Rousseau's Partial Reception of Fénelon

Edited by Christoph Schmitt-Maaß,

Stefanie Stockhorst and Doohwan Ahn

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2014

Fénelon in the Enlightenment: Traditions, Adaptations, and Variations

With a preface by Jacques Le Brun

Cover illustration: Telemach betrachtet die Gelegenheit der Stadt Tÿrus. In: François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon: Die Begebenheiten des Prinzen von Ithaca, Oder: der seinen Vater Ulysses, suchende Telemach [?]. Transl. by Benjamin Neukirch. Vol. 1. Onolzbach 1727, p. 145. Classmark: ESlg/2 P.o.gall. 10-1. Reproduction courtesy of Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München.

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The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents - Requirements for permanence”.

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Table of Contents Jacques Le Brun Préface : Une réception paradoxale 7 Christoph Schmitt-Maaß/Stefanie Stockhorst/Doohwan Ahn Introduction: Early Modernism, Catholicism and the Role of the Subject – Fénelon as a Representative of the Age of Enlightenment 13 Karen Pagani And if Voltaire Ceased to be Voltaire? The Influence of Quietism on Voltaire’s Later Works 25 Matthew D. Mendham Rousseau’s Partial Reception of Fénelon: From the Corruptions of Luxury to the Contradictions of Society 47 Andrew Mansfield Fénelon’s Cuckoo: Andrew Michael Ramsay and the Archbishop Fénelon 77 Doohwan Ahn From Idomeneus to Protesilaus: Fénelon in Early Hanoverian Britain 99 Jorge Fernández-Santos Ortiz-Iribas/Sara Muniain Ederra Prendre modèle sur Télémaque: The Fénelonian Underpinnings of ‘Cultural Policy’ at the Court of Philip V of Spain 129 Christoph Schmitt-Maaß Quietistic Pietists? The Reception of Fénelon in Central Germany c. 1700 147 Patricia A. Ward Fénelon and Classical America 171 Márcia Abreu The Adventures of Telemachus in the Luso-Brazilian World 193 Arzu Meral The Ottoman Reception of Fénelon’s Télémaque 211

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Dragana Grbić Telemachus – Dositej Obradović’s Last Wish. The Serbian Reception of Fénelon 237

Anna Szyrwińska Polish Translations of Fénelon’s The Adventures of Telemachus in the 18th and early 19th Century 263

Mary D. Sheriff Painting Telemachus in the French Regency 281

Bernward Schmidt The Rejected Maxim: Images of Fénelon in Rome 1699 and by Catholic Reformers c. 1800 313

Silvia Schmitt-Maaß Collecting Fénelon: Images, Imaginations, and Collecting Portraits 339

Bruno Forment Fénelon’s Operatic Novel: Audiovisual Topoi in Télémaque and their Representation in Opera 365

Biographical Notes 377

Index 383

Rousseau’s Partial Reception of Fénelon: From the Corruptions of Luxury to the Contradictions of Society

Matthew D. Mendham Recent scholarship has called our attention to the significance of Fénelon’s influence on Rousseau. Whereas their similarities have been emphasized, in offering the first systemat-ic comparison of their ideas on economics, commerce, and luxury, this chapter will also highlight their differences. Although Fénelon centrally inspired Rousseau’s passion for antique simplicity over modern luxury, we find that Fénelon offers a surprisingly contex-tualist and tolerant approach to the range of viable political societies (here anticipating Montesquieu). Rousseau was significantly more dismissive of commerce and high culture than his revered predecessor, and close verbal parallels indicate that these departures were intentional. Although long neglected, especially in the English-speaking world, in the last few decades the significance of Rousseau’s debt to Archbishop Fénelon has begun to be understood. François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715) was entrusted by Louis XIV with the tutelage of his grandson, the Duc de Bourgogne, in 1689. It was for this purpose that he wrote The Adven-tures of Telemachus, Son of Ulysses (1693–1694, published – perhaps without his permission – in April 1699),1 which was probably the most widely read book in eighteenth-century Europe, and was certainly so in eighteenth-century France.2 A fictional continuation of Book IV of Homer’s Odyssey, Telemachus portrays the goddess Minerva, disguised as Mentor, “regulat[ing] the whole 1 It was published through “the infidelity of a copyist” (Patrick Riley, ‘Introduction’ to

Telemachus, ed. and transl. by Riley (Cambridge 1994), p. xv). Jacques Le Brun is less convinced, claiming the author may or may not have been complicit in its publica-tion, which occurred just a few weeks after his fall from grace with Louis XIV (Œu-vres, 2 vols., ed. by Jacques Le Brun (Paris 1983, 1997), I, p. xxi, II, p. ix). The writing and publication dates in this paragraph follow Riley, Le Brun (“Chronologie,” in Œu-vres, I, pp. xxix–xxxix), and H. C. Barnard, Fénelon on Education (Cambridge 1966), pp. 145–147.

2 Regarding Europe, Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Na-tion-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 2005), p. 25; regarding France, Riley, ‘In-troduction’ to Telemachus, p. xvi, and ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns’, in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. by Patrick Riley (Cambridge 2001), pp. 78–93 (p. 81). According to Diane Berrett Brown, Te-lemachus was “a runaway eighteenth-century bestseller: 115 French editions and 75 translations were published between 1699 and 1810. Forty years after its initial publi-cation, each new printing continued to sell out […]. Indeed, no book other than the Bible would appear in as many editions throughout eighteenth-century France, where it became a pedagogical staple […]” (‘Emile’s Missing Text: Les Aventures de Télé-maque’, Symposium: A Quarterly Journal in Modern Literatures, 63.1 (2009), 51–71 (pp. 54f.).

Matthew D. Mendham 48

course of the life of Telemachus, in order to raise him to the highest pitch of glory” (Telemachus XVII, p. 310/p. 304).3 The pupil learns the essential lessons of political authority and moral virtue, emphasizing avoidance of the twin evils of harsh, absolute authority, and soft, pompous luxury. The charms of simple nature and the disinterested service of a higher good are thus central standards, as they are in Fénelon’s other major political, moral and educational writings, The Education of Girls (1678, published 1687) and the Letter to the French Academy (1714, published 1716). The course of his later career was most affected by his defense of a quietistic, disinterested love of God in his Maxims of the Saints on the Inner Life (January 1697), provoking strong opposition from Bossuet, a former ally. Fénelon was banished to his diocese (August 1697), and divested of his tutorship and pension (January 1699); the Maxims was then placed on the Index of banned books by Pope Innocent XII (March 1699). The rupture with the king and his court became permanent with the publication of Telemachus in April, since Louis XIV un-derstandably read it as an attack on his faults. Finally, with the premature death of the Duc de Bourgogne in 1712, the hopes of Fénelon and his circle for a renewed France collapsed.4

3 References to works of Fénelon and Rousseau list section divisions, followed by the page number in an English translation, a slash mark, and the page number in the French edition. Fénelon’s collected writings are cited as Œuvres = Œuvres, 2 vols., ed. by Le Brun. For frequently cited individual works of Fénelon, Tel. = Telemachus, ed. by Riley/Les Aventures de Télémaque, Œuvres II. Letter = Fénelon’s Letter to the French Academy, ed. and transl. by Barbara Warnick (Lanham 1984)/Lettre à l’Académie, Œu-vres II. Education = The Education of Girls, in Fénelon on Education, ed. by Barnard/De l’éducation des filles, Œuvres I. For modern editions of Rousseau, EPW = The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and transl. by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge 1997). LPW = The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, ed. and transl. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge 1997). CW = The Collected Writings of Rousseau, 13 vols., ed. by Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly (Hanover 1990–2010). OC = Œuvres Com-plètes, 5 vols., ed. by Bernard Gagnebin, Marcel Raymond, Jean Starobinski, et al. (Paris 1959–1995). For frequently cited individual works of Rousseau, Conf. = Con-fessions (CW, p. 5/OC, p. 1); Corsica = Constitutional Project for Corsica (CW, p. 11/OC, p. 3); DOI = Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (EPW/OC,p. 3); E = Emile, or On Education (transl. by Allan Bloom [New York 1979]/OC, p. 4);Julie = Julie, or the New Heloise (CW, p. 6/OC, p. 2); LR = Last Reply (EPW/OC, p. 3); Poland = Considerations on the Government of Poland (LPW/OC, p. 3); PN = Preface to Narcissus (EPW/OC, p. 2); RJJ = Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues (CW, p. 1/OC, p. 1); SC = Of the Social Contract (LPW/OC, p. 3).

4 Riley, ‘Introduction’, pp. xivf. Although the story typically ends with the death of Louis de Bourbon, in fact Fénelon had also tutored his two brothers. Philip, Duke of Anjou, ascended to the Spanish throne in 1700 as Philip V, and throughout his life showed the deep influence of Fénelon. See in this volume the essay by Jorge Fernán-dez Santos Oritz-Iribas and Sara Muniain Ederra.

Rousseau’s Partial Reception of Fénelon

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Among Fénelon’s leading themes one can easily discern many of the pri-orities of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778): the return to ancient models of virtue, simple nature, and public dedication, against modern indulgence, luxuries, and absolutism. Of course, much of this model of ancient virtue can be found in Plutarch. And since Rousseau was enchanted by Plutarch from boyhood, and proclaimed him to be the last he would read into old age, as “the author who grips and benefits me the most” (Reveries IV, CW 8:28/OC 1:1024), we might plausibly find Plutarch to be Rousseau’s leading influence. And yet, among many others who clearly left their marks – Plato, Lucretius, Seneca, Machiavelli, Montaigne, Locke, and Montesquieu – we have plausible grounds for ranking Fénelon second. First, we know that the Genevan read the Archbishop in early adulthood, during his time with the Madame de Warens.5 Second, while Rousseau is normally at pains to demonstrate the practical impossibility of being virtuous amid modern civi-lization, he places Fénelon among a precious few exceptions.6 Third, Rous-seau’s Emile, or On Education (1762), which he judged to be his “worthiest and best book”,7 is brimming with allusions to Telemachus, especially involv-ing parallels between the two tutors and their pupils (Mentor – Telemachus 5 He is likely to have read Telemachus around age 25 (Henri Gouhier, ‘Rousseau et

Fénelon’, in Reappraisals of Rousseau: Studies in Honor of R. A. Leigh, ed. by Simon Har-vey et al. (Manchester 1980), pp. 279–289 (p. 281), citing ‘Le Verger de Madame la Baronne de Warens’ (1739), CW XII, p. 8/OC II, p. 1128). Cf. the ‘Universal Chro-nology’ (c. 1737), CW XI, p. 2/OC 5, p. 488. During his time at Les Charmettes with Madame de Warens, Rousseau claims to have become “devout almost in the manner of Fénelon” (Reveries of the Solitary Walker, CW VIII, p. 19/OC I, p. 1013). Rousseau may have read The Education of Girls in 1740 when he was working for Mably (Gou-hier, ‘Rousseau et Fénelon’, p. 284). Clear evidence exists that he also read the Traité de l’existence de Dieu (Georges Pire, “Fénelon et Rousseau, du Télémaque à l’Émile,” Les Études Classiques 23.2 (1955), pp. 288–309 (p. 291)). The importance of these readings for Rousseau was also recognized by Charles Hendel, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist, 2 vols. (New York 1934), I, pp. 33–34.

6 See RJJ II, p. 158/p. 863f.; Conf. XII, p. 519/p. 620; Julie II.18, p. 212/p. 259; cf. a similar reference to “the virtuous Fénelon” in ‘Polysynody’, CW XI, p. 79/OC III, p. 620, and the letter to Pierre-Laurent Buirette de Dormont de Belloy, 19 February 1770, in Correspondance complète de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 53 vols., ed. by R. A. Leigh (Genève 1965–1995), XXXVII, p. 243. In the letter to Franquières (15 January 1769), Rousseau places Fénelon alongside Socrates and Cato as standing among the mortals who did not abuse their freedom (LPW p. 280/OC IV, p. 1141f.). See, on the other hand, Rousseau’s incredulity that Fénelon seemed sincerely to believe in hell; he claims to hope Fénelon was lying, for “one certainly must lie sometimes when one is a Bishop” (Conf. VI, p. 192/p. 229).

7 Conf. XI, p. 475/p. 568; cf. p. 480/p. 573; RJJ I, p. 23/p. 687. Rousseau claims that Emile is his “greatest and best book” (RJJ I, p. 23/p. 687), his “worthiest and best book” (Conf. XI, p. 475/p. 568, cf. p. 480/p. 573: “best” and “most important”).


and Jean-Jacques – Emile). While Robinson Crusoe is famously the only book that Emile is permitted to read in his boyhood, Telemachus is prominent among the few he receives in early adulthood, and plays a central role in the formation of his future wife, Sophie.8 Finally, we have the testimony of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre – one of Rousseau’s few confidants in his final years – who concluded that Rousseau “preferred Fénelon over everyone.” When Bernardin suggested that “if Fénelon were living, you would be Cath-olic”, Rousseau was “moved to tears” and replied, “If he were alive, I would seek to be his lackey, to merit being his valet! Ah, it is happy to believe!”9 One may conclude, then, that while Plutarch originally inspired Rousseau’s obsession with antiquity, it was Fénelon who confirmed and legitimated it.10

These passages have been commonly referred to by the handful of scholars who have studied the Fénelon-Rousseau connection. Among these, it is perhaps Judith Shklar and her student, Patrick Riley, who have provided the clearest theoretical basis for understanding Rousseau’s reception of Fénelon’s political thought. According to Shklar, Rousseau presents two different utopias – a rustic household in an “age of gold,” as well as a stern Spartan city. Whereas most interpreters have thought that Rousseau intends to reconcile these two utopias, Shklar argues that Fénelon illustrates a tradi-tion of appealing to different, equally valid but incompatible utopias, with- 8 This has been recently discussed by Brown, ‘Emile’s Missing Text’, pp. 61–63, p. 68,

and ‘The Constraints of Liberty at the Scene of Instruction’, in Rousseau and Freedom, ed. by Christie McDonald and Stanley Hoffman (Cambridge 2010), pp. 159–73 (pp. 164–68).

9 Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, La vie et les ouvrages de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. by Maurice Souriau (Paris 1907), p. 108 (my translation, following R. A. Leigh in reading “valet de chambre” for “valet de champ”: Correspondance complète, XXXVII, p. 245). Rousseau pre-ferred Fénelon to everyone because he turned the views of Europe towards agricul-ture, the basis of human happiness (ibid., p. 122, p. 123n2, p. 127). Bernardin’s testi-mony is also discussed in Albert Cherel, Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France, 1715–1820 (Paris 1917), p. 396; Georges Pire, ‘Fénelon et Rousseau’, p. 291; Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, OC I: p. 1346f., note 1 to p. 229; and Marguerite Haillant, ‘Rousseau admirateur de Fénelon: ressemblances et différences’ in Jean-Jacques Rous-seau, politique et nation, ed. by Robert Thiéry (Paris 2001), pp. 577–594 (p. 578); Charly J. Coleman, ‘The Value of Dispossession: Rethinking Discourses of Selfhood in Eighteenth-Century France’, Modern Intellectual History, 2.3 (2005), 299–326 (p. 316). Rousseau apparently made similar claims about serving as Fénelon’s valet (Kam-merdiener) during his October 1763 conversation with Wegelin and Schulthess (Corre-spondance complète XVIII, p. 258; cf. XLV, pp. 288f.). Here, though, Fénelon is men-tioned in distinction from Plutarch, and given his privileged place “among the moderns” (“Unter den Neuern giebt es wenige Menschen, die er höher als den weisen Fenelon schäzte […]”, XVIII, p. 258; cf. Saint-Pierre, Vie et ouvrages, p. 123, which mentions Plutarch just before Fénelon, but without direct comparison).

10 Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel’, p. 78.


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out entailing any contradiction, since they are not intended to be combined. As depicted in Telemachus, “Bétique, the utopia of spontaneous rural simplici-ty, illuminates all the vices of a denatured civilization. Salante, the creation of a single legislator, is a model of organized civic virtue, which serves to show up the social degradation of France under Louis XIV.”11 For Shklar, Rous-seau’s appeals to similar models above all attempt to diagnose “the emotion-al diseases of modern civilization”, and to insist upon a choice between rustic isolation and harsh Spartan discipline, each of which “meets the psy-chic needs of men for inner unity and social simplicity.”12 In this paradigm, Rousseau offers his rustic, domestic utopia most clearly in works such as Emile and Julie, or The New Heloise (1761), whereas his Spartan, civic utopia is defended in works such as The Social Contract (1762) and Considerations on the Government of Poland (written 1771–1772). While the connections between Rousseau’s (Spartan) idea of civic virtue and Fénelon’s idea of “disinterest-ed” love have been very well-treated by previous scholars,13 this article will offer what is, to my knowledge, the first systematic comparison of their ideas on economics, commerce, and luxury. Alongside disinterestedness and pedagogy,14 the politics of commerce and luxury could plausibly be taken as one of the great points of contact between their intellectual projects.

11 Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge 1969),

pp. 4f. 12 Shklar, Men and Citizens, p. 1 and p. 5. 13 Cf. Riley, ‘Introduction’, esp. pp. xxi–xxv; Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quar-

rel’, esp. pp. 88–91; Riley, ‘Fénelon’s Republican Monarchism in Telemachus’, in Mon-archisms in the Age of Enlightenment: Liberty, Patriotism, and the Common Good, ed. by Hans Blom, John Christian Laursen, and Luisa Simonutti (Toronto 2007), pp. 78–100 (pp. 95–97), (the remainder of this chapter is essentially reprinted from the two former essays); Coleman, ‘The Value of Dispossession’, esp. pp. 312–320; Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge 2003), pp. 183–194. The issue is also associated with Fénelon’s cosmopolitanism, with which Rous-seau has a complex relation (see, e.g., Riley, The General Will before Rousseau: The Trans-formation of the Divine into the Civic (Princeton 1986), pp. 206f.).

14 On pedagogy, see especially Pire, ‘Fénelon et Rousseau,’ pp. 293–299, and Gouhier, ‘Rousseau et Fénelon.’ On religious similarities, see Gouhier and André Charrak, ‘Fénelon,’ in Dictionnaire de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. by Raymond Trousson and Frédéric S. Eigeldinger (Paris, 2006), pp. 336–339 (pp. 337f.). While Charrak empha-sizes their differences on the question of pure love and hope in the afterlife, consider also the role of direct emotional contact with God in Fénelon’s quietism – an idea often closely associated with Rousseau. See the essay by Karen Pagani in this volume.


I. The Civic Contextualism of Telemachus Shklar’s model surely explains much that could otherwise be perplexing in Rousseau.15 Nonetheless, for anyone who has extensively dwelt among Rousseau and his interpreters, and turns only later to Fénelon, it may be surprising to see just how wide-ranging are the societies which the Telemachus presents as mirrors for cultural, economic, and political judgment. While not all of them qualify as full-fledged utopias (with which Shklar concerned herself), and some are portrayed as depraved, the diverse societies which Fénelon depicts with a high level of subtlety and precision call to mind not the eloquent denunciations of Rousseau, but the patient ethnologies of Montesquieu. Fénelon also anticipates Montesquieu in the range of the societies for which he was willing to offer robust, virtually unqualified praise, as being fundamentally just, culturally and economically sustainable, and well-suited to their physical situation. So if Fénelon’s influence on Rousseau was central, and if this influence consists largely in providing vari-ous theoretical and observational hammers for pounding modern deca-dence, it is noteworthy to observe any major deviations from Fénelon, espe-cially where Rousseau becomes more sweepingly dismissive of modern soci-ety than his revered predecessor.

Although Fénelon never provides a straightforward rank-ordering of the various societies he depicts, whether in terms of an economic principle or a moral hierarchy, he does seem to have a clear sense of their differences in economic complexity, an insight developed by Enlightenment figures in-cluding Turgot, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Smith, and Millar.16 Alt-hough most scholars have focused on two or three of Fénelon’s models,17 15 For a more detailed assessment of the Shklarian interpretation of Rousseau, see

Matthew D. Mendham, ‘Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens against Civilization: Un-raveling Rousseau’s Paradoxes’, American Journal of Political Science, 55.1 (2011), 170–187.

16 For the Enlightenment stadial theory, see e.g. Ronald Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge 1976); Christopher J. Berry, Social Theory of the Scottish En-lightenment (Edinburgh 1997), esp. chaps. 6–7; Hont, Jealousy of Trade, esp. pp. 103–108, pp. 159–184, pp. 354–388. Although Fénelon clearly sees agriculture as a later development than foraging or herding, it is not clear that he would have seen a nearly universal pattern from foraging to herding, from herding to subsistence-agriculture, and from subsistence-agriculture to commerce.

17 In his thorough discussion of related issues, Paul Schuurman offers a discussion parallel to Shklar’s, following Istvan Hont’s account of Fénelon’s “tripartite model in the history of luxury”: Boetica, unreformed Salentum, and reformed Salentum (‘Fénelon on Luxury, War, and Trade in the Telemachus’, History of European Ideas, 38.2 (2012), 179–199 (p. 182); cf. Hont, ‘The early Enlightenment Debate on Com-merce and Luxury’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. by Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge 2006), pp. 379–418 (p. 384). Schuur-


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we can clearly distinguish eight societies which are given substantive socio-political analysis in Telemachus, organized according to Fénelon’s clear divi-sion between condemnable and praiseworthy, as well as his implied depic-tions of economic complexity. The exercise may be worthwhile both for continuing to expose Fénelon’s social thought “to the light of present day,” as well as for specifying Rousseau’s deviations from it.18 a. Societies which are brutally savage or decadent 1. The shepherds of the mountains in the desert of Oasis, outside of the civilized part of Egypt (Book II). Upon Telemachus’s initial banishment among them, these shepherds were “as savage as the desert itself”. Their lack of knowledge of agriculture is clearly linked with “a savage and brutal life”. Eventually, Telemachus follows Apollo’s model and teaches them – especially through flutes, song, and praise of “the golden fruits with which autumn rewards the husbandman’s toil” – “to know the charms of a country life, and to enjoy every delight which simple nature can produce” (Tel. II, p. 23/p. 23).

2. Cyprus (Book IV). This island epitomizes effeminacy, voluptuousness, violent passions, and idleness. Although the land is “naturally fertile and agreeable,” and evidently the Cypriots have knowledge of agriculture, the land remains “quite uncultivated, so averse were its inhabitants to labor” (Tel. IV, p. 49f./p. 49).19

3. Unreformed Salente (Book X; typically seen as a critique of contem-porary France). Recently founded by Idomeneus, the former king of Crete, Mentor faults the colony for languishing in population, cultivated lands, and genuine prosperity, due to the prioritization of “magnificent structures,” “pomp and grandeur,” as well as the false sense of glory which led to un-necessary wars (Tel. X, pp. 152f./pp. 150f.).

man mentions the Tyreans briefly in connection with Salentum’s approach to com-merce (p. 188, p. 191). Nannerl Keohane follows Shklar in discussing “two exempla-ry regimes that have come to be seen as his two utopias: Bétique and Salente” (Philos-ophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Princeton 1980), pp. 338–343).

18 The quoted phrase is Riley’s recommendation for understanding what was obvious in the intellectual context of Rousseau (‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel’, p. 79). Developing these ethnologies also seems justified by the conclusion of Charrak re-garding the impact of Fénelon on Rousseau’s political thought: “In sum, it is the tab-leau of moeurs, and not the properly political principles, which, in the thought of Fénelon, interests the Genevan” (‘Fénelon’, p. 336f., my translation).

19 Calypso’s island illustrates a supernatural version of this sensualism (Tel. IV).


b. Societies which are healthy, or at least sound in their fundamentals 1. The Mandaurians (Book IX). An exclusively foraging society, described by the then-hostile Idomeneus as “a savage race who roamed through the forests, and lived by hunting and by the fruits which the trees spontaneously produced” (Tel. IX, p. 130/p. 127). And yet they end up providing the peo-ple of Salente with multiple lessons in “gentleness and generosity” (p. 130/p. 128), preferring peace to “that brutality which, under the fine [beaux] names of ambition and glory, madly ravages whole provinces, and sheds the blood of men, who are brothers” (p. 131/p. 129).20 Thus, the Mandaurians would always prefer being “ignorant and barbaric, but just, humane, faithful, and disinterested”: “If the sciences to which the Greeks apply themselves so closely, and if the politeness on which they value them-selves so highly, inspire them with such a detestable injustice, we believe ourselves only too happy in having none of these advantages” (p. 131/p. 129).21

2. Boetica (Bétique, Book VII). Near “the pillars of Hercules,” with an ex-ceptionally “serene and temperate” climate, the Tyrean merchant Adoam remarks, “This country seems to have preserved the delights of the golden age” (Tel. VII, p. 109/p. 106; cf. p. 114/p. 112). They share their land col-lectively; with such abundance derived from the earth, and such simple needs prevailing among them, there is no need for dividing it (pp. 110f./p. 108). “They are almost all either shepherds or plowmen [laboureurs]” (p. 109/p. 107).22 They have very few artisans, since they only allow the arts that “truly serve the needs of men” (p. 109/p. 107).23 Arts related to archi-tecture are useless to them; they refrain from building any fixed dwelling, 20 Translation modified, from “beaux” as “gaudy.” The translator’s intent is understand-

able, but it is important for our purposes to see that the Mandaurians are not re-nouncing glory (as, for instance, Rousseau’s pre-social savages would). Rather, as the translation also suggests in the next sentence, they only renounce “false glory [fausse gloire]” (Tel. IX, p. 131/p. 129).

21 Translation modified. Shklar briefly mentions the discussion of the Mandaurians as “the tale of the good savages,” in a footnote related to Bétique (Men and Citizens, p. 5).

22 Translation modified. Instead of “plowmen”, Riley translates “laborers”. The latter is the proper translation for labourers, but Fénelon’s laboureurs means plowmen or farm-ers (cf. Tel. II, p. 23/p. 23, correctly translated as “husbandmen”). The correction is potentially significant since, on the one hand, artisans exist but are rare in Boetica. On the other hand, the passage may otherwise seem to focus overwhelmingly on shepherding, to the relative neglect of agriculture. “Almost” has also been inserted before “all”, for “presque tous”.

23 Translation slightly modified.


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since this would indicate undue attachment to the earth, and they consider it sufficient to protect themselves from the wind (p. 110/p. 107).24 They have no money and no foreign commerce – or more precisely, they take pleasure in giving their superfluities away to strangers (p. 109, p. 113/pp. 106f., p. 111).25 Similarly, they consider navigation pernicious: “If those nations who practice it have, in their country, the wherewithal to satisfy nature, what do they go to other countries for?” (p. 114/p. 112). After mentioning their dismissal of architecture, Adoam observes: “As for the other arts esteemed among the Greeks, Egyptians, and other civilized nations, they detest them, as the inventions of vanity and effeminacy [mollesse]” (Tel. VII, p. 110/p. 107).26 Altogether, the Boeticans seem to represent a highly spon-taneous innocence and simplicity.27

3. Crete (Book V).28 An ancient civilization of immense population, there Telemachus noticed countless well-built villages, large towns, and superb cities (p. 59/p. 57). Crete adheres to the laws of Minos, “the wisest and best of all kings” (p. 59/p. 58).29 Its educational system accustoms the Cretans to “a simple, frugal, and laborious life,” and they are limited to “sat-isfying their real needs.” These traits allow them to see that the earth is gen-erous with them, and the higher their population, “the greater plenty they

24 They believe that “There will always be more land than can be cultivated. As long as

there are lands unoccupied and uncultivated, we would not even defend those we possess, should our neighbors see fit to seize them” (Tel. VII, p. 113/p. 111, transla-tion modified). However, they endorse war in defense of liberty (as opposed to land: p. 112/p. 109). This approach to self-defense parallels the response of the Man-daurians to Idomeneus’ first landing (Tel. IX, p. 130/p. 128).

25 Iron, gold, and silver are only used for practical implements, such as plowshares (Tel. VII, p. 109/p. 107).

26 Translation modified, from mollesse as “luxury.” 27 See Hont on how Boetica should not be seen as a semi-Platonic utopia, but rather,

following Claude Fleury’s Les Moeurs des Israélites (1681), as modeled upon (what Fleu-ry understood to be) the genuine experience of Israel for four thousand years (‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, pp. 384f.).

28 Gouhier is unusual in mentioning Crete as a key model for Rousseau; Bétique and the reformed Salente are the two other societies he mentions (‘Rousseau et Fénelon’, p. 282).

29 Regarding the excellence of Minos, consider Fénelon’s careful distinctions applying to the morals of the ancients: “Their philosophy was merely vain and superstitious. Before Socrates, morality was quite imperfect, even though legislators had provided excellent rules for the people’s government” (Letter X, p. 104/p. 1190; cf. Education VI, p. 34/p. 119). On the purification of the ethics of Homer in Telemachus, see Da-vid Hume, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ (1757) in Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, ed. by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis 1985), p. 228.


enjoy” (p. 59/p. 58).30 There is never need to repress “pomp and effeminacy [le faste et la mollesse],” since they are not known there. Everyone works, yet “nobody aims at wealth; they all think themselves sufficiently repaid for their labor by a sweet and ordered [douce et réglée] life, in which they enjoy in peace and plenty all that is truly necessary to life” (p. 60/p. 59).31 Although their furniture and meals are simple, they do have houses, which are “neat, commodious, and pleasant [riantes], but without any ornaments” (p. 60/p. 59).32 In view of Minos’ education toward virtue, but their inno-cence in regard to luxury, the Cretans would seem to be at a middle point between spontaneous goodness and a virtue which is intentionally willed or reformed form vice.33

30 Fénelon thus emphatically rejects the assumption of a fixed economic pie with regard to agriculture, insisting that the earth multiplies its gifts in generous proportion to the number and diligence of its laborers, nourishing them with ease (e.g. Tel. V, p. 59/p. 58; X, pp. 166–68/pp. 164–66; XIV, p. 259/pp. 253f.; XVIII,p. 296/p. 289). This “sacralization of the earth” had a definitive impact on the Phys-iocrats (Philippe Bonolas, ‘Fénelon et le luxe dans le Télémaque’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 249 (1987), pp. 81–90, p. 89f.). Fénelon thus preemptively re-jects Malthus. His approach also seems close to Thomas More’s combination of dili-gence and frugality in Utopia, which David Wootton, following the analysis of Joseph Schumpeter, describes as an attempt to overcome the problem of scarcity by “econ-omizing on labor,” rather than economizing on costs of production as in a typical capitalist economy (‘Introduction’ to Thomas More, Utopia, ed. and transl. by Woot-ton (Indianapolis 1999), pp. 18–23).

31 Translation modified, from “douce et réglée” as “agreeable regular.” The emphasis on order and diligence is also clear in a fable, The Bees, written by Fénelon shortly after he was appointed tutor to the Duc de Bourgogne. A young prince observes a bee-hive, where “The idle and the lazy were banished from this little State; everything there was in movement, but without confusion and without trouble.” The queen bee soon explains to him: “In our home, we do not put up with either disorder or li-cense; one becomes considerable among us only by his work and by the talents which may be useful to our republic. Merit is the sole route which raises to the prem-iere places” (Les Abeilles, in Fables et opuscules pédagogiques, Œuvres I, p. 229, my transla-tion). According to Hont, it is Fénelon’s image of the virtuous and frugal beehive which Mandeville would famously ridicule (Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, p. 383, p. 387). However, according to Christopher Brooke, although the early stagesof Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees were largely directed against Fénelon’s political thought in general, based on the publication dates of Fénelon’s Fables (French 1718, English 1722), the common use of the bee metaphor is “probably just a marvelous coincidence” (Philosophic Pride: Stoicism and Political Thought from Lipsius to Rousseau (Princeton 2012), p. 153).

32 Translation modified, from “riantes” as “elegant.” 33 Thebes in Egypt is only given a very brief description, but may represent a slightly

more advanced version of the Cretan model (see Tel. II, p. 18/pp. 17f.). The case of Crete would seem to weigh against Hont’s claim that “Boetica was the highest stage of material civilisation without luxury” (‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, p. 384).


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4. Reformed Salente (Books X, XI, and XVII; understood as a reform program for contemporary France). The society depicted by far the most thoroughly and famously, here Idomeneus follows Minerva in successfully purging and reconstituting his city. As with the happiness of the Boeticans and the wisdom and goodness of Minos – whose laws are largely endorsed in Salente – we find yet more superlatives: “And thus did Minerva, in the guise of Mentor, establish the government of Salente upon the best laws and the most useful maxims of government…” (Tel. XI, p. 197/p. 194). Through law and the example of the king, “all those arts that are subservient to pomp [le faste]” were banished from Salente (Tel. X, pp. 162–64/pp. 159–161).34 A few artisans thus remain employed in useful, necessary arts, espe-cially those pertaining to agriculture, while a very small group of proper genius is permitted to pursue the fine arts (Tel. X, pp. 163f./pp. 161–163; XVII, p. 296/p. 290). The majority of the former artisans are thus shifted toward agriculture and commerce. Regarding commerce, certain firm regula-tions exist concerning the punishment of bankruptcy and the limitation of spending in comparison to reserves. Both domestic production and foreign merchandise are prohibited from introducing “luxury and effeminacy [le luxe et la mollesse]” (pp. 161f./p. 159). Apparently with these exceptions assumed, Mentor states without qualification that “the liberty of commerce was pre-served entire: far from cramping it by imposts, a recompense was offered to all those merchants who should open a new trade between Salente and any other nations” (p. 161/p. 159). Although the exceptions seem more striking to the current reader,35 Fénelon’s standard is evident: “Everything useful was 34 Translation modified, from “le faste” as “pomp and luxury”. 35 Compare the view of Hont, that in reformed Salentum, “The port was isolated from

the rest of the economy, and subjected to draconian financial regulation” (‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, p. 385). Richard Whatmore follows Hont in describing Sal-entum’s “isolated commercial port at the edge of a self-contained economy” (“En-lightenment Political Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Phi-losophy, ed. by George Klosko (New York 2011), pp. 296–318 (p. 307)). Similarly, Ryan Patrick Hanley plausibly summarizes Hont’s Fénelon as offering an “anti-modern, anti-commercial view” (‘Cambridge’s Enlightenment’, in Political Theory 36.4 (2008), 634–640, p. 637). I have not found evidence of any special isolation of the port. Although the financial regulations would be rejected by many, including Mon-tesquieu, Hume and Smith, it may be misleading to describe them as draconian – Mentor severely punishes bankruptcies as resulting generally from fraud or rashness, and prevents merchants from ever risking “the property of others, or more than half of their own” (Tel. VII, p. 161/p. 159; cf. III, p. 37/p. 37). The regulations are clear-ly intended to protect (useful) commerce itself in the long-run, and not to stifle it or even to balance it against some perceived countervailing value. It would be better to emphasize Fénelon’s surprisingly moderate stance on commerce as such, alongside a truly severe repudiation of luxury, throughout the whole of Salente (as well as Crete


imported and exported without restraint” (161/159).36 Finally, in part be-cause children belong “not so much to their parents as to la république,” a vigorous system of public education is instituted, teaching the love of glory and virtue through physical exercises and charming songs in praise of heroes (Tel. XI, pp. 194f./pp. 191f.; see also Education VII, pp. 46f./pp. 129).

5. Tyre (Book III; understood as portraying contemporary Holland).37 The leading city of Phoenecia appears to belong not to any one people, but “to all nations in general, and [to be] the center of their commerce” (Tel. III, p. 36/p. 36). Telemachus asks a Tyrian, Narbal, how it is that the Phoene-cians “have made themselves the masters of the whole commerce of the world, thus enriching themselves off of all other nations?” (p. 36/p. 36).38 Some have interpreted this question to suggest an element of mercantilist thinking in Fénelon – that the economy is a fixed pie, and trade simply en-

and Tyre). Lionel Rothkrug’s contextual reading of Fénelon’s “Christian agrarianism” supports this (qualified) pro-commercial reading of Telemachus (see Opposition to Louis XIV: The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton 1965), pp. 234–298, esp. pp. 271f. and 271n49).

36 Emphasis added. Liberty of commerce also entails the most exact and impartial justice in the treatment of people of all nations at the port (Tel. X, p. 161/p. 159), in accordance with the well-established traditions of Tyre. On commerce in general, see the rebuke of contemporary France in the remarkable Letter to Louis XIV (ca. 1693–1694): “Cultivation of the fields is almost abandoned. The cities and the countryside are losing population. All the trades are languishing and can no longer provide for the workers. All commerce is destroyed. Consequently, you have destroyed half of the real strength within your realm in order to make, and then defend, vain conquests without” (in Fénelon, Selected Writings, ed. and transl. by Chad Helms (New York 2006), p. 201/Œuvres I: p. 547).

37 On Holland, see Hont, Jealousy of Trade, p. 26; Schuurman, ‘Fénelon on Luxury, War, and Trade’, p. 188. Regarding my categorization, it is not self-evident whether re-formed Salente or Tyre should be seen as more economically complex. I have adopt-ed this ordering since Salente is predominantly agricultural while Tyre is almost ex-clusively commercial, and thus the latter would have far less natural simplicity and self-sufficiency. Consider also the comparisons of incentive structures discussed in note 43 below.

38 Translation modified: “…se sont rendus les maîtres du commerce de toute la terre et qu’ils s’enrichissent ainsi aux dépens de tous les autres peuples?” (Tel. III, p. 36/p. 36). For “aux dépens de”, Riley has “at the expense of”, which I have re-placed with “off of”. Apparently in the seventeenth century, both are legitimate pos-sibilities for aux dépens de. Cf. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, 3 vols., ed. by Alain Rey (Paris 2012), s.v. “dépens”: “Le mot est demeuré usuel dans la locution prépositionnelle aux dépens de (1306), qui a perdu son sens propre, ‘aux frais de’ (encore au xviie s.), pour le sens figuré ‘au détriment de’, attesté depuis Montaigne (1580)[…].”


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riches one entity at the expense of another.39 But that would be contrary to the overall thrust of Fénelon’s thinking about (non-luxurious) commerce.40 We might, then, take the remark in a more benign sense, as closely parallel-ing Montesquieu’s later praise of the Tyreans, that they “drew their liveli-hood from the entire universe.”41 It may also reflect a naïve initial assump-tion on the part of Telemachus, who, after hearing Narbal’s answer, soon asks him about “the proper methods of establishing one day in Ithaca a like commerce” (p. 37/p. 37). Presumably, he is not aspiring to any genuine parasitism or the beggaring of foreign nations. In any case, Narbal explains that their city is “happily situated for commerce,” and has “the glory of having invented navigation” (p. 37/p. 36f.). There follows a praise of this commercial people which Montesquieu would echo, but which surely made Rousseau cringe: “The Tyrians are industrious, patient, laborious, clean, sober, and frugal; they have a well-regulated administration; there is no dis-cord among them; never was there a people more firm and steady, more candid, more loyal, more reliable, or more kind to strangers” (p. 37/p. 37). Apparently, the legal suppression of pomp and luxury, which was central in Salente, is less necessary in Tyre, since their frugality is maintained through cultural momentum (they had not previously experienced thorough corrup- 39 Philippe Bonolas reads Fénelon as being in accordance with the mercantilists in this

passage, although not in most respects of his thought (‘Fénelon et le luxe’, p. 85). 40 For instance, Mentor hails the Phoenecians as being “so helpful to all nations” (Tel.

VII, p. 97/p. 95), and their patron deity, Neptune, describes them as making the sea “the bond of society which holds the nations of the earth together […] and they dif-fuse plenty, and the conveniences of life, all over the earth” (Tel. VIII, p. 118/p. 116; cf. the theological basis for this in Fénelon’s Traité de l’existence et des attributs de Dieu, discussed in Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV, pp. 274f.). Similarly, in reformed Salente, the (qualified) free commercial policy results in a net gain: “What was carried out was more than balanced by what was brought in return” (Tel. X, p. 161/p. 159). This is also in keeping with the prescription of Narbal, that taxation of commerce is not appropriate, since rulers will derive “advantage enough from [trade], by the great wealth it will bring into their dominions” (Tel. III, p. 38). In these ways, one could see how Fénelon harnesses commerce as part of the ‘anti-Malthusian’ project we see clearly in his agricultural thought (discussed in note 30 above).

41 See Montesquieu’s encomium of the commercial virtues, which echoes many of the traits ascribed by Fénelon to Tyre, including industriousness, justice, moderation, tranquility, and frugality (The Spirit of the Laws, transl. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge 1989), V.6, XX.5, and XXI.6, p. 360/ De l’esprit des lois, in Œuvres Complètes, 2 vols., ed. by Roger Callois (Paris 1949, 1951), II, p. 608). The parallel (and possible echo) of Fénelon occurs in the discussion of Tyre, Venice, and the Dutch towns, which concludes: “They had to live; they drew their livelihood from the whole universe [Il fallut subsister; ils tirèrent leur subsistence de tout l’univers]” (The Spirit of the Laws, XX.5, p. 341, De l’esprit des lois, II, p. 589).


tion) and through the necessities of economic efficiency.42 Telemachus is instructed “above all” to “leave the whole profits of [trade] to their subjects, who take all the pains […]. It is the prospect of gain and convenience alone that brings strangers to your country” (p. 37f./p. 37f.).43 Although Tyre’s grandeur seems threatened by ruin, this is by all appearances the result of the tyrannical rule of Pygmalion – demanding to know countless particular details of each entering ship, imposing new taxes, and using artifice to con-fiscate the goods of the merchants (p. 38/p. 38). It thus does not seem to be a necessary result, or strong tendency, of the city’s fundamental nature.44

c. The intentions behind Fénelon’s societiesEach of the societies labeled healthy seems to be endorsed in full measure by Fénelon, despite their differences and even incompatibilities. They avoid the fatal errors of the brutally savage or decadent societies. Shklar’s frame-work seems correct insofar as some of the healthy societies offer unmistak-able criticisms of the other healthy ones, thus suggesting these models are in no way meant to be harmonized. These criticisms seem ultimately to

42 See the warnings on the decline that would come if the Tyreans made various mostly cultural (not legal) shifts, including that they begin “to soften themselves in seductive delights and idleness,” or that the leading men begin to “despise labor and frugality” (Tel. III, p. 37/p. 37, translation modified). This being the case with luxury, Tyre’s regulations on merchants are similar to those of reformed Salente: “punish with se-verity fraud in merchants, and even negligence and pomp [le faste]; these ruin com-merce, by ruining those who carry it on” (Tel. III, p. 37/p. 37, translation modified).

43 The insistence in this section on effort and arts being “properly rewarded” differs from the ethos of Crete, where everyone labors, but none aspire to become rich. Based on the subtle contrast of language, it would appear that working the fields in one’s own homeland (à la Crete) does not require the robust incentive structure nec-essary or natural for excellence in the mechanical arts or (especially) foreign com-merce. Both the foreign and the commercial elements may be less intrinsically sweet (cf. Mentor’s idea that serving justly as a king is so burdensome that it is only a duty for one’s homeland: Tel. V, p. 73/p. 72). Here the reformed Salente may constitute a middle point, since the most agriculturally productive families are rewarded with re-duced taxation and additional lands, but the portions of land apparently remain small enough (per person) that superfluities and excess abundance are prevented (Tel. X, pp. 168–69/pp. 166–67).

44 Bonolas may also be right to consider commercial prosperity very fragile by its es-sence, requiring only a despotic ruler such as Pygmalion to make the riches languish (“Fénelon et le luxe”, p. 85; cf. Tel. III, p. 37/p. 37). It is probably correct that agri-cultural prosperity is less vulnerable according to Fénelon, although the case of Louis XIV reveals at least some fragility. In particular, Fénelon’s circle was committed to free international trade in part because, without it, bountiful harvests would only lead to collapsing prices for grains, leading to misery among the peasants (Rothkrug, Op-position to Louis XIV, e.g. p. 239, p. 265).


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amount to warnings or limitations, rather than inevitable failings of the soci-eties so criticized. For instance, we have seen the influential criticisms, by the Mandaurians and the Boeticans, of science, politeness, and commerce, which would later partly inspire Montesquieu’s fable of the Troglodytes and Rousseau’s Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (1751).45 However, it is almost certainly significant that Fénelon frames these condemnations of the civi-lized arts as conditionals – if Greek science and politeness lead to war, or if the needs of nature can be satisfied at home, then we (the happy barbarians or golden-age denizens) are better off without them. These antecedents need not always be affirmed, and therefore, the polished Fénelon does not seem to be endorsing the conclusions as necessary for every society.

As for Greek science and politeness, we know the fine arts are pursued at Salente, and the limitation on the number of people who may pursue them is motivated precisely by the need for excellence in them. This implies a rejection of wholesome barbarism as the highest cultural achievement, and an endorsement of Greek science and politeness in this form. Similarly, Salente is said to be “so advantageously situated” for commerce, as Tyre is “happily situated for commerce” (Tel. X, p. 153/p. 150; III, p. 37/p. 36f.). Although Fénelon does not clarify how these observations may be recon-ciled with the Boetican critique of commerce, it would seem that, first, a situation like Tyre’s rocky shores does require trade in order to satisfy na-ture.46 Second, it appears that Fénelon politically endorses the move beyond the strictest standards of nature (as embodied in Boetica), toward the “con-venient,” “commodious,” or “beneficial” fulfillment of genuinely natural 45 For the Troglodytes, see Montesquieu, Persian Letters, transl. by Margaret Mauldon

(New York 2008), Letters pp. 10–14, and the discussions in Michael Sonenscher, Be-fore the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution (Princeton 2007), pp. 95–108, and Richard B. Sher, ‘From Troglodytes to Americans: Montesquieu and the Scottish Enlightenment on Liberty, Virtue, and Commerce’, in Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1649–1776, ed. by David Wootton (Stan-ford 1994), pp. 368–402. For numerous close connections of the Troglodytes with Boetica, see Cherel, Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France, pp. 323f., and Sonenscher, pp. 106f. François Bouchardy observes that even though the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts was not the first to criticize the arts and sciences, it was still striking and up-setting to numerous readers, perhaps because it was not cloaked in fiction as the Te-lemachus and the Troglodytes had been (OC III: p. 1244, note 2 to p. 10).

46 This also seems to be suggested by an important discourse in the underworld by Erycthon, who first introduced the use of silver as money, and urges us to endeavor “chiefly” to produce the true riches of agriculture. “As for silver money, no account ought to be made of it, but in as far as it is necessary, either for carrying on unavoid-able wars abroad, or for purchasing commodities that are useful and necessary, but lacking in your own country; for it is to be wished that all trade in articles of luxury, vanity, and softness, were laid aside” (Tel. XIV, p. 259/pp. 253f.).


desires (cf. Tel. X, p. 161/p. 158).47 For instance, the Boeticans do not build houses, instead apparently living in portable tents (partly, no doubt, because the natural environment is consistently mild there). By contrast, all three of the healthy and complex societies – Crete, Salente, and Tyre – evidently live in homes which are simple and without ornament, yet commodious and convenient for large families.48 Thus, the Boetican model remains a hum-bling and inspiring vision of the delights of pure nature and the distance of contemporary civilization from it, but it is not intended to be normative for politics or ethics.49 In sum, although Fénelon was justifiably received in the following century as the chief modern scourge of luxury and softness, in his portrayals of highly varying yet legitimate societies, we find a surprising sort of contextualism, including a robust defense of the legitimacy of commerce as such. Without giving a hint of permissive relativism, Fénelon is apparent-ly suggesting an increase of toleration and even admiration for foreign cus-toms, insofar as these are properly adapted to the challenges and opportuni-ties of a given physical environment, as well an existing or attainable level of cultural innocence or sophistication. Although Rousseau, as a close reader of Fénelon and Montesquieu, is not unaware of these contextual factors, we will see that his range of tolerable and sustainable political practice is far narrower than Fénelon’s.50 47 By contrast, Mandeville’s defense of luxury hinges in large part upon denying the

possibility of any coherent middle position which rejects luxury, once one has aban-doned adherence to the simplest needs provided spontaneously by nature (The Fable of the Bees, Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits [1732], ed. by F. B. Kaye (Indianapolis 1988), I, Remark L., p. 107; Remark Q., p. 182; see also Hont, ‘The Early Enlight-enment Debate’, p. 391).

48 In Crete, the houses are “neat, commodious, and pleasant [riantes], but without any ornaments” (Tel. V, p. 60/p. 59). In Salente, Mentor “drew plans of a species of ar-chitecture equally beautiful and simple, by which an inconsiderable [médiocre] space of ground afforded an airy house convenient for a numerous family […]” (Tel. X, p. 164/p. 162). Something like this may be assumed of Tyre, where they are well-compensated for their labor, yet known to be frugal. Compare Montesquieu on “economic commerce” and on the English sort of luxury as a refinement upon real needs (Spirit of the Laws, V.3, XX.4, XIX.27, p. 331/De l’esprit des lois, II: p. 581; see al-so Cherel, Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France, p. 325).

49 Cf. Tel. VII, p. 114/p. 112. This follows Shklar, Men and Citizens, pp. 4f.; Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France, pp. 338f.; Bonolas, ‘Fénelon et le luxe’, p. 85.

50 For views of Rousseau’s contextualism as more robust, see Fonna Forman-Barzilai, ‘The Emergence of Contextualism in Rousseau’s Political Thought: The Case of the Parisian Theatre in the Letter à d’Alembert’, History of Political Thought, 24 (2003), 435–463, and Ryan Patrick Hanley, ‘Enlightened Nation Building: The ‘Science of the Legislator’ in Adam Smith and Rousseau’, American Journal of Political Science, 52.2 (2008), 219–234. My response, which is closer to traditional interpretations of Rous-


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In the remaining sections of this article, we will analyze the close connec-tions between Fénelon and Rousseau on luxury and social injustice, disor-der, vice, and martial flabbiness. Despite many clear similarities, we will find that Rousseau moves beyond Fénelon’s rejections of luxury and toward more radical and intrinsic criticisms of society and civilization as such. Much of the contrast can be explained by understanding Fénelon as an extraordi-narily pure synthesis of classical and Christian moralism.51 Although Rous-seau draws amply from these traditions, he adds a more subversive and modern strand of individualism, perhaps because he sees interdependence itself as the ultimate source of the maladies of contemporary civilization.

II. Luxury and Social Decay in Fénelon and Rousseau The classical and Christian traditions, especially as articulated by Plato and Augustine, each run through multiple currents to Fénelon and Rousseau.52 To a large extent, the socio-political implications of these traditions amount to the claim that by indulging in unnecessary and destructive desires, one ultimately commits social injustice by consuming a disproportionate share of inherently finite goods, while undermining the prospects of ascending to love higher goods, including immaterial pleasures and human community.53

seau, is offered in ‘Enlightened Gentleness as Soft Indifference: Rousseau’s Critique of Cultural Modernization’, History of Political Thought, 31.4 (2010), 605–637.

51 Lord Acton wrote perceptively of Fénelon: “He learnt to refer the problem of gov-ernment, like the conduct of private life, to the mere standard of morals, and extend-ed further than any one the plain but hazardous practice of deciding all things by the exclusive precepts of enlightened virtue…. He is the Platonic founder of revolution-ary thinking” (Lectures on the French Revolution, ed. by Stephen J. Tonsor (Indianapolis 2000), pp. 3f.). This passage was brought to my attention by Richard Whatmore, ‘The Origins of the French Revolution’, History of Political Thought, 29.4 (2008), 717–729, p. 718.

52 See, e.g., Riley, ‘Introduction,’ xxii, xxvii; Hulliung, ‘Rousseau, Voltaire, and the Revenge of Pascal,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, pp. 57–77; and David Lay Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment (University Park 2007), pp. 36–40, pp. 53f. Brooke is useful in considering the related Stoic currents, although he concedes that Plato was “the ancient philosopher from whom Fénelon drew the most inspiration” (Philosophic Pride, p. 51), and frames Rousseau as shifting in his allegiances from a more Epicurean view to a more Stoic one.

53 See, e.g., Plato, Gorgias 492e-94a, 507d-8a, 515e-19b, Republic IX, 572d-75a, 585e-86b, Laws X, 906a-d; Augustine, City of God, V. 16, XII.1, XV.3–5, XVIII.2. For Fénelon’s direct endorsement of Plato’s strict approach to the fine arts, see Education X, pp. 87f./pp. 163f.; Tel. X, p. 164/p. 162; Letter IV, pp. 66f./pp. 1149f.; VI, p. 84/p. 1169; VII, pp. 92f./p. 1177. This last passage (on Molière) is echoed in Rousseau, Letter to M. d’Alembert on the Theatre, transl. by Allan Bloom (Ithaca 1960), pp. 26–37/CW X, pp. 270–77/OC V, pp. 24–34. For an exploration of prominent modern views that virtues can have deleterious consequences, while vices may bene-


Next to Plato and Augustine themselves, Fénelon and Rousseau may be unrivalled in the depth and fervor with which they articulated this moral worldview in regard to luxury. They even surpass their ancient predecessors in terms of how sustained their treatments of luxury are, perhaps because of the increased political momentum and philosophical respectability acquired by luxury in the modern world. Whereas most Enlightenment philosophers (notably Mandeville and Voltaire) apparently saw Fénelon as a formidable adversary, and a few (notably Montesquieu) wished to partially accommo-date him, Rousseau stands out in ferociously endorsing the Fénelonian ap-proach to luxury.54 And yet, perhaps in part because of this very momentum and the novel wealth and interdependence generated by the burgeoning capitalist system, Rousseau would offer far more sweeping criticisms than his predecessors, extending clearly to commerce and the arts, and in some ways even to agriculture and civilization themselves, leaving a residual suspi-cion of the latter even when they must be practically endorsed.

a. Common critiquesSince fully developing each of the parallels between their criticisms of luxury would itself require a lengthy article, a brief overview must suffice.55 First, Fénelon and Rousseau are in full agreement that luxury increases social stratification and disharmony. Both respond, for instance, to the argument (known by Rousseau from Melon and Voltaire) that it is only through luxury that the poor can maintain themselves at the expense of the rich. On the contrary, for Fénelon, the poor can maintain themselves better and more usefully in “multiplying the fruits of the earth” (Tel. XVII, p. 297/p. 291). And for Rousseau, “Luxury may be needed to provide bread for the poor:

fit society, see Vittorio G. Hösle, ‘Ethics and Economics, or How Much Egoism Does Modern Capitalism Need? Machiavelli’s, Mandeville’s, and Malthus’s New In-sight and Its Challenge’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 92 (2011), 425–440.

54 The best comparative survey of the reception of Fénelon remains Cherel, Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France. For Rousseau’s relation to the philosophes, see Mark Hulliung, The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes (Cambridge 1994), and Graeme Garrard, Rousseau’s Counter-Enlightenment: A Republican Critique of the Philosophes (Albany 2003).

55 For more detailed discussion, see Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel’, pp. 86–92 (which focuses more on the Letter); and on Rousseau, Mendham, ‘Enlight-ened Gentleness as Soft Indifference’. See also Gouhier’s helpful summary of the shared “vision of the world, common in the Telemachus and in the entire work of Rousseau” (‘Rousseau et Fénelon’, pp. 281f., my translation). Space precludes us from taking up a complex related issue: the role of women in fostering either luxury and softness on the one hand, or true civility and gentleness on the other hand. For a helpful discussion of Fénelon’s critical side, see the essay by Mary Sheriff in this vol-ume.


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but if there were no luxury, there would be no poor” (LR p. 70/p. 79).56 In both cases we can see that Fénelon and Rousseau do not see all economic questions as concerning a fixed pie, but have strict criteria about subtracting from productive fields into unproductive and corruptive ones. Second, Fénelon and Rousseau brought unremitting, passionate attention to the cruel ambition and vanity of the wealthy, whose frivolous excesses were purchased at the expense of the bread of the poor.57 Third, and conversely, they believe luxury greatly increases crime, since all seek to raise themselves up to the new and artificial delights, but many cannot do so virtuously or honestly.58 This sort of ambition leads to universal discontent with one’s current station, as well as disproportionate urbanization and the depopula-tion of the countryside.59 Thus rich and poor alike are corrupted by luxury. 56 He continues in a footnote: “For every hundred paupers whom luxury feeds in our

cities, it causes a hundred thousand to perish in our countryside […]” (LR 70n/79n). On the advisability of sending the denizens of Paris and the urban poor back “to plow the earth in their provinces,” see ‘Letters to Malesherbes’, IV, CW V, p. 580/OC I, p. 1145, and Letter to Beaumont, CW IX, p. 62f./OC 4, p. 980; on ine-quality in Paris more generally, Conf. IV, p. 133/p. 159.

57 E.g. Tel. XVIII, p. 321/p. 315. See Fénelon’s remarkable argument in behalf of the amiable frugality and simplicity of “the first men,” concluding: “Happy are the men content with pleasures which cause neither crime nor ruin! It is our mad and cruel vanity, and not the ancients’ noble simplicity, which we must correct” (Letter X, p.110/pp. 1195f.; see pp. 107–110/pp. 1193–1196). For Rousseau, “in this mon-strous and forced inequality, it necessarily happens that the sensuality of the rich consumes in pleasures the people’s substance, and barely sells it dry, black bread at the cost of its sweat and the price of servitude” (“Political Fragments” VII, CW IV, p. 50/OC III, p. 523). See also “Moral Letters” II, CW XII, p. 181/OC 4, p. 1089; Julie II.13, p. 189/p. 231. Much in these passages can be seen as rejoinders to Vol-taire’s pun in behalf of “le superflu, chose très necessaire” (see ‘Le Mondain’ [1736], in Mé-langes, ed. by Jacques van den Heuvel (Paris 1961), p. 203). Voltaire’s remark immedi-ately follows his jibes against the Salente of “monsieur de Télémaque” (ibid., pp. 205f.; see Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, pp. 412f.).

58 Tel. XIV, p. 250/p. 245; XVIII, p. 321/p. 315; Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté XII, Œuvres II, pp. 980f. For Rousseau, theft is among the most characteristic (and inevitable) vices of the poor; see especially the generalizations based on his own experiences in Conf. I, p. 27/p. 32. Similarly, “Financial systems make venal souls, and as soon as all one wants is to profit, one invariably profits more by being a knave [fripon] than by being an honest man” (Poland XI, p. 226/p. 1005). See also DOI Note IX, p. 198/p. 203; E IV, p. 312n/p. 633n.

59 Tel. XVIII, pp. 295–97/pp. 289–91; X, pp. 162f./pp. 159–161; Advice to a Lady of Quality, in Fénelon on Education, p. 103/Œuvres II: p. 1132. Although Rousseau does not share Fénelon’s more aristocratic sense of the need to establish strict ranks, they are agreed on the danger of living above one’s income from “vanity and ostentation” or “false shame” (Tel. XVIII, p. 297/p. 291). Rousseau implores country folk of all ranks not to forsake their current estate for the infamy, misery, and dishonor of ur-


A final argument shared by Fénelon and Rousseau is luxury’s generation of “effeminacy” or “softness,” making citizens incapable of overcoming pleas-ure or pain for the sake of virtue or the public good.60 In this connection they both appeal often to the necessities and beauties of martial virtue and toughness. While they often chide their ages for effeminacy, the careful reader may see that each ultimately steps back from any belligerent milita-rism, praising strength and patriotism insofar as they are gentle and prudent. And this sort of patriotism, they maintain, is naturally averse to conquest and aggression.61

Amid this deluge of shared or similar criticisms of luxury, it is notewor-thy that Fénelon and Rousseau each make exactly one prominent exception to their prohibitions. For Fénelon, magnificent architecture is excluded from both Crete and reformed Salente – except regarding the ornaments of reli-gious temples (Tel. V, p. 60/p. 59; X, p. 152, p. 164/p. 150, p. 162). Similar-ly, in one of his later works, Rousseau finally offers his exception: “let us tolerate military luxury, the luxury of weapons and horses, but let all effemi-nate finery be held in contempt […]” (Poland III, p. 188/p. 965; cf. p. 188f./p. 965). It may be that Rousseau had Fénelon in mind when finally

ban life (Julie, Second Preface, p. 14/p. 20). And the Wolmars are offered as a model for the wealthy, in contributing “as much as they can to rendering the peasants’ con-dition easy [douce], without ever helping them to leave it.” Julie’s great maxim is “not to favor changes of condition, but to contribute to making each one happy in his own, and above all to make sure that the happiest of all, which is that of a villager in a free State, is not depopulated in favor of the others” (Julie V.2, pp. 438f./pp. 535f.). See also Conf. III, p. 76/p. 91; Letter to M. d’Alembert, 126n/CW X, p. 344n/OC V, p. 115n.

60 As Riley writes of Telemachus, “at every turn, and in every chapter, the inventions de la vanité et de la molesse are denounced” (‘Introduction’, p. xix).

61 For Fénelon, the discussion of softness and effeminacy on the islands of Calypso and Cyprus are typical (Tel. IV). His critique of aggressive war, and lament of the disas-ters of even the most justified wars, is more evident than Rousseau’s, and has been well-discussed (e.g., Schuurman, ‘Fénelon on Luxury, War, and Trade’, pp. 183–188; Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp. 24–27). In Rousseau’s political thought, one can easily miss his gentleness amid all the bravado; I have attempted to sort this out at length in ‘Enlightened Gentleness as Soft Indifference’, pp. 620–631. Since both thinkers re-ject aggressive war, but endorse superior martial dedication and skill insofar as they are necessary for the defense of liberty, Riley may make them appear too dovish in describing Fénelon’s “proto-Rousseauean, demilitarized ‘Spartanism’” (‘Introduc-tion’, xvii; ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel’, p. 82). “Non-aggressive” would be more helpful than “demilitarized” here. An important difference on international re-lations is that Fénelon thought a combination of free trade and the elimination of luxury would greatly decrease war, whereas Rousseau found pervasive war to be in-evitably caused by the division of nations, and therefore inseparable from civilization (“The State of War”, LPW p. 163/ OC III, p. 610; E V, pp. 466–467/p. 848).


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admitting this quasi-indulgence.62 In any case, their differing exceptions could speak volumes about their ultimate priorities, whether this be chiefly a contest between religion and patriotism, Catholicism and Calvinism, or orthodox Christianity and the sort of enlightened sentimentalism whose only temple is the human heart.

b. Rousseau’s radicalizations: Rejecting commerce and the fine arts, questioning agriculture and civilization In our discussions of Salente and Tyre, we have seen how Fénelon endorses liberty of commerce but firmly rejects luxury. Although this may appear paradoxical in hindsight, both components were clear repudiations of Col-bertist policy under Louis XIV, whose sumptuous courts were combined with a mercantilist policy premised upon the “jealousy of trade”.63 While aware that commerce might break out into luxury (Tel. XIV, pp. 259f./pp. 253f.), Fénelon is confident that luxury can be steadily prevented by pro-scribing luxurious arts, similar importations, and keeping each family’s share of land modest and directly proportionate to its size (Tel. X, pp. 168f./pp. 166f.). Given these conditions, the ruler should not fear the prosperity and trade of the people, but on the contrary, see these as securing the people’s gratitude, affection, and loyalty.64

Where Fénelon insists upon a (qualified) liberty of commerce, Rousseau aims to minimize it as much as possible.65 He moves beyond Fénelon – and apparently even Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero – in deriding not only interna-tional trade but local or national commerce as well.66 Rousseau agrees with Fénelon that a fundamentally agricultural polity can have genuine prosperity, whereas one driven by luxury and money has the empty and short-lived 62 The model Rousseau ended up endorsing can be found in Plutarch. Marcus Brutus

used gold and silver in the arms of his republican army, contrary to the high level of frugality and self-control he required in all other things (Plutarch, Marcus Brutus, chap. 38, in Plutarch’s Lives, transl. John Dryden, rev. Arthur Hugh Clough (New York 2001), II, p. 598).

63 See Hont, ‘The Early Enlightenment Debate’, p. 384, and Jealousy of Trade, pp. 24–26; John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution (Ithaca 2006), pp. 20–22; Rothkrug, Opposition to Louis XIV.

64 Tel. X, p. 169/p. 167; XI, p. 183f./p. 180f.; XVIII, p. 324f./p. 318f. Here we can see the echoes of the debate between Cicero’s De Officiis and Machiavelli’s The Prince. For Fénelon, agrarianism had strongly anti-Machiavellian implications (Rothkrug, Opposi-tion to Louis XIV, p. 262); Rousseau’s relations to Machiavelli are far more complex.

65 See esp. Poland XI, p. 228/pp. 1007f.; Corsica p. 148/p. 931. 66 This is why the naturally imposed isolation among citizens in the mountains of Swit-

zerland is so praiseworthy (e.g., Corsica pp. 134f./pp. 914f.), discussed well in Jona-than Marks, Perfection and Disharmony in the Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge 2005), pp. 77–82.


appearance of prosperity (Tel. X, p. 165/p. 163; Poland XI, p. 228/p. 1008). But Rousseau applies this principle more sweepingly. He sees “material luxury” and “mental luxury” as mutually reinforcing components alongside “the sciences, the arts, commerce, industry […], Academies, [and] above all a good financial system which makes money circulate well.”67 Similarly, he is aware of the contextual factors we discussed regarding Salente and Boetica, which push some nations toward commerce. But he reaches a very different conclusion: “Do you occupy extensive and convenient shores? Cover the sea with ships, cultivate commerce and navigation; you will have a brilliant and a brief existence.”68 He takes a sober conclusion said to be from Mon-tesquieu: “Freedom, not being a fruit of every clime, is not within the reach of every people” (SC III.8, p. 100/p. 414). But he fills this in with a content which condemns a far greater proportion of civilizations than his predeces-sors had.

Even more strikingly, Rousseau’s critique of acquisitiveness applies in some ways to agriculture itself. Students of political thought are familiar with his diatribe on the origins of private property, which opens Part II of the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (1755: p. 161/p. 164). One might contend that the Boeticans of Fénelon are intended to provoke a similar sense of loss in the reader.69 However, the endorsement of property, elsewhere in Telemachus, as a component of the “best laws” suggests an in-tention much less subversive than Rousseau’s in the Second Discourse. Perhaps of greater theoretical significance is Rousseau’s positing of original human nature as asocial.70 It is only with the rise of primitive societies that amour-propre (an intense, exclusive, comparative self-love) is born. And yet the most decisive shift for Rousseau comes with “metallurgy and agriculture” – “iron and wheat” – which “civilized men, and ruined mankind” (p. 168/p. 171). For

the moment one man needed the help of another; as soon as it was found to be useful for one to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, property appeared, work became necessary, and the vast forests changed into pleasant

67 Poland XI, p. 224/p. 1003; cf. Observations, EPW p. 45/OC III, p. 49f., LR p. 65/p. 74, DOI Note 9, pp. 201f./pp. 205f.

68 SC II.11, p. 79/p. 392; see also II.10, p. 76/p. 389, III.8, p. 101/p. 415. 69 Pire sees a “perfect concordance” between Telemachus and the Second Discourse on the

beginnings of private property (“Fénelon et Rousseau,” p. 301n100). More generally, Pire finds a significantly greater congruence between Telemachus and Rousseau than I will be defending here (see pp. 299–309).

70 Rousseau’s “crucial” departure from Fénelon here is also briefly mentioned by Coleman (‘The Value of Dispossession’, p. 317), but is usually left unobserved by studies showing the many links between Fénelon and Rousseau.


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plains [Campagnes riantes] that had to be watered with the sweat of men, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow together with the harvests. (p. 167/p. 171)71

Here it is interdependence which is the decisively negative factor in the corruption of civilization, and agriculture is implicated as the necessary con-dition of interdependence.72 Turning to a parallel passage in Fénelon, we have seen that, before Telemachus taught the shepherds in the desert of Oasis the arts of music, poetry, and agriculture, they lived a contemptibly savage and brutal life. Telemachus was instructed to “Soften their fierce hearts [Adoucissez les coeurs farouches].” As he was instructing them, “nothing savage [sauvage] now appeared amidst those deserts. All was sweet and pleas-ant [doux et riant]: the civilization [politesse] of the inhabitants seemed to sweeten the earth [adoucir la terre]” (Tel. II, p. 24/p. 24).73 In this context, Rousseau’s use of “riantes” – an ostensibly positive term74 – suggests an ironic, and possibly intentional, juxtaposition with his forerunner.75 71 Translation modified. For “pleasant plains,” Gourevitch has “smiling fields.” In his

“A Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review” (1756), Adam Smith translates the phrase as, “the vast forrests of nature were changed into agreeable plains […]” (in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed. by W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce (Indian-apolis 1982), p. 252). He surely has Rousseau in mind when he later explains why it is useful that nature “deceives” us into admiring wealth and greatness, thereby turning “the rude forests of nature into agreeable and fertile plains […]” (The Theory of Moral Sentiments [1759], ed. by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis 1982), IV.I.9, p. 183).

72 In seeing “personal dependence” as “the true villain of Rousseau’s analysis”, more than other related factors (including amour-propre, inequality, and property), this inter-pretation follows Arthur Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rous-seau’s Thought (Chicago 1990), p. 70, pp. 74–81, p. 108, p. 290; Laurence Cooper, Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life (University Park 1999), p. 136n35, p. 180n97; Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton 1968), p. 168, pp. 171–175.

73 Translation modified. For instance, for “doux et riant,” Riley has “agreeable and smil-ing.” See also the reference to Cyprus, where “la campagne” was “naturellement fertile et agréable” (Tel. IV, p. 49/p. 49), as well as the endorsement of the landscape of Crete, profoundly transformed by the marks of the plow, and by the removal of all useless plants such as briars and thorns (Tel. V, p. 59/p. 57). This is all contrary to certain traditions of primitivism and of the golden age, which lamented the plow and the ship as committing greedy violence against the earth (cf. Horace Epode XVI, Ovid Metamorphoses I.89–112, Virgil Eclogue IV.37–45, Seneca Epistles XC.36–43, cf. Lucre-tius V.925–1005). By contrast, the Boeticans – Fénelon’s explicit embodiments of the golden age – apply this reasoning against mining, while endorsing plowing (Tel. VII, p. 114/p. 111).

74 Meaning happy, or (in the context of landscapes) pleasant; from rire, to laugh (Oxford-Hachette French Dictionary, ed. by Marie Hélène Corréard et al. (New York 2001), s.v.


The many likely implications of this contrast can be confirmed by several other differences in the two systems of thought. With the ‘pleasant’ fields inducing exploitation and slavery, Rousseau is clearly reversing the evalua-tion of agriculture in the birth of civilization.76 By contrast, although the Boeticans show the possibility of a humane and virtuous barbarism, Fénelon is clearly grateful about his country’s emergence from barbarism, recent though it may be.77 And in his general normative teaching, Fénelon often points to poetry and agriculture as decisive in softening and civilizing early peoples, thus allowing the experience of “social pleasures,” “cultivated vir-tue,” and many other chief goods.78 The positive role of the arts is unmis-takable to a careful reader of Telemachus:

“riant”). Consider also Lucretius’s positive discussion of the retreat of the forests in favor of “happy” (laeta) vineyards (De rerum natura 5.1370–78, in On the Nature of the Universe, transl. Ronald Melville (New York 1997), pp. 175f., consulting also the Latin text available online through Tufts University’s Perseus Project).

75 Contrast the view of Gouhier, who concludes his discussion of Bétique: “One thus understands, in the face of the denaturing of man by civilization, the same reaction dictates the same words to Fénelon and to Rousseau” (‘Rousseau et Fénelon’, pp. 282f., my translation; see also p. 285). As I read him, Fénelon has no essential quarrel with civilization.

76 For Rousseau, “Moses appears to have disapproved of agriculture by attributing its invention to a wicked man and making God reject his offerings […]. The author of Genesis had seen farther than had Herodotus” (Essay on the Origin of Languages IX, LPW p. 272/OC 5, p. 400).

77 Fénelon observes, in the midst of his famous praise of the ancients over the moderns, that “our own nation…has only recently emerged form barbarity” (Letter X, p. 106/p. 1191; cf. III, p. 58/p. 1141, Dialogues sur l’éloquence III, Œuvres I, pp. 81–83, and Education: “In short, it is as unreasonable to rely solely on beauty as to place all merit in strength of body, as savage and barbarous races do” [X, p. 71]). See his detailed discussion of early French barbarism, including endorsement of the “resur-rection of literature and arts” which “began in Italy and passed into France very late” (Letter VIII, p. 97/p. 1182). This historical development is, of course, exactly what Rousseau decried in the First Discourse, and he would be consistent in condemning literature in almost all forms in both his political thought and his educational thought.

78 See Education V, p. 21/p. 108, and esp. Letter V, p. 71f./p. 1155: “Moreover, poetry gave the world its first laws. It is poetry which softened fierce and savage men [adouci les hommes farouches et sauvages], assembled them together outside forests where they had been scattered and wandering, civilized them, governed their morals, formed families and nations, persuaded them to experience social pleasures [les douceurs de la societé], called for the exercise of reason, cultivated virtue, and invented the fine arts. Poetry also raised their spirits for war and tempered them for peace.” In a similar fa-ble, a nightingale and a warbler anticipate that a young shepherd, who may be Apol-lo, will have his heart softened (adoucira) by poetry, and may “carry in his heart the audacity of Achilles without having his ferocity [férocité]” (Fables et opuscules pédagogiques XXIV, ‘Le Rossignol et la Fauvette’, Œuvres I, pp. 220f.).


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From Egypt, to which Greece was indebted for its letters and good morals [bonnes moeurs], Cecrops brought useful laws, softened the fierce inhabitants [adoucit les naturels farouches] of the towns of Attica, and united them by the bands of society…. In a short time Triptolemus taught the Greeks how to plow the ground, and fertilize it by proper culture: soon…even those peoples, savage and fierce [Les peuples…sauvages et farouches], that wandered through the forests of Epirus and Etolia, in quest of acorns for their food, softened their mores [adoucirent leurs moeurs] and submitted to laws, after they had learned to raise crops of corn and to live on bread. (Tel. XIV, p. 258, p. 260/p. 253, pp. 254f.)79

Assuming an elementary level of intellectual consistency which I have found no reason to doubt, the Telemachus has no intention of suggesting that savage or barbaric peoples – those lacking agriculture – are characteristically good or humane. Yet Rousseau seems committed to that conclusion (PN p. 101–2n/p. 970n, LR p. 71/p. 80; cf. E II, p. 85/p. 311). For Rousseau, it is ro-mantic love and living in shared or nearby dwellings which achieved the proper “taming” of early humanity.80 Thus Telemachus’s gifts to the Egyp-tian shepherds would seem to be unnecessary, at best. And, of course, in the crescendo of Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality, even the social dedication of the citizen is questioned as a kind of oppressive, pointless frenzy, in com-parison with the spontaneous equanimity and freedom of the savage.81 By contrast, Mentor specifically rejects the suggestion that “the freest of all men” is “a barbarian [Barbare], who, by hunting in the middle of the woods, 79 Translation modified. See also Tel. XVIII, p. 326/p. 320. On iron as properly used

for the plow, although it is “elsewhere […] employed to destroy everything,” see Tel. XIII, p. 226/p. 222; cf. the Boetican use of metals in VII, pp. 109f./p. 107.

80 DOI II, p. 164/pp. 167f.; Essay on the Origin of Languages IX, LPW pp. 277/OC V, pp. 404–407; discussed in Mendham, ‘Gentle Savages and Fierce Citizens’, pp. 179–183. Here Rousseau may be following Lucretius (De rerum natura V.1011–1014). Of course, Rousseau’s discussion of “the lawgiver” and the founding of republican politi-cal communities (SC II.7, cf. I.8) would more closely parallel Fénelon’s discussion of the founding of civilization, but even here, Rousseau’s civilizing labor is performed by a feigned divine authority, rather than by poetry or music.

81 “The [savage] breathes nothing but repose and freedom […]. By contrast, the Citi-zen, forever active, sweats, scurries, constantly agonizes in search of ever more strenuous occupations […]. How many cruel deaths would not this indolent Savage prefer to the horrors of such a life, which is often not even softened by the pleasure of doing good [adoucie par le plaisir de bien faire]?” (DOI II, p. 187/pp. 192f., translation modified). This last phrase seems to be another echo of Fénelon, again to different purpose. His discussion of the most wretched of all men – proclaimed by Mentor to be “a king who thinks himself happy in making others miserable” – laments that “he never knows the pleasure of doing good [le plaisir de faire le bien]” (Tel. V, p. 68/p. 66f.; see also XIV, p. 251/p. 245).


was independent of all civilization [police] and all need” (Tel. V, p. 67/p. 66, translation modified).

Rousseau’s preference for a more raw nature would continue to have implications throughout his writings. Although he never maintains that the arts and the sciences were the sole causes of corruption, and concedes that a very few transcendent geniuses can pursue them without corruption, he insists that at a social level and from a moral point of view, the sciences are likely “the most profuse and swiftest” among all factors that tend toward corruption.82 Much of this cultural contrast is evident in that even in his mature, constructive political teaching, Rousseau never grants a positive political role for the fine arts, as he knew Fénelon did in Salente.83

To be sure, the contrast should not be overdrawn, since unlike in his early “critical” writings, Rousseau exuberantly readmits agriculture in his later, “constructive” writings.84 He seems largely to agree with Fénelon con-cerning domestic economic production, limiting it to “agriculture and the arts necessary for life” (e.g. Poland XI, p. 224/p. 1004). Rousseau eventually came to offer a plausible basis for understanding his apparent contradictions on agriculture. He claims that he maintained throughout his writings that “human nature does not go backward, and it is never possible to return to the times of innocence and equality once they have been left behind” (see RJJ III, p. 213/p. 935). Although there was almost always more goodness and surely more happiness in the forests of the “savage” or the shepherding of the “barbarian,” our own ideas and conditions have been radically and permanently altered (cf. DOI Note IX, pp. 203f./pp. 207f.; SC II.11, p. 79/p. 392f.). So, granting the conditions of civilized humanity, agricultureis clearly the best remaining option, and the goal must be to halt – or, where this is no longer possible, at least to slow down – the contemporary rage to increase commerce, luxury, and the arts (RJJ III, p. 213/p. 935; Observations, EPW 34/OC III: p. 37).

82 Quoted phrase from PN p. 96n/p. 964n; see also, e.g., Discourse on the Sciences and Arts II, EPW p. 17, p. 26/OC III: p. 19, p. 29; Letter to Raynal, EPW p. 29/OC III: p. 31; Observations, EPW p. 33/ OC III, p. 36, LR 64/73, PN p. 102/p. 970.

83 For many supporting references on Rousseau, see Mendham, ‘Enlightened Gentle-ness as Soft Indifference’, pp. 610–617.

84 On agriculture, the endorsement is clear throughout the Discourse on Political Economy, SC, Poland, and Corsica. The “critical” versus “constructive” distinction is the “Kanti-an” interpretation of Rousseau, developed by Ernst Cassirer and others. For Kant, see ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’ and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge 2007), AK VIII, pp. 116f. and VII, pp. 326f., respectively).


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c. The intentions behind Rousseau’s radicalism More significant than Rousseau’s demotion of agriculture to a merely rela-tive goodness, however, is his highly pessimistic sense of the inherent pre-cariousness of even the most virtuous civilized community. Apparently, agriculture is necessary for such a community, but he retains the sense (de-veloped in his earlier, critical thought) that it is a necessary condition for dramatically increasing interdependence and inequality, and thus the mutual-ly reinforcing cycles of luxury, exploitation, and injustice.85 Agricultural civilization even seems to have strong natural tendencies to move in these directions. By contrast, for Fénelon, a community that follows the standards of nature – pursuing virtue, justice, and genuine needs – seems to find itself in a stable, mutually reinforcing cycle of prosperity, security, and gratitude. If students of Fénelon, then, have had reason to wonder whether his uni-formly virtuous polity has totalitarian implications,86 these concerns are heightened in Rousseau. Since, for the latter, all the natural tendencies of civilization are towards greater commerce, interdependence, and luxury, only the most radical original founding, and the most vigilant efforts to prevent interdependence from developing even among fellow citizens, can offer hope that civilized people might attain justice, dignity, and virtue.87 For Rousseau, because human nature is originally asocial, even the most virtuous

85 See esp. Essay on the Origin of Languages IX, EPW p. 272/OC 5, p. 400: “As for agri-

culture, it arises later [than hunting and herding] and involves all the arts; it introduc-es property, government, laws, and gradually wretchedness and crimes, inseparable for our species from the knowledge of good and evil.”

86 See Schuurman, ‘Fénelon on Luxury, War, and Trade’, p. 192 and pp. 198f. Schuur-man’s discussion could be improved, however, by a greater awareness of the strong classical roots of Fénelon’s thought, which is to a large extent a Christian purification of Plato and Lycurgus. Lord Acton (quoted in note 51 above) is closer to the right track here.

87 E.g. Discourse on Political Economy, EPW, p. 19/OC III, p. 258. Regulations must keep the arts and commercial activity to an absolute minimum, since a middle ground combining commerce and agriculture is ultimately impossible (Poland XI, pp. 224f./pp. 1003f.; Corsica p. 127, p. 139/p. 905, p. 920). This intense fear of inter-dependence explains his goal “that every Citizen be perfectly independent of all the others, and excessively dependent on the City; which is always achieved by the same means; for it is only the State’s force that makes for its members’ freedom” (SC II.12, p. 80/p. 394). On inherent instability, see especially Melzer, Natural Goodness, pp. 73–74. See also SC II.11, p. 79/p. 392: “It is precisely because the force of things always tends to destroy equality, that the force of legislation ought always to tend to maintain it.”


politics is a highly artificial enterprise, and any sort of artificiality gives rise to proportional inconvenience.88

It is unclear what originally moved Rousseau to frame the problem of civilization in such stark terms – involving the very nature of society and interdependence – rather than, in the manner of Fénelon, being content with excising luxury, which was relatively simple and containable. It is diffi-cult to trace his critique of interdependence to his known influences. But if Rousseau’s radical diagnosis is novel, it may be explained by his sense of the novelty of his times:

All our writers regard the crowning achievement [le chef-d’œuvre] of our century’s politics to be the sciences, the arts, luxury, commerce, laws, and all the other bonds which, by tightening the social ties among men through self-interest, place them all in a position of mutual dependence, impose on them mutual needs and common interests, and oblige everyone to contribute to everyone else’s happiness in order to secure his own. (PN p. 100/p. 968, emphasis add-ed)89

This novel emphasis on increasing humanity’s mutual ties was inseparable from Enlightenment defenses of luxury – which Rousseau also considered a novel and disreputable endeavor by those claiming to be philosophers.90 It may be, then, that Fénelon was Rousseau’s most profound and far-reaching source for his critique of luxury, but unprecedented challenges led the Ge-nevan toward deeper (and more dangerous) foundations.

III. Conclusion For Fénelon, there are “two grievances in government which are scarcely ever guarded against or remedied: the first is an unjust and overly violent 88 Political virtue is highly artificial but nonetheless praiseworthy because it recreates a

sort of natural equilibrium between moral strength and desire. See SC I.8, II.7; E I, p. 40/p. 250; ‘Geneva Manuscript’ II.2, CW IV, p. 101/OC III, p. 313; Cooper, Rous-seau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life, chapter 1, esp. p. 25 and p. 32, as well as pp. 52f., pp. 124–125 and p. 204n19. On the inconveniences of artificial conditions, see esp. E IV, p. 317/p. 640.

89 Nannerl Keohane makes Rousseau’s critique of “the masterpiece of policy in our century” central to her reading of him (Philosophy and the State in France, pp. 425–432). See also, above all, DOI Note IX.

90 Melon is singled out as the first such philosopher (LR p. 84/p. 95). On the prior consensus against luxury, see Discourse on the Sciences and Arts II, EPW, p. 18/OC III, p. 19; ‘Political Fragments’ VII, CW IV, p. 45/OC III, p. 517. For the Enlighten-ment debates on luxury and interdependence – linked with “doux commerce” theory – see Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton 1977), pp. 56–63; and Mendham, ‘Enlightened Gentleness as Soft Indifference’, pp. 605–610.


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authority assumed by kings; the second is luxury, which corrupts mores” (Tel. XVII, p. 296/p. 290).91 Having somewhat adequately treated Rous-seau’s reception of the second grievance, some scholarly land remains to be tilled regarding the first. Patrick Riley has plausibly argued that Rousseau’s greatest departure from Fénelon is the insistence upon the general will, add-ing a modern and even Lockean insistence upon consent in just govern-ance.92 The contrast is surely correct, and yet Rousseau seems to have drawn much from Fénelon concerning the practice of political and pedagogical authority, such as the need to inspire affection in the governed, the limits of force and fear, and even the artificiality of social inequality. Of special inter-est is the fact that it is Rousseau who has gone down in history for awaken-ing Immanuel Kant to the universal dignity of humanity.93 And yet the rele-vant passages in Rousseau amount to little more than what Fénelon had already stated quite well:

It will not be easy to accustom young persons of high birth to behave in this gentle [douce] and charitable way, for the impatience and impetuosity of youth, joined to the false ideas which their birth gives them, makes them regard serv-ants almost like horses. They think themselves of a different nature from that of footmen, and regard them as having been made for the convenience of their masters. Show how contrary these ideas are to modesty and respect [l’humanité] for one’s neighbor. Make it clear that men are not made to be waited on and that it is a shocking [brutale] error to believe that some men are born to pander to the idleness and pride of others. As service has been established contrary to the natural equality among men, it should be alleviated [adoucir] as much as possible…. (Education XII, 81f./159)94

This may suggest that one of the most central ideas of the modern liberal-democratic world has an unexpected debt to one of the more thoughtful 91 Translation modified; I have inserted “overly” here for “trop”. 92 See Riley, ‘Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel’, esp. pp. 88f. 93 See Allen Wood, ‘General Introduction’ to Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and transl. by

Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge 1996), pp. xviif., or Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cam-bridge 1999), pp. 5–9; Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, and Goethe, transl. by James Gutmann, Paul O. Kristeller, and John H. Randall (New York 1963 [1945]), pp. 1f., p. 14.

94 The idea is applied to political rulers throughout the Telemachus: see V, p. 60f./p. 59; XVII, p. 311/p. 305f.; XVIII, p. 323/p. 316f.; see also Letter to Louis XIV, in Selected Writings, p. 203/Œuvres I: p. 549, and Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté II, Œuvres II, p. 974. For anticipations in Erasmus, Coustel, and Fleury, see Le Brun, Œuvres, I: p. 1289, notes 2–3 to p. 159. For the parallel passages from which Kant likely derived his idea of dignity, see esp. Julie IV.10, p. 378, p. 386/p. 460, p. 469; V.2, p. 439/p. 536; cf. SC I.2.


representatives of the aristocratic, Platonic, and Catholic-Christian tradi-tions.

Our main analysis indicates that it would be misleading to state in gen-eral that either Fénelon or Rousseau is more moderate, or liberal, or authori-tarian. Rather, Rousseau’s added concern about interdependence makes him shift in two extreme directions, away from the pure classical-Christian mor-alism represented by Fénelon. On the one hand, in his political prescrip-tions, Rousseau is led to a far more extreme repudiation of commerce, and with it a more extreme questioning of the arts, agriculture, and economic dependence upon fellow citizens and foreigners alike. On the other hand, we often find in Rousseau a sort of antinomian rejection of the claims of society as such, represented in his celebration of the repose and freedom of the pre-social “savage”, as well as in his frequent rejections of foresight, constraint, and gratitude in his autobiographical writings.95 We must fully acknowledge a shared core of classical-Christian moralism in Rousseau, declaiming against luxury, softness, aggression, and violent, abusive authori-ty. The comparison with Fénelon highlights these components more clearly than perhaps any other vantage point. And yet, in Rousseau this moralism is frequently juxtaposed with a much more radical and destabilizing individual-ism, if not always in his prescriptions, then at least in his assumptions about original human nature. Assuming our authors may have somewhat accurate-ly perceived the cultural effects of luxury, this may partly explain why Rous-seau continues to be read with fascination across every undergraduate cur-riculum, while the once preeminent Fénelon has become the preserve of historical specialists. While any of us can see much of ourselves in some aspect of Rousseau, the intellectual and cultural world of Fénelon becomes more distant with each passing decade.

95 See e.g. RJJ II, p. 114, p. 150/p. 808, p. 854; Reveries VII, CW VIII, p. 57/OC I, p. 1060; cf. Conf. II, p. 47/p. 56.

Rousseau's Partial Reception of Fénelon

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