling port. Johor eventually became economically tied to Singapore, integrating the
state to Singapore to the point when they became important parts of each others
economy. The Straits Settlements of Penang, Singapore, and Melaka became the main
centers of trade for the Malay Peninsula but operated outside of its traditional political
structure.74 During its initial decades under the East India Company, the Straits
Settlements focused generally on economic growth and trade to increase its importance
and influence rather than dominate the peninsula militarily, leaving a power vacuum that
piratical factions and sea raiders filled.
73 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 114-117.74
? Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004), 86, 117.
48
The population of Singapore was not of the traditional Malay composite, but more
cosmopolitan with its inhabitants of various backgrounds and cultures. A large number
of the immigrants sailed from India and China to work in Singapore, eventually
overshadowing the native Malay population. Five years after its establishment,
Singapore composed of over 10,000 inhabitants with Malays composing of over 4,500
and the Chinese accounting for 3,500. Twenty-five years after its incorporation, Chinese
inhabitants achieved a majority of the population. By the mid 1840s, the overall
population of Singapore reached 52,000 inhabitants with approximately 32,000 Chinese
residents filling most of the trades throughout the port. In Singapore, many Chinese
immigrants found commercial prosperity with some becoming wealthier than
Europeans.75 The numbers and wealth of the Chinese allowed members of that
community to have a significant amount of power within the region. Chinese maritime
trade came to account for a significant component of the overall trade within the region
giving or revealing Chinese seafarers’ skill in sea travel.
The administration of Singapore under British authority coincided with shifts in
trade patterns, particularly in regard to maritime trade. Native seafarers declined
proportionally in Singapore with fewer native vessels calling there. From 1829 to 1830
Malay prahus composed of 23% of Singapore’s maritime trade in contrast to 1865-6
when prahus composed of 8% of vessels calling at Singapore.76 Besides European
vessels, Chinese merchant vessels docked increasingly at Singapore, jumping from four
large junks in 1821 to 143 in 1856-7. Rather than acting as a major port for English
products for export to China as Raffles initially hoped, the Chinese importers purchased
75 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117-118.76
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.
49
goods native to Malay lands, which became known as “Straits Produce” by the English.
Chinese merchants usually purchased products from the marine and forest environments
of Southeast Asia, such as camphor, beeswax, rattan palms, bird’s nests, and seaweed.
Demand for forest goods resulted in a closer relationship between collectors of the
products and the merchants, altering the traditional systems and straining the local
ecology. The orang laut once sailed the seas of Southeast Asia as traders became agents
for collecting forest resources by the mid 19th century, while the aboriginal forest
dwellers extracted resources in greater quantities than before.77 The maritime economy
of the Straits of Melaka changed from Malay domination to domination by other groups.
Changed times brought certain traditionally maritime groups away from the sea to find
work on land.
2.4 Agriculture and International Trade: The Changes in Malaya’s Economy
The economic changes were not limited to Singapore Island, but spread
throughout the Malay Peninsula, increasing the influence of the Chinese in the region
initially through agricultural products. Johor developed economical links with
Singapore’s merchant community given its close proximity, which allowed Johor to
export fresh water and food to Singapore. Chinese agricultural settlements in Johor
planted crops including gambier and pepper.78 Gambier helped develop Singapore during
the 1830s especially with elimination of its duties in Great Britain in 1834, permitting the
purchase by tanners for tanning leather black and others for dying in general. Chinese
planters had more success than their European counterparts who attempted to grow
coffee, cotton, and tea. In Melaka, Chinese planters combined gambier and pepper with
77 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 136-137.78
? Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.
50
tapioca in concert with each other to improve the overall ecological and financial success
of the plantations. The demand in China accounted for a higher proportion of revenue in
Singapore of 19% in 1848-9 as opposed to 16% for Europe, although Chinese demand
revenue later dropped to 12% and Europeans rose to 25% in 1868-9.79 Early Chinese
planters helped Singapore succeed as a viable settlement and port while independently
making inroads in Malay territory, thus growing foreign influence there. The commercial
shift to Europe made piracy more difficult because the increased difficulty regarding the
seizure of European vessels.
The demand overseas for exports through the Straits Settlements shaped Malay
society and trade even without the necessary presence of British authorities within the
Malay states. The demand for products shipped through Singapore contributed to the
accumulation of capital by Singapore residents including those originally from China.
Europe and America increased demand for gutta percha, a type of tree used similarly to
the rubber tree decades latter. The rise in demand came around the 1840s, the resin of
which easily conformed to molds when heated and became particularly useful for the
manufacture of buggy whips. Gutta percha rose even higher in demand with the
discovery that processed resin sealed the submarine telegraph cables effectively. Malays
and the orang asli80 of the forest brought much gutta percha to port for sale, for some as a
substitute income for trading and piracy in the former group, creating revenue important
for the survival of the Straits Settlements. The cultivation of the plant resin was deeply
79 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137, 139.80
? Orang asli, translates to “original people,” descend from the ancient inhabitants of the peninsula and live in isolated communities throughout the forests. Malays considered them “savages” and hunted them as slaves particularly during the 18th and 19th centuries. Slave traders hunted them down, killing all adult males and then selling the women and children into slavery or presented them as gifts to local rulers. Colin Nicholas, Orang Asli, http://www.magickriver.net/oa.htm.
51
flawed because the orang asli, often slaves held by Malays, harvested it directly from
nature and usually in a manner that killed the tree, forsaking their animist ideals of
appeasing the spirits to meet the demands of Malay and Chinese middlemen.81 The
demand for gutta percha displayed the shift in demand for goods from the Straits
Settlements toward Europe, which exemplified the economic and social shifts occurring
in the Malay Peninsula. Former maritime Malay maritime traders and pirates found
different ways to earn a living more in line with European economic demands.
The mismanagement of the gutta percha plant suggested that Malay society failed
to reach the demands of the European market on its own, rather requiring huge changes to
the overall administration of Malay society if it were to meet that demand. Rather than
cultivating gutta percha on a plantation and extracting the resin slowly in a relatively
controlled process, harvesters of the plant caused ecological and economical problems by
destroying too many gutta percha trees. Collecting enough resin for one pikul, roughly
62.5 kilograms required the destruction of ten full grown trees. The export sales of gutta
percha to Singapore jumped from $5,239 in 1848 to $139,317 in 1866. British and
Chinese investors shied away from investing in gutta percha enterprises mainly because
of their reliance on the orang asli to collect the substance and the forced labor used by
Malays to gain their services.82 The Malay business model was unworkable for the
demands of the Europeans because it yielded too little and required the employment of
morally questionable labor sources. To meet the demands of the foreign market,
investors needed a new economic model that required a different labor source and more
effective resource extraction methods.
81 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137-8.82
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 138, 139.
52
2.42 Mining in Malaya: The Development of an Industrialized Economy
The need for a foreign business model became clear with the increased demand
for the mining and extraction of tin, which native Malays generally devoted less of their
lives to. By the 1850s politics and economics changed sufficiently with the Malay rulers’
recognition of the value of the Chinese laborers and the realization of Chinese financiers
of the potential value of the tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula.83 Financiers found too
few Malays willing to quit their lives as subsistence farmers for a new life in the tin
mines. The mining settlements were relatively far away from traditional Malay villages
during the 1840s and 1850s, leaving little reason start over as fulltime miners.84 The
traditional Malay method for tin extraction required the digging of channels, filling it
with a stream of water, and then the hauling of the soil into running water. The water
washed away the soil and the miners collected the remaining tin, a process which
permitted extraction on a small scale useful for subsistence farmers and fishermen. The
Malay chiefs benefitted from the increased production of tin as the traditional methods
yielded them little revenue, because the Chinese financiers promised mining rights fees
and other forms of income.85 The invitation of foreigners to work on Malay land
represented potential incomes that the indigenous Malays could not offer, letting the
Chinese in appeared to be in their self-interest, but that was often not the case in the long
term.
The Chinese immigrants became quite successful by filling the tasks other groups
neglected to do in large numbers, turning the economy of Malaya into a more
83 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.84
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 129-130.85
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192.
53
economically-developed society. A large number of the Chinese immigrants found
employment in low-paying basic labor positions such as coolies at the mines. Others
took positions as kitchen hands and gardeners, while more skilled laborers took careers in
carpentry and as clerks. Few other groups filled positions such as small shopkeepers,
which often succeeded because by moving into the rice industry.86 The Chinese method
of extracting tin ore, know as the Lombong method, which started with trial boring in
search of the mineral. After a successful trial, miners dug a large hole in the ground with
tin bearing soil brought to the surface in baskets and dumped it into a water-carrying
trough. In the trough, workers, sometimes women and children, separated the tin ore
from other minerals with smelting sometimes done elsewhere. On site smelting included
alternations of mangrove wood and coal under a brazier connected to pipes which drained
away the molten metal.87 The Chinese techniques increased productivity but required
dedicated miners rather than traditional Malay part-timers, along with a substantial
amount of capital to pay for equipment and labor. The sheer numbers of workers
required for mining molded the demographics of Malaya.
Malay states possessing substantial tin deposits brought in more Chinese to
extract the tin for sale on the global market, bringing in large numbers of fairly
independent foreigners for work. In Perak, a minor chief named Long Ja’afar brought
Chinese miners to Larut to extract tin, which made him the wealthiest Malay in Perak and
expanded his political power and independence greatly. His son, Ngah Ibrahim
succeeded him in 1857 and the sultan confirmed his position a year later, along with
receiving $200,000 a year by the early 1860s in tin revenues. Ibrahim’s income
86 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 122-123.87
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192-3.
54
permitted him to own a European-style bungalow, purchase two steam-powered yachts,
and hire a Penang lawyer, along with enough power to convince the sultan to appoint him
Mantri of Perak. At one point 40,000 Chinese resided in Larut in connection with the
mining industry, to help control such a large population Ibrahim hired Penang’s
superintendant of police T. C. S. Speedy for security.88 The rapid rise of Larut and large
increase in a population without a single political authority powerful enough to keep a
peaceful society created social, economic, and political imbalances throughout the state
leading to a significant amount of violence.
Selangor also possessed an abundance of tin reserves within its lands leading to
great opportunities in trade and society for that state. Rajah Juma’at attracted miners to
extract tin in his district of Lukut, bringing in $120,000 a year in revenues with 2,000
miners. Rajah Abdullah, brother of Juma’at, received the Klang valley in place of Rajah
Mahdi. Juma’at also pushed his candidate, Rajah Abdul Samad, successfully for sultan.
In 1857, chiefs voted down a proposal for a centralized treasury and uniform tariffs to
prevent income inequality. The development of mines in Klang valley flourished while
miners exhausted the Lukut mines by 1860. Abdullah’s new mines developed at Ulu
Klang, a short distance from the river port and storage center at Kuala Lumpur. The
populations swelled to five times that of the whole of Selangor in the 1840s with two
prominent Chinese groups being Ghee Hin centered in Kanching, and Hai San around
Kuala Lumpur and Ampong. Foreign financiers also partook in the Selangor economy
with Abdullah renting tax farms to businessmen Tan Kim Cheng and W. H. M. Read.89
The indigenous chiefs refused to reform their political and economic system despite its
88 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 273-274.89
? Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 282-284.
55
obvious problems. The arrival of foreigners in Selangor in large numbers created an
imbalance in trade and society leading to problems of violence throughout the state in
time with no native force capable of controlling all the factions without significant allies
and a long war.
Chinese labor and mining techniques helped but did not fully solve the mining
problems and therefore used British help and technology to boost productivity and safety.
To prevent flooding of the mines, Resident Hugh Low of Perak introduced the steam
engine and centrifugal pump to the Chinese miners. Yap Ah Loy purchased two steam
engines for greater depth of mining and improved safety for the miners, along with
importing the techniques of hydraulic sluicing and gravel pumping from Australia.
Furthermore, techniques such as tin dredging also increased the productivity on the mines
in Malaya. Smelters developed in Singapore and Penang in 1887 and 1897 respectively
made transport much more efficient.90 The development of the tin industry created great
disparity within Malay society before the British intervention contributing to war and
piracy in the region. The relationship between Yap Ah Loy and Europeans showed a
degree of cooperation under the mantle of a centralized British authority.
Improved logistics through a centralized planning made possible by the state
made shipping more efficient during the late 19th century. The development of railroads
permitted the transport of the metals from the mines to the ports much faster and in
greater quantities than previously possible. The development of the steamship enabled
much faster transport of goods from Malaya to Great Britain, a steamship sailed from
Singapore to London in five weeks, which the Suez Canal cut even further upon its
completion in 1869. The British tin plate manufacturing that increased dramatically since
90 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 193-194.
56
the 1850s powered economic growth for the Malay Peninsula.91 The success of Chinese
miners through the adoption of European techniques helped certain factions become
extraordinarily powerful and wealthy. Development of Industrial Age infrastructure
required a centralized government system to facilitate long-distant trade of high volume
goods and coordinate protection against raiders.
2.43 Plantations: British Authorities and a Developing Economy
Rubber became a symbol for British Malaya and modernization because British
botanists brought the rubber plant to Malaya for plantation agriculture. After the Kew
Botanical Gardens collected rubber plant seedlings in 1876 twenty-two seedlings arrived
at the Singapore Botanical Garden in 1877 and eventually Hugh Low’s Residency in
Kuala Kangsar, Perak. Planting the rubber trees required substantial patience because
rubber trees required five to six years before tapping. Henry Ridley, Director of the
Gardens of Singapore, set out to convince planters to grow rubber as early as 1888. In
1896, Tan Chay Yan of Melaka agreed to plant four acres and a British coffee estate
agreed to plant five acres of rubber. By 1905 the production of rubber throughout
Malaya reached 200 tons, while Ridley improved the tapping methods to increase output
while minimizing damage to the tree. By World War I the demand for rubber
skyrocketed and production in Malaya soon followed.92 With the help of British
botanists, Malaya became an exporter of rubber throughout the global market and became
a valuable resource provider to Great Britain increasing its wealth immensely.
Foreigners introduced many new types of flora through the plantations,
particularly after the British intervention in Malaya. By 1875 palm oil arrived in
91 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 139, 194.92
? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 203-204.
57
Singapore as seeds to be planted in botanical gardens and by the 1900s planters grew it
around Kuala Lumpur. Europeans also brought the pineapple to Singapore in 1888 from
where it spread to Johor, Selangor, and Perak.93 Around 200,000 Indians migrated to
Malaya by 1913, many from South India particularly as plantation laborers. Tamils
sometimes worked on the plantations, but also worked in other positions than basic
laborers such as clerks and overseers. Sydney W. Moorhouse, a planter from Ceylon,
started a rubber growing company in 1905 and eventually grew to 16,000 of rubber trees
by 1916.94 Foreigners brought new plants to Malaya to grown for export on a scale not
seen before on the Malay Peninsula, the revenues from which helped develop a British-
Malay territory with industrial infrastructure and a significant education system.
2.5 Education: The Imperial Influences in Society
The development of a British-style education system in Malaya revealed Great
Britain’s intended societal and economic objectives. Governor Cavenagh secured funds
for schools from the British India Office in London to develop a school system without
the brutal punishments suffered in indigenous Malay religious schools. The construction
of schools before the interventions displayed how the Straits Settlements considered
public education important. The number of secular Malay schools and pupils increased
from 596 pupils in sixteen schools in 1872 to 7,218 students in 189 schools in 1892. The
Malay schools taught pupils the British Industrial Age “habits of industry, punctuality,
and obedience,” along with the basic skills necessary to be a part of an industrializing
society.95 The British-Malay education system reinforced British values in a society
93 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 205-209.94
? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 51-52.95
? Loh, The Malay States, 156, 161, 162, 167.
58
mostly alien to them in order to develop a society integrated into the British imperial
system.
The British colonialists implemented the Malay school system in part to weaken
the old Malay power structure and reinforce British authority. By 1879 British
authorities in Selangor made education mandatory to increase attendance, an idea that
Rajah Mahmud rejected by refusing to send his children or any of his people to the
government Malay schools. To enforce such dramatic changes on Malay society
administrators threatened fines and summonses to the parents of children who failed to
attend school. Frank Swettenham refused the teaching of English in Malay public
schools in Selangor, which the next acting resident discontinued. William Maxwell,
Resident of Selangor starting in 1889 offered the sons of the Malay nobility an English
education to make future leaders sympathetic to Great Britain.96 British authorities
sought to control the power of the old nobility, which basically possessed most of the
political power prior to British intervention.
The development of English-style education in Malaya helped modernize Malay
society but in a manner that protected British imperial power. According to Swettenham
prior to the introduction of the British education system, boys finished school often
became troublemakers in accordance with Malay beliefs regarding the suitable showing
of a spirit. Wealthier sons at times committed violent acts and robbery in particular.97
British authorities developed a “safe” education to prevent the application of ideas
contradictory to British imperial power. Not every aspect of education in British Malay
developed around pragmatic political goals, because British administrators possessed 96
? Loh, The Malay States, 163, 165-168.97
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 135-6.
59
some genuine humanitarian concerns by believing the utility of education had the means
to improve the lives of ordinary Malays. The education system maintained political
stability in Malaya with the old social order in place but with significantly less power,
while developing the Malayan economy.98 Swettenham summed up the transition
through describing Malay boys in 1874 as armed “with two or three weapons” but carried
books and slates by the 20th century.99 The preservation of British authority required that
the children of chiefs and rajahs keep the social statuses of their parents when they came
of age and develop the Malayan economy with British ideas to maintain social stability.
British authorities employed education to maintain their perception of order within
Malaya to keep children out of trouble such as piracy.
Conclusion
The westernization of the Malay society by British authorities maintained the
social structure while mostly eliminating the roots of forms of unrest such as piracy by
economic development. The indigenous systems of trade proved inadequate for the
demands of the industrialized world, whereas the traditional Malay society failed to
provide the labor or techniques required to meet the enormous economic demands of the
West. The development of an industrialized economy in coordination with political
reforms reduced acts of piracy in the Straits of Melaka. The development of a colonial
education system increased productivity of the common Malays while teaching the sons
of rajahs and chiefs to accept British culture and domination. The introduction of ideas
from Great Britain regarding trade and society demilitarized the once powerful Malay
chiefs and rajahs, while giving other ethnic groups economic value within Malaya. 98
? Loh, The Malay States, 169-170, 174-175.99
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 135.
60
The economy and society of Malaya made piracy a likely profession for a
significant proportion of the seafarers within the Straits of Melaka during the early
decades of the 19th century. Most people within the peninsula lived directly from the land
or sea, whether harvesting in agriculture or collecting fish from the sea. Farmers and
fishermen alike usually lived near the coast or on a river, making sea-raiding a possible
alternative during years when nature failed to provide a good harvest. In the event of a
famine, foreign trading vessels provided a stopgap measure to allow indigenous Malays
to provide food for themselves and their families at the expense of sea traders.
Furthermore the decentralized politics of Malaya meant commoners rarely received
outside help in the event of a catastrophe. Commoners rarely possessed any personal
storage for their own food by the early 19th century because chiefs and rajahs simply took
it, therefore making starvation difficult to avoid without a generous ruler to alleviate
famine. Resorting to piracy presented a risky, but plausible alternative for commoners
watching their families starve or die of diseases associated with malnutrition.
The fractious and diverse nature of society in Malaya contributed to intermittent
but intense warfare and piracy. Some ethnic groups established their own states
independent of foreign powers to an extent such as the Bugis of Selangor. Many of these
various factions posed a potential threat to peaceful commerce within the Straits of
Melaka in the event of war or some crisis, which held a strong potential for piracy
because of the multiple authorities created within each ethnic group. Various factions
often based on ethnicity, sometimes loosely, fought for their own interests, switching
sides when convenient and possessing little solid political loyalty to any single faction.
Some ethnic groups, including the orang laut specialized in maritime skills for trading
61
purposes giving them a great amount of skill in regard to seafaring, while only trading for
some months of the year. A variety of factions each with their own political goals often
composed of many of people with an expertise in seafaring as part of their culture, which
made piracy a means to achieve individual wealth or collective dominance.
The emergence of the Straits Settlements under British control and an increase of
demand of products from Malaya helped weaken native piracy but strengthened Chinese
pirates. Malays and other groups found the exploitation of land resources as profitable,
making a life at sea less attractive. The exploitation of resources including tin and
rubber, along with other products increased the wealth of many, especially certain
Europeans and Chinese who possessed interests throughout the Malay Peninsula by the
beginning of the 20th century. The wealthy merchants and financiers possessed a grave
interest in the economic development of Malaya. Their opponents included native rulers
who restricted trade or failed eventually to keep up with infrastructure development and
especially the sea-raiders who pushed up shipping costs by threatening vessels and
cargoes. Armed conflict presented the financiers with particular difficulties regarding
their investments in warzone with limited trade, which encouraged British intervention.
Economics and society played an important role regarding the sea-raiders and
their supporters, but also their opponents once the economy of Malaya shifted from the
favor of the sea raiders. The economic presence of the British colonies depressed the
power of other states in the region by attracting trade from other ports while applying
minimal protection of vessels at sea for years. Sea-raiders and pirates filled the political
vacuum of in the Malay world and attacked the most vulnerable craft and communities.
The strategically important Straits of Melaka and South China Sea needed centralized
62
authority for the flourishing of peaceful trade or at least coordination between various
authorities to prevent piracy.
63
Sampan (Figure 2)
Pearson Scott Foresman, “Sampan,” Jul, 24 2010, http://www.cliparts101.com/free_clipart/19139/sampan_ship.aspx (accessed April 10, 2011).
64
Chapter 3: Piracy and Marauding: Piratical Seafarers in Straits of Melaka and the
South China Sea
The Straits of Melaka created a maritime chokepoint between China and India,
along with a significant opportunity for traders throughout Southeast Asia. The
abundance of trade in a politically fragmented region offered many opportunities for
Malay and Chinese seafarers to engage in violence for the sake of capturing a prize
vessel. The Malay and Chinese groups used their respective political groups as cover for
their actions depending on the political circumstances. Piracy and marauding grew out of
particular social, economic, and political conditions counter to the ideal structure of an
industrialized European state. The marauders became numerous because of an
uncoordinated plurality of political authorities, ample economic targets of opportunity,
and large quantities of skilled seafarers willing to commit violent acts at sea. Piratical
behavior in the Straits of Melaka around formed out of opportunism in the absence of a
capable authority in an economic system that offered maritime merchants and fishermen
the option of being a maritime predator, too.
Piracy was not unique to any particular location along the Straits of Melaka by the
beginning of the 19th century, because pirates targeted victims sailing through the
gauntlet. The profession of the inhabitants of Singapore prior to Raffles according to
Swettenham was “probably, piracy,” citing Hiyat Abdullah, which also depicted Colonel
Farquhar disposing of the vast amount skulls under his command at Singapore. Pirates
prowled the Straits of Johor particularly from 1819 to 1840 to steal cargo and capture
men, women, and children for sale as slaves. Even when pirates misidentified warships
for peaceful traders, the pirates often fought to the death in the fury of their assault rather
65
than surrender. Swettenham admitted to the lack of sources in evaluating the effect of
piracy on commerce as he lacked the evidence to determine whether it was a nuisance or
strategic threat.100 Milton Osborne suggested a combination of pirates and fishermen
inhabited Singapore prior to 1819.101 The few inhabitants of pre-modern Singapore likely
fished for daily food, but also resorted to piracy when opportunities arose because they
possessed the necessary skills and little other economic opportunity. Regardless of the
commercial significance of piracy, the political ramifications for the perception of the
region being infested with pirates resulted in great political repercussions and changes
even to the most powerful of rulers.
3.1 Who Were the Pirates? Class and Ethnicity in Piracy
Various segments of society composed the vaunted sea-raiders of the Straits of
Melaka, coming from a variety of social structures within Malay society. The orang laut
partook in piracy after their seasonal trading expedition financed by local chiefs for
victuals in exchange for an investment return. The annual monsoon provided the wind in
the direction necessary for sailing up the Straits of Melaka to ambush trading vessels for
their cargo, along with the passengers and crew for sale as slaves.102 Seafarers conducted
regular trade until the Southeast monsoon winds in June when they conducted piracy
throughout the Straits of Melaka until October, often with the tacit support of local rulers
in return for a percentage of the profit.103 The orang laut or other groups not under any
legitimate chief in the Malay world became perompak or pirates who sailed as renegades
100 Swettenham, British Malaya, 81.101
? Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117.102
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.103
? Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963), 39-40.
66
while some orang laut became hereditary outlaws without a fixed home. At times, a
chief or rajah in economic need or a foreigner enlisted perompak to reverse their fortunes.
In economic slowdowns, piracy became worse because more rulers resorted to plunder to
make up for revenue shortfalls.104 In the waters around the Malay Peninsula, traders and
chiefs became sea-raiders during particular seasons and periods of economic distress,
which revealed piracy often not as a permanent profession but rather a temporary means
to alleviate financial problems or to supplement existing income.
Many rulers financed pirate expeditions, perpetuating piracy as a means to
supplement their jurisdictions’ labor and supply of materials.105 Sultans also supported
raids, particularly in the Sulu Archipelago the raiders from which became the most feared
raiders of the Malay world by the mid 19th century.106 In particular, the Sultan of
Terengganu likely supported piracy, while the Bendahara of Pahang likely turned a blind
eye to orang raoyat piracy according to a British commentator.107 The Johor Sultanate,
for example, enacted legitimate naval operations because of the hereditary right to
enforce their traditions. Traditionally, the sultan delegated tax collection, cargo
investigation, and intelligence gathering to his laksmana or temenggong.108 In many
cases actions by sultans possessed legitimacy because they exercised their rights as
leaders of a sovereign state to patrol their waters for recognized purposes. Chiefs also
104 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.105
? L. Mills, “British Malaya 1824-1867,” Journal of the Malayan Branch o the Royal Asiatic Society, (Oct. 1923), 216-217.106
? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88-90.107
? Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 40.108
? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 60, 69.
67
participated in maritime activities of less legitimacy by supporting piratical missions
without the overt support of the sultan or his chief ministers.
The ruling class did not monopolize marauding at sea as people of a variety of
classes became pirates to increase their incomes, often through joining less-renowned
members of the ruling class. Pirates also acted without the consent of the local ruler in
their operations, the raoyat plundered vessels without their leadership or consent of the
ruling class and often sought patronage from another ruler. The pirates sold their plunder
in ports such as Singapore and hid in other ports such as Pahang, Terengganu, and
Kelantan to evade capture by authorities.109 Orang laut became pirates or perompak
through following poorer rajahs and foreigners in their attempt to gain wealth through
raiding.110 Although less-reputable rulers raided for their own economic gain in search of
goods and scarce labor, obtaining such assets enhanced the prestige of the raiding leader.
By 1825, merchants and rulers alike participated in raiding to improve their incomes
through, in their perception, an honorable manner.111 The decentralized political
authority permitted pirates’ operations without the sultan’s support to survive so long as
the various states refused to tackle piracy in a concerted effort.
Chinese merchant vessels also partook in piracy to supplement the income of their
crews and owners. Emerging after 1840, Chinese pirates menaced the Straits of Melaka
and increased their attacks significantly by the 1860s while other pirate groups declined.
Chinese pirate vessels occasionally included Europeans to provide expertise in
armaments and serve as officers, while European crewmembers were virtually
109 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80, 83, 86.110
? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.111
? Mills, British Malaya, 216.
68
nonexistent in Malay pirate prahus.112 British officials meanwhile recognized that
suspected Chinese pirates adapted to the British legal system to avoid hanging from the
gallows. Depositions placed Chinese junks attacking other vessels, but officials hardly
made arrests lacking specific evidence against particular owner or crew while pirate
vessels outfitted in Singapore. Chinese pirates gathered arms and intelligence regarding
shipping in Singapore by exploiting loose laws and poor enforcement. Even if British
authorities accused a Chinese merchantman of piracy, the Chinese community in
Singapore defended Chinese merchants through the law with great success generally
because a lack of evidence. Therefore, Chinese pirates challenged the prosecution more
than the Malays because of their adept use of the legal system.113 The existence of
Chinese pirates in the Straits of Melaka based in Singapore revealed how virtually any
person with adequate capital or maritime experience possessed the potential to be a pirate
in the region regardless of national origin.
For the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula, nearly any person regardless of class
or ethnicity could potentially become a pirate, particularly with the necessary maritime
skills, which amounted to a significant proportion of the population because much of
Malay society relied on fishing and maritime history. Impoverished fishermen
coordinated their attacks on unsuspecting vessels and quickly disengaged upon capture of
their target vessel. Pirates also included traders, merchants, and less-fortunate noblemen
who seized their target vessels to supplement their incomes. Even the heads of state
supported raiding missions of questionable legitimacy to improve their own status.
Foreigners to Southeast Asia also conducted piracy with the assistance of Singapore as an
112 Mills, British Malaya, 223.113
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 207-08, 215-217, 224.
69
open and economically liberal port. Piracy gave any person, virtually regardless of social
status, a means to express their political authority, albeit often unrecognized by most of
society, over the crew of another vessel for economic gain.
3.2 Tools of the Trade: Vessels and Weapons of the Pirates and Sea-Raiders
Some fishermen in the Straits of Melaka also raided foreign vessels to gain a
supplemental income based on opportunism. Sampan piracy was perhaps the most
difficult form of piracy to eradicate. According to Governor Butterworth of the Straits
Settlements a flotilla of fifteen to twenty sampans, small low-draft vessels, with four to
seven crewmen fished and hunted for turtles until their prey came leeward of the
sampans. The sampans attacked the vessel with fish darts and spears normally used for
fishing and hunting to suppress the crew while stealing the cargo. If the sampans came
under attack, the vessels fled through a shoal where deep-draft vessels ran aground. After
beaching the sampans, the crew fled into the jungle with the plunder. If sampans sailed
into jungle-lined rivers or creeks, authorities had great difficulty determining their
location after they entered the waterways because of the mangroves and the forest.
Sometimes the crew of sampans used the rivers as cover upon ambushing unsuspecting
craft and then quickly retreated into the forest. Malay villages along the coast usually
possessed the sampans necessary for such piratical missions.114 Sampan pirates were
usually common fishermen supplementing their income through a highly decentralized
level of organization. Sampan piracy revealed that pirates were also common folk
searching to improve their lives at the expense of vessels and their crews. Armed with
114 Butterworth to Beadon, December 21, 1844; Congalton’s memo, December 17, 1843, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 103298, 17, 21, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 209, 210.
70
basic fishermen’s equipment, even the humblest of seafarers in the Straits of Melaka
participated in piracy during the 19th century.
The sampans lacked of firepower providing for a significant weakness regarding
their viability as a pirate vessel and making other vessels preferable for marauders. The
crews of other native pirate vessels and warships in the Malay world armed themselves
more effectively. In the early 19th century Malay prahus were maritime vessels almost as
effective their European counterparts of similar size. According to one account, eighty
seafarers operated prahus by sail and oar, permitting the vessels to sail faster than their
British counterparts in the early years of British-controlled Penang. Pirates and states
armed their prahus with guns, impressive arsenals, and towing lines for capturing prizes.
The low-draft prahus cleared shoals much easier than their European counterparts, while
possessing planking and shields for some protection against enemy fire.115 Thomas J.
Newbold gave a similar description of the war prahus as being fast particularly because
of skilled paddlers. Usually weighing eight to ten tons burthen, prahus used low-caliber
swivel guns capable of long range at the bow, center, and stern with musket shot resistant
wooden bulwarks called apilans to protect the crew in combat. The crew armed
themselves with a variety of close-combat weapons such as krises, spears, and hatchets,
but also firearms such as muskets and blunderbusses.116 Malay war prahus possessed the
speed and the equipment to pose a threat to most vessels sailing the Straits of Melaka,
save heavily-armed European ships.
115 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 112.116
? Thomas J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 37-39.
71
The largest war prahus posed a great threat to the shipping of the Straits of
Melaka and the villages along the coast. Some of the largest native pirate vessels sailing
through the Straits of Melaka were over ninety feet in length with a double-tiered set of
oars with a sharp bow and wide beam. Builders placed a gun port for a six to twenty-four
pounder usually brass gun at the bow of the vessel with numerous swivel guns elsewhere.
When needed the crews lowered or raised the mast with its large mainsail and an ensign
with great speed. The largest prahus possessed an armed crew from the ruling class
numbering fifty to eighty seafaring warriors. The large native raiding vessels in the
region possessed a hold for captured victims from the Straits of Melaka and elsewhere
often for months before sale as slaves in a far-off land.117 The large war prahus
devastated the coast of Malay lands, proving more than a match for the native seafarers
throughout the region. To successfully resist the large sea-raider vessels states required a
centralized state to coordinate a navy and fight the marauders.
Malays possessed a variety of specialized vessels each designed to complete a
specific purpose relevant to piracy. Malay seafaring communities usually possessed three
types of vessels with specific uses known as the penjajaps, kakaps, and paduakans.
Malay marauders used the penjajap prahus as a light but long vessel capable of hiding in
the mangroves creeks of Malaya. The vessel usually possessed two masts without a deck
and the only cover from the sun being an awning for the headman. Marauder crews
armed their penjajaps with swivel guns for considerable firepower against other vessels.
Malay flotillas employed patrol vessels or kakap prahus as a one mast small vessel
steered by one rudder. A crew of eight to ten skilled warriors sailed small patrol vessel to
117 Horace St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1853), 119, 120, 149.
72
gather intelligence for a larger vessel or a flotilla. The paduakan possessed a single mast
with one lateen sail and weighed twenty to fifty tons burthen that a helmsman steered by
two rudders.118 Being the largest of the three vessels, Malays sailed the paduakan for
long-distance voyages with significant cargoes. The combination of vessels gave the
marauder a variety of options for raiding with vessels capable of specialized tasks making
the seafarers of Malaya formidable and versatile.
The participation of Chinese merchant junks in piracy showed that large infusions
of capital went into pirate voyages, permitting the capture of medium-sized vessels.
Chinese pirate junks in the region displaced seventy to one hundred fifty tons, but the
largest weighed 200 tons. As for armaments, vessels possessed up to twenty-five large
guns with a crew ranging from one to two hundred seafarers. The size of the vessels and
number of the crew made them formidable opponents for most vessels.119 The Cantonese
trading junks looked exactly like the pirate junks, making distinguishing the pirate
vessels from peaceful traders nearly impossible for patrolling Royal Navy warships.120
Petty Chinese pirates, those not organized into large fleets, usually supplied from one
port, which was likely Singapore for 19th century Chinese pirates in Southeast Asia.
Particularly in expeditions with low overhead, Chinese pirates used basic fishing
implements including knives and bamboo pikes. Most attacks by Chinese pirates
depended on swift attacks with the pirate crew quickly stealing their objective and then
retreating to avoid capture, relying on chance for a prize and economic survival.121
118 St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, 183, 184.119
? Mill, British Malaya, 223.120
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 215.121
? Dian Murray, “Living and Working Condition in Chinese Pirate Communities, 1750-1850,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by
73
Chinese pirates operating around the Malay Peninsula capitalized on the laws and politics
of the Straits Settlements to survive. The pirate junks distinguished little from the
merchant vessels because the merchants and the pirates were often one in the same
alternating between trade and piracy as enterprises.
3.3 Causes of Piracy: Societal, Economic, and Political Contributions
No single aspect of Malaya and the Straits of Melaka or its history caused piracy
to thrive there during most of the 19th century, but rather a variety of factors contributed
to its development. Traditionally, historians cited the oppressive policies of the
Portuguese and Dutch overlords as being a significant cause of piracy for centuries in the
Straits of Melaka. William Dampier blamed Dutch economic policies for pushing
Malays toward piracy by 1689.122 Swettenham blamed the Portuguese and the Dutch
partially for driving the Malays to piracy, along with Anderson who placed Portuguese
and Dutch monopolistic trading policies for squeezing the Malays out of peaceful trade
and into piracy.123 Although there may be some truth to such a statement, the historians
risked over simplification through notions that Europeans for centuries gave natives no
alternatives than piracy. Piracy in the Straits of Melaka was an economic and political
action that sought to enrich or even empower the perpetrator using a long tradition of
maritime experience including military operations.
3.31 Maritime Traditions: Sea-Raiding, Trade, and Warfare
By the 19th century Malays possessed centuries of experience regarding naval
warfare and a tradition of raiding by seafarers. Traditional Malay warfare involved quick
David Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 58-59, 61.122
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.123
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 140; Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 93.
74
attacks, looting, and withdrawals while the local population and ruler retreated into the
jungle. When Portuguese Governor Albuquerque captured Melaka in 1511, the sultan
and the court retreated into the jungle when defeat appeared imminent, expecting the
Portuguese to loot the city and depart, but the Portuguese remained in Melaka.124 The
heritage of sea-raiding remained in the 19th century and played into piracy, giving
prestige to the most successful raiders such as the orang laut from Galang Island. Sultan
Husain of Johor explained to Raffles that piracy brought no disgrace to its perpetrators in
defense of the raiding tradition, which generally targeted native vessels.125 Governor Sir
Andrew Clarke of the Straits Settlements considered the entire Selangor royal family as
“thoroughbred pirates,” during the 1870s particularly in regard to the pirate activities off
their territory.126 The Malays, Bugis, and orang laut, elites considered raiding an activity
based on centuries of tradition as a means to obtain wealth and prestige. The European
belief regarding the evilness of piracy contrasted greatly with Malay concepts of wealth,
raiding, and respectability.
Hardly distinguishable at times, native merchants sometimes operated as pirates
to provide supplemental income through less-peaceful means. The Chinese merchant
vessels were not the only to alternate between peaceful trader and violent pirate. Being
opportunistic, Malay seafarers switched between piracy and peaceful trading depending
on their best interests at any given time.127 Malays and other Southeast Asians relied on
maritime trade for the basis of their economies since before colonial times. The monsoon
winds permitted vessels to sail up the Straits of Melaka for pirate raids on native vessels
124 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 89.125
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 133-134.126
? Sadka, The Protected Malay States, 48.127 Mills, British Malaya, 218.
75
for loot and slaves. Governor Fullerton of the Straits Settlements commented in 1828
that a Malay sailor could practice both peaceful trade and piracy. Trade competition
became more difficult by the 19th century particularly with the increased presence of
foreign trade and the introduction of steam-powered vessels.128 In the face of increased
competition, native merchants potentially sought alternative means such as piracy to earn
a living. The annual monsoon brought a wind that permitted sea-raiders to sail into the
Straits of Melaka, but the change in winds meant an end to the season and the resumption
of regular trade. Pirates raided in one season and traded peacefully in the next, revealing
that the same merchant vessels and crew engaged peaceful trade, but in also in violent
raids.
3.32 Pirates and Authority: Raiding as a Power Grab
The Malay political states system relied on piratical raids as an expression of
power for rulers and those seeking political power. Political figures used piracy as a
means to gain authority over people.129 One example of leaders using pirates for
conventional war was the 1869 siege of Klang already mentioned, but besides the
Sumatran miners under Dato Dagang joining Tengku Kudin, Ilanun pirates from Riau
also joined the surprise assault on forts surrounding Klang.130 Piracy became a means for
princes and petty nobles to gain power, the anak rajah, literally “child king,” pirates
thrived particularly with a decentralization of authority. Anak rajah piracy became
particularly prevalent during succession disputes, such as Kedah and Siak, while Riau
failed to control its anak rajah particularly after 1784. By the late 18th century many
128
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134-136.129
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 11,130
? Charles D. Cowan, Nineteenth- Century Malaya, 72, 73.
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Malay states experienced succession disputes including Negri Sembilan and Perak.131
The decentralization of Malay states contributed greatly to the increase of sea-raiding
during the 18th and 19th centuries particularly with succession disputes, along with the
royalty and nobility fighting for more power and wealth through piracy. According to the
British perception, pirates challenged centralized authority directly, which required a
response to protect the colonial trade system that was less effective with a variety of
chiefs vying for power.
Sea-raiders came into the service of the sultans or other recognized rulers to
reinforce their authority, making them an extension of the state prior to the increased
influence of Great Britain. The Johor Sultanate employed roughly a third of orang laut to
protect their traders, while harassing the shipping of other states.132 The orang laut
constituted a significant proportion of the temenggong’s power-base by patrolling the
coast of Johor and contributing flotillas of ten to twenty prahus each with a crew and a
nakhoda, master of the vessel, in times of war.133 By the early 19th century sultans no
longer possessed the power to defend against piracy and therefore used permission to raid
as a payment to their supporters.134 The patronage of the orang laut not only increased
the power and prestige of Johor, but also bought off a large segment of the otherwise
dangerous seafarers from damaging Johor’s interests. The failure to limit the sea-raiders’
power brought devastation to the lands and merchant fleets of Johor, severely limiting the
ability of the state to function.
131 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 113.132
? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 89.133
? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59.134
? Mills, British Malaya, 218.
77
Piratical power limited the authority of the rulers of Johor by defying their
authority and wrecking the Johor economy. By 1784, Johor’s population suffered
gravely from the piratical raids leaving entire areas bare of populations particularly in the
west coast of Johor. In 1824, maritime peoples numbered between 6,000 and 10,000
within the temenggong’s jurisdiction, many of whom took advantage of the power
vacuum with Temenggong Daing Ibrahim rise to his father’s old position in 1826 at the
age of fifteen, which contributed to ten years of rampant piracy. Not all chiefs
recognized the legitimacy of Ibrahim’s authority or even that of the Sultan Husain of
Johor and rather split into factions claiming loyalty to the Sultan of Lingga instead.135
The early 19th century Malay chiefs used sea-raiding to achieve political power and
prestige as part of the state system. Europeans regarded private warfare between factions
for greater authority as piracy.136 Native chiefs, nobles, and members of royal families
used piratical behavior and sea-raiding as their chief expression of political power with
raiding more common in years of political upheaval. Raiding and piracy worked within
the Malay state system that placed authority within decentralized chiefs, whom raiding
often supported.
3.4 Raiding Economy: Economic Causes for Piracy and It Results
Seafarers used piracy and sea-raiding ultimately for economic survival or gaining
more political prestige. Economic hardship forced Malays to find alternative means to
survive making piracy a tempting alternative to starvation. A murrain killed most
buffaloes in Selangor, making rice cultivation extraordinarily difficult and forced people
to either starve or survive as pirates during the early years of Sultan Abdul Samad’s
135 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59, 71, 76.136
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.
78
reign.137 Economic hardship contributed to piracy with people left with little alternative
for survival, economic hardship was hardly unique to the Malay Peninsula during the 19th
century. David Starkey provided an economic framework for understanding piracy in
general and J. L. Anderson wrote an analysis regarding types of Malay piracy.
Starkey’s market approach, though intended for the Atlantic economy, revealed
the pirates and sea-raiders’ economic reasons for risking their lives for the chance of
capturing vessels at sea. The supply perspective regarded land, capital, and labor for the
basis of overall productivity of the pirate, while the demand perspective offered the pirate
compensation for his services often for a “good” otherwise difficult to obtain. Pirates
needed land to construct, maintain, and beach or dock their vessels, along with adequate
amounts of capital such as vessels, victuals, and arms required for capturing other
vessels. For an enterprise a nakhoda or anak rajah required a crew capable of rowing,
sailing, and fighting, which required plenty of manpower.138 The Malay pirates were also
enterprising businessmen who usually pirated native trading vessels rather than large
well-armed European merchantmen for a share of the cargo and slaves.139 Therefore,
Malay pirates possessed similarities with their European pirate counterparts an ocean
away because the market framework applied to Southeast Asian piracy, too.
Pirates needed adequate land, capital, and labor, along with a demand for their
services for successful enterprises. Raiders and pirates possessed no lack of land to hide,
the numerous estuaries, river, and other hiding spots on the Malay Peninsula offered
plenty of foliage for cover. With centuries, if not millennia of maritime experience native
137 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 42.138
? David Starkey, class lecture notes, Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic Economy, c. 1560-1856, 2007.139
? Mills, British Malaya, 214.
79
seafarers were extraordinarily skilled, while the archipelago possessed plentiful amounts
of vessels for transport. Maritime vessels were not a luxury but a necessity for large
proportions of the coastal populations reliant on fishing and trade. Prior to the British
intervention in Malaya, Malay men carried weapons around all the time, usually arming
themselves with daggers, spears, a gun, and a sword. The most prized Malay weapon
was a kris, a type of sword, which a Malay man took with him wherever he went.140 Such
accounts showed that heavy weaponry, but also basic fishing equipment was easily
available as a form of capital. The amount of skilled labor for seafaring was a likely
substantial part of the overall labor market, but the amount of available labor varied. In
instances of natural disaster, piracy flourished because labor from farming and petty trade
needed work in other professions. Warfare forced labor away from peaceful tasks
because trading became difficult, if not impossible, especially with prohibitions or
blockades against it. The demands for labor increased in regard to seafarers to enact
blockades or raids on the enemy during periods of conflict. Chiefs possibly considered
followers of rulers with questionable legitimacy as pirates.
A high degree of demand for piracy as a service revolved around the demand for
slave labor and additional revenue particularly in times of war. The early 19th century
witnessed an increased demand for labor so rulers resorted to enslavement because of the
scarcity of labor. The Sulu Sultanate encouraged slave-raiding by the Iranun and
Balaging sea-raiders during the 19th century, making them the most feared raiders in the
Malay world.141 Malay chiefs often taxed the profits of the pirates operating from their
territory142 and therefore possessed little reason to counter it. During times of war, rajahs 140 Swettenham, British Malaya, 146.141 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88.142
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 26.
80
encouraged plundering for taxation to fund their own war efforts, which needed more
revenue than in peacetime to pay for additional costs. The decentralized political system
of the pre-colonial Malaya led by chiefs seeking power and prestige pushed the peninsula
into intermittent conflict, which increased piracy. The demand for goods and the
weakness of the state resulted in piratical behavior of astonishing proportions, including a
naval blockade of Pahang by pirates costing traders $200,000.143 The pirates’ ability to
operate tied with the weakness of the state and the demand for revenue by local chiefs or
the demand for slaves by foreign ones.
J. L. Anderson described three types of piracy within the Malay context of 1750
to 1850, parasitic, episodic, and intrinsic in an attempt to understand the costs of piracy to
an economy. Parasitic piracy grew off the trade, particularly off European expansionist
trade but usually indirectly as function of trade. The parasitic piracy redirected trade and
increased costs for merchants who needed more protection against raiders for more
weapons, making trade less efficient. Another type of piracy included episodic piracy
when seafarers resorted to raiding as opportunism when other seagoing activities failed to
support them.144 Anderson defined intrinsic piracy as raiding was intrinsic to the
functioning of the native states because piracy provided the necessary revenue for the
running of the state because little other ways to tax. The revenue contributed to the
economic productivity, political power, and prestige for the state and its leaders.
Anderson concluded that piracy increased costs for overall production, causing market
prices to increase and taking money out of the economy, along with threatening maritime
trade with annihilation.145 The underlining factor in Anderson’s analysis remained the 143
? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 95.144 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88-89.145
81
tendency to toward warfare and sea-raiding, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as a
means for seafaring people of Malaya to survive regardless of the cost to the maritime
trader.
Conclusion
The seafaring Malays used raiding at sea for economic, social, and political gains
from the ranks of petty fishermen to the most powerful sultans, which increased during
political decentralization, wartime, and other calamities. The geography of the Malay
Peninsula and its surrounding seas provided cover for raiders with plenty of hiding places
from even the most powerful of enemies, including the Royal Navy. Sultans and chiefs
deployed sea-raiders as political patrons who patrolled the local trade routes in exchange
for goods. The difference between a legitimate sea-raider and a perompak or pirate was
not always clear because of the constant ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of the
supporting chief. Malays distinguished between illicit actions at sea and the practice of
recognized authority, but difficulty with such distinctions coincided with an overall
decentralized political authority. Times of openly and violent questioning of authority
witnessed an increase of piracy and raiding. British authorities needed a native partner to
negotiate and acquiesce when necessary, whereas piracy inherently created a plurality of
authority and hampered trade by increasing costs for merchants. Piracy represented the
prime naval challenger to British naval authority and inhibited trade necessary for the
Straits Settlements to be profitable.
? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 89-90, 92-94.
82
Chapter 4: Breaking the Sea-Raiders: The Establishment of British Authority in
Malaya through the Destruction of the Sea-Raiders’ Power
The implementation of anti-piracy policies by Great Britain arose with the
contradictory interests of pirates and the British Empire. Pirates created much trouble for
the East India Company by depriving their settlements of trade income requiring counter-
piracy efforts by British forces. The Royal Navy and private navies implemented
strategies to weaken the impact of the pirates, including patrolling sea lanes and
destroying pirate bases. British authorities also implemented technological advantages
and developed infrastructure to weaken pirates and other opponents of Great Britain. The
technological advancements permitted faster communications and transport resulting in
rapid responses to armed opposition. The Straits Settlements employed a judiciary to
process suspected pirates and pressured native states to prosecute those accused of piracy.
The variety of strategies employed by British authorities took their toll on the sea-raiders
making the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea safer from pirates over the course
of decades.
Raiding as a form of political power consolidated the dominance of particular
rulers in Southeast Asian through systems of political patronage that held up the remnants
of the traditional Malay political system during the early 19th century. British authorities
conceived of sea-raiding as a form of piracy regardless of the legitimacy of the action in
Malay eyes and sought its suppression to replicate their own worldview of trade and the
state in Southeast Asia. By the 19th century inability of the Malay trading system to
produce enough raw materials to meet the industrial demand of Europe and America
became apparent, requiring large changes to the political system dominated by the raiding
83
policies of local chiefs. Malays failed to extract enough tin to meet foreign export
demands leading to the introduction of Chinese laborers and techniques. The destruction
of raiding as an important Southeast Asian institution became vital to British authorities
to protect their settlements and the trade necessary for their survival. Eventually
economic prosperity and military force secured the settlements. The further destruction
of the institution of raiding became necessary for the strengthening of British dominance
and the further integration of the Malay Peninsula into the West-led global economic
system. Sea-raiders increased costs for all producers, created greater uncertainty in
marketplaces, and challenged British authority. To break the power of the sea-raiders,
British authorities developed a strategy involving military force, foreign political
pressure, imposition of a judiciary, and eventually domination of Malay territory.
4.1 Consequences of Piracy: The Effects of Pirate Raids on the British
Settlements of Balambangan and Penang
The effectiveness of raids in Southeast Asia posed a threat to the existence of the
European colonies with renewed British interest in the region by the 18th century. The
English East India Company expanded its role in Southeast Asia, receiving the island of
Balambangan off northern Borneo from the Sultan of Sulu in 1762 and finally inhabited
the settlement in 1773. Sailing to Dutch ports became expensive with heavy tolls on
company vessels in the China trade. Balambangan offered a potential port-of-call for a
route to China used in 1757-8 by Commodore Wilson. Pirates raided the colony within
two years, destroying it as a useful port.146 The destruction of Balambangan showed that
piracy posed a threat to British colonies, requiring military protection for future
settlements, regardless of the land grants by local sultans. Pirate raids represented a
146 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 73-74.
84
strategic threat to British interests in the region, reducing the amount of commerce
through looting and raiding, which presented British authorities with policy difficulties
for decades.
Penang also suffered from piracy although it survived through a higher trade
volume and by adopting policies that made business more difficult for pirates. Pirates
usually attacked smaller vessels near Penang, seizing them in significant numbers. The
evening proved a particularly difficult time for seafarers to conduct business at sea
because the cover of darkness provided pirates with the opportunity to plunder. Pirates
kidnapped seafarers anchored within Georgetown’s jetty and captured some within one
hundred yards of the shore at night, selling them into slavery elsewhere. Pirates usually
operated close by from various islands or from the Prye River as staging points for raids
on Penang. The purchase of mainland territory in 1800 denied the operating space for
pirates to operate and provided the inhabitants of Georgetown with a closer food supply.
The land became known as Province Wellesley, which after 1821 Malay refugees fleeing
Siamese military might populated the province significantly.147 The purchase of more
territory represented the willingness of the Honorable Company to deal with piracy
through the purchase of more territory. Controlling land on the Malay Peninsula
provided an effective means to control the levels of piracy in the surrounding seas.
4.2 Naval Strategies: Attempts to Eliminate Piracy by the Royal Navy
The most obvious response to repel seaborne raiders was the deployment of
warships to the East Indies to engage and destroy suspected pirates, because armed force
was the only way to protect property and lives directly from armed raiders. The support
of warships in the region cost British taxpayers and the East India Company a significant
147 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 84-85.
85
amount of funds, making the deployment of sufficient warships a challenge. The
destruction of Malay war prahus or Malay sailing vessels required the presence of strong
European naval forces armed well enough to combat experienced Malay seafarers.
British officials ordered the engagement of sea-raiders fully aware of the complicity of
local rulers in their safe harbor if not outright support. British policy sought the
protection of peaceful trade and British interests, permitting the Straits Settlements to
thrive and grow.
The deployment of naval forces meant an armed conflict between British forces
and sea-raiders often of unclear political loyalties. Governor Bonham noted that with the
death of Sultan Husain in 1835, various chiefs supported the Sultan of Lingga placing
unfriendly marauders in a potentially threatening position south of Singapore in places
such as Galang. Bonham viewed the “pirates” switch of allegiances from the houses of
his allies to Lingga as a need “to place the inhabitants under the restraint of some chiefs
who can be made responsible for their behaviour.”148 The Straits Settlements Governor
wanted the elimination of marauding as part of breaking the power of the various chiefs
in the region by placing them under authorities friendly to the East India Company. The
raiders posed a threat to the commerce of Singapore with their bases so close to the port,
which required British naval forces to weaken their power for the safety of commerce.
4.21 Counter-Piracy Naval Operations and the War on Piracy
British forces launched military operations against the suspected pirates despite
the questionable legal right to do so without the full consent of the Dutch administrators.
Captain Chads of Andromache a British 28-gun frigate sailed into the Straits of Melaka to
148 Bonham to Murchison, June 4, 1836, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 69433, 53, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80.
86
find and destroy suspected pirates. Andromache and a few gunboats successfully
destroyed five prahus that attacked them in June 1836, freeing some captive Vietnamese
seafarers in the process.149 Chads deemed Galang the largest pirate center in the region
and sought a victory with the destruction of its harbor because he believed all its
inhabitants participated to the pirate trade somehow. Despite the Dutch refusal to
participate, Chads and the flotilla of British vessels attacked Galang anyway, destroying
three villages, fourteen large prahus, thirty to forty smaller prahus, and numerous smaller
vessels. During the raid, an officer and his crew of a gunboat recognized the prahus that
earlier burned an English brig after stealing her cargo. The action saw two British
seamen wounded and a few Malays dead, but most suspected pirates and villagers
managed to escape the attack. The British flotilla rescued a Vietnamese junk and crew,
saving the Vietnamese from certain slavery.150 The British raid weakened the suspected
pirates by destroying their vessels, but also limited their ability to trade peacefully and
fish. British naval actions such as the raid on Galang made living as a seafarer much
more difficult than prior to the stepped-up military presence.
British authorities implemented a variety of strategies to eliminate suspected
pirates, along with establishing naval dominance and protect less-threatening traders.
Between 1825 and 1850 authorities rewarded Royal Navy and East India Company
warships crews for killed or captured pirates. In a few years during the 1840s, British
warships received ₤42,000 for the killing and capturing of suspected pirates.
Unfortunately for the seafarers of the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea, the
crews of the warships proved overly effective and likely destroyed peaceful traders along
149 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 81, 83, 244.150
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 84.
87
with pirates in the region. A Singapore newspaper proclaimed that native shipping
declined because of the naval operations that destroyed vessels indiscriminately. An
orang laut seafarer lamented the destruction of his vessel in Tuhfat al-Nafis at the hands
of a British warship.151 British strategies eliminated many of the native prahus, whether
peaceful traders or violent raiders, effectively wresting agency at sea from traditional
seafarers. Though brutal and probably unfair, the strategy of ransoming suspected pirates
reduced piracy in the region, but also decreased trade in Singapore as a side-effect.
4.22 The Royal Navy and the Chinese Pirates of Malaya
The Chinese in Malaya grew to a large population, which also contributed to
piracy in the region, resulting in retaliation by British forces against hostile Chinese
forces and their Malay allies. The Chinese population of Malaya resorted to piracy and
spared no nationality or ethnicity as its target. Perhaps the most famous instance of
Chinese piracy in the straits prompted a significant response by British forces. Kim Seng
Cheong with a cargo of piece goods and foodstuffs departed Penang on June 14, 1871
and disappeared prompting an owner Ong Hong Buan to sail for Singapore with a letter
from Lieutenant-Governor Arthur Birch regarding the owner’s plight. En route to
Singapore onboard the steamer Historian, Ong Hong Buan spotted a vessel remarkably
similar to Kim Seng Cheong and believing that the vessel was his, complained to Colonel
Anson in Singapore that pirates stole his vessel. Anson dispatched Pluto, a government
steamer, to search for the missing junk with a police detachment on board. The
detachment spotted the missing vessel in the Selangor River on June 28 and confirmed
the identity of the vessel through inscriptions reading “Kim Seng Cheong,” along with
151 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.
88
finding the captured helmsman.152 Pirates slaughtered much of the crew, along with
passengers totaling thirty-four people after sneaking aboard as passengers. The junk was
worth around $1,500, while the cargo was worth $7,000, so finding the cargo was also
important.153 The police detachment remarkably found the stolen vessel but investigated
further without fully comprehending what they stepped into. Suppressing piracy proved
too important for the British policemen because the severity of the crime warranted
justice regardless of whom they antagonized, but the consequences of their actions
caused more difficulties.
The following actions by the Straits Settlements and Royal Navy revealed the
depths of their determination to destroy pirates’ hiding places without fully understanding
its consequences. Although Rajah Musa, the son of the sultan, assisted Captain
Bradberry of Pluto and Inspector George Cox of the police detachment to recover the
stolen goods, Syed Mashor and Rajah Mahmud opposed the British detachment. Forced
to swim to Pluto the landing party received further humiliation at the guns of a stockade
but suffered no casualties.154 The Britons learned the difficult way that Rajah Mahdi
controlled Kuala Selangor, but arrested nine Chinese suspected pirates and retrieved part
of the cargo.155 The British detachment achieved much of their mission, but decided that
capturing the suspected pirates, the cargo, and the missing vessel was not enough.
For the British authorities to demand that the port no longer harbor pirates
became important enough to risk military action against native rulers. An attempt to
152 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 85-86.153
? Parkinson, British Intervention, 48.154
? Parkinson, British Intervention, 48-50.155
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-87.
89
negotiate with the local rulers failed, resulting in a firefight that killed one Briton. On
July 4, HMS Rinaldo opened fire upon the Selangor forts in retaliation, steamed past the
fort, and eventually silenced the native guns. The engagement cost one British seaman
his life because of heatstroke during the engagement. The 19th Madras Native Infantry
from Penang landed to disabled the guns and destroyed much of the town for the sake of
denying safe haven to pirates.156 British forces essentially went to war for the sake of
defeating piracy, along with directly challenging the de facto native ruler to achieve this
purpose. But the destruction at Kuala Selangor in the name of suppressing piracy was
only the beginning of an increased role of British authorities within native Malay politics.
The possibility that the Selangor Civil War encouraged piracy by forcing local
rulers to grant safe have to pirates for funding their war chests disturbed the British
authorities enough to apply direct pressure to local rulers to isolate unfriendly chiefs.
Colonel Anson ordered Colonial Secretary Wilfred Birch and Auditor General C. J.
Irving to Langat to speak with Sultan Abdul Samad and delivered his letter regarding
piracy. Anson demanded the surrender of pirates, along with Rajah Mahdi and Rajah
Mahmud, but also the promise never to harbor pirates again. Birch also demanded the
reappointment of Tengku Kudin, which Anson did not request. The guns of HMS Teazer
pressured Sultan Abdul Samad to favor British demands, which were against the policies
of London. Anson and Birch made their own policy decisions regarding Selangor and
neglected to consult Sultan Abdul Samad before the actual bombardment.157 Straits
Settlement officials employed gunboat diplomacy to fight piracy and their alleged
156 Parkinson, British Intervention, 50-52.157
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 87-92.
90
supporters among the chiefs. British imperialism initially attacked suspected pirates and
their alleged safe haven as part of an attempt to increase British influence in Malaya.
Further piratical actions within the Straits of Melaka increased Great Britain’s
presence within Malay and Chinese politics. Unlike with the ‘Selangor Incident’ in 1871,
the Chinese of Larut required no safe harbor with local Malay rulers because their power
was overt as the local rulers failed to dislodge them. The strategy employed by both
sides during the Larut war focused on cutting off enemy trade through stockades and
blockades to weaken them. In one instance, Ghee Hin junks fired upon Fair Malacca,
hitting her thirty-five times, reports of which convinced Governor Ord to dispatch
gunboats to the coast of Perak.158 Pirates plundered vessels of all nationalities almost
daily, while British gunboats patrolled the coast of Perak but possessed too heavy a draft
to navigate the shallow waters, resulting in a miserable campaign with brutal heat and
heavy rains. Pirates easily escaped through mazes of mangroves or hid in seemingly
peaceful villages and even plundered vessels within sight of British crews, often waiting
until darkness to attack.159 In one particular instance in 1873, pirates slaughtered the
crews of two Penang junks within view of HMS Avon and even managed to escape.
Governor Clarke realized that he needed more naval forces to fight the sea-raiders, but
even Colonel Anson opposed direct intervention within Perak.160 Piracy proved itself as a
formidable extension of Ghee Hin power that British forces found difficult to eliminate.
Breaking the power of the Ghee Hin pirates would restore the peaceful traders to sail
safely through the Straits of Melaka.
158 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 113-118.159
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 125, 126.160
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 179.
91
The destruction of the stockades guarding the Larut River proved most difficult,
but was important for the destruction of the Ghee Hin’s power in Malaya. The boats of
HMS Midge came under fire from Ghee Hin pirates in the Larut River’s estuary, resulting
in a battle that injured half the boats’ crews while wounding two officers seriously
without the capture of any pirate vessels. The British gunboats successfully destroyed the
stockade and multiple junks. In response, the Ghee Hin faction assaulted various British
police stations and destroyed the mantri’s house during the night.161 Even during the
1870s, pirates proved themselves worth adversaries of the Royal Navy through clever use
of the surrounding waters. The power that secret societies possessed came under attack
directly through naval actions because of their threat to peaceful trade and British power.
The nature of piracy and raiding made naval force a limited solution to the
political challenges for British authorities. The destruction of Malay vessels during the
attack on Galang symbolized the fate for many of the orang laut forced from their
maritime traditions in the name of counter-piracy. The reduction of piracy by force and
the increased competition from Chinese, Indian, European, and Arab traders placed the
native traders in decline. Changes in technology made native seafarers less competitive
against the steamships that traveled against the wind with remarkable speed. The orang
laut witnessed the decline of their role in the maritime world during the 19th century,
which forced changes in their way-of-life perhaps previously unimaginable.162 Naval
power was the most overt form of counter-piracy used by the British Empire and the
destruction wrought by the Royal Navy and the East India Company was only one part of
161 Swettenham, British Malaya, 126.162
? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135-136.
92
an imperial system bent on destroying sea-raiding and bases of power unfriendly to
British interests.
4.3 Imperial Technology: Industrial Age Equipment and Policy
British administrators brought in new technology to the Malay Peninsula to
increase their power in the region, because industrial technology brought key advantages
to British forces over Malay and Chinese forces. By 1837, steamships provided
firepower in an effective manner that previous more traditional warships failed to
accomplish. Previously, pirates attacked trading vessels within sight of the British
warships without recourse. Steam-powered vessels attacked and destroyed raider
strongholds throughout the Malay world, proving more effective than a number of wind-
powered sloops-of-war despite often being relatively small.163 Steam launches in
particular supported the British colonial effort in the Straits Settlements, providing
valuable services including transportation for various purposes. The steam launches
proved themselves as multipurpose vessels for supplying lighthouses, maintaining
beacons, and surveying bodies of water for the purpose of maintaining a British
presence.164 Steam-powered vessels gave British naval forces a huge advantage over
native prahus, permitting warships to sail against the wind without an entire deck of
oarsmen who constantly needed water and food. Steam-power also provided services for
civil functions necessary for the maintenance of the state and commerce.
Improvements in communications technology permitted imperial authorities to
suppress unwanted activities. Before the advent of the telegraph, Singapore and Penang
communicated via maritime vessels that took some time to deliver and varied with sea
163 Mills, “British Malaya,” 225-226.164
? Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 59.
93
and weather conditions. The development of the telegraph system between Singapore
and Penang in 1870 and its connection Madras a year later certainly made
communication much faster than before. Wireless communication in the 20th century
made tracking piratical actions and other illicit activities easier.165 The rapid mobilization
of British forces from India to Malaya in less than one month permitted the quick
destruction of native forces during the Perak War.166 British forces displayed the
effectiveness of communication and steam transportation technologies with the quick
deployment of military might, which would not have been possible without the new
technologies.
Navigation equipment potentially disrupted piracy by allowing authorities to
better see into the darkness and enforce laws. Aside from guiding vessels through the
Straits of Melaka safely during the night, lighthouses provided a means for the authorities
to look out for piracy and smuggling. Other navigational equipment such as buoys and
beacons illuminated the straits as tools for both navigation and state control.
Watchtowers along the coast provided the colonial authorities with a means to observe
vessels and report misbehavior.167 The navigational tools provided Great Britain with
additional power at sea by permitting foreign traders to safely navigate treacherous
waters without fully knowing the straits. Away from the main ports and their garrisons,
lighthouses were static and vulnerable to assault, but their presences at strategically
important locations were prominent reminders to people of Great Britain’s power. The
lighthouses in particular acted as symbols of the British presence, permitting the
165 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 78-80.166
? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 68.167
? Tagliacozzo, , Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 82-84.
94
enforcement of British laws and a degree of control by illuminating the darkness used for
hiding actions deemed illicit by British authorities.
4.4 British and Selangor Judicial Machinery: The Courts and the
‘Suppression of Piracy’ through Legal Processes
The British legal system prevented the unjust detainment of individuals suspected
of committing crimes and therefore government officials did not possess the right to
arbitrarily arrest people or detain property. The legal system processed suspects based on
the merits of each case rather than on mere accusation in theory, but the legal system of
the Straits Settlements initially made trials for suspected pirates difficult. Lawmakers
and politicians reformed the local judicial system to better process and convict suspected
pirates to reduce the overall crime within and around the colony. The British legal
system showed that the state took serious offense to piratical actions as an extension of
the British Empire. The lines between judicial and political were not always clear in
cases of piracy because politicians used the judicial system to weaken their political
opponents and convince native Malays, particularly rulers that they best side with the
British authorities in disputes. Politically slanted policies weakened the impartiality of
the legal systems in Malaya but weakened the bonds between political rulers and
marauders.
British authorities sided with politicians deemed friendliest to their goals in
Malaya rather than creating a justice system that prosecuted any individual suspected of
harboring pirates. Throughout the Selangor Civil War both factions participated in
piratical acts including the forces of Tengku Kudin, who ultimately won the war with
military assistance from neighboring Pahang.168 British authorities did not side with
168 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 57, 71.
95
Kudin because he was innocent of supporting pirates, but rather because he was friendlier
to British interest and needed outside support to hold his gains in Selangor. The Straits
Settlements administrators were pragmatic in their war against piracy because finding
pirates and limiting their impact required the assistance of native leaders. Suppressing
piracy within the principles of equality in any justice system was simply unrealistic
because pirates hid throughout the west coast of Malaya often with the support of native
rulers. The Straits Settlements required the support of the local states to weaken the
impact of the marauders, while the implementation of a judiciary became a tool to deter
piracy.
The inadequacies of the Straits Settlements judicial system for admiralty cases
particularly in cases of piracy made enforcement of admiralty laws difficult to prosecute.
The merchants of Singapore throughout 1835 petitioned the Indian government and
Parliament to deal with the suspected pirates. Although piracy affected European
shipping substantially less than the devastated native shipping, Singapore needed the
native traders to an extent for its prosperity. Singaporean petitioners with the support of
Governor Bonham of the Straits Settlements requested the permission of the local courts
to prosecute suspected pirates. The older system required the authorities to ship the
suspected pirates and the witnesses to Kolkata for an Admiralty trial, which too often was
beyond the capacity of the local governments. Even if the suspected pirates arrived in
court across the Bay of Bengal, the prosecution had difficulty receiving convictions with
a lack of evidence because many of the witnesses refused to travel such a long distance to
court. The Straits Settlements finally received its own Admiralty courts through act of
Parliament in 1837.169 The presence of an effective judiciary permitted greater
169 Mills, “British Malaya,” 231-232.
96
prosecution by the government of suspected pirates, making conviction rates higher
because more witnesses spoke in court. Admiralty jurisdiction brought more seafarers
effectively under British legal influence after 1837 for the Straits Settlements because
trials became much easier for the prosecution. Witnesses to piracy in the Straits of
Melaka and the South China Sea found traveling to Straits Settlements courts much easier
than sailing to Kolkata to testify, which made convictions much easier.
4.41 The Straits Settlements Legal System and Piracy
British authorities in the Straits Settlements wrote laws that made it more difficult
to conduct piratical operations, particularly aimed at suspected Chinese pirates using
Singapore as their homeport but local officials had great difficulty in receiving
permission to enact rather draconian laws. As already mentioned, the Chinese
community adeptly defended themselves against accusations of piracy despite reports of
Chinese junks illegally seizing other vessels. Reports of Chinese piracy up and down the
coast persuaded Governor Blundell of the Straits Settlements to pursue a more aggressive
policy against them. Blundell wanted more authority from the Indian government in
regard to the search and seizure of suspected pirates at sea, but his requests were
unacceptable because its enforcement would breach international law. The governor
permitted government officials to board vessels and detain suspected pirate vessels for six
months without evidence of piracy in 1854. Though the orders gave much power to
officials within the harbor, Blundell wanted even more power to defeat the pirates at
sea.170 The effort to weaken and destroy pirates in the Straits of Melaka and the South
China Sea required stronger legal measures by various governments. The Straits
170 Edmonstone to Blundell, February 28, 1856, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 189619, 48, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225.
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Settlements government possessed a large number or restrictions on its aims to eliminate
piracy because of constraints set by the Indian government and international law.
The Straits Settlements required stronger anti-piracy laws to scale down the native
and Chinese piratical acts to strengthen the British presence while building their vision of
commerce in the region. In 1856 officials discovered four Chinese junks heavily armed
for combat, giving reason for temporary detention. British officials dismounted the guns
of the vessels, leaving five or six guns mounted for defensive purposes while placing the
excessive dismounted guns below decks. The British officials released the four junks to
go about their business without meeting legal or physical opposition from the owners for
the temporary seizure of questionable legality.171 The laws permitting the detention of
excessively armed merchant vessels passed in May 1857, but British lawmakers
minimized the legal hassles to merchants to avoid risking loss of trade in Singapore to
other ports in the region.172 The laws in Singapore made obtaining excessive amounts of
arms more difficult while maintaining liberal economic policies to keep Singapore
competitive as the major shipping hub in the region. The merchant community of
Singapore showed willingness to accept anti-piracy laws to an extent that did not severely
interfere with regular business, making a political alliance more feasible between British
officials in Singapore and the merchant community composed of Europeans and Chinese.
British laws targeted the pirates’ support in British-held Singapore as part of a
strategy to break marauders away from their political and economic support. Police
enforced laws to weaken the power of the Chinese secret societies and piratical
171
? Blundell to Secretary, May 27, 1856, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 189619, 50, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-226.172
? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-228.
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marauders. The “Ordinance for the Suppression of Piracy 1866” permitted greater
punishments for the suppliers of pirates and for the purchasers of goods stolen by pirates.
The ordinance increased the cost of victuals for pirates while selling pirated loot became
more difficult.173 Singapore’s police stations existed along the coasts initially and spread
later to the island’s interior to enforce laws particularly regarding pirates and secret
societies. Eventually British authorities placed hundreds of streetlamps by the docks to
assist police prevent illegal actions there.174 Authorities in the Straits Settlements focused
on the elimination of support of pirates to break their power and convince them to work
within the sphere of British legality. The development of ordinances and infrastructure
increased the challenges for pirates convincing a significant number to cease piratical acts
revealing the increasing strength of British authorities.
4.42 The Prosecution of Piracy within the Native States
Piracy occurring outside of British jurisdiction presented legal problems for its
administrators who possessed no right to prosecute suspected perpetrators. In November
1873, pirates seized a Chinese vessel from Melaka off the Jurga River near the sultan’s
residence in Kuala Langat, Selangor. Piracy became such a problem that crews found
supplying the North Sands lightship difficult.175 Other attacks included the seizure of
vessel on December 3, 1873 and an assault on the Cape Rachado Lighthouse in January
1874. Governor Sir Andrew Clarke headed to Kuala Langat with six Royal Navy
warships as support to demand justice for the recent piratical attacks.176 The raids
emanated from the domain of Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor, who previously agreed
173 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 102.174
? Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 62-64.175
? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-190.176 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 288, 304.
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not to harbor pirates. Clarke wished the imposition of British ideals of the era regarding
piracy by cutting the ties between the state and the sea-raiders. British administrators
pressured sovereign states to prosecute suspects within their own legal system despite the
dubious credibility of native trials.
The piracy trials at Kuala Langat in 1874 symbolized the imposition of British
power over the sultan came through an attempt of bringing suspected pirates to justice.
Aside from the overwhelming firepower from warships bearing down upon the sultan, the
threat to his power became particularly obvious because the most important prosecutor.
People generally believed that the sultan’s son organized the raid while receiving the
protection of the sultan and who responded when learning of the accusation that his son
was a pirate by calling the actions “boys’ play.” The China Squadron under Sir Charles
Shadwell took Clarke to Kuala Langat and also picked up Tengku Kudin for the trial.
The sultan agreed to Clarke’s demands that the suspects be tried with Kudin and three
other chiefs as prosecutors, along with the destruction of various stockades along the
river. The accused received a lecture on the severity of disrupting the “lighthouse
system” with British representatives Macnair and J. G. Davidson, Kudin’s backer at the
trial. The sole survivor of the attack identified the trial’s defendants as the pirates
resulting in their conviction. The sultan dispatched a kris for the executions, leaving
Kudin with greater authority within Selangor.177 The trial and the executions effectively
revealed the fate of anak rajah piracy within Malaya, the British authorities showed their
new authority within the region.
177 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-191; Swettenham, British Malaya, 183; Swettenham’s description of the sultan’s reaction showed the disparity in regard for piratical actions between British and Malay authorities.
100
The trial, however, was less about justice as much as the imposition of British
authority and perspective on piracy or other trade obstructions. The trial gave Kudin
more power by showing the extent of his British backing and protected British interests
by opening up trade while protecting certain assets. The trial certainly gave Clarke an
opportunity for a show of force and weakened his Malay political opponents. Frank
Swettenham later discovered that the executed defendants were likely innocent because
the witness probably never saw the faces of the assailants during the chaos in the dark of
night of the attack. Swettenham also noted that despite the injustice regarding the
executions the general populace understood the main point of the trial, suppressing piracy
on the Selangor coast and consolidating Kudin’s power.178 Raiding was the chief
expression of antagonism against British authority in the region for decades, but the
breaking of the power of the chiefs and anak rajahs decreased organized sea-raiding
within the region.
Conclusion
The conflict with the raiders required native allies willing to assist the Straits
Settlements and therefore Great Britain’s power grew often at the expense of other native
powers, sometimes weakening opponents through military action. Nicholas Tarling
argued that Malay marauding was the political remnant to the old empires of the Malay
world and that British influence in the region came about through the suppression of
suspected pirates, along with Great Britain being the greatest power in the region.179 The
complications of native Malay politics made distinctions between various factions
difficult for foreigners to fully comprehend because of its decentralized nature. The
178
? Swettenham, British Malaya, 183-184.179 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 19, 20.
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Temenggong of Johor assisted British forces weaken piracy particularly from 1843 to
1848 thus earning the support of Straits Settlements Governor Butterworth. Malay
pirates rarely attacked large European vessels, doing so usually in calm weather or
sneaking aboard while in harbor, but an overwhelming majority of vessels composed of
native victims.180 Great Britain employed a variety of means, not just military, to ensure
safe trade throughout the Straits of Melaka regardless of the nationality or ethnicity of the
traders. While protecting peaceful traders while weakening the inhibitors of trade such as
pirates, raiders, and local chiefs imposed the contemporary British ideals regarding trade
and politics, while making various alliances with anglophile chiefs to support their own
influence.
The Malay sea-raiders gave the native rulers the farthest reach of power over any
other of their assets, posing the greatest threat to the security of the British colonies and
their trade. Breaking the power of the sea-raiders was the first step for British authorities
to gain considerable influence with local rulers who usually relied on the support of local
chiefs. The European and Chinese merchants of Singapore led the demands for
intervention in Malay politics particularly by the 1870s.181 Piracy prompted further
involvement by British authorities. For instance, a piratical incident in July 1874 resulted
in Swettenham advising Sultan Abdul Samad by August. The relationship between the
sultan and Swettenham went well enough that the sultan paid $1,000 a month for
Swettenham’s expenses, while allowing Swettenham to manage import and export
180
? Mills, “British Malaya,” 214, 221, 223.181
? One estimate by Chinese merchants placed losses to piracy at 2% of the total trade or $15,000 to $20,000 a year, but the actual losses were probably much higher. One incident of piracy of a sampan resulted in a loss of cargo worth $10,000. The underestimation was likely to hide the true costs of piracy to avoid paying higher taxes to British authorities. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 94-95.
102
duties.182 Despite the stronger relationship with the native rulers, piracy continued around
Singapore with attacks in 1884 and 1909,183 but piracy no longer posed the threat as it did
earlier in the 19th century because the British counter-piracy and opposition to raiding
proved effective. British authorities broke the power of the indigenous chiefs and
weakened the Chinese secret societies through conducting anti-piracy operations making
Great Britain the most powerful political force in Malaya.
Great Britain employed a variety of military and non-military strategies for the
‘suppression of piracy’ in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. The military
strategies relied heavily on the Royal Navy and private flotillas to patrol sea lanes and
attack suspected pirate havens. Technology gave Great Britain a large advantage over the
sea-raiders through faster deployments and various tactical advantages. Although British
campaigns often dispersed marauders, completely destroying them was virtually
impossible because large numbers usually slipped away into the cover of trees or in a
maze of estuaries. British authorities employed political, economic, and judicial
strategies to protect the interests of British subjects. Employing the resident system,
British authorities centralized the native Malay political system by taking power away
from the chiefs and placing it in nominal hands of the sultan but the administration really
fell to British administrators. More control of the coastland made piracy more difficult
because the leadership no longer supported it in any significance. Economic
development through tin mining, infrastructure projects, and non-indigenous agricultural
goods such as rubber shifted attention away from marauding as an income for many
living in Malaya. The development of an education system demilitarized the youth of 182
? Wythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 172-173, 188.183
? Mills, “British Malaya,” 234-235.
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Malaya and imbued them with sympathy toward Great Britain. Legal systems within
Malaya became more effective in convicting suspected pirates, deterring others from
partaking in raids. The strategies employed by British authorities weakened the power
and impact of the sea-raiders of the Malay Peninsula.
104
Conclusion
In the time since the end of 19th century few historians wrote about the sea-raiders
of Malaya for the sake of better understanding them in a socio-economic context because
the sea-raiders themselves left few known historical records regarding their profession.
Instead, more historians focused on the attempted eradication of piracy within the Straits
of Melaka and the South China Sea by British, Dutch, French, and Spanish authorities
during the 19th century. Historians wrote generally about the sea-raiders of Malaya in the
context of the increased role of Europeans throughout Southeast Asia as imperial powers.
Sea-raiding as a profession was important to the history of Southeast Asia and Europe
colonialism because sea-power was a critical component of political power and economic
wealth. Malaya’s inhabitants of lesser means employed sea-raiding as a survival
technique that revealed an important aspect of their lives as perpetrators, while victims
lost their lives or freedom as slaves in some faraway land.
A variety of factors contributed to the prevalence of sea-raiding during the 19th
century around the Malay Peninsula stemming from often uncooperative and
decentralized authorities, a largely maritime economy, along with a tradition of maritime
raiding. Raiding at sea became particularly prevalent during years of warfare when
commerce stalled and people found their way-of-life threatened with destruction.
Although natural disasters pushed individuals toward sea-raiding, the flexibility of Malay
society absorbed the shock to an extent that did not make sea-raiding inevitable. War and
internal conflict contributed more to the danger for fishing and merchant vessels more
than any single natural factor. The sea-raiders came from a variety of backgrounds from
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throughout society including humble fishermen, maritime traders, and retainers of the
sultan.
The sea-raiders acted as the first line of defense against the onslaught of western
imperialism by challenging directly their power and indirectly through attacking Asian
traders who traded in the Straits Settlements. The defense may not have been conscious
because the sea-raiders were often primarily businessmen, but the native Malay state also
deployed raiders for naval patrols and tax collectors. Early raids on British settlements
revealed the vulnerability of the settlements to local sea-raiders because a lack of
adequate defenses and the sheer number of raiders. Piracy and state-sponsored sea-
raiding threatened the Straits Settlements during its early years by siphoning away the
maritime trade the colonies needed to survive. The sea became the most disputed space
between the sea-raiders and the British authorities in the early years of the British
presence in Malaya.
The attributes of the native political system contributed to piracy while making
commerce more difficult for the merchants and financiers of the Straits Settlements. To
increase exports from Malaya, British authorities weakened the power of the chiefs to
sever the connections between the chiefs and the sea-raiders. Required payment of
arbitrary tolls and other taxes set by chiefs from one fiefdom to the next made developing
industrial infrastructure for large-scale exports extremely difficult. Furthermore,
intermittent internal struggles between various factions throughout Malaya in part caused
by disputes over tin revenue made internal and external trade more difficult and less
profitable. Raiders as agents of the native state or other factions attacked vessels in
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contradiction to the interests of the Straits Settlements because of decreased trade and
increased shipping costs suffered by the colony.
The development of a two-part counter-piracy strategy included the suppression
of suspected pirates by military force and the weakening of pirates through non-military
means. The Royal Navy and the counter-piracy navies of the Straits Settlements attacked
suspected pirates and their vessels. Squadrons attacked the suspected operating bases of
sea-raiders, conducted sea patrols, and defended British interests. British authorities
weakened the Malays’ sea-power through the destruction of their maritime vessels at the
guns of the Royal Navy and private navies loyal to the Straits Settlements. The
devastation of the Malay maritime society through British armed forces was insufficient
to break the power of the native and Chinese sea-raiders, because the abundant numbers
of seafarers possessed enough vessels and equipment for the continuation of sea-raiding.
Sea-raiders had plenty of places to hide from the patrols of British warships throughout
Malaya. Therefore, the British authorities needed a nonmilitary solution to break the
power of the sea-raiders.
The development of civil infrastructure and other economic projects enhanced
the power of the colonial government making piracy more difficult. The political and
economic development on the mainland potentially dissuaded those contemplating piracy
to find work in a different profession. The growing economy of Malaya through the
development of the mining and agriculture industries made investing in more peaceful
enterprises more rewarding and less-risky than sea-raiding. The importation of seeds to
Malaya for agricultural development in plantations by colonial authorities eventually
became important to the accumulation of wealth in Malaya. The rubber and palm oil
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industries drew labor from other industries and locations while giving immense returns
on investment. The colonial government encouraged economic growth in Malaya
through a variety of successful programs making sea-raiding a much less relevant
industry by the 20th century.
British-Malay public education brought more people in Malaya under British
influence. British policy placed particular attention toward educating the children of the
elite to be sympathetic to Great Britain through an education system, which eventually
taught them the English language. The public education system taught Malays English
Industrial Age values to become more productive members of a colonial society without
learning too much to become troublesome to British authorities. The values emphasized
increased economic growth while maintaining the social structure of Malaya despite its
inherent contradictions. The schools reinforced loyalty to the colonial system while
placing control over the students’ lives dissuading them from violence including a life of
sea-raiding.
British authorities pressured native Malay rulers to end support for sea-raiders and
punish them when caught. British officials signed treaties with Malay rulers sometimes
within sight of a British warship forbidding the support of piracy or the harboring of
pirates. Close relationships between the Straits Settlements and some Malay states such
as Johor and Pahang prior to an official annexation by Great Britain convinced the states
to deny safe haven to sea-raiders. Straits Settlements officials and investors backed
Malay leaders friendly to foreign investment and British authority in Malaya. Diplomacy
and political pressure convinced leaders of Malay states to end their support for sea-
raiding to avoid the displeasure of British authorities.
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The development of an English-style legal system weakened the impact of the
sea-raiders while maintaining good relations with the merchant community through the
perception of fairness and equality under the law. The Straits Settlements legal system
separated the activities of sea-raiders from merchants of Singapore who supplied the
piratical voyages. The implementation of a legal system assured merchants of the
protection their property from sea-raiders without the infringement upon their rights.
Failure to respect the merchants might send their business elsewhere in the region and
therefore the Straits Settlements needed a relatively fair legal system for the separation of
sea-raiders and peaceful businessmen. The success of the Straits Settlements legal
system increased the costs of sea-raiding, which decreased the seafarers’ and merchants’
participation in sea-raiding.
Great Britain’s use of military force, civic reform, and economic growth reduced
the impact of piracy and sea-raiding on the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea.
The erosion of sea-raiding as an institution among other events broke the power of the
native chiefs who once possessed great control over their people and land. Their
traditions were incompatible with 19th century British ideals regarding trade and politics,
which made the breaking of the chiefs’ power necessary before further significant
investment. Sea-raiding was an important expression of the chiefs’ power because it was
an important source of income. British authorities saw all sea-raiders as pirates, who
threatened the interests of Great Britain in the region. The strategy to weaken the sea-
raiders required the assistance of reliable Malay chiefs who opposed sea-raiding, but the
strategy required the compliance of many Malay leaders along the straits rather than a
few. Therefore the weakening of sea-raiders required decades of combat operations,
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negotiations with local leaders, economic development, and institution building by
British authorities.
The extent of sea-raiding decreased during periods of leadership and cooperation
but sea-raiders never fully disappeared during years of effective authority. Decentralized
political systems with little or no cooperation placed little check on marauders. Future
studies could investigate the effect of the relationship between the indigenous rulers of
Malaya and the merchants or their relationship with the orang laut. Studies could also
examine the impact of British colonialism on the maritime cultures of Malaya in great
depth. Malaya possessed a tradition of the sea-raiding that considered it an honorable
profession. Many societies in the region required seafaring skills of many of its
inhabitants, which provided the labor for increases of sea-raiding, whereas wars and
leadership disputes provided the spark for periods of rampant piracy and sea-raiding.
British authorities severely weakened the sea-raiders not only through destroying them at
sea, but also by controlling the land from which pirates operated often through non-
military means.
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Glossary:
anak rajah: child descendants of sultan; younger members of ruling class
apilans: wooden bulwarks on Malay vessels to provide cover from projectiles
bendahara: chancellor; prime minister; a high degree of independent power [Sanskrit]
dato: chief; lord; not related to nobility
drakha: treason; punishable by death
kampong: basic administrative unit; large house; compound [Malay]
kakap: a Malay skiff with one mast
kerah: mandatory labor for commoners
kris: sword found in Malaya; prized possession of its owner [Malay and Javanese]
laksamana: admiral; in charge of the fleet; important minister in sultan-era Melaka
maharaja lela: military general [Sanskrit]
mandulika: governor; sent tribute to the sultan
mantri: adviser; secretary of state; administrator for executive [Malay]
nakhoda: master of a vessel; supercargo; owner or owners’ representative [Malay]
orang kaya besar: treasurer [Malay]
orang laut: sea people; resided in Riau archipelago in the southern Straits of Melaka
paduakan: a relatively large single mast Malay vessel
penghulu: basic administrator; headman; ancient position of leadership [Malay]
penghulu bendahari: secretary for the sultan
penjajap: a long sailing vessel with two masts
perompak: pirate; someone acting without consent of sultan
prahus: Malay sailing vessel; also spelled proa, perahus, prahu [Malay]
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rajah: ruler; leader [Sanskrit]
raoyat: commoner; possessed few rights by 19th century [Sanskrit]
rajah muda: heir apparent; required consent of chiefs before becoming sultan
sampan: Asian boat often used for fishing
shahbandar: harbormaster; important minister in sultan-era Melaka [Persian]
sultan: leader of the state; king; emerged with adaptation of Islam
temenggong: chief of police; chief judge; maintained peace and order [Malay]
tengku: prince; used for Malay royalty
yang-di-pertuan besar: leader of the confederacy of Negri Sembilan
112
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