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BANGLADESH/BURMA

ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN BANGLADESH:

THE SEARCH FOR A LASTING SOLUTION

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

II. BACKGROUND

III. FORCED REPATRIATION

IV. NEW ARRIVALS

V. CONTINUED ABUSE AND DISCRIMINATION IN BURMA

VI. CONCLUSION


Between July 20 and 22, 1997, the Bangladesh government forcibly repatriated some 400refugees belonging to the Rohingya minority of Burma's northern Arakan state. Therepatriations, which drew international protests, highlighted the dilemma facing theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the internationalcommunity in addressing the Rohingya situation. When the host government's patienceruns out, and abuses are continuing in the country from which the refugees fled, whatchoices are available?

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The 400 repatriated were among a group of 21,400 refugees remaining in two camps inthe Cox's Bazaar district of Bangladesh from a much larger group of Rohingyas who fledpersecution by Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1991 and1992.1 With the help of the UNHCR, tens of thousands voluntarily returned to Burmabeginning in 1994, and a UNHCR team in Arakan was on hand to monitor their

reintegration. But even as the refugees were returning, new arrivals continued to crossinto Bangladesh, with over 10,000 arriving between March and July 1997 alone. Some ofthe 1997 arrivals reported that forced labor, arbitrary taxation, and the confiscation ofMuslim property were continuing in northern Arakan, despite the UNHCR's presence.These abuses are part of systematic discrimination against Rohingyas, and amount topersecution according to criteria established by the UNHCR. Their exodus suggestedserious flaws in the repatriation and reintegration program, and a need to reexamine boththat program and Burma's practices in Arakan. The exodus also intensified the fears ofthose left in the refugee camp, making them more unwilling than ever to return, but at thesame time, the option of resettlement in Bangladesh has been ruled out by the Bangladeshgovernment.

This report, based on research conducted by Refugees Internationaland Human Rights Watch/Asia, including a mission to Bangladesh by aRefugees International researcher in July 1997, is intended toencourage more openness by everyone involved in the search for alasting solution which will ensure that the rights of the Rohingyas arerespected. Both organizations recognize that the UNHCR's presence inArakan is essential to monitor the situation for the returnees and, incases of human rights violations, to intervene as necessary withauthorities both locally and in Rangoon. But they remain concernedthat UNHCR is not fully acknowledging the ongoing problems in

Arakan, and this has two consequences: refugees cannot make aninformed decision as to whether they should return to Burma, and theinternational community is unable to assist the UNHCR in pressing theBurmese government to cease its abusive practices.

The report describes the forced repatriations, and conditions for thenew arrivals in Bangladesh. It then documents the abuses committedby the SLORC against the Rohingyas in Burma, including forced labor,arbitrary taxation, confiscation of property and restrictions on freedomof movement. These abuses are linked to the Rohingyas' status as non-citizens in Burma, a status which the Burmese government has thus far

refused to alter. This policy is in clear violation of internationalstandards on the elimination of statelessness. Human RightsWatch/Asia and Refugees International conclude that as long as individualsand families continue to flee Burma, temporary asylum in Bangladesh is critical, and theUNHCR should seek to maintain the camps there and assist the new arrivals. The longerterm solution, however, lies in improving the human rights situation inside Burma, andfor this, theinvolvement of the international community, and especially the Association of

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South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which recently admitted Burma as a member, iscrucial.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch and Refugees International make the following recommendations:

To the Bangladesh Government

* Bangladesh should continue to offer temporary asylum to Rohingyas fleeing abuse inBurma. Any attempts to use force to push asylum seekers back to Burma or physicallyprevent them from entering Bangladesh would violate the principle ofnon-refoulement,which is an obligation on all states under customary international law. Refoulementmeans to expel or return a refugees in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers ofterritories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race,religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, as

defined in the Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, aswell as Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

* Bangladesh should grant the UNHCR immediate and continued access to all refugeesarriving in Bangladesh.

* The Bangladesh government should demonstrate its commitment to internationalhuman rights standards by becoming a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to theStatus of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.

* Bangladesh should seek to cooperate with the UNHCR in resettling the 5,000 refugees

who have been screened by the UNHCR and recognized as persons with a well-foundedfear of persecution.

To the State Law and Order Restoration Council

* As a matter of urgency, the SLORC should immediately amend or repeal the 1982Citizenship Act "to abolish its over-burdensome requirements for citizens"- requirementsthat, as the U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma points out, have "discriminatory effects onracial or ethnic minorities." The SLORC should also grant the Muslims of Arakan fullcitizenship and accompanying rights, in particular the right to freedom of movement.

* The SLORC should immediately cease the practice of forced labor in Arakan andacross Burma in compliance with the 1930 International Labor Organization Conventionon Forced Labor, which the Burmese government signed in 1955.

* The SLORC should also cease practices such as arbitrary taxation, confiscation ofproperty without compensation and the denial of freedom of movement within Arakan,which together violate the right of Rohingyas to equal protection under the law, as set

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forth in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 26 of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

* The government should permit the new U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma, JusticeRajsoomer Lallah to visit Burma and northern Arakan in time for him to report to the

U.N. General Assembly in November. During that visit, he should be guaranteed free andconfidential access to residents.

* Human rights abuses in Arakan are a reflection of the situation all over the country. Toaddress those conditions, the government of Burma should implement the main humanrights components of 1996 U.N. General Assembly Resolution and the 1997 U.N.Commission on Human Rights resolution on Burma, with particular attention to theparagraphs concerning the rights to freedom of movement, association and expression.

To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

* The UNHCR must seek to ensure that temporary asylum is maintained for all refugeeswho have fled Burma.

* The UNHCR should commit itself to a presence in Bangladesh as long as required tomonitor the repatriation process and offer protection to new arrivals. This commitmentshould be made clearly and unequivocally to the government of Bangladesh.

* The UNHCR should continue to press for measures to ensure that any return ofBurmese refugees is voluntary as well as for access to those arriving in Bangladesh fromBurma. In order to allow refugees to make an informed decision about whether or not toreturn, the UNHCR must regularly provide detailed and objective information on the

situation in Arakan, including information concerning any human rights violations.

* The UNHCR should seek to remain in Arakan beyond the current 1998 deadline, andfor as long as required to protect returnees. UNHCR should reconsider its plan to pass onto the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) responsibility to develop northernArakan for the long term reintegration of Rohingyas, as UNDP lacks a protectionmandate and staff trained in protection issues.

* The UNHCR should put into practice the recommendations from the U.N. WorkingGroup on International Protection of August 1992 concerning "direct prevention" andwork closely with the Secretary-General in carrying out his mandate to ensure the

implementation of the 1996 General Assembly resolution on Burma and the work of theU.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma, with particular attention to the call for Burma to endforced labor and to amend its citizenship law.

To the International Community

* Those governments, notably the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdomand the United States, which have contributed funds to the refugee and repatriation

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program should encourage Bangladesh to continue allow refugees to enjoy asylum.Donor countries must be prepared to commit funds to the care and maintenance of thispopulation.

* There must be some degree of burden-sharing with regard to those refugees who

ultimately cannot return to Burma. The Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN) in particular should consider creating a pool from which to draw refugeeseligible for third country resettlement. At the same time, a working group should beestablished within ASEAN to assist in establishing the necessary conditions to preventfurther refugee outflows.

* The international community must step up efforts to ensure that the human rightssituation in Burma is improved and conditions are created under which the Rohingyascould voluntarily return in safety and dignity. Coordinated pressure must be applied, withwestern and Asian governments working together through the United Nations Secretary-General's office. Governments should explore ways of exerting economic pressure,

including the continued ban on assistance by international financial institutions.

II. BACKGROUND

Between December 1991 and March 1992, some 250,000 Rohingya Muslims fromBurma's Arakan state fled to Bangladesh.2 At the time the refugees reported summarykillings, rape, forced labor, forced portering and religious persecution by the Burmesearmy which had forced them leave their homes.3 The Bangladesh government grantedtemporary asylum to the refugees and called on the UNHCR to assist in the provision ofhumanitarian aid. In April 1992, however, the Bangladesh and Burmese governmentscame to a bilateral agreement on a repatriation scheme that did not allow for further

UNHCR involvement. Some 5,000 refugees were forcibly repatriated under thisagreement, until UNHCR's threat to leave the camps finally persuaded the Bangladeshgovernment to cease the repatriation in December 1992. Despite an agreement betweenBangladesh and the UNHCR signed in May 1993, nearly 50,000 refugees wereinvoluntarily repatriated by November 1993. In that month the UNHCR finally securedan agreement from the SLORC allowing its representatives to be present in Arakan state,the first U.N. agency to do so. Once ten staff had been appointed and the program was upand running in Arakan, the UNHCR started a mass repatriation program with thecooperation of both sides, which was to have ended in December 1995.

Various factors, including cyclones in May 1994 and May 1996 that devastated the

camps, political unrest, and a general strike in Bangladesh in 1996, conspired to slow therepatriation, but over the five years that the program was implemented, two other factorswere more important: the reluctance of the refugees to return home when stories fromreturnees to Bangladesh suggested that little had changed; and constant delays by theBurmese side in clearing refugees for return.4 In a report published in 1996, HumanRights Watch/Asia described in detail the repatriation and reintegration programs andcriticized all parties in the repatriation for failing to ensure the protection of refugees. 5

That report concluded that the Rohingyas would always remain a vulnerable group as

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long as the SLORC refused to recognize them as citizens. In this situation, it concluded,the UNHCR must keep the rights of refugees uppermost whenever there is a conflictbetween the need to publicize and advocate against abuses and the need to maintain goodrelations with both the country of origin and the host country.

December 1995 came and went, with some 35,000 refugees still in the camps. During1996 resistance to the repatriation increased, and between January and October only15,000 returned. The slow rate of return forced all parties to the repatriation to extend thedeadline for completion of the operation to March 1997. Nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) working in the camps were informed in October 1996 that they would all have toleave thecamps by March 31, 1997, after which time, if the repatriation was notcompleted, Bangladesh authorities, such as the Department of Health and Education,would take over the provision of humanitarian aid in any remaining camps.6

As the March deadline drew near, the newly-elected Awami League government inBangladesh held extensive negotiations with Burma regarding the refugees. In January an

upbeat news commentary on Bangladesh Radio Network reported that the "Myanmargovernment has agreed to take back all the 26,000 ethnic Rohingyas still living in campsin Bangladesh by the end of March."7This optimism was short-lived, however, and asthe deadline was reached over 20,000 remained in the camps, over half of whom had notbeen cleared to return by Burma. A new agreement was reached to keep the receptioncenters in Burma open until the end of April, and an additional 2,000 refugees werecleared. Only 246 of these volunteered to return however, and between April and Julythere were no further repatriations. Instead, the UNHCR formally proposed that theremaining caseload of 21,400 be resettled in Bangladesh. However, with local hostilitytowards the refugees increasing, and with Islamic fundamentalist elements activelyworking within the refugee camps the Bangladesh government refused the offer of

increased assistance and resettlement packages.8 UNHCR threatened to end itsoperations within the camps by the end of June unless the government started to resettleat least the 5,000 refugees who had been classified through the UNHCR statusdetermination procedure as being in fear of persecution.

Further negotiations took place between Burma and Bangladesh, and on July 14 it wasannounced that Burma would reopen its border for the repatriation of the 7,535 clearedrefugees who would be repatriated in groups of 400 every other day until the deadline ofAugust 15.1 The Rohingyas who arrived during 1991/92 were considered prima facie refugees by the UNHCR andhave not been "screened", that is, interviewed by UNHCR protection officers to determine individual fearof persecution. They are all thus referred to throughout this report as refugees. These refugees have been

interviewed by UNHCR to determine that they made a voluntary decision to return to Burma, and under theagreement between UNHCR and Bangladesh, they are entitled to a further interview at the point ofdeparture, at which time they may express a fear of return. Of those who have said they do not wish toreturn to Burma, some 5,000 were screened by UNHCR and classified as having a well-founded fear ofpersecution and thus entitled to long term protection. The new arrivals, none of whom have been screened,are referred to in this report as asylum-seekers, since they assert a claim to refugee status, and are thus

entitled to temporary asylum and assistance while their claims are investigated.2 Arakan state wasrenamed "Rakhine state" by the current military government in 1990. We continue to usethe old name, as "Rakhine" refers to the predominant ethnic minority in Arakan state, and

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"Arakan" is more inclusive. In a previous exodus of Rohingyas, in 1978, some 200,000fled to Bangladesh. Most were involuntarily returned to Burma by 1980, but some 20,000were resettled in Bangladesh.3 See Amnesty International, "Union of Myanmar (Burma):Human Rights Violations against Muslims in Northern Rakhine (Arakan) State,"(London: Amnesty International, May 1992); Asia Watch, "Burma: Rape, Forced Labor

and Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan," A Human Rights Watch Short Report,vol.4, no.13, May 1992.4 Under a bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Burma,lists of refugees willing to go back to Burma are given to Burmese authorities to enablethem to check that the individuals did have habitual residence in Burma before 1991.Only then are they permitted to return. The"'clearing" process can be very lengthy,though in mid-1996 there were suspicions that the Burmese had deliberately slowed theprocess once the number of returnees reached 200,000. See Human Rights Watch/Asia,"Burma: The Rohingya Muslims - Ending a Cycle of Exodus?"A Human Rights WatchShort Report, vol. 8, no. 9 (c), September 1996, p.21. 5 Human Rights Watch/Asia,"Ending a Cycle..." pp. 14-21. 6 Despite this threat, the two NGOs (MSF Holland andConcern) working in the two remaining camps were permitted to continue their work

there through July 1997.7 Bangladesh Radio Network, January 6, 1997. The AwamiLeague, headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was elected in July 1996.8 The JamaatIslami Party has actively supported Rohingya insurgent groups and political activistssince the first mass exodus from Burma to Bangladesh in 1978. By 1997 the entirerefugee population was very politically active, with reports of beatings and abuse withincamps of those who did not cooperate with the camp bosses. Violence against refugeeswho have not followed the militant line has been a problem in some camps since 1992(see Human Rights Watch/Asia "Ending a Cycle.." p.13).


Between July 20 and 22, 1997, the Bangladesh government forcibly repatriated some 400refugees belonging to the Rohingya minority of Burma's northern Arakan state. Therepatriations, which drew international protests, highlighted the dilemma facing theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the internationalcommunity in addressing the Rohingya situation. When the host government's patience

runs out, and abuses are continuing in the country from which the refugees fled, whatchoices are available?

The 400 repatriated were among a group of 21,400 refugees remaining in two camps inthe Cox's Bazaar district of Bangladesh from a much larger group of Rohingyas who fledpersecution by Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1991 and1992.1 With the help of the UNHCR, tens of thousands voluntarily returned to Burmabeginning in 1994, and a UNHCR team in Arakan was on hand to monitor their

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reintegration. But even as the refugees were returning, new arrivals continued to crossinto Bangladesh, with over 10,000 arriving between March and July 1997 alone. Some ofthe 1997 arrivals reported that forced labor, arbitrary taxation, and the confiscation ofMuslim property were continuing in northern Arakan, despite the UNHCR's presence.These abuses are part of systematic discrimination against Rohingyas, and amount to

persecution according to criteria established by the UNHCR. Their exodus suggestedserious flaws in the repatriation and reintegration program, and a need to reexamine boththat program and Burma's practices in Arakan. The exodus also intensified the fears ofthose left in the refugee camp, making them more unwilling than ever to return, but at thesame time, the option of resettlement in Bangladesh has been ruled out by the Bangladeshgovernment.

This report, based on research conducted by Refugees Internationaland Human Rights Watch/Asia, including a mission to Bangladesh by aRefugees International researcher in July 1997, is intended toencourage more openness by everyone involved in the search for a

lasting solution which will ensure that the rights of the Rohingyas arerespected. Both organizations recognize that the UNHCR's presence inArakan is essential to monitor the situation for the returnees and, incases of human rights violations, to intervene as necessary withauthorities both locally and in Rangoon. But they remain concernedthat UNHCR is not fully acknowledging the ongoing problems inArakan, and this has two consequences: refugees cannot make aninformed decision as to whether they should return to Burma, and theinternational community is unable to assist the UNHCR in pressing theBurmese government to cease its abusive practices.

The report describes the forced repatriations, and conditions for thenew arrivals in Bangladesh. It then documents the abuses committedby the SLORC against the Rohingyas in Burma, including forced labor,arbitrary taxation, confiscation of property and restrictions on freedomof movement. These abuses are linked to the Rohingyas' status as non-citizens in Burma, a status which the Burmese government has thus farrefused to alter. This policy is in clear violation of internationalstandards on the elimination of statelessness. Human RightsWatch/Asia and Refugees International conclude that as long as individualsand families continue to flee Burma, temporary asylum in Bangladesh is critical, and theUNHCR should seek to maintain the camps there and assist the new arrivals. The longer

term solution, however, lies in improving the human rights situation inside Burma, andfor this, theinvolvement of the international community, and especially the Association ofSouth East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which recently admitted Burma as a member, iscrucial.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Human Rights Watch and Refugees International make the following recommendations:

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To the Bangladesh Government

* Bangladesh should continue to offer temporary asylum to Rohingyas fleeing abuse inBurma. Any attempts to use force to push asylum seekers back to Burma or physicallyprevent them from entering Bangladesh would violate the principle ofnon-refoulement,

which is an obligation on all states under customary international law. Refoulementmeans to expel or return a refugees in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers ofterritories where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race,religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, asdefined in the Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, aswell as Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

* Bangladesh should grant the UNHCR immediate and continued access to all refugeesarriving in Bangladesh.

* The Bangladesh government should demonstrate its commitment to international

human rights standards by becoming a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to theStatus of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.

* Bangladesh should seek to cooperate with the UNHCR in resettling the 5,000 refugeeswho have been screened by the UNHCR and recognized as persons with a well-foundedfear of persecution.

To the State Law and Order Restoration Council

* As a matter of urgency, the SLORC should immediately amend or repeal the 1982Citizenship Act "to abolish its over-burdensome requirements for citizens"- requirements

that, as the U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma points out, have "discriminatory effects onracial or ethnic minorities." The SLORC should also grant the Muslims of Arakan fullcitizenship and accompanying rights, in particular the right to freedom of movement.

* The SLORC should immediately cease the practice of forced labor in Arakan andacross Burma in compliance with the 1930 International Labor Organization Conventionon Forced Labor, which the Burmese government signed in 1955.

* The SLORC should also cease practices such as arbitrary taxation, confiscation ofproperty without compensation and the denial of freedom of movement within Arakan,which together violate the right of Rohingyas to equal protection under the law, as set

forth in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 26 of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

* The government should permit the new U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma, JusticeRajsoomer Lallah to visit Burma and northern Arakan in time for him to report to theU.N. General Assembly in November. During that visit, he should be guaranteed free andconfidential access to residents.

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* Human rights abuses in Arakan are a reflection of the situation all over the country. Toaddress those conditions, the government of Burma should implement the main humanrights components of 1996 U.N. General Assembly Resolution and the 1997 U.N.Commission on Human Rights resolution on Burma, with particular attention to theparagraphs concerning the rights to freedom of movement, association and expression.

To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

* The UNHCR must seek to ensure that temporary asylum is maintained for all refugeeswho have fled Burma.

* The UNHCR should commit itself to a presence in Bangladesh as long as required tomonitor the repatriation process and offer protection to new arrivals. This commitmentshould be made clearly and unequivocally to the government of Bangladesh.

* The UNHCR should continue to press for measures to ensure that any return of

Burmese refugees is voluntary as well as for access to those arriving in Bangladesh fromBurma. In order to allow refugees to make an informed decision about whether or not toreturn, the UNHCR must regularly provide detailed and objective information on thesituation in Arakan, including information concerning any human rights violations.

* The UNHCR should seek to remain in Arakan beyond the current 1998 deadline, andfor as long as required to protect returnees. UNHCR should reconsider its plan to pass onto the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) responsibility to develop northernArakan for the long term reintegration of Rohingyas, as UNDP lacks a protectionmandate and staff trained in protection issues.

* The UNHCR should put into practice the recommendations from the U.N. WorkingGroup on International Protection of August 1992 concerning "direct prevention" andwork closely with the Secretary-General in carrying out his mandate to ensure theimplementation of the 1996 General Assembly resolution on Burma and the work of theU.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma, with particular attention to the call for Burma to endforced labor and to amend its citizenship law.

To the International Community

* Those governments, notably the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdomand the United States, which have contributed funds to the refugee and repatriation

program should encourage Bangladesh to continue allow refugees to enjoy asylum.Donor countries must be prepared to commit funds to the care and maintenance of thispopulation.

* There must be some degree of burden-sharing with regard to those refugees whoultimately cannot return to Burma. The Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN) in particular should consider creating a pool from which to draw refugeeseligible for third country resettlement. At the same time, a working group should be

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established within ASEAN to assist in establishing the necessary conditions to preventfurther refugee outflows.

* The international community must step up efforts to ensure that the human rightssituation in Burma is improved and conditions are created under which the Rohingyas

could voluntarily return in safety and dignity. Coordinated pressure must be applied, withwestern and Asian governments working together through the United Nations Secretary-General's office. Governments should explore ways of exerting economic pressure,including the continued ban on assistance by international financial institutions.

II. BACKGROUND

Between December 1991 and March 1992, some 250,000 Rohingya Muslims fromBurma's Arakan state fled to Bangladesh.2 At the time the refugees reported summarykillings, rape, forced labor, forced portering and religious persecution by the Burmesearmy which had forced them leave their homes.3 The Bangladesh government granted

temporary asylum to the refugees and called on the UNHCR to assist in the provision ofhumanitarian aid. In April 1992, however, the Bangladesh and Burmese governmentscame to a bilateral agreement on a repatriation scheme that did not allow for furtherUNHCR involvement. Some 5,000 refugees were forcibly repatriated under thisagreement, until UNHCR's threat to leave the camps finally persuaded the Bangladeshgovernment to cease the repatriation in December 1992. Despite an agreement betweenBangladesh and the UNHCR signed in May 1993, nearly 50,000 refugees wereinvoluntarily repatriated by November 1993. In that month the UNHCR finally securedan agreement from the SLORC allowing its representatives to be present in Arakan state,the first U.N. agency to do so. Once ten staff had been appointed and the program was upand running in Arakan, the UNHCR started a mass repatriation program with the

cooperation of both sides, which was to have ended in December 1995.

Various factors, including cyclones in May 1994 and May 1996 that devastated thecamps, political unrest, and a general strike in Bangladesh in 1996, conspired to slow therepatriation, but over the five years that the program was implemented, two other factorswere more important: the reluctance of the refugees to return home when stories fromreturnees to Bangladesh suggested that little had changed; and constant delays by theBurmese side in clearing refugees for return.4 In a report published in 1996, HumanRights Watch/Asia described in detail the repatriation and reintegration programs andcriticized all parties in the repatriation for failing to ensure the protection of refugees. 5

That report concluded that the Rohingyas would always remain a vulnerable group as

long as the SLORC refused to recognize them as citizens. In this situation, it concluded,the UNHCR must keep the rights of refugees uppermost whenever there is a conflictbetween the need to publicize and advocate against abuses and the need to maintain goodrelations with both the country of origin and the host country.

December 1995 came and went, with some 35,000 refugees still in the camps. During1996 resistance to the repatriation increased, and between January and October only15,000 returned. The slow rate of return forced all parties to the repatriation to extend the

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deadline for completion of the operation to March 1997. Nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) working in the camps were informed in October 1996 that they would all have toleave thecamps by March 31, 1997, after which time, if the repatriation was notcompleted, Bangladesh authorities, such as the Department of Health and Education,would take over the provision of humanitarian aid in any remaining camps.6

As the March deadline drew near, the newly-elected Awami League government inBangladesh held extensive negotiations with Burma regarding the refugees. In January anupbeat news commentary on Bangladesh Radio Network reported that the "Myanmargovernment has agreed to take back all the 26,000 ethnic Rohingyas still living in campsin Bangladesh by the end of March."7This optimism was short-lived, however, and asthe deadline was reached over 20,000 remained in the camps, over half of whom had notbeen cleared to return by Burma. A new agreement was reached to keep the receptioncenters in Burma open until the end of April, and an additional 2,000 refugees werecleared. Only 246 of these volunteered to return however, and between April and Julythere were no further repatriations. Instead, the UNHCR formally proposed that the

remaining caseload of 21,400 be resettled in Bangladesh. However, with local hostilitytowards the refugees increasing, and with Islamic fundamentalist elements activelyworking within the refugee camps the Bangladesh government refused the offer ofincreased assistance and resettlement packages.8 UNHCR threatened to end itsoperations within the camps by the end of June unless the government started to resettleat least the 5,000 refugees who had been classified through the UNHCR statusdetermination procedure as being in fear of persecution.

Further negotiations took place between Burma and Bangladesh, and on July 14 it wasannounced that Burma would reopen its border for the repatriation of the 7,535 clearedrefugees who would be repatriated in groups of 400 every other day until the deadline of

August 15.1 The Rohingyas who arrived during 1991/92 were considered prima facie refugees by the UNHCR andhave not been "screened", that is, interviewed by UNHCR protection officers to determine individual fearof persecution. They are all thus referred to throughout this report as refugees. These refugees have beeninterviewed by UNHCR to determine that they made a voluntary decision to return to Burma, and under theagreement between UNHCR and Bangladesh, they are entitled to a further interview at the point ofdeparture, at which time they may express a fear of return. Of those who have said they do not wish toreturn to Burma, some 5,000 were screened by UNHCR and classified as having a well-founded fear ofpersecution and thus entitled to long term protection. The new arrivals, none of whom have been screened,are referred to in this report as asylum-seekers, since they assert a claim to refugee status, and are thus

entitled to temporary asylum and assistance while their claims are investigated.2 Arakan state wasrenamed "Rakhine state" by the current military government in 1990. We continue to usethe old name, as "Rakhine" refers to the predominant ethnic minority in Arakan state, and

"Arakan" is more inclusive. In a previous exodus of Rohingyas, in 1978, some 200,000fled to Bangladesh. Most were involuntarily returned to Burma by 1980, but some 20,000were resettled in Bangladesh.3 See Amnesty International, "Union of Myanmar (Burma):Human Rights Violations against Muslims in Northern Rakhine (Arakan) State,"(London: Amnesty International, May 1992); Asia Watch, "Burma: Rape, Forced Laborand Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan," A Human Rights Watch Short Report,vol.4, no.13, May 1992.4 Under a bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Burma,lists of refugees willing to go back to Burma are given to Burmese authorities to enable

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them to check that the individuals did have habitual residence in Burma before 1991.Only then are they permitted to return. The"'clearing" process can be very lengthy,though in mid-1996 there were suspicions that the Burmese had deliberately slowed theprocess once the number of returnees reached 200,000. See Human Rights Watch/Asia,"Burma: The Rohingya Muslims - Ending a Cycle of Exodus?"A Human Rights Watch

Short Report, vol. 8, no. 9 (c), September 1996, p.21. 5 Human Rights Watch/Asia,"Ending a Cycle..." pp. 14-21. 6 Despite this threat, the two NGOs (MSF Holland andConcern) working in the two remaining camps were permitted to continue their workthere through July 1997.7 Bangladesh Radio Network, January 6, 1997. The AwamiLeague, headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was elected in July 1996.8 The JamaatIslami Party has actively supported Rohingya insurgent groups and political activistssince the first mass exodus from Burma to Bangladesh in 1978. By 1997 the entirerefugee population was very politically active, with reports of beatings and abuse withincamps of those who did not cooperate with the camp bosses. Violence against refugeeswho have not followed the militant line has been a problem in some camps since 1992(see Human Rights Watch/Asia "Ending a Cycle.." p.13).

III. FORCED REPATRIATION

Five days after this agreement, on the night of Saturday, July 19, armed riot policeentered Nayapara refugee camp in Cox's Bazaar district intending to arrest refugees

cleared by Burma for repatriation. The refugees resisted, with some throwing stones, andtear gas was used to quell the protests. One hundred eleven refugees, mainly women andchildren, were held in the camp office overnight. The next morning, these people alongwith seventy-six other refugees were driven in buses to a repatriation point and forcedonto boats to be taken back to Burma. A partly paralyzed man and a heavily pregnantwoman were among those taken. The refugees were frightened and women threwthemselves on the ground in the hope that they would not be taken. At least one womanwas beaten with a cane. Back in the camp, refugees protested the forced repatriation, andthere were violent clashes. Some fifteen people, including three Bangladesh policemen,were reported to have been injured, although the true figure may have been higher as itwas reported that refugees were too afraid to report to the clinics for medical help.

On Tuesday, July 22, a similar event took place in the only other remaining refugeecamp, Kutu Palong, with 212 refugees rounded up overnight and deported by boat andoverland the next day. A total of sixty-seven children were separated from their mothersin the repatriations. Again there were protests in the camp, though in this case thesecurityforces remained outside the camp, and some 300 demonstrators were allowed to sit in themiddle of the road without interference. On Thursday, July 24, following protest lettersfrom the UNHCR assistant high commissioner,9the Bangladesh government denied that

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there had been any use of force in the repatriations, but also said that there would be nofurther repatriations without the UNHCR's presence. In the days following, Bangladeshissued several statements reiterating their determination to repatriate all refugees, withForeign Minister Abdus Samad Azad saying, "It is not possible for us to allow them apermanent settlement on our land. This problem has to be addressed by the international

community."10 Nevertheless, by August 6, the 13,000 refugees in Nayapara camp wereon a hunger strike, refusing to collect their daily rations and refusing to access theavailable services, including medical clinics, in the camps.

A Bangladesh foreign ministry statement released on July 25 denied that any forcedrepatriations had taken place, saying, "The refugees are predominantly economicmigrants and any generous subsidies and campaigns about local settlement will work as adisincentive for the refugees to return."11 UNHCR was blamed for encouraging therefugees to refuse to go back to Burma by promising that they would be resettled.

9 "UNHCR Protests Expulsions in Bangladesh," UNHCR press release, July 23, 1997. In

a letter to the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Assistant High Commissioner SergioVieira de Mello appealed to the Bangladesh authorities to refrain from further forcedrepatriations and allow UNHCR to carry out interviews to ensure refugees were returningvoluntarily. "In the absence of such arrangements," the letter said, "UNHCR would nolonger be in a position to associate itself with the repatriation operation."10 "Bangladesh says some Burmese accept food," Reuters, July 31, 1997.11 Statement by Bangladesh Foreign Ministry, Bangla News Agency (BSS), July 25,1997.

IV. NEW ARRIVALS

That the refugees do not wish to return to Burma is without doubt. As noted, their fearsabout the situation in their country of origin were heightened by the arrival of some10,000 to 15,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh in the first six months of 1997 who describedincreased forced labor, heavy taxation of Muslims and some instances of rape. Thisinflux was almost an exact repeat of the events of the first six months of 1996. 12 TheUNHCR and NGOs are not formally permitted to have access to the new refugees,although in 1996 the UNHCR was able to interview some 600 new arrivals. Those whohave relatives or close friends in the refugee camps sometimes try and live in the camps,sharing the food rations of their relatives. Mdecins Sans Frontires reported in June1997 that this practice had led to an increase in the numbers of malnourished childrencoming to their supplementary feeding centers, as it seemed that families were no longerfeeding the children from their own rations. However, in many cases in 1996 and 1997,the Bangladesh authorities in the camps rooted out new arrivals from the camps and hadthem charged with illegal entry. By October 1996 there were an estimated 900 Rohingyasin Cox's Bazaar jail, a facility built to house one hundred, and NGOs reported thatovercrowding led to the death of four inmates in September 1996. Neither the UNHCRnor any other international body was permitted access to those detained.13 Arrests of newarrivals in thecamps continued in 1997, although precise figures were not available. A

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BBC journalist reported that fourteen people were arrested by the so-called Camp-in-Charge, the camp commander, on June 17.

Those who do not enter the camps have hidden in jungle areas or in the slums aroundCox's Bazaar, while some have traveled further afield in Bangladesh or abroad.14 Most

try to eke out a living by sending their children to beg in the streets, working in the ricefields, or taking other jobs. According to those interviewed by Refugees International,Rohingyas generally received 40 takas per day, less than US$1, as opposed to the localrate of 100 to 120 takas. Local hostility towards the newcomers from Bangladesh daylaborers, who see their jobs are taken and wages forced down, is high. Four Rohingyawomen who arrived by boat in June told the BBC that they were robbed and then rapedby some local Bangladesh men on arrival near Teknaf.15Some reported that the localauthorities have sometimes given Rohingyas food in return for their departure from thearea, while the unlucky ones have been forcibly pushed back across the land border intoBurma. In May the commander of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in southeastern Cox'sBazaar district, Col. Wali Ullah, was quoted in the press as saying that several families

who had tried to enter Bangladesh for "economic reasons" were immediately deported.He added that all boats crossing the Naf river, which marks the border with Burma, werealso being checked by troops.16 In mid-June some 200 to 400 refugees were forciblypushed back by the BDR.

12 Some 10,000 refugees also arrived in the first six months of 1996. These figures areestimates based on reports by NGOs and journalists working in the area. The UNHCRgave figures of between 5,000 to 7,000 new arrivals in 1997 (press release, July 18,1997), and in 1996 said that information had been gathered on "more than 2,000persons." (Situation Update, September 1996).13 Human Rights Watch/Asia was informed in November 1996 that there had been some

discussions between the Bangladesh government and the International Committee of theRed Cross, but these appear to have been fruitless.14 When Malaysia conducted a crackdown on illegal workers in March 1997, 8,000Rohingyas were detained.15 Frances Harrison, conversation with Human Rights Watch/Asia, June 23, 1997.16 "Rohingya said to be Fleeing Famine," The Nation (Bangkok), May 11,1997;"Bangladesh Tightens Security on Border with Burma," Agence France Press, April5, 1997.V. CONTINUED ABUSE AND DISCRIMINATION IN BURMA

According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma:

Lt. Gen. Mya Thinn [the minister for home affairs] recalled that theMuslim population of Rakhine State were not recognized as citizens ofMyanmar under the existing naturalization regulations, and they were noteven registered as so-called foreign residents. Consequently, the Ministeradded, their status situation did not permit them to travel in thecountry...They are also not allowed to serve in the State positions and arebarred from attending higher educational institutions.17

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In mid-July 1997 a researcher from Refugees International visited Cox's Bazaar andinterviewed thirteen Rohingyas in slums around the town, all of whom had arrived withintwo weeks of the interview date. All said they had fled because of starvation, a claimwhich is supported by evidence of the situation in Arakan.18 This has led theBangladeshgovernment to conclude that most or all of the new arrivals are economic migrants, not

bona fide refugees. Nonetheless, even if the lack of food and economic opportunity werethe most pressing reason for flight, further questioning revealed that in fact they had beensubject to abuses such as forced labor, arbitrary taxation, denial of freedom of movementand access to educational institutions in a manner which discriminates against them onthe basis of their race and religious beliefs.

Human Rights Watch and Refugees International believe that the discriminatory laws andpractices which the majority of Rohingyas in Arakan state are subject to amount topersecution according the criteria established by the UNHCR. That is, the laws andpractices "lead to consequences of a prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g.,serious restricitons on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to practice his religion, or

his access to normally available educational facilities" which "produce, in the minds ofthe person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity are regards his futureexistence."19

This is not to say however, that all Rohingyas should therefore be classified as primafacie refugees, since there are circumstances in which some individuals and families maynot be subject to abuses of sufficient severity to amount to persecution. Much depends onthe attitude of the local military commander or other government officials such asNaSaKa officers and IMPD personnel. Abusive officials, however, are in no danger ofbeing punished by their superiors and their victims have no legal recourse. In some cases,individuals or families may be protected from abuse by their social or financial position,

their willingness and ability to cooperate with the authorities, perhaps at the expense ofother Rohingyas, or other factors. Thus, there are Rohingyas from Arakan in Bangladeshwho do not have a fear of persecution and are living as economic migrants. These includebusinessmen who travel between the two countries, others who regularly travel toBangladesh to find work with relatives during the lean months in Burma, or those wholive and work in Dhaka and elsewhere. But these are usually not the people who end upin the slums around Cox's Bazaar.

Citizenship Status

Under Burma's 1982 Citizenship Law, which was promulgated shortly after Rohingyarefugees returned from the 1978 exodus to Bangladesh and was designed specifically todeny citizenship to the Rohingyas, a person in order to become a full citizen must provethe residency in Burma of all his or her ancestors back to 1823, the year before the Britishgovernment annexed Arakan.20 This law violates several fundamental principles ofcustomary international law, and in 1993 the U.N. requested that the SLORC repeal oramend it to bring into line with international standards.21 In particular, the law violatesthe 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the International Covenant ofCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.22

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Given the over-burdensome requirements for citizens in the 1982 law, few Rohingyasqualify as either full, associate or naturalized citizens (the three categories created by thelaw), and even those who do would find proofalmost impossible. Citizenship is essentialin Burma to gain access to basic social, educational and health services. To add to thedifficulties faced by Rohingyas, in 1989 the Burmese government began to issue new

identity cards to all citizens, which include not only a photograph of the bearer, his or herfather's name, place of residence and so on, but also ethnicity and religion. The identitycard must be carried at all times, and the card number has to be given when buyingtickets to travel; registering children in school; staying overnight with friends outsideone's own council area; applying for any professional post, including all civil serviceposts; buying or exchanging land and other acts of everyday life. All residents in Burmahad to apply for these new cards, and even for those with old cards (which included manyRohingyas who had been able to get some form of citizenship under pre-1982 laws),proof of citizenship had to be reestablished. Across Burma the process of issuing the newcards is not yet over-in ethnic minority areas in particular, the process has been veryslow-but for Rohingyas it never really began.

Because citizenship is so vitally important, the registration process continues to be amajor concern for the refugees and all Rohingyas, and has also been taken up by theUNHCR in their negotiations with the Burmese authorities. At the time of the forcedrepatriations in July, the UNHCR representative in Cox's Bazaar was quoted as saying,"The Rohingyas are not citizens of Myanmar. The question of formal Myanmarnationality for the Rohingyas is a crucial issue."23 The UNHCR endeavored to ensurethat the returnees-and to prevent non-discrimination between returnees and Rohingyaswho did not leave, all Muslims in northern Arakan State-were given some form ofidentity cards and in July 1995 the government, through the Immigration and ManpowerDepartment (IMPD), moved to regularize the population of northern Arakan by issuing

new identity cards to all resident Rohingyas.

The new cards were issued under the 1949 Residents of Burma Registration Act and the1951 Residents of Burma Registration Rules, both of which were superseded by the 1982Citizenship Law but were reintroduced in order to be used solely for the registration ofRohingyas. Theses laws allow for the issuing of Temporary Registration Certificates toforeign residents or stateless persons and for citizenship applications to be made by theholder at some point, although it is not known if there is a time limit within which theapplication has to be made. Some returnees interviewed by a Refugees Internationalrepresentative in January 1997 were able to produce these temporary cards. The cardscarry a number, as well as the bearer's photograph, name, year of birth, ethnicity, andreligion, color of hair and eyes, father's name and father's ethnicity and religion. The cardobtained by Refugees International stated "Muslim, Islam" in the space marked"race/religion," and there was nothing on the card to show place of birth or residence.While the UNHCR and others may hope that these cards will offer a permanent future forthe Rohingyas in Burma, by June 1997 there was no sign that the cards would be the firststep towards Burmese citizenship. Unless the 1982 Citizenship Law is repealed oramended, there seems to be little point in Rohingyas applying.

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In short, Rohingyas in Burma continue to be non-citizens under the prevailing law, whichwas designed to exclude them as an ethnic group and make naturalization virtuallyimpossible. Deprivation of citizenship has resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights,to which all persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, are due. The withholding ofcitizenship has become a mechanism for discrimination and persecution on the basis of

ethnicity. Thus, Rohingyas are doubly at risk in a country where citizens face abuese suchas forced labor, forced relocation, and denial of freedom of speech, association andassembly on a daily basis.

Forced Labor

All the interviewees reported an increase in forced labor, to around two weeks per monthin the three months prior to their departure. Two of those interviewed had workedclearing land at a place called Angooma by the coast in Maungdaw township. One man, aforty-five-year-old father of three, described how the NaSaKa (BorderAdministrationForce)24 came to his village near Maungdaw town to decide how long each person would

have to work on this project. Those with enough rice or funds to buy rice for three dayswere taken, with their rice, to work for three days. Those who could afford more weretaken for longer. However, since it was a two-day journey, on foot, to reach the work site,the rice would not last. He was told he would be taken for twenty days but escaped beforehe had to go. Another man from south Maungdaw reported that he had had to work fortwo weeks every month since the Burmese new year (April) building houses for BurmeseBuddhist families whom the government had relocated to the area.

Since most of the Rohingyas are unskilled day laborers, one day of work without pay canmean one day without food for the whole family. The availability of work depends verymuch on the agricultural cycle, and during the dry season (December - July), there tends

to be very little work. In the past, Rohingyas would have traveled to find work in townsor in areas where work was available, but since 1991 their freedom of movement hasbeen severely restricted by the NaSaKa (see below). They thus have very few sources ofincome to begin with, and since the dry season also happens to be the best time forconstruction work when forced labor demands are most intense, the burden on theRohingyas is particularly acute.

Forced labor occurs throughout Burma. Because it is not targeted specifically atRohingyas UNHCR has said that while the practice is abusive, it cannot be consideredgrounds for refugee status. Rather, UNHCR has taken a pragmatic approach andattempted to negotiate a reduction in the burden of forced labor on the returnees.25 Theagency has maintained since 1994 that returnees are only required to work four days ofevery month (one day per week) and that monitoring by UNHCR representatives inArakan has not revealed any increase. Returnees and visitors to the region, however,consistently report that the burden of forced labor remains much higher than the figurecited by UNHCR, and there is concern that UNHCR's sixteen international staff inArakan cannot effectively monitor the situation for the 200,000 returnees in an areawhere transportation is extremely difficult.26

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Confiscation of Land and Property

In addition to having to work for the government for no pay, those among the newarrivals who had been landowners told Refugees International that their land had beenconfiscated by the military, leaving them with no means of livelihood.

In Burma all land is owned by the government. Tenants may have land use rights, whichcan be inherited by children, but on land designated for rice cultivation (paddy land),which constitutes over half the agricultural land in Burma, use rights cannot be rented orsold.27 As associate or naturalized citizens or as foreign residents (seebelow), Rohingyasare not permitted land use rights. Nevertheless, customary law applies in most villages,and Rohingyas have been able to acquire tenancy of land over the years. In many parts ofMaungdaw, Buthidaung and Kyauktaw townships, however, the military has confiscatedland to build roads, "model villages" (see below), military barracks, hydroelectricstations, prawn farms and other commercial activities. In cases where land is taken in thisway, there is no compensation for the owner and no recourse to law. The confiscation of

land for development occurs throughout ethnic minority areas of Burma. While ethnicBurmans can also been relocatedfor urban or rural development projects they are givegiven, or have the possibility of buying at discounted rates, new land or housing, whichethnic minorities including the Rohingya, do not.

A sixty-year-old man from Maungdaw township had arrived in Cox's Bazaar with histhree wives and sixteen children. He had owned a fairly large farm, but in June 1997military intelligence officers came to his house and ordered him to give up his land. Herefused and the next day they came back and raped one of his daughters and took asecond daughter to jail. Eleven days later, after much begging, he was swapped for hisdaughter and spent twenty days in jail. During that time he was beaten. He and the rest of

the family fled after he was released; he later learned that the daughter who was rapedhad died. When they reached the border his family were pushed back by Bangladeshguards. Burmese NaSaKa troops then took all the money they had before letting them go.After a five-day walk, they crossed into Bangladesh at another crossing.

A fifty-year-old man from a village twenty-five miles south of Maungdaw told RefugeesInternational that his land was confiscated by the government in September 1996. Later afamily of Burmese Buddhists were given this land. As his savings decreased, he sold hiscattle to survive. His son left to escape the demands of forced labor, and when he hadnothing left, he finally took the rest of his family to Bangladesh. This man had not been arefugee in the past.

A woman, a widow with three children, from south Maungdaw said she left after themilitary confiscated her small plot of land on which she grew beetles. Having no othermeans of support, and being afraid of abuse by the NaSaKa, she left for Bangladesh.

Arbitrary Taxation

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Taxation in Burma is notoriously arbitrary.28 As a condition of exercising land userights, tenants must pay taxation in kind to the government: usually, a percentage orquota of the harvest that the farmers must sell to the government at a price fixed by thegovernment. In Arakan state the rice tax is calculated as a percentage of the land acreageavailable to the farmers, rather than on the basis of the yield of the land. The calculation

has a discriminatory impact on Rohingyas, who for the most part have access to only thepoorest quality land where yields are much less than for good land.

In addition to the land tax, Rohingyas have also been subject to increasing new forms oftaxation since 1992. It seems that all forms of business are now taxed. Every family innorthern Arakan has to pay a chili tax, regardless of whether they actually grow chilies.As a result, many Rohingyas are forced to buy chilies at the market rate of 500 kyats, and"sell" them to the NaSaKa at the government rate of 100 kyats. Refugees who had arrivedin Bangladesh in February 1996 told Human Rights Watch that they had had to pay a feewhen going on to the river to fish and when going the forest to cut bamboo. The fishingfee only applies to the Rohingyas, as Buddhist Rakhines do not fish. New arrivals in 1997

said that the taxes had been extended to farm animals; the owners of a cow must pay 80Kyats a year, while a goat is assessed at 30 Kyats a year. Finally, Rohingyas have to payfor permits to travel from their village to the next, or to the market village to sellwhatever produce they may have. A thirty-five-year-old man from Maungdaw townshipinterviewed by Refugees International in July said he had to pay 20 Kyats every timehewanted to travel to the market to sell his eggs or chicken meat. In the end it was notworth his while, because once at the market the military would come to his stall and takewhatever they wanted without paying for it.

Forced Relocations

The SLORC appears to be working on a program of population engineering, moving allMuslims in Arakan from areas outside Maungdaw and Buthidaung into those townships,and moving Burmese or Arakenese families into "model villages" in the wealthiest partsof Maungdaw and Buthidaung. In most cases the Burmese families are the relatives ofsoldiers based in the area, and as the military has continued to expand nationally (from280,000 men under arms in 1988 to around 400,000 in 1996), so military barracks havebecome an ubiquitous presence in every village. Reports from visitors to Arakan andfrom the BBC correspondent in Dhaka suggest that many of the new arrivals in 1997were from Kyauktaw township, an area of mixed Rohingya and Rakhine villages whichpreviously had seen no exodus of refugees. The UNHCR has confirmed this impression,though as they do not operate in Kyauktaw they could give no reasons for the outflow.29However, Human Rights Watch/Asia and Refugees International believe that it is forcedrelocations from Kyauktaw to Buthidaung and Maungdaw, or simply the confiscation ofMuslim-owned land in Kyauktaw, which has caused people to flee.

Freedom of Movement

There is no freedom of movement for Rohingyas, as Lt. Gen. Maung Thinn made clear inthe statement quoted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur in his 1996 report. All of the new

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arrivals mentioned the lack of freedom of movement as a major factor in forcing them toleave Burma. Indeed, some noted that it was considerably easier to travel from theirvillages to Bangladesh than it was to travel within Arakan State. Rohingyas are notallowed to travel anywhere beyond their village boundaries without getting priorpermission. Request to travel must be made to the village council, which then passes on

the request to the nearest NaSaKa base. Here, the IMPD, police, riot police, militaryintelligence, and customs all have to agree to the request. Once that happens, a permitmust be purchased. In most cases passes are only given for a twelve-hour round trip tonearby villages: only in exceptional cases are Muslims permitted to stay overnight. Totravel further, for instance to the township capitals at Maungdaw or Buthidaung, or thestate capital at Sittwe, is virtually impossible. The sheer complexity and cost of thisarrangement was said by some Muslims to dissuade them even for applying to leave theirvillage. While everyone in Burma has to register and pay a small fee at the local SLORCoffice when staying overnight in a town or village other than their own, only non-citizens,such as the Rohingya, have to apply for permission prior to leaving their home. Beingunable to travel, even within Arakan state, makes it extremely difficult for landless

Rohingyas to find work during the dry season, when there is very little agricultural workavailable.

17 Special Rapporteur to Burma, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,prepared by Mr. Yozo Yokota, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,in accordance with Commission resolution 1995/72," U.N. Document No.E/CN.4/1996/65, February 5, 1996.18 Extreme poverty among the Muslims in Arakan led the World Food Program toconduct a malnutrition survey in late 1996. The results of this survey were not madepublic. In addition, in mid-1997 the whole of Burma suffered rampant inflation, with thevalue of the Kyat falling from $1 = 120 Kyat in January to $1= 380 Kyat in June. In

Arakan rice prices increased to 60 Kyat per kilo in June 1997 (compared to 20 Kyats inJune 1996), when an average wage for a day laborer was only 50 Kyat. While rice pricesincreased, the SLORC refused to allow local traders to import rice from Bangladesh. TheUNHCR and WFP negotiated with the local military commander to overturn this decisionin June, but there were no reports of a change in this policy.19 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951Convention and the 1967 Protocal relating to the Status of Refugees" (Geneva: UNHCR) January 198820 For a full discussion of citizenship in Burma, see Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Endingthe Cycle..." pp. 24 - 29.21 The former U.N. Special Rapporteur to Burma, Prof. YozoYokota, first made thisrecommendation in his "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar." U.N.Doc. No.E/CN.4/1993/37, February 17, 1993. It was then incorporated into the U.N.

Commission on Human Rights resolution on Burma in April 1993.22 Burma's practice is contrary to prevailing international norms enjoining states to reduce statelessness aswell as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15 stiputlation that "no one shall arbitrarily bedeprived of his nationality." The Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Burma acceded in 1992,obliges states to provide children who would otherwise remain stateless with the right to acquire anationality.23 Van To Nguyen , quoted in "Burmese Refugees Set Preconditions for Going Home",Reuters, July 26, 1997.

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24 NaSaKa was created in 1992, after the Rohingya exodus, and comprises five differentgovernment agencies: the police, military intelligence (MI), Lone Htein (riot police,notorious for their involvement in the killings in Rangoon in March and April 1988),customs, and the Immigration and Manpower Department (IMPD). The NaSaKa is underthe direct command of the SLORC and the army's Western Commander based in Sittwe

and is thus a quasi-military body.25 UNHRC has concluded, "Extensive recruitment for compulsory labor was believed tobe one of the main reasons for the mass-exodus in 1991/92 and continues to be an issueof concern. UNHCR has [...] focused on this issue and has repeatedly intervened withregard to returnees being called for compulsory labor. Whilst the aim of this interventionis the eventual elimination of this practice, UNHCR has to be pragmatic in its approachand therefore sought to minimize the burden placed on the population of northernRakhine [Arakan] State." See "Voluntary Repatriation and Reintegration:Bangladesh/Myanmar. Situation Update," (Geneva: UNHCR), September 1996.26 See "Situation Update...", and also Human Rights Watch/Asia "Ending the Cycle..." ;U.S. Committee on Refugees, "The Return of the Rohingya Refugees to Burma:

Voluntary Repatriation or Refoulement?"(Washington, D.C: March 1995).27 See World Bank, "Myanmar: Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform," CountryReport, 1995.28 For a discussion of taxation in Burma, see "Burma: A Country Study," U.S. Embassy,Rangoon, July 1996.29 UNHCR representatives in Cox's Bazaar speaking to Human Rights Watch on June31, 1997. Also confirmed in a telephone conversation with the UNHCR Head of AsiaDivision, Francois Fouinat, on July 29, 1997.

VI. CONCLUSION

It has been a year since Human Rights Watch/Asia published its report on the repatriationof the Rohingyas. Although the UNHCR has implemented some of the recommendationsof the report, including increasing its international staff in Arakan and ensuring regularexchange of staff between Burma and Bangladesh, the SLORC has changed little in itsattitude towards the Rohingyas. They are still considered non-citizens and are unwelcome

except for the free labor they provide. Indeed, the continued antagonism and racism ofmany Buddhist Burmese towards members of the Muslim minority in Burma wasrevealed in violence that broke out in March 1997 when Muslim communities inBurmese cities were attacked by groups of Burmese. Many reports indicated that theviolence may have been encouraged by the government to deflect criticism of itstreatment of Buddhist monks incarcerated since1988. In Rangoon, Mandalay, Prome,Pegu and Toungoo, mosques were ransacked, Muslim shops looted, and Muslimsphysically assaulted.30

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But the Rohingya Muslims are not the only ethnic minority to suffer abuse at the hands ofthe Burmese military, nor are they the only refugees to flee Burma. During 1997 thenumber of refugees in camps in Thailand rose to over 100,000, and there are at leastanother one million Burmese eking out a precarious existence as illegal migrant workersin Thailand. The refugees in Thailand fare no better than the Rohingyas; indeed, since

there is no UNHCR presence in their camps to provide protection from involuntaryrepatriations, their position may be even worse.31In the final analysis, while protectionmust be provided to those fleeing persecution in Burma to neighboring countries, onlyimprovements in the human rights situation in Burma will bring about a lasting solutionfor the Rohingyas and all of Burma's ethnic minority groups.

Human Rights Watch/Asia

Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around theworld.

We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice, to preventdiscrimination, to uphold political freedom and to protect people from inhumane conductin wartime.

We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.

We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respectinternational human rights law.

We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of humanrights for all.

The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Susan Osnos, associate director;Michele Alexander, development director; Cynthia Brown, program director; BarbaraGuglielmo, finance and administration director; Robert Kimzey, publications director;Jeri Laber, special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Susan Osnos,communications director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Wilder Tayler, general counsel; andJoanna Weschler, United Nations representative. Robert L. Bernstein is the chair of theboard and Adrian W. DeWind is vice chair.

Its Asia division was established in 1985 to monitor and promote the observance ofinternationally recognized human rights in Asia. Sidney Jones is the executive director;

Mike Jendrzejczyk is the Washington director; Robin Munro is the Hong Kong director;Patricia Gossman is the senior researcher; Zunetta Liddell is the research associate;Jeannine Guthrie is NGO liaison; Sarah Cooke is the research assistant; Mickey Spiegelis a consultant; Olga Nousias and Tom Kellogg are associates. Andrew J. Nathan is chairof the advisory committee and Orville Schell is vice chair.

Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org

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Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message [email protected] with "subscribe hrw-news" in the body of the message (leavethe subject line blank).

Refugees International

Founded in 1979 in response to the forced repatriation of thousands of Cambodian andVietnamese refugees, Refugees International provides early warning in crises of massexodus. It seeks to serve as the advocate of the unrepresented-the refugee.

In recent years, Refugees International has moved from its initial focus on Indochineserefugees to global coverage, conducting almost 30 emergency missions in the last fouryears. We have answered the emergency calls of Kurds stranded along the mountainousTurkish border; Burmese forced to flee to Bangladesh; war victims in Bosnia; Africansfleeing strife and famine in Liberia, Ethiopia, and Somalia; and Rwandans surging intoTanzania and Zaire.

The organization mixes quiet diplomacy and the power of the press to mobilizegovernments and engage the UN. Our on-the-ground emergency assessment paves theway for relief agencies and human rights organizations to step in with life savingmeasures.

Refugees International accepts no government or UN funds and is heavily reliant on thesupport of committed and concerned individuals. We are the independent and unfetteredvoice of refugees and displaced persons.

The Refugees International staff includes Lionel Rosenblatt, president; Dennis Grace,

vice-president; Mary Pack, Burma project director; and Yvette Pierpaoli, Europeanrepresentative.

Web Site Address: http://www.refintl.org

30 "Burma puts five cities on security alert after religious unrest", AFP March 19, 1997;"Burmese government says religious unrest 'under control'", Associated Press, March 25,1997. See also Images Asia, Report on the Situation for Muslims in Burma (Bangkok:Images Asia) May 1997. To prevent the spread of violence, curfews were implemented inthese towns for periods of up to ten days, but it is not known if any of the perpetrators ofthe violence were prosecuted.

31 See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma/Thailand: No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuaryin Thailand,"A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 6 (c), July 1997.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Publications

THE ROHINGYA MUSLIMS

Ending a Cycle of Exodus?

Vol. 8, No. 9 (C), September 1996

SUMMARY | RECOMMENDATIONS | TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

The title of this report is taken from a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR) report of June 1995 on the repatriation of over 200,000 Burmese refugees,most of them members of the Rohingya Muslim minority, from Bangladesh to their homestate of Arakan in northern Burma. The repatriation is being held up as a success story bythe UNHCR in speeches of senior officials as well as in publications, including its annualreport, State of the Worlds Refugees 1995. For the UNHCR, the return of so manyrefugees by early 1996, most of whom had left Burma in 1991 and 1992, was avindication of its shift from providing refugee relief to promoting voluntary repatriation asthe most durable solution to refugee problems.

But the story of the Rohingyas was not over: the cycle of exodus has not ended. On April20, 1996, fifteen Burmese Muslims, part of a group of 150 who were seeking asylum inBangladesh, drowned in the Naf river as they were being towed back to Burma by theBangladesh Border Rifles, a branch of the Bangladesh army. All fifteen were women andyoung children. This incident brought much-needed attention to the plight of some 5,000new asylum seekers who had entered Bangladesh since the end of February 1996. By theend of May their number had risen to an estimated 10,000. The Bangladesh governmenthad refused UNHCR access to the new arrivals and was intent on sending them all back.Its security forces arrested 254 refugees without permitting them to apply for asylum andforcibly returned an estimated 200 others in violation of international standards.

These new arrivals came to Bangladesh at a time when the UNHCR was attempting towind up the repatriation of the Rohingya who had fled violent abuse by the Burmesemilitary in 1991 and 1992. As one journalist put it, The influx is something of anembarrassment for the UNHCR...[who] fear that any move to help the newcomers wouldspur others to follow. Having conducted only a handful of individual interviews, theUNHCR in Dhaka publicly stated that all the new arrivals were economic migrants whowere escaping poverty not persecution, and stepped up efforts inside Arakan State to

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ensure that those planning to leave would not do so.

The 1996 exodus from Burma raises several important questions about the UNHCRsrepatriation operation from Bangladesh and about the promotion of voluntary return tocountries with particularly abusive governments. Rohingyas are not the only refugees to

have left Burma since its military government, the State Law and Order RestorationCouncil (SLORC), came to power after a series of popular uprisings in 1988. In June 1996the 95,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand were joined by 2,300 new arrivals from Karennistate and at least 8,000 people from Shan state, all of whom came from areas whereSLORC was forcibly relocating villages to bring them more directly under governmentcontrol. The Shan, unlike other Burmese minorities, have been prevented from enteringThailand and seeking asylum, as is their right under international law. In the absence ofrefugee determination procedures and camps for new arrivals, those forced to flee whohave managed to evade border patrols have sought low-paid jobs in the constructionindustry and agriculture, swelling the ranks of the estimated 600,000 Burmese illegalmigrants in Thailand.

At the same time, inside Burma, the governments attitude towards political dissent washardening, as revealed by the arrest at the end of May 1996 of 262 members of thepolitical opposition, most of whom were elected members of parliament. While most havesince been released, many of them have been harassed and threatened with the loss oftheir jobs or worse if they did not resign their seats and leave the National League forDemocracy (NLD). By July 1, seventeen had resigned. Human rights abuses, in the formof summary executions of suspected rebels, forced labor, arbitrary arrest, cruel andinhumane treatment, violations of the laws of war, and a total denial of freedom of speechand association continue, despite Burmas obligations under international law. In 1955Burma signed the 1930 International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention on Forced

Labor; in 1991, it ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and in 1992 theGeneva Conventions, yet it continues to flout their provisions. The SLORC has givenlimited cooperation to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, appointed bythe U.N. Commission on Human Rights, who has visited the country every year since1992, but it has failed to implement any of the rapporteurs recommendations or any ofthe successive resolutions of either the commission or the U.N. General Assembly.

Given such an abusive and intransigent government, what guarantees can be put in placeto ensure the long-term safety of returning refugees? What more can the internationalcommunity do to see that the government accepts its responsibility for the protection ofhuman rights, especially the rights of ethnic and religious minorities who make up 40percent of the population and 99 percent of refugees? In this context, is UNHCRspromotion of voluntary repatriation and its shift of emphasis away from the right to seekasylum towards the right to remain in the country of residence either appropriate orsustainable? In its 1994 Oslo Declaration, UNHCR itself acknowledged concerns:

There was a general agreement that voluntary repatriation is the preferred and bestsolution to the refugee problem. However, it was noted that in some instances UNHCRhas placed too much emphasis on early return to countries of origin which has resulted in

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return movements to less than favourable conditions.

The situation in Arakan was certainly less than favorable, despite the presence sinceJanuary 1994 of a UNHCR office there to monitor the situation of returnees.

This report, based on four visits to the region and extensive interviews over the past fouryears with individuals involved in the repatriation and reintegration program, examinesthe issue of protecting refugees who return to an abusive environment, using the Muslimsfrom Arakan state as an example. In setting the context for their flight and return, thereport examines the claims of the Rohingyas to be a distinct ethnic minority within Burmaand the efforts of the government since 1962 to deny them citizenship and allaccompanying rights and to occasionally force them out as illegal immigrants.

The report then analyzes the attempts at repatriating Rohingya Muslim refugees inBangladesh who fled in 1991. In the first forced repatriation, between September 1992and the end of 1993, UNHCR was not present in Burma and had no agreement with the

Burmese government to provide assistance to returnees. Even more seriously, while theagency was present in the camps in Bangladesh, it could not prevent serious abuses,including beatings and the denial of food rations by camp authorities directed at forcingthe refugees back to Burma. The vast majority of the 50,000 refugees who returned toBurma did so involuntarily, and three years later the UNHCR has not been able to tracethem. There undoubtedly was concern that without full UNHCR participation, therepatriation could have turned into a replay of the 1978 repatriation of Burmese Muslimsfrom Bangladesh, worked out bilaterally between the two countries concerned, in whichover 12,000 refugees starved to death as the Bangladesh government reduced food rationsin the camps in order to force them back. Given that worst case scenario, at least onejournalist suggested that the principle of voluntary return became a euphemism for no

real alternative.

The second repatriation effort took place after the UNHCR had established a limited fieldpresence in Arakan state in 1994. It began promoting mass repatriation on the groundsthat the situation in Arakan was now conducive to return, and it gave up the hard-wonright to interview each refugee individually to ensure that she or he was returningvoluntarily. The report examines the extent to which the refugees have been able to makefully informed decisions about their return, based on knowledge of their right to requestcontinued asylum and objective information about conditions in Arakan. It also looks atvarious elements of the reintegration program and the consequences of the UNHCRhaving as its implementing agency or government partner an ostensibly civilian agencythat in some parts of Arakan is under the direct command of the military.

Finally, the report documents a pattern of continuing discrimination and other abusesagainst the Muslims in Arakan state, from denial of citizenship to forced relocations andforced labor, leading to a new influx of refugees as described above.

Human Rights Watch/Asia concludes that while it applauds UNHCRs efforts at aninternational level to work toward preventing refugee outflows by promoting hum

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