Scra Cases

7/30/2019 Scra Cases

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Tanada vs. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446)

FACTS: Petitioner is Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a

right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as theprinciple that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or

otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondentpublic officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of variouspresidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter

of implementation and administrative orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the law is a requirement for its effectivity

HELD: Publication is mandatory even if the law provides its own date of effectivity.

REASONING: The clear object of the publication is to give the general public adequate notice

of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such

notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legisnon excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the

transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.


2/25

Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212

SCRA 298; G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DOLE, quasi-legislative power)

Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employmentagencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that

will enhance the protection for the same.

The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers.

Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines onthe government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the

accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the

memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domesticworkers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their

rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through anadministrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and

regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses

that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessaryimplication conferred upon the respondents.
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3/25

VANDOM vs. RONILLO 139 SCRA 139

Facts:

The petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent Romillo is an American citizen.

They married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after their marriage, established a residence in the

Philippines. The parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982 and now, petitioner is married toTheodore Van Dorn. Respondent Romillo, Jr. Filed a suit against petitioner in RTC Pasay stating

that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties and that the

petitioner ordered to render an accounting of that business and that the private respondent bedeclared with a right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on

the ground that the case of the action is barred of the judgment in the divorce proceeding in the

Nevada Court wherein the respondent had acknowledged that he and the petitioner had nocommon property as of June 11, 1982.

Issue:

Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged

conjugal property in the Philippines.

Held:

It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and private

respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative community property, complete

separation of property or any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is that the Nevada

divorce of the parties that the Nevada Court obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner and privaterespondent.


4/25

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo

139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen,was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had

2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with

Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitionersbusiness in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed

therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as theadministrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in

Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to suepetitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation

before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens

may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are validaccording to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondentby virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the

end of justice is to be serve


5/25

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio

CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,

Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian

family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick andEditha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady ofPerpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately

without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still inAustralia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory

Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on

March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage withEditha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to

prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:


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The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid

and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though

the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document wasinadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/

embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or

official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is

not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the

Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to

receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry

petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.


7/25

Republic vs. Orbecido Case Digest

Republic vs. Orbecido

472 SCRA 114

Facts:On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married

in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, LadyMyros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she wasnaturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was livingwith his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorcedecree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invokingpar. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboangadel Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that,

petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional TrialCourt. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to theinstant case.

Issue:Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).

Ruling:

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of thecelebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instantcase is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were twoFilipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen andsubsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed sheremarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of

Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtainedabroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there

was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fatewould have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorcecapacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipinospouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization heis still barred from remarrying.


8/25

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidenceshowing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorcedecree and had remarried.Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to Facebook
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9/25

Under Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code (FC), where a marriage between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained

abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewisehave the capacity to remarry under Philippine Law. This is the law which Gerry, a former

Filipino citizen who became a Canadian citizen tried to use in his case.

On January 8, 2005 Gerry married Lyn, a Filipina, in Pasig City. But due to work and other

professional commitments, he had to leave for Canada soon after the wedding. Sometime inApril 2005 however, he returned to the Philippines intending to surprise his wife, but was the one

shocked to discover that Lyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,

Gerry returned to Canada to file a petition for divorce. The divorce decree was granted onDecember 8, 2005 and took effect a month later on January 8, 2006.

Since then Gerry has moved on and two years later he found another Filipina to love. Desirous of

marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, he went to the Pasig City Registry Office

and registered the Canadian divorce decree. The National Statistics Office (NSO) howeverinformed Gerry that the marriage between him and Lyn still subsists under Philippine law and

that the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine

court in order to be enforceable.

Accordingly, Gerry filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for judicial recognitionof foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved. Although summoned, Lyn did not

file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the court,

offering no opposition to Gerrys petition. In fact she said that she would have filed a similarcase herself but for financial and personal problems. She thus requested that she be considered a

party-in-interest with a similar prayer as Gerrys.

On October 30, 2008, the RTC denied Gerrys petition. The RTC said that Gerry was not the

proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is aCanadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the FC in order for him/her to remarry under Philippine law. Was the

RTC correct?

The RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the FCfor the benefit of the Filipino spouse. The alien spouse can claim no right under the said

paragraph. Essentially, the said paragraph provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to

have his/her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him/her to

remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the FC, the judicial recognition of theforeign divorce, whether in a proceeding precisely for the purpose or as a related issue in another

proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognizedivorce as a mode of severing the marital bond. The policy against absolute divorce cannot be

subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country (Article 17, Civil Code).

Opinion ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1


10/25

The FC recognizes only two types of defective marriages void and voidable. In both cases, the

basis for judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at

the time of the marriage. Divorce on the other hand contemplates the dissolution of the lawfulunion for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce

between Filipino citizens.

But even if Gerry as an alien has no right under the said second paragraph of the FC, his petition

before the RTC should not be dismissed. The unavailability of the said paragraph does notnecessarily strip him of legal interest to petition the RTC for recognition of his foreign divorce

decree. His direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe

him with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of theforeign judgment. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with

Canadian laws have been duly proven, serves as presumptive evidence of a right in favor of

Gerry pursuant to Section 48. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The case should therefore beremanded to the trial court for further proceedings especially to determine whether the divorce

decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law and to allow other interested parties to oppose

the foreign judgment and overcome the presumptive evidence of a right in Gerrys favor underthe said foreign judgment (Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas, G.R. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA

266).

* * *


11/25

Thursday, December 20, 2012

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS Case Digest

GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMASG.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadiancitizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipinanamed Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbertleft for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in

April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having anaffair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and fileda petition for divorce and was granted.

Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his newFilipina fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered theCanadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSOofficial informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to beenforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippinecourt.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration ofmarriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested forthe same prayer.

RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos andnot to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares thatno entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. TheRules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for aspecial remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judiciallycancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictionaland procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing

the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.


12/25

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, Jr.

March 29, 1995 (A.M. No. MTJ-92-706)

PARTIES:

Complainant: LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA

Respondent: JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,Manila

FACTS:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety

against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.

Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondentJudge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida

Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went

through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a validmarriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went

through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a

marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los

Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposesthat he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent also

argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that

his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines;while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Read the rest of this entry
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13/25

Morigo vs People

Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but

after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition

for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He

subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was nomarriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of

arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo

pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner

contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete

before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage

ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a

marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriagewhen he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and

is acquitted in the case filed.Posted by hyper_jetsetterat 6:23:00 PM
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Sunday, September 16, 2012

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera Case Digest

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera174 SCRA 653

Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, andprivate respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the FederalRepublic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple livedtogether for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed bya separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. Heclaimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since

April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of

divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the childwas granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legalseparation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manilaon January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filedtwo complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while stillmarried to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as earlyas 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with aprayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower

court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot beprosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action,it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legalrepresentation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is stillsubsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present

case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, theFederal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may berecognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of thenationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Privaterespondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing tocommence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse atthe time he filed suit.


15/25

FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC

Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of

the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late

brother A and B.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between A and B had

been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license

being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the

marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a

marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether a person may bring an action for the

declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his

deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the OLD Civil

Code?

RULING: YES. Before anything more, the Court has to clarify

the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter

(A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitlyprovides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or

wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between

marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized


16/25

under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family

Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a

procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confinedonly to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for

declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from

the limitation, to wit:

Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date

of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity

of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the

Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between A and B was contracted

on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil

Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the

marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the

marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration

of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC hadabsolutely no application to the petitioner.


17/25

Ty vs CA Case Digest

Ty vs. CAG.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

Facts: Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in acivil and church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic RelationsCourt of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriageof license.

Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, privaterespondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in achurch wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until privaterespondent petition that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage oflicense and that at the time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He

stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to AnnaMaria had not been issued.

Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She submittedthe marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the evidence.However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with maritalobligations of the respondent.

Ruling: There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital

obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in thepresent case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to privaterespondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimatewife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baselesscomplaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.

Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays thewife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application ofthe law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.


18/25

Republic vs. Miller, GR No. 125932, April 22, 1999Posted by Pius Morados on March 27, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption by aliens, vested rights)

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles

City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child and Youth

Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving theirirrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the

basis of its evaluation.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino

child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the

effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in

force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affectedby the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an

exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
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Facts: Petitioner Dueas is the daughter of the late

Cecilio Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a

parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares

located at General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City ,Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty

subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the

Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision. The Land Registration

Commission approved the project and the National

Housing Authority issued the required Certificate of

Registration and License to Sell. At the time ofCecilios death in 1988, there were already several

residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.

Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA

submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her

to provide within the subdivision an open space for

recreational and other community activities, in

accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as

amended by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner, however,

rejected the request, thus, prompting the members

of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. The

Regional Director HLURB opined that the open

space requirement of P.D. No. 957 was not

applicable to Santos Subdivision. SSHA filed amotion for reconsideration, which averred among

others that: P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively

to Santos Subdivision. HLURB-NCR dismissed the

complaint. It ruled that while SSHA failed to


20/25

present evidence showing that it is an association

duly organized under Philippine law with capacity

to sue. SSHA then appealed to the HLURB Board of

Commissioners. The latter body, however, affirmedthe action taken by the HLURB-NCR office.

Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals

which granted the petition and accordingly ordered

the case to be remanded to the HLURB. Petitioner

moved for reconsideration which the Court of

Appeals denied.

Issue : Whether or not PD No. 957 should be

retroactively applies in this case

Held:The petitioner assails the appellate courts

finding based on the Supreme Courts previous

ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon which allowed

P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively.

The Supreme Court ruled that Eugenio v. Exec.

Sec. Drilon is inapplicable in this case. The issue in

Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to

purchase agreements on lots entered into prior toits enactment where there was non-payment of

amortizations, and failure to develop the

subdivision. It held therein that although P.D. No.

957 does not provide for any retroactive


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application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of

protecting the helpless citizens from the

manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous

subdivision and condominium sellers justify itsretroactive application to contracts entered into

prior to its enactment. Hence, the SC ruled that the

non-payment of amortizations was justified under

Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure

of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision

project.

Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the

subdivision is not present in this case, nor any

allegation of non-payment of amortizations.

Further, it has held in a subsequent case that P.D.

No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied

retroactively in view of the absence of any express

provision on its retroactive application. Thus:

Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall

have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is

provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express

provision for its retroactive application must bemade in the law. There being no such provision in

both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot

be applied to a situation that occurred years before

their promulgation.


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The SC has examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and

has not found any clause or provision expressly

providing for its retroactive application. Basic is therule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or

regulation shall be given retrospective effect

unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is no legal

basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply

retroactively.


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How to Digest a Case

A case digest or a case brief is a written summary of the case. A case sometimesinvolves several issues. Digesting the same would help the student in separating one

issue from another and understanding how the Court resolved the issues in the case.The student does not need to discuss all the issues decided in the case in his casedigest. He only needs to focus on the relevant issue or the issue related to the subjectthat he is taking. A case digest may also serve as a useful study aid for classdiscussions and exams. A student who has a case digest does not need to go back tothe case in order to remember what he has read.

Format of the Case Digest

I. Caption. This includes the title of the case, the date it was decided, and citation.Include also the petitioner, respondent, and the ponente.

II. Facts. There is no need to include all the facts. Just include those that are relevant tothe subject.

III. Issues. Include only those that are relevant. Issues are usually framed in the form ofquestions that are answerable by "yes" or "no," for example, "Is the contract void?"Sometimes, students frame the question by starting it with the word "whether," forexample, "Whether the contract is void" or "Whether or not the contract is void." Theanswer to the question has to be answered in the ruling.

IV. Ruling. This usually starts with a "yes" or a "no." This is the answer to the question/s

involving the issue. After the categorical yes/no answer, the reason for the decision willbe explained.

V. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions. This part is optional, but it would help toinclude them because there are professors who ask for separate opinions in recitations.

Sample Case Digest

DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS226 SCRA 572Petitioner: Roberto Domingo

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Delia Soledad AveraPonente: J. Romero

FACTS:

On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petitionentitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against RobertoDomingo. The petition, which was filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:
http://www.pinoycasedigest.info/http://www.pinoycasedigest.info/http://www.pinoycasedigest.info/


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(a) they were married on November 29, 1976;

(b) unknown to her (Delia), he had a previous marriage with Emerina dela Paz on April25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing;

(c) she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerina suedthem for bigamy;

(d) since 1979, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in thePhilippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted byher employer;

(e) Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support andsubsistence;

(f) Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession ofRoberto, who disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge andconsent;

(g) while on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage,which is void ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested thatprivate respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of theproperties alleged to have been acquired by their union.

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner's motion for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not a petition for judicial delaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If inthe affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.)

2) Whether or not the petition entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separationof Property" is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real andpersonal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

HELD:

1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot beaccomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that theirunion is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to amockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.


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On the other hand, the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment delaring suchmarriage void" in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring theprevious marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.

2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together

with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. TheFamily Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relationsgoverning them.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA's decision is affirmed.

Scra Cases

Documents

Transcript of Scra Cases