SCRA FULL Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

7/9/2015 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 224

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014e71ddab95c6a2eab3000a0094004f00ee/p/AKH214/?username=Guest 1/32

792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDOposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.*

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by theirparents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTANICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parentsCALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDASALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minorsand represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDAFLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORESFORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, allsurnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parentsGEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIOand ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETAALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANECASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor,represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELADESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II andCRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIEGABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, representedby their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE andDAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented bytheir parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamedENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parentsBALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. andREGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, representedby their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA,



MABILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamedCARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIOand LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGELand IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors andrepresented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSAOPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAHJAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,

_______________

* EN BANC.

793

VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 793Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX andVILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. andMILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINEECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THEHONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in hiscapacity as the Secretary of the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources, and THEHONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judgeof the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of thecomplaint is of common and general interest not just to several,but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the requisites for the filingof a valid class suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules ofCourt are present.—Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90777as a class suit. The original defendant and the presentrespondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, Wehereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. Thesubject matter of the complaint is of common and general interestnot just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomesimpracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them beforethe court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein arenumerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection



of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing ofa valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules ofCourt are present both in the said civil case and in the instantpetition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ personality to sue inbehalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on theconcept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to abalanced and healthful ecology is concerned.—This case, however,has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert thatthey represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, forothers of their generation and for the succeeding generations, filea class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeedinggenerations can only be based on the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthfulecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”

794

794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors’ assertion oftheir right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time theperformance of their obligation to ensure the protection of thatright for the generation to come.—Needless to say, everygeneration has a responsibility to the next to preserve thatrhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced andhealthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion oftheir right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection ofthat right for the generations to come.

Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specificfundamental legal right; The right to a balanced and healthfulecology.—The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legalright—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for thefirst time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnlyincorporated in the fundamental law.

Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecologycarries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing theenvironment.—The right to a balanced and healthful ecologycarries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the



environment.

Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced andhealthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to protect andadvance the said right.—Thus, the right of the petitioners (and allthose they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is asclear as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of itspowers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the AdministrativeCode of 1987—to protect and advance the said right.

Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is nolonger the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial poweror the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislativeactions from judicial inquiry or review.—The foregoingconsidered, Civil Case No. 90777 cannot be said to raise apolitical question. Policy formulation or determination by theexecutive or legislative branches of Government is not squarelyput in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of aright visavis policies already formulated and expressed inlegislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the politicalquestion doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to theexercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protectsexecutive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

795

VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 795


Same; Contracts; Nonimpairment Clause; A timber license isnot a contract, property or a property right protected by the dueprocess clause of the Constitution.—Needless to say, all licensesmay thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not acontract, property or a property right protected by the due processclause of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does notcreate irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.—A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwisewould be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom itis granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does itcreate a vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, thisCourt held that the granting of license does not create irrevocablerights, neither is it property or property rights.



Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not contracts,the nonimpairment clause cannot be invoked.—Since timberlicenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, cannot beinvoked.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonimpairment clausemust yield to the police power of the state.—In short, the nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; The protection of the environmentincluding the forest cover of our territory is of extreme importancefor the country.—I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari becausethe protection of the environment, including the forest cover ofour territory, is of extreme importance for the country.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissalorder of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Oposa Law Office for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right ofFilipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which thepetition

796


ers dramatically associate with the twin concepts of “intergenerational responsibility” and “intergenerationaljustice.” Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether thesaid petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent themisappropriation or impairment” of Philippine rainforestsand “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vitallifesupport systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90777which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National CapitalJudicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the



(1)

(2)

principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented andjoined by their respective parents. Impleaded as anadditional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and nonprofitcorporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,engaging in concerted action geared for the protection ofour environment and natural resources. The originaldefendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,then Secretary of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources (DENR). His substitution in thispetition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion bythe petitioners.

1 The complaint

2 was instituted as a

taxpayers’ class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs “are all

citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, andentitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country’s virgintropical rainforests.” The same was filed for themselvesand others who are equally concerned about thepreservation of said resource but are “so numerous that itis impracticable to bring them all before the Court.” Theminors further asseverate that they “represent theirgeneration as well as generation yet unborn.”

4

Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

“x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and otherpersons acting in his behalf to—

_______________

1 Rollo, 164; 186.2 Id., 6265, exclusive of annexes.3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.4 Rollo, 67.

797


Cancel all existing timber license agreements in thecountry;Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,processing, renewing or approving new timberlicense agreements.”



and granting the plaintiffs “x x x such other reliefs just andequitable under the premises.”

5

The complaint starts off with the general avermentsthat the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a landarea of thirty million (30,000.00) hectares and is endowedwith rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied,rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found;these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemicalpool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat ofindigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, enduredand flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidencereveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthfulecology, the country’s land area should be utilized on thebasis of a ratio of fiftyfour per cent (54%) for forest coverand fortysix per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion anddisturbance of this balance as a consequence ofdeforestation have resulted in a host of environmentaltragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from thedrying up of the water table, otherwise known as the“aquifer,” as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusiontherein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of whichmay be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality ofBacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequentialloss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with thevolume of soil eroded estimated at one billion(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum—approximatelythe size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) theendangering and extinction of the country’s unique, rareand varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance anddislocation of cultural communities, including thedisappearance of the Filipino’s indigenous cultures, (f) thesiltation of rivers and seabeds and consequentialdestruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to acritical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g)recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced bythe entire

_______________

5 Id., 74.

798



7.8.

9.

10.

11.


country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds whichresult from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding oflowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absenceof the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation andshortening of the lifespan of multibillion peso damsconstructed and operated for the purpose of supplyingwater for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation ofelectric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth’s capacityto process carbon dioxide gases which had led to perplexingand catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenonof global warming, otherwise known as the “greenhouseeffect.”

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse anddetrimental consequences of continued and deforestationare so capable of unquestionable demonstration that thesame may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. Thisnotwithstanding, they expressed their intention to presentexpert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic andfilm evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

“CAUSE OF ACTION

Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.Twentyfive (25) years ago, the Philippines had somesixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constitutingroughly 53% of the country’s land mass.Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remainedno more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests orfour per cent (4.0%) of the country’s land area.More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectaresof virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of theentire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomicalsecondary growth forests.Public records reveal that defendant’s predecessors havegranted timber license agreements (‘TLA’s’) to variouscorporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 millionhectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered ishereto attached as Annex ‘A’.



12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour—nighttime,Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included—thePhilippines will be bereft of forest resources after the endof this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

799


The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, seriousinjury and irreparable damage of this continued trend ofdeforestration to the plaintiff minors’ generation and togenerations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible.As a matter of fact, the environmental damagesenumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiffadults.The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders tocut and deforest the remaining forest stands will workgreat damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs—especially plaintiff minors and their successors—who maynever see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and uniquenatural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/orimpairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust forthe benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to abalanced and healthful ecology and are entitled toprotection by the State in its capacity as the parenspatriae.Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedieswith the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffsserved upon defendant a final demand to cancel all loggingpermits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs’ letter dated March 1, 1990 is heretoattached as Annex ‘B’.

Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel theexisting TLA’s, to the continuing serious damage andextreme prejudice of plaintiffs.



18.

19.

‘(a)

‘(b)

‘(c)

a.

b.c.

d.

21.

The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancelthe TLA’s is an act violative to the rights of plaintiffs,especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a countrythat is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of thewonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which thePhilippines has been abundantly blessed with.Defendant’s refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA’s ismanifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in thePhilippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,states that it is the policy of the State—

to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions underwhich man and nature can thrive in productive andenjoyable harmony with each other;to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements ofpresent and future generations of Filipinos and;to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality thatis conducive to a life of dignity and well being’. (P.D. 1151,6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant’s continued refusal to cancel theaforementioned TLA’s is contradictory to the Constitutional policyof

800


the State to—

effect ‘a more equitable distribution of opportunities,income and wealth’ and ‘make full and efficient use ofnatural resources (sic)’. (Section 1, Article XII of theConstitution);‘protect the nation’s marine wealth.’ (Section 2, ibid);‘conserve and promote the nation’s cultural heritage andresources (sic).’ (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);‘protect and advance the right of the people to a balancedand healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm andharmony of nature.’ (Section 16, Article II. id.)

Finally, defendant’s act is contrary to the highest law ofhumankind—the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs’



22.right to selfpreservation and perpetuation.There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inlaw other than the instant action to arrest the unabatedhemorrhage of the country’s vital lifesupport systems andcontinued rape of Mother Earth.”

6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, SecretaryFactoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaintbased on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have nocause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by theplaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains tothe legislative or executive branches of Government. Intheir 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitionersmaintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear andunmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and(3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involvesthe defendant’s abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an ordergranting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.

7 In the said

order, not only was the defendant’s claim—that thecomplaint states no cause of action against him and that itraises a political question—sustained, the respondentJudge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayedfor would result in the impairment of contracts which isprohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court andask this

_______________

6 Rollo, 7073.7 Annex “B” of Petition; Id., 4344.

801


Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on theground that the respondent Judge gravely abused hisdiscretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents ofthe plaintiffsminors not only represent their children, buthave also joined the latter in this case.

8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the



petition and required the parties to submit their respectiveMemoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and thepetitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly andunmistakably states a cause of action as it containssufficient allegations concerning their right to a soundenvironment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the CivilCode (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizingthe right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law andthe concept of man’s inalienable right to selfpreservationand selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitionerslikewise rely on the respondent’s correlative obligation, perSection 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people’s right toa healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondentSecretary’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in grantingTimber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas forlogging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of theConstitution’s nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintainthat the same does not apply in this case because TLAs arenot contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs maybe considered protected by the said clause, it is well settledthat they may still be revoked by the State when publicinterest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that thepetitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specificlegal right violated by the respondent Secretary for whichany relief is provided by law. They see nothing in thecomplaint but vague and nebulous

_______________

8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

802




allegations concerning an “environmental right” whichsupposedly entitles the petitioners to the “protection by thestate in its capacity as parens patriae.” Such allegations,according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.They then reiterate the theory that the question of whetherlogging should be permitted in the country is a politicalquestion which should be properly addressed to theexecutive or legislative branches of Government. Theytherefore assert that the petitioners’ recourse is not to filean action to court, but to lobby before Congress for thepassage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,respondents submit that the same cannot be done by theState without due process of law. Once issued, a TLAremains effective for a certain period of time—usually fortwentyfive (25) years. During its effectivity, the same canneither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has beenfound, after due notice and hearing, to have violated theterms of the agreement or other forestry laws andregulations. Petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAsindiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearingwould be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on someprocedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.90777 as a class suit. The original defendant and thepresent respondents did not take issue with this matter.Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case isindeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint isof common and general interest not just to several, but toall citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since theparties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if nottotally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. Welikewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerousand representative enough to ensure the full protection ofall concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for thefiling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of theRevised Rules of Court are present both in the said civilcase and in the instant petition, the latter being but anincident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element.Petitioners minors assert that they represent theirgeneration as well as generations yet unborn. We find nodifficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for othersof their generation and for the succeeding generations, filea class suit. Their personality to sue



803


in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be basedon the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar asthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the“rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means thecreated world in its entirety.

9 Such rhythm and harmony

indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,utilization, management, renewal and conservation of thecountry’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,offshore areas and other natural resources to the end thattheir exploration, development and utilization be equitablyaccessible to the present as well as future generations.

10

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility tothe next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the fullenjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a littledifferently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a soundenvironment constitutes, at the same time, theperformance of their obligation to ensure the protection ofthat right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus beenaddressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of thepetition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question anda meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issuesraised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do nothesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against therespondent Judge’s challenged order for having been issuedwith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack ofjurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order readas follows:

x x x“After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint,

the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For althoughwe believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it(sic) feel short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specificlegal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specificlegal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint isreplete with vague assumptions and



_______________

9 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.

804


vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs failto state a cause of action in its Complaint against the hereindefendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter beforeit, being impressed with political color and involving a matter ofpublic policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Courtwithout doing violence to the sacred principle of ‘Separation ofPowers’ of the three (3) coequal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, nomatter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayedfor by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber licenseagreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements. For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment ofcontracts’ abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.”

11

We do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion that theplaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness aspecific legal right involved or a specific legal wrongcommitted, and that the complaint is replete with vagueassumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. Areading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legalright—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, issolemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

“SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of thepeople to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with therhythm and harmony of nature.”

This right unites with the right to health which is providedfor in the preceding section of the same article:



“SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to healthof the people and instill health consciousness among them.”

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to befound under the Declaration of Principles and StatePolicies and

_______________

11 Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 4344.

805


not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is lessimportant than any of the civil and political rightsenumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to adifferent category of rights altogether for it concernsnothing less than selfpreservation and selfperpetuation—aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—theadvancement of which may even be said to predate allgovernments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, thesebasic rights need not even be written in the Constitutionfor they are assumed to exist from the inception ofhumankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in thefundamental charter, it is because of the wellfounded fearof its framers that unless the rights to a balanced andhealthful ecology and to health are mandated as statepolicies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlightingtheir continuing importance and imposing upon the state asolemn obligation to preserve the first and protect andadvance the second, the day would not be too far when allelse would be lost not only for the present generation, butalso for those to come—generations which stand to inheritnothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carrieswith it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing theenvironment. During the debates on this right in one of theplenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,the following exchange transpired between CommissionerWilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna whosponsored the section in question:



“MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions

against all forms of pollution—air, water and noisepollution?

MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the correlativeduty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctionsmay be prov ided for impairment of environmentalbalance.”

12

The said right implies, among many other things, thejudicious management and conservation of the country’sforests.

_______________

12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

806


Without such forests, the ecological or environmentalbalance would be irreversibly disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balancedand healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as theother related provisions of the Constitution concerning theconservation, development and utilization of the country’snatural resources,

13 then President Corazon C. Aquino

promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,14 Section 4 of

which expressly mandates that the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources “shall be the primarygovernment agency responsible for the conservation,management, development and proper use of the country’senvironment and natural resources, specifically forest andgrazing lands, mineral resources, including those inreservation and watershed areas, and lands of the publicdomain, as well as the licensing and regulation of allnatural resources as may be provided for by law in order toensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefromfor the welfare of the present and future generations ofFilipinos.” Section 3 thereof makes the following statement



of policy:

“SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the policy ofthe State to ensure the sustainable use, development,management, renewal, and conservation of the country’s forest,mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources,including the protection and enhancement of the quality of theenvironment, and equitable access of the different segments of thepopulation to the development and use of the country’s naturalresources, not only for the present generation but for futuregenerations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognizeand apply a true value system including social and environmentalcost implications relative to their utilization, development andconservation of our natural resources.”

This policy declaration is substantially restated in TitleXIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,

15

specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

_______________

13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economyand Patrimony.

14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment andNatural Resources.

15 E.O. No. 292.

807


“SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.—(1) The State shall ensure, for thebenefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration anddevelopment as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and othernatural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining asound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing thequality of the environment and the objective of making theexploration, development and utilization of such naturalresources equitably accessible to the different segments of thepresent as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true valuesystem that takes into account social and environmental cost



implications relative to the utilization, development andconservation of our natural resources.”

The above provision stresses “the necessity of maintaininga sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancingthe quality of the environment.” Section 2 of the same Title,on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of theDENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact ofthe agency’s being subject to law and higher authority.Said section provides:

“SEC. 2. Mandate.—(1) The Department of Environment andNatural Resources shall be primarily responsible for theimplementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge ofcarrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control andsupervise the exploration, development, utilization, andconservation of the country’s natural resources.”

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987have set the objectives which will serve as the bases forpolicy formulation, and have defined the powers andfunctions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before theratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutesalready paid special attention to the “environmental right”of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. Theformer “declared a continuing policy of the State (a) tocreate, develop, maintain and improve conditions underwhich man and nature can thrive in productive andenjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,

808


economic and other requirements of present and futuregenerations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment ofan environmental quality that is conducive to a life ofdignity and wellbeing.”

16 As its goal, it speaks of the

“responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardianof the environment for succeeding generations.”

17 The latter



statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they

represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear asthe DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of itspowers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and theAdministrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance thesaid right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who hasthe correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect thesame gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintainthat the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was donewith grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to abalanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protectionthereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed orgranted.

A cause of action is defined as:

“x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rightor rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right ofthe plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act oromission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.”

18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismissbased on the ground that the complaint fails to state acause of action,

19 the question submitted to the court for

resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in thecomplaint itself. No other matter should be considered;furthermore, the truth of

_______________

16 Section 1.17 Section 2.18 Maao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community

Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remiterevs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462[1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs.Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].

19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

809




falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for thetruth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The onlyissue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting suchalleged facts to be true, may the court render a validjudgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?

20

In Militante vs. Edrosolano,21 this Court laid down the rule

that the judiciary should “exercise the utmost care andcircumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on theground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by itsfailure to manifest a correct appreciation of the factsalleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the lawgrants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens,there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands indisrepute.”

After a careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint,We find the statements under the introductory affirmativeallegations, as well as the specific averments under thesubheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enoughto show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly orpartly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however,that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,there is the need to implead, as party defendants, thegrantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90777 cannotbe said to raise a political question. Policy formulation ordetermination by the executive or legislative branches ofGovernment is not squarely put in issue. What isprincipally involved is the enforcement of a right visavispolicies already formulated and expressed in legislation. Itmust, nonetheless, be emphasized that the politicalquestion doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacleto the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shieldthat protects executive and legislative actions from judicialinquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1,Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave

_______________

20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.Sandiganbayan, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.



21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

810


abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction onthe part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Commenting on this provision in his book, PhilippinePolitical Law,

22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a

distinguished member of this Court, says:

“The first part of the authority represents the traditional conceptof judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights asconferred as law. The second part of the authority represents abroadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice toreview what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretionof the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, andparticularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even thewisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and todeclare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction becausetainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is themeaning of grave abuse of discretion,’ which is a very elasticphrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition ofthe judiciary.”

In Daza vs. Singson,23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for

this Court, noted:

“In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomeseven less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we wereto assume that the issue presented before us was political innature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it underthe expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, inproper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, ofthe Constitution clearly provides: x x x.”

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing thecomplaint is the nonimpairment of contracts clause foundin the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

_______________



22 1991 ed., 226227.23 180 SCRA, 496, 501502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187

SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamasvs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue RibbonCommittee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].

811


“The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matterhow we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by theplaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements inthe country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,processing, renewing or approving new timber licenseagreements. For to do otherwise would amount to ‘impairment ofcontracts’ abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.”

24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We areamazed, if not shocked, by such a sweepingpronouncement. In the first place, the respondentSecretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in hismotion to dismiss the nonimpairment clause. If he haddone so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to theGovernment by providing undue and unwarranted benefitsand advantages to the timber license holders because hewould have forever bound the Government to strictlyrespect the said licenses according to their terms andconditions regardless of changes in policy and the demandsof public interest and welfare. He was aware that ascorrectly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timberlicense must be read Section 20 of the Forestry ReformCode (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

“x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, thePresident may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege grantedherein x x x.”

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked orrescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, propertyor a property right protected by the due process clause ofthe Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,

25 this

Court held:



“x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the Stateregulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to theend that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not acontract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only alicense or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn wheneverdictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

_______________

24 Rollo, 44.25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

812


‘A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwisewould be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom itis granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does itcreate a vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, thisCourt held that the granting of license does not create irrevocablerights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. OngTin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x”

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:

26

“x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are theprincipal instruments by which the State regulates the utilizationand disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare ispromoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merelyevidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, anddo not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to theparticular concession area and the forest products therein. Theymay be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by theChief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, theyare not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process oflaw clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, asamended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L24548,October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].”

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause, which reads:



“SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall bepassed.”

27

cannot be invoked.In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the

same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a lawor even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation ormodification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless,granting further that a law has actually been passedmandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannotstill be stigmatized as a violation of the

_______________

26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

813


nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very natureand purpose, such a law could have only been passed in theexercise of the police power of the state for the purpose ofadvancing the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancingthe general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,

28 this

Court stated:

“The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is notmeant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject toreasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of publichealth, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, theconstitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations ofcontract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,in the interest of public health, safety, moral and generalwelfare.”

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.New York,

29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance

Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

“ ‘Under our form of government the use of property and themaking of contracts are normally matters of private and not of



public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free ofgovernmental interference. But neither property rights norcontract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if thecitizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equallyfundamental with the private right is that of the public toregulate it in the common interest.’ ”

In short, the nonimpairment clause must yield to thepolice power of the state.

31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did,how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect tothe prayer to

_______________

28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947949.30 22 SCRA 135, 146147 [1968].31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler

Corp., supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. ElizaldeRope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 1[974]; Kabiling vs. National HousingAuthority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].

814


enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for,save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yetexisted in the other instances. Moreover, with respect torenewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instantPetition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order ofrespondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No.90777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may thereforeamend their complaint to implead as defendants theholders or grantees of the questioned timber licenseagreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.



Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, GriñoAquino, Regalado,Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J.), No part; related to one of theparties.

Feliciano, J., Please see separate opinion concurringin the result.

Puno, J., No part in the deliberations. Vitug, J., No part; I was not yet with the Court

when the case was deliberated upon.

FELICIANO, J.: Concurring in the result

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother inthe Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, isone of the most important cases decided by this Court inthe last few years. The seminal principles laid down in thisdecision are likely to influence profoundly the direction andcourse of the protection and management of theenvironment, which of course embraces the utilization ofall the natural resources in the territorial base of ourpolity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically tomyself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have thelocus standi necessary to sustain the bringing andmaintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 1112). Locus standiis not a function of petitioners’ claim that their suit isproperly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standito refer to the legal interest which

815


a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.Because of the very broadness of the concept of “class” hereinvolved—membership in this “class” appears to embraceeveryone living in the country whether now or in the future—it appears to me that everyone who may be expected tobenefit from the course of action petitioners seek to requirepublic respondents to take, is vested with the necessarylocus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to berecognizing a beneficiaries’ right of action in the field ofenvironmental protection, as against both the publicadministrative agency directly concerned and the private



persons or entities operating in the field or sector ofactivity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries’ right ofaction may be found under any and all circumstances, orwhether some failure to act, in the first instance, on thepart of the governmental agency concerned must be shown(“prior exhaustion of administrative remedies”), is notdiscussed in the decision and presumably is left for futuredetermination in an appropriate ca se.

The Court has also declared that the complaint hasalleged and focused upon “one specific fundamental legalright—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology”(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that “the right to abalanced and healthful ecology” is “fundamental” and that,accordingly, it has been “constitutionalized.” But althoughit is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very greatrespect, that it cannot be characterized as “specific,”without doing excessive violence to language. It is in factvery difficult to fashion language more comprehensive inscope and generalized in character than a right to “abalanced and healthful ecology.” The list of particularclaims which can be subsumed under this rubric appears tobe entirely openended: prevention and control of emissionof toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles;of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and rawsewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oilrigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumpingof organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets andthoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripminingor openpit mining; kaingin or slashandburn farming;destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living searesources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and otherchemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss ofcertain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The otherstatements pointed out

816


by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977—all appear to be formulations of policy, as general andabstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in



(a)(b)(c)(d)

(i)(ii)

(iii)(iv)(v)

(vi)

(vii)

Article II, Sections 16 (“the right—to a balanced andhealthful ecology”) and 15 (“the right to health”).

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled “ThePhilippine Environment Code,” is, upon the other hand, acompendious collection of more “specific environmentmanagement policies” and “environment quality standards”(fourth “Whereas” clause, Preamble) relating to anextremely wide range of topics:

air quality management;water quality management:land use management;natural resources management and conservationembracing:

fisheries and aquatic resources;wild life;forestry and soil conservation;flood control and natural calamities;energy development;conservation and utilization of surface and groundwatermineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly,neither petitioners nor the Court has identified theparticular provision or provisions (if any) of the PhilippineEnvironment Code which give rise to a specific legal rightwhich petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, thePhilippine Environment Code identifies with notable carethe particular government agency charged with theformulation and implementation of guidelines andprograms dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine EnvironmentCode does not, in other words, appear to contemplate actionon the part of private persons who are beneficiaries ofimplementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners’ cause ofaction as anchored on a legal right comprised in theconstitutional state

817

VOL. 224, JULY 30, 1993 817




ments above noted, the Court is in effect saying thatSection 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitutionare selfexecuting and judicially enforceable even in theirpresent form. The implications of this doctrine will have tobe explored in future cases; those implications are too largeand farreaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, beforethe trial court, show a more specific legal right—a rightcast in language of a significantly lower order of generalitythan Article II (15) of the Constitution—that is or may beviolated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to thepublic respondent by petitioners so that the trial court canvalidly render judgment granting all or part of the reliefprayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood assimply saying that such a more specific legal right or rightsmay well exist in our corpus of law, considering the generalpolicy principles found in the Constitution and theexistence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that thetrial court should have given petitioners an effectiveopportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting theproceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is anessential component of a cause of action be a specific,operable legal right, rather than a constitutional orstatutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is thatunless the legal right claimed to have been violated ordisregarded is given specification in operational terms,defendants may well be unable to defend themselvesintelligently and effectively; in other words, there are dueprocess dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broadergauge consideration—where aspecific violation of law or applicable regulation is notalleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall backon the expanded conception of judicial power in the secondparagraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitutionwhich reads:

“Section 1. x x xJudicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality



of the Government.” (Emphases supplied)

818


When substantive standards as general as “the right to abalanced and healthy ecology” and “the right to health” arecombined with remedial standards as broad ranging as “agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction,” the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social andeconomic policy making. At least in respect of the vast areaof environmental protection and management, our courtshave no claim to special technical competence andexperience and professional qualification. Where nospecific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,then the policy making departments—the legislative andexecutive departments—must be given a real and effectiveopportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms andstandards, and to implement them before the courts shouldintervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists thatthe timber companies, whose concession agreements orTLA’s petitioners demand public respondents shouldcancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. Itmight be asked that, if petitioners’ entitlement to the reliefdemanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by thetimber companies of one or more of the specific terms andconditions of their concession agreements (and this,petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companieslitigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seekto dispute the existence of the specific legal rightpetitioners should allege, as well as the reality of theclaimed factual nexus between petitioners’ specific legalrights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act ofpublic respondent administrative agency. They may alsocontrovert the appropriateness of the remedy or remediesdemanded by petitioners, under all the circumstanceswhich exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because theprotection of the environment, including the forest cover ofour territory, is of extreme importance for the country. Thedoctrines set out in the Court’s decision issued today

SCRA FULL Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

Documents

Transcript of SCRA FULL Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.