S12j security for dstl

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presentation to workshop on the ESRC / MoD research call on Security and Science, Institute of Physics, London, 1 st November 2012 Andy Stirling SPRU & STEPS Centre “Social, Ethical and Cultural Challenges” in UK security-related research

Transcript of S12j security for dstl

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presentation to workshop on the ESRC / MoD research call onSecurity and Science,

Institute of Physics, London, 1st November 2012

Andy StirlingSPRU & STEPS Centre

“Social, Ethical and Cultural Challenges”

in UK security-related research

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“S&T Opportunities and Threats”

2012 ESRC/DSTL Call:…•How the risks to defence and security that emerge from future developments in S&T can be better assessed and addressed?

•The influence of cultural, historical, ethical, economic and societal factors on how S&T is developed and harnessed in future to present opportunities and threats for defence and security. …

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“S&T Opportunities and Threats”

2012 ESRC/DSTL Call:…•How the risks to defence and security that emerge from future developments in S&T can be better assessed and addressed?

•The influence of cultural, historical, ethical, economic and societal factors on how S&T is developed and harnessed in future to present opportunities and threats for defence and security. …

Rigorous social science and humanities thinking on ‘security’- requires broadening out and opening up traditional terms of debate. (Call: divergent views … preventive co-operation … economic factors …

Blackett Review … Solana Report )

Robust research requires understandings of how future S&T “emerge”:- governance challenges on ‘direction’ as well as ‘rate’, ‘risk’ and ‘race’ (Call: “… the vanguard … the rate of advance in S&T…”)

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- The Economist

`

“we'll restore science to its rightful place”… - President Obama

“Our hope … relies on scientific and technological progress” - Premier Wen Jiabao

PROGRESS

“you can’t stop progress” …

“One can not impede scientific progress.” - President Ahmadinejad

Mainstream Research Policy

all innovation is progress…

Lisbon Strategy for: “pro-innovation action”

- EU Council of Ministers

“we need more pro-innovation policies” - PM Gordon

Brown

“… the Government’s strategy is … pro-innovation” - PM David Cameron

TECHNOLOGY

SCIENCE

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PROGRESS

TECHNOLOGY

Lord Alec Broers, President, RAEng

…“history is a race to advance technology”

Technology:

“will determine the future of the human race’”

The challenge of government:

“to strive to stay in the race”…

The role of the public:

“to give technology the status it deserves”…

The One-Track, Hard-Wired Innovation Race

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Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives… no politics … no choice !

“OPPORTINITIES & THREATS”

TECHNOLOGY

Conventional Innovation Policy

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“OPPORTINITIES & THREATS”

Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !

Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast? … who leads?

TECHNOLOGY

Conventional Innovation Policy

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“OPPORTINITIES & THREATS”

TECHNOLOGY

Treats innovation as homogeneous: no distinctions … no alternatives … no politics … no choice !

Scope for debate restricted to: yes or no? … how much? how fast?’ … who leads?

Seriously neglects questions over: which way? …what alternatives? says who? …why?

Conventional Innovation Policy

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Constituted by institutions, practices, discourses, imaginations… knowledges of many kinds … as well as science and technology

BUT: not all that is conceivable, feasible, viable – will be fully realisable

For instance... “sustainable energy”

Innovation as Branching Social Pathways

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Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways

social shaping (Bijker, 85) co-construction (Misa, 03) studies: expectations (Brown, 03) imaginations (Jasanoff, 05)

Innovation as Branching Social Pathways

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Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways

history: contingency (Mokyr, 92) momentum (Hughes 83)path-dependence (David, 85) path creation

(Karnoe, 01)

Innovation as Branching Social Pathways

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Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways

philosophy: autonomy (Winner, 77) closure (Feenberg, 91)/politics entrapment (Walker, 01) alignment (Geels, 02)

Innovation as Branching Social Pathways

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Intended and unintended processes and power ‘close down’ pathways

economics: homeostasis (Sahal, 85) lock-in (Arthur, 89) regimes (Nelson & Winter, 77) trajectories (Dosi,

82)

Innovation as Branching Social Pathways

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Research and Innovation for Security?

Does UK security research consider alternative directions for investment?

Is UK research itself somewhat ‘locked in’ to military applications?

Are concepts of ‘security’ in UK research sufficiently balanced?

?

Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?

1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)

Is ‘security’ predominantly about capacity to project military force?

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Does UK security research consider alternative directions for innovation?

Is UK research itself too ‘locked in’ to security-related applications?

(Call: “majority of reported global S&T advancement is associated with civil research” )

?

Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?

1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)

Is ‘security’ predominantly about capacity to project military force?

Research and Innovation for Security?

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Does UK security research consider alternative directions for innovation?

Is UK research itself too ‘locked in’ to security-related applications?

Are concepts of ‘security’ in UK research sufficiently balanced?

?

Non-nuclear defence? Relinquished force projection? Resilience not coercion?

1/3 UK public funding is military (higher in robotics, nanoscience, aerospace?)

Do military paths offer best security? How much security from security industry?

Research and Innovation for Security?

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“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?

• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?

• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?

• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?

• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?

• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?

• “Dual use” (eg: rising global integration, infrastructure dependency?)

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?

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• Military and securitisation as insecurity (eg: conditions, options)?

• Social inequalities as drivers of insecurity (eg: poverty, injustice)?

• Changing global contexts (eg: Blackett Report: climate, pandemics)?

• Infrastructure vulnerabilities (eg: tier 1: industrial, cyber, terror, crisis)?

• Uncertainty or control (eg: agility, resilience, robustness, diversity)?

• Security as ‘end not means’ (eg: health, integrity, wellbeing, equity)?

• Beyond organised violence to ‘human security’ (eg: Solana Report)?

• Ethical issues (eg: mass destruction, robotic systems, violence)?

• Dual use” (eg: rising global integration, infrastructure dependency?)

• Opportunity? geopolitics (interdependence, soft power, hegemony)? - reduced relative power raises UK benefits of nonviolent security strategies?

“Challenge” or Opportunity: Real Security?