RULE 130 Sec 25 - 35 Additional Cases

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EVIDENCE RULE 130 SEC. 25 - 35 ADDITIONAL CASES AGUSTIN, E. P. | 1

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 152364 April 15, 2010

ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband,ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFOSANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES,assisted by her husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINASANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS, Petitioners,vs.MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA

AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is theDecision1 dated February 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA)in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321. The CA had affirmed, withmodification, the Decision2 dated February 6, 2001 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Civil CaseNo. 11951-13, which also affirmed, with modification, theDecision3 dated January 6, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court inCities (MTCC) of Laoag City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 2834.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are asfollows:

On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners filed against hereinrespondents a Complaint4 for partition with the MTCC of LaoagCity, alleging as follows:

x x x x

II

That the plaintiffs and the defendants are thedescendants of the late Simeon C. Santos, married toTrinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcelof land situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra.,Municipality of Laoag, designated as Lot No. 10675 ofthe Cadastral Survey of Laoag;

III

That Simeon C. Santos during his lifetime, married toTrinidad Duldulao, begot four (4) legitimate children,namely: Basilisa D. Santos, Alberto D. Santos, LeoncioD. Santos and Alejandra D. Santos. Basilisa D. Santos,[who] was married to Petronilo Agustin, is nowdeceased; Alberto Santos, married to RizalinaGuerrero, is now deceased, while Leoncio D. Santos,married to Dictinia Tabeta, and Alejandra D. Santosmarried to Isauro M. Lazaro, are still living;

IV

That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santosfrom whom the parcel of land originated as owner, hischildren, namely[:] Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, allsurnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of landmentioned in paragraph II of this complaint be titledin the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest andso Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the nameof Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was

agreed among them that it did not and does notnecessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole andexclusive owner of this parcel of land, and asembodied in the Title obtained in the name of BasilisaSantos, the parcel of land is particularly described asfollows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 10676 of the Cadastralsurvey of Laoag), with the improvements thereon,situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra.,Municipality of Laoag. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No.10677; on the SE. by Panganiban Street; on the SW.by Lot No. 10672; and on NW. by Lot No. 1065,containing an area of three hundred and one (301)square meters, more or less, covered by TaxDeclaration No. 010-00224 for the year 1994 in thenames of Modesta Agustin, et al. with a market value

of P96,320.00 and an assessed value of P14,450.00.

V

That there is a residential house constructed on thelot described in paragraph IV of this complaint and inthe construction of which plaintiff Alejandra Santos,then still single, spent the amount of P68,308.60,while Basilisa Santos and her children spent theamount of P3,495.00. Afterwards, Alejandra Santosgot married to Isauro M. Lazaro who was employed ina private company and when he retired from theservice, some additional constructions were made onthe residential house and lot such as a bedroom,azotea, two (2) toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car garage,the money spent for these additional constructionscame from the earnings of the spouses AlejandraSantos-Lazaro and Isauro M. Lazaro. The saidresidential house is now covered by Tax DeclarationNo. 010-00225 in the names of Basilio Agustin(should be Basilisa Agustin) and Alejandra Santos forthe year 1994 with a market value of P93,920.00 andan assessed value of zero;

VI

That without the knowledge and consent of theplaintiffs, the title of the lot described in paragraph IVof the complaint was transferred into another titlewhich is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin,

Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin,Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin who are thechildren of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin who areherein named as defendants with Monica Agustin nowdeceased represented by her children Paul A. Dalaloand Noel A. Dalalo as defendants;

VII

That during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin,plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former,

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who are sisters, that the transfer of the title coveringthe lot described in paragraph IV of this complaint inthe name of Basilisa Santos into the names of herchildren would erroneously imply that the lot is solelyand exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin'schildren, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to]plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry becausean affidavit was already executed by her recognizing

and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos andLeoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of thelot;

VIII

That in a move to determine if the children and theheirs of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, namely: Modesta

Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Paul Dalalo and Noel Dalalo who are thesuccessors of their mother the late Monica Agustin,Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin would followthe line of thinking of their mother and grandmotherof Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo on the shares ofthe lot and residential house erected on it, the

plaintiffs initiated a partition in the barangay courtwhere the lot is situated described in paragraph IV ofthis complaint, but that the children of BasilisaSantos-Agustin and her grandchildren Paul A. Dalaloand Noel A. Dalalo refused and opposed the partitionclaiming that they are the sole and exclusive ownersof the lot being that the lot is now titled in theirnames, and hence there was no settlement as shownby the certification of the barangay court heretoattached as annex "A";

IX

That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of thecourt to partition the lot in accordance with the lawon intestate succession and to partition the residential

house as specified below. x x x

x x x x5

Petitioners also prayed for the grant of attorney's fees, moraland exemplary damages, and costs of suit.

Herein respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim,6 raisingthe following as their Special/Affirmative Defenses:

1. The subject parcel of land is owned exclusively bythe defendants as heirs of the late Basilisa Santos,wife of Petronilo Agustin, who was the originalregistered owner of the property evidenced by OCTNo. 20742; the plaintiffs never became owners of saidland. There was never any agreement between theascendants of the plaintiffs and defendants, neither isthere any agreement between the plaintiffs anddefendants themselves that in the ownership, theplaintiffs have a share over the lot;

2. The defendants are the ones paying for the realestate taxes of said land;

3. Some of the plaintiffs were able to stay on thesubject house because defendants' mother Basilisa

Santos was the eldest sibling and she had to takecare of her brother Leoncio and sister Alejandra whenthese siblings were not yet employed and Basilisaallowed them to reside in the house constructedwithin the lot; Alejandra Santos stayed in the houseup to the present with the agreement that she willspend for the renovation of the house in lieu ofmonthly rentals that she has to pay when she already

became financially able;

4. Prior to 1962, subject property was mortgaged byBasilisa Santos Agustin to the Philippine National Bankand the property was foreclosed by PNB when theloan was not paid, hence, TCT No. (T-9522)-4495,under the name of the Philippine National Bank wasissued (Annex "A"). Thereafter, Basilisa Santos-

Agustin, purchased it from the PNB and TCT No. T-5662 was issued under her name (Annex "B"); theproperty was later on transferred to her directdescendants, the defendants herein as evidenced byTCT No. T-20695 (Annex "C");

x x x x7

Respondents then prayed that petitioners' complaint bedismissed. In their Counterclaim, respondents asked the court todirect petitioners to pay reasonable compensation for the latter'suse of the disputed property, exemplary and moral damages,attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

After the issues were joined and the pre-trial was terminated,trial on the merits ensued.

On January 6, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision8 dismissingthe complaint and denying petitioners' prayer for partition.

The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value couldbe given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, whereinshe purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject

property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra,because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand,such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay.Moreover, the MTCC held that two credible witnesses testified inplain, simple and straightforward manner that at the time theaffidavit was supposed to have been signed and sworn to beforethe notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalidwho could not even raise her hand to feed herself. In addition,the MTCC also gave credence to the testimony of the notarypublic, before whom the document was supposedly signed andsworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete andthumbmarked when the same was presented to him by a personwho claimed to be Basilisa.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC of Laoag City.

On February 6, 2001 the RTC issued a Decision9 affirming, withmodification, the judgment of the MTCC. The RTC found that thehouse erected on the disputed lot was built and renovated bypetitioners in good faith. As a consequence, the RTC held thatpetitioners were entitled to indemnity representing the costs ofthe construction and renovation of the said house. Thedispositive portion of the RTC Decision, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmedwith the modification directing the appellees [herein

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respondents] to indemnify the appellants [herein petitioners] inthe amount of P68,308.60 as proved by them.

Considering the apparent error of the lower court in quoting thequestioned lot as Lot No. 10675, the same is hereby correctedso as to reflect the correct lot number as Lot No. 10676 toconform to the evidence presented.

SO ORDERED.10

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a petition forreview with the CA.

On February 21, 2002, the CA issued its presently assailedDecision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 6, 2001 rendered inCivil Case No. 11951-13 is hereby AFFIRMED subject to theMODIFICATION that appellees [herein respondents] pay theamount of P68,308.60 in indemnity solely to appellant AlejandraSantos-Lazaro.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

I. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF BASILISA S. AGUSTIN IS ADECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST WHICH ESTABLISHES THECO-OWNERSHIP OF LOT NO. 10676 BY AND AMONG THEPETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS AS HEIRS OF THE LATESIMEON C. SANTOS.12

II. THE CO-OWNERSHIP OF LOT NO. 10676 BY AND AMONGBASILISA S. AGUSTIN, ALBERTO D. SANTOS, ALEJANDRA S.LAZARO AND LEONCIO D. SANTOS DID NOT TERMINATE AS ARESULT OF THE TRANSFER OF THE LOT'S OWNERSHIPPRECIPITATED BY ACTS OF BASILISA S. AGUSTIN WITH

RESPECT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY .13

III. PETITIONER ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO IS A CO-OWNER OFTHE RESIDENTIAL HOUSE ON LOT NO. 10676 NOT MERELY ABUILDER IN GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT THERETO AND ASSUCH, IS ENTITLED TO A PARTITION OF THE SUBJECTHOUSE.14

In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa'ssworn statement which recognizes her siblings' share in thedisputed property is a declaration against interest which is oneof the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitionersargue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, itshould be admitted in court without further proof of its dueexecution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa'snurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing

evidence which could overthrow such notarized document; thatthe notary public cannot impugn the same document which henotarized for to do so would render notarized documentsworthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.

As to the second assigned error, petitioners aver that their co-ownership of the questioned property with Basilisa did not ceaseto exist when the Philippine National Bank (PNB) consolidated itsownership over the said parcel of land. Petitioners assert thatthey did not lose their share in the property co-owned whentheir share was mortgaged by Basilisa without their knowledgeand consent; that the mortgage was limited only to the portion

that may be allotted to Basilisa upon termination of their co-ownership; that PNB acquired ownership only of the sharepertaining to Basilisa; that when Basilisa bought back theproperty from PNB, she simply re-acquired the portion pertainingto her and simply resumed co-ownership of the property withher siblings. Petitioners also contend that Basilisa's children didnot acquire ownership of the subject lot by prescription, and thatneither Basilisa nor respondents repudiated their co-ownership.

Anent the third assignment of error, petitioners argue that Alejandra Lazaro, being a co-owner of the disputed parcel ofland and not simply a builder in good faith, is entitled to apartition of the subject residential house.

At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitionersto argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declarationagainst interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead,it is an admission against interest.1avvphi1

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions againstinterest and declarations against interest. Admissions againstinterest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one inprivity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and areadmissible whether or not the declarant is available as awitness.15 Declarations against interest are those made by aperson who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to thesuit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to thehearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant isunavailable as a witness.16 In the present case, since Basilisa isrespondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity withthe latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, ifproven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as anadmission against interest.

A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also revealsthat it refers to a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 10678while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676.17 On thisbasis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the propertybeing referred to in the sworn statement is the same propertyclaimed by petitioners.

Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, thequestion that arises is whether the subject sworn statement,granting that it refers to the property being disputed in thepresent case, can be given full faith and credence in view of theissues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution.

The Court rules in the negative.

Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carriesthe evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its dueexecution, and documents acknowledged before a notary publichave in their favor the presumption of regularity.18 However, thispresumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear andconvincing evidence to the contrary.19

Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from therule on authentication.20 Thus, an affidavit does notautomatically become a public document just because it containsa notarial jurat.21 The presumptions that attach to notarizeddocuments can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond disputethat the notarization was regular.22

However, a question involving the regularity of notarization aswell as the due execution of the subject sworn statement ofBasilisa would require an inquiry into the appreciation of

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evidence by the trial court. It is not the function of this Court toreview, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value ofthe evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in suchevent. Settled is the rule that questions of fact cannot be raisedin an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are notproper for its consideration.23 The rationale behind this doctrineis that a review of the findings of fact of the trial courts and theappellate tribunal is not a function this Court normally

undertakes.

24

The Court will not weigh the evidence all overagain unless there is a showing that the findings of the lowercourts are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous soas to constitute serious abuse of discretion.25 Although there arerecognized exceptions26 to this rule, none exists in the presentcase to justify a departure therefrom.

Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularityaccorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, anotarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that adeed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of itscontents.27 As earlier discussed, the presumption is not absoluteand may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to thecontrary.28 The presumption cannot be made to apply to thepresent case because the regularity in the execution of thesworn statement was challenged in the proceedings belowwhere its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly

questionable circumstances under which it was supposedlyexecuted, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testifiedon the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as wellas on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time thequestioned document was supposedly executed. The trial andappellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to thetestimonies of these witnesses. The Court has repeatedly heldthat it will not interfere with the trial court's determination of thecredibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record somefact or circumstance of weight and influence which has beenoverlooked or the significance of which has beenmisinterpreted.29 The reason for this is that the trial court was ina better position to do so, because it heard the witnesses testifybefore it and had every opportunity to observe their demeanorand deportment on the witness stand.30

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reversethe rulings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although thequestioned sworn statement is a public document having in itsfavor the presumption of regularity, such presumption wasadequately refuted by competent witnesses.

The Court further agrees with the ruling of the RTC that:

The testimony of [the notary public] Atty. Angel Respicio did notsuffice to rebut the evidence of the appellees considering hisadmission that the affidavit was already thumbmarked whenpresented to him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos andwhom, the witness said he did not know personally. Further,what makes the documents suspect is the fact that it wassubscribed on the same date as the financial statement of

Alejandra Santos.

It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that theprincipal function of a notary public is to authenticatedocuments.31 When a notary public certifies to the due executionand delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he givesthe document the force of evidence.32 Indeed, one of thepurposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before anotary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surroundthe execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize suchdocuments to be given without further proof of their executionand delivery.33 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith

and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and thepublic at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgmentexecuted before a notary public and appended to a privateinstrument.34 Hence, a notary public must discharge his powersand duties, which are impressed with public interest, withaccuracy and fidelity.35 A notary public should not notarize adocument unless the persons who signed the same are the verysame persons who executed and personally appeared before him

to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

36

In the instant case, the notary public should have exercisedutmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the personexecuting the said sworn statement. However, the notary publicdid not comply with this requirement. He simply relied on theaffirmative answers of the person appearing before him attestingthat she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the swornstatement are true; and that the thumbmark appearing on thesaid document was hers. However, this would not suffice. Hecould have further asked the person who appeared before himto produce any identification to prove that she was indeedBasilisa Santos, considering that the said person was notpersonally known to him, and that the thumbmark appearing onthe document sought to be notarized was not affixed in hispresence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commitany error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn

statement.

The second and third assigned errors proceed on thepresumption that petitioners are co-owners of the disputedproperty. Since the Court has already ruled that the lower courtsdid not err in finding that petitioners failed to prove their claimthat they were co-owners of the said property, there is no longerany need to discuss the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2002Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 177572 February 26, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.JUANITO DELA CRUZ Y RIVERA, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Of the so-called heinous crimes, none perhaps moredeeply provokes feelings of outrage, detestation, anddisgust than incestuous rape. It is indeed difficult tofind a more perverted form of sexual aberration thanthis bestial felony. It is undeserving of society’scompassion or tolerance.1

We are called here to review the Decision rendered by the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02407 dated 26 October 2006,2 affirming with modification the Decision of the Manila RegionalTrial Court (RTC), Branch 163, in Criminal Cases No. 115031-H,No. 115032-H, No. 115033-H, and No. 115034-H dated 21February 2000,3 convicting the accused-appellant Juanito R. delaCruz of raping his own daughter, AAA,4 with the use of force andintimidation.

The records bear the following facts:

On 9 November 1998, four separate informations5 were filedwith the RTC against appellant for rape, allegedly committed asfollows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 115031-H

That sometime in March 1995, in XXX, Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,above-named accused, with lewd designs and bytaking advantage of his moral ascendancy over hisown daughter, AAA, then sixteen (16) years old andby means of force, threat and intimidation, did, thenand there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie andhave sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will.


That during the period January to December

1996, in XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, above-named accused, withlewd designs and by taking advantage of his moralascendancy over his own daughter, AAA, thenseventeen (17) years old and by means of force,threat and intimidation did, then and there, willfully,unlawfully, and feloniously lie and have sexualintercourse with AAA, against her will.


That during the period January to December1997, in XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, above-named accused, withlewd designs and by taking advantage of his moralascendancy over his own daughter, AAA, and bymeans of force, threat and intimidation did, then andthere, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lie andhave sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will.


That on or about July 24, 1998, in XXX, Philippines,and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,above-named accused, with lewd designs and bytaking advantage of his moral ascendancy over hisown daughter, AAA, and by means of force, threatand intimidation did, then and there, willfully,unlawfully, and feloniously lie and have sexualintercourse with AAA, against her will.

Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial.When arraigned on 21 April 1999, appellant, with the assistanceof counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of thecharges.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA and Dr. ArmieSoreto-Umil (Dr. Umil). Their testimonies are as follows:

AAA testified that appellant is her father and BBB is her mother;that appellant and BBB are married; that she is the fourth childin a brood of five children born to appellant and BBB; and thatshe resided with her family at XXX.7

On 8 March 1995, AAA went home from work to celebrate withher family the birthday of her younger brother, CCC. Later thatevening, she slept inside the house, while appellant had adrinking session with some friends outside the house. BBB wasthen peddling several merchandise at the Quirino MemorialHospital (QMH). Subsequently, appellant entered the house and

lay down beside her. Appellant fondled her breast and vagina.She resisted but to no avail because appellant punched her inthe stomach and slapped her face. Appellant then placed himselfon top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter,DDD, her elder brother, entered the house and saw appellant ontop of her. Afraid of appellant, DDD ignored the two. Thefollowing day, DDD told AAA that he saw the incident and thathe will report it to appellant’s sister, EEE. AAA did not informBBB of the incident because of her fear that appellant wouldmake good his threat to kill her and the rest of the familymembers.8

Again, in 1996, appellant, with the use of force, threat andintimidation, raped AAA six times on several occasions inside thehouse. BBB was selling goods at the QMH during the commissionof these rapes.9

Likewise, in 1997, appellant, by applying the same physicalharm, threat and intimidation, sexually assaulted her severaltimes inside the house. BBB was also out of the house whenthese bestial acts transpired.10

On 24 July 1998, at about 1:00 in the morning, AAA and hersiblings were sleeping inside a nipa hut owned by her family andlocated in front of their house, while appellant was drinkingliquor with a certain Rey and Benito Casaljay outside the house.

After the drinking session, Rey and Benito left appellant.

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Appellant then entered the nipa hut, woke her up, and started tomake sexual advances on her. She tried to resist appellant’sonslaught but failed because appellant punched her in thestomach. Appellant went on top of her and inserted his penisinto her vagina. After satisfying his lust, appellant warned hernot to tell anyone of the incident or he would kill her and therest of the family members.11

Upon being informed by EEE of the incidents, BBB, on 30 July1998, accompanied AAA to the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) office at Taft Avenue, Manila, and reported the heinousacts of appellant. AAA also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay regarding the incidents. Thereupon, appellant was arrested andcharged with rape.12

Dr. Umil narrated that she conducted a genital examination on AAA upon the request of NBI Supervising Agent Rosalina Espina-Chiong. Her findings as stated in her medico-legal report are: (1)no evident sign of any extra-genital physical injuries noted onthe body of the subject at the time of the examination; and (2)hymen, intact, but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cm. indiameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sizedadult Filipino male organ in full erection without producinghymenal injury.13

The prosecution also adduced documentary evidence to buttressthe foregoing testimonies of prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1)Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA;14 (2) Medico-Legal Reportregarding AAA signed and issued by Dr. Umali ;15 and (3) a letterwritten by appellant in a Marlboro cigarette wrapper addressedto AAA asking her forgiveness.16

For its part, the defense proffered the lone testimony ofappellant to refute the foregoing accusations.

Appellant divulged that AAA is his daughter and BBB is his wife;that he did not rape AAA on 8 March 1995; that a birthdaycelebration for one of his children, CCC, was held at their houseon 8 March 1995 which was attended by several friends; that he

did not rape AAA in 1996, 1997, and on 24 July 1998; that BBB, AAA and his other children resided with him in their house atXXX from 8 March 1995 to 24 July 1998; that he had a drinkingspree with Rey and Benito at nighttime during the said periods;and that he wrote a letter to AAA but denied that it was thesame one presented by the prosecution.17

The defense also offered as its sole documentary evidence theMedico-Legal Report issued and signed by Dr. Umil.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guiltyof rape as alleged in the four informations. In Criminal Cases No.115031-H and No. 115032-H, the Court imposed on appellantthe penalty of death. In Criminal Cases No. 115033-H and No.115034-H, appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Thedispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Juanito delaCruz y Rivera, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 115031-H, GUILTY asprincipal of the offense of qualified rape penalizedunder then Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by R.A. 7659, and sentences him to sufferthe supreme penalty of DEATH. Accused is furtherordered to pay the offended person, AAA, the amountof Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil

indemnity plus Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) asmoral damages.

2. In Criminal Case No. 115032-H, GUILTY asprincipal of the offense of qualified rape penalizedunder Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by R.A. 7659, and sentences him to sufferthe supreme penalty of DEATH. Accused is further

ordered to pay AAA the amount of Seventy-FiveThousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity plusFifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moraldamages.

3. In Criminal Case No. 115033-H, GUILTY asprincipal of the offense of simple rape penalizedunder Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by R.A. 7659 [Now Art. 266-A and Art. 266-B under R.A. 8353], and sentences him to suffer thepenalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused is furtherordered to pay AAA the amount of Fifty ThousandPesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity plus the amountof Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moraldamages.

4. In Criminal Case No. 115034-H, GUILTY asprincipal of the offense of simple rape penalizedunder Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, asamended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. Accused is further ordered to pay

AAA the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) ascivil indemnity and the amount of Fifty ThousandPesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.18

In view of the death penalty it imposed on appellant in CriminalCases No. 115031-H and 115032-H, the RTC forwarded therecords of the cases to us for automatic review. However,pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo ,19 we remanded thecases to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On 26 October2006, the appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming withmodifications the RTC decision. It held that appellant is liable

only for simple rape and not qualified rape in Criminal Cases No.115031-H and No. 115032-H because the qualifyingcircumstance of AAA’s minority was not duly proven by theprosecution. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the February 12, 2000 Joint Decision,as far as Criminal Case No. 115033-H and CriminalCase No. 115034-H are concerned, is hereby

AFFIRMED.

In Criminal Case No. 115031-H and Criminal Case No.115032-H, finding the accused guilty beyondreasonable doubt of two acts of simple rape, theCourt hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetua, to pay civil indemnity in theamount of P50,000.00, and to pay moral damages in

the amount of P50,000.00 in each case.20

In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TOTHE UNBELIEVABLE AND UNCORROBORATEDTESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT AAA;

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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT JUANITO DELA CRUZ OF FOUR(4) COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THEPROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT.21

Rape is committed when the accused has carnal knowledge ofthe victim by force or intimidation and without consent .22

In determining the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases ofrape, the victim’s testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsicnature of the crime in which only two persons are normallyinvolved. The accused may be convicted on the basis of thevictim’s lone and uncorroborated testimony provided it is clear,positive, convincing, and consistent with human nature.23

We have painstakingly reviewed the records and found thatappellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force andintimidation on the dates stated in the informations. In her courttestimony, AAA positively and categorically identified theappellant as the one who ravished her, viz:

Q. Now, on July 24, 1998 at about 1:00 in themorning, do you remember where [you were]?

A. Yes, mam.

Q. Where were you then?

A. I was in our house, mam.

Q. Where is your house located?

A. At XXX.

Q. Do you recall of an unusual incident thathappened on July 24, 1998 at your house?

A. Yes, mam.

Q. What was that unusual incident?

A. At 1:00 in the early morning my father"ginapangan niya ako."

Q. What do you mean "ginapangan ka?"

A. He raped me, mam.

Q. How did your father rape you?

A. He inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q. When he inserted his penis into your vagina,what did you do?

A. I was not able to do anything because healready hurt me.

Q. What do you mean he hurt you?

A. I was struggling and he boxed me on mystomach.

Q. And, after that raped (sic) incident, whathappened?

A. I was shocked, mam.

Q. Was that the first time that your father rapedyou?

A. No, mam.

Q. When was the first time?

A. On March 8, 1995 , mam.

Q Why do you recall March 8, 1995 as the firsttime that your father raped you?

A That time I was at my work and I went homebecause my brother is (sic) celebrating his birthday.

Q When did that rape that happened on March 8,1995?

A In our house, mam.

x x x x

Q Now, on March 8, 1995 when your father rapedyou, what did you do, if any?

A I cannot do anything, mam, because he get (sic)what he wants.

COURT:

Q When you were raped on March 8, 1995, whatdid you do when you were being raped?

A I was struggling away from him but he harmedme.

FISCAL:

Q How did your father hurt you?

A He boxed me on my stomach.

Q And, after that raped (sic) incident, whathappened?

A I keep silent, mam.

Q Did you not try to tell your mother about thatincident?

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A No, mam.

Q Why did you not tell your mother?

A I was afraid, mam.

Q Why?

A Because he was threatening to kill my family.

x x x x

Q. What about in the year 1996, was there anunusual incident that happened between you andyour father?

A. Yes, mam, there is.

Q. Can you recall on what month?

A. I cannot remember, mam.

Q. But the same incident happened in 1996?

A. Yes, mam.

Q. If you can recall, how many times did he rapeyou in the year 1996?

A. Six (6) times, mam.

x x x x

Q. Was that six (6) times done on one occasion?

A. No, mam.

Q. So, there were several rapes?

A. Yes, mam.

Q. And, where did these six (6) rapes thathappened in 1996 took place?

A. In our house also, mam.

Q. Also in XXX?

A. Yes, mam.

x x x x

Q. What about in 1997, do you recall of anunusual incident that happened between you andyour father?

A. Yes, mam.

Q. What was that unusual incident?

A. About the rape, mam.

Q. When was that if you can recall?

A. I cannot remember, mam, what I remember

was only the last raped (sic).

COURT:

Q. But, how many times have you been raped in1997?

A. Many times, your Honor.

Q. You cannot count it?

A. No, your Honor.

x x x x

Q. Now, madam witness, in the first occasion thatyou were raped by your father, did he tell youanything before raping you?

A. None, sir.

Q. In other words, you would like to tell the courtthat he does not say anything he just raped youwithout saying anything?

A. First, he was not able to say anything but afterhe raped me he said something.

Q. And, what did he tell you?

A. She (sic) told me not to report the incidentbecause she (sic) will kill my family.

Q. Is that all what your father told you?

A. Yes, your Honor.

x x x x

Q. You did not tell (sic) your father why he is doingit to you?

A. I told him but he did not listen to me.

x x x x

Q. You said that you were punched in the stomachby your father prior to the sexual attacked (sic) onyou on July 24, 1998, isn’t it? Other than beingpunched at the stomach, what else did he do, if any?

A. Sinasampal po.


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Q. How did you describe the pain when you werehit at the stomach?

A. I lost consciousness, sir.

Q. So, it was very strong, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, he did it with the clench[ed] fist, is thatcorrect?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, how many times did he club you?

A. Two (2) times, sir.24

It is a well-settled doctrine that the testimony of a youthful rapevictim is given full weight and credence considering that when agirl says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is

necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.25 It isagainst human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story thatwould expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime ofshame, especially when her charge could mean the death orlifetime imprisonment of her own father.26

Further, the testimony of Dr. Umil corroborated the testimony of AAA on relevant and substantial points.27

The testimonies of AAA and Dr. Umil are in harmony with thedocumentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTCand the Court of Appeals found their testimonies to be "credible,true and sufficiently reliable." Both courts also found no illmotive on their part to testify against appellant.28

The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration ofthe testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of theprobative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored onsaid findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This ismore true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court.When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by theappellate court, said findings are generally binding upon thisCourt.29

Appellant, however, alleges in his first assigned error severalinconsistencies in the testimony of AAA, to wit: (1) AAA testifiedthat she was with her five siblings inside the house when shewas raped by appellant on 8 March 1995, while in hersubsequent testimony she stated that only DDD was presentwhen she was raped by appellant on the said date; (2) AAA toldthe court that she was with her five siblings inside the house

when she was raped by appellant on 24 July 1998, while in herlater testimony she narrated that her siblings were out of thehouse when she was raped by appellant on the said date; and(3) AAA disclosed that during the rape on 24 July 1998 she sawRey and Benito outside the house staring at appellant who wasthen on top of her, while in her other testimony she recountedthat she merely learned from EEE that Rey and Benito sawappellant on top of her on the same date.30

The credibility of a rape victim is not impaired by someinconsistencies in her testimony.31 Such inconsistencies areinconsequential when they refer to minor details that have

nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of thecrime – carnal knowledge through force and intimidation.32

The supposed contradictions cited by appellant refer to minordetails and are evidently beyond the essential fact of thecommission of rape because they do not pertain to the actualsexual assault itself – that very moment when appellant wasforcing himself on AAA. Besides, these minor inconsistencies

even bolster the credibility of AAA as one could hardly doubt thather testimony was contrived.33

Appellant further claims that AAA’s testimony does not jibe withher Sinumpaang Salaysay and with the testimony of Dr. Umil asshown by the following: (1) In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, AAAstated that she was raped by appellant on 8 March 1995 and on24 July 1998, while in her court testimony she revealed that shewas raped by appellant six times in 1996 and several times in1997; and (2) AAA divulged that appellant punched her in thestomach and slapped her during the incidents but Dr. Umiltestified that no contusions, abrasions or other physical injurieswere found on AAA’s body during the latter’s physicalexamination.34

We have steadfastly ruled that the alleged inconsistenciesbetween the testimony of a witness in open court and his swornstatement are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgmentof conviction. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit thewitness since ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete.Sworn statements taken ex-parte are generally considered to beinferior to the testimony given in open court.35

The fact that Dr. Umil found no contusions or abras ions on AAA’sbody during the latter’s physical examination does not renderimprobable the occurrence of rape because settled is thedoctrine that absence of external signs or physical injuries doesnot negate the commission of rape.36

Anent the second assignment of error, appellant argues that it isimprobable for appellant to rape AAA in the presence of the

latter’s siblings; that the informations in Criminal Cases No.115032-H and 115033-H which allege that the rapes werecommitted "during the period January to December 1996," and"during the period January to December 1997," respectively, aredefective because it does not specifically state the exact dates ofthe commission of rapes; that AAA is not a credible witnessbecause she did not immediately inform BBB nor the policeauthorities of the incidents; that the failure of AAA toimmediately report the incidents implies that no rapes werecommitted and that the sexual contacts between him and AAAwere voluntary and consensual; that AAA’s testimony that shereported the 8 March 1995 incident to EEE is unbelievablebecause if such was true then the instant case would have beenfiled earlier and the subsequent rapes could have been avoided;that he never admitted having written the letter on a Marlborocigarette wrapper to AAA and thus the said letter cannot be usedas evidence against him because its due execution and

authenticity was not proven; and that the qualifyingcircumstance of minority of AAA during the incidents was notproven because the latter’s birth certificate was not presented incourt.37

Lust is no respecter of time and place. Thus, we held that rapecan be committed inside a house where there are otheroccupants, and even in the same room where other members ofthe family are also sleeping.38 It is not impossible, nor incredible,for AAA’s siblings to be in deep slumber and not to be awakenedwhile appellant was raping her.39

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Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapesoccurred does not ipso facto make the information defective onits face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of thecommission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crimebecause the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a womanthrough force and intimidation. As such, the date or time neednot be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that thecomplaint or information states that the crime has been

committed at any time as near as possible to the date of itsactual commission.40

In several cases, we sustained complaints and informations inprosecutions for rape which merely alleged the month and yearof its commission.41 Hence, the allegations in the informationsregarding Criminal Cases No. 115032-H and 115033-H whichstate that rapes were committed "during the period January toDecember 1996" and "during the period January to December1997" are sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant.

We have ruled that the failure of the rape victim to immediatelyreport the rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricatedcharge.42 It is not uncommon for young girls like AAA to concealfor some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist’sthreat on their lives, more so when the rapist is living with her as

in this case.43

AAA testified that appellant threatened to kill herand the other family members should she report what he haddone to her. AAA’s delay in reporting the sexual violations istherefore understandable and cannot undermine her credibility.

Appellant’s letter written on a Marlboro cigarette wrapper asking AAA’s forgiveness is admissible in evidence against him. AAAtestified that after the instant case was filed in the RTC, BBBvisited appellant once in jail. During the said visit, appellanthanded to BBB a letter written on a Marlboro cigarette wrapperand thereafter instructed BBB to give the said letter to her. BBBgave her the said letter and told her "pinaabot ng tatay mo." Inthe said letter, appellant asked her to forgive him for what hedid to her as he was only drunk at that time. She knows that theletter was written by appellant because she is familiar with hishandwriting and signature.44 AAA positively identified the letteritself during her direct examination and this was formally offeredas documentary evidence for the prosecution.45

More importantly, appellant himself readily admitted that theletter is the same letter he wrote for AAA.46 He also confirmedthat the handwriting therein is his.47 Although later, he woulddeny the same on the basis that he does not use the Marlborocigarette brand, but only Winston cigarette brand,48 we still givemore weight to his admission of the said letter since it was givenvoluntarily and spontaneously. His subsequent denial is not onlybased on flimsy grounds but also an obvious attempt to cover-uphis earlier damaging testimony. As to the contents of the letter,verily, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he hascommitted a wrong and a plea for forgiveness may beconsidered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offerof compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence asan implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of

the Revised Rules on Evidence.49

We agree, however, with appellant’s contention, as affirmed bythe Office of the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals, thatthe RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance ofminority of AAA and in imposing the maximum penalty of deathin Criminal Cases No. 115031-H and 115032-H.

Republic Act No. 7659 is the law applicable for the rapescommitted in March 1995 and on several occasions during theperiod of January to December 1996, as respectively alleged in

Criminal Cases No. 115031-H and 115032-H. The said law statesthat the death penalty shall be imposed if the rape victim is aminor and the offender is a parent. The qualifying circumstancesof minority of the victim and the latter’s relationship with theoffender must be alleged and proven to warrant the impositionof death penalty.50

The informations specifically alleged that AAA was a minor when

she was raped by appellant. Nonetheless, the prosecution failedto prove such allegation with sufficient evidence.

AAA solely testified that she was fifteen years old when appellantraped her on March 1995, and sixteen years old when appellantdefiled her again six times during the period of January toDecember 1996.51 Appellant neither denied nor objected to thesaid testimony of AAA.

In People v. Tabanggay ,52 a case almost identical herein, weheld as insufficient evidence of minority the bare testimony ofthe two rape victims, who were sisters, that they were 13 and14 years of age, respectively, when their father raped them. Weemphasized therein that there must be independent evidenceproving the age of the victims other than their own testimoniesand the absence of denial by the accused. The victims’ originalor duly certified birth certificate, or baptismal certificate, orschool records would suffice as competent evidence of their age.The prosecution presented a photocopy of one of the victim’sbirth certificate but we gave no probative value to it because itwas neither duly certified nor formally offered in evidence. Inconclusion, we ruled therein that the prosecution failed to provethe minority of the rape victims.

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence to the case at bar, the baretestimony of AAA as to her age is not sufficient proof that shewas a minor when appellant raped her on the given dates. Theremust be independent evidence showing her minority other thanher bare testimony and the absence of denial by the appellant.The independent proof may consist of her original or dulycertified birth certificate, or her baptismal certificate or schoolrecords.

A photocopy of AAA’s birth certificate is included in the recordsof the present case.53 Nevertheless, the same was neitherproperly identified nor formally offered in evidence. Hence, noprobative value can be given to it. Aside from the said birthcertificate, no other documentary evidence was adduced toprove the age of AAA.

With respect to appellant’s failure to object on the aforesaidtestimony of AAA, we decreed in People v. Pruna ,54 that thefailure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidenceregarding the rape victim’s age shall not be taken against him.In People v. Tipa y 55 and People v. Pecayo, Sr. ,56 we alsopronounced that the lack of denial on the part of accused asregards the rape victim’s age does not excuse the prosecutionfrom discharging its burden of proving the minority of the rape

victim. As the qualifying circumstance of minority alters thenature of the crime of rape and increases the penalty thereof, itmust be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crimeitself .57

Since the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s minority was not dulyproven by the prosecution, appellant should be held liable onlyfor simple rape in Criminal Cases No. 115031-H and 115032-H.58 Consequently, the penalty therein should be reduced to reclusionperpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended by Republic Act No. 7659.59

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Finally, we concur with the disposition of the Court of Appealsthat appellant should pay AAA civil indemnity in the amount ofP50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.60 However, aside fromthese damages, appellant should also pay AAA exemplarydamages in the amount of P25,000.00 in order to deter otherfathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviorsfrom sexually abusing their own daughters.61

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02407 dated 26 October 2006is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellantis also ordered to pay AAA exemplary damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 for each of the four cases.

SO ORDERED.

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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173151 March 28, 2008

EDUARDO BUGHAW, JR., Petitioner,vs.TREASURE ISLAND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule45 of the Revised Rules of Court , filed by petitioner Eduardo

Bughaw, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,

1

dated 14 June 2005 and the Resolution,2 dated 8 May 2006 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85498. The appellatecourt reversed the Decision dated 28 August 2003 andResolution dated 27 February 2004 of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000231-02that found the petitioner to be illegally dismissed fromemployment by respondent Treasure Island IndustrialCorporation. The dispositive portion of the assailed appellatecourt’s Decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, discussion considered, the decision dated August28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission, FourthDivision, Cebu City, in NLRC Case No. V-000231-02 (RAB VII-06-1171-01), is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE en toto.

The award of money claims to [herein petitioner] is NULLIFIEDand RECALLED.3

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant Petitionare as follows:

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner was employed as productionworker by respondent. Respondent was receiving informationthat many of its employees were using prohibited drugs duringworking hours and within the company premises.4

On 5 June 2001, one of its employees, Erlito Loberanes(Loberanes) was caught in flagrante delicto by the police officerswhile in possession of shabu. Loberanes was arrested and sentto jail. In the course of police investigation, Loberanes admitted

the commission of the crime. He implicated petitioner in thecrime by claiming that part of the money used for buying theillegal drugs was given by the latter, and the illegal drugspurchased were for their consumption for the rest of the month.5

In view of Loberanes’s statement, respondent, on 29 June 2001,served a Memo for Explanation6 to petitioner requiring him toexplain within 120 hours why no disciplinary action should beimposed against him for his alleged involvement in illegal drugactivities. Petitioner was further directed to appear at the officeof respondent’s legal counsel on 16 June 2001 at 9:00 o’clock inthe morning for the hearing on the matter. For the meantime,

petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for the periodof 30 days effective upon receipt of the Notice.

Notwithstanding said Memo, petitioner failed to appear beforethe respondent’s legal counsel on the scheduled hearing dateand to explain his side on the matter.

On 19 July 2001, respondent, through legal counsel, sent asecond letter7 to petitioner directing him to attend anotheradministrative hearing scheduled on 23 July 2001 at 11:00o’clock in the morning at said legal counsel’s office but petitioneronce again failed to show up.

Consequently, respondent, in a third letter8 dated 21 August2001 addressed to petitioner, terminated the latter’semployment retroactive to 11 June 2001 for using illegal drugswithin company premises during working hours, and for refusalto attend the administrative hearing and submit writtenexplanation on the charges hurled against him.

On 20 July 2001, petitioner filed a complaint9 for illegal dismissalagainst respondent and its President, Emmanuel Ong, before theLabor Arbiter. Petitioner alleged that he had been working for

the respondent for 15 years and he was very conscientious withhis job. He was suspended for 30 days on 11 June 2001 basedon the unfounded allegation of his co-worker that he used illegaldrugs within company premises. When petitioner reported backto work after the expiration of his suspension, he was no longerallowed by respondent to enter the work premises and was toldnot to report back to work.

On 8 January 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision10 infavor of petitioner since the respondent failed to presentsubstantial evidence to establish the charge leveled against thepetitioner. Apart from Loberanes’s statements on petitioner’salleged illegal drug use, no other corroborating proof wasoffered by respondent to justify petitioner’s dismissal. Further,respondent failed to comply with due process when itimmediately suspended petitioner and eventually dismissed him

from employment. Petitioner’s immediate suspension was not justified since no evidence was submitted by the respondent toestablish that petitioner’s continued employment pendinginvestigation poses a serious and imminent threat torespondent’s life or property or to the life or property ofpetitioner’s co-workers. Finally, the Labor Arbiter observed thatthe notices of hearing sent by respondent to petitioner were notduly received by the latter. The Labor Arbiter was not swayed byrespondent’s explanation that the reason therefor was thatpetitioner refused to receive said notices. The Labor Arbiter thusruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby renderedordering [herein respondent] to pay [herein

RULE 130 Sec 25 - 35 Additional Cases

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