RevisedPaper October 2013-1003 - Birkbeck Institutional...

Running Head: Inattentional Blindness, Absorption

Inattentional Blindness, Absorption, Working Memory Capacity,

and Paranormal Belief

Anne Richards

Department of Psychological Sciences

Birkbeck College

University of London

Moa Gunnarsson Hellgren, Christopher C. French

Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit

Department of Psychology

Goldsmiths College

Key words: Inattentional blindness, absorption, working memory capacity,

paranormal belief

Address correspondance to: Anne Richards, Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck

College, London University, Malet Street, London, WC1E 78HX, UK. Email:

[email protected].

2

Abstract

Two studies investigated the relationship between inattentional blindness,

paranormal belief/experience, absorption, and working memory capacity (WMC).

‘Inattentional blindness’ (IB) refers to the failure to consciously register an

unexpected visual stimulus or event when attention is diverted to a different task.

Absorption is a highly focused state where individuals are unaware of stimuli

outside of attentional focus and is linked with paranormal belief. It was predicted

that IB individuals would have higher absorption scores and be more likely to

believe in the paranormal than non-‐inattentionally blind (NIBs) individuals. In both

studies, IBs had higher absorption and paranormal belief scores than NIBs, as

predicted. In addition, Study 2 measured WMC. Although absorption predicted IB,

when WMC and paranormal belief were entered into the analysis, only WMC

predicted IB with IBs having lower WMC than NIBs. These data offer support for a

cognitive deficit account of paranormal belief.

Inattentional Blindness, Absorption 3

Inattentional Blindness, Absorption, Working Memory Capacity,

and Paranormal Belief

It is well documented that objects appearing in our visual field often go unnoticed,

and this is more likely to happen if we are busily involved in a resource-‐consuming

activity. Such a failure of attention has been called Inattentional Blindness (IB) by

Mack and Rock (1998) and is a frequent cause of errors in eyewitness testimony. IB

is demonstrated in the classic ‘Gorillas in Our Midst’ (Simons & Chabris, 1999) study

where a person in a gorilla suit is not seen by approximately half of the participants

who are engaged in counting the number of ball passes between people in white

shirts while simultaneously ignoring ball passes between people in black shirts.

More recently, Most et al. (2001, see Simons, 2003) developed an IB task in which

black and white letters bounce around a screen and participants are required to

monitor targets (white letters) but ignore distractors (black letters). An unexpected

red cross arriving on the scene often goes unnoticed.

Most, Scholl, Clifford, and Simons (2005) propose that inattentional

blindness is the converse phenomenon of attentional capture and put forward a

model based on Neisser’s (1976) ‘perceptual cycle’ conceptualization. Whether the

unexpected stimulus is noticed mainly depends on the physical characteristics of the

display (e.g., proximity and conspicuity; see Jensen, Yao, Street, & Simons, 2011;

Mack & Rock, 1998) but expectation and attentional state are also influential in

determining whether or not the unexpected item will be seen. Thus, it is generally

accepted that inattentional blindness is a consequence of both top-‐down and

bottom-‐up factors. However, differences between individuals also play a part (e.g.,

4

Clifasefi, Takarangi, & Bergman, 2006; Hannon & Richards, 2010; Memmert, 2006).

In a series of experiments, people with low working memory resources have been

found to be more likely to be inattentionally blind (Hannon & Richards, 2010;

Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010; Richards, Hannon, & Vitkovitch, 2012). We

have also observed difference in low-‐level saliency detection, with people who are

inattentionally blind being less sensitive to stimuli with low saliency levels

compared to non-‐inattentionally blind individuals (Papera, Cooper, & Richards,

2013).

Another candidate for predicting IB status is absorption which is a highly

focused attentional state in which the individual is unaware of unattended objects

or events. Susceptibility to such states can be measured as a personality trait,

indicating “the tendency to become engrossed in one’s ongoing experience” (Kerns,

Karcher, Raghavan, & Berenbaum, 2014, p. 67), using Tellegen’s Absorption Scale

(TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). We therefore predict that individuals who are IB

in a sustained attention task would score higher than others on this scale.

Moreover, absorption correlates, albeit moderately, with both paranormal

belief (Glicksohn & Barrett, 2003; Nadon & Kihlstrom, 1987; Palmer & Van Der

Velden, 1983) and reports of subjective paranormal (Glicksohn, 1990; Irwin, 1985)

and mystical experiences (Mathes, 1982; Spanos & Moretti, 1988). If IB status is

related to absorption, we might therefore predict that IB participants would have

higher paranormal belief/experience scores than non-‐inattentionally blind

participants (NIBs). Many ostensibly paranormal experiences are based upon the

fact that the ‘experiencer’ could not explain a particular event, e.g., apparently


inexplicable movement of an inanimate object. Often a mundane explanation would

plausibly solve the mystery by simply assuming that the claimant had failed to

process some aspect of the original situation (e.g., the presence of an agent to move

the object).

This is only one way in which absorption may lead to reports of ostensibly

paranormal experiences. As shown by Glicksohn and Barrett (2003), absorption is

also correlated with hallucinatory tendencies that could also account for many

ostensibly paranormal encounters. Furthermore, a growing body of evidence (for

reviews, see French, 2003; French & Wilson, 2006; French & Stone, 2014) indicates

that absorption correlates not only with paranormal belief and reports of subjective

paranormal experiences but also with susceptibility to false memories. This raises

the possibility that at least some reports of ostensibly paranormal experiences

might be based upon false memories of apparent events that in fact never took place

at all. Reality monitoring refers to the psychological processes involved in

distinguishing between mental events that are internally generated and those that

are the result of external events (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Hashtroudi, &

Lidsay, 1993). It can be seen that absorption is related to reality monitoring in both

the perceptual domain (leading to hallucinatory experiences) and the memory

domain (leading to false memories).

Believers in the paranormal tend to be poorer eyewitnesses in anomalistic

contexts than are non-‐believers and are less able to accurately report important

details of anomalous events (e.g., Wiseman & Morris, 1995). In fact, the first ever

systematic study of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony was carried out by

6

Davey in the context of a faked séance (Hodgson & Davey, 1887) and such studies

have been repeated more recently (e.g., Wiseman, Greening, & Smith 2003).

Amongst other findings, these studies show that believers in the paranormal are

more susceptible to the power of suggestion in such contexts than non-‐believers.

For example, they are more likely to report stationary objects as having moved if

such a suggestion is made by the ‘psychic’ (see also, Wiseman & Greening, 2005). It

is plausible to argue that absorption plays a dual role in such situations. First,

intense attentional focus on only certain aspects of the situation means that the true

explanation for an ostensibly paranormal event (e.g., sleight of hand) is missed.

Secondly, mental events generated via intense imagination in response to external

suggestion are confused with objectively real events. The focus of the current study

is solely on the possibility that high absorption may be related to the tendency to

miss important aspects of the external environment while concentrating on other

aspects.

Interestingly, an early demonstration of IB (although not identified as such)

took place in an anomalistic context. Cornell (1960) reports experiments in which

he dressed as a ghost in a butter muslin sheet and walked across a cinema screen

whilst the audience watched the film. Although in full view for 50 seconds, 32% of

the audience did not see the ‘apparition’. Ironically, this is one of the few situations

one could imagine where IB would make an individual less likely to report an

ostensibly paranormal event.


In this study, we take measures of both absorption and paranormal

belief/experience to see if they predict IB status. We predict that IBs would have

higher scores on both absorption and paranormal belief/experience then NIBs.

Method

Participants

A total of 98 participants were tested but 6 were excluded due to IB familiarity and

one was excluded for omitting several items on the TAS questionnaire), which left

91 participants (age range 18 to 60; mean age = 21.49 years, SD = 6.12; 74 females)

who were included in the analyses.

Stimuli & Materials

Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974): The TAS is a 34-‐item

true-‐false scale measuring openness to experience and cognitive-‐affective

alterations across a range of situations (scores range from 0 to 34). Example items

are “Sometimes I feel and experience things as I did when I was a child”, “I can be

greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language”, and “I like to watch cloud shapes

change in the sky”. The scale has been shown to be reliable and valid. For example,

Glicksohn (1991) reported reliability of r=0.80 and Glicksohn and Barrett (2003)

reported reliability of .84.

(Modified) Australian Sheep-‐Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalbourne, 2010): A modified

version of the widely used Australian Sheep-‐Goat Scale was used in this study to

measure to measure paranormal belief and experience (available at

http://www.wlv.ac.uk/PDF/sas_ASGS.pdf). This modified version had 16 rather

than 18 true-‐false items, scoring one point for every “true” response (the two items

8

relating to belief in life after death were omitted). Example items are “I have had at

least one dream that came true and which (I believe) was not just a coincidence.” As

this version did not include a “don’t know” option for responses, scores could only

range between 0 and 16. Although other versions of the ASGS have been shown to

be reliable and valid (Thalbourne, 2010) and it seems likely that scores on the

current version would correlate highly with the standard 18-‐item ASGS, no

reliability and validity data from previous studies were available for this modified

version.

Inattentional Blindness. A computerized IB task very similar to one used by Most et

al. (2001; see Simons, 2003) was employed in which black (distractor) and white

(target) letters move around the screen, frequently hitting the frame. The video (see

Figure 1) began with a still frame for 8 s in which the starting positions of the

targets and distractors were displayed.

Figure 1. Still frame from the Inattentional blindness video showing the unexpected

red cross traversing the screen.


The video began immediately following the still frame and lasted for 25 s. After 7 s

of moving letters, a red cross appeared at the right hand side of the display and

moved across the centre of the screen to the left hand side, where it disappeared 11

s later. Participants are instructed to ignore the four black letters and to silently

count the times the four white letters 'hit' the display frame.

Procedure

Participants were tested individually in a cubicle. They completed the modified-‐

ASGS and TAS followed by the computerized IB task. Participants were instructed to

silently count the total number of 'hits' (i.e., the total number of times the white

letters hit the frame on the video). At the end of the task, participants were asked

how many hits they counted and then asked whether they had seen anything in

addition to the white and black letters. Those answering 'no' were classified as IB,

and those answering 'yes, a red cross' were classified as NIB. At the end of the study,

participants were fully debriefed.

Results

Of the 91 participants, 39 (43%) were inattentionally blind (IB) to the red stimulus

whereas the remainder were non-‐inattentionally blind (NIB). All participants

correctly identified the number of hits (plus or minus 2) in the primary IB task.

IBs had higher absorption scores and higher modified-‐ASGS scores (see

Table 1).

10

Inattentionally Blind N = 39

(9 males)

Not Inattentionally

Blind N = 52

(8 males)

t(89) CI95 (Cohen d)

Age 21.59 (3.73)

21.42 (7.46)

0.13

TAS (Total) 20.23 (4.69)

13.62 (5.25)

6.22** 4.5, 8.7 (1.34)

TAS (Paranormal Belief items removed)

18.31 (4.50)

12.40 (4.66)

6.07** 4.0, 7.8 (1.28)

Modified ASGS (Paranormal Scale)

5.64 (3.04)

3.46 (2.80)

3.50** 1.0, 3.4 (0.75)

Table 1. Characteristics of the Inattentionally Blind and Non-‐Inattentionally Blind

Groups for Study 1 (SDs in parentheses). ** p=<.001

These results support both of our hypotheses. A logistic regression analysis was

performed with IB (IB coded as 1 and NIB as 0) as the DV and TAS, modified-‐ASGS

scores, age and gender of participant (female coded as 1 and male as 0) as IVs (see

Table 2).


Predictor β (Se) Wald χ2

p Odds Ratio Exp(B)

95% C.I. for Odds Ratio

Lower Upper TAS (Absorption)

0.24 (0.06) 15.51 <.001 1.27 1.13 1.43

Modified-‐ASGS (Paranormal Belief)

0.12 (0.09) 1.78 ns 1.13 0.94 1.35

Age

0.03 (0.04) 0.52 ns 1.03 0.95 1.12

Gender

-‐0.08 (0.70) 0.01 ns 0.93 0.24 3.64

Table 2. Logistic Regression Predicting Inattentional Blindness from Absorption

(TAS scale), paranormal Belief (modified-‐ASGS), Age and Gender.

The overall model was significant (Model = χ2(4) = 34.15, p<.001), but only

absorption predicted inattentional blindness. A one-‐point increase in absorption

results in a 1.27 unit change in the odds of being classified as IB. A mediation

analysis revealed that the association between paranormal belief and inattentional

blindness status was mediated by absorption (Sobel test = 3.45, SE = .01, p <.001)

whereas the direct association between absorption and inattentional blindness

status was not mediated by paranormal belief (Sobel = 1.26, SE = .004, p=.21).

Finally, there was a significant relationship between paranormal belief

(modified ASGS) and absorption (TAS), r = 0.44, p<.001, replicating an association

reported by previous investigators using the 18-‐item version of the ASGS (e.g.,

French, Santomauro, Hamilton, Fox, & Thalbourne, 2008; Thalbourne, 1998;

12

Thalbourne, Bartemucci, Delin, Fox, & Nofi, 1997). One concern was that that this

correlation may be inflated due to overlapping items in the two scales, with the TAS

containing some items that clearly tap into paranormal belief/experience (e.g., “At

times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there.”). To

address this, the overlapping items were removed from the TAS scores and the

analyses performed again. There was no reduction in the prediction of inattentional

blindness with the revised absorption scale (Wald statistic = 15.08, Exp(B) = 1.29).

As expected, none of the other variables were significant predictors (all Wald

statistics < 2.64). The revised TAS scale significantly correlated with the modified

ASGS (r = 0.40, p<.001).

Discussion

IBs scored higher on absorption than NIBs. Furthermore, IBs had higher paranormal

belief/experience scores than NIBs, supporting the suggestion that IB may be a

factor in explaining some ostensibly paranormal experiences. However, when both

absorption and paranormal belief/experience were entered into the regression,

only absorption significantly predicted IB status. In addition, the mediation analysis

confirmed an indirect relationship between paranormal belief and inattentional

blindness via absorption. As predicted, absorption and paranormal

belief/experience were correlated. However, when the items relating to paranormal

belief were removed from the TAS, there was no reduction in the predictive power

of this construct and paranormal belief did not predict IB status.

These results are important as they are possibly the first to demonstrate a

significant association between a personality trait (absorption) and susceptibility to


IB. To check the replicability of these findings using the standard ASGS form, a

second study was undertaken. Furthermore, Study 2 examined a possible

underlying cognitive factor that might lead to both IB and absorption (and,

indirectly, to higher levels of paranormal belief/experience).

Research has shown that low working memory capacity (WMC) is associated

with IB (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010; Richards,

Hannon, & Vitkovitch, 2012; Seegmiller, Watson, & Strayer, 2011). High WMC is

associated with enhanced performance on central executive functioning tasks

(Conway & Eagle, 1994; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and with effectively allocating

attentional resources (Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003). There is

evidence that operation span is highly correlated with measures of fluid intelligence

(e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Salthouse & Pink, 2008; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle,

2005). This suggests that individuals with low compared to high WMC need to

devote a higher proportion of their cognitive resources to the primary task thus

resulting in fewer resources being available to notice task-‐irrelevant stimuli.

Study 2 was a direct replication of Study 1 except that (a) WMC was assessed

and (b) the standard 18-‐item true-‐false version of the ASGS was used. This version

of the ASGS is known to be reliable and valid (Thalbourne, 2010). In addition to the

hypotheses of Study 1, it was also hypothesised that IBs and NIBs would differ in

terms of WMC. We will examine the relationship between WMC, absorption, and

paranormal belief in the context of the “cognitive deficits hypothesis” (Irwin, 2009),

i.e., the notion that at least some aspects of paranormal belief/experience can be

explained in terms of cognitive deficits on the part of believers.

14

Study 2

Method

Participants

A total 70 participants were tested but 4 were excluded due to familiarity with IB

research, leaving 66 participants (age range 18 to 44; mean age = 23.02; 31 females).

Stimuli & Materials

Materials were identical to those in Study 1 except that (a) the standard 18-‐item

True/don’t know/False version of the ASGS was administered (True = 2 points;

don’t know = 1 point; False = no points) with a theoretical range of scores from zero

to 36 and (b) WMC was measured with the widely used Automated Operation Span

Task (AOSPAN; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).

Automated Operation Span Task (AOSPAN): This task measures working memory

capacity (WMC). Participants complete, as quickly as possible, a series of arithmetic

problems. Participants solve each problem and then click the mouse. An answer is

presented on the screen and the participant decides if the solution is true or false by

clicking the appropriate box. Each problem is followed by a letter that is recalled at a

later stage. At the end of each trial (comprising between 3 and 7 problems), a 4 x 3

matrix of letters (F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, Y) is presented and participants click a

box next to the appropriate letter in the exact order that the letters had appeared.

Accuracy feedback is given. There are three practice blocks to train the participant

and to calculate average solution time for the arithmetic problems. This average

time (plus 2.5 SD) is then used as the time limit for the arithmetic portion of the task.


The test phase of the AOSPAN comprised set sizes of 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 items,

each of which were presented 3 times. This gave a total of 75 trials with scores

therefore ranging from 0 to 75. The absolute AOSPAN score is calculated by adding

the number of items that were reported in the correct order whereas the total score

would be how many items were correctly reported without regard to their serial

position (e.g., if someone correctly recorded all items in the correct position for all

sets except the 3 sets with 7 items, then their score would be 54; if the 7-‐item sets

had been recalled correctly but in the wrong order, then the total score would be

75). This test has been shown to have good test re-‐test reliability and internal

validity (alphas = 0.83 and 0.78, respectively; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle,

2005).

Procedure

The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that for Study 1 except that participants

additionally performed the AOSPAN task after completing the TAS and then

completed the standard ASGS before performing the IB task.

Results

Of the 66 participants, 32 (48%) were IB to the red stimulus and the remaining

participants were NIB. All participants correctly (plus or minus 2) reported the

number of target hits in the primary task.

Consistent with Study 1, IBs had higher absorption and higher ASGS scores

than the NIBs. However, they had lower AOSPAN (see Table 3).

16

Inattentionally Blind N = 32

(14 males)

Not Inattentionally

Blind N = 34

(21 males)

t(64) CI95 (Cohen d)

Age 22.63 (4.67)

23.38 (5.04)

0.63

AOSPAN (Working Memory)

39.50 (10.39)

52.03 (11.67)

4.60** 7.1, 17.97 (1.13)

TAS (Absorption)

20.97 (6.69)

14.97 (6.48)

3.70** 2.8, 9.2, 7.8 (0.83)

ASGS (Paranormal Belief)

13.09 (6.74)

8.21 (4.85)

3.40** 2.0, 7.8 (1.34)

Table 3. Characteristics of the Inattentionally Blind and Non-‐Inattentionally Blind

Groups for Study 2 (SDs in parentheses). ** p=<.001.

Both effects reported in Study 1 were replicated and the finding of a significant

difference in AOSPAN scores between IBs and NIBs in previous research was

confirmed.

As planned, a hierarchical logistic regression analysis with IB as the DV and

TAS, ASGS and AOSPAN as IVs was performed. To confirm the findings in Study 1,

TAS was entered on the first step and ASGS and AOSPAN added on the second step

(see Table 4).


Predictor β (Se) Wald χ2

p Odds Ratio Exp(B)

95% C.I. for Odds Ratio

Step 1 Lower Upper TAS (Absorption)

0.14 (0.04) 10.00 .002 1.15 1.05 1.23

Step 2 TAS (Absorption)

0.01 (0.07) 0.43 ns 1.10 0.89 1.15

ASGS (Paranormal Belief)

0.10 (0.07) 1.89 ns 1.11 0.96 1.28

AOSPAN (Working Memory)

-‐0.09 (0.03) 7.86 .005 0.91 0.86 0.97

Table 4. Hierarchical Logistic Regression, with Absorption entered on the first step

and Paranromal Belief and Absorption added on the second step .

When TAS was entered on its own, it was a significant predictor of IB (Model = χ2(2)

= 12.50, p<.001; Wald statistic = 10.00, p=.004, B = -‐.14, Exp(B) = 0.87, CI95 = 0.80,

0.95). However, when AOSPAN and ASGS were then added the overall model was

again significant (Model = χ2(3) = 23.67, p<.001) but only AOSPAN predicted IB

status (Wald statistic = 7.86, p = .005, B = -‐.09, Exp(B) = 1.09, CI95 = 1.03, 1.17) and

both TAS and ASGS were non-‐significant (Wald statistics of 0.04 and 1.89,

respectively, ps>.16).

A mediation analysis was performed in which the association between

paranormal belief and inattentional blindness status was significantly mediated by

working memory capacity (Sobel test = 2.04, SE = 0.03, p =.042). In addition, there

18

was no mediating effect of paranormal belief on the direct predicting effect of

working memory capacity on inattentional blindness status (Sobel test = -‐1.66, SE =

0.01, p=.10). Likewise, working memory capacity mediated the relationship

between absorption and inattentional blindness (Sobel test = 2.33, SE = .03, p =.019)

but there was no converse mediation by absorption on the direct effect of working

memory capacity on inattentional blindness status (Sobel test = -‐1.55, SE = 0.01,

p=.12).

Finally, significant correlations were found between paranormal belief and

absorption (r = .74, p<.001), between absorption and AOSPAN (r = -‐.41, p<.001), and

between paranormal belief and AOSPAN (r = -‐.32, p=.008).

Discussion

The incidence of IB was comparable to that of Study 1. Consistent with Study

1, IBs had stronger paranormal belief and higher absorption scores than NIBs. There

was also an inverse relationship between paranormal belief and WMC, suggesting

that paranormal belief is associated with a reduction in working memory resources

relative to the participant with higher working memory resources in the sample.

Although absorption predicted IB when entered into the logistic regression alone,

WMC underlies this relationship with absorption failing to contribute significantly

to the prediction when WMC is included.

The working memory capacity scores for the IBs and NIBs are similar to

those produced in similar studies (e.g., Richards, Hannon, & Derakshan, 2010, with

AOSPAN scores of 44.68 and 55.41 for IBs and NIBs respectively (N=82)). In

addition, the mean AOSPAN score for the IB group is smaller than the mean AOSPAN


score in many published studies. For example, Shelton, Elliott, Hill, Calamia, and

Gouvier (2009) reported an average AOSPAN score of 44.15 (N = 174, SD = 15.54)

and Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-‐Ward, and Watson (2013) reported a mean of

44 (N=277, SD = 16). Our IB participants had significantly lower AOSPAN scores

than Shelton et al. (t-‐difference = -‐2.13, mean difference = -‐4.65, CI95 = -‐9.30, 0.01)

and Sanbonmatsu et al. (t-‐difference = -‐2.17, mean difference = -‐4.50, CI95 = -‐8.93, -‐

0.37). Conversely, the average AOSPAN score for our NIB group (52.03) was

significantly higher than the mean reported by both Shelton et al. (t-‐difference = 3.39,

mean difference = 7.88, CI95 = 3.33, 12.43) and Sanbonmatsu et al. (t-‐difference =

3.62, mean difference = 8.03, CI95 = 3.68, 12.38). These comparisons suggest that

performance on the AOSPAN for the IB group was significantly lower than average

and is indicative of a cognitive deficit explanation of inattentional blindness and,

indirectly, of paranormal belief. However, it should be noted that the mean AOSPAN

scores for the IB group was not lower than the mean of 39.16 (N = 252) as reported

by Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock and Engle (2005).

Working memory capacity appears to be associated with inattentional

blindness but it is clear from other studies that there are additional factors at work.

For example, people with high working memory capacity may be inattentionally

blind and this cannot be explained by a reduction in working memory resources.

One possibility is that the status of the unexpected stimulus in the standard

inattentional blindness task is ambiguous and it is not clear whether the more

efficient performer should process it and remember it or process it and forget it.

Some of our recent work has manipulated the relevancy of the unexpected change

20

and shown that when the unexpected change is relevant to the task then people

with high working memory capacity are more likely to report having seen it

whereas when the unexpected change is irrelevant to the goal of the task,

individuals with high working memory are actually less likely to report having

noticed it (Richards, Hannon, Iqbal Vohra, & Golan, 2013).

Given the facts that susceptibility to IB has been shown to be related to WMC

in this and several previous studies (e.g., Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards et al.,

2010, 2012; Seegmiller et al., 2011) and that WMC is highly correlated with fluid

intelligence (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Salthouse & Pink, 2008; Unsworth et al., 2005),

it would be interesting in future IB studies to include direct measures of fluid

intelligence. Furthermore, this pattern of findings might suggest that paranormal

belief/experience is strongly related to fluid intelligence. Although a few studies

(e.g., Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Smith, Foster, & Stovin, 1998) have reported results

consistent with this possibility, other studies have failed to do so (e.g., Jones, Russell,

& Nickel, 1977; Stuart-‐Hamilton, Nayak, & Priest, 2006). In general, it appears that

there is at present little strong support for such a direct link between intelligence

and paranormal belief (French & Stone, 2014; Irwin, 2009) although there is a

paucity of research into this basic issue.

There are, of course, inherent limitations in correlational research, as it is not

possible to determine causality. In the current research, we have measured

personality traits and cognitive performance without any attempt at manipulation.

This restricts the conclusions that can be drawn and it is thus not possible to


definitively conclude that having a low working memory score leads to either

inattentional blindness or, indirectly, to a propensity to believe in paranormal

phenomenon. Having said that, such an account is inherently plausible

General Discussion

In two studies, higher absorption and paranormal belief were associated with the

failure to notice an unexpected stimulus appearing in the visual field. Both studies

showed that absorption was important in predicting IB, suggesting that the effect is

replicable. The IBs scored more highly than NIBs on paranormal belief/experience,

supporting the suggestion that IB may sometimes be a factor in reports of ostensibly

paranormal experiences. The reported findings are particularly noteworthy as they

are arguably the first to demonstrate a link between susceptibility to IB and a

personality variable (i.e., absorption).

Study 2 confirmed and extended the findings of Study 1 and confirmed

previous findings (Hannon & Richards, 2010; Richards et al., 2010, 2012) indicating

that low WMC is a determining factor in producing IB. We have demonstrated that

although belief in the paranormal is associated with high absorption, there is an

underlying cognitive deficit in WMC. Low WMC may render the individual

effectively blind to events that are causally related to an ostensibly paranormal

encounter because only a limited amount of information from the environment is

attended to and fully processed. The failure to perceive and remember causally

connecting events, such as someone moving an object from one location to another,

may encourage a paranormal interpretation. Alternatively, absorption may be

22

linked to paranormal belief and reports of ostensibly paranormal experiences via

other routes, such as the association between absorption and hallucinatory

tendencies on the one hand and that between absorption and susceptibility to false

memories on the other. Future research should attempt to distinguish between

these various possibilities.

The present research did not record race and ethnicity data, and therefore the

generalizability of the current findings are somewhat limited. Future research

should ensure that full demographic details are recorded. In addition, the current

research is limited by the possible influence of contextual factors. The

questionnaires were administered together in one experimental session, which

increases the possibility of inflating the correlations between the various measures

(Council, 1993; Council, Kirsch, & Hainer, 1986). These potential context effects

should be avoided in future research by administering the key questionnaires in

independent experimental contexts. This procedure would reduce the likelihood

that participants will become aware of the possible connections between the

different measures. The current research should be performed under conditions

where context effects have been controlled to assess the generalizability of the

findings.

References

Bleckley, M. K., Durso, F. T., Crutchfield, J. M., Engle, R. W., & Khanna, M. M. (2003).

Individual differences in working memory capacity predict visual attentional

allocation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 884-‐889.


Clifasefi, S. L., Takarangi, M. K. T., & Bergman, J. S. (2006). Blind drunk: The effects of

alcohol on inattentional blindness. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 697-‐704.

Conway, A. R. A., & Engle, R. W. (1994). Working memory and retrieval: a resource-‐

dependent inhibition model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123,

354-‐373.

Conway, A. R. A., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M.F., Hambrick, D.Z., Wilhelm, O., & Engle, R. W.

(2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user’s

guide. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 769–786.

Cornell, A. D. (1960). Further experiments in apparitional observation. Journal of the

Society for Psychical Research, 409-‐418.

Council, J. R. (1993). Context effects in personality research. Current Directions in

Psychological Science, 2, 31-‐34.

Council, J. R., Kirsch, I., & Hainer, L. P. (1986). Expectancy versus absorption in the

prediction of hypnotic responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,

50, 182-‐189.

Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P.A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory

and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 450-‐466

French, C. C. (2003). Fantastic memories: The relevance of research into eyewitness

testimony and false memories for reports of anomalous experiences. Journal of

Consciousness Studies, 10, 153-‐174.

French, C. C., Santamauro, J., Hamilton, V., Fox, R., & Thalbourne, M. A. (2008).

Psychological aspects of the alien contact experience. Cortex, 44, 1387-1395.

24

French, C. C., & Stone, A. (2014). Anomalistic psychology: Exploring paranormal belief

and experience. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

French, C. C., & Wilson, K. (2006). Incredible memories: How accurate are reports of

anomalous events? European Journal of Parapsychology, 21, 166-‐181.

Glicksohn, J. (1990). Belief in the paranormal and subjective paranormal experience.

Personality and Individual Differences, 11, 675-‐683.

Glicksohn, J. (1991). Cutting the ‘Gordonian Knot’ using absorption and dream recall.

Journal of Mental Imagery, 15, 49-‐54.

Glicksohn, J., & Barrett, T. R. (2003). Absorption and hallucinatory experience. Applied

Cognitive Psychology, 17, 833-849.

Hannon, E. M., & Richards, A. (2010). Is inattentional blindness related to individual

differences in visual working memory capacity or executive functioning?

Perception, 39, 309-‐319.

Hodgson, R., & Davey, S. J. (1887). The possibilities of malobservation and lapse of

memory from a practical point of view. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical

Research, 4, 381-‐404.

Irwin, H. J. (1985). Parapsychological phenomena and the absorption domain.

Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 79, 1-‐11.

Irwin, H. J. (2009). The psychology of paranormal belief: A researcher’s handbook.

Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press.

Jensen, M. S., Yao, R., Street, W. N., & Simons, D. J. (2011). Change blindness and

inattentional blindness. Cognitive Science, 2, 529-‐546.


Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.

Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3-‐28.

Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 67-‐

85.

Jones, W. H., Russell, D. W., & Nickel, T. W. (1977). Belief in the Paranormal Scale: An

objective instrument to measure belief in magical phenomena and causes.

Journal Supplement Abstract Service, Catalog of Selected Documents in

Psychology, 7, 100 (MS 1577).

Kerns, J. G., Karcher, N., Raghavan, C., & Berenbaum, H. (2014). Anomalous

experiences, peculiarity, and psychopathology. In E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynn, & S.

Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientific

evidence 2nd ed. (pp. 57-‐76). Washington, DC: American Psychological

Association.

Mack, A., & Rock, I. (1998). Inattentional blindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mathes, E. W. (1982). Mystical experiences, romantic love and hypnotic

susceptibility. Psychological Reports, 50, 701-‐702.

Memmert, D. (2006). The effects of eye movements, age, and expertise on

inattentional blindness. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 620-‐627.

Most, S. B., Scholl, B. J., Clifford, E. R., & Simons, D. J. (2005). What you see is what

you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness.

Psychological Review, 112, 217-‐242.

26

Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., Jimenez, R., Clifford, E., & Chabris, C. F. (2001).

How not to be seen: The contribution of similarity and selective ignoring to

sustained inattentional blindness. Psychological Science, 12, 9–17.

Musch, J., & Ehrenberg, K. (2002). Probability misjudgement, cognitive ability, and

belief in the paranormal. British Journal of Psychology, 93, 169-‐177.

Nadon, R., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). Hypnosis, psi, and the psychology of paranormal

experience. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 10, 597-‐599.

Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive

psychology. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

Palmer, J., & Van Der Velden, I. (1983). ESP and ‘hypnotic imagination’: A group free-‐

response study’. European Journal of Parapsychology, 4, 413-‐434.

Papera, M., Cooper, R., & Richards, A. (2013). Artificially created stimuli produced by

a genetic algorithm using a saliency model as its fitness function show that

Inattentional Blindness modulates performance in a pop-‐out visual search

paradigm. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Richards, A., Hannon, E. M., & Derakshan, N. (2010). Predicting and manipulating the

incidence of inattentional blindness. Psychological Research, 74, 513-‐523.

Richards, A., Hannon, E. M., & Vitkovitch, M. (2012). Distracted by distractors: eye

movements in an inattentional blindness task. Consciousness and Cognition, 21

170-‐176.

Richards, A., Hannon, E., Iqbal Vohra, S., & Golan, J. (2013). Tales of the unexpected:

goal-relevance and change awareness and inattentional blindness. Manuscript

submitted for publication.


Salthouse, T. A., & Pink, J. E. (2008). Why is working memory related to fluid

intelligence? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 364-‐371.

Seegmiller, J. K., Watson, J. L., & Strayer, D. M. (2011). Individual differences in

susceptibility to inattentional blindness. Journal of Experimental Psychology,

Learning, Memory and Cognition, 37, 785-‐791.

Shelton, J. T, Elliott, E. M., Hill, B. D., Calamia, M. R., & Gouvier, W. D. (2009). A

comparison of laboratory and clinical working memory tests and their

prediction of fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 37, 283-‐293.

Simons, D. J. (2003). Surprising studies of visual awareness (DVD). Champaign, IL:

Viscog Productions. http://www.viscog.com.

Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999). Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional

blindness for dynamic events. Perception, 28, 1059-‐1074.

Spanos, N. P., & Moretti, P. (1988). Correlates of mystical and diabolical experiences

in a sample of female university students. Journal for the Scientific Study of

Religion, 27, 105–116.

Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Strayer, D. L., Medeiros-‐Ward, N., & Watson, J. M. (2013). Who

multi-‐tasks and why? Multi-‐tasking ability, perceived multi-‐tasking ability,

impulsivity, and sensation seeking. PLOS ONE, 8, e54402.

Smith, M. D., Foster, C. L., & Stovin, G. (1998). Intelligence and paranormal belief:

Examining the role of context. Journal of Parapsychology, 62, 65-‐77.

Stuart-‐Hamilton, I., Nayak, L., & Priest, L. (2006). Intelligence, belief in the

paranormal, knowledge of probability and aging. Educational Gerontology, 32,

173-‐184.

28

Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974). Openness to absorbing and self-‐altering

experiences (“absorption”), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of

Abnormal Psychology, 83, 268-‐277.

Thalbourne, M. A. (1998). Transliminality: Further correlates and a short measure.

Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 92, 402-‐419.

Thalbourne, M. A. (2010). The Australian Sheep-‐Goat Scale: Development and

empirical findings. Australian Journal of Parapsychology, 10, 5-‐39.

Thalbourne, M. A., Bartemucci, L., Delin, P. S., Fox, B., & Nofi, O. (1997).

Transliminality: Its nature and correlates. Journal of the American Society for

Psychical Research, 91, 305-‐331.

Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An automated version

of the operation span task. Behaviour Research Methods 37, 498-‐505.

Wiseman, R., & Greening, E. (2005). “It’s still bending”: Verbal suggestion and

alleged psychokinetic ability. British Journal of Psychology, 96, 115-‐127.

Wiseman, R., Greening, E., & Smith, M. (2003). Belief in the paranormal and

suggestion in the seance room. British Journal of Psychology, 94, 285-‐297.

Wiseman, R., & Morris, R. L. (1995). Recalling pseudo-‐psychic demonstrations,

British Journal of Psychology, 86, 113–125.

All authors developed the studies, designed the experiments and analysed the data.

A.R. and C.C.F. wrote the article. M.G.H. collected data. All authors approved the final

version of manuscript for submission.

30

Notes

Anne Richards, Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, London University, Malet

Street, London, WC1E 78HX, UK. Email: [email protected].

Christopher C French and Moa Gunnarsson Hellgren,

Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit, Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths,

University of London, New Cross, London, SE14 6NW, UK.

Thanks to Lauren McKeown for collecting the data for Study 2.

These findings were presented at the Society for Psychical Research Annual

Conference, University of Sheffield, 10-‐12 September 2010.

RevisedPaper October 2013-1003 - Birkbeck Institutional...

Documents

Transcript of RevisedPaper October 2013-1003 - Birkbeck Institutional...