THE REPUBLIC

Ferrari (G.R.F.) (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’sRepublic. Pp. xxvi + 533. Cambridge and New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2007. Paper, £16.99, US$29.99 (Cased, £48, US$80).ISBN: 978-0-521-54842-7 (978-0-521-83963-1 hbk).doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001856

This volume maintains the high standard which readers have come to expect of theCambridge Companions. In addition to an introduction by the Editor it has sixteenchapters, all specially commissioned, covering all the major aspects of the dialogue.Ten of the contributors are from the USA, μve from the UK and one from Germany;as the interests of the authors cover a spectrum from the more literary and historicalat one extreme to the more narrowly philosophical at the other (several contributionsmanifesting both aspects) the work as a whole displays a greater breadth of approachthan in some comparable volumes, as is particularly appropriate to the notoriouslydiverse subject-matter and complex construction of the Republic. Each chaptercontains a bibliography, and in addition there is a comprehensive survey of work onthe dialogue, listing edited collections, editions, commentaries, translations, booksand articles (thematically arranged), totalling more than 600 items. Students of thedialogue will place this bibliographical provision high among the many merits of thisvolume. The work is completed by an index locorum and a general index.

After the Editor’s introduction, setting out the aim of the volume and summarisingthe individual chapters, the work proper begins with three chapters discussingdi¶erent general features of the dialogue. Harvey Yunis presents it as a work ofprotreptic rhetoric, whose strategy is ‘to exploit the available literary resources in sucha way that an unknown reader would most likely be moved as close to Socrates’position on justice and the soul as was possible’ (p. 7); this strategy requires Socratesto defend justice by deploying arguments which are maximally persuasive to areadership untrained in technical philosophy, at the same time as employing literaryartiμce to challenge the status of poetry as the foundation of the popular valueswhich the dialogue seeks to subvert. The theme of Plato’s use of poetic techniquesand imagery to challenge the cultural supremacy of poetry is explored in more detailby David O’Connor in Chapter 3, which points among other themes to the reshapingof Homer’s account of Odysseus’ descent to the underworld in Socrates’ descent tothe Piraeus at the beginning of the dialogue and in the escaped prisoner’s return to thecave, episodes in which (as in Protagoras 315b–c and Meno 100a) the μgure ofSocrates is ambiguous between Odysseus and the blind seer Tiresias. In Chapter 2Christopher Rowe places the Republic in the context of Plato’s other politicalwritings, arguing persuasively for a closer continuity among them than is generallyassumed, and suggesting provocatively (but not unpersuasively) that since thenecessity for a warrior class arises from the corruption of the original ‘city of pigs’,the political system of Callipolis, as opposed to a simpler social structure based onfundamental human needs, may be not the ideal form of social organisation but aconcession to ‘fallen’ human nature. (A very similar suggestion appears at the end ofDonald Morrison’s extremely sensible discussion of Plato’s utopianism [Chapter 9]. Itis one of the most stimulating aspects of the collection that, as μts the character of thedialogue [see above], certain themes recur, treated from di¶erent viewpoints, andsometimes with divergent results, in di¶erent chapters. I discuss another instancebelow.)

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The remaining chapters deal with the principal arguments of the dialogue, togetherwith certain speciμc themes, starting with the defence of justice in Books 1 and 2,continuing through psychology, ethics and politics and the metaphysics andepistemology of Books 5–7 to conclude with the degenerate political states of Books8–9 and the leading themes of 10, the critique of imitative poetry and the myth. Sincea brief review does not allow extended discussion of such copious and diversematerial, I restrict myself to a single central issue.

Among the themes which recur in several contributions is that of the philosophers’return to the cave in Book 7. Are the guardians obliged to sacriμce their ownwell-being in taking their share of administration instead of devoting their wholeenergies to metaphysics? If they are, are they a counter-example to the central thesisof the dialogue, that justice beneμts the just person both intrinsically and in terms ofits consequences? Further, if they have to sacriμce their well-being, what motivatesthem to do so? This issue is discussed by Roslyn Weiss in the context of the defence ofjustice in Books 1–2, by Malcolm Schoμeld on the ‘Noble Lie’, by Donald Morrisonon Plato’s utopianism, and by David Sedley on the role and education of thephilosopher-rulers. Sedley alone maintains that the philosophers do not sacriμce theirwell-being, since the alternative to their accepting their share in government is, asspeciμed in Book 1 (347c–d), subjection to the rule of non-philosophers, withdisastrous consequences for the political system, and hence for their well-being. Heacknowledges (p. 281) that this provides a self-interested reason for the philosophersas a class to accept that they should rule, but not for any individual philosopher totake his or her turn, as opposed to becoming a free rider, selμshly devoting him orherself to full-time metaphysics. To avoid that possibility Sedley posits appeal to aprinciple of fair sharing of burdens. That is indeed closer to the text of 520, whichstresses, not the avoidance of the perils of rule by inferiors but the obligation of thephilosophers to replay the beneμts of their education by the polis, but thenself-interest is being subordinated to the independent claims of fairness, contrary toSedley’s thesis. Weiss accepts (p. 112) that ‘for the philosophers themselves, only thejustice argument compels … It is justice in the form of repaying a debt … thatmotivates the philosophers to rule’. To the objection that in that case justice does notpay the philosophers, contrary to the central thesis, she replies (ibid.) that it is beingjust, not acting justly, which beneμts the just person. The state of being just, i.e. ofhaving one’s soul in optimal condition, is desirable both in itself, as ‘a source of joyand pleasure to the person in that condition’ (p. 113), and for its consequences, but theconsequences, viz. just actions, ‘beneμt primarily not the agent himself but others’(ibid.). I doubt whether this ingenious suggestion μts the text; the class of thingsdesirable for their consequences, whether intrinsically desirable like health orintrinsically undesirable like medical treatment, seems to be conceived of as desirableto or for the person who has or experiences those things. Given that conception, beingjust (as described by Weiss) would be desirable in itself but (frequently) undesirablefor its consequences, which is contrary to Socrates’ view. Schoμeld and Morrisonpropose a third view; the philosopher is motivated to rule neither by considerations ofself-interest nor by the claims of abstract justice, but by patriotism. In Morrison’sversion (pp. 243–4) patriotism does not require that the philosophers’ motivation ispermeated by philosophically-based universal altruism. In Schoμeld’s the distinctionis less clear, since in his view the mechanism by which the spirit of patriotism isinculcated is an ideology including both the ‘Noble Lie’, which includes the myth ofthe universal brotherhood of the indigenous population (p. 138), and the claims ofobligation on the philosophers to repay the beneμts of their education (see above).

64 the classical review

Comparison with the similar arguments put forward by the laws in the Crito showshow closely considerations of patriotism intertwine with those of abstract justice; thecitizen must regard his city as his parents, and in virtue of that relationship he mustacknowledge an abstract obligation to obey it. This diversity of opinion amplyconμrms Morrison’s shrewd observation that ‘the great messy hairball of the issuethat is the philosopher’s return to the cave has no clear resolution without importing agreat deal that is not explicit in the text, so any answer that is put forward by itsadvocates is speculative’ (pp. 242–3).

In addition to the value of its bibliography, a volume of this kind provides asnapshot of the scholarly work being done on its subject (primarily in theAnglophone world) at the time of its publication. Its longer-term utility depends onthe value of its individual contributions, some of which are likely to enter the canonof the literature on the dialogue, while others sink without trace. I am prepared tohazard the prediction that among the contributions to this volume which will still beregularly read in twenty years’ time are those by Sedley, Nicholas Denyer on the Sunand Line (a model of lucidity, which makes illuminating use of the mathematicalbackground) and Jessica Moss on the critique of imitative poetry; the clarity andfreshness of this piece make it, in my view, one of the best discussions of this hoarytopic, and it should be on everyone’s reading list.

Corpus Christi College, Oxford C.C.W. TAYLORchristopher.taylor@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

THE SOPHIST

Ambuel (D.) Image and Paradigm in Plato’s Sophist. Pp. xviii + 279.Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2007. Cased, US$32. ISBN:978-1-930972-04-9.doi:10.1017/S0009840X08001868

A.’s book treats Plato’s Sophist in three parts. It μrst presents an analysis of the wholedialogue, although the μnal deμnition (264b–268a) is visited brie·y. Then a newtranslation is provided, followed by an appendix which examines some scholarlydiscussions (the main target is G.E.L.Owen, Plato on Not-being [1971]). Thetranslation is generally good, and its readable English will lessen the stress for readerswho μnd the dialogue full of unusual expressions and complex arguments. While it isbased on the new OCT (D. Robinson, 1995), it has the good sense, for example, toadopt the manuscripts’ reading against the emendation at 251a (p. 224, n. 211).

The whole strategy for reading the Sophist is presented at the outset (pp. xiv–xv). A.aims to establish three main points in the book: (1) the dialogue as a whole is‘aporetic’, creating a reductio ad absurdum, for its apparent conclusion derives from‘assumptions that are shown in the middle section to be untenable’; (2) the dialogue ismeant to cricitise Parmenides, whose incomplete thought leads to sophistry; (3) thedialogue indirectly argues for ‘the necessity of the ontological distinction betweenparadigm and image, the basis for the theory of participation as an account of realityand meaning’. The meaning of these claims gradually emerges as the author proceedsto analyse each argument.

However, a reader may feel ambivalent about a combination of the step-by-stepanalysis of Plato’s argument and the proposed line of reading, repeated throughoutthe book. On the one hand, the analysis seems to pay due attention to the details of

The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 1 © The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved

the classical review 65