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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONSAuthor(s): S. KörnerSource: The Monist, Vol. 51, No. 3, Kant Today: Part I (JULY, 1967), pp. 317-331Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902036
Accessed: 19-10-2015 01:37 UTC
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8/19/2019 S. Korner - The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions
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THE
IMPOSSIBILITY
OF
TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS
The
purpose
of this
paper
is
first
to
explain
a
general
notion
ot
transcendental
deductions,
of
which
the
Kantian
are
special
cases;
next to
show,
and
to
illustrate
by
examples
from Kant's
work,
that
no
transcendental
deduction
can
be
successful;
and
thirdly
to
put
one
of Kant's
achievements
in its
proper
light by substituting
for
his
spurious
distinction between
metaphysical
exposition
and
transcendental
deduction,
a
revised notion
of
metaphysical
expo
sition
and
of
the
philosophical
tasks
arising
out
of
it.
L
The General
Notion
oj
a
Transcendental
Deduction
Making
statements
about
the
external
world
presupposes
not
only
a
prior
distinction
between
oneself
and that
world,
but
also
a
method for
differentiating,
within
one's
experience
of
it,
external
objects
and
attributes-properties
and relations
of which external
objects
are
the
bearers.
I
shall
say
that
such
a
method of external
differentiation is associated
with,
or
belongs
to,
a
categorial
schema
or,
briefly,
a
schema
of
external differentiation
if,
and
only
if,
the attributes employed comprise what may be called respectively,
in
accordance
with
philosophical
tradition,
constitutive and
in
dividuating
attributes.
An
attribute
is
constitutive
(of
external
objects)
if,
and
only
if,
it
is
applicable
to external
objects
and
if,
in
addition,
its
applicability
to an
object
logically
implies,
and
is
logically
implied
by,
the
object's being
an
external
object.
I
shall
say,
more
briefly,
that
a
constitutive
attribute
is
comprehensively
applicable
to
external
objects.
An
attribute
is
individuating
(for
external
objects)
if,
and
only
if,
it is
applicable
to
every
external
object
and
if,
in
addition,
its
applicability
to
an
external
object
logically implies, and is logically implied by, the external object's
being
distinct from
all other external
objects.
I
shall
say,
more
briefly,
that
an
individuating
attribute
exhaustively
individuates
external
objects.
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318
THE MONIST
Some
comments
on
these definitions
may
be
helpful.
Although
not
yet
fully
general, they
fit,
for
example,
Kant's
view of
the
attribute
'x
is
a
substance*
as
constitutive
of,
and
his view
of
the
attribute
6x
wholly
occupies
a
region
of absolute
space
during
a
period
of
absolute time*
as
individuating
for,
external
objects.
The
term
logically
implies
is used
to
express
the
converse
of the
relation
of
logical
deducibility
with
respect
to
some
underlying
logic,
which
at
this
stage
need
not
be
made
explicit.
An
individuat
ing
attribute the
possession
of which
by
an external
object
logi
cally
implies
its
being
distinct from
all
others,
must not
be
confused
with
any
merely
identifying
attribute
the
possession
of
which
by
an
external
object
happens
as a
matter
of fact
to
distinguish
it from
all others.
Lastly
it
should be
emphasised
that
a
method of
prior
external
differentiation
does
not
necessarily
belong
to
a
categorial
schema.
Statements
about the external world
are
not
the
only
ones
which
presuppose
a
prior
differentiation of
experience
into
objects
and attributes,
and
thus, possibly,
a
categorial schema consisting
of constitutive
and
individuating
attributes.
We
also
make,
at
least
prima
facie,
statemer
of other
kinds,
presupposing
prior
dif
ferentiations
of other
gions
of
experience,
e.g. sensory,
moral
and
aesthetic
experience,
which
may
or
may
not
belong
to
categorial
schemata. A
schema
of
sensory
differentiation
would
con
tain constitutive
attributes
of,
and
individuating
attributes
for,
sen
sory
objects.
The*
same
would
hold
analogously
for schemata
of
moral
and aesthetic
differentiation,
if
any.
Such
considerations
per
mit
us to
generalize
the
definition of
a
categorial
schema
as
follows:
A method of prior differentiation of a region of experience is as
sociated
with,
or
belongs
to,
a
categorial
schema
if,
and
only
if,
the
attributes
employed
comprise
attributes
which
are
constitutive of
the
region's objects,
and attributes which
are
individuating
for
them.
For
my
purpose
here
it
is
not
necessary
to
raise,
much
less
to
answer,
the
question
why
anybody
uses
the
methods
of
prior
differentiation
which he
does
in
fact
use,
or
why
for him
experience
should
fall
into
more
or
less
clearly distinguishable
regions
and should
fall
into
them
in
one
way
rather than
in
any
other.
A
transcendental
deduction
can
now
be
defined
quite
generally
as a
logically
sound demonstration of the reasons
why
a
particular
categorial
schema
is
not
only
in
fact,
but also
necessarily
employed,
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 319
in
differentiating
a
region
of
experience.
This
definition is
very
wide
indeed
and will
presently
be
shown
to cover
Kant's
conception
of
a
transcendental
deduction.
Because
of
its
generality
it
must
be
protected
against
such
charges
of
vagueness
as
would rob
the
subsequent
discussion
of
all
cogency.
Such
protection
can
be
achieved
by
the
following
characterization
of
the
key-phrases
which
occur
in the
definition.
Although
a
logically
sound
demonstration
need
not
be
a
deductive
argument,
it
may
contain
deductive
argu
ments
in
which case thesemust not be fallacious.
Again,
whatever
else
may
be
meant
by
the
statement that
a
schema
is
necessarily
employed
in
differentiating
a
region
of
experience
it
logically
implies
that
any
method
actually
or
possibly
employed
in
differ
entiating
the
region
belongs
to
the
schema.
Apart
from
these
pro
visos
no
further restrictions
are
imposed
on
interpreting
the
definition.
Among
the
most
important
and
interesting
examples
of
at
tempted
transcendental
deductions
are,
of
course,
those
found
in
Kant's philosophy,
on
which
I
shall be drawing
for
illustrations
of
the
general
thesis
that
transcendental
deductions
are
impossible.
This choice
will limit
me
to
an
examination
of schemata
of
ex
ternal and
practical
differentiation.
Kant's
transcendental
deduc
tions contain
only
such.
He held
that of all
the
methods
of
prior
differentiation of
experience
which
he
investigated, only
those
of
external
and
practical
differentiation-and
not,
for
example,
any
method
of aesthetic
differentiation-belong
to
categorial
schemata.
It would
not
be
difficult
to
find,
in these
or
other
fields,
many
simpler
or more
simple-minded
philosophical
arguments
easily
rec
ognizable as attempts at transcendental deductions in the sense of
our
definition.
II.
The
Impossibility
of
Transcendental
Deductions
I
shall
now
examine
the
preconditions
of
the
possibility
of
any
transcendental
deduction,
and
show
that
at
least
one
of
them is
such
that
it
cannot
be
satisfied;
from
which
result,
of
course,
the
impossibility
of
transcendental
deductions
follows
immediately.
Be
fore
a
transcendental
deduction
can
be
attempted
for
any
region
of
experience,
a method of
prior
differentiation of the
region
must
first
be
exhibited
and
shown
to
belong
to
a
schema.
This,
as
was
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320
THE MONIST
pointed
out
by
and
was
perfectly
clear
to
Kant,
need
not
be the
case.
But
if
the
method of
prior
differentiation does
belong
to
a
schema
the task
of
exhibiting
the schema
is
feasible. It consists
(a)
in
searching
for
nonempty
attributes,
e.g.
an
attribute
P
such
that
?x
is
an
object
of the
region*
logically
implies
and
is
implied
by,
'x
is
a
P\ Sometimes
one
may
succeed
in
the
more
ambitious
task
of
giving
a
complete,
finite
enumeration
of the
simplest
consti
tutive
attributes,
i.e. such
as are
not
logically
equivalent
to
a
con
junction
of other constitutive attributes. We
might,
following
Kant,
call
such
simple
and
finitely
enumerable
attributes
the
cate
gories
of the
region
and
say
that
they
are
ultimately
constitutive
of the
region's
objects.
But
this
pleasant
possibility
may
be
ignored.
The task further
consists
(b)
in
searching
for
at
least
one
non
empty
attribute,
say
such
that
Q
is
applicable
to
every
object
of
the
region,
and
is
such that
'x
is
an
object
of
the
region
and
a
Qf
logically
implies,
and
is
logically
implied
by,
*x
is
a
distinct
object
of
the
region*.
If
another
attribute
say
R,
should also
turn out
to
be
an
individuating attribute for the objects of the region then lx
is
an
object
of the
region
and
an
RJ
logically
implies,
and
is
logical
ly
implied
by,
'x
is
an
object
of
the
region
and
a
Q*.
We
may
again
ignore
this
possibility.
The
fulfilment
of the
first
precondition
of
the
possibility
of
a
transcendental
deduction,
i.e. of
the above
tasks
(a)
and
(b)
may
be called
the
establishment of
a
schema -on
the
basis
of
investigating
a
particular
method
of
prior
differentiation
of
a
region
of
experience
into
objects
and
attributes.
With
the
establishment
of
a
schema the
preconditions
for
its
transcendental deduction
are,
however,
not
yet
satisfied. For
to
establish a schema is to establish that a particular method for dif
ferentiating
a
region
of
experience belongs
to
the
schema,
and
not
that
any
method which
might
actually
or
possibly
be
thus
em
ployed,
also
belongs
to
it.
Before
one can
show
why
any
and
every
possible
method
belongs
to
the
schema
one
has
to
show
that
any
and
every
possible
method
belongs
to
it.
One
must,
as
I
shall
say,
demonstrate
the
schema's
uniqueness.
How could
this
be
done? Prima
facie
three
possibilities
are
open.
First,
to
demonstrate the
schema's
uniqueness
by
comparing
it with
experience
undifferentiated
by
any
method
of
prior
differ
entiation. But this cannot be done since the statements
by
which
the
comparison
would
have
to
be
made,
cannot
be
formulated
with
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 321
out
employing
some
prior
differentiation of
experience;
and
even
if
there
were
undifferentiated
experience,
one
could
at
best
show
that
a
certain
schema reflects
it,
and
not
that
some
other
schema
could
not
also
reflect
it.
Second,
to
demonstrate
the
schema's
uniqueness
by
comparing
it
with
its
possible competitors.
But
this
presupposes
that
they
all
can
be
exhibited,
and
is
self-contradictory
in
attempting
a
demonstration
of
the
schema's
uniqueness,
by
con
ceding
that
the
schema
was
not
unique. Thirdly,
one
might propose
to examine the schema and its
application
entirely
from
within
the
schema
itself,
i.e.
by
means
of
statements
belonging
to
it.
Such
an
examination,
at
best,
could
only
show
how the
schema
functions
in
the differentiation
of
a
region
of
experience,
not
that
it
is
the
only
possible
schema
to
which
every
differentiation of
the
region
must
belong.
The
three
methods
include
the
possible grounds
for
a
con
cordance between
reality
and
its
apprehension,
mentioned
in
the
preface
to
the
second
edition
of
The
Critique
of
Pure
Reason.
In
order
to
avoid vague appeals
to
demonstrations of
a
categorial
schema's
uniqueness
by
other
methods,
e.g.
some
mystical
insight
or some
special
Logic,
I
am
prepared
to
reduce
my
claim
to
the
thesis that
uniqueness
demonstrations
of
a
schema
by
comparing
it
with
undifferentiated
experience,
by
comparing
it
with
other
sche
mata,
or
by
examining
it
from
within,
are
impossible.
It
should
be
noted that
I am
speaking
not
of isolated
concepts,
such
as
'per
manence*
or
'change*,
which
may
or
may
not
be
indispensable
to
our
thinking,
but which
by
themselves
are
not
constitutive
of,
or
individuating
for,
the
objects
of
a
region
of
experience-even
though a demonstration of their uniqueness is, as I should be pre
pared
to
argue,
equally
impossible.
It is the
impossibility
of
demonstrating
a
schema's
uniqueness
that renders
transcendental
deductions
impossible.
The
general
argument
just
sketched
rests
mainly
on
two
distinctions:
the
dis
tinction
between
a
method
of
prior
differentiation
and
its
cate
gorial
schema,
if
any;
and
the distinction
between
(a)
establish
ing
that
a
method of
prior
differentiation
belongs
to
a
schema
and
(b)
demonstrating
the
uniqueness
of the
schema. In
order
to
illus
trate
my
conclusion
with
examples
from
Kant's
work,
I
shall
try
to choose such as will not
only
serve to draw attention to
errors,
but
will
also
suggest
reasons
why
these
errors
are
liable
to
escape
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322
THE MONIST
undetected.
I
begin
with what
I
consider
to
be
a
mistake
which
all
the
Kantian
attempts
at
transcendental
deductions
have in
common.
Assume that
we
have
investigated
a
method of
prior
differentia
tion
of
a
region
of
experience
and
found that it
belongs
to
a
schema.
The
result,
as
we
have
seen,
is
formulated
(a)
by
state
ments
to
the
effect
that
some
of
the
attributes
employed
by
the
method
are
constitutive
of the
objects
of the
region,
e.g.
that
among
the attributes is
one,
say
P,
such that P
is
applicable
to
objects
of
the
region
and
such
that
*x
is
an
object
of
the
region* logically
implies,
and is
implied
by,
(x
is
a
P\
(b)
by
statements
to
the effect
that
one
(or
more)
of
the
attributes
employed
are
individuating
for
the
objects
of the
region,
e.g.
that
among
the attributes is
an
at
tribute,
say
Q,
such
that
Q
applies
to
every
object
of
the
region
and
such that
*x
is
an
object
of
the
region
and
a
Q*
logically
implies,
and
is
implied
by,
'x
is
a
distinct
object
of
the
region*.
Let
us
now,
as
Kant
did,
examine
the
logical
status
of
(a)
statements
of
compre
hensive applicability and (b) statements of exhaustive individuation.
Each
of
them
is
a
conjunction
of
two
statements. The
first
ex
presses
that the extension
of
an
attribute
is,
as
a
matter
of
fact,
not
empty,
that
something
exists,
the existence of
which
could
not
be
guaranteed
by logic
or
definitions alone.
It
is
therefore
a
synthetic
statement.
The second
is
clearly logically
necessary.
Since
a con
junction
of
a
synthetic
and
a
logically
necessary
statement
is
syn
thetic,
the
statements
of
comprehensive
applicability
and
exhaus
tive individuation
are
all
synthetic.
Moreover,
each of these
two
kinds
of statements
in
question,
namely that of comprehensive applicability and that of exhaustive
individuation,
is
compatible
with
any
statement
about
objects,
i.e.
with
any
statement
expressing
the
applicability
or
inapplicability
of attributes
to
objects-provided
that
such
a
statement
is
made
by
a
method of
prior
differentiation which
belongs
to
the
schema.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
in
that
case no
attribute
can
be
applied
or
refused
to
any
objects
except
such
as
are
constituted and
indi
viduated
by
the
schema's
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes.
Thus
no
incompatibility
can
arise
between
the
statements
of
com
prehensive applicability
and
exhaustive
individuation of
a
cate
gorial
schema on the one
hand,
and
any
statement
expressed
by
a
method of
prior
differentiation
belonging
to
the
schema
on
the
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 323
other. The
statements
of
comprehensive
applicability
and
exhaus
tive
individuation
are
thus
a
priori
with
respect
to
a
particular
rschema,
namely
the
schema which
comprises
them.
It
does
not
fol
low that
they
are
also
a
priori
with
respect
to
any
schema
which
can
be
claimed
to
be
the
only
one
possible,
i.e. that
they
are
uniquely
a
priori.
Thus
in
establishing
that
a
method of
prior
differentiation
belongs
to
a
schema
one
shows
eo
ipso
that
the
statements
of
comprehensive applicability
and
of
exhaustive
indi
viduation
are
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori.
To
show that
they
are
uniquely
a
priori
would
require
a
demonstration
of
the
schema's
uniqueness,
which
I
have
just
argued
to
be
impossible.
Kant
did
not see
this,
and he
conflates
uniquely
a
priori
with
nonuniquely
a
priori
statements.
This
conflation
not
only
per
vades
his
whole
philosophy,
but
even
determines
its
structure,
espe
cially
the division
of
all his
principal
arguments
into
metaphysical
expositions
and transcendental
deductions.1 A
metaphysical exposi
tion
which exhibits
a
concept
as,
or
exhibits
it insofar
as
it
is,
a
priori is always the result of inquiry into one actually employed
method of
differentiation.
It
can
thus
at
best establish the
schema,
if
any,
to
which the
method
belongs.
A
transcendental
deduction,
aimed
at
showing
that
and how
a
priori
concepts
are
applicable
or
possible,
examines
only
the
schema
which
has
been
established
by
the
metaphysical
exposition
of
this
particular
schema.
It
thus
does
not
examine
a
schema the
uniqueness
of
which
has been
dem
onstrated. Kant's
failure
even
to
consider the
need for
interpolating
a
uniqueness-demonstration
between
any
metaphysical
exposition
and
a
corresponding
transcendental deduction
and
his
conflation
of
nonuniquely and uniquely a priori statements are so intimately
related
that
they
deserve
to
be
regarded
as
two
aspects
of
the
same
error.
The
reasons
why
these
points,
which
in
our own
day
are
not
too
difficult
to
see,
have
escaped
Kant,
are
partly
historical and
partly
logical.
The historical
ones,
are,
of
course,
that
like
most
of
his
contemporaries,
Kant
considered the
mathematics
and
physics
of
his
day
and
the
moral code
by
which he
found
himself
bound,
to
be
true
beyond
doubt;
he felt in
no
way
compelled
to
consider,
therefore,
the
question
of schemata
other
than
those
to
which be
l
See
Critique
of
Pure
Reason,
B.
38,
80 etc.
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8/19/2019 S. Korner - The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions
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324
THE MONIST
long
the
methods
of differentiation
employed
by
him
in his mathe
matical,
physical
and
moral
thinking.
The
logical
reasons
are
that
his
various
attempts
at
transcendental
deductions
contain
sub
sidiary
assumptions
which tend
to
reinforce
the
common
error
underlying
all of them.
The
Transcendental
Aesthetic
which
exhibits
the individuat
ing
attributes
of
the Kantian
schema
is
based
on
the
assumption
that the
propositions
of
Euclidean
geometry
describe
the
spatial
relations
between
external
objects;
also
the
more
general assump
tion that
ii-per
impossibile-two
different
geometries
were
con
ceivable,
then
at most
one
of them
would
describe,
and
at
least
one
would
misdescribe,
these
relations.
However,
neither
Euclidean
geometry,
nor
any
other,
describes
the
spatial
structure
of external
objects
or
the
spatial
relations
between
them.
A
physical
triangle,
for
example,
is
not
an
instance of the
concept
'Euclidean
triangle*,
or
for
that
matter
'non-Euclidean
triangle',
just
as
neither
a
Euclid
ean
triangle
nor
a
non-Euclidean
one
is
an
instance
of
the
con
cept 'physical triangle*.To apply geometry to the external world
is
not to
assert
geometrical
attributes
of
external
objects,
but
to
identify
external
objects
with
instances of
geometrical
attributes
in
certain
contexts
and
for certain
purposes,
i.e.
to
treat
them
as
if
they
were
identical. The
applicability,
in
this
sense
of
one
geometry
does
not
exclude the
applicability
of another.
Kant
assumes
the
unique
applicability
to
external
objects
of
Euclidean
geometry,
without
even
attempting
to
establish
the
assumption.
Yet the
assumption
of
the
unique applicability
of
Euclidean
geometry
to
external
objects
is
a
key
premiss
in
the
very
argument
by
which he
tries to establish that spatio-temporal location in Euclidean space
and
Newtonian
time
is
the
principle
of
individuation
for
all
ex
ternal
objects-a
principle
which
he
shows
to
be
synthetic,
and
non
uniquely
(not,
as
he
thinks,
uniquely)
a
priori.
Again,
the
Transcendental
Analytic,
which
exhibits
the
consti
tutive attributes
of
the
Kantian
schema,
assumes
as
a
principle
that
the
categories
must
be
recognized
as
conditions
a
priori
of
the
pos
sibility
of
experience2
conceived
as
differentiated
into
distinct
exter
nal
objects
and
attributes
of
such.
Sufficient
conditions
are
not
distinguished
from
sufficient
and
necessary
conditions.
The
former,
2
See
e.g.
B
126.
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 325
which
Kant
tries
to
establish,
are
satisfied
by
the
establishment
of
a
schema.
The latter
would
be satisfied
only
if the schema's
unique
ness were
also
demonstrated. Failure
to
distinguish
between
the
two
lands
of
conditions
thus
supports
the conflation of
statements
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori,
with
synthetic
and
uniquely
a
priori
statements
of
comprehensive
applicability.
The
most
convincing
way
to
expose
Kant's
failure
to
give
a
transcendental
deduction of
the
schema
of
external
differentiation
established in
the
Critique
of
Pure
Reason,
is
simply
to
provide
an
example
of
a
different
schema
of
external
differentiation. Since
I
have
gone
into this
point
in
detail
elsewhere,3
I
may
put
it
here
quite
briefly.
Grant
that
determinate
spatio-temporal
location,
as
conceived
by
Newton
and
Kant,
exhaustively
individuates
exter
nal
objects
of
which
the Kantian
categories
of
substance,
causality
and
the
rest,
are
the
constitutive
attributes;
and
grant
also
that
the
statements
to
this
effect
are
synthetic
a
priori.
The
existence
of
relativistic
quantum-mechanics
compels
us
to
grant
equally
that
determinate spatio-temporal location in a spatio-temporal con
tinuum
of
an
altogether
different kind
exhaustively
individuates
ex
ternal
objects
of
which the
constitutive
attributes
are
quite
other
than
the
Kantian
categories;
and
to
grant
equally
that
the
state
ments to
this
effect
are
synthetic
a
priori.
But
neither
schema
of
external
differentiation is
unique;
and the
synthetic
a
priori
state
ments
about the
comprehensive
applicability
of,
and the
exhaustive
individuation
for,
external
objects
with
respect
to
either
schema
are
non-uniquely
a
priori.
In
Kant's
practical
philosophy
he
investigates
a
method
for
dif
ferentiating objects and attributes within the experience of the
practicable.
The
objects
might
be
called
morally
relevant
objects
since their
attributes
include
moral
attributes.
By
exhibiting
the
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
employed
by
the
method,
the
method
is
shown
to
belong
to
a
schema.
Again
no
attempt
is
made
to
demonstrate
the
uniqueness
of
the
schema.
Such
an
at
tempt
could
not,
as
I
have
argued,
in
any
case
have been
successful,
from
which
circumstance
the
impossibility
of
any
transcendental
deduction of
the schema
immediately
follows.
3'Zur
Kantischen
Begr
ndung
der
Mathematik und der
Naturwissenschaften*
Kant
Studien,
56,
No.
s/4
1966).
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8/19/2019 S. Korner - The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions
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326
THE MONIST
At
this
point,
however,
Kant
varies
his usual
procedure.
Hav
ing
established the
schema,
he
does
not
immediately
attempt
its
transcendental deduction.
Instead
he
tries
to
derive
a new
principle
from
it,
namely
the
categorical
imperative,
the
applicability
of
which
does
not
only
characterize
the
merely
morally
relevant
ob
jects,
which
are
constituted and
individuated
by
the
schema,
but
also those
among
the
morally
relevant
objects
which
are
the
bearers
of
moral
value.
Only
after
the
alleged
derivation
of
the
cate
gorical
imperative
is
completed,
does he
attempt
a transcendental
deduction
of
it
and
the
schema.
Kant's belief
that
an
examination of
his schema
of
practical
differentiation
yields
the
categorical
imperative,
which
he
regarded
as
a
necessary
and
sufficient criterion
of
the
morality
of
any
action,
was one
of
the
main
reasons
why,
in his
practical
philosophy,
he
overlooked
the
circumstance
that
to
establish
a
schema
is
not to
demonstrate
its
uniqueness;
and
why
consequently
there
too
he
conflated
synthetic
statements
which
are
nonuniquely
a
priori
with
uniquely
a
priori ones. I shall not consider Kant's derivation of the
categorical
imperative
from
the
allegedly
unique
schema
of
practi
cal
differentiation. Instead
I
shall
compare
that
schema
with
a
dif
ferent
one,
thus
providing
the
strongest
possible
kind of
argu
ment
against
the
assumption
of
its
uniqueness,
and,
therefore,
against
the soundness of
the
attempted
transcendental
deduction
of it.
Since
what
is
practicable
is
practicable
in
the external
world,
any
method
of
practical
differentiation will
depend
on,
and
vary
with,
the
adopted
method of
external
differentiation
and
even
with substantive
assumptions
about the external world, formulated
by
means
of this method.
Let
us
ignore
such
variations,
however
important
they
may
be.
Kant's
metaphysical
exposition
as
a
search
for the
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
employed
in
his
method
of
practical
differentiation
leads him
to
the
following
con
clusions:
(a)
the
attribute
'x
is
a
morally
relevant
object*
is
not
empty;
and it
logically
implies,
and
is
logically
implied
by,
lx
is
a
type
of
act
and
x
is
performed
in
accordance
with
a
maxim,
chosen
by
an
agent*,
(b)
The
latter attribute
is
not
only
constitutive
of
morally
relevant
objects,
but also individuates them
exhaustively.
The
key-terms
of the bilateral
implication require
comment.
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 327
An
act
is
the
intentional initiation
(prevention
or
nonpreven
tion)
by
a
person
of
a
change
in the situation which confronts
him.
A
maxim
is
a
rule
of the
general
form:
'If in
a
situation
of
type
S,
perform
an
act
of
type
A\
S
and
A
are
not
the
unmanage
ably
long,
and
possibly
unlimited,
conjunctions
of
attributes
which
are
respectively
characteristic of
concrete
situations
and
particular
acts.
They
are
manageable
conjunctions
of
relevant
attributes
their
relevance
or
irrelevance
being
determined
by
the
person
who
chooses themaxim before
acting,
who formulates it
retrospectively
or
who is
at
least assumed
to
be
capable
of
doing
so.
S
may,
and
usually
does,
comprise
some
reference
to
the
person's
desires
and
intentions
other
than
the
intention
involved
in
performing
the
act.
A
need
not,
usually
does
not,
and-on
some
interpretations
of
Kant's
theory-must
not,
comprise
such
a
reference.
Examples
of
maxims where
A
does
not
comprise
it
are:
If in
. . .
help
(or
don't
help)
your
neighbour,
commit
(or
don't
commit)
suicide
etc.
According
to
Kant
an
act
by
itself is
not
a
morally
relevant ob
ject.What constitutes and individuates the bearers of moral at
tributes,
i.e.
of
moral
value,
disvalue and
indifference,
is the
type
A
under
which
a
person
subsumes his
act,
and
the maxim
to
which
he conforms in
acting.
At this
point
a
glance
at
the
history
of moral
philosophy
is
sufficient
to
provide
examples
of
schemata
of
practical
differentiation,
which
are
internally
consistent,
have
been
actually
employed
and
are
quite
different from
the
Kantian.
According
to
a
whole class
of
such
schemata
a
morally
relevant
object
is
a
com
plicated
relation
between
an
act,
the
agent's
beliefs,
the truth
or
falsehood of his beliefs and his
desires. Such
a
relation
need
not
depend on the person's chosen maxims; and is quite compatible
with
the reasonable
assumption
that
not
every
act
is
governed
by
a
maxim.
The
Kantian
schema of
practical
differentiation
is
non
unique
and
its
transcendental deduction
therefore
impossible.
III.
A
Revised Notion
of
Metaphysical
Exposition
Before
arguing
that
the
spurious
distinction
between
meta
physical
exposition
and
transcendental
deduction
should
be
re
placed by
a
revised
notion of
metaphysical
exposition
and
showing
how much in
harmony
such
replacement
is with some of Kant's
insights,
another
attempt
must be
briefly
examined
at
reconstruct
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13/16
328
THE MONIST
ing
the
strategy
of the transcendental
philosophy.
It
sees
the
fundamental
error not
in
neglecting
the
problem
of
demonstrating
the
(undemonstrable)
uniqueness
of
any
schema of
differentiation,
but
merely
in
a
narrowness
of
the
methods
investigated
by
Kant
of
prior
differentiation
and
a
corresponding
narrowness
of
the
schemata
established
by
him.
On this
view
the
post-Kantian
development
of
physics
and
mathematics,
for
example,
would
merely
show the
Kantian
schema
of external differentiation as
having
to be
widened
before a
transcendental
deduction
is
attempted;
one
need
not
regard
a
transcendental
deduction
as
in
principle
impossible.
Thus
the
indi
viduating
attribute
for
external
objects
'x
wholly
occupies
a
region
of
space
and
an
interval
of
time
as
conceived
by
Newton*
is
to
be
replaced
by
*x
wholly
occupies
a
region
of
space
and
an
interval
of
time
as
conceived
by
Newton
or a
spatio-temporal
region
as
conceived
by
Einstein*.
In
a
similar
manner
the
Kantian
con
stitutive attributes
are
to
be
replaced
by
unions of
them
with
other
corresponding constitutive attributes. But, then, how could one
show that the
available
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
exhaust
all
the conceivable
ones,
or
that
all
those
conceivable
have
been
conceived?
To
show
this,
one
would
have
to
produce
a
dem
onstration
of
the
widened
schema's
uniqueness
and,
as
has been
argued
quite
generally,
such
a
demonstration is
impossible.
In
his
metaphysical
expositions
of
a
particular
method
of
prior
external
and
a
particular
method of
prior
practical
differentiation,
Kant
has established that
they
belong
to
schemata,
i.e.
that
they
employ
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes.
The
statements
to
the effect that the constitutive attributes are comprehensively ap
plicable
to
the
objects
of the
differentiated
region
of
experience
and
that the
individuating
are
exhaustively
individuating
for
them,
are
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori-not
as
Kant
thought
uniquely
a
priori.
These
statements
do
not
demarcate the
structure
of
any
method
of
external
or
of
practical
differentiation,
as
neces
sarily
unchangeable;
they
are
compatible
with the
assumption-and
the historical
truth-that
schemata of external
and
practical
dif
ferentiation
can
change
and
become obsolete.
The constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
of
a
schema
which is no
longer
employed,
may
even turn out, or be
judged,
to
be
empty.
Having
e.g.
abandoned
the
Kantian schema of
external
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 329
differentiation
in favour of
another,
it
becomes
possible-looking
as
it
were
from
the
outside-to
assert
that the
Kantian attribute
of
substance is
empty,
i.e.
that
the
synthetic,
nonuniquely
a
priori
statement
asserting
its
comprehensive
applicability
to
external
ob
jects
is
false.
A
social
anthropologist
may
in
a
similar
manner
judge
that
the
constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
of
a
de
monology,
which he has
investigated,
are
empty,
even
though
a
cer
tain
way
of life
might
be
inseparably
bound
up
with
it.
In order
to
do
justice
to
such
possibilities
I now
define
a
revised
notion
of
metaphysical
exposition,
which
relativizes
the Kantian
absolute
notion in
a
number
of
ways.
It
is the
analysis
of
methods
for
the
differentiation of
more-or-less-well-demarcated
domains into
objects
and
attributes
which aims
at
the
exhibition
of
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori
statements,
by
exhibiting
the
schemata
in
respect
of which
the
statements
are a
priori.
The
differentiated
domain,
as
became clear
in
discussing
geometrical
statements,
need
not
be
a
region
of
experience.
It
may
be
a
domain of
ideal
ob
jects. A method of differentiation belongs, we remember, to a
schema
if,
and
only
if,
it
employs
attributes
which
are
constitutive
of all
objects
of
the
domain
and
attributes
which
individuate
all
of
them.
The constitutive
and
individuating
attributes
are
the
schema.
A
statement
is
synthetic
if,
and
only
if,
it
is
not
logically
valid
with
respect
to
the
logic
underlying
the
methods
of
dif
ferentiation
being
considered.
Thus
we
must,
distinguish
e.g.
statements
synthetic
with
respect
to
classical
from
those
synthetic
with
respect
to
intuitionist
logic.
A
statement
is
a
priori
with
re
spect
to
a
schema
if,
and
only
if,
it
is
compatible
with
any
statement
in which an attribute is applied to one or more distinct objects
by
means
of
any
method
which
belongs
to
the schema.
Among
the
kinds
of
schemata
which
a
metaphysical
exposition
(in
the revised
sense)
of various
methods
of
differentiation
may
establish for
them
are
the
following:
Schemata
(a)
of
external
differentiation,
including
the schema
established in
the
Critique
of
Pure
Reason
for
the
method
of external
differentiation
investigated
by
it. But
there
are
other,
methods of
external
differentiation
be
longing
to
the
same or
other
schemata.
Schemata
(b)
of
practical
differentiation,
including
the
schema
established in
the
Critique
of
Practical Reason for the method of
practical
differentiation in
vestigated
by
it. But
there
are
other
methods
of
practical
differentia
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8/19/2019 S. Korner - The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions
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330
THE MONIST
tion
belonging
to
the
same or
other
schemata.
Schemata
(c)
of
idealized external
or,
briefly,
mathematical
differentiation of
a
do
main
which is
an
idealization
of
some
aspects
of
external
experience.
The
methods
of
differentiating
such
a
domain
and
the
statements
which
are
true
about
it,
are
sometimes
expressed
in
axiomatic
mathematical
theories,
even
though
a
large
class
of
such
theories
cannot,
as
G
del has
shown,
comprise
all
the statements
which
are
true
about
the
domain.
Kant,
as
was
pointed
out
earlier,
failed
to
recognize
the
multiplicity
of
possible
mathematical
schemata
and
confused
mathematical
with
external
differentiation.
Schemata
(d)
of
idealized
practical
differentiation,
which
are
of
interest
in the
study
of certain
normative,
e.g.
legal,
systems.
Schemata
(e)
of
logical
differentiation.
Their
establishment
results
in
synthetic
non
uniquely
a
priori
statements
of
comprehensive
applicability.
Such
a
statement
is
a
conjunction
consisting
of
two
statements,
an
ana
lytic
statement
asserting
that
certain
statement-forms
are
true
of
all
objects
constituted
and
individuated
by
any
of
the available
meth
ods of differentiation, and
a
synthetic statement asserting that the
domain of
these
objects
is
not
empty.
Kant,
who
was
not
faced with
the
problem
of
alternative
logics,
naturally
did
not
consider this
possibility.
Every
synthetic,
nonuniquely
a
priori
statement
is
a
priori
with
respect
to
at
least
one
schema.
Thus
statements
of
comprehensive
applicability
and
exhaustive
individuation
are
a
priori
with
respect
to
the schema
to
whose
constitutive and
individuating
attributes
they
refer.
Next,
all
synthetic,
ideal
statements
are a
priori
with
respect
to
any
schema
of
external
differentiation,
because
no
state
ment solely about ideal objects can be incompatible with any state
ments
solely
about
external
objects,
however
these
may
be
consti
tuted
or
individuated.
Again
the
question
how
far
statements
which
belong
to
a
schema
of
practical
differentiation are
a
priori
with
re
spect
to
a
schema of
external
differentiation
cannot
be answered
in
general,
since
methods of
external
differentiation and
methods
of
practical
differentiation
(and
their
schemata,
if
any)
may
stand
in
a
variety
of
relations
to
each other.
The
important
Kantian
distinction
between
synthetic
a
priori
statements
and
regulative
principles
remains
valid.
We
might
de
fine a
regulative
principle
as
being
synthetic
if,
and
only
if,
the
statement
describing
the
type
of
action
prescribed
by
the
principle
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8/19/2019 S. Korner - The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions
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IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS 331
is
synthetic;
and
as
a
priori
with
respect
to
a
schema of
differentia
tion
if,
and
only
if,
the
descriptive
statement
is
compatible
with
any
statement
in
which
attributes
are
applied
to
objects
by
a
method
of
differentiation
which
belongs
to
the
schema.
Regulative
prin
ciples
which
are
in this
sense
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori
dif
fer,
of
course,
from
synthetic
and
nonuniquely
a
priori
statements
by
having
no
truth-value.
In the
course
of
a
metaphysical exposition
such
principles
will
often be
uncovered,
whether
or
not
we
decide
to
include
their
exhibition
among
its
explicit
aims.
Epistemologi
cally
of
greatest
interest
are
those
regulative
principles
which
regu
late
the
construction
of theories
and those
which
express
preferences
for
some
schemata
over
others.
Transcendental
deductions of
schemata and
of
synthetic
a
priori
statements
are,
as
I
have
argued,
impossible
because
their
unique
ness
cannot
be
demonstrated.
The
Kantian
question
as
to
how
synthetic
and
uniquely
a
priori
judgements
are
possible
does
not
arise.
In
its
place,
however,
there
arises
another
question:
How
are
synthetic and nonuniquely a priori statements possible? To answer
this
question
is,
as we
have learned
from
Kant,
to
examine the
function
of
such
statements,
that
is
to
say
their
relations
to
each
other,
to
analytic
and
to
empirical
statements.
The
task is
by
no
means
simple
or
trivial
as can
be
seen,
for
example,
by
considering
the relation
in
scientific
thinking
between various
schemata
of
ex
ternal,
ideal
and
logical
differentiation.
Moreover,
since
contrary
to
Kant's
convictions,
not
only
methods of
differentiation
but
also
the
schemata
to
which
they
belong
can
and
do
change,
the task
cannot
be
completed
once
and for
all,
but
must
be
undertaken
over and over again.
S.
K
RNER
THE
UNIVERSITY,
BRISTOL