Luciano Ladano vs. Felino Neri et.al. GR 178622, 12 November 2012 [indirect contempt cannot be initiated by motion; initiated either motu propio or by formal charge

FACTS: The case before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA and its resolution which denied the reconsideration of its decision reversing the Decision of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).The case originated from a complaint filed by Petitioner Luciano against Respondent s Neri et. al for entering forcibly in the two-hectare land, asking him to vacate the same, and claiming as the owner of the land. Unheeded, respondents fenced the property and destroyed some incidents to it. Ladano prayed to be declared as rightful owner and maintained that he has been a possessor in good faith for 30 years. The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the complaint. On appeal to DARAB Central Office, it reversed the latter decision. Respondents filed an MR which was likewise denied. On appeal, CA reversed the DARAB Decision. A reconsideration was filed by Ladano but was denied. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Motion for Urgent Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order TRObefore the Court. He alleged that, despite the pendency of his appeal, respondents bulldozed the subject land and destroyed petitioners trees.Since respondents did not deny petitioners factual allegations, the Court granted petitioners motion and issued a TRO. Subsequently, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Cite Private Respondents Felino Neri and Edwin Soto in Contempt of Court.He alleged that these respondents defied the Courts TRO by bulldozing the subject property. He had the incident blottered with the Office of the Barangay Captain and with Precinct 2 of the Philippine National Police in Antipolo City.He attached pictures of bulldozed earth to his motion.Respondents denied the allegations. They maintained that the pictures attached to petitioners motion were taken way back in 2003 and were not truthful representations of the current state of the subject property.ISSUE: Whether respondents are guilty of indirect contemptRULING: NO. A charge for indirect contempt, such as disobedience to a courts lawful order,54is initiated either motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.55It cannot be initiated by a mere motion,56such as the one that petitioner filed.Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that respondents violated the TRO. The entries in the barangay and police blotters attached to his motion carry little weight or probative value as they are not conclusive evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact that these entries were made.57The pictures depicting bulldozing activities likewise contained no indication that they were taken after the Courts issuance of the restraining order. Simply, the Court has no way of gauging the veracity of petitioners factual allegations. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court resolves to deny petitioners motion.The CA rightfully reversed this conclusion. The DARAB failed to consider that ones occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso facto make him a de jure tenant.69It should not have considered such occupation as a basis for assuming the landowners consent, especially when the occupant himself never alleged that he obtained the landowners consent.Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with the landowner of the subject property.Indeed Ladanos Complaint did not assert any right that arises from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession of the two-hectare property and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The issues that he wanted resolved are who between himself and the respondents have a better right to possess the property, and whether he has a right to be compensated for the improvements he introduced on the property. Clearly, the nature of the case be filed is one for forcible entry72and for indemnification,73neither of which is cognizable by the DARAB, but by the regular courts. While neither of the parties challenged the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the Court can consider the issue of jurisdiction motu proprio.PETITION DENIED.

Lipata vs. Tutaan, GR L-16643, September 1983 [Contempt to whom order is given]FACTS: In a decision of Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan (Tutaan), he ordered to Luzviminda Lipatan (Lipatan) and her stepmother to deliver the two-storey house to alleged vendees, spouses Agcaoili, and to pay the latter P800 a month as rental. This decision became final and executory. Their two petitions forcertiorariin the Court of Appeals, assailing the disallowance of their appeal, were dismissed. In an unverified motion, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda and her stepmother be cited or declared in contempt of court and committed to prison until they complied with the decision because, according to the deputy sheriffs return of the alias writ of execution, they failed to obey the decision of Judge Tutaan. Accordingly, Judge Tutaan adjudged Luzviminda in contempt of court because she failed to comply with the writ of execution. She was "sentenced to be confined to the city jail of Quezon City until she shall have complied with the decision". Patrolman Valle was directed to serve the warrant of arrest. She was arrested but released allegedly upon her oral request for an extension. She was re-arrested and confined in jail. Hence this petition forcertiorariand prohibition. ISSUE: whether failure of Lipata (judgment debtor) on the writ of execution merits her to be in contempt of court as such order is valid.RULING: NO. We hold that the contempt order is void. It is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is not contempt of court for a judgment debtor to disobey the writ of execution. It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ. He did not perform his duty, as ordained in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt because of his alleged disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him. A writ of execution issued by a justice of the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the defendant. The delivery of the real property pertains to the sheriff alone to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments.

Inonog vs. Ibay, AM RTJ-09-2715, 28 July 2009 [act to delay the proceedings must be with malice or bad faith for indirect contempt to lie]BRIEF FACTS: The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysayof Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135,MakatiCitywith gross abuse of authority.The complaint involved an incident in the MakatiCity Hallbasement parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked his superiors vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent judge. Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order dated March 18, 2005 in Criminal Cases, directing the complainant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. That same day, respondent judge issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt for failure of Inonong to appear and issued a warrant of arrest.FACTS: Complainant was the security-driver of the Chief of Business Permit Division of Makati City. On March 18, 2005, at aroung 1:00 a.am. Unknown to him, He parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss at the slot of Judge Francisco Ibay (Judge). During that time, the slot that he usually parked was already occupied and that only numbers were indicated. Thereafter, he left the vehicle in the basement, went home because his not feeling well and did not report that day. Later that morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City Government of Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala of respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge.He was informed that the respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case because the latter had a hard time looking for another parking space.Complainant was also informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued. He immediately went left home in Tanay to go to Makati despite of not feeling well. He arrived there only at around 1:00 p.m.He found out that by then he had already been adjudged guilty of contempt of court by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice.He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).A warrant for his arrest was also issued.On March 21, 2005, complainant through counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, but said motion was denied.Subsequently, complainant filed an Amended Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest, attaching proof of payment of the fine in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).In his motions, complainant explained that he did not know that the parking space was reserved for the respondent judge.He also begged for forgiveness and promised not to repeat the incident. Acting on the said amended motion, respondent judge issued an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainants explanation to be unsatisfactory.However, respondent judge modified his previous order by deleting the sentence for imprisonment for five (5) days but the fine ofP1,000.00 was increased toP2,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint. According to respondent judge, complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved for him because it bore his name.He emphasized that prior to the incident, he already had his name indicated at the said slot precisely because there had been previous occasions when other vehicles would occupy his parking space and he had been forced to park at the public parking area.

OCA penalized Judge Ibay to pay a fine of P5,000.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Venancio Inonong is with malice or bad faith as such the contempt order of Judge Ibay is proper and he shall not be administratively liable.RULING: NO. The phrase improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.We held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court.In Lu Ym v. Mahinay (491 SCRA 253 [2006]), we held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Here, the act of complainant is not contrary or clearly prohibited by an order of the court. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.

JUDGE IBAY WSS FOUND GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY ANDORDERED TO PAY A FINE OF P40 000.

IF EVER KAYLANGAN LANG PO. DISCUSSION PO NG OCA SA RECOMMENDATION NILA. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND REQUIREMENTS. Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,136 SCRA 57).Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect.Direct contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (Section 1, Rule 71).Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558).Undoubtedly, Judge Ibay cited the complainant for indirect contempt of court since the subject incident transpired not in the courts presence.In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge.The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings.At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice.Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay.Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the courts honor.xxxxxxxxxAssuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of court, he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in writing and given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel.Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before a person may be punished for indirect contempt, thus: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543).Proceedings against persons charged with contempt of court are commonly treated as criminal in nature, thus this mode of procedure should be strictly followed.