Save the Rhinos

The Rhino Facing Extinction

Game Theory

Instructor: David McAdams

February 24, 2014

Brett Farley

Andrei Horga

Reza Logday

Tina Retief

Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction

The Plea for Help:Dear Game Theory strategists,

I am in a life threatening position and I would like to call on you for help to ensure my and my

family’s survival. I am one of 20 000 rhinos left in the world, with poaching rates exceeding

birth rates my kind are on the brink of extinction (Stoddard, 2014). In 2013 alone 1000+ rhinos

were poached, which is a 50% increase on 2012’s figures, and the highest in modern history

(Stoddard, 2014), as shown below.

Figure 1: Rhinos poached in South Africa 2000- 2013. South African Department of Environmental Affairs. Retrieved from

http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics

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I find myself in South Africa, which is home to 73% of the world’s rhinos with poachers

flocking here to obtain our precious horn. Sixty-five percent of rhino kills are in South Africa,

with the poaching network stretching internationally (Affairs, 2014). Our horns are being

exported to Vietnam and Chinese markets where they are irrationally perceived as status symbols

or used as party drugs, aphrodisiac or as a treatment against cancer (Guildford, 2013). I just

don’t understand it as my horn is made of keratin, the same material human nails and hair is

made of (Ellis, 2014). Can’t they rather just grind and use their nail clippings for their health

tonics instead of killing my friends and I for a little bit of Keratin? My elephant brothers also

struggled with this problem, but fortunately they shook them off as Ivory become uncool. When

is it my turn to be uncool?

The poachers have become increasingly competent at tracking us down using night vision

goggles, high-powered weapons, dart guns and helicopters operating in gangs. What sort of a

chance do we stand with just four legs? Even some of the farmers are cutting off our horns to

prevent us from being shot, or selling us as our security is breaking the bank and poses a risk to

their family’s safety (Sharife, 2013).

Admittedly it seems it is a lucrative possession to have with my 2 kilogram (4.4lbs) horn

reaching $120 000 ($60 000/kg). In Vietnam Rhino horn prices reach between $33 and $133 per

gram, which is double the price of gold and higher than the cost of cocaine (Guildford, 2013).

There is talk of several options, including conservation authorities and private landowners set up

anti-poaching units armed with latest weapons and drones to stop the trade. My concern is as

imminent as tomorrow as I might not be able to stick around to find solution. Thus I am in

desperate need of your help game theorists to act fast to find solutions to save my family and I.

Fondest from the green pastures of the Kruger National Park,

Rex The Rhino

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Several Popular Solutions ConsideredWe have considered many different options to save Rex the Rhino. The following section

describes solutions that we considered and discarded, as they were not optimal in combating the

poaching epidemic. Our optimal solution is described at the end.

Trade EmbargoA trade embargo with the countries that are identified as being the main culprits (Vietnam and

China) was considered as a way to punish these countries and force their governments into action

to stop the trade of Rhino horn. The problem with this solution is that often the governments

have no control of the poachers and illegal traders and are therefore almost powerless to stop it.

There is also massive underlying corruption in many of these governments that extends far

beyond the trade of Rhino horn and so asking these governments to solve one problem of this

sort would be almost impossible. In addition these countries are often significant trade partners

and so it would far too much of a financial sacrifice in many instances to have a trade embargo

with these countries and the trade embargo would only hurt the legitimate businesses while the

black market businesses will continue to thrive.

In our solution we had to weigh the conservation of an endangered species against the significant

financial implications that a trade embargo would have and decided that it would not be feasible

to implement a unilateral trade embargo.

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PoisonAnother option that was seriously considered was to poison the horn of the all Rhinos. This

would mean that poison would be injected into these horns and that the consumption of this horn

would result in the person either becoming ill or dying. This is already done at a small scale level

(Tafline, 2013).

This was a drastic proposition and the hope was that once people start realizing that these horns

could potentially kill them, they would stop demanding them and this would drive the prices

down and make it unattractive for the poachers.

The problem with this solution was that the majority of Rhino horns would have to be poisoned

for this solution to work and this would be almost impossible logistically as this poison would

have to be injected on a regular basis. If the poachers felt that there was still a reasonable chance

of getting an unpoisoned horn, they would keep poaching. Another reason with this is that the

people who would suffer would be the ignorant consumers rather than the poachers. These

consumers are already paying a lot of money for something that has no health benefits and will

not potentially die when they consume it, all while the poacher still gets paid. We felt that while

the conservation of Rhinos is very important, it would not be correct to advocate for a solution

that takes human lives to save the lives of Rhinos.

Improved Security and ConservationSixty-five percent of the world’s rhino population, and 60% of all the rhinos poached yearly are

in Kruger National Park (“Helping Rhinos,” 2014) . Kruger has lost 50% of its Rhinos since

2010. This is ground zero for conservation, and this is where the war on poaching will be won or

lost.

Seventy percent of rhino killings in South Africa can be attributed to Mozambiquans. With a

long, porous border between South Africa and Mozambique, and 7580 square miles to patrol,

there is simply not enough manpower available to secure the rhinos.

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There are “multiple incursions of up to 15 heavily armed poaching groups in Kruger at any given

time”, who shoot at park rangers on sight (Carnie, 2014a). Many of these poachers are ex-

Mozambiquan militiamen, trained in their previous civil war. During a full moon, up to 60

poaching groups are in the park (“Posts about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos,” 2014).

The rhino war is getting bloodier and bloodier in these battlefields, with an estimated 300

Mozambiquan poachers (who make up 70% of the poachers) killed in Kruger since 2008 (“Posts

about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos,” 2014).

The SA government has deployed 262 troops and 1 helicopter to patrol Kruger national park, and

has even deployed an unarmed drone (Laing, 2013). The problem is that there is simply too

much area to cover for this group of park rangers and military. It does not help that the border

with Mozambique is porous, and that rangers and South African military men cannot cross the

border in pursuit of suspects. Many times, cases against poachers must be dropped as the

evidence is mysteriously lost (as syndicates bribe officials).

As shown below, arrests are increasing every year, but this does not deter poachers, many of who

are promised enormous sums of money (relative to their living situation) for a Rhino horn.

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Figure 2: Number of rhino poaching arrests in South Africa, 2010-2013. South African Department of Environmental Affairs.

Retrieved from http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics

We have considered deploying more drones to the area, but as a drone only has 90 minutes of

fly/surveillance time, this is not practical. Increasing security at Kruger could help, but it is still a

massive space, and with only 262 troops protecting rhinos against up to 60 poaching groups that

shoot to kill, this will only increase the bloodshed. Most likely the poachers will simply move to

a less secure park if security is increased at Kruger. As long as it’s profitable to them, the will

continue to hunt, so this solution is not optimal.

Increased penalties will have the same effect. While it might deter a few, if you are promised

more than a year’s salary as a poor farmer, would you still poach rhinos? The answer is yes, as it

is simply too lucrative to poach.

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Ship Rhinos to AustraliaSeveral drastic options were considered to save the rhino, which include transporting some

animals to alternative locations for safeguarding. South Africa, which has 73% of the world’s

rhino population, struggles to monitor and protect the current rhino population and therefore

suggests an alternative home as contingency plan. Australia is included as an suggested

alternative home, to prevent their extinction and the country’s ability to guard them and lower

likelihood of bribery and corruption of guarding officials in Australia (Carnie, 2014b).

While we feel this could work on a small scale, the Rhinos remaining in Africa would still get

poached, perhaps at an ever greater rate, as there is less supply easily available, which could

push prices up, making the Rhino horn even more profitable for crime syndicates. This could be

a safeguard against extinction, but it would not solve our poaching problem.

CounterfeitThe idea would be to create and flood the market with fake Rhino horns with the intention of

reducing the price of Rhino horns and therefore the incentive to poach Rhinos. The proportion of

counterfeits needs to be just enough to creating doubt in consumers’ minds about the market. For

some, counterfeits may still provide the placebo effect and may satisfy those wanting to impress

colleagues through a status symbol.

This approach has its merits, but time is running out and the R&D required to create credible

fakes would take some time. Although this would provide some funding to continue R&D, there

would be a continuous race against improving detection technologies by the better-funded

syndicate networks. The syndicates would potentially be incentivized to create and support

testing labs, which would add to the cost of “certified” Rhino horns, and this would circumvent

the fake horns, much like DeBeers is doing with their support of artificial diamond detection

machinery.

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Selected Solution – Legalization, Dehorning, and Farming

LegalizationLegalization seems to be a good solution to the dilemma, as it would allow us to cater to the

needs of irrational consumers who truly believe that these Rhino horns will provide them with

health benefits. If we assume that it would be very difficult to eradicate this mentality from the

consumers of Rhino horn, then this may be the best strategy. If we cannot eradicate this

consumer mentality then it means that there will always be demand that will need to be fulfilled

and the best way would be to make it unattractive financially to poachers, who are responsible

for the majority of Rhino deaths.

Removing horn from a Rhino to sell does not mean that the Rhino has to be killed. It could

simply be a similar sort of case to that of sheep that are sheared for their wool whenever it has

grown back. By legalizing and regulating the market for Rhino horn, legitimate businesses will

enter the market and these businesses will adhere to the regulations and through farming and

other sources will increase supply and this will drive prices down and there will be less incentive

to poach Rhino horn.

The problem with this approach is largely that we would be advocating the consumption of

Rhino horn, which would almost give it a stamp of approval in some consumers eyes and this

may result in the consumption increasing dramatically. However as long as this demand is

catered for be legitimate supply, then this should not be a problem. The other issue would be that

we would continue to sit by while consumers waste their money on something that has been

scientifically proven to have no health properties, but the aim is to save the lives of the

endangered Rhino species and as said this solution would more than likely be the best suited if

we are dealing with a market of consumers whose mentality cannot be changed.

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De-horningDe-horning has been heralded as a solution to the poaching dilemma. If Rhinos were to be

legally dehorned, poachers would have no incentive to kill them, and demand could be met via a

renewable supply. Namibia was the first to dehorn Rhinos legally, in 1989. This proved to be

successful, as not a single dehorned rhino was poached (“De-horning,” 2014).

However, this raises a few concerns. Firstly, Rhinos use their horns for mating rituals. Dehorning

increases infant mortality as mothers are less able to protect them from predators, however it

reduces mortality from adult fight (Berger & Cunningham, 1994). A hornless Rhino could be at

evolutionary risk.

Secondly, dehorned Rhinos are still killed. This could be because the poacher doesn’t want to

track the same (economically) valueless Rhino again. Or it could be out of vengeance, to display

to the park rangers that they will not stop killing if they de-horn (“De-horning,” 2014).

There are significant challenges of trying to reach 100% dehorning of Rhinos. Not only is it

expensive and time consuming, at $1,000 per Rhino, but also not all Rhinos can be tranquilized,

such as the very young or pregnant Rhinos. Some will be able to hide. This now makes the

supply of Rhino horn even rarer, and pushes up the price, leading to increased poaching of those

left with horns - young Rhinos and pregnant Rhinos - leading to a dramatic decrease in

population.

Making Rhino horn legal makes it socially acceptable and increases demand. A legal market

enables laundering opportunities and provides cover for illegal trade and may encourage illegal

farming.

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The suggestion of dehorning has been seen as highly controversial by conservation groups and it

will require some convincing to get buy in. Culling of Elephants in Kruger Park was also

controversial when it was started. As they have no natural predators, culling was used to keep

their numbers under control and prevent habitat destruction and is beginning to be accepted by

the public.

FarmingSpeaking to increased supply farming is a natural choice, but is proving to be a difficult option.

Through rearing animals on a program with numbers as a key output the extinction of the animal

can be managed to an extent. In nature rhinos age until an average of 35 - 40 years, with females

beginning breeding at 4 years old, but males only sexually mature at 9 years old. The gap

between calves is however 3 to 4 years, which can make breeding under monitored environments

possible, with gestation taking 16 to 18 months. These factors highlight the difficulty of natural

reproduction.

A suggested solution would be for mature rhinos to be taken into captivity for farming purposes

and producing offspring and released into the wild. Through marking females breeding can take

place every three to four years constantly yielding new rhinos in an attempt for breeding rates to

exceed poaching rates.

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Flood MarketAnother method that can be used to control supply, and thus customer price, is flooding the

market with stockpiled rhino horns. South Africa alone has 16,000 tons of stockpiled horn

(Mead, 2013). The thinking here is that if we flood the market with supply, price will drop

significantly, and every player in the illegal supply chain will have less of an incentive to do their

part - as it is not as profitable, thus poaching would be reduced.

This method has been attempted before. In 1997 and 2008, elephant ivory was auctioned legally,

China and Japan colluded before the auction to keep prices low and short change the selling

countries. Once the Chinese government acquired the elephant horn, they did not flood the

market to lower prices but instead kept supply limited, charging high prices, and in effect

competing with the illegal crime syndicates (Revkin, 2012). This actually caused prices to

double and caused poaching of elephants to be increased by three times as they were more

lucrative and profitable. A legal distribution system would be required to get the products

directly into the hands of consumers and avoid this problem.

The long-term effect of flooding the market set a bad precedent; implicitly approving of rhino

horn usage in Asia and encouraging more Chinese and Vietnamese may buy horn. This is also

true if indeed the prices do manage to go down, as more people can financially access the horn.

Flooding the market with no legalized, trusted, distribution system will therefore not work.

However, if there was some sort of legalized, monopolized control, flooding the market could

indeed keep the price down, and possibly discourage the illegal poaching of Rhinos. This, in

addition to a customer education campaign, could decrease both supply and demand side

pressures on rhino horn.

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Monopoly (DeBeers Model)The cartelization option requires legalization, but differs from the option to flood the market as it

attempts to control the market and increase the price to reduce demand. The market would be

modeled on DeBeers in that Rhino horn would only be sold legally through a centralized selling

organization who controls distribution channels and supply levels. In the long term, high costs

may encourage the Vietnamese government and others to step in and help spread the message.

Until then, Southern Africa could ride the wave until the bubble bursts.

This option would be financially beneficial to farmers and the National Parks as a whole. It costs

$2,000 to tranquilize and dehorn a Rhino and the horn can be sold for $120,000 or more. Horns

regrow fully every 2 years, but may need to be done more frequently to reduce poaching risks to

Rhinos with valuable part-grown horns. Revenue could be used for:

Registration, monitoring, policing, stockpile security and monopoly control

Conservation and anti-poaching efforts

Community health and education (with clear messages of funding source)

The monopoly approach can only be effective if it has complete control of the supply. All Rhinos

therefore need to be dehorned to avoid poacher efforts being redirected to those with horns. By

focusing efforts on dehorning all rhinos quickly, the monopoly will effectively make the first

move, sending a strong and highly observable signal to the poachers that the game has changed.

To maintain credibility and highlight its irreversibility, the dehorning process needs to continue

uninterrupted for a long period of time (decades).

Tourism is likely to be negatively affected; however there will be a large increase in awareness

and publicity with Rhinos dehorned on this scale. Some people may unfortunately profit from

stockpiled Rhino horns previously sourced illegally.

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Education and PRRhino horn is made of a hard material, mostly keratin much like fingernails and human hair, with

the perception of great medicinal benefits. Through education and solid public relation work the

user can be educated and break down the information cascade, which they are a victim of. This

misperception costs users serious heavily and causes unnecessary death of rhinos. Through

simple perception change and educating consumers the perception change can have physical

impact affecting the information asymmetry. Education and effective public relations campaigns

can be used to educate the user indicating a lack of benefit and can therefore impact use of the

horn.

Education in terms of scientific testing can be done using a placebo controlled test and prove the

inefficiency of the products. This should be widely publicized and featured to spread the words.

Insinuation can be created the poachers robbing people selling them Keratin, and charging in

excess of the price of gold.

The following techniques are recommended to change the perception:

Emotional pictures of rhino casualties and harm done to rhinos removing the horn, such

as the one below.

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Figure 3: An illegally dehorned Rhino. Source unknown.

An educational smear campaign can be used which bad mouths rhino horn buyers.

Stigmas can also be associated implying damaging future generations with bad karma of

rhino horn buyers or users. Vietnam being the biggest user of the product the campaign

should be targeted to this audience, and stigmatize on a property that is important in their

culture. This threat can be helpful in changing the game.

Through educating users the properties of rhino horn alternatives to their ailments can be

discussed. Alternatives, which can be discussed instead: abalone, Viagra, zinc. Instead

of sign of wealth or status symbol luxury goods can be used instead, and through flooding

the market with rapid price decrease rhino horn will lose its value as status symbol.

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By combining the monopoly and education suggestions, Rhino horns could be sold with

packaging similar to that from no-smoking campaigns (pictures of slaughtered rhinos and

educational information about the lack of health benefits) to educate users and reduce demand.

References

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Affairs, S. A. D. of E. (2014). Poaching Statistics. South African

Department of Environmental Affairs. Retrieved February 24, 2014,

from http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics

Berger, J., & Cunningham, C. (1994). Phenotypic Alterations,

Evolutionarily Significant Structures, and Rhino Conservation.

Conservation Biology, 8, 833–840. doi:10.1046/j.1523-

1739.1994.08030833.x

Carnie, T. (2014a). 11 poachers killed in rhino war. IOL. Retrieved

February 24, 2014, from

http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/11-poachers-killed-in-

rhino-war-1.1634857#.UwtxKv3HSoU

Carnie, T. (2014b). Plan to ship SA rhinos to Australia. IOL. Retrieved

February 24, 2014, from

http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/environment/plan-to-ship-sa-

rhinos-to-australia-1.1648375#.Uwttcf3HSoV

De-horning. (2014). Save The Rhino. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from

http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/issues_for_debate/de-

horning

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Ellis, R. (2014). Poaching for Traditional Chinese Medicine. Save The

Rhino. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from

http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/threats_to_rhino/poachin

g_for_traditional_chinese_medicine

Guildford, G. (2013). Why Does a Rhino Horn Cost $300,000? Because

Vietnam Thinks It Cures Cancer and Hangovers - Gwynn Guilford -

The Atlantic. The Atlantic. Retrieved from

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05/why-does-

a-rhino-horn-cost-300-000-because-vietnam-thinks-it-cures-cancer-

and-hangovers/275881/

Helping Rhinos. (2014). Game Reserves United. Retrieved February 24,

2014, from http://www.helpingrhinos.org/how-we-help/game-

reserves-united/

Laing, A. (2013). Drones join war on rhino poachers in South Africa. The

Telegraph. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocea

n/southafrica/10082727/Drones-join-war-on-rhino-poachers-in-

South-Africa.html

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Mead, D. (2013). Why South Africa’s Proposed Rhino Horn Auction

Won't Work As Advertised | Motherboard. Vice. Retrieved February

24, 2014, from http://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/blog/why-

south-africas-proposed-rhino-horn-auction-wont-work-as-

advertised

Posts about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos. (2014). Fight for

Rhinos. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from

http://fightforrhinos.com/tag/kruger-national-park/

Revkin, A. (2012). A Story Exposes How the Chinese Government is

Fueling Elephant Slaughter. New Scientist. Retrieved February 24,

2014, from http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/a-

report-exposes-how-the-chinese-government-is-fueling-elephant-

slaughter/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

Sharife, K. (2013). Is it time to legalise rhino horn trade? Le Monde

Diplomatique. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from

http://mondediplo.com/openpage/is-it-time-to-legalise-rhino-horn-

trade

Stoddard, E. (2014). More than 1,000 rhinos poached in South Africa

last year - Government - Yahoo News. Yahoo News. Retrieved

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February 24, 2014, from http://news.yahoo.com/more-1-000-

rhinos-poached-south-africa-last-135215268.html

Tafline, L. (2013). South African Game Reserve Poisoned 100 Rhino

Horns to Curtail Poaching. Inhabitat. Retrieved February 24, 2014,

from http://inhabitat.com/south-african-game-reserve-poisoned-

100-rhino-horns-to-curtail-poaching/

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