Reviewer Legal Writing

7/29/2019 Reviewer Legal Writing

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Republic of the PhilippinesSixth Judicial Region

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Branch___Roxas City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CIVIL CASE NO._______Plaintiff, FOR:

RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE- versus -

TITO CRUZ AND VIC CRUZ,

Accused.x-----------------------------------------------x

PRE-TRIAL BRIEF OF THE PROSECUTION

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, through the undersigned City

Prosecutor, before this Honorable Court, most respectfully submit this Pre-Trial

Brief:

SUMMARY OF ADMITTED FACTS

AND PROPOSED STIPULATION OF FACTS

The following are the admitted facts:

1. the identities of those charged in the information and that of thepersons arraigned are one and the same;

2. the identity of Joey Cruz, the victim;

3. the killing of the victim;

4. the date and places of the commission of the crime.

EVIDENCE FOR MARKINGS

1. Affidavit of the cashier Geraldine Demetri

Purpose: to prove that she was on-duty when the robbery took place and that

one of the accused pointed a gun at her, who eventually declared hold-up while

the other emptied the cash registers and took some grocery stuffs;

2. Affidavit of customer Bea Robles

Purpose: to prove that she was one of the customers at the time the robbery

took place and that she saw and identified the accused by their faces;

3. Affidavit of customer Paris Michaels

Purpose: to corroborate the testimonies of Geraldine Demetri and Bea Robles;

3. Autopsy Report of Joey Cruz issued by Iloilo Mission Hospital

Purpose: to prove the extent of the injury and the cause of death of the victim;

4. Blotter Report of Jaro Police Station (ICP-PP3)

Purpose: to prove that the police authority received a report that a robbery took

place at Iloilo Supermart, located at Tabuk Suba, Jaro, Iloilo City.

5. Affidavit of Romeo V. Benamarca


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Purpose: To prove that he personally heard a gun shot from an abandoned rice

mill and actually saw the accused holding a gun and the dead body of the

deceased which subsequently followed the arrest of the accused.

6. Paraffin test result

Purpose: To prove that accused became positive of gun powder burns.

7. Anatomical Sketch

Purpose: To prove which part of the victims body was shot and the nature,

extent and location of wound.

8. Ballistics Test result

Purpose: To prove that the slug recovered from the victims body came from the

same gun which was recovered from the possession of Tito Cruz.

9. Fired Shell

10. Three live ammunitions

11. .45 caliber pistol

I S S U E S

1. Whether or not the accused committed the crime charged;

2. Whether or not they were guilty thereof.

W I T N E S S E S

1. Geraldine Demetri to testify that a robbery took place;

2. Bea Robles to testify that she was one of the customers of the Iloilo

Supermart at the time the robbery took place;

3. Paris Michaels to testify that she was one of the customers of Iloilo

Supemart at the time the robbery took place.

4. Romeo V. Benamarca to testify that he was the police officer who went

to the scene of the crime and arrested the accused.

5. Dra. Isabel Cenon to testify that she conducted the post mortem

examination of Joey Cruz and to attest to the veracity of her findings in the

autopsy report.

6. Police Senior Inspector Anthony Villar to testify that he conducted the

ballistics examination and to attest to the veracity of his findings in the said

report.

7. Chemist Dionisia Paqui to testify that she conducted a paraffin test to

the accused and to attest to the veracity of her findings in the said report.

T RIAL DATES

Specifically all Fridays of the month, with the regular appearance of theundersigned city prosecutors before this Honorable Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Iloilo City, Iloilo, Philippines, July 4, 2008.


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ILOILO CITY PROSECUTORS OFFICERamon Q. Avancea Hall of Justice

Bonifacio Drive,Iloilo City

By:

JOHN FRED C. HALLARESAssistant City ProsecutorRoll No. 67890 / 5-2-07

IBP. No. 667899 / 12-29-07MCLE ExemptPTR Exempt

And

JASIE ANN MAGHOPOYAssistant City ProsecutorRoll No. 67891 / 5-2-07

IBP No. 667900 / 12-29-07MCLE ExemptPTR Exempt

Copy furnished:

ATTY. KENETH P. TUPAS

Counsel for the Defense

Room 200, New Valentine Bldg.Central Philippine UniversityLopez Jaena St., Jaro, Iloilo City

Received by:___________Date: ___________


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila City

JUANA DELA CRUZ,

Defendant-Petitioner,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345For: Ejectment

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff-Respondent.x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM

COME NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the undersigned counsel, unto

this Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully submit and present this Memorandum in the

above-titled case and aver that:

THE PARTIES

1. Plaintiff-Respondent Jane Doe is of legal age, single, and residing on 1010 GinooBoulevard, Pasay City, where she may be served with legal processes and notices issued by

this Honorable Court;

2. Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and residing on 123 Binibini

Street, Quezon City, and may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices

thereto.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectmentdated February 7, 2008 against Defendant-Petitioner;

2. On December 22, 2008, an Answer dated December 15, 2008 was filed by theDefendant-Petitioner;

3. On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of Metropolitan TrialCourt of Pasay City in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent;


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4. On August 6, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration filed July 5, 2009 by Defendant-

Petitioner through legal counsel was denied by Judge Lorenzo Menzon of Branch 10 of the

Regional Trial Court Pasay City;

5. On September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September 9, 2009 was filed to

the Court of Appeals by Defendant-Petitioner;

6. On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel filed a Comment dated

April 19, 2010;

7. On May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the Judicial Records Division

(JRD) no Reply was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;

8. On May 21, 2010, a Resolution was rendered by the Court of Appeals denying

Defendant-Petitioners Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO);

9. Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit theirrespective Memoranda fifteen (15) days from notice, otherwise regardless whether or not

Memoranda were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision;

Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

10. Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay

be returned to her possession, but due to Defendant-Petitioners occupancy thereat, theformer cannot claim possession which left her with the option of residing at 1010 Ginoo

Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-Respondent is the registered

owner of the land subject under TCT No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Theproperty was sold to them by the now deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo and

Marcela del Pilar;

11. Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged lessee of the original owners ofthe land since September 1955. They had repeatedly assailed the verbal contract of lease for

more than 50 years;

12. Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately the land for it was previously

subject to a pending legal proceeding and that there was still no urgent necessity of using and

occupying it. When the event came that Plaintiff-Respondent was able to enforce her rightover the land, Defendant-Petitioner, despite earnest and peaceful efforts of the Plaintiff-

Respondent still refused to vacate the land. This led her to seek help from the Barangay

officials for mediation and/or conciliation in accordance with law. However, the Defendant-

Petitioner still persistently occupied the land without heed to the serious and constantdemand of the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an agreement;

13. Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land attributed to the obstinaterefusal of the Defendant-Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled to hire the services

of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of ejection under the wings of the courts of

law.

III. ISSUES OF THE CASE


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A.) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ACTED

CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON

THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT

HAD RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D.

2016, APD 1-12 PASAY CITY;

B.) WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE

BONA FIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL THE PRIVILEGES AND

BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517;

C.) WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS

FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO

THE LIST OF THE STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENT

AND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES

AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.

IV. ARGUMENTS

A.) The court committed no error in deciding that an unlawful detainer action be

enforced upon herein Defendant-Petitioner despite the assailed contention of the

former under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.

B.) There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful detainer to avail the benefits

and privileges provided by Section 6 P.D. 1517 provided it is applicable.

C.) The determination of the scope and limitation of Areas for Priority Development

shall be based on the list of specific areas prescribed by the proclamation.

V. DISCUSSION

A.) It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent is the bona fide owner of

the parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No, 12345 of theRegister of Deeds of Pasay City. In the Philippines, the presentation of a valid certificate of

title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the person whose name thecertificate of title is entitled to.

Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it provides that the

original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under thesignature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is

situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received

as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to allmatters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act.

Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a certificate of title in provingvalid ownership of a land. In the decision of the case ofSpouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel,

the ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance of a valid certificate of title in

claiming ownership over a land. It was held that in the recent case ofUmpoc v. Mercado,the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT

in the name of the decedent vis--vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later


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inArambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the

property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a

Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for this argument. It was

stated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and the questionability ofthe title is immaterial in an ejectment suit. Futhermore, Article 428 of the New Civil Code

enumerates the rights of an owner. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,

without other limitations other than those established by law. The owner has right of actionagainst the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT

No. 12345 which is registered in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City entitles Petitioner-Respondent the right to exercise the aforementioned rights, specifically, in this instant case,

the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover the land.

The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease agreement they had madewith the now deceased original owners Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilar for over 50 years shall

entitle them to the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016 (Annex A and B,respectively) is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6 of P.D. 1517 grants lessees the

right of first refusal before they may be ejected from a land, but this is only feasible under

certain conditions. It is an indispensable qualification that the land is included in the list ofAreas for Priority Development (APD) before an owner can be granted of the right of first

refusal. The land subject of this case is clearly not included in the specific areas enumerated

in the list of APD. To reiterate the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. CV 12345:

Insofar as the property in litigation, appellant Jane Doe is, consequently, correct in objectingto appellees exercise of the right of first refusal granted under Section 6 of Presidential

Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not included in the areas for priority development

specifically identified under Proclamation No. 1967 indicates that appellee have no cause ofaction for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and preliminary injunction against appellants.

B.) The Plaintiff-Respondents argument in this issue is intimately connected with thepreceding argument. Defendant-Petitioner vigorously assails that there is no bar to the

availability of the privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lessee whenever there is an

unlawful detainer action. It is however true. But this is subject to circumstances that may

qualify a lessee to the privileges and benefits under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as theright of first refusal. Unfortunately, the land possessed by the Defendant-Petitioner does not

fall under the ambit of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517. Therefore, the Defendant-Petitioner has

no cause of action in this issue.

C.) The third issue questions the coverage of the APD prescribed by the proclamation,

whether or not it refers to the list of streets subject to the Zonal Development or to the areasincluded in the delineation of the metes and bounds indicated.

Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision of the Court of Appeals

that in the List of Areas for Priority Development (APDs), labeled as the South Sector ofPasay City, the area for priority development was defined as Tramo Lines along Barangays

San Isidro, San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was thereafter specifically enumerated the list of

covered sub-areas (please refer to Annex C for diagram) which are the following: 1) F.Victor, 2) Ventanilla Street, c) Juan Luna Street, d) D. Jorge Street, e) Viscarra Street, f)

Conchita Street, g) Dolores Street, h) Leonardo Street, i) Alvarez Street, j) Basilio Street, k)

Rodriguez Street, and i) Villa Barbara. There is consequently no gainsaying the fact thatwith its Binibini Street location, the property in litigation is not included among the sites

identified as Areas for Priority Development in Pasay City.The mere fact that the list does

not include Binibini Street necessarily implies that it is deemed excluded from it.


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Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a profound analysis of Section 6

of P.D. 1517 (as found in Annex A of this Memorandum) based on statutory construction:

We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, before a preemptive

right can be exercised, the disputed land should be situated in an area declared to beboth an APD and a ULRZ.

An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section 6, PD 1517, as follows:

Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban

Zones[,] legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years ormore [,] who have built their homes on the land[,] and residents who have

legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten yearsshall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first

refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable

prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone

Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 ofthis Decree.

Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones wherein this preemptiveright could be availed ofviz.:

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11 September 1979,

pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1517, declaring the entire MetropolitanManila area as Urban Land Reform Zone.

WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to identify specific sites

covered by urban land reform in Metropolitan Manila for purposes of makingspecific the applicability of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No.

935.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution andexisting laws, and in relation to Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire

Metropolitan Manila area as an Urban Land Reform Zone, and LOI 935,

hereby amend Proclamation No. 1893 by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan

Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones asdescribed in the attached annex.

The provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall

apply only to the above[-]mentioned Areas of Priority Development andUrban Land Reform Zones.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforecited whereas clauses express a clear intent to limit the operation of PD

1517 to specific areas declared to be located in both an APD and a ULRZ. The

conjunctive andin the last sentence of the quoted provision confirms thisintention. Andin statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union. As

understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction and, theprovisions of PD 1517 apply only to areas declared to be located within both anAPD and a ULRZ.

With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-Petitioners action would

necessarily lead to futility for no cause of action.


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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premise considered, it respectfully prayed for that this Honorable

Supreme Court that Defendant-Petitioners prayer for writ of injunction be DENIED forhaving no cause of action and the petition DISMISSED for being clearly unmeritorious.

Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise being prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 8, 2011.

AZURIN BUHAIN BONTUYAN AND ARICAYOS LAW OFFICES

Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent

10th Floor, New Building,

Makati Avenue, Makati City

By:

ATTY. PAOLO COELHO

IBP Lifetime No. 67891; 5/10/2005

PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2011

Roll of Attorney No. 2005-001023

MCLE Compliance No. III 000899

Copy Furnished:

ATTY. JEFFREY A. ARCHER

Counsel for Petitioner

Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium,

Espana, Manila

.


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LEGAL OPINION FORMAT

(ADDRESSED TO THE CLIENT)

July 18, 2011

Mrs. Malou Ang911 Bluewhale StreetPalanan, Makati City

RE: POSSIBLE LAWSUIT AGAINST MCBEEFOR THE INJURY YOU HAVE SUSTAINED

Dear Mrs. Ang:

Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and yourdocuments, are as follows:

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The issue here is clear: its whether or not McBee is liable to you fordamages. In my opinion,

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

As for the nature of McBees liability, the provision that governs is____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of_________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

One thing: my opinion is based on the laws and the jurisprudence applicableto your situation. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confidentthat the case willbe decided in your favor.

Very truly yours,

Atty. Karren Cecil I. Panopio-Lofranco

- OR YOU CAN USE THIS FORMAT -


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In response to your request, I have analyzed whether you can file an actionfor damages against McBee.

My opinion is based on the following facts:________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

As regards to the first issue______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

As regards to the second issue___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

On this basis, I hereby offer the following opinion:__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

If you pursue with this action, I believe you have an excellent chance ofprevailing. Please call should you have any questions about this opinion.

Sincerely,

Atty. Karren Cecil I. Panopio-Lofranco


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December 10, 2010

Mr. Peter Banag

16 Annapolis St.Cubao, Quezon City

Dear Mr. Banag:

Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and your documents,

are as follows:

Your daughter, Mary Banag, about six years old, went to Arthur Sisons house to buy

ice-candy on September 12 at about 3 PM. Mary knocked on the gate, but having gotten no

response from Arthur who was napping then, she tested the gate by pushing it. Upon doingso, the gate yielded and Arthurs dog jumped out, went after Mary and attacked her from

behind, biting her on the leg and arms as she fell to the ground. She was saved by Fred

Puzon, a neighbor, who kicked the dog away and protected her. Awakened by the commotion

and having heard shouts that his dog had attacked a child, Arthur went out, sent the dog backto his yard and bought Mary to a nearby clinic for treatment, paying the medical bill

thereafter. You asked Arthur to pay Mary P20,000 in damages for the ordeal but all you got

was a letter saying that he cannot grant your demand because he was not at fault. He basedhis stand on the following:

1. That there was a sign at the gate warning about the presence of the dog, ineffect implying that if Mary heeded what the sign says, the attack wouldnt

have happened

2. That at the time of the attack she was not accompanied by an adult, impliedly

putting the blame on you as her parent for letting her roam outside unattendedand therefore exposing her to danger; and

3. That he already paid the bill for Marys medication.

The issue here is clear: its whether or not Arthur is liable to Mary for damages. Inmy opinion, Arthur is liable for damages notwithstanding his defenses. First and foremost,

what happened to Mary is classified as a quasi-delict, as defined by Article 2176 of the CivilCode:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is


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no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is

governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

As for the nature of Arthurs liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of the

Civil Code. It provides that:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for

the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility

shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the faultof the person who has suffered damage.

The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of Vestil v. Intermediate

Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74431, 179 SCRA 47), saying that:

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is

not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or

user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on theprinciple of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or

service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.

Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory

negligence on Marys part as the former implied in his letter, or he may claim that lettingMary roam the vicinity unaccompanied is negligence on your part and constitutes the

proximate cause of her injuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate

unlocked before napping. Both scenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that

provides:

When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his

injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, theimmediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care,

the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be

awarded.

In the first scenario, the Supreme Courts ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v.

Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129792, 321 SCRA 375) that a child under nine years of age

must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of lawcovers Mary, hence throwing the notion of contributory negligence on her part out the

window. As for the second scenario, the ruling in Umali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69

SCRA 263) provides that parental negligence in allowing a young child to go out of the housealone may at most qualify as contributory negligence and as such would be covered by the

second sentence of Article 2179.

Arthur, being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary, is liable for damages, with all

possible defenses taken into consideration. If Arthur didnt leave the gate unlocked before

taking a nap an act showing a lack of due care there would have been no way the dog

could have attacked Mary. Mary could test the gate all day long and she wouldnt be attackedby Arthurs dog had the gate been closed. Of course, he may say that paying Marys medical

bill should be enough, but that does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to

under Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code, which specifically pertains to quasi-delicts causingphysical injuries. As mentioned earlier, the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of

his liability.

One thing: my opinion is based on the laws and the jurisprudence applicable to your

situation. If by any circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confident that the case

will be decided in your favor.

Very truly yours,


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Emile Justin P. Cebrian

Reviewer Legal Writing

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