Phobe Sheene Q. Hermosada

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Civil Procedure

Atty. Amando Virgil LigutanRULE 35- SUMMARY JUDGMENTSSec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant

Nocom v. Camerino, G.R. No. 182984, February 10, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing his appeal as the case involves questions of fact; that summary judgment was not proper as there were genuine issues of fact raised in his Answer; that respondents failed to implead their lawyer, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, as an indispensable party-defendant, who, according to them, allegedly connived with him in making them sign the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in his favor; and that since the case partakes of the nature of an action to recover ownership and titles to the properties, respondents complaint should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket fees.

Respondent Oscar Camerino argues that the sole issue to be resolved pertains to the legal issue of whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) denominated as irrevocable may be revoked; that three material facts have been established, i.e., that the SPA was executed, that Atty. Santos facilitated the signing and execution of the SPA, and that petitioner paidP500,000 to each of the respondents in consideration for the signing of the SPA and, thus, summary judgment was proper; and that pure questions of law are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT RAISED IN PETITIONERS ANSWER.

RULING:

The petition has merit.

In dismissing petitioners appeal, the CA erroneously relied on the rationale that the petitioners appeal raised questions of law and, therefore, it had no recourse but to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The summary judgment rendered by the trial court has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and, thus, the petitioner, being the aggrieved party, correctly appealed the adverse decision of the RTC to the CA by filing a notice of appeal coupled with the appellants brief under Rule 41 of the Rules.

Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case involves certain factual issues which remove it from the coverage of a summary judgment.

Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.5A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.

The present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

Summary judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. In this present case, while both parties acknowledge or admit the existence of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney," the variance in the allegations in the pleadings of the petitioner vis--vis that of the respondents require the presentation of evidence on the issue of the validity of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" to determine whether its execution was attended by the vices of consent and whether the respondents and their spouses did not freely and voluntarily execute the same. In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner denied the material allegations of respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint for being false and baseless as respondents were informed that the document they signed was the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" in his favor and that they had received the full consideration of the transaction and, thus, had no legal right over the three parcels of land. Indeed, the presentation of evidence is necessary to determine the validity and legality of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney," dated December 18, 2003, executed by the respondents in favor of the petitioner. From said main factual issue, other relevant issues spring therefrom, to wit: whether the said "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was coupled with interest; whether it had been obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation or other vices of consent; whether the five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers checks given by petitioner to the respondents amounting toP500,000 each were in consideration of the "inchoate and contingent rights" of the respondents in favor of the petitioner; whether Atty. Santos connived with petitioner in causing the preparation of the said document and, therefore, should be impleaded as party-defendant together with the petitioner; whether respondents deposited the amount ofP9,790,612.00 plusP147,059.18 with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256; and whether the sale of respondents inchoate and contingent rights amounted to a champertous contract.

Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware, G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners aver that the summary judgment issued by the RTC is improper and without legal bases, considering that genuine issues were raised in the pleadings filed by petitioners.

ISSUE:

WON THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS (PETITIONERS).

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.

In this respect, the Court's ruling in Nocom v. Camerino,is instructive, to wit:

x x x When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A "genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.

In the present case, it bears to note that in its original Complaint, as well as in its Amended Complaint, respondent did not allege as to how petitioners' partial payments of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied to the latter's obligations. In fact, there is no allegation or admission whatsoever in the said Complaint and Amended Complaint that such partial payments were made. Petitioners, on the other hand, were consistent in raising their affirmative defense of partial payment in their Answer to the Complaint and Answer to Amended Complaint. Having pleaded a valid defense, petitioners, at this point, were deemed to have raised genuine issues of fact.

On the basis of the foregoing, petitioners' defense of partial payment in their Answer to Second Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised genuine issues of fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC in favor of respondent is proper.

Phil. Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010

FACTS:

Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.

Tan discovered thata certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans.Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),and used CST properties as collateral.Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan.

In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB,he claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans.Nevertheless,he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB.According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.

PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00),insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN RECALLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON THE WRONG NOTION THAT THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

RULING:

DENYthe petition for being unmeritorious.

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:

Section 4.Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule,judgment is not rendered upon the whole caseor for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make anorderspecifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.

This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means tosimplifythe trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.

Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010

FACTS:

Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the area.Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the foreshore area.They later formed themselves into the DSierto Beach Resort Owners Association, Inc. (DSierto).

DENR Regional Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease applications of the DSierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the foreshore areas applied for by respondent.

Respondent, through its Public Relations Manager Arlene de Guzman, invited the DSierto members to a luncheon meeting to discuss common details beneficial to all parties concerned.Atty. Liza Marcos (Atty. Marcos), wife of Governor Bongbong Marcos, was present as she was asked by Fort Ilocandia hotel officials to mediate over the conflict among the parties.Atty. Marcos offeredP300,000 as financial settlement per claimant in consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition that they would vacate the area identified as respondents property.A DSierto member made a counter-offer ofP400,000, to which the other DSierto members agreed.

Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag, City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 12891-13, against respondent.Petitioner alleged that his son had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him.

ISSUE:

WON summary judgment is appropriate in this case.

RULING:

The petition has merit.

Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1.Summary Judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment has been explained as follows:

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays.When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper.A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.

Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary judgment has been properly rendered in this case.

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party

Smart v. Aldecoa, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. On March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant lot, measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property).Petitioner, through its contractor, Allarilla Construction, immediately constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.

Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000.

Respondents thus prayed for the RTC to:

1. Issue a temporary restraining order and after due hearing to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;

2. Render judgment:

- Making the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction permanent;

- Declaring the construction of the SMART tower as a nuisance per se or per accidens;

- Ordering the abatement of this nuisance by ordering the removal and/or demolition of petitioners communication tower;

- Condemning petitioner to pay respondents moral damages in the sum ofP150,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum ofP30,000.00;

- Ordering petitioner to pay attorneys fees in the amount ofP20,000.00 plus trial honoraria ofP1,000.00 for every appearance in Court;

- Ordering petitioner to refund to respondents litigation expenses in the amount of not less thanP10,000.00;

petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that reads:

Petitioner SMART Communications Inc., thru counsel, respectfully manifests that:

1. There is no need for a full-blown trial as the causes of action and issues have already been identified in all the pleadings submitted to this Honorable court by both respondents and petitioner

2. There is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact or cause in the action.

3. There is no extreme urgency to issue a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction as stated in an affidavit executed by SMART Senior Supervisor Andres V. Romero in an affidavit hereto attached as Annex "A"

4. Petitioner seeks immediate declaratory relief from respondents contrived allegations as set forth in their complaint;

ISSUE:

WON summary judgment is appropriate in this case.

RULING:

At the outset, the RTC erred in granting petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and ordering the dismissal of respondents Complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000.

Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:

SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation,the Court discussed extensively when a summary judgment is proper:

For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.

The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.

Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving party and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto. Conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise an issue of material fact. A party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculations or compilation of differences. He may not create an issue of fact through bald assertions, unsupported contentions and conclusory statements. He must do more than rely upon allegations but must come forward with specific facts in support of a claim. Where the factual context makes his claim implausible, he must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)

Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual issues disputed or contested by the parties.

Sec. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon

Sec. 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion

Phil. Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010 (Supra.)

FACTS:

Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.

Tan discovered thata certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans.Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00),and used CST properties as collateral.Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts of this loan.

In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB,he claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans.Nevertheless,he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB.According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.

PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00),insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN RECALLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION ON THE WRONG NOTION THAT THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS NOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

RULING:

DENYthe petition for being unmeritorious.

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.

The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:

Section 4.Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this Rule,judgment is not rendered upon the whole caseor for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make anorderspecifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just.The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.

This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means tosimplifythe trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.

Sec. 5. Form of affidavits and supporting papers

Sec. 6. Affidavits in bad faith

RULE 36- JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders

See: Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Gotamco v. Chan Seng, G.R. No. L-22737, November 28, 1924

FACTS:

Antonio Tanpoco died in the year 1920 and left a will dividing his estate of over P300,000 among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant, whom he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three adopted sons, Tan Kimco. Tan Kimbio and Tan Kim Choo, and appointed Go Siu San, a resident of Manila, as executor of his will, which provided that no bond should be required.

During all of this time the minor heirs were still in China. In September, 1922, they arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, on November 27, 1922, Judge Harvey ordered an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad litem of all the minor heirs, including the claimant, who made a written report to the court.

The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan Kim Hong.

After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor, and in his order of removal, among other things, said:

The commissioners Te Sue and that he had not received any claim; that the claims which appears in the report were taken from the books of the business of the deceased, Antonio Tanpoco (p. 16, s. n.); nevertheless, the claim of Tan Peng Sue does not appear in the report of these commissioners on claims although it appears in the books and was afterwards accepted by the commissioners last appointed. In the report of the first commissioners on valuation and claims there appears a claim of Tan Kim Ho (Tan Kim Hong) for the sum of P38,766.69 without any voucher (pp. 11-12, s. n.). This claimant is a minor and was not represented by any guardian orcurador. The commissioner Te Sue testified that he had gone to Tarlac but once and in the year 1922 to attend the claims, but the report of the commissioners bears date previous to that time which demonstrates evidently that the administrator Go Siu San was the person who furnished the data upon which the supposed claims which appear in the report of the commissioners were based notwithstanding the fact that they received no claims."

ISSUE:

WON there is a valid claim.

RULING:

A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .

In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.

Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty upon justice. It appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were notres judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee.

Jose v. Javellana, G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012 (Supra.)

FACTS:

On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration ofP160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land.

They agreed that Javellana would payP80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens Systemand that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for registration.

After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.

Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97.

Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

On June 24, 1999. RTC upon Priscillas Motion for Reconsideration granted her Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that 1. that Javellana had no cause of action, 2. no evidence showing the payment of the balance; 3. that he had never demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal.

On June 21, 2000 Javellanas Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259).

It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition forcertiorariin the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455).

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari,finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders. the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with law.

ISSUE:

WON Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the

order of dismissal was a final order and appealable.RULING:

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of theRules of Courtprovides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders inPahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.Thetesttoascertainwhetheror not an order or a judgment is

interlocutory or final is:does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with thefinal judgment ruleenunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of theRules of Courtto the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action forcertiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given inPahila-Garrido v. Tortogois apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties mayinterpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then iscertiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified thattheprohibitionagainstappealinganorderdenyingamotionfor

reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

Calderon v. Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint3 for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On motion of petitioners counsel, the trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order.

7 On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.

Petitioner emphasized that she is not appealing the Decision dated May 16, 2005 which had become final as no appeal therefrom had been brought by the parties or the City Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Petitioner pointed out that her appeal is from the RTC Order dated March 7, 2005, issued prior to the rendition of the decision in the main case, as well as the May 4, 2005 Order denying her motion for partial reconsideration.13 By Decision dated September 9, 2008, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16, 2005 which had long become final and executory. The CA further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order.

ISSUE:

DID THE CA COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and/or REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RTC ORDERS DATED MARCH 7, 2005 AND MAY 4, 2005 ARE MERELY INTERLOCUTORY.

RULING:

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.18 An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002

FACTS:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr.Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.

During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite.It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case.

It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV,where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28.Upon the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his fathers estate.

In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount ofP47,800.00.

RULING:

That case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B.The parties in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff, and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants.On the other hand, the parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr., as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.

The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former.Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.

Furthermore, Natividads title was clearly not an issue in the first case. In other words, the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. If the first case resolved anything, it was the ownership of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B alone.

Third.Petitioners allege that, as shown by several deeds of sale executed by Maximino, Sr. and Aurea during their lifetime, the intention to dispose of their real properties is clear.Consequently, they argue that the Deed of Sale of January 29, 1970 should also be deemed valid.

This is anon-sequitur.The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino, Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29, 1970 is valid.

Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale.The question, however, is whether these sales were made for a consideration.The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.

Indeed, it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale.

Re: Hon. Suan, A.M. RTJ-04-1849, September 20, 2004

FACTS:

Before the Court are cases against Judge Pedro L. Suan (retired) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Ozamiz City, for gross inefficiency and ignorance of the law; and Judge Resurrection T. Inting (also now retired) of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City, Branch 16, for ignorance of the law.These cases originated as Administrative Matter No. 02-5-298-RTC(Re: Report on the Judicial Audit in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, ofOzamizCity).The Report of the Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator(OCA) dated May 15, 2002, disclosed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,OzamizCity, had as of December 14, 2001, an inventory of two hundred twenty-three (223) civil and criminal cases, of which thirty-nine (39) had already been submitted for decision, but had yet to be acted upon.

Earlier, presiding Judge Pedro L. Suan, in his December 13, 2001 Letter, requested an extension of time within which to finish the foregoing backlog.In a Resolution dated February 11, 2002, this Court granted his request and gave him one hundred eighty (180) days from notice to decide the cases.During the extended period, only fifteen (15) cases were disposed of within the mandated reglementary period.Thus, he left a total of twenty-four (24) unresolved cases.

ISSUE:

WON both judge be held liable for gross inefficiency and ignorance of the lawRULING:

Entrenched in our jurisprudence as early as 1917 is the principle that for judgments to be valid and binding, they should be made by legally constituted judges.Further, not only must judges make their judgments during their tenure, they must also promulgate these within that period.As reiterated inPeople v. Labao,for a judgment to be valid, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it; otherwise, it cannot acquire a binding effect.

Thus, likewise devoid of any legality were the Decisions of Judge Suan in Criminal Case Nos. RTC-1225 (People v. Alberto Dionson), RTC-1878 (People v. Dandy Rubio), RTC-1974 (People v. Amir Razo Vidal), RTC-2003 (People v. Joseph Elnas), RTC-2464 (People v. Larry Gascore), RTC-2646 (People v. Felipe Carreon IV) and RTC-2051 (People v. Vevencio Paglinawan).Though promulgated by his successor, Respondent Judge Inting, these were penned and signed by Judge Suan during his incumbency.

In response, Judge Suan argues that none of the parties in Civil Case Nos. 93-64, 98-42 and 95-01 ever questioned the validity of the disputed Decisions, purportedly because of their faith in his sense of justice and honesty.Needless to say, a decision that is void for failure to comply with substantial requirements would remain invalid, notwithstanding the failure of the parties to question it.Be that as it may, Judge Suans claim is nonetheless belied by the plain fact that all three cases have been elevated to the Court of Appeals.

To exculpate themselves, respondents cite the Supreme Court Resolution of August 12, 2002,which both claim to have authorized them to dispose of the pending cases in the disputed manner.However, this Resolution cannot excuse either of them for ignorance of fundamental legal principles.On July 3 and July 19, 2002, well before the issuance of this Courts August 12, 2002 Resolution, Judge Suan had already promulgated the Decisions in Civil Case Nos. 95-01 and 93-64.This means that, with or without the contentious August 12 directive, he would have proceeded to promulgate them.

The liability of both judges cannot be obliterated by their retirement. When a mistake has been committed as to constitute gross ignorance of the law, the respondent judge would necessarily be answerable despite compulsory retirement.

As early as December 14, 2001, and prior to his receipt of the August 12 directive, Judge Suan had already incurred a delay in twenty-four (24) cases, according to the report of the judicial audit team.Such delays were in violation of the rule that judges should dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the specified period.Under the Constitution, trial judges are given only ninety days -- from the filing of the last pleading, brief and memorandum -- within which to resolve the matter at hand.

Members of the bench have always been exhorted to adhere strictly to the foregoing rule.Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.Failure to comply with the reglementary period has always been regarded as gross inefficiency.Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics unequivocally requires magistrates to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to [them], remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

True, Judge Suan is guilty of delay in deciding cases; and both he and Judge Inting, of gross ignorance of the law.Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that the absence of bad faith on the part of both judges mitigates their liability.

UP v. Hon. Dizon, G.R. No. 171182, August 23, 2012FACTS:

University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in LosBas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty.FelimonNolasco(Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty.Nolascowas not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final andexecutory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC.Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:I.Whether or not the UPs funds can be validly garnished?II.Whether or not the UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed out of time?HELD: The petition for review is meritorious.

FIRST ISSUE: UPs funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.

POLITICAL LAW: garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability.As the Court succinctly stated inMunicipality of San Fernando, La Union v.Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability."Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final andexecutorydecision already validated the claim against the UP.

SECOND ISSUE: Period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record.

REMEDIAL LAW: doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-callednuncprotuncentries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty.Nolascoof the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS inDiliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty.Nolascowas valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPsfavorof the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling inNeypesv. Court of Appeals,viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty.Nolascoreceived the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day."

Petition for review is GRANTED. The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Amovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154559, October 5, 2011

FACTS:

Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the total amount ofP4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages.When BCBI defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.

With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure on June 23, 1977 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union.The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 2794.

GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals.The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 09361.It appears that the Armovit Law Firm ceased to be the counsel of BCBI sometime before the appeal of GSIS.The said law firm and BCBI dispute the legality of the replacement, with BCBI claiming that the Armovit Law Firm had been remiss in its duties as BCBIs counsel.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on February 10, 1988 and the records were remanded to the courta quoon March 14, 1988.The GSIS did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

On October 29, 1992, the Armovit Law Firm filed in Civil Case No. 2794 an Omnibus Motion praying, among other things, that a final assessment of its attorneys fees be computed at 20% on the value of all the properties recovered by BCBI, deducting the amount already paid which is 20% of the money judgment forP1,900,00.00; and that a writ of execution for the full payment of the balance of its attorneys fees be issued.

ISSUE:

THE APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS ERRED IN DEFYING THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION AWARDING PETITIONER A CONTINGENT FEE OF TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES.

RULING:

In this regard, our ruling inGrageda v. Gomezis enlightening:

It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion orfalloof a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter.An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision.This rule rests on the theory that thefallois the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.

Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.x x x.

Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable) is not an order which can be the subject of execution.Neither can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mistake in the dispositive portion.On the contrary, the context in which the statement was used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovits valid claim is only for an additionalP252,000.00 in attorneys fees:

Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction.It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however,we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable.In the case ofAro v. Naawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services.In parallel vein,we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim forP252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement amid the private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations. (Emphases supplied.)

The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies of Decisions may not be the subject of execution: random statements can easily be taken out of context and are susceptible to different interpretations.When not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.

Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the execution of the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision that we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for twenty percent of all recoveries to be unreasonable.All things considered, it was the interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law Firm, not that of the trial court, which had the effect of varying the final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90983.The instant Petition forCertiorarishould therefore fail.

Sec. 2. Entry of judgments and final orders

Abrigo v. Flores, G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013

FACTS:

Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in the Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna and inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia (Faylona) from their deceased parents. The lot is declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 7378 which Gaudencia managed to secure in her name alone to the exclusion of Francisco and the latters widow and children. It appears that after Franciscos death, his widow and Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was assigned to Franciscos heirs while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencias death. It thus result that both the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in common the land in dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by Gaudencia herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in actual possession of the entire area, encroached and built improvements on portions of the western half. In the case of the petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage and poultry pens extended to the western half.

Such was the state of things when, on July 22 1988, in the Regional Trial Court at San Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, among whom are the private respondents, desiring to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs of Gaudencia, filed their complaint for judicial partition in this case, which complaint was docketed a quo as Civil Case No. SP-3048.

In a decision dated November 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment for the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia whose heirs were further required to pay rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and occupancy of portions on the western half.

With no further appellate proceedings having been taken by the petitioners and their other co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment was issued by this Court on June 3, 1996.

Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the court a quo a motion for execution to enforce and implement its decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by this Court in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 25347

ISSUE:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DENIAL OF THE RTC OF ITS ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECISION DESPITE THE OBVIOUS SUPERVENING EVENT THAT WOULD JUSTIFY MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES AND WHICH MAKES EXECUTION INEQUITABLE OR UNJUST.

RULING:

We deny the petition for review, and rule that the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in issuing its order of May 13, 1998 denying petitioners motion to defer resolution on the motion for demolition, and its order dated June 10, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the November 20, 1989 decision directed the partition of the 402-square meter parcel of land between the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona, with the former getting the western half and the latter the eastern half; and ordered the latter to remove their improvements encroaching the western portion adjudicated to the former. The decision became final after its affirmance by the CA through its decision promulgated on December 28, 1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the decision only by deleting the award of rentals. There being no further appellate proceedings after the affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of judgment on June 3, 1996.

Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the judgment. The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties were entitled to its execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution should issue to enforce the dispositions therein.

The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

Sec. 3. Judgment for or against one or more several parties

Sec. 4. Several judgments

Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that her complaint seeks to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the fraudulent conveyance of her property. She claimed that the trial court cannot render several judgment and separate the liability of Borres with that of her co-respondents. As such, appeal from the decision of the trial court can be perfected by the filing of a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the questioned order without need of submitting a record on appeal.

On August 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding that the trial court validly rendered several judgment because the liability of Borres in petitioners third cause of action is distinct from the liability of the other respondents.

ISSUE:

WON rendition of several judgment is proper.

RULING:

SEC. 4.Several judgments.In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.

A several judgmentis proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the complaint was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is proper.

the issue of encroachment and the area thereof, if there is any, will determine the propriety of awarding back rentals as well as the basis of the computation of rental arrearages on a per square meter basis. The trial court cannot validly render decision on the amount of arrearages without resolving first the question on encroachment. Hence, no several judgments can be rendered and no multiple appeals can be made in the said case because the issues arose from a single cause of action,i.e., to compel correction or adjustment of the encroached area. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding among others, that the trial court erred in rendering partial judgment on the rental arrearages because the averments and available evidence tendered a valid issue which could not be resolved merely on the pleadings.

The doctrine laid down inRoman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals,is not applicable to the instant case. Petitioners cause of action against Borres for collection of sum of money is clearly severable from her action against the other respondents. Thus, rendition of several judgment is proper.

Heirs of Bang v. Sy, G.R. No. 114217, October 13, 2009

DOCTRINE: It is the court hearing the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widows allowance considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts.

Nature: Petitions for review on certiorari

FACTS:

Parties to the case:

a.) Petitioners: Jose, Julian and Oscar are children of the deceased Sy Bang from his first marriage. Other petitioners include Zenaida and Ma. Emma who are the wife and child of Jose.

b.) Respondents: Rosauro and eight others are children of Sy Bang from his second marriage with his surviving spouse respondent Rosita Ferrera -Sy.

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971 and in an out-of-court conference, the children of both marriages divided upon themselves the control and management of Sy Bangs various businesses.

Certain controversies arose which prompted respondent Rolando to file a Complaint of Partition against the petitioners.

Rosita Ferrera-Sy also filed a motion for payment of widows allowance.

From the time of Sy Bangs death until the filing of the motion in 1996, she claimed she was not given any widows allowance. She cited Rule 83(3) of the RoC.

Petitioners argued that Rule 83(3) is granted only during the settlement of the estate and such allowance shall be taken from the common mass of property during liquidation.

Since this case is a special civil action for partition under Rule 69, Rosita is not entitled to any widows allowance.

The Court granted Rositas motion for payment of widows allowance.

Petitioners argued that Rosita had already executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving any claims against the petitioners in exchange of a parcel of land and 1 million pesos. Respondents countered that Rosita was no longer in full possession of her mental faculties when she signed the waiver.

Petitioners also argued that under Rule 83(3) a widows allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the case for partition be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court hearing the partition case had exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the allowance.

In the meantime, Respondents filed a joint petition for the guardianship of Rosita Ferrer-Sy where Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named special guardian, filed before the guardianship court a motion to order the deposit of the widows allowance.

The Court ruled in favor of the deposit of the widows allowance.

The petitioners all failed to comply with the ruling. They were all found guilty of contempt of court.

The petitioners, who are now Zenaida and Emma, argued that they should not be made to pay the allowance as they did not have any participation in the management of the businesses of Sy Bang.

Also, the said allowance must come from the estate of Sy Bang and not from Jose or any of the latters heirs.

They also asked that the Court should equally divide the liability for the widows allowance between the children of the first and second marriages.

They also raised the issue of the validity of Rositas marriage to Sy Bang. They claimed that the documents proving such were falsified.

Issues:

1. W/N the Guardianship court has exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widows allowance?

2. W/N the respondents are also liable for the payment of the widows allowance as heirs of Sy Bang?

Held:

1. YES.

The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction.

It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widows allowance.

The court cited in Rule 83 (3) is the court hearing the settlement of the estate and it is this court which has jurisdiction over the properties of the estate, to the exclusion of all the other courts.

In a cited case, the court said that the Guardianship Court may order the delivery of the property of the ward to the guardian only if the property clearly belongs to the ward or if the title has been judicially decided.

2. NO.

The widows allowance is chargeable to the estate of Sy Bang and since petitioners are the one holding the properties belonging to Sy Bang, they should pay for the allowance.

In order to effect a partition of properties (so that the other children may be made liable), the issue of ownership or co-ownership must be first resolved in the action for partition.

In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:

(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or

(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

That the full extent of Sy Bangs estate has not yet been determined is no excuse from complying with courts order on this issue.

Properties of the estate have already been identified, i.e. those in the names of petitioners, thus these properties should be made to answer for the widows allowance of Rosita.

In any case, the mount Rosita receives for support will be deducted from her share of the estate.

DISPOSITION: In view of the delay caused by the petitioners in paying for the allowance, they are ordered to pay the court treble the costs.

Sec. 5. Separate judgments

Marcos v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014

FACTS:

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiturebefore the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379)in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14.The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0141.

Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million (now USD 658 million), and two treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5 million, as ill-gotten wealth.The Swiss accounts, previously held by five groups of foreign foundations,were deposited in escrow with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), while the treasury notes were frozen by theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP).

Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly out of proportion to the spouses lawful income. This claim was based on evidence collated by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice Department and the Swiss Federal Police Department.The Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.

The Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision granting respondents Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.[14]It found that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0141 had not yet terminated, as the Petition for Forfeiture included numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and Supreme Court had not yet ruled upon. The Republics 1996 Motion was merely held in abeyance to await the outcome of the global settlement of the Marcos assets. Further, this development had prompted the Republic to file the 2000 Motion, which was clearly limited only to the Swiss accounts amounting to USD 356 million. Thus, according to the Sandiganbayan, its 19 September 2000 Decision as affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152154, was in the nature of aseparate judgmentover the Swiss accounts and did not preclude a subsequent judgment over the other properties subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture, such as those of Arelma.

ISSUE:

Whether in this case there are genuine, triable issues which would preclude the application of the rule on summary judgment.

RULING:

Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto).The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties.Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture suitsthat will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.

In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion as aseparate judgment,which is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:

Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.

Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, and judgment is not rendered uponallof the reliefs sought. InPhilippine Business Bank v. Chua,we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not [put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.In this case, there was never any final or complete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayans partial summary judgment in the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.

Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because some facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an entirelydifferent subject matterhad earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis for petitioners contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for summary judgment over the Arelma account.

Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture caseonly as to the five Swiss accounts.Respondents 2004 Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36. More importantly respondent has brought to our attention the reasons why a motion for summary judgment over the Arelma account was prompted only at this stage.

Associated Anglo-American v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010

FACTS:

Spouses Paul Pelaez, Jr. (Paul) and Roceli Mamisay Pelaez (Roceli) were employees of petitioner Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (the Corporation).Paul worked as Sales Supervisor and later as Senior Salesman while Roceli worked as secretary.

As salesman, Paul was required, onApril 17, 1986, by the Corporation to post a bond to answer for any amount which he might fail to turnover to the Corporation.He complied by executing a mortgage bond over his family's house and lot in favor of the Corporation.The mortgaged real estate was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 155994 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.

Upon its determination that Paul had defaulted in remitting the sales proceeds, the Corporation initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage bond.

To stop the extrajudicial sale, Paul and Roceli filed onAugust 21, 1987, a Complaint against the Corporation, Dy and the Sheriff Virgilio S. Villar (Sheriff) before the RTC.

ISSUE:Is the subject RTC Decision divisible, such that a portion may be considered already final and unappealable while another portion may be considered asnot yetfinal and unappealable

RULING:

Rule 37, Sec. 7.Partial new trial or reconsideration.- If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matter in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issuesif severablewithout interfering with the judgment or final order