Review of the International Federation’s Management and ... · Sept 20 -21 London Donor Forum...

Review of the International Federation’s Management and Coordination of the Preparedness Phase

Iraq Crisis 2003

FINAL REPORT October 2003

Wayne MacDonald Review Team Leader

Review of International Federation’s Preparedness - Iraq Crisis 2003

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................................................................. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................................. 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................................... 5

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................................. 5 WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED .................................................................................................................................. 5 OVERALL ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................................................ 8 OTHER OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS ...................................................................................................... 9 SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................10 CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................................................................................................................12

MAIN REPORT....................................................................................................................................................................13 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................................................13 SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW .........................................................................................................13 METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................................................................................14 BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................................................................15 OPERATING CONTEXT.............................................................................................................................................16 WHAT RESULTED FROM THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS.....................23 OVERALL ASSESSMENT ..........................................................................................................................................27 ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS .......................................................................................31

Disaster preparedness – Federation’s policy..........................................................................................................31 Contingency Planning.................................................................................................................................................32 Task Force.....................................................................................................................................................................33 Human Resources.........................................................................................................................................................34 Communication.............................................................................................................................................................35 Telecommunications.....................................................................................................................................................35 Finances.........................................................................................................................................................................35 Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) ...............................................................................................35 Standard Operating Procedures................................................................................................................................35 Seville Agreement.........................................................................................................................................................36 Structure and Coordination........................................................................................................................................37 Relations with the ICRC..............................................................................................................................................37 Relations with National Societies..............................................................................................................................39 Relations with United Nations....................................................................................................................................39 Relations with External Donor Governments..........................................................................................................40 After-Action Review, Evaluation and Institutional Learning................................................................................41

CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................................................................................................................42

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................................................................43 APPENDIX 1 Terms of Reference ..........................................................................................................................43 APPENDIX 2 List of Interviews ..............................................................................................................................47 APPENDIX 3 List of Documents ............................................................................................................................49 APPENDIX 4 Chronology of Operations in Iraq ..................................................................................................53 APPENDIX 5 Annotated Summary of Selected Documents ..............................................................................54 APPENDIX 6 Annotated Summary of Operations Updates ...............................................................................60 APPENDIX 7 Disaster Preparedness Policy ..........................................................................................................62 APPENDIX 8 Disaster Preparedness Assessment Tools .....................................................................................63


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ABBREVIATIONS AMCROSS American Red Cross BEG Baghdad Executive Group BPI Better Programming Initiative BRCS British Red Cross Society C&D Cooperation and Development CAS Cooperation Agreement Strategy CBFA Community Based First Aid CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare CERF Central Emergency Relief Fund DMC Disaster Management and Coordination Division, Geneva Secretariat DPP Disaster Planning and Preparedness DREF Disaster Relief Emergency Fund ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office ERU Emergency Response Units FACT Field Assessment and Coordination Team FMT Field Management Teams FRCS French Red Cross Society GCC Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council GRCS German Red Cross Society GVA SG Geneva Support Group HoD Head of Delegation IASC Inter-Agency Steering Committee ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross Red Crescent IFRC/the Federation International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent IHL International Humanitarian Law IRCS Iraqi Red Crescent Society IRRCS Iranian Red Crescent Society JRCS Jordanian Red Crescent Society KRCS Kuwait Red Crescent Society MENA Middle East and North Africa MoU Memorandum of Understanding NCW Non-conventional weapons NRC Netherlands Red Cross NS National Society OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) PHC Primary Health Centre PNS Participating National Society POWs Prisoners of War QRCS Qatar Red Crescent Society RDRT Regional Disaster Response Team SARC Saudi Arabian Red Crescent SMM Senior Management Meeting SOP Standard Operating Procedures SRCS Syrian Red Crescent Society (also SARC- Syrian Arab Red Crescent) TCNs Third Country Nationals ToR Terms of Reference TRCS Turkish Red Crescent Society UAE RC United Arab Emirates Red Crescent UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees VCA Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment WTP Water Treatment Plant


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Review presents the main conclusions and recommendations covering the management and coordination of the preparedness phase of the Iraq Crisis 2003. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the many individuals who contributed to the review process. The Review drew heavily upon face to face and telephone interviews conducted throughout July, 2003. I am very grateful to the many staff from the International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Secretariat, ICRC, National Societies, as well as representatives from Government Missions in Geneva along with other major humanitarian organizations involved in the Iraq Crisis who took the time to offer their views and opinions. Appreciation must also be shared with the Director of the Disaster Management and Coordination Division (DMC), Abbas Gullet, and the Head of the Evaluation Department, Mathew Varghese for their helpful advice and guidance at the beginning of the review process. Special thanks is extended to Ashley Fontanetta, a summer intern with the Federation Secretariat from the University of Southern California, who provided invaluable assistance in organizing documentation, participating in selective interviews and providing timely reflections on various substantive issues. I am very much indebted to the administrative assistants Julie Kummer and Clarisse Sikawho who helped organize and manage the interview schedule during July. They never lost patience in the often frustrating attempt to reach actual and potential interviewees for this review. The Review was undertaken by an external consultant with no past involvement in the activities under review. As such the report constitutes an independent assessment of the preparedness work. The views and opinions expressed in this Review are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the funding policy positions of the International Federation Secretariat. Wayne MacDonald Review Team Leader 20 October 2003


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION This review was carried out during July 2003 at the request of the International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Secretariat’s Evaluation Department. Its focus was to examine the Federation’s management and co-ordination of the preparedness for the Iraq crisis, 2003. The objectives were two-fold:

1. To examine the performance of the Secretariat in fulfilling it’s role during the preparedness phase of the Iraq operations, and

2. To draw out lessons for possible application to similar crises in the future operations . The main client for this review was the Director and staff of the Federation Secretariat’s Disaster Management and Coordination Divis ion (DMC). The review covered several issues: the adequacy of planning and goal setting; the decision-making process; opportunities for improving disaster preparedness; lessons learned from the Secretariat’s management of the process that may require further clarification of roles, alignment and co-ordination; and any assumptions about inputs and outcomes underpinning the operation, especially those that might have been left out or ignored. For the purposes of this exercise, the emergency preparedness phase was taken to be approximately six and a half months, starting 3 September 2002 (marked by the meeting between the Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict preparedness for Iraq) to 20 March 2003 (the start of the actual conflict and issuance of the Federation’s Emergency Appeal 08/03). In terms of methodology, the analysis and findings of the review are based on three major activities: 1) Face to face and telephone interviews with about 60 interviewees internal and external to the Federation, 2) A documentation review that covered over 1000 pages of reference material, and 3) The presentation of interim findings and recommendations to senior management of the Federation (mid August, 2003). Based on the requirements outlined in the terms of reference and the time allocated for this assignment, the Review Team was confident that the major trends and issues have been described.

WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED TIMELINE

Sept 3 Geneva Meeting between the Secretariat of the International Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict preparedness for Iraq

Sept 20-21 London Donor Forum (PNS)

Oct 16-17 Chavannes de Bogis

Meeting of Host National Societies concerning a Potential Conflict-Related Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

Oct 17 Geneva Joint Statement by ICRC and the International Federation concerning potential crisis in Iraq

Nov 6-8 Geneva Federation Governing Board

Nov 11 Geneva Joint PNS Meeting on Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region hosted by ICRC

Nov 12 Geneva Informal ICRC-Federation exchange - Post PNS Information Meeting

2002

Nov 19 Geneva Letter to PNS requesting confirmation of capacity and intentions

Jan 17 Geneva Pre-briefing at UNHCR with Permanent Missions on agreement with the Federation

Jan 31 Geneva SMM Meeting Jan 29 Geneva Joint ICRC/International Federation MENA Consortium Meeting Feb 1 Geneva DMC takes over operational responsibility from C&D Feb11 Geneva Geneva Support Group/Regional Teleconference Host NS and TF? Feb 15-16 Geneva Humanitarian Meeting on Iraq hosted by Government of Switzerland Mar 20 Geneva War begins/Emergency Appeal 8/03

2003

Mar 21 Geneva Formal Agreement between UNHCR and International Federation


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Emergency appeal successfully launched On 20 March 2003 the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies launched its emergency appeal for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries. This was the end result of a long and complex preparatory process lasting nearly six and one half months. The Federation focused primarily on providing assistance to National Societies who deliver assistance to refugees (or other beneficiaries). The Federation appeal assumed a short term situation involving more than 600,000 refugees (UNHCR estimate) and as many as 2 million internally displaced persons. Based on the preparatory activities, the Federation’s relief efforts were to focus on basic human needs linked with health and care, water and sanitation, the distribution of food and non-food items and temporary shelters. In conjunction with National Societies in the region, the operation was to cover two phases:

1. First Phase (anticipated three months duration) consists of reinforcing effective disaster response capacity in Iraq and neighbouring countries, i.e. update contingency plans, pre-position relief stocks, and disaster training (already accomplished) in preparation for the anticipated relief operations

2. Second Phase (anticipated six months duration) consists of planning for rehabilitation programmes aimed primarily at national society capacity building.

The overall Goal was:

To alleviate the suffering of affected populations by supporting National Societies in the countries neighbouring Iraq in their efforts to effectively deliver assistance to the people of Iraq, particularly in the event of a large population movement to Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia .

Under the goal, there were two categories of Objectives. The first group were organized by sector (health care, water and sanitation, relief distribution of food and basic non-food items, shelter) and were to be accomplished in 3 months. The second set of objectives (again sorted by the same sectors) referred to the capacity building of National Societies in countries neighbouring Iraq over a period of 9 months. ü First Set of Objectives - (The health situation; water and sanitation, general condition,

adequate shelter facilities ) of a target population is maintained at a satisfactory level within the emergency period of 3 months

ü Second Set of Objectives - National Societies in the region are better prepared to respond to man-made and natural (including epidemics) disasters

Each set of objectives were ‘unpacked’ in terms of expected results, indicators, and activities planned. Preparedness Capacity Established National capacity established in the region included non-food supplies for over 300,000 people. Approximately 80,000 volunteers were at the ready to support distribution efforts if needed. This was complemented by a Federation field team of approximately 25 including 20 locally engaged staff. Non-food capacity mobilized by the Federation could accommodate another 60,000 persons. An estimated CHF 200,000 to 600,000 was available from the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) if needed. Finally among relief supplies totalling over 50,000, items included blankets, tents, mattresses, jerry cans, kerosene lamps, hygiene parcels and food parcels.


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FACT and ERU mobilized The Federation had succeeded as part of the preparations to mobilize for possible deployment of FACT (Field assessment and co-ordination team). A team of 20-25 members would be deployed with 12-24 hours notice in the region in smaller groups of 3 to 7 persons, depending on the needs and size of the targeted area. The members have the mandate to stay in the area for up to one month and replace delegate needs in case of a major influx. Also, the Federation ensured that National Societies engaged actively in the preparations by making available and putting on standby their Emergency Response Units - ERU units (self-supporting for the first month and can be deployed for up to 3 months). Available modules were not pre-positioned for Iraq, but could be deployed upon receipt of an ERU alert (mobilized with 48-72 hours). These units were to be deployed to neighbouring countries based on the Movement of large populations. It is also made clear in the appeal that ERU were not appropriate or designed for use in the situation of NCW and could not provide decontamination services to victims. National Societies ready to contribute the more than 30 ERUs included: Austria (5), Belgium (1), Denmark (1), Finland 3(5), Germany (8), Japan (2), Norway (4), Spain (4), Sweden (1), and UK (1).

Coordination structure and information exchange processes created The launch of the Federation appeal was successfully coordinated with the simultaneous launch of the ICRC appeal. Both appeals made reference to each other. Coordination was the hallmark of the appeal launch process as well as during the preparatory phase to ensure that what was in the appeal was accomplished. The structure consisted of coordination at several levels: 1) Headquarters – Geneva Support Group that consisted of weekly meetings of ICRC and federation secretariat operational teams 2) Iraq - Executive Group – that consisted of the ICRC, Federation and national society weekly meetings chaired by ICRC as the Lead Agency 3) Neighbouring countries - Field Management Teams which included Weekly meetings of the host national society, the Federation, ICRC and all participating national society representatives present in country, co-chaired by Federation and the host NS. External coordination with other actors outside of the Movement was deemed important. The Federation and UNHCR would reach a formal understanding on a regional framework that would be signed the day following the appeal (21 March 2003). Here, the intention of the Federation at the country level was to include host National Societies into a tripartite contract with the aim of ensuring maximum coordination to guarantee services needed for people fleeing Iraq. Similarly, both the Federation and ICRC would coordinate information exchange on behalf of the Movement with the UN in Larnaka. Training activities undertaken Considerable effort was put into enhancing national society capacity in the region and in Iraq through training in relief, logistics, health, organizational development, disaster preparedness, information and finance. Preparatory efforts included the following:

Regional Human Resource Support- Training Completed Federation’s Strategic Relief Centre Iran,

Teheran 2002 – newly opened

Regional Disaster Response Team Iran Teheran

2002 (mid-December) involving 35 disaster staff and volunteers MENA

Camp Management Training Syria, Palmyre 2002 (October)

Camp Management Training Iraq 2002 (November) Disaster Management Workshops Turkey 2003 - Three workshops

Camp Management Training Kuwait 2003 (March) involving UNHCR and ICRC for 250 volunteers in KRCS

Water/Sanitation Training Syria NS volunteers with a technical background.


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As for the finances, a discretionary budget of CHF 3.2 million was approved by the Secretary General in January, 2003 to cover initial orders of basic non-food relief items in neighbouring countries. Total commitments for disaster preparedness had exceeded that amount and stood at CHF 6.3 million, covering pre-positioning of non-food relief items and delegates during the preparedness stage.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT While there is no precise blueprint for organizing preparedness activities, it is nevertheless possible to identify some standard components for any disaster preparedness system. In an ideal system, the quality of preparedness is not found at the headquarters of an international organization like the Federation, but is found at the local, national and regional level. The Federation Secretariat well- recognized this fact. Given the limits of the methodology, it was not possible to review directly the nature and extent of preparedness activities in neighbouring countries. However, it would not be surprising to discover that in a region such as MENA these capacities would vary considerably across countries and National Societies. It must be also assumed that in the absence of such capacities at the local level, there will always remain a need for international organizations such as the Federation to be involved in helping to fill in the gaps. In any disaster preparedness system, there are three main components that cover operational preparedness and the proactive tasks deemed essential for an effective emergency response1. Contingency arrangements consist of activities that must occur in advance of a crisis to ensure that human and material resources are readily available. Situation Monitoring and needs assessment are those activities required to identify crisis situation before they become critical and determine appropriate response. Initial response involves the mobilization and deployment of personnel, equipment and materials to a crisis site. Against the above criteria, it can be concluded here that the Federation’s management and coordination of the preparations for the Iraq Crisis was successful. At the same time this accomplishment should be viewed against a backdrop of many exogenous or external variables. First, the period to prepare was relatively long and explicit. This is somewhat unusual in most crisis situations. In most disasters, the luxury of a long preparation period is often never present. Second, the preparedness phase occurred during an extremely difficult period in the evolution of the Federation. With organizational change strategies piled on top of political tensions at the highest level (that ultimately led to the departure of the Secretary General), coupled with funding and staff morale issues, it is rather remarkable that activities did not simply grind to a halt. This is a tribute to the dedication and professionalism of the management and staff of the Secretariat’s Disaster Management and Coordination and the other Federation units supporting DMC. Many will acknowledge that Iraq was special. Iraq was not the Balkans, nor was it Afghanistan. While there may have been many commonalities, there were also significant differences. In Iraq, while it did take 6 months to prepare, in the end the effort were never really actualised. The anticipated population flows simply did not materialise, a blessing in itself. Whether the preparations would have resulted in a well-coordinated, efficient and timely response will always remain in the realm of speculation. During the review, many interviewees from the Federation Secretariat, field delegations, National Societies, ICRC, government donors and external organisations were asked to rate overall the preparedness activities of the Federation on a five point scale (with 5 representing what could be considered a model DP exercise). More than sixty percent of the interviewees took the opportunity to score the exercise. Overall, their views tend to converge. The conclusion reached was that the Federation’s overall efforts were judged to be both positive and worthwhile.

1 Lester Salamon and Associates, Center on International Cooperation, The Preparedness Challenge in Humanitarian Assistance, (New York University, Oct. 1999).


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While the preparatory process for Iraq may not be viewed as a model for future operations, nevertheless most of the building blocks are there and should be captured as part of the current ongoing work to produce Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). When the feedback is broken down, it is not unsurprising that the self-assessment of those directly involved in the preparedness activities viewed the effort very positively. They would give a four out of five for the preparedness phase. This is slightly higher than other parts of the Federation (regional department, support services) who tended to see the results less favourably. They, along with external stakeholders, would say that many things were done right, but not necessarily as well as they could have been. Opportunities were missed, but this must not cloud the fact that an enormous effort was made by a dedicated core team in the Disaster Management and Coordination Division. New ground had been broken in many areas with respect to coordination with National Societies, the ICRC, and the UN. The ICRC tended to be slightly more positive towards what the Federation had accomplished during the Iraq preparations than many National Societies. Finally, among other international organizations and donors, a similar pattern was observed. The reaction of UN representatives was the most favourable among all the groups while donors tended to be less satisfied, but certainly more pleased than PNS representatives.

OTHER OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Quick Reference What Worked What Did Not Work (As Well As Expected)

Duration - Time to do the preparatory work – process scores very high. People generally were willing to talk. Second half (Jan to May 2003) more effective.

Slow mobilization -First half (Sept to Jan 2002) less effective. The perception is that preparedness took too long. There was a lost of momentum, especially in engaging the ICRC.

Geneva Support Group – While it did not have decision making power, it was a good tool.

DP Policy and tools -Follow the preparedness policy in a loose sense and little evidence is available suggesting use of DP tools.

Model building blocks -Compared to 5-10 years ago, Federation was more prepared. Emphasis was on capacities. Efforts provided elements for a working model (e.g. joint declaration with ICRC).There was little overlapping and duplication.

Scenario assumptions around population Movement were questionable. Situation concerning IDPs less clear. Country assessments not well done. Little understanding existed about capacities inside Iraq. Much happened in the field, but it did not get reported.

Good dialogue on security - coordination between Geneva Headquarters was constructive; however contingency planning in the field was less optimal.

Non-compliance of HOD in the field with security regulations and relationship with ICRC was a limiting factor. Coordination & leadership in the field an issue.

Co-ordination with the UN was very positive, especially with respect to Larnaka, MOU with UNHCR signed. Federation got appeal out sooner than the UN.

Agreements incomplete - MOU with ICRC and tripartite contracts in the field (Federation, NS and UNHCR) remained unsigned. Relationship with UN could have been more strategic. IOM was an issue

ERU and FACT – the PNS were pulled together and bent over backwards to put people and equipment on standby. Support unit kept PNS informed.

Little Useable FACT Team results. Getting the right people at the right spot and the right time was a challenge. No assessment methods used for ERU.

Donor outreach & funding –Briefings appreciated. Selective donors covered the costs of preparedness. .

Donor interest in preparedness was generally weak. Donors were also concerned about double dipping.

Reporting from the field delegates was vital, Information Sharing and DMIS was under-exploited.

The International Federation’s Management and Coordination of Preparedness

For the Iraq Crisis 2003


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Quick Reference What Worked What Did Not Work (As Well As Expected)

especially in terms of information on target populations. Overall reporting was more consistent later in the process due to coordination by DMC.

In the spirit of 2010 and Movement strategy, DMIS could have provided up to date information, highlighting real time trends and discussion of issues.

Media Pick-up- Stories on the IRCS were picked up by other media and newspapers

Communication tended to focus too much on the short term and missed opportunities to engage NS

Logistics and Information tools – Overall implementation was done well, mobilization tables showing the needs established, and PNS were generally kept informed via DMIS.

Federation Task Force meetings – no clearly defined membership or mandate. It tended to focus on details and not enough on scenario planning. Bottlenecks in information flows.

There were delegate briefings and end of project reports by delegates

Human Resources –Confusion created by DMC contacting delegates. Preparation of job descriptions

Joint briefs and meetings with (P)NS - willingness of neighbouring NS. Capacity statements worked.

Some regional NS were very difficult to work with, lacking preparedness capacity. One voice was lacking.

Unilateral and bilateral action of PNS kept to a minimum – With a few exceptions, there was a general sense of collective responsibility.

Transition – handovers between DMC and C&D experienced a loss of momentum after missing target date of May 2003. Relationship with MENA strained.

Risk-taking – Secretary General approved initial allocations for preparedness. Risk was known and considered within acceptable limits.

Finance – budgeting and analytical reporting systems were inadequate for tracking and controlling funds. Donor funding arrived late.

Avoided ‘political landmines.’ Preparedness had to contend with many political issues. There was a considerable amount of good will that allowed many ‘show-stopping’ issues to be side-stepped.

Governance and organization – vertical accountability not clearly defined. Organization charts were old. Reporting lines with the field were blurred. Core issues unresolved by GSG. Role of regional delegation needed to be clarified.

Training workshops – were considered useful and generally well-attended.

Military cooperation with NS and the NS tendency towards unilateralism

In general, the system worked – mobilization took place in spite of uncertainty in the Federation. This was due mainly to staff motivation.

Restructuring in the Federation did not enable preparedness – reorganization, decentralization and budget cuts tended to be destabilizing factors.

Cooperation between ICRC and Federation – There were some disagreements, but things worked.

Talk about WMD and CBW – conflicting messages tended to be simplistic and distracted people

Learning - As a learning opportunity, there were many things that can be re-used (e.g. MoUs and Agreements).

Frequency of briefings was uneven – use of available technology under-exploited (video/teleconferencing)

In summary, when judged against an ideal model, the Federation’s overall preparations were both relevant and appropriate. What exactly does this mean? Overall, there was contingency planning (although limited), training was undertaken, ready access was created to relief supplies in the form of stockpiles or stand-by arrangements with suppliers, provisions were made for transport, fundraising initiatives were undertaken, relationships were cultivated with key actors (ICRC, National Societies, donors, UN agencies), materials were pre-positioned in areas of risk, protocols for needs assessments and response teams (ERU, FACT) were established, sites were identified and surveyed (to a limited degree), early communications were undertaken (with National Societies, on a regular basis with ICRC, with donors on a bilateral basis). The overall deduction that can be drawn is that if there had been a population outflow of the magnitude expected, the Federation would have been prepared to provide at least an initial response. The perception held by all stakeholders was that by 20 March 2003, arrangements were in reasonably good shape. It may not have been perfect, but most agreed that the job got done.

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the review, it is recommended that: 1) In terms of transition - assuming the current split between DMC and C&D and where operational

responsibility resides with DMC - a member of the regional department and/or responsible


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geographic desk should join the DMC team in the last forty days of the mandate to coordinate the parameters of operational transition back to the respective regional department.

2) Key DP polic ies, guidelines and tools should be translated into Arabic and that these materials, are

kept together for easy access and retrieval, and used as a basis to re-engage the National Societies in the region, especially for training and coaching purposes.

3) The format for a contingency plan should be reviewed with the aim of producing a shorter, more

tightly focused document that covers the basic information needed in contingency planning. For every crisis, the contingency plan should be completed in sufficient detail to guide implementation efforts and include information on objectives, outputs, inputs and costs with relevant indicators.

4) Task force meetings should focus on strategic and long term issues involving DP staff not limited

to implementation details; follow-up actions and decisions should be recorded accordingly. 5) In order to enhance more efficient and effective communication, further consideration should be

given to implementing other models to operational planning and coordination that better link the Federation and the field.

6) A detailed plan of action should be produced shortly after the launch of an emergency appeal. 7) More staff and delegates need to join the Geneva team during the preparedness phase of a crisis.

The Task Force should include a financial specialist, charged with the responsibility of budgeting and accounting, as well as human resources, i.e. to oversee job descriptions, briefing and other administrative details on behalf of the DMC team.

8) The Federation should carefully review the relevance and appropriateness of current job

descriptions - especially for Heads of Delegation - from the point of view of roles, responsibilities and accountability during a disaster or crisis, and carefully screen for suitability of incumbents for these positions against a well-defined statement of qualifications.

9) The financial system used to track budgets, commitments, expenditures and forecasts needs

careful reconsideration. 10) The draft standard operating procedures (SOP) for disaster management covers roles,

responsibilities, accountabilities, key activities (logistics, FACT, ERU, human resource recruitment, training, financial management, communications, information management) and should be completed as rapidly as possible . The document should be circulated inside the Federation Secretariat for discussion and also distributed among Movement components for feedback, with the intent of adding it to existing training modules

11) The Memorandum of Understanding with the ICRC should be reviewed at a more general level for

its possible utilization as a basic model or standing agreement for future operations 12) Agreements (the Federation), guidelines (ICRC), and tripartite contracts in the field with National

Societies and UN organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR) should be reviewed in terms their implications (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks) and a Movement position articulated.

13) Coordination between ICRC and the Federation, as was done in Larnaka, should be implemented

in future exercises. 14) A system be introduced that contains a capacity assessment of each National Society, covering

personal, material, equipment, information and financial resources. Such a system would complement what is already provided via the National Society self-assessment and would address the characteristics of a well-prepared National Society.


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15) NS should be encouraged in the future to continue to formally state their intentions as a routine part of the preparedness process (i.e. in the form of capacity statements)

16) Teleconferencing and regular meetings with National Societies (both traditional and non-

traditional partner National Societies – PNS) should be a routine part of any preparedness phase and involve senior management.

17) The Federation should actively pursue the issue of donor-funding policies for disaster

preparedness in the context of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative 18) Donor appeal documents coordinated with the ICRC should be done in such a way as to ensure

consistency of certain information (e.g. adopting similar exchange rates for Swiss, US and European currency). With respect to coordination with other key actors, references should be made to how these efforts compliment, rather than contradict, the mandate of an organization (e.g. the agreement with UNHCR).

19) After every major response to a crisis or disaster, some form of post action review or evaluation

should be undertaken. 20) A dialogue network should be established, involving the Federation, National Societies and the

ICRC, to discuss observations and recommendations flowing out of recent Movement evaluations and reviews (Iraq, Goma, Gujarat and others) with the aim of promoting a learning culture and sharing best practice among the components of the Movement.

CONCLUSIONS While the preparations for the Iraq crisis were successful, the Federation must continue to improve the process in a way that is consistent with its mandate. Some might argue that the Federation was over-prepared for the Iraq Crisis. This view is not shared by all. This period did provide an excellent opportunity to work through issues, learn from mistakes and make constructive changes. If anything, the Federation should draw conclusions quickly from this experience and systematically incorporate the lessons into Standard Operating Procedures, work that is currently underway. The key responsibility of the Federation in times of crisis and disaster is that of a facilitator. The front line for disaster preparedness work and response is each National Society. For example, the Iranian Red Crescent was exemplary during the preparedness phase. The Federation must seek to improve upon its role as catalyst in support of all National Societies. Part of this task is to better communicate its coordination responsibilities and accountability. There is little question that the Federation did play a central part during the preparedness phase. This was demonstrated throughout the management and coordination activities. But there is more that the Federation could have done. For example, it should have had a capacity to anticipate in advance such things as population movements (e.g. where IDPs are likely to go in a crisis) as well as monitor on an ongoing basis the disaster management capacities of all National Societies. While a network cannot be built overnight, preparedness capacity and competence cannot be established if the prevailing tendency is to ‘crisis hop’ from one disaster to another. Local capabilities and local knowledge is the key. Here the Federation Secretariat needs to be more open. It can not impose its will, but must take every opportunity to better appreciate the needs of National Societies during the crisis preparation phase. The planning relationship needs to be much closer. Listening is the key for such a change to occur. …And this is a challenge not just for the Federation, but for the entire Movement!


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MAIN REPORT

INTRODUCTION This review was carried out during the month of July, 2003 at the request of the International Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Secretariat’s Evaluation Department. Its focus is on the Federation’s management and co-ordination of the preparedness for the Iraq crisis, 2003. More than one year ago, indications continued to suggest that a major humanitarian crisis affecting Iraq might be coming. This was the main topic of a June 2002 regular meeting of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Federation on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).2 It was understood and acknowledged by all who attended that meeting that the current status quo situation in Iraq was likely “to change permanently, under the influence of different and primarily external factors.” It was agreed that developments in and outside the country needed to be closely monitored to enable both organizations to act accordingly. Two months later, both organizations would gather around the table, not to discuss a status quo situation, but contingency planning for Iraq. It was unknown at the time, but a little more than six months later the crisis in Iraq would quickly escalate. Preparedness would shift to response, and by early April, with cessation of major military operations, attention would turn to rehabilitation. Under the Seville Agreement, responsibility for coordinating and managing the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’s response to humanitarian consequences of a conflict in countries neighbouring Iraq was with the Federation. ICRC was the Lead Agency, responsible for relief efforts in Iraq. Since July 2002, the Federation had coordinated the preparation of contingency plans for a possible influx of refugees with each concerned national society (Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Turkey and Iran). This review focuses on these preparedness efforts of the Federation. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are included as Appendix 1.

SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW The objectives of the review are twofold:

1. To examine the performance of the Secretariat in fulfilling it’s role during the preparedness phase of the Iraq operations, and

2. To draw out lessons for possible application to similar crises in the future operations . The main client for this review is the Director and staff of the Federation Secretariat’s Disaster Management and Coordination Division. The review was expected to look at: the adequacy of the planning and goal setting; the decision making process; opportunities for improving disaster preparedness; lessons learned from the Secretariat’s management of the process that may require further clarification of roles, alignment and co-ordination; and any assumptions about inputs and outcome underpinning of the operation, especially those that might have been left out or ignored. For the purposes of this exercise, the emergency preparedness phase is taken to be approximately six and a half months, from 3 September 2002 (marked by the meeting between the Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict preparedness for Iraq) to 20 March 2003 (the start of the actual conflict and issuance of the Federation’s Emergency Appeal 08/03). It is well recognized that preparedness efforts had started prior to September, 2002. While it is important to acknowledge these early activities, they are seen more within the perspective of the status quo situation, and the ongoing capacity-building activities of the Federation. It is also well known that

2 Minutes of ICRC-Federation (MENA Region) Meeting, (4 June 2002). The ICRC, while maintaining its analysis of the situation in Iraq and in principle claiming the role of Lead Agency, had not been insisting at the time on the formal assigning of the Lead Agency role in the present situation in Iraq. Both sides expressed satisfaction with recent initiatives towards harmonization and cooperation between the two organizations in Iraq.


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the expected large-scale humanitarian crisis predicted in the neighbouring countries never did materialize. Hence, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federation’s preparedness efforts were never really put to the test. While references are made in this report to response efforts during and following the period of major military intervention, these are not the focus of this review. This departs from earlier evaluation exercises where relief/response activities were central.3 By extension, the post-conflict and rehabilitation phase is an important period, but is also outside of this review. It will likely be the subject of later assessment and/or evaluation. Last but not least, it should be noted that the review was not expected to cover issues concerning the suitability and/or appropriateness of relief items pre-positioned in the MENA region for the Iraq crisis.

METHODOLOGY The analysis and findings of the review are based on three major activities:

• Face to face and telephone interviews - Approximately 60 interviewees were contacted, with approximately one half representing the Federation Secretariat in Geneva, and the remainder of the interviews covering Federation field delegations, National Societies, the ICRC, other International organizations and donor governments. See Appendix 2 for the list of interviewees.

• Documentation review - Over 1000 pages of reference material was examined. Much the material cover relevant policies, strategies, MoUs, appeals, situation reports, operational updates, project proposals, minutes of meetings (MENA Consortium, Geneva Support Group and Regional National Societies), job descriptions, financial reports, end of mission reports and other documentation) See Appendix 3 for a list of documents consulted.

• Presentation of interim findings - The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the senior management of the Geneva Secretariat for feedback before the final version of the Review was completed.4

Based on the requirements outlined in the terms of reference and the time allocated for this assignment, the Review Team is confident that the major trends and issues have been described. At the same time, we would be remiss in not acknowledging some of the limitations of this review.

1. Approach – A review should not be confused with that of an evaluation or operations audit. It does not profess to examine the stringent adherence to statutes or regulations, nor does it purport to look at the impact, effectiveness or efficiency of preparedness (at least not in a detailed, rigorous sense). The review process is by definition highly subjective and qualitative, not quantitative in nature. The focus is more on learning than accountability – to look at the practice during a critical moment in time and ask: What worked? Was it worth doing? What did not work? What can be learned from the process for the next time?

2. Resources - The time allocated for this review exercise was unusually short (17 days) in

comparison to a detailed evaluation processes which can often take many more months to complete and involve a team of at least two individuals.

3. Timing – The review took place during the month of July. It was very difficult to reach key

individuals due to vacation, end of mission, maternity and other leave. Similarly the untimely shooting of an ICRC delegate in Iraq also influenced the availability of individuals especially at the ICRC. The implication is that list of people interviewed is more heavily weighted

3 See Lawry-White, Evaluation of the Goma Volcano Operation” (September 2002), and Pousette and Deolalikar, Evaluation of the Response by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to the India Earthquake (January, 2003) 4 See MacDonald, Summary of Preliminary Findings, August 2003


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toward Federation and Geneva and as such tends to reflect more the perspectives of Headquarters.

4. Documentation – Sources for this review were limited to those provided by DMC. While

comprehensive in terms of volume, certain types of documents were not available to the Review Team such as minutes of Task Force meetings, consistent financial accounting information, or key e-mails.

5. Field visits – Most exercises are incomplete without a field visit. It was determined that given

the subject (the preparedness phase), the period under examination (3 September 2002 to 20 March 2003) and the unlikely availability of people, that a field visit would not be a cost-effective use of resources.

BACKGROUND Early warning signs of a sharp escalation in the humanitarian situation in Iraq began in 2000. Up to that point the extent of the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Iraq - brought on by the devastating consequences on the population of ten years of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations in 1990 - had already been documented and reported in the media. The continual degradation of public infrastructure (buildings, water and sewage plants, electricity, and telecommunications) was noted with alarm by all aid agencies. December 1998 had already seen a large scale air bombardment, in retaliation for Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors. US policy, supported by UK and some Gulf states, continued to maintain economic sanctions and enforce a “no-fly zone” in the north and south. After 2000, the continued refusal of the Iraqi government to cooperate with the international community, the growing lack of consensus among permanent members of the UN Security Council towards Iraq, the change in US administration brought on by the presidential elections, combined with the fallout from the Al Quaida terrorist attack in New York on September 11th, 2001, suggested that further humanitarian shockwaves in Iraq might not be far off. The US administration was accumulating more and more reasons to support the overthrow of Iraqi leadership. The ambiguity and mounting antagonism was further partly reinforced by the fact that the Iraqi government was expected to pay for its own humanitarian activities under the oil-for-food program. Up to this point, the number of NGOs and their programmes present in government-controlled areas was small, and included CARE, Première Urgence and Enfant du Monde. All NGOs were required to work through the government’s designated ‘humanitarian coordinator,’ the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) and this was not appreciated by them. On the other side of the great humanitarian divide, many of the activities of WFP, WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNDP, and HABITAT were supported under the oil-for-food programme. Coordination and monitoring of activities was carried out by the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordination for Iraq (UNOCHI). Within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the acknowledged reference source for the humanitarian situation in Iraq, apart from the IRCS, was the ICRC. Given the conditions, the ICRC’s relationship with the Iraqi authorities was relatively constructive. It was the only organization with humanitarian assistance projects and a regular presence all over the country (including Iraqi Kurdistan). The ICRC’s program focused on protection and those aspects not covered under the oil-for-food program, including rehabilitation of public infrastructure (water and habitat), training and capacity building in the health sector (medical and orthopaedics). The Federation had an office in Baghdad, but tended to encounter difficulty in implementing its action plans due staff and funding problems. The lack of a five-year strategic development plan for the IRCS, coupled with a lack of timely and sufficient resources, placed the Federation’s organizational development efforts in an awkward situation. For example, unlike other National Societies in the region, there was no established disaster management unit within the IRCS. While the relationship between the Federation and the IRCS showed some tension, the ICRC/IRCS relationship was on even shakier footing. There was an inability to resolve mutual coordination issues, agree on priorities and arrive at an appropriate division of labour. In the background was a disagreement over Lead Agency


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status in Iraq. And yet the Federation investments and engagement were not insignificant. Over the past two decades it was estimated that the activities of the Federation alone to meet humanitarian needs in Iraq totalled CHF 95 million. Since 2001, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and the Federation had started to shift priorities. Relief programs had been gradually replaced by assistance aimed at rehabilitation of health infrastructure, development of health education and first aid training, strengthening the national society’s capacities in disaster preparedness and providing services to disabled persons. The perceived overlap with ICRC humanitarian activities was quite visible. But with the formalization of agreements and understandings to support IRCS program management capacity, service delivery and preparedness, overall cooperation within the Movement started to improve.

OPERATING CONTEXT By mid 2002, events suggested that what would be required was not just the maintenance of existing capacities, but a full escalation of preparedness activities in anticipation of possible military action in Iraq. Federation officials deemed it necessary to begin reviewing contingency plans and to direct delegation staff in how to deal with the evolving situation. In July 2002, the Federation drew to the attention of a number of participating National Societies (PNS) the ever increasing acute needs in Iraq and the necessity to enable the Iraqi Red Crescent Society to cope with a growing emergency situation. Consequently, the Federation informed PNS of its plans to substantially enhance the 2002 Iraq annual appeal disaster preparedness programme. The appeal called for the provision of an emergency stock of non-food items for 55,000 persons. Approximately CHF 2 million was requested in support of the activities identified. Several participating National Societies and/or governments did respond to the appeal.5 By early September 2002, internal and external pressures were starting to mount and necessitated a special meeting of the Federation Secretariat and the ICRC to focus on conflict preparedness and contingency planning in Iraq. The meeting convened at ICRC Headquarters reviewed the situation, discussed current operational capacity of the IRCS, considered the role of the IRCS as a potential operational partner of the ICRC, further confirmed the roles and responsibilities of the Federation and ICRC, and reflected on aspects of coordination of Movement operations. Some important messages were passed by the two Geneva houses that would later influence, and at times confuse, the coordination relationships throughout the coming six months. It is important to reiterate what was said:

• Scenario consideration - A range of possible situations were identified:

Ø Slow build-up for a ground offensive in late 2002 or early 2003, Ø Combination of bombardment and support to opposition groups (similar to

Afghanistan) and Ø Possible surprise attack on Baghdad to decapitate Iraqi government.

In the end, elements from all three scenarios eventually did come into play, but at the time there was agreement that something significant was coming and hence preparedness and contingency planning needed to be stepped up. It is worth noting that reference was also made at that time that there might not be large scale population Movements. Unless the scarcity of food compelled people to seek refugee status in neighbouring countries, it was conjectured that people might be more likely to stay in Iraq, seeking safety in the countryside or away from military objectives.

5 See Project Proposal to the British Government from the Iraq Delegation for Operational and Financial Support for The enhancement of the disaster Preparedness Capacity in Iraq to meet the Emergency Humanitarian Requirements for 15000 Families (29 October 2002).


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• IRCS Operational Capacity - Due in part to the Federation’s past support of disaster

preparedness training, it was estimated that the IRCS had some operational capacity that could be instrumental in the distribution of relief supplies. However, concern was also expressed over the perceived IRCS linkages with Government authorities. In the end, it was agreed that the decentralized operational capacity of the IRCS needed to be confirmed (mapped), that gaps could be filled to enable IRCS to become a reliable partner, and that regular tripartite meetings be convened with the IRCS.

• Lead Agency Status – Reference was also made to the previous 05 June 2002 meeting where it

was agreed that ICRC would be recognized as Lead Agency in Iraq in the event of an escalation of hostilities, with the Federation to assume Lead Agency status for countries not involved in the conflict. For the latter, the intent would be to support respective National Societies (NS) in the neighbouring countries. The messages passed between both Geneva headquarters were relatively clear and could be considered general criteria for success in the days and months to come:

Ø As ‘supporting agents’ of the ICRC, the Federation Secretariat and the National

Societies insisted on a clear vision from the ICRC of the Movement’s role and activities for Iraq during a situation of conflict. In other words, an exact sense of ICRC’s current capabilities, what ICRC was doing precisely to get ready, and a clear determination of who would tackle what.

Ø From their side, the ICRC insisted that while support to the IRCS, under an ICRC

umbrella, would be beneficial, “no independent parallel International Federation operation in Iraq should take place any longer if the ongoing conflict further escalates.”6

• Coordination of Movement Operations – It was noted by the Federation that, like the ICRC,

National Societies in the region were under tremendous pressure to act in favour of victims. Compared to 1991, these same National Societies had a greater capacity to respond. The major challenge for both the ICRC and the Federation would be to develop an appropriate coordinating mechanism that could take into account the above situation. National Societies in the region anticipated being included in the confidential dialogue and part of the contingency planning process of the two Geneva Headquarters. In this regard, both organizations saw things the same way from the outset. In the days and months to come, both the Federation and ICRC would come under pressure to create enough space to allow National Societies in the region to contribute substantially to the Movement operations and to undertake concrete projects of involvement. This too could be taken as a benchmark against which to gauge later success of the preparedness planning.

• Other stakeholders -The importance of speaking with a common voice, not only in contacts

with the PNS but to the outside world, was also stressed. In comparison to the United Nations (UN), the value added of the Movement as an independent humanitarian force was underscored. The ICRC stressed that none of Movements components should become implementing agents of the UN. This was especially true in Iraq, given Iraqi perception of the UN at the time. Tremendous media attention was also anticipated. It was agreed that external communications would be crucial. It was agreed that “All aspects of the Movement relief operation should be discussed, including communications, security and coordination aspects. A vision of the operation should emerge, so that the Movement may as much as possible speak and act as a single and independent humanitarian force if and when the conflict escalates.”

6 Minutes of the meeting between the Secretariat of the International Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict preparedness for Iraq (3 September 2002).


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In retrospect, the 03 September 2002 meeting was key linchpin for the escalation of preparedness phase activities. Over the next six months, a series of meetings on contingency planning and mobilization were convened by both Geneva headquarters; this continued well into 2003, as profiled in the timeline below.

Extended Timeline 7

June 4 Geneva Regular ICRC-Federation (MENA Region Meeting) June 17-21 Geneva PNS Meeting

Sept 3 Geneva Meeting between the Secretariat of the International Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict preparedness for Iraq

Sept 9 Geneva ICRC-IFRC MENA Coordination Meeting Re: Iraq Sept 20-21 London Donor Forum (PNS) Oct 4 Geneva MENA Coordination Meeting – Iraq and Neighbouring Countries Oct 10 Geneva MENA Coordination Meeting - Iraq and Neighbouring Countries

Oct 16-17 Chavannes de Bogis

Meeting of Host National Societies concerning a Potential Conflict-Related Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

Oct 17 Geneva Joint Statement by ICRC and the International Federation concerning potential crisis in Iraq

Oct 28 Geneva MENA Coordination Meeting - Iraq and Neighbouring Countries Oct 28-30 Washington MENA Consortium Nov 6-8 Geneva Federation Governing Board

Nov 11 Geneva Joint PNS Meeting on Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region hosted by ICRC

Nov 12 Geneva Informal ICRC-Federation exchange - Post PNS Information Meeting Nov 12 PNS Consortium MENA

Nov 18 Geneva Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

Nov 19 Geneva Letter to PNS requesting confirmation of capacity and intentions Dec 2 Geneva Geneva Support Group Dec 10 Geneva Geneva Support Group Dec 17 Geneva Geneva Support Group Jan 17 Geneva Pre-briefing at UNHCR with Permanent Missions on agreement with the Federation Jan 31 Geneva SMM Meeting Jan 29 Geneva Joint ICRC/International Federation MENA Consortium Meeting Feb 1 Geneva DMC takes over operational responsibility from C&D Feb 4 Geneva Geneva Support Group 11 Fe Geneva Geneva Support Group/Regional Teleconference Host NS and TF? Feb 15-16 Geneva Humanitarian Meeting on Iraq hosted by Government of Switzerland Mar 4 Geneva Geneva Support Group Mar 11 Geneva Geneva Support Group Mar 17 Geneva Geneva Support Group Mar 20 Geneva War begins/Emergency Appeal 8/03 Mar 21 Geneva Formal Agreement between UNHCR and International Federation Mar 25 Geneva Geneva Support Group Apr 1 Geneva Geneva Support Group Apr 6 Abu Dhabi Sub-Regional Meeting of National Societies, ICRC and Federation Ap8 r Geneva Geneva Support Group Apr 14 Geneva Geneva Support Group May 13 Baghdad Meeting of Participating National Societies hosted by ICRC May 22-23 Geneva MENA Consortium May 26 Geneva Geneva Support Group

2002

June 1 Geneva DMC hands back operational responsibility to C&D Over the next six months, the Federation would maintain an active dialogue and work with the National Societies of the neighbouring countries in Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait. One key

7 See APPENDIX 4 for an annotated chronology of events and operations in Iraq.


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planning meeting took place 16-17 October 2002 with national society representatives from the region. The meeting was convened at the invitation of the ICRC to discuss the potential conflict-related humanitarian crisis in Iraq and the region. Given the importance of the meeting, here too a number of issues were agreed upon between the Federation, ICRC and regional National Societies. These points of concurrence could also be taken as expected parameters for the mobilization efforts. In terms of guiding principles, the ICRC articula ted the overall orientation for the preparedness, mobilization and possible implementation phase of the operations:

1. Stand ready to make a difference to those affected as a RC/RC Movement, the Seville agreement leading us to work together in cooperation;

2. Speak with one voice in this crisis, giving the same messages around the globe; and 3. Be results oriented through effective coordination. The components of the Movement have

different tasks. However a clear unity of purpose and effective mechanism of coordination will help achieve effective results.

All National Societies (NS) bordering Iraq gave first indications at this meeting of the degree of advancement of their preparedness and planning. It was clear to all at the meeting, and especially for NS, that respective planning and mobilization processes were well underway. Specific admiration was directed towards the Iranian RCS for the nature and extent of their advanced efforts. At this meeting, the ICRC presented its plans organized along two phases – Initial response to needs (first month) using the ensuring time to build towards a subsequent phase (that was expected to last three months). During this second phase, both the ICRC and Federation stated their intention to remain present in Iraq, security permitting. The need to support the IRCS was well understood by all present. The Federation acknowledged that no contingency plans were yet developed, but that it would work to support the National Society plans presented at the Chavannes-de-Bogis meeting by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Kuwait (Iraq participated via phone link). The determination of the Federation to take up its role in advocating for needs of NS in the region was once again reiterated towards the end of the same meeting. However, limits were also set. In a badly recorded response to possible cross border action, the ICRC stated: “..that (it) did not reject support to NS in the region but duplication (sic). Coordination with the Federation will be essential.” The Iraqi RCS also signalled that it did not want NS activities on its territory if not coordinated. The concluding remarks highlighted several key themes discussed in the meeting, which were later to become important parameters during the preparedness phase of activities for all components of the Movement:

1. The current situation required preparation of the RC/RC Movement 2. Components of the Movement had to join efforts and resources to enable the Movement to

provide a strong, united, coordinated, effective, and efficient response. 3. Support to the IRCS was central 4. The ICRC’s contingency planning was noted and especially the focus on assisting the Iraqi

population within its borders in order to avoid large scale population Movements towards neighbouring countries

5. Federation would support contingency planning already started by all Red Crescent Societies neighbouring Iraq

6. The ICRC would lead Movement activities in Iraq, while Federation coordinates relief operations of National Societies in neighbouring countries. All NS were urged to refrain undertaking unilateral initiatives, but to coordinate activities under the organizing principles of the Movement

7. Several important issues required further analysis and consultation ü Cross border operations to be coordinated with the Movement ü NS contributions from countries taking part in the hostilities need to be integrated in a

manner that did not jeopardise the overall Movement operation


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ü Given the complex security and political environment, coordination with the UN needed to done in a manner that preserved the independence of the Movement’s operations

ü Movement is not capable to operate in areas where non-conventional weapons (NCW) are used

8. A joint statement would be issued by the Federation and ICRC 9. An appeal for funds was not possible at this stage of the preparations, despite the limitation of

existing resources that could be committed. Many of the above elements were included in the Joint Statement issued by ICRC and the International Federation concerning potential crisis in Iraq (intended for internal Movement use - dated Oct 17th):

• If the crisis in Iraq escalates, it was essential that the Movement adopt a well-coordinated approach in its humanitarian response.

• The ICRC assumes the function of Lead Agency to coordinate the international Movement response. Services are to be provided together with those from the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and with the support of other Movement actors.

• Should the need for international cooperation be confirmed in neighbouring countries not directly affected by the conflicts, all components of the Movement would be invited to contribute to the international relief efforts under the leadership and general coordination of the Federation?

• In Iraq, preparatory work was underway to respond to increased needs by all the components of the Movement in case of escalation of hostilities.

o The ICRC was planning to address potential urgent needs in health, water and shelter in close consultation with IRCS, including the pre-positioning of stocks. It was working to reinforce IRCS capacity in restoring family links, dissemination activities and reinforcement of communication infrastructure.

o Federation was also supporting the IRCS in the areas of disaster preparedness, community first aid, and pre-positioning of stocks.

o Federation would coordinate the preparation of contingency plans of each National Society of neighbouring countries including the definition of roles within a national context, scaling up of operational capacities, training and pre-positioning of minimum stocks.

• In terms of Movement coordination mechanisms: o The ICRC would lead coordination of international relief operations in Baghdad,

security permitting. o Federation would lead coordination of operations in the surrounding countries. o Geneva level support group would be set up to coordinate between the two

institutions, thus ensure information-sharing between the two field coordination groups.

o Ad hoc meeting would be organised involving all relevant partners and specialists o A MoU would be concluded between the two headquarter organisations outlining

technical arrangements. o In terms of communication, ICRC would act as spokesperson for the Movement’s

operations in Iraq and the Federation would do the same in neighbouring countries. Shortly after issuing the declaration, the PNS were invited to an information meeting on 11 November 2002 to discuss the outcomes of the Chavannes-de-bogis meeting. The occasion was also used to ascertain PNS plans for Iraq and region and ensure commitment to a Movement coordinated approach. The invitation involved both traditional PNS and non-traditional PNS in the region bordering Iraq.8 A number of thematic issues were covered on the agenda including ONS/PNS relations, NS as auxiliary to the state (military and humanitarian state operations), NS from countries taking part in the hostilities, cooperation with external UN and other actors that could have implications for independent operations, communications and threat NCW/Security. 8 No record of the meeting was made available to the Review Team.


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Feedback initially suggested that the PNS were satisfied with the overall outcomes, however further reactions shared by the Federation following the MENA Consortium meeting (12 November 2002) that implied a lower enthusiasm. Overall, it was concluded that the PNS wanted more from Movement coordination. They wanted to hear further about the lessons learned from Afghanistan and especially about the situation after the acute phase of the conflict. It is worth noting that, unlike the Balkans, there is no formal record of a coordinated Movement review or evaluation of Afghanistan. Hence there was not much to share, despite recommendations to both Geneva Headquarters in 2000 following the Balkans operations to undertake review exercises following any major disaster response activities.9 In spite of this, the ICRC did request that PNS prepare capacity statements, reflecting both plans and intentions. By 17 December 2002, approximately 19 inputs had been received by the ICRC, copied to the Federation. It was in December, at the time of the launch of the annual Emergency appeal by both Geneva headquarters, that some rough edges started to become more visible in the working relationships between the Federation and ICRC concerning Iraq preparation and mobilization. Disagreement centred mainly on security and Lead Agency status. While some indications of these differences could be traced back to October 2002, it was not until January 2003 that this would be sorted out. For example, at the Geneva Support Group meeting (10 December 2002) the Federation noted that it was having technical difficulties communicating instructions on sensitive matters to its staff in Baghdad. The Federation explicitly disagreed with the ICRC that there should be a system of predefined indicators that would allow the concept of “Lead Agency” in Iraq to be automatically evoked. Instead, the Federation preferred a process whereby the relevant directors of both institutions would decide. On this point, the ICRC expressed confusion. They simply did not understand what was meant under “directors should decide.” The ICRC’s preference was for a no-nonsense approach based on interpretation that permitted any side to propose Lead Agency status, especially keeping in mind the security of staff. Furthermore, the Federation also disagreed that during the “orange” phase all its representatives should be evacuated from Iraq. Without warning, the Federation argued that it did not completely agree to the ICRC being in full control at this phase. The Federation argued that they required 1-2 representatives in a facilitating capacity (who would also support the ICRC) to advise the IRCS on management and policy during a delicate and critical time, and prepare to re-start activities after the break in activities. Predictably, the ICRC did not see such a role for the Federation during the orange phase, nor did ICRC understand what was meant by facilitation. Due to the strong disagreement from both sides, further discussion was suspended on the subject. Nevertheless, in another unexpected turn, the Federation indicated that it was ready to give full support the ICRC role as Lead Agency in front of the IRCS should the issue be raised. However, concerning the Federation’s representative in Iraq, they informed the ICRC, “…that the planned discussion of the use of IRCS preparedness stocks which will be established with the Federation’s support was not relevant before the main issue (above) was solved.” On the theme of UN cooperation, the Federation informed the ICRC that no new discussions were held in Baghdad on co-operation agreements with UNICEF or any other UN agencies. The ‘cracks’ further widened at a later Support Group Meeting (17 December 2002). It was acknowledged that security management was an issue and would be forwarded to Directors for discussion. The Federation repeated its position: “…that they (the Federation) will be present in Iraq during the acute phase of hostilities, with an advisory role to the NS, not an operational one.” Two

9 It is worth noting that nowhere among the 26 recommendations in the report of the Ad hoc Group on the conduct of international relief operations (Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent – 08.02.2001) was there any reference to necessity of undertaking ‘after action reviews’ or evaluation. Yet, a great deal is said about preparedness, organization and management, compatibility, information and image, and culture and behavior. The lack of an appropriate review and evaluation mechanism that enables Movement components to regularly reflect together or separately on lessons following major relief initiatives is analogous to driving a car without the aid of rear view mirrors.


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options were put on the table - either be coordinated by the Lead Agency or go for parallel programmes. Discussion once again was suspended to await feedback from the Directors. By the next GSG meeting, nearly one month later (14 January 2003), minutes from the previous meeting had not been finalized. No clear messages were forthcoming to the field. The consequences were most felt on the security side where it was perceived that little had been undertaken in the field following the Lead Agency decision. Non-conventional weapons (NCW) continued to be an issue, especially the training initiatives of Netherlands and Norway Red Cross. It was at this meeting that the Federation finally acknowledged that initial contact had indeed been made with UNICEF, signalling that the latter wished a go-between for themselves and IRCS for the purpose of distributing stocks for UNICEF. In the face of concerns raised by the ICRC, the Federation conceded that it was best to redirect UNICEF to ICRC as the Lead Agency, and to share with ICRC the draft agreement proposed by UNICEF. Further astonishment was expressed by the ICRC when it was revealed that discussions were underway between the Federation and UNHCR. The aim was to define an enhanced agreement between the Federation and UNHCR and to later include the National Societies in neighbouring countries. The ICRC, without qualification, indicated that it did not want to be a part of the agreement. It cited its concerns that a joint pre-briefing had been quickly organized to inform permanent missions. It also recalled its earlier disquiet about cross border operations, the status of Movement and assets under the lead of ICRC; how the statutes of the Movement and Seville would be recognized, the perceived independence of the Federation and National Societies, and possible target population preferences (i.e. refugees versus all vulnerable victims). By 31 January 2002, the discordance in Geneva was mirrored by dysfunctional relationships in the field between respective Heads of Delegation in Baghdad. The disagreement reached such a height that it was raised by ICRC at the monthly Senior Management’s Meeting. Here, the Federation confirmed that earlier understandings shared by the senior managers of both institutions about coordination and Lead Agency status remained valid. It was admitted that this arrangement had not been properly communicated or understood in the field. The Federation committed itself to contact its Head of Delegation in the field to clarify the common understandings shared by the two headquarters in Geneva. On the same day, the Federation and ICRC were also participating in a joint MENA Consortium meeting (29 January 2003). It concerned a country by country briefing on NS preparedness plans by the Federation and ICRC. Discussions centred on ERU and FACT deployment, the Movement (GSG, Baghdad Executive Group and Field Management Teams) and interagency coordination bodies, an update from the Iranian Red Crescent Society, and issues related to media and communications. On this last point, it must be noted that a low profile approach had been adopted by the Geneva institutions in order not to be perceived too visibly as preparing for conflict in Iraq. The impression that certain scenarios were a forgone conclusion was to be avoided. Despite this strategy, it was apparent that National Societies were being approached by media in the region about their preparedness plans. Unlike the other components, they were going public. The Federation also informed the PNS about the pending agreement with UNHCR, and the results of a pre-briefing meeting with Permanent Missions. The Federation also shared their thoughts on capacity-building during a crisis operation, and on later rehabilitation and reconstruction. By February, the Federation finally handed over revised minutes from December and January at the GSG meetings (4 February, 2003). At this session, members took the opportunity to reflect on the GSG’s role, its performance and decision making power, taking into account recent discussion from the January SMM meeting. It was at this meeting that the Federation announced that the Disaster Management and Coordination Division (DMC) had officially taken over operational responsibility for Iraq from the Cooperation and Development Division (C&D). GSG members agreed that work should commence quickly on sector guidelines, concluding in a Federation-ICRC Memorandum of Understanding. The 11 February meeting also focused on the continuing saga of NCW and the uncoordinated training initiatives of the Dutch Red Cross targeted at NS of countries neighbouring Iraq.


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By March, 2003, the dialogue was highly active, organized using a standard agenda, and revolving around the fine tuning of details related to coordination mechanisms and operational progress. For example, issues covered included: ü Latest developments in the region ü Coordination of appeals, ü Security arrangements (relocation) ü DG - ICRC visit it Iraq ü Customs situation in Iraq ü MOU (still had not be finalize) ü ERU (no pre-positioning and team leaders meeting ) ü BTC training ü Unsolicited donation for Iraq ü Deployment procedures of PNS staff (briefings, security training, deployment logistics) ü PNS coordination (bilateral and unilateral delegates, and PNS in Syria and Turkey) ü Cross border ambitions of NS in the region ü UN, NGO and interagency coordination ü Meeting for ERU Team Leader

Throughout March, the Federation invested considerable effort in co-ordinating final preparations of contingency plans with each concerned national society. This involved on-going follow-up to PNS capacity statements. Internal Federation Task Force meetings were held daily, however it is unclear what was discussed, decided or followed-up as no meeting records were available to the Review Team. Work continued in earnest on an active cooperation with the NS of neighbouring countries, supporting each society within their national context, scaling up of their operational capacity, enhanced disaster preparedness training and the pre-positioning of stocks. With the escalation of hostilities in Iraq, and the launch of the Emergency Appeal, the preparedness process would now move into the next phase – implementation and preparation of contingency plans.

WHAT RESULTED FROM THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS On 20 March 2003, all the preparations and mobilization efforts came together. On this date, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies launched its emergency appeal for Iraq and Neighbouring Countries. The Federation launch was successfully coordinated simultaneously with a separate launch of the ICRC appeal. Both appeals made reference to each other. The Federation appeal solicited CHF 111,039,000 (USD 79,776,929 or EUR 75,481,631) in cash, kind and services to assist 305,000 beneficiaries for 9 months (55,000 in Iraq and 250,000 in neighbouring countries.10 The priorities of the Federation, as reflected in the updated contingency plans, were primarily focused on providing assistance to National Societies to support the delivery of assistance to refugees (or other beneficiaries) by:

• Scaling-up operational capacity • Enhanced disaster preparedness training • Pre-positioning of stocks; and • Preparing refugees or displaced persons camp sites

The Federation’s relief response efforts would focus on basic human needs linked with health and care, water and sanitation, the distribution of food and non-food items and temporary shelters. In conjunction with National Societies in the region, the Federation identified a two-phase operation

1. First Phase (anticipated three months duration) would consist in reinforcing effective disaster response capacity in Iraq and neighbouring countries, involving update contingency plans,

10 The ICRC appeal was for 108.5 million CHF for four months.


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pre-positioning of relief stocks, and disaster training (already accomplished) in preparation for the anticipated relief operations

2. Second Phase (anticipated six months duration) would consist in planning for rehabilitation programmes aimed primarily at national society capacity building.

From the perspective of scenario planning, the Federation appeal refers to the estimates derived from other humanitarian agencies. In a short term, the conflict in Iraq was described as potentially leading to a situation involving more than 600,000 refugees and as many as 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). It was also noted that 500,000 persons could require emergency medical treatment. In a medium-term war, it was conjectured that further escalation in population Movement might be anticipated, amounting to 1.5 million refugees and 5-6 million IDPs. A longer term conflict would require international assistance for most of the population. The overall goal of the Federation’s response effort was stated:

To alleviate the suffering of affected population by supporting National Societies in the countries neighbouring Iraq in their efforts to effectively deliver assistance to the people of Iraq, particularly in the event of a large population movement to Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Under the goal were four regional objectives, organized by sector (health care, water and sanitation, relief distribution of food and basic non-food items, shelter) to be accomplished in 3 months, and 4 objectives, again sorted by the same sectors, that referred to the capacity building of National Societies in countries neighbouring Iraq over 9 months. ü Objective 1 - (In each of the health situation; water and sanitation, general condition,

adequate shelter facilities) the target population is maintained at satisfactory level within the emergency period of 3 months.

ü Objective 2 - National Societies in the region are better prepared to respond to man-made and natural (including epidemics) disasters.

Each objective was ‘unpacked’ in terms of expected results, indicators, and activities planned. The proposed post-conflict rehabilitation in Iraq intended to reactivate projects included in the 2003 Iraq annual appeal (no 01.88/2003). As for the neighbouring countries, it was stated that the objectives would be further developed and plans translated into projects depending on the situation. For the time being the MENA appeal (no 01.93/2003) would be relied upon to provide a starting point.


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Explanatory Notes 1Number of persons assisted for 3 months 2Includes non-food items in Dubai for 20,000 (3 months) 3Located in Jordan to cover 8,000 families and located in Dubai for 4,000 families 4Total no of identified site with responsibility of NS in brackets 5The 6 camps are within Turkey and 12 sites outside (not under NS responsibility) 6(1/family/Month). In terms of Movement coordination, the following structure had been established:

Red Cross/Red Crescent Co-ordination Established

Headquarters Geneva Support Group - Weekly meetings of ICRC and Federation secretariat operational teams.

Iraq Executive Group - ICRC, Federation and weekly meetings chaired by ICRC as the Lead Agency.

Neighbouring countries Field Management Teams - Weekly meetings of the host National

MIDDLE EAST DISASTER PREPAREDNESS CAPACITY ESTABLISHED Profile of Facts and Figures at a Glance

20 March 2003 IRAQ IRAN TURKEY SYRIA JORDAN KUWAIT TOTAL National Society Capacity in the region

Non food Relief1 55,000 100,000 80,000 5,000 5,000 20,000 305,000 Volunteers 3,000 70,000 4,000 2571 600 500 80,170

Federation Capacity in the region Delegations Country Country Regional Office Regional Office

Human Resources 5+local 3+4 8+3 1+3 7+7 1+3 25+20local Non food Relief 1 40,000 60,0002

Profile of Deployed Delegates

1 HOD 1 FED Representative 4 Disaster Management 2 Logistics 2 Water/Sanitation 1 PHE SoL 2 Information 1 Security 1 Relief

15

Other Disaster Management Capacity FACT 297 trained members of which 50 available in 36 hours 35-40

National Societies ERU on standby

1 Telecom 4 Water Treatment & Supply line 4 Logistics 4 Field hospitals 2 Water Distribution and Trucking 4 Mass Sanitation 9 (11) Basic Health Care 4 Specialized Water and Sanitation

30(32)

DREF CHF 200,000 – 600,000 available immediately IRAQ IRAN TURKEY SYRIA JORDAN REGIONAL3 Camp Sites4 10 (10) 18(6)5 6(1) 4(1) 38(18) Family tent 4x4 2,000 20,000 16,000 1,000 1000 8,000 (4,000) 52,000 Blankets 45,000 100,000 160,000 5,000 5,000 40,000 (30,000) 385,000 Plastic Tarpaul/pcs (10,000) 10,000 Kerosene stoves 15,000 20,000 16,000 1,000 1,000 8,000 45,000 Kerosene heater 8,000 1,000 1,000 8,000 34,000 Mattresses 16,000 5,000 5,000 40,000 50,000 Pillows 3,000 3,000 24,000 30,000 Beds 16,000 Kitchen sets (5 pers) 15,000 20,000 16,000 1,000 1,000 8,000 (5000) Kettle 20,000 20,000 Bucket 20,000 20,000 Jerry cans 20L 15,360 16,000 2,000 2,000 16,000 51,360 Jerry cans 10L (15,000) 15,000 Tanks for water/fuel 40,000 40,000 Kerosene lamps 15,000 20,000 16,000 1,000 1,000 8,000 61,000 Towels 45,000 3,000 3,000 24,000 75,000 Soap sets (5pcs/100g) 15,000 1,000 1,000 8,000 25,000 Hygiene parcels6 60,000 60,000 Plastic sheet-roll 60x4 2,000 100 100 800 25,000 Rubbhalls 4 4 food parcel6 60,000 60,000 Added NS capacity1 100,000


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Society, the Federation, ICRC and all participating National Society representatives present in country, co-chaired by Federation and the host NS.

In the context of coordination with other actors outside of the Movement, the Federation and UNHCR would reach a formal understanding between the institutions on a regional framework that would be signed the following day (21 March 2003). Here, the intention of the Federation at the country level was to include host National Societies into a tripartite contract with the aim of ensuring maximum coordination to guarantee services needed for people who might flee Iraq. Similarly, both the Federation and the ICRC would coordinate information exchange on behalf of the Movement with the UN in Larnaka. As noted in the earlier chart, the Federation had prepared for possible deployment of FACT (Field assessment and co-ordination team). A team of 20-25 members would be deployed with 12-24 hours notice in the region in smaller groups of 3 to 7 persons, depending on the needs and size of the targeted area. The members had the mandate to stay in the area for up to one month and replace delegate needs in case of a major influx As per earlier chart, National Societies engaged actively in the preparations by making available and putting on standby their Emergency Response Unit - ERU units (self-supporting for the first month and can be deployed for up to 3 months). Available modules were not pre-positioned for Iraq, but could be deployed upon receipt of an ERU alert (mobilized with 48-72 hours). These units were to be deployed to neighbouring countries based on the Movement of large populations. It was also made clear in the appeal that ERUs were not designed for use in the situation of NCW. They could not be expected to provide decontamination services to victims. National Societies ready to contribute the more than 30 ERUs included: Austria (5), Belgium (1), Denmark (1), Finland 3(5), Germany (8), Japan (2), Norway (4), Spain (4), Sweden (1), and UK (1) In terms of training, considerable effort was put into enhancing national society capacity in the region and in Iraq in relief, logistics, health, organizational development, disaster preparedness, information and finance. Preparatory efforts included the following:

Regional Human Resource Support- Training Completed

Federation’s Strategic Relief Centre Iran, Teheran

2002 – newly opened

Regional Disaster Response Team Iran Teheran

2002 (mid -December) involving 35 disaster staff and volunteers MENA

Camp Management Training Syria, Palmyre

2002 (October)

Camp Management Training Iraq 2002 (November) Disaster Management Workshops Turkey 2003 - Three workshops

Camp Management Training Kuwait 2003 (March) involving UNHCR and ICRC for 250 volunteers in KRCS

Water/Sanitation Training Syria NS volunteers with a technical background. From an accountability perspective, the Federation committed itself to having in place a monitoring and evaluation system that would assure assistance delivery and support to those most in need. This would include Operational updates based on reports from the region, implementing agents and field visits. Real time evaluation would be undertaken and project monitoring carried out. At the end of the nine month appeal period, an evaluation of the degree of achievement of the expected results, objectives and goal would be completed. As for the financial picture, a discretionary budget of CHF 3.2 million was approved by the Secretary General in January, 2003 to cover initial orders of basic non-food relief items in neighbouring


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countries.11 The total commitments for the disaster preparedness had exceeded that amount and stood at CHF 6.3 million, covering pre-positioning of non-food relief items and delegates.

The Financial Estimates Established Pre-positioning CHF– 6.3 million Total commitments (including pre-position of non-food items

and delegates)

Start-up CHF-46.6 million

Beginning of operations - deployment of FACT and ERU, utilization of Dubai stocks, establishment of refugee camps, additional personnel and immediate replenishment of stocks in Iran and Turkey

Total Commitment CHF-52.4 million Pre-positioning and Start-up

Operating Cost CHF-51.0 million Based on CHF-17 million (monthly) operating costs for 250,000 - emergency expected to last 3 months

Rehabilitation Budget CHF- 8.0 million Anticipated initial costs

OVERALL ASSESSMENT While there is no precise blueprint for organizing preparedness activities, it is nevertheless possible to identify some standard components for any disaster preparedness systems. In any ideal system, the quality ‘preparedness’ is not found at the headquarters of an international organization like the Federation, but is found at the local, national and regional level. The Federation Secretariat well recognized this fact. Given the limits of the methodology for this review, where no field visits were undertaken as well as time constraints, it was not possible to directly assess the actual nature and extent of preparedness activities in the neighbouring countries. However, it would not be surprising to discover in a region such as MENA, that these capacities varied considerably across countries and National Societies. It would also be reasonable to assume that in the absence of capacities at the local level, there will always remain a need for international organizations such as the Federation to be involved in helping to fill in the gaps. In any DP system there are three main components covering operational preparedness and those proactive tasks deemed essential for an effective emergency response12. They consist of contingency arrangements - activities that must occur in advance of a crisis to ensure that human and material resources are readily available. Situation Monitoring and needs assessment - activities required to identify a crisis situation before it becomes critical and the appropriate responses. Initial response involves the mobilization and deployment of personnel, equipment and materials to a crisis site.

Components of an Ideal Preparedness System

11 See Email requesting authorization to place orders for Syria and Jordan from Kalle Loovi to Abbas Gullet (cc to Jean Ayoub), approved by Secretary General (17.01.03) 12 Lester Salamon and Associates, Center on International Cooperation, The Preparedness Challenge in Humanitarian Assistance, (New York University, Oct. 1999).


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These three Core Preparedness functions can be further unpacked.

PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM – KEY ACTIVITIES Contingency Arrangements Situation Monitoring

and Needs Analysis Initial Response

ü Undertake contingency planning ü Complete training – emergency support

staff and standby personnel ü Create ready access to relief supplies

(i.e. stockpiles and standby arrangements)

ü Establish standby arrangements for transport

ü Launch any research and development needed

ü Finalize fundraising plan ü Cultivate relationships with key actors

(UN, donors, NGOs) ü Preposition materials in areas of risk ü Develop protocols and support for needs

assessment and response teams

ü Survey areas for risk ü Identify sites for

assessment work ü Deploy need

assessment teams ü Establish adequate early

communication about conditions as they develop

ü Maintain situation monitoring personnel and equipment in the field

ü Develop appropriate response

ü Activate funding arrangements, standby personnel and supply arrangements

ü Mobilize and deploy permanent, stand-by personnel and hire local personnel as required

ü Establish operations site with logistic and communication systems

ü Deliver initial emergency goods

ü Coordinate response with other humanitarian agencies.

Against the above criteria, it can be concluded that the Federation’s management and coordination of the preparations for the Iraq Crisis was successful. At the same time this accomplishment should be viewed against a backdrop of many exogenous or external factors. First, the period to prepare was relatively long and explicit. This is unusual in most crisis situations. Second, the preparedness phase occurred during an extremely difficult period in the evolution of the Federation. With organizational change strategies piled on top of political tensions at the highest level (that ultimately led to the departure of the Secretary General), coupled with funding and staff morale issues, it is rather remarkable that activities did not simply grind to a halt. This is a tribute to the dedication and professionalism of the management and staff of the Secretariat’s Disaster Management and Coordination and the other Federation units supporting DMC. Many will acknowledge that Iraq was special. Iraq was not the Balkans, nor was it Afghanistan. While there may have been many commonalities, there were also significant differences. In Iraq, it did take 6 months to prepare. And in the end, the results of this preparatory effort were never really put to the test and actualised. The anticipated population out flows simply did not materialise, a blessing in itself. Whether the preparations would have resulted in a well-coordinated, efficient and timely response will always remain in the realm of speculation. During the review, extensive interviews were conducted. Interviewees from the Federation Secretariat, field delegations, National Societies, ICRC, government donors and external organisations

Situation Monitoring and Needs Assessment

Contingency Arrangements

Initial Response

Core Preparedness

functions


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were asked to rate the overall the preparedness efforts of the Federation on a five point scale (with 5 representing what might be considered a model DP exercise). More than sixty percent of the interviewees took the opportunity to score the exercise. Overall, their views tend to converge. The conclusion is that the Federations preparatory efforts were judged to be positive and worthwhile. While the Federation’s preparatory process for Iraq may not be viewed as a model for future operations, nevertheless most of the building blocks are there and should be captured as part of the current ongoing work to produce Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). While the preparatory process for Iraq may not be viewed as a model for future operations, nevertheless most of the building blocks were there and should be captured as part of the current ongoing work to produce Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) When the feedback is broken down, it is not surprising that the self-assessment of those directly involved in the preparedness activities viewed their efforts very positively. They would give a four out of five for the preparedness phase. This is slightly higher than other parts of the Federation (regional departments, support services) who tended to see the results slightly less favourably. They, along with external stakeholders, would that many things were done right, but not necessarily as well as they could have been. Opportunities were missed, but this must not cloud the fact that an enormous effort was made by a dedicated core team in the Disaster Management and Coordination Division. New ground had been cleared in many areas, especially in terms of coordination with National Societies, the ICRC and the other stakeholders (e.g. UN). Surprisingly, despite the many problems at the outset, the ICRC tended to be slightly more positive towards what was accomplished by the Federation during the Iraq preparations. This was in contrast to National Societies who were less upbeat. Finally, among other international organizations and donors, similar patterns were observed. Reactions among UN representatives were the most favourable, while donors tended to be less satisfied but certainly more pleased than National Society representatives.

Quick Reference What Worked What Did Not Work (..As Well As Expected)

Duration - Time to do the preparatory work – process scores very high in terms of willing and intentions. People generally were willing to talk. Second half (Jan to May 2003) more effective

Slow mobilization -First half (Sept to Jan 2002) less effective. The perception is that preparedness took too long. There was a lost of momentum, especially in engaging the ICRC.

Geneva Support Group – While it did not have decision making power, it was a good tool.

DP Policy and tools -Follow the preparedness policy in a loose sense and little evidence is available suggesting use of DP tools.

Model building blocks -Compared to 5-10 years ago, Federation was more prepared. Emphasis was on capacities. Efforts provided elements for a working model (e.g. joint declaration with ICRC).There was little overlapping and duplication.

Scenario assumptions around population Movement were questionable. Situation concerning IDPs less clear. Country assessments not well done. Little understanding existed about capacities inside Iraq. Much happened in the field, but it did not get reported.

Good dialogue on security - coordination between Geneva Headquarters was constructive; however contingency planning in the field was less optimal.

Non-compliance of HOD in the field with security regulations and relationship with ICRC was a limiting factor. Coordination & leadership in the field an issue.

Co-ordination with the UN was very positive, especially with respect to Larnaka, MOU with

Agreements incomplete - MOU with ICRC and tripartite contracts in the field (Federation, NS and

The International Federation’s Management and Coordination of Preparedness

For the Iraq Crisis 2003


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Quick Reference What Worked What Did Not Work (..As Well As Expected)

UNHCR signed. Federation got appeal out sooner than the UN.

UNHCR) remained unsigned. Relationship with UN could have been more strategic. IOM was an issue

ERU and FACT – the PNS were pulled together and bent over backwards to put people and equipment on standby. Support unit kept PNS informed.

Little Useable FACT Team results. Getting the right people at the right spot and the right time was a challenge. No assessment methods used for ERU.

Donor outreach & funding –Briefings appreciated. Selective donors covered the costs of preparedness. .

Donor interest in preparedness was generally weak. Donors were also concerned about double dipping.

Reporting from the field delegates was vital especially in terms of information on target populations. Overall reporting was more consistent later in the process due to coordination by DMC.

Information Sharing and DMIS was under exploited. In the spirit of 2010 and Movement strategy, DMIS could have provided up to date information, highlighting real time trends and discussion of issues.

Media Pick-up- Stories on the IRCS were picked up by other media and newspapers

Communication tended to focus too much on the short term and missed opportunities to engage NS

Logistics and Information tools – Overall implementation was done well, mobilization tables showing the needs established, and PNS were generally kept informed via DMIS.

Federation TF meetings – no clearly defined membership or mandate. It tended to focus on details and not enough on scenario planning. Bottlenecks in information flows.

There were delegate briefings and end of project reports by delegates

Human Resources –Confusion created by DMC contacting delegates. Preparation of job descriptions

Joint briefs and meetings with (P)NS - willingness of neighbouring NS. Capacity statements worked.

Some regional NS were very difficult to work with, lacking preparedness capacity. One voice was lacking.

Unilateral and bilateral action of PNS kept to a minimum – With a few exceptions, there was a general sense of collective responsibility.

Transition – handovers between DMC and C&D experienced a loss of momentum after missing target date of May 2003. Relationship with MENA strained.

Risk taking – Secretary General approved initial allocations for preparedness. Risk was known and considered within acceptable limits.

Finance – budgeting and analytical reporting systems were inadequate for tracking and controlling funds. Donor funding arrived late.

Avoided ‘political landmines.’ Preparedness had to contend with many political issues. There was considerable amount of good will that allowed many ‘show-stopping’ issues to be side-stepped.

Governance and organization – vertical account-ability not clearly defined. Organization charts were old. Reporting lines with the field were blurred. Core issues unresolved by GSG. Role of regional delegation needed to be clarified.

Training workshops – were considered useful and generally well-attended.

Military cooperation with NS and the NS tendency towards unilateralism

Generally system worked – mobilization took place in spite of uncertainty in the Federation. This was due mainly to staff motivation.

Restructuring in the Federation did not enable preparedness – reorganization, decentralization and budget cuts tended to be destabilizing factors.

Cooperation between ICRC and Federation – There were some disagreement, but things worked.

Talk about WMD and CBW – conflicting messages tended to be simplistic and distracted people

Learning - As a learning opportunity, there were many things that can be re-used (e.g. MoUs and Agreements).

Frequency of briefing was uneven – use of available technology under-exploited (video/teleconferencing)

In summary, when judged against an ideal model, the Federation’s overall preparations were both relevant and appropriate. What exactly does this mean? Overall, there was contingency planning (although limited), training was undertaken, ready access was created to relief supplies in the form of stockpiles or stand-by arrangements with suppliers, provisions were made for transport, fundraising initiatives were undertaken, relationships were cultivated with key actors (ICRC, National Societies, donors, UN agencies), materials were pre-positioned in areas of risk, protocols for needs assessments and response teams (ERU, FACT) were established, sites were identified and surveyed (to a limited degree), early communications were undertaken (with National Societies, on a regular basis with ICRC, on a bilateral basis with donors). The overall inference that might be drawn is that if there had been a population outflow of the magnitude expected, the Federation would have been prepared to provide an initial response. There was a perception held by all stakeholders that by 20 March 2003, arrangements were in reasonably good shape. The resulting appeal was considered reasonable, limited and legitimated. It may not have been perfect, but most agreed that the job got done.


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ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Disaster preparedness – Federation’s policy Preparedness is critical for any timely, competent and cost-effective emergency response. Many case studies of humanitarian crises have documented that inadequate preparedness results in delayed, less effective and costlier delivery of emergency relief.13 But what does the Federation mean by disaster preparedness? On its web site, The Federation describes DP as: “The readiness to reduce the impact of disasters, and where possible predict, even prevent disasters occurring.” It is also noted on that same page that “.National Societies and the International Federation have a responsibility to ensure that all disaster preparedness activities and programmes are carried out in compliance with the Federation’s disaster preparedness policy.” (See APPENDIX 7) The Federation’s DP policy was approved in 1999 14 and speaks to an ability to predict and, if possible, prevent disasters. At the centre of the policy are themes such as reducing the vulnerability of households and communities in disaster-prone areas and improving their ability to cope with the effects of disasters; strengthening the capacities of National Societies in disaster preparedness and post-disaster response; determining a National Society role and mandate in national disaster plans; and establishing regional networks of National Societies that will strengthen the Federation's collective impact in disaster preparedness and response at the international level. But a policy framework is not enough. It must be imbedded within a wider learning framework. At the beginning of the preparedness phase, some assessment is required. This is to determine what we want to get from the intervention overall. Similarly after the initial assessment, some formalized planning needs to be undertaken. The process cannot be left simply to reside in the heads of people. The decisions taken must be documented, or at the very least allowed in such a form that outside observers can review the facts easily. This is why Standard Operating Procedures are essential, and must be linked with disaster preparedness policy. In support of the above, practical materials are available on the Federation’s web page on planning (i.e. Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment –VCA; Better Programming Initiative (BPI); Well Prepared National Society (WPNS); and Reach Out Project – refugee protection training). As well there are other references (DP training manual, VCA guidelines, disaster preparedness publications), and links to other disaster preparedness sites. The relationship between the disaster preparedness assessment tools is provided in APPENDIX 8. The Federation notes that all these policies and guidelines “…provide detailed direction for the International Federation's humanitarian action in specific areas. They serve as a point of reference to ensure consistency in decision-making worldwide. Policies define the boundaries for the conduct of the Federation and the people working within it. All National Society and Federation staff, delegates and volunteers must be able to access, understand and implement these policies. It is equally important that the authorities, agencies and organizations with whom the National Societies and the Federation work on a daily basis or in time of crisis, are aware of the nature and content of these policies Despite the availability of extensive array of materials, there is little evidence that any of these tools were actually used by National Societies in their preparedness efforts. In fact one criticism on the table for both the Federation and the UN was that perhaps during preparedness, too much attention was paid to the lessons from 1991, than to what was actually happening on the ground in Iraq in 2002.

13 Lester Salamon and Associates, Center on International Cooperation, The Preparedness Challenge in Humanitarian Assistance, (New York University, Oct. 1999). 14 The policy was adopted by the 12th Session of the General Assembly of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies on October 26, 1999. The policy replaces all previously established disaster preparedness policies.


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It is clear from the very outset that Iraq would be different, involving a rather an ‘off the cuff’ orientation to preparedness, especially during the build up stage. The gap between policy and disaster preparedness was evident throughout. In reality, there was no model of disaster preparedness really at work. Other examples might have been drawn upon such as Algeria, but little existed on paper. No disaster preparedness staff was actually involved on the Iraq Task Force. In the future, it could be more favourable to include more directly the regional department, as well as disaster preparedness staff (policy and technical perspective from the regional delegation) in the preparations, guided by an agenda that encourages such involvement. Such an arrangement would be very advantageous, especially in terms of transition.

1) Recommendation - In terms of transition, assuming the current split between DMC and C&D and where operational responsibility resides with DMC, a member of the regional department and/or responsible geographic desk should join the DMC team in the last forty days of the mandate to coordinate the parameters of operational transition back to the respective regional department.

Of course understanding is greatly facilitated when the source material is at least available in the native tongue of the speakers. A considerable amount of communication and media materials (e.g. updates) are routinely made available in Arabic. But many key policy documents are not. These included the above disaster preparedness policy, post-emergency rehabilitation policy, health policy, first aid policy, essential drugs and medical supplies, social welfare policy, guidelines on family reunification, guidelines on the reception of asylum seekers are but a few.

2) Recommendation - Key DP policies, guidelines and tools should be translated into Arabic and that these materials, are kept together for easy access and retrieval, and used as a basis to re-engage the National Societies in the region, especially for training and coaching purposes.

Contingency Planning A review of the contingency plan (no date) seems to suggest that it was underdeveloped, or still in draft version with many sections incomplete, in spite of its 30 page length. While containing very general and often descriptive information on MENA region and countries in MENA, there is little information on population vulnerabilities, NS disaster response capacities, general intervention strategies and plans, objectives, possible partnerships, coordination mechanisms, etc. Similarly, there is little or no content on finance and administration, fundraising and reporting, media and reporting. It is not surprising that these aspects later turned out to be so problematic during the transition period. For the above reasons, the contingency plan was not a useful document in guiding the Federation efforts.15 Furthermore, there is no suggestion from the interviews conducted that this plan was the centrepiece of preparedness. However, as a much shorter document it might cover the basics concerning the crisis: a brief description of the overall situation, identification of key target populations who needed to be reached during the preparedness/response phase (e.g. Federation field delegations, National Societies in the region, ICRC, PNS, donors, UN organizations, NGOs, media, etc), specification of a limited number of objectives and the results expected to be achieved, the identification of key risks factors that need to be managed and contingency activities that may need to be called upon to minimize the risk, specification of key milestones and time frames, and some idea regarding the magnitude of resources required.

3) Recommendation - The format for a contingency plan should be reviewed with the aim of producing a shorter, more tightly focused document that covers the basic information needed in contingency planning. For every crisis, the contingency plan should be completed in

15 For example it was predicted that one million third country nationals would be at risk. This was based on a UN estimate. Some within the Federation felt that this should not have been put into the appeal and that the Federation should rely more on information coming from sources within the Movement.


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sufficient detail to guide implementation efforts and include information concerning results objectives, outputs, input and costs along with relevant indicators for each.

As a footnote to the above, it was interesting to note in reviewing the actual draft contingency plan a reference, under security and safety, indicating that during the pre-conflict:

Our planned action is to take out delegates from Baghdad when we (the Federation) cannot be operational anymore without being exposed to too big unnecessary security risks…Seen how the situation in Iraq might turn out in the event of an attack, it will imperative that we are conducting a timely relocation of our delegates. We will make this clear also to the IRCS and in time, so no surprises occur when we relocated. We have already now a high preparedness and relocation alert.

Task Force The Federation Secretariat Task Force met everyday (from one half hour to one hour). Discussions tended to focus on the details, often be ing more than what 15 people needed to hear. Few opportunities were taken to activate scenario planning. Often no record of discussion was maintained. The general impression among Task Force Members was that the Task Force could have been more efficient, with fewer people (but the same people) at each session. At the same time, monthly meetings might have been convened for a larger group to share more general information. It was felt that DMC needed to have more people on the team, but such a request was not forthcoming. For example, the absence of a financial expert on the Task Force was perceived to be a gap. In parallel with the above, meetings and arrangements were felt to be very dependent on Head of Task Force. The relationship with the Deputy was not sufficiently clear to others. The prevailing impression among Task Force members was that tasks needed to be more clearly defined, with more delegation of responsibility, so others could follow. The Department (MENA) needed to be more involved, especially in the latter part of the ninety-day assignment. It was felt that the Department knows how the region works. This lack of involvement was most felt during the transition stage back to the Department from the DMC. Here many frustrations, especially on the financial side, were expressed within the Secretariat. It was also felt that the regional delegation was neither sufficiently informed nor pulled into the operations. Communications from the Regional delegation in the field needed to be better linked within the Secretariat. The value added of having operations limited to Geneva should be more carefully assessed. One model could be to have operations planning and coordination done from the field, while Geneva is limited to media services, information exchange, human resource recruitment, external relations and finance. Similarly, bringing other actors into a Task Force arrangement from the ICRC, Federation and National Society should have been given more consideration.

4) Recommendation - Task force meetings should focus on strategic and long term issues involving DP staff, not limited to implementation details, and follow-up actions and decisions recorded accordingly.

5) Recommendation – In order to enhance more efficient and effective communication, further

consideration should be given to implementing other models to operational planning and coordination that better link the Federation and the field.

6) Recommendation - A detailed plan of action should be produced shortly after the launch of

an emergency appeal.

7) Recommendation - More staff and delegates should be considered to join the Geneva team during the preparedness phase of a crisis. The Task Force should include a financial specialist, charged with the responsibility of budgeting and accounting, with human resource


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competencies to oversee job descriptions, briefing and other administrative details on behalf of the DMC team.

Human Resources Obtaining the best possible quality people to do the job is critical in preparedness activities. It is time-consuming work. Before one can send personnel to the field, strict procedures need to be followed covering medical clearances, visa arrangements and sometimes renewal of passports. This is not only true for operations, but also for support key functions such as reporting and information sharing. How PNS respond to the job descriptions is a central step in the process. For example, sending a list of skilled people such as pilots and lawyers to fulfil what is basically a reporting job is not always a good match. Providing candidates that are neither suited to the job description nor meet the statement of qualifications slows things down and usually brings a higher overhead to the undertaking. The Federation’s human resources section is vita l to a smooth operation. Yet the messages passed to HR did raise some concerns whether planning was realistic. How many delegates were really needed? The urgency in Geneva to place delegates in the field was not shared by the field. Effective leadership and management are, of course, central to a well-run operation. It is evident that at headquarters, the Federation had many knowledgeable staff with 10 to 25 years experience with the Red Cross. But is background experience enough? The ability to shift to a disaster culture should happen more automatically, especially at the HOD level. Clear job descriptions are of critical importance, and must better reflect not only the culture of development but also that of disaster. In its absence, the probability of something going wrong is dramatically increased. This was true for Iraq, where job descriptions either did not exist or were judged to be inappropriate. For example, the job description for the Federation’s Head of Delegation (HOD) in Iraq says virtually nothing about responsibilities and tasks when the situation shifts into a crisis response situation, especially when ICRC assumes Lead Agency responsibility. With respect to the Head of Delegation in Iraq, there were clearly personnel problems which caused considerable frustration not only for the Federation but for National Societies and the ICRC. At the staff level tasks were equally unclear, but this was not limited only to Baghdad. It was equally felt in other parts of the Federation field operations. Another example was the two American disaster management specialists in Turkey. When they arrived, job descriptions were considered inappropriate and had to be rewritten by the HOD. In a crisis, the profile of the HOD needs to be adjusted. It is no longer a normal situation and changes may be required including on occasion the replacement of the HOD, if for only a temporary duration. The incumbent of a position should reflect qualities more in keeping with a humanitarian crisis mandate: 1) possess previous operational emergency experience; 2) is knowledgeable about the Federation and RC/RC emergency system; 3) has worked previously with ERU and FACT; 4) exhibits a temperament and personality that avoids taking ‘knee jerk’ reactions in an emergency situation; and 5) possess a broader knowledge that others do not have (e.g. how the UN system works). Most importantly, the HOD must be able to implement the general parameters for coordination set out in the Seville agreement, covering the key areas of security, communications and logistics. With respect to training, it was noted that people trained in regional disaster preparedness were not really used directly. There might have been opportunities to pull such resources into the preparations and place them along side more experienced staff members.

8) Recommendation - The Federation should carefully review the relevance and appropriateness of current job descriptions, especially for Heads of Delegation, regarding roles, responsibilities and accountabilities during a disaster or crisis, and the suitability of incumbents of these positions be carefully screened against a well-defined statement of qualifications.


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Communication The adoption of low key communications for the Iraq crisis was a decision that is open to debate within the Red Cross Movement. The perception from the Federation Secretariat side was that during the preparedness phase, communication activities were subject to significant restrictions and hence little was heard from the Federation. From a donor and PNS perspective, communications from the Secretariat, Regional Delegation and NS worked best when they were relatively open. Many stories could be made public, especially during slow moments. From the other side, doing articles in Arabic is not something new for the Federation and a lack of input did not stop local National Societies in the region. The Federation did produce articles on the crisis later on that were picked-up by regional newspapers (e.g. Jordan Times, newspapers in Baghdad).

Telecommunications Preparedness was generally adequate given the expectations and conditions present (i.e. only 1 permanent telecom expert for the region). The recognition that more telecom trained personnel are needed in the field to undertake the necessary technical assessment in coordination with NS during a crisis should not be underestimated. In normal circumstances, the role of coordinator is to work with local societies to build up capacity. During the preparedness phase, the ideal is to have a coordinator teamed up with NS trained technicians to provide an assessment on overall arrangements and standards. The role of HOD is critical at such times and (s)he should possess the necessary training and awareness of such telecommunications matters. Half-day induction courses are usually not enough. Delegates and HOD need to have more training, otherwise you risk having people who are not really suited to the responsibilities they are asked to carry out.

Finances Transparent financial budgeting and accounting is not a choice. It is an obligation requiring skilled individuals. For the Iraqi preparations, it was not possible to clearly follow the evolution of the process from the financial side. To achieve a minimum of transparency requires utilizing appropriate and reliable financial management tools. At the same time, the quality of information that goes into the financial and budget system is critical. Low grade information does little to enhance the preparedness process, and certainly does not support coordinated action. When no budgets are approved or evident, any sense of clear direction or shared understanding is difficult to achieve. Similarly, post-events briefings should be required especially to account for what financial resources have been spent.

9) Recommendation - The financial system used for preparedness activities to track budgets, forecasts, commitments, and expenditures needs careful reconsideration.

Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) The daily DMIS e-mails to National Societies to say that the website had been updated were appreciated. However, PNS felt that it was not enough to expect readers to find the website and determine what was new. A more informative e-mail with a subject headline, points to highlight the changes and hot links to the content within the website would be more appreciated. The overall aim within and beyond the DMIS is to better share required information during a disaster in order to support constructive decision-making.

Standard Operating Procedures Work has already begun by the DMC on consolidating the various tools and lessons from past emergency response efforts into a set of Standard Operating Procedures. This task is of vital importance and should be completed at all costs, no matter how pressing an emerging humanitarian


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crisis might be, since it will clarify the role, activities and accountabilities of the Disaster Management and Coordination Division.

10) Recommendation – The standard operating procedures (SOP) for disaster management covers roles, responsibilities, accountabilities, key activities (logistics, FACT, ERU, human resource recruitment, training, financial management, communications, information management) should be completed as rapidly as possible. The document should be discussed inside the Federation Secretariat and also distributed among Movement counterparts for feedback, and eventual inclusion in Federation and Movement training modules.

Seville Agreement Did Seville work or not during the preparedness phase? What did it mean in practical terms? Was Iraq a model operation? As usual it depends on one’s perspective and interpretation. Seville sets out a general framework for coordination that could have benefited, in the case of Iraq, from an interpretative document or addendum. A MOU was to be produced between the two institutions, but this did not materialise. In its absence there was a significant lack of clarity concerning responsibilities. Lead Agency status may have been clear to everyone in Geneva as far back as June 2002, but this was not accepted by the Federation HOD in the field, resulting in awkward delays and misunderstandings. For a period of time spanning from the fall of 2002 to early 2003, conflicting messages from Baghdad which suggested either a weak chain of command or other games were being played. This was especially in the face of constant attempts to re-negotiate security arrangements. This situation was reinforced by mixed signals from Geneva, especially during the month of December 2002. During the interviews, it was acknowledged by both institutions that more should and could have been done by senior management to ensure clearer direction to the field. The consequence of senior management not taking a more proactive role did result in the classic stereotypical attitudes. For example, the usual caricature of the ICRC as less generous or cultivating an identity outside the Movement seemed to be all too convenient. And the fact that this was used as a basis to question the Seville agreement and Lead Agency status was not constructive. Currently, the climate is right to make further progress on implementing Seville. The fact that joint appeals were issued, instead of separate requests, should not be overlooked. There was indeed more collaboration between all components of the Movement during the preparedness stage. This was noticeable even to outside observers. The fact that the Red Crescent societies in neighbouring countries were more visible was significant. No doubt more could have been done. For example, extra thought might be given to how and when to end the Federation presence. Similarly, it is not impossible to make an MOU on common place action and coordination. Iraq may have been an opportunity missed, but similar situations are bound to emerge. Lastly, as a general principle, there seems to be agreement that the Federation need not be required to relocate at the request of the ICRC, (as per the current terms of Seville) every time an emergency situation suddenly strikes. However it is important that objectives be clear when it is not possible to travel, when institutional capacity-building work is suspended, and when risk is high and the situation volatile. In the face of weak proposals concerning what the HOD could do in Baghdad with the National Society during the crisis, (given the personality differences and the security situation) relocation was probably the right call.

11) Recommendation - The Memorandum of Understanding with the ICRC should be reviewed at a more general level for its possible utilization as a basic model or standing agreement for future operations

12) Recommendation - Agreements (the Federation), guidelines (ICRC), and tripartite contracts

in the field with National Societies and UN organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR) should be


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reviewed for their implications (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks) and a Movement position articulated.

Structure and Coordination Coordination was both an internal and external issue. Internal division of responsibility in the Federation involved two geographic divisions plus two departments and several delegations. If one adds to this all the National Societies, both from within and outside the region, complexity increases and coordination can become more problematic. The degree of coordination for the Iraqi operation from the field was noticeably less effective than it was in the case of Afghanistan or the Balkans. In the latter case, coordination relied heavily on people in the field who knew one another to make things happen. The Balkans tended to be more management-minded; there was more willingness to listen. When people trust one another, things tend to work better, including coordination. In both the Balkans and Afghanistan, the general approach was to solve problems in the field as they arose. However, what happens when relationships are not progressing well in the field? Difficulties tend to be thrown back on the shoulders of headquarters, and if things are not well structured here to deal with such problems, then control processes can start to breakdown very quickly. If the objective is to better integrate the Movement, then something more is required in terms of optimising coordination and organizational structure. This will continue to be a challenge as the perception still remains, rightly or wrongly, that the ICRC is the most efficient when the Movement is not there. When the Movement is involved, based on past working processes, the perception is that it is seen to slow things down. There is a personnel issue here. If the conditions of Seville are to be met, you need to have people who are operationally strong. The culture of working together still requires effort; especially to better understand what each other is doing and the implications. For example, holding common seminars (for field delegates) would be start. Encouraging more telephone conferences would be another avenue. Overall, the walls still need to be broken down, and this must start in Geneva. Simply getting together will have longer term benefits beyond the immediate crisis. There is a need following each major crisis to come back to the table and say what is being done. Of special interest is to describe how assets were used, especially by National Socie ties. The convening of interagency meetings to review how assets were deployed should be given further consideration.

Relations with the ICRC The fact that ICRC started serious preparatory work in Iraq when early warning signs flashed was commended by many donors. The fact that ICRC stayed in Iraq was courageous and this was applauded. Equally acknowledged were the Federation’s efforts to stay positioned in the region, supporting the neighbouring countries. Overall, relations between the Federation Secretariat and the ICRC were viewed positively by NS. While it was thought to work well, some PNS wondered out loud why there had been so much discussion on the Seville agreement and on the question whether ICRC should be Lead Agency. For them it was clear that the ICRC was the Lead Agency, since they had the knowledge, capacity and better communication systems in place to undertake relief efforts. The fact that the ICRC was seen by some NS to be the more advanced of the two organisations in terms of thinking with respect to Iraq, was partly based on the quality of contacts in the field. It was also the ICRC who was seen by NS as requesting the capacity statements. ICRC led the meetings in November 2002. It was the ICRC who was seen to be setting the agenda and the deadlines. This prompted some NS to question where the Federation’s presence in all of this. Some NS even noted


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that copies of capacity statements that had been sent to the Federation never did receive substantive replies.16 For other NS, however, the issue was not why the Federation started preparedness activities so slowly, but why the ICRC chose to exhibit qualities perceived to be inflexible, sometimes patronizing, and at times too controlling. Here, it is argued that while the preparations in terms of joint meetings may have went well, real understanding on the part of ICRC was thought to be lacking. The subject that most respondents point to as an irritant concerned the interest of NS to enter Iraq. For many the fact that the NGOs were already present seemed inconsistent with the position of ICRC. Some NS voiced the opinion that ICRC used security as an excuse to block access. Where meaningful dialogue should have existed in engaging NS, instead, it was felt that the ICRC here had overplayed its hand. Iraq was not considered by many as a good example of how the Movement should function. The ICRC was thought to be completely deaf to the needs and attitudes of NS. Its behaviour tended to suggest that it was either unable or unwilling to find a way to accommodate NS needs. This perceived inflexibility added impetus to the doubts about the workability of the Seville agreement. It was thought that ICRC should and could have tried to at least show more understanding of NS needs even if the outcomes were to remain the same. Similar criticism was expressed in terms of communications that insufficient space was given to what NS were doing in Iraq. Similarly, on the human resource side it was acknowledged that there was little on no contact between the Federation and ICRC. Both competed for delegates, with little clarity around the basis of recruitment. In response to this assessment that it had been too conservative and parochial, equally valid questions were raised by the ICRC about Federation and NS behaviour. The fact that working relationships between HoDs in Baghdad were never really on a solid footing raised concerns. Moreover, it was also justifiably felt that there was not a transparent dialogue coming out of NS. Some in the ICRC do admit that more might have done more to share the rationale behind its position. The reflex has tended more towards not explaining situations, unless it is asked to or forced to do so. ICRC argues that this should not be mistaken as arrogance, but one of operational culture. How to be more proactive and participatory will continue to be a challenge. ICRC claims that there was no modus operandi. Things were not done in a rigid way deliberately. Strategy is defined on the basis of whether space exists and if the necessary degrees of freedom are present to act. Overall, more leadership might have been expected from the ICRC in its dealings with the Federation. It insisted on the lead role, but did the ICRC really follow through? It was well-recognized that the Federation was in flux, not to mention the ongoing financial problems. For the ICRC, things were much easier. This is not meant to be a criticism, but recognition of a successful organization. The ICRC could have dealt with the situation from a position of strength. For 2-3 weeks there were no calls between the two organizations. Much information was not passed on. If ICRC is in the lead, is there not a responsibility to initiate follow-up contact? In other areas, the perceived transparency and engagement with the ICRC has had positive consequences. This was especially felt in terms of coordination with the UN in Larnaca where it was acknowledged by the Federation that the most useful information on the situation reporting in Iraq was often coming from the ICRC delegation. More than simply reporting about the quantity of tents and blankets, the ICRC’s unique approach to information tended to shed light on other situational factors. From the UNHCR side, it was acknowledged that during critical periods of the crisis, the ICRC was indeed “the only game in town.” At the same time this does suggest that a stronger presence might have been expected from OCHA.

16 To external observers the image projected was not always balanced. For example, there could have been 1-2 external briefings at the Federation headquarters. Joint briefings conducted together, alternating between both houses, would have suggested a stronger impression around coordination.


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13) Recommendation - Harmonized coordination between ICRC and the Federation, along the lines as that undertaken in the context of Larnaka, should be considered favourably in future exercises.

Relations with National Societies Managing partnership relationships with NS was a difficult task for the Federation. It was clear that the NS wished to be actively involved and needed something to do. The Federation Secretariat did a reasonable job in relaying this concern; however, the Secretariat could also have spent more time figuring out a constructive and creative outlet for NS activities. This was especially important in the event that the primary scenario did not materialise, an anticipated outflow of refugees. Considerable pressure was on non-traditional PNS in the region. Throughout the coordination process, they were underrepresented. There was little flexibility within the mechanism devised to adequately engage regional National Societies. Iraq was not just about the Red Cross, but also the Red Crescent. To the outsider, the meetings and information exchange sessions with NS, especially the meeting in Dubai, appear more as efforts intended to keep order in the ranks.

14) Recommendation - A system is introduced containing a capacity assessment of each National Society covering personal, material, equipment, information and financial resources. Such a system would complement what is already provided via the National Society self-assessment, and would address the characteristics of a well-prepared National Society.

15) Recommendation – National Societies should be encouraged in the future to continue to

formally state their intentions as a routine part of the preparedness process (i.e. in the form of capacity statements)

16) Recommendation - Teleconferencing and regular meetings with National Societies (both

traditional and non-traditional partner National Societies – PNS) that were generally well rated should continue to be a routine part of any preparedness phase and involve the senior management level.

Relations with United Nations The United Nations does not have natural structures like the Movement. NS are a real strength of the Movement, one in which the UN would like to invest. However, the Movement should ensure it serves itself first by putting Movement relationships and resources to better use. On the UN side, it was acknowledged that stock-taking did not occur quickly enough. The organization of meeting networks, information networks, and contact networks did not happen until much later. Few mechanisms existed within the UN early in the preparedness phase to allow the sharing of sensitive information. At the same time there was a concern within the UN that it might peak too early. It was noted that many people did get tired. There was a gap of two months where only regular updates were being produced. From late January to late February 2003, the perception that predominated was that UN preparedness activities were in under-drive. Collective energy had been dissipated. It only really revived itself at the last minute during March 2003. In many of the meetings convened by the UN, both the Federation and ICRC were present. The UN was sensitive to some of the misgivings that existed within the Movement. The UN was reminded that it could not rely solely on the capacity of NS. While NS did have resources, there were also many gaps. For the UN, the planning assumption was that the NS would piggy back onto UN activities. This was most evident in the case of UNHCR where it was agreed that they would share caseload with the Federation. UNICEF also saw the Iraqi Red Crescent as a potential player. What the UN had underestimated was the length of time before it would return to Iraq (sooner than later). There were other miscalculations. For example, few organizations factored anything into the equation with respect to looting or the level of criminality in the environment. Many aspects tended to be treated in a


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naïve way. For example, food was an issue and the UN did have an image problem in Iraq. They were seen more as humanitarian liberators. When people were exploited on the ground, blame tended to be directed towards the UN. Over time, the UN’s privileged position had slowly unwound. To outside observers, the alarmist nature of the UN appeal was also a concern. It assumed a repeat scenario of 1991 and then took the mid range, producing very high projections based on the limited data available. While Afghanistan was still fresh in people’s minds, 1991 was all the UN had to go on. Faced with little real information, and the fact that coordination efforts in Afghanistan were not the stellar success that some might claim, the UN nevertheless did try to do better in Iraq and, in some respects, it did improve. Nevertheless, it was criticized for not being critical enough, especially when looking at IDPs. For the UN, Iraq preparedness is unlikely to be written up as a bad exercise, but it too is unlikely to be viewed as a model for future operations. Whether such a conclusion is substantiated will depend on whether OCHA launches an internal review and IASC wishes it to go further to examine the response phase. From the Federation Secretariat perspective, information-sharing was usually timely and useful. While the Federation is not always good at engaging OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and OMI, it exceeded liaison expectations during the Iraq crisis. Generally, there was good cooperation and this was acknowledged by many outside observers. Despite the misgivings from ICRC, the MOU with UNHCR was viewed very positively. The perception generally among many donors was that the Red Cross had been better organized and prepared than the UN.

Relations with External Donor Governments Donor outreach is an important activity. Most humanitarian agencies rely heavily on donor financial support to deliver timely and effective humanitarian assistance. The Federation is no exception. Preparedness is a critical phase, limiting what can or cannot be done. Donors generally want to be reassured that everything is under control; that the preparedness has proceeded in a proper manner. Overall the donor assessment of the preparedness activities of the Federation was generally positive. They noted that the appeal had been successfully launched. Communications had been transparent. Bilateral discussion with the Geneva missions had gone well. Knowledge about the activities of various NS was considered ‘value added’. Desk officers’ contacts with the NS were appreciated. Everyone was generally impressed. Unfortunately, few donors were ready to support financially the preparatory work of the Federation. They were ready to invest in an initial emergency response or post-emergency rehabilitation response phase, but they were not keen to absorb costs of preparedness. While some donors continue to use the language of accountability, quality and performance effectiveness, the rationale behind non-support can sometimes border on incoherency:

• The quality of the Federation’s analysis did not sufficiently take into account the political situation, especially for those governments who thought that conflict was unnecessary and opposed to the war.

• Some Geneva Missions acknowledged that they were unclear as to the exact views of their capitals concerning their willingness to support preparedness.

• Others suggested that they did not have a policy to support preparedness, but were convinced of its merits in terms of prevention.

• Some argued that the Federation should have accessed the CERF, which is theoretically open to all IASC members.

• Others noted that even though preparedness activities of the Federation were positive, any available resources would go to the United Nations.17

17 One donor was very candid. It did not matter if the Federation had prepared better, there would be no funds for them. The action was in Iraq and the government was not prepared to fund a regional response.


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• And still others argued that resources were not given to the Federation for the same reason that they were not given to UNHCR – there were no refugees, and besides ICRC was already in Iraq.

As noted above, few donors contributed to the preparedness phase. For many it was a political decision. The lack of support for the preparedness stage was justified as a reluctance to fund something that was still under discussion at the Security Council. Donors did not want to convey a message that accepted the inevitability of the war. They wanted to have a collective response, and some were even put off by what they saw as a rather timid response from the humanitarian community. They suggested that a more forceful and coordinated humanitarian voice had been needed. The Movement might have played more of a catalyst role in this regard, but most donors acknowledged that the Federation really did not have a choice. Preparations had to be undertaken. Donor support for preparedness is an issue worthy of further examination. This may be a topic for discussion within the context of Good Humanitarian Donorship. The Federation is well-placed to convene an information session with the Geneva Coordination Group for Good Humanitarian Donorship, chaired by Canada, to discuss donor approaches to building preparedness capacity, removing early obstacles to rapid response, and facilitating greater coordination.

17) Recommendation - The Federation should actively pursue the issue of donor-funding policies for disaster preparedness in the context of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative.

18) Recommendation - Donor appeal documents coordinated with the ICRC should be done in

such a way as to ensure consistency of certain information (e.g. adopting similar exchange rates for Swiss, US and European currency). With respect to coordination with other key actors, references should be made to how these efforts are complimentary, not duplicative or counter to the mandate of organizations (e.g. the agreement with UNHCR).

After-Action Review, Evaluation and Institutional Learning It is interesting to note that just as the preparations for the Iraq crisis begin, the evaluation of the Goma volcano operation was just completed (September 2002). Similarly, the evaluation of the response of the Movement to the India Earthquake was also completed in January of 2003. 18 For Afghanistan, no coordinated review or evaluation was undertaken and hence little systematic learning was left behind. In the case of Goma and Gujarat, both evaluations contained a number of observations and recommendations that tended to reappear in the Iraq crisis preparations. Lawry-White in the Goma evaluation states:

“… this operation has highlighted important shortcomings in systems for the management and coordination of Federation disaster response. In spite of recent progress in the development of disaster response mechanisms, this operation (Goma) should act as a wake-up call regarding what still needs to be done to properly coordinate, implement and report on effective disaster response. Significantly, some of the problems experienced during this operation are well known, long-running and chronic and require political will to address. Without action, these same issues could occur again.”.19

One of the recommendations contained in the Goma study was pivotal. It is suggestion that the Secretariat sets up a working group with representatives of the PNS, with input from regional National Societies to address unresolved coordination questions. Within the context of Iraq, we would support such an idea and suggest going one step further: bring together the two previous evaluations and this review could have a catalytic value. If nothing more, it presents an agenda around which to organize

18 Madeline Pousette and Bapu Deolalikar. 19 Simon Lawry-White (Vine Management Consulting), Evaluation of the Goma Volcano Operation: Final Report (September 2002) p. 1.


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future dialogues. As one interviewee stated “…we keep doing these reviews and evaluations. There are recommendations, but never any follow-up.” Much of the input received for this Review has been based on ‘bilateral’ conversations in face to face interviews or teleconferences. Within a learning milieu, a more interesting discussion has yet to take place that would use the results from recent evaluations and reviews as backdrop. What is advocated here is matching the same effort that was put into dialogue during the preparedness phase of the Iraq crisis. By bringing together various components of the Movement (the Federation, ICRC, National Societies) to discuss the learning that has been acquired and what can be done on a regular basis can have a potentially positive learning benefit. Many of the National Societies suggested distributing this review and the ICRC also nodded in this direction, “when the situation returns to a normal state, it would make sense to assess the process to see what can be learned.” In fact such a reality was suggested two years ago under Action 9 of the Movement Strategy (Promote learning from experience through systemic evaluations of national and international activities, and by implementing a system of knowledge-sharing and ‘best practice’ within the Movement). Perhaps in a second phase it might be possible to include other humanitarian actors and donors to discuss both preparedness and response to the Iraq crisis. This could be done separately or within the context of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP). It has been suggested to this Review Team that the UN agencies, under the coordination of OCHA, are about to launch an inter-agency ‘lessons learned review’ of contingency planning for Iraq that could involve IASC members (WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF). There is nothing preventing the Federation from organizing such ‘after-action review’ (AAR) on what was really achieved and learned using a standard framework of pertinent questions.20 Such an approach would support not only the unique position of the Federation Secretariat, but would promote considerable confidence and trust among stakeholders. Within such a context, a summary of the evaluations and reviews would not only facilitate a dialogue, but the results from such a conversation would also likely produce additional observations and recommendations. It would bring closure to the exercise and could substitute for the requirement to produce a project termination report. It would certainly make for more interesting reading. As noted above, the usual staff criticism of evaluation exercises is that the recommendations are never followed-up. Well, here is an opportunity to take a slightly different path.

19) Recommendation - After every major response to a crisis or disaster, some form of after- action review or evaluation should be undertaken.

20) Recommendation – Establish a dialogue network, involving the Federation, National

Societies and the ICRC to discuss observations and recommendations flowing out of recent Movement evaluations and reviews (Iraq, Goma, Gujarat and others) with the aim of promoting a learning culture and sharing best practice among the components of the Movement.

CONCLUSIONS While the preparations for the Iraq crisis were successful, the Federation must continue to improve the process in a way that is consistent with its mandate. Some might argue that the Federation was over-prepared for the Iraq Crisis. This view is not shared by all. This period did provide an excellent opportunity to work through issues, learn from mistakes and make constructive changes. If anything, the Federation should draw conclusions quickly from this experience and systematically incorporate the lessons into Standard Operating Procedures, work that is currently underway. The key responsibility of the Federation in times of crisis and disaster is that of a facilitator. The front line for disaster preparedness work and response is each National Society. For example, the Iranian Red Crescent was exemplary during the preparedness phase. The Federation must seek to

20 Many donors are preoccupied by indicators and it was expected that the Federation Secretariat would have done more in this regard.


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improve upon its role as catalyst in support of all National Societies. Part of this task is to better communicate its coordination responsibilities and accountability. There is little question that the Federation did play a central part during the preparedness phase. This was demonstrated throughout the management and coordination activities. But there is more that the Federation could have done. For example, it should have had a capacity to anticipate in advance such things as population movements (e.g. where IDPs are likely to go in a crisis) as well as monitor on an ongoing basis the disaster management capacities of all National Societies. While a network cannot be built overnight, preparedness capacity and competence cannot be established if the prevailing tendency is to ‘crisis hop’ from one disaster to another. Local capabilities and local knowledge is the key. Here the Federation Secretariat needs to be more open. It can not impose its will, but must take every opportunity to better appreciate the needs of National Societies during the crisis preparation phase. The planning relationship needs to be much closer. Listening is the key for such a change to occur. …And this is a challenge not just for the Federation, but for the entire Movement!

APPENDICES

1. Terms of Reference

2. List of Interviews

3. List of Documents

4. Chronology of Operations in Iraq

5. Annotated Summary of Selected Documents

6. Annotated Summary of Operations Updates

7. Disaster Preparedness Policy

8. Disaster Preparedness Assessment Tools

APPENDIX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review of the International Federation’s Management and Co-ordination of Preparedness for the Iraq Crisis, 2003

1. Background The run up to the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq during April/May 2003, and the response of the Federation to that crisis, needs to be considered in light of Iraq’s recent history which included two previous conflicts and a decade of international sanctions. Under the “Seville Agreement” responsibility for coordinating and managing the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement’s response to humanitarian consequences of a conflict in countries neighbouring Iraq lies with the Federation. Therefore, since July 2002, the Federation had co-ordinated the preparation of contingency plans for a possible influx of refugees with each concerned national society (Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Turkey and


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Iran.). Key activitie s have included support to the definition of roles of each society within their national context, scaling up of their operational capacity, enhanced disaster preparedness training sessions and pre-positioning of stocks. Furthermore, in line with its responsibility for enhancing National Society Disaster Preparedness, the Federation also provided Iraqi Red Crescent with relief items to be able to respond to humanitarian needs in-country as well. Unexpectedly, the large-scale humanitarian crisis predicted by some sources did not occur, especially in neighbouring countries. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Federation’s preparedness remains untested. The emergency preparedness phase ended in the middle of May, with the cessation of general hostilities in Iraq. Currently, the Federation’s programming for the country enters the post-conflict rehabilitation phase. The main challenges in this phase will be the reconstitution of the Iraqi Red Crescent and the implementation of programmes adjusted to the new reality in Iraq. Further issues regarding the Federation’s long-term presence in the MENA region will also arise as a result of the new situation in Iraq and the rest of the region. During the preparedness process it was envisaged by Disaster Management and Coordination Division (designated as the lead division for this operation) that formal reviews/evaluations of each stage in the operation – preparedness, post-conflict and rehabilitation – would be undertaken in order to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Secretariats role in coordinating its membership and to draw out ‘lessons learned’ in order to be better prepared for similar crises in future. It is accepted by DMC, which is initiating the review, that the process would be independent, objective and transparent. To this end, the Evaluation Department is requested to manage the review. 2. Objectives To assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Secretariat’s role in fulfilling its role under the Seville Agreement during the preparedness phase of the operation. This would mainly include relationships between the following stakeholders • Internal Secretariat co-ordination • Relationships with it’s field delegations • Relationships with Host NS • Relationships with PNS • Relationships with ICRC • Relationships with other humanitarian actors (especially the UN family and HCR in particular) • Relationships with other authorities (Governmental including Permanent Missions and Embassies

etc.) The review is not expected to cover issues such suitability of relief items that were pre-positioned in the MENA region, but rather the co-ordination and decision-making processes that lie behind the operation. 3. Reasons for the Review: This review is conducted to learn lessons with regard to the management and co-ordination of the preparedness phase of the Iraq operations with the aim of applying the lessons to similar operation in the future. This crisis was unusual in the sense that humanitarian agencies (Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the United Nations and NGOs) had a long timeframe to carry out planning their emergency response in the event of a humanitarian crisis resulting from a conflict in Iraq. One constraint lay in the need to keep preparations as low key as possible, in order not to being seen to be making pre-judgements about the inevitability of conflict, something that would seriously compromise the RC/RC Movement’s neutral stance. Whilst it is accepted that the Iraq crisis in some senses was


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unique, further crises of this type cannot be excluded. More generally, the crisis and the Federation’s response will have issues that are generic to the RC/RC Movement’s role and mandate in complex humanitarian emergencies, particularly in the area of co-ordination within the Movement and its relationship with other external humanitarian actors. The Disaster Management and Coordination Division would benefit from a review of this operation, in order to take stock of the activities and outcomes of the management and coordination of the preparedness systems in practice. The review will facilitate learning from the experience, contribute to ideas and options resulting from experience which then need to be discussed by all the relevant actors in the Federation and field. 4. Scope Within the timeframe September 2002 to May 2003, the review will examine current policy and practice, making independent comments on:

i. the adequacy of the planning and goal setting ii. the speed of response – by documenting the history of the evolution of the disaster

preparedness and commenting on decisions being made iii. the opportunities for improving international disaster preparedness and response, especially in

terms of management effectiveness, co-ordination, relationships and coverage as per the following definitions

a. Effectiveness: Assessment of the operations management from Geneva including decision-making process

b. Relationships, Co-ordination, Management: The nature and extent of functional relationships, co-operation and exchange of information among key players in the Movement, external actors and within the Secretariat

c. Coverage: The degree of the adequacy of planning to meet needs in various geographical areas and sectors

iv. the lessons learned from the Secretariat management of the operation, suggesting areas which may require further clarification of roles, alignment and co-ordination

v. the assumptions made about inputs and outcomes of the operation; more specifically, were important assumptions been left out or ignored?

5. Client and intended use: The primary client for this review is the Head of the Disaster Management and Coordination Division. Used as a basis for an active dialogue on lessons learned, other potential clients for the review include senior management, technical and regional departments, delegations, and Federation members world-wide. The review also has the potential to be circulated more widely and hence may afford a learning opportunity for the humanitarian community in general. 6. Review Methodology and Timeframe: The scope of the exercise will include: • Desk review of key documents to be provided by the Federation Secretariat. • Face to face interviews with selected key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat and Regional

Delegation, and other key external stakeholders with whom relationships were established for this operation.

• Telephone interviews with key National Societies in the region and PNS. • Collection of other relevant data, analysis and interpretation • Report writing, redrafting and presentation of key findings • A debriefing at the Federation’s Secretariat


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The exercise is expected to take four weeks. Start date will be the first week of July 2003. An approximate time allocation is three days for literature review, four days for meeting staff at the Secretariat, four days for telephone interview with Regional Delegation and National Societies ICRC and external agencies, six days to prepare and present the report. 7. Key Stakeholder Interviews Within the Secretariat structure DMC MENA Europe Department Logistics Finance Relationship management Human resources Telecommunications Security Appeals and reporting service Health Media Field delegations (including Larnaca and New York) Legal Other Red Cross ICRC-Geneva Support Group (including the Field Management Teams/Executive Group) Host PNS-Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, Iran Donor National Societies. UN Family UNHCR Resident Co-ordinator Larnaca Embassies in the field and permanent missions in Geneva 8. The Consultant: The successful Consultants is likely to possess: • Knowledge of disaster management and coordination. • Knowledge of the systems of RC/RC Movement. • Capacity to analyze and articulate lessons learnt in the context of complex network of

organizations. • Experience in evaluation and preparing analytical reports. • Good interview and interpersonal skills 9. Preparation of the Draft and Final Review Report: The external consultant will prepare a report identifying key policy and management questions. This will be based on the review of the literature and interviews. The external consultant is responsible for the preparation of the review. This will be done through submission of a draft report for comments and final report based on comments received from the client for this review. The final report should assess the key processes associated with the preparedness phase. It should indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the coordination and management and make recommendations for improvements, taking into account the change process within the Federation.


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10. List of Reference Documents: Federation/ICRC joint declaration October 2002 Appeal 08/03 Letter to Permanent Missions and PNS IFRC Preparedness briefing notes MoU Federation/ICRC Minutes of the Geneva Support Group Framework agreement Federation/UNHCR Minutes of the MENA consortium meeting, Geneva January 29th Comparative regional updates (various) Operations Updates 1- 8 Disaster management Information System

APPENDIX 2 LIST OF INTERVIEWS

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Secretariat in Geneva

Mr. Markku Niskala Acting Secretary General Mr Abbas Gullet Director, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Mr. Kalle Löövi Head of Operations, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Ms. Jasna Djjordjevic Regional Officer, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Ms. Helga Leifsdottir DMIS Promotion and Training, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Ms Tiziana Bonzon Federation Preparedness Data Officer, Disaster Management and Coordination

Division Ms. Caroline Dunn Emergency Response Unit Officer, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Mr. Denis McClean Head, Media Services Ms. Sara Canna Recruitment Officer, Organization and Staffing Unit


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Ms Liz Franklin Recruitment Officer, Organization and Staffing Unit Mr. Neil Dewar Field Support Officer, Field Support and Telecommunication Unit Mr. Jean-Paul Lucot Telecom Engineering Officer, Field Support and Telecommunication Unit Mr. Ibrahim Osman Director, Monitoring and Evaluation Mr. Mathew Varghese Head, Evaluation Department Ms. Sylvie Chevalley Desk Officer, Europe Department Mr. Tor Planting Field Security Coordination Officer, Cooperation and Development Division Dr. Ali Said Ali Head, Middle East and North Africa Department Mr. Martin Fischer Senior Officer Iraq Operations, Middle East and North Africa Department Ms. Birgitte Stalder-Olsen Unit Manager, Logistics and Resource Mobilization Department Ms Bente Knagenhjelm Senior Officer, PNS Relations, Resource Mobilization and Donor Relations

Department Mr. Evgeni Parfenov Senior Desk Officer, Middle East and North Africa Department Mr. Martin Faller Cooperation and Development Division Mr. Steve Claffey Global First Aid Project Manager, Health and Care Department Mr. Tore Svenning Senior Officer, Humanitarian Advocacy Department Mr. Jean Ayoub Director, Cooperation and Development Division Dr. Hakan Saddbladh Senior Officer, SRO Health in Emergencies, Health and Care Department Dr. Fidel Font Officer, SRO Maternal and Child Health, Health and Care Department Mr. John English Former Operations Officer, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Mr. Mike Davis Unit Manager, Financial Accounting Unit Mrs. Eva Von Oelreich Head, Disaster Preparedness & Policy, Disaster Management and Coordination

Division Mr. Mart in Zak Operations Manager -Africa, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Mr. Ian Logan Operations Manager – Latin America, Disaster Management and Coordination

Division Marcel Fortier SRO PNS Relations, Resource Mobilization and Donor Relations Department

Federation Field Delegates Mr. Ole Guldahl Former Head of Delegation, International Federation, Iran Mr. Robert Linker Former Programme Coordinator, Federation, Iraq Mr. Kelemu Yitbarek Disaster Preparedness Delegate, Turkey Delegation Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

National Societies

Dr. Ertan Gönen President of Turkish Red Crescent Society (feedback via facsimile) Mr. Langdon Greenhalgh American Red Cross Ms. Heidi Gilbert Assistant Desk Officer, Central Europe, Middle East & North Africa Desk, British Red Cross Society Mr. Flemming Nielsen Head of Disaster Management, Danish Red Cross Society

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Mr. Finn Rude ICRC Delegation – Turkey Mr. Andreas Wigger Deputy Director, Office of the Director General, ICRC Ms Angela Gussing Head of Division, Doctrine and Movement Cooperation, ICRC Mr. Alain Lennartz Middle East and North Africa, Operations Department, ICRC Mr. Eduard Abegg Deputy Head of Operations, Middle East and North Africa, Operations Department,

ICRC Mr. Gherardo Pontrandolfi Middle East and North Africa, Operations Department, ICRC Arnold Leuthold Deputy Head, International Organization Divisions, Operations Department, ICRC External Organizations - United Nations and Government Donor Missions

United Nations

Dr. Allessandro Loretti Emergency Health Intelligence and Capacity Building, Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action, World Health Organization (WHO)


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Ms. Christine McNab Jordan Resident Representative, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Mr. Jean-Marie Fakhouri Director Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) Mr. Jamie McGoldrick Chief, Africa and Middle-East Section, Response Coordination Branch, Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA – Geneva)

Government Donor Missions Mr. Emmanuel Rousseau Conseiller, Mission Permanente de la France auprès de l’Office des Nations Unies à

Genève Ms. Leslie Norton Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Geneva Mrs. Merete Lundemo Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, Geneva Mr. Eeuwke Faber Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations, Geneva Mr. Michael Jenssen Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, Geneva Mr. Alexender Wogda Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations, Geneva Mrs. Tanja Gren Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations, Geneva Mrs. Piper Campbell Counsellor Refugees and Migration Affairs, Permanent Mission of the United States

to the United Nations, Geneva Mr. Meinrad Studer Senior Advisor, Division of Multilateral Affairs and Special Assignments,

Humanitarian Aid, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Bern

APPENDIX 3 LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Policies, Strategies, MoUs, and Codes of Conduct • Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief • Disaster Preparedness Policy - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies • Emergency Response Policy - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies • Post-Emergency Rehabilitation Policy - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies • Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the International Red

Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Seville, Spain 26 November 1997) • Joint Statement by the ICRC and the Federation on the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq and region (17

October 2002)


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• Draft Memorandum of Understanding between The International Committee of the Red Cross and The International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies regarding Respective Roles and Responsibilities in the Response to Humanitarian Needs in Iraq and Countries Neighbouring Iraq

• Contingency Plan: Iraq and surroundings - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (no date)

• Cooperation Framework Agreement between the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (21March 2003)

• Post-Conflict Rehabilitation in Iraq and Disaster Preparedness in neighbouring countries – Concept Paper, Meeting of Participating National Societies (Baghdad, 13 May 2003)

Appeals (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) • Emergency Appeal no. 8/03 - “Iraq and Neighbouring Countries: Humanitarian Crisis”.(20 March 2003) Situation Reports and Operational Updates • Comparative Regional Updates: (4 February 2003) • Middle East Disaster Preparedness, Facts and Figures (14 February 2003) • Disaster Preparedness Updates: (10-14 February) • Disaster Preparedness Updates: (17-21 February) • Disaster Preparedness Updates: (24-28 February) • Disaster Preparedness Updates: (3-7 March 2003) • Comparative Regional Updates: (16 March 2003) • Briefing Notes of the operation planned to support National Red Crescent Societies in the region of Iraq and

its neighbouring countries (17 March 2003) • Middle East Preparedness Documents: capacity statements, contingency stocks • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (23 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (24 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (25-26 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (27 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (28 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (29-30 March 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (1 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (2-3 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (5-6 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (7 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (9 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (10 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (11 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (12-13 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (14 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (15 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (16 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (17 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (18-20 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (21 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (22 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (23 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (24 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (25-27 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (28 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (29 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (30 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (1 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (2 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (3-4 April 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (5 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (7 May 2003)


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• Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (8 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (9-11 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (12 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (13 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (15 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (16-18 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (19 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (20 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (21 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (22 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (23-26 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (27 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (28-29 May 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (30 May – 1 June 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (2-3 June 2003) • Situation updates on Appeal no. 8/03, Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (4 June 2003)

Project Proposals (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) • Enhancement of the Disaster Preparedness Capacity in Iraq to Meet the Emergency Humanitarian

Requirements for 15,000 Families (Iraq Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies submitted to British Government, 29 October 2002)

MENA Consortium, Geneva Support Group and Regional National Societies Meetings • Regular ICRC-Federation (MENA Region) Meeting (4 June 2002) • Meeting between the Secretariat of the International Federation and the ICRC concerning conflict

preparedness for Iraq (ICRC Headquarters - 3 September 2002) • ICRC-IFRC MENA Coordination Meeting Re: Iraq (ICRC Headquarters - 9 September 2002) • MENA Coordination Meeting Re: Iraq and neighbouring countries (Federation Headquarters – 4 October

2002) • MENA Coordination Meeting Re: Iraq and neighbouring countries (ICRC Headquarters – 14 October 2002) • Meeting of National Societies concerning a Potential Conflict-Related Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the

Region (Chavannes-de-Bogis – 16-17 October 2002) • MENA Coordination Meeting Re: Iraq and neighbouring countries (Federation Headquarters – 28 October

2002) • Non-official notes of informal meeting following debriefing of the November 11 PNS information meeting

(12 November 2002) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(18 November 2002) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region (2

December 2002) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(10 December 2002) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(17 December 2002) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(14 January 2003) • MENA Consortium Meeting (Geneva, 29 January 2003) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region (4

February 2003) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(11 February 2003) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region (4

March 2003) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(11 March 2003) • Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region

(17 March 2003)


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• Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region (25 March 2003)

• Geneva Support Group – Coordination Mechanism: Potential Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq and the Region (1 April 2003)

• Sub-Regional meeting of National Societies, ICRC, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: Humanitarian Needs and Actions in Iraq and Neighbouring Countries (Abu Dhabi, 6 April 2003)



• MENA Consortium (Federation Headquarters, 22-23 May 2003) Operational Updates (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) • Operations Update no 1 – Period Covered, 20 March – 22 March 2003 • Operations Update no 2 – Period Covered, 23 March – 26 March 2003 • Operations Update no 3 – Period Covered, 27 March – 4 April 2003 • Operations Update no 4 – Period Covered, 20 March – 10 April 2003 • Operations Update no 5 – Period Covered, 10 April – 17 April 2003 • Operations Update no 6 – Period Covered, 18 April – 30 April 2003 • Operations Update no 7 – Period Covered, 20 March – 15 May 2003 • Operations Update no 8 – Period Covered, 01 May – 25 May 2003 • Operations Update no 9 – Period Covered, 20 March – 2 June 2003 • Operations Update no 10 – Period Covered, 20 March – 30 June 2003 Position Description • Head of Delegation (Damascus, Syria – 2/1/2003) • Head of Regional Delegation (Amman, Jordan – 11/2/1999) • Head of Delegation (Iraq – 12/03/2002) End of Mission Reports (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) • Tore Svenning, Co -ordination with the UN, Look Ahead: Some experiences from Larnaca • Fernando Sole Gil, Telecom Delegate in Amman (3 June – 3 July, 2003) • Claus Olsen, Telecom Delegate, Assessment of the Baghdad delegation & the Iraqi Red Crescent Offices (3

June – 23 June, 2003) • Willy Kaiser, Telecom Delegate, Amman (30 January – 19 May, 2003) • Annette Bokkenheuser, Reporting Delegate Iran (12 April – 26 July, 2003) • Daniel Pewitt, Kuwait (27 January – 20 April, 2003) • Patrick Howard, Disaster Management Co-ordinator Jordan – JRCS (10 February – 9 May, 2003) • Christer Aqvist, Head of MENA Regional Delegation, Jordan (February 2000 – June, 2003) • G.M. Platt, Logistic Delegate, Syria (10 February – 27 April, 2003) • Alasdair Gordan-Gibson, Head of Delegation, Syria (12 February – 31 May, 2003) • Ole Guldahl, Head of Country Delegation, Iran (10 September, 2002 _ 09 September, 2003) • Head of Regional Delegation (Damascus, Syria) Other Reports • World Disasters 2003 Report: Focus on ethics in aid - International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies (July 2003) • Simon Lawry-White, Evaluation of the Goma Volcano Operation, International Federation of Red Cross and

Red Crescent Societies (Geneva, September, 2002) • Madeline Pousette and Bapu Deolalikar, Evaluation of the Response by the International Federation of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Movement to the India Earthquake, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Geneva, January, 2003)


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• The Turkish Red Crescent Society General Directorate –The efficiency of the International Federation in terms of Co-operation before and during the Iraq crisis. (facsimile communications 04.08.2003)

• Lester Salamon and Associates, Center on International Cooperation, The Preparedness Challenge in Humanitarian Assistance, (New York University, Oct. 1999).

APPENDIX 4 CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

DATE GLOBAL FEDERATION ICRC/ MOVEMENT September 2002

US announces that if the UN fails to enforce resolutions against Iraq, the US will act alone.

Federation plans to enhance the 2002 preparedness programme for Iraq. Work begins with IRCS to prepare relief items.

Organizations agree to harmonize immediately their efforts concerning Iraq. Field coordination is to be set up ASAP.

October 17, 2002

Joint Statement issued outlining Movement regional approach. ICRC assigned ‘Lead Agency’ in Iraq while Federation will support IRCS and neighbouring PNS.

November 2002

UN inspectors return to Iraq and begin insp ections

Federation expressed that if the ICRC, as ‘Lead Agency’, did not adequately consider the Federation’s needs and concerns, it would reserve the right to work outside of the ICRC’s leadership.

ICRC concerned about possible partnership between UNICEF, Federation and IRCS, jeopardizing the independence of the Movement.


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December 2002

UN Security Council agrees to extend Oil for Food programme for another 6 months.

Federation issues outline of 2003 goals, including pre-positioning non-food items in Iraq and training for camp management, first aid and emergency health activities. Officials plan to assist 75,000 in Iraq and 250,000 in neighbouring countries.

Internal debate between ICRC and Federation representatives regarding when to evoke the ‘Lead Agency’ concept.

January 2003

Saddam Hussein declares that he is ready for war. British naval task force deployed.

Federation security and framework cooperation agreement signed with UNHCR.

Movement coordination is presented at MENA mtg. GVA SG, BEG and FMT included.

February 2003

Russia, France and Germany propose a step-by-step disarmament program.

President of Federation begins a two-day visit to Iran on Feb. 18. The possible humanitarian crisis in Iraq was among issues discussed.

Movement asks NRC to refrain from NCW training in the region surrounding Iraq.

March 2003

UN weapons inspectors leave Iraq. Increasing air strikes kill civilians in Basra. US states that Hussein has 48 hours to leave Iraq or face invasion.

Approximately 30 ERUs are on stand-by to provide any refugee influx into countries neighbouring Iraq with vital life-support in the form of field hospitals, clinics, water, and sanitation services. Federation boosts the capacity of its NS in the region by providing logistics and telecommunications support

Approximately 120 ICRC national staff remain working in Iraq.

March 20 War begins. US launches air strikes on Baghdad. Missile hits Syrian passenger bus near Iraqi border, killing 5. Red Cross warns of humanitarian emergency as wat er supplies begin to run out in Basra.

Emergency Appeal no 8/03 is issued. The first displaced people from Iraq arrive at the Red Crescent camp in Jordan. JRCS, supported by the Federation, will provide shelter, water and non-food emergency relief supplies.

In an address to a press conference, the President of the ICRC solemnly appeals to belligerents to respect IHL and to protect the civilian population. ICRC delegates from Kuwait are based in Umm Qasr to carry out visits to POWs.

March 21 Massive increase in air strikes over Baghdad and Umm Qasr. 15 oilfields set on fire.

Federation and UNHCR sign an agreement outlining areas of cooperation in the region surrounding Iraq. The agreement foresees improved mechanisms for sharing information and expertise, coordinated contingency planning and programme implementation, maximising the use of resources, and avoiding any duplication of efforts.

ICRC contact with authorities continues. Warehouse staff is ensuring that surgical materials are ready for immediate delivery to hospitals in need. ICRC Baghdad has considerable stocks of surgical materials for the treatment of the wounded. The ICRC is currently completing the installation of a water purification unit at the Medical City General Hospital, and is monitoring the water situation.

April 2003

Looting destroys town centres. Hospitals are overcrowded. Major water pumping station ceases functioning. US urges the UN to lift economic sanctions against Iraq, stating that the country has been liberated. Oxfam delivers water and sanitation supplies to Iraq.

The Federation Delegation in Iraq has returned to Baghdad. The Federation has maintained its field structure in countries neighbouring Iraq. The Federation continues to extend its support to health, water and sanitation, information and disaster management spheres. Preparedness for the second phase of operations begins.

Limited access and lack of phone lines impedes communication and information from outside of Baghdad. ICRC expresses concern for water and medical situations in Southern Iraq. Looting and vandalism creates problems for health care. ICRC and Federation continue close cooperation at the field and HQ levels.

May 2003 UN Security Council lifts economic sanctions against Iraq. Interim government is established. US and UK submit post war plans to the UN.

Emergency preparedness phase is concluded. Federation staffing is to be restructured once plans are finalized for the second phase. The Federation office in Baghdad has been re-established and the country delegation has begun working with the new IRCS governance.

ICRC initiates a meeting of RC/RC and Federation reps to demonstrate support for IRCS and discuss the continuing Movement response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

APPENDIX 5

ANNOTATED SUMMARY OF SELECTED DOCUMENTS Management and Coordination of

Preparedness and Response to the Iraq Crisis, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

*Note: Chronology is based on documentation made available to the Review Team Events/Meetings 1. 4 June 2002, Regular ICRC-Federation (MENA) meeting


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Participants: ICRC: Mr. Eduard Abbed, Mr. Bruce Biber Federation: Mr. Ali Said Ali, Mr. Evgeni Parfenov Beginning stages of cooperation and harmonization between ICRC and Federation are discussed and roles are agreed upon. At present, the ICRC does not insist on the formal assignment of Lead Agency. 2. 3 September 2002, Meeting between Secretariat of the IFRC and the ICRC Participants: ICRC: Balthasar Staehelin, Delegate General for MENA Angela Gussing, Deputy Head of Division for Doctrine and Cooperation within the Movement Eddy Abegg, Deputy Head of Operations for the Middle East Bruce Biber, Head of Sector for Cooperation with NS in Europe, the Middle East and North America Federation: Dr. Ali Said Ali, Head MENA Evgeni Parfenov, Senior Desk Officer MENA Ian Logan, Disaster Head of Operations, Americas and Pacific, Disaster Management and Coordination Division Karin Jestin, Change Coordinator, Officer of the Secretary General Issues discussed at the meeting included the unpredictable situation in Iraq, the current operational capacity of the IRCS, the potential of the IRCS as an operational partner to the ICRC, the roles and responsibilities of the ICRC as Lead Agency in Iraq and the Federation and National Societies as ‘supporting agents’, and the coordination of Movement operations. It was agreed that further discussions were needed regarding coordination and preparation of the Movement relief operation in both Geneva and the field. 3. 9 September 2002, ICRC and Federation MENA coordination meeting regarding Iraq Participants: ICRC: Balthasar Staehelin, Eddy Abbeg, Bruce Biber, Stéphane Jacquier Federation: Ali Said Ali, Kalle Loovi, Evgeni Parfenov, Karin Jestin Both delegations in Iraq to harmonize security systems and procedures and assess the lead time necessary for fully switching under ICRC security umbrella. An assessment of the preparedness of neighbouring countries (Iran, Turkey, Jordan and Syria) is made as well as the roles of ICRC and the Federation in those countries. Expected restriction of UN involvement in Iraq will create an added responsibility for the RC/RC, Balthasar is scheduled to meet with the UN to understand their plans. Security, Communication and Coordination issues are discussed. 4. 4 October 2002, MENA Coordination Meeting regarding Iraq and neighbouring countries Participants: ICRC: Balthasar Staehelin, Eduard Abbeg, Arnold Leuthold, Jean-Michel Diez, Walter Stocker, Stéphane Jacquier, Angela Gussing, Celine Leonet IFRC: Ali Said Ali, Martin Zak, Karin Jestin The Federation is to provide the ICRC with a definition of its role in the Iraqi operation, to share plans for neighbouring countries, to support the National Societies in their negotiations with UN agencies and to evaluate the agreement currently standing between the Syrian RC and the UN. It is suggested that the Federation act as a Movement partner of UN agencies. ICRC and the Federation have diverging opin ions regarding the responsibility of the Lead Agency related to security matters. The Federation intends to maintain a presence in Iraq to pursue its support to the IRCS. Federation delegations in Iraq and neighbouring countries are scaling up disaster preparedness programmes. 5. 14 October 2002, MENA Coordination Meeting regarding Iraq and neighbouring countries Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Angela Gussing, Celine Leonet, Eduard Abbeg, Stéphane Jacquier Federation: Martin Zak, Evgeni Parfenov, Karin Jestin


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Preparation for meeting to be held on 17 October: Issues discussed include the role of NS of belligerent countries, cooperation with the UN, and the importance of coordinated communication between the ICRC and the Federation once operations have begun. 6. 28 October 2002, MENA Coordination Meeting regarding Iraq and neighbouring countries. Participants: ICRC: Georgios Comninos, Julia Bassam, Walter Stocker, Eduard Abbeg, Celine Leonet Federation: Ali Said Ali, Martin Zak, Evgeni Parfenov, Karin Jestin, Bente Knagenhjelm Federation continues to work on the mobilisation of the disaster preparedness programme at the IRCS. 40% of stocks from IRCS warehouses will be distributed as a winterisation programme and the Federation delegation in Baghdad will be reinforced with specialized relief skills. Mobilisation of ERUs remains unclear. Federation cooperation with NS in Turkey and Jordan has intensified, and assessment missions will take place in UAE, Kuwait and Syria. 7. 12 November, 2002: Non-official notes of informal meeting Participants: ICRC: Georgios Comninos, Walter Stocker, Eduard Abegg, Federation: Sten Swetlund, Christer Aqvist, Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin Discussion of Norcross and NL RC initiatives regarding NCW: It is felt as inappropriate for the Movement to be active in the decontamination field, as that is an issue for military and civil defence. Instead, RC involvement should be linked only to security contingency for staff. Both organizations are to draft a common statement. 8. 18 November 2002, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Georges Comninos, Walter Stocker, Eddy Abegg, Celine Leonet Federation: Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin Both agencies expressed concern for the urgent importance to agree on security management. The Federation expressed that if the ICRC, as ‘Lead Agency’, did not adequately consider the Federation’s needs and concerns, the Federation would reserve the right to work outside of the ICRC’s leadership. ICRC expressed serious concern of the possible tri-lateral partnership between UNICEF, the Federation and IRCS, as that would jeopardize the independence of the Movement. It was mentioned that no agreement with UN agencies should be made at that time, considering the role of the UN Sec Council in the present situation. 9. 2 December 2002, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Georges Comninos, Eddy Abegg, Celine Leonet, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Evgeni Parfenov ICRC and Federation representatives have not yet met to discuss a shared staff security contingency plan. The ICRC is pre-positioning relief materials in countries neighbouring Iraq. ICRC activities will include IDPs and Iraqi residents. If the refugee situation escalates beyond the control of the Federation, the ICRC will consider lending support. 10. 10 December 2002, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Georges Comninos, Eddy Abegg, Celine Leonet Federation: Kalle Loovi, Evgeni Parfenov Federation delegation in Iraq agreed to modify its security regulations to meet the requirements of the overall security set-up. Federation HoD in Iraq is to share the final security plan with the Head of the ICRC Delegation in Baghdad. International Federation found difficulties in communicating sensitive


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information to staff in Baghdad since it was avoiding the use of open communications channels. Federation representatives strongly disagreed with ICRC reps about when to evoke the concept of “Lead Agency” in Iraq. It was decided that the relevant directors of the ICRC and the Federation should decide. This met objections from the ICRC. No conclusion was reached at this time. Federation representatives strongly disagreed that during the “orange” phase (acute phase of hostilities) all of its representatives should be evacuated from Iraq while they agreed that the ICRC should remain in full control of all RC operations at that time. During the “orange” phase, it is proposed that the Federation reps 1) advise the IRCS in management issues; 2) advise the ICRS in general policy; and 3) prepare the Federation action to start immediately again. The ICRC still sees no role for the Federation during the “orange” phase. No conclusion was reached at this time. The Federation states that it will support the ICRC and its decisions in front of IRCS. No discussions had yet been held regarding cooperation with the UN family. 11. 17 December 2002, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Georges Comninos, Eddy Abegg, Celine Leonet Federation: Kalle Loovi, Martin Zak Information on ICRC contingency plan and Federation disaster preparedness programme in Iraq: Notes regarding logistics, delay in DP programme, protection, restoring family links and relations with the UN. Latest developments in strengthening the capacity of the Iraqi RC in conflict preparedness: Safety and stress course, donations and logistics assessments. Weaknesses of IRCS include lack of assets, lack of tools for assessment of needs, lack of a viable central warehouse in Baghdad and no transport capacity. 12. 14 January 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Eddy Abegg, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin The Federation feels that little had been undertaken at the field level on security matters. Cooperation between UNICEF and IRCS and UNHCR and neighbouring NS will be negotiated with the assistance of the Federation. Cooperation between UNHCR, UNDP and the JRCS has declined due to lack of trust between the organizations and the NS. The Federation stated its objective to perform further enhanced camp management training, especially in Jordan and Kuwait. 13. 29 January 2003, MENA Consortium Meeting Participants: British RC: Ms. Heidi Gilert, Mr. Ernest Achtell Danish RC: Ms. Alice Moltke Lisberg Dutch RC: Mr. Pieter de Ritjke Finnish RC: Ms. Hannele Virtanen French RC: Mr. Benoit Porte German RC: Mr. Walter Papenhagen Iran RC: Mr. Mostafa Mohagnen Japanese RC: Mr. Hiroshi Higashiura, Mr. Naoki Kokawa Norwegian RC: Mr. Erling Kvernevik, (Ms. Mette Buchholz) Qatar RC: Mr. Khaled Diab Spanish RC: Ms. Cristina Castillo Swedish RC: Ms. Lena B. Hansson Swiss RC: Mr. Ernest Lueber, Mr. Hannes Heinemann United Arab Emirates RC: Dr. Saleh Al Taie ICRC: Mr. Walter Stocker, Mr. Gherardo Pontrandolfi, Mrs. Nadia Doumani Federation: Dr. Ali Said Ali, Mr. Kalle Loovi, Mrs. Bente Knagenheljm, Mrs. Karin Jestin, Mrs. Jasna Djordjevic, Mr. John English, Mr. Evgeni Parfenov, Mrs. Marie -Francoise Borel, Mr. Tor Planting, Mr. Tore Svenning, Ms. Anna Segall


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Federation update on emergency preparedness: The Federation plans to build up the capacity in the region but does not want to speculate with different scenarios as they remain highly unpredictable. Preparedness efforts underway include assistance to contingency planning, camp management trainings and mobilization of emergency relief items. No pre-positioning of ERUs is to take place, and inter-agency cooperation will be kept confidential and as low key as possible. Included in the minutes is a summary chart of the Movement and Inter-Agency coordinating bodies. 14. 4 February 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Eddy Abegg, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin, John English, Jasna Djordjevic The Federation intends only to do awareness-raising sessions to help NS leadership. With regard to NCW, the Federation does not intend to provide protective equipment for delegates in the region. An In-country Field Management Team Executive Group includes Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey and Syria but not Iraq. The Federation proposed to help integrate the IRCS. Cooperation areas under discussion with UNHCR include relief items, camp management and training. 15. 11 February 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin, John English, Jasna Djordjevic Concern for the NCW activities of the Netherlands RC: Both organizations wish to ask the NS to refrain from organizing NCW-related trainings targeted at NS in countries neighbouring Iraq. The Federation aims at developing a general NCW position/awareness training to give guidance to NS. 16. 4 March 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Eddy Abegg, Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, John English, Jasna Djordjevic A joint working group is to be formed to develop the MoU and discuss its future uses. Representatives from AMCROSS will be taken aboard as Federation delegates in Jordan and Turkey. It is proposed that the Federation issue a statement that the IFRC and the ICRC are launching their own appeals, as the Federation needs all possible ways of obtaining funds. Discussion of IRCS needs in order to facilitate donation allocations. 17. 11 March 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Eddy Abegg, Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Karin Jestin, Kalle Loovi, Jasna Djordjevic Efforts are made to co-ordinate ICRC and Federation appeals. Feedback from the Federation on what was considered a useful meeting of NS representatives regarding ERU deployment and coordination. ICRC and the Federation agree that a PNS meeting will be organised in the event of a crisis but is not to take place until at least 2 weeks after the intensification of the conflict in order to gain a clearer picture. Concerning communication coordination, it is agreed that a closer coordination between the Federation and the ICRC should be ensured in the future. It is agreed that the LOG departments of the Federation and the ICRC will be responsible for coordinating the delivery of relief items once they reach Iraq. 18. 17 March 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: (Not listed, representatives from the following NS attended)


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Kuwait RC, Qatar RC, UAE RC, Saudi RC, American RC, Turkish RC ICRC and the Federation discuss coordination of MoU and Appeal Launch, as well as the possibility of a simultaneous launch with UN. Kuwait and Saudi RC are prepared to accept 100,000 refugees, but are doubtful that the number will be that great. It is agreed that UNHCR, NS and the Federation will be equal partners, based on the framework of the existing agreement between the Federation and UNHCR. 19. 25 March 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Jasna Djodjevic, John English GVA SG agrees to carry out joint teleconferences with Arab NS. A joint communications coordination working group will be in charge of sharing information about the respective communications strategies, fine-tuning key messages to external interlocutors about ongoing operations and activities as well as communication guidelines on matters of common concern. 20. 1 April 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: (Not listed) Regarding the Arab NS teleconferences organised by the ICRC, it is agreed that they should be co-hosted by ICRC and the Federation. Comments about the final draft of the MoU included the lack of a platform for the Federation support of the ICRC inside Iraq and the guarantee of Federation presence inside Iraq once the situation is safe enough. 21. 6 April 2003, Sub-Regional Meeting of National Societies, the ICRC and the Federation “Humanitarian needs and Actions in Iraq and Neighbouring Countries) Participants: SARC: Mr. Abdel-Rahman El Suweylam, Mr. Abdallah Mohamed El Hazzaa KRCS: Mr. Berges HamMoUd El Bergess, Mr. Abdel-Rahman El Awn QRCS: Mr. Mohamed Ibn Ghanem El Maadid, Mr. Mohamed Ibn Jawhar Mohamed BRCS: Mr. Sadeq El Shihaby, Mr. Abdel-Latif El Rumeihy, Mr. Mubarak Khalifa El Hadi SRCS: Mr. Abdel Rahman El Attar, Mr. MoUnib El Rifai JRCS: Mr. Fahd El- Ejjah, Mr. Mushaal El Hadid IRRCS: Mr. Daftary Beshly, Mr. Farshid Tewfiqi Namin TRCS: Mr. Fateh Everin UAE RC: Mrs. Sanaa Darwich El Kutubi, Mr. Saleh El Mulla, Dr. Slaeh El Tani, Mr. Anas El Ateiba GCC: Mr. Ali Ben Saleh El Yehya Federation: Mr. Abbas Gullet, Mr. Ibrahim Osman, Dr. Ali Said Ali, Mr. Kalle Loovi, Mr. Daniel Prewitt, Mr. Alasdair Gibson, Mr. Christer Aqvist, Mr. Sten Swedlund, Mr. Ole Guldahl ICRC: Mr. François Bugnon, Mrs. Maria Gossing, Mr. Georges Comninos, Mr. Jeremy England, Mr. Michael Meyer, Mr. Stephen Jakuier The meeting focused on providing assistance and responding to the needs of the people in and around Iraq. Discussion was held regarding the safe arrival of aid items to Iraq and the need to comply with the Seville Agreement as a best means to coordinate action between PNS, ICRC and the Federation. The joint ICRC/Federation support group for operations in Iraq will provide advice to NS regarding resources and materials to meet needs. The meeting was concluded with a call for all parties to fully comply with the basic principles of IHL. 22. 8 April 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Georges Comninos, Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Jasna Djodjevic, Karin Jestin


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NS reactions to the 6 April meeting were sceptical of the ICRC security approach in Iraq, stating that the ICRC would overstress security concerns as a pretext to keep NS from carrying out their own actions in Iraq. NS remain interested in a coordinated Movement response; however will not be willing to wait much longer for a visible and physical presence in Iraq. NS also expect stronger condemnation of the war, especially from the ICRC. It is suggested that NS are given a more visible role through the creation of communications cells at the regional level. The communications coordination team will draft a communications strategy in the event of possible unilateral NS operations in Iraq. 23. 14 April 2003, Geneva Support Group Meeting Participants: ICRC: Georges Comninos, Walter Stocker, Gherardo Pontrandolfi Federation: Kalle Loovi, Karin Jestin, John English Final revision of the MoU was pending. It is agreed that a PNS meeting should take place as soon as possible to inform PNS about the operational situation in Iraq and the region and discuss their potential involvement. ICRC would chair sessions concerning operations in Iraq, while the Federation would chair sessions regarding operations outside Iraq. UNHCR-Federation country agreements with Turkey and Iran have not yet been signed. GVA SG was informed of the limited possibilities for safe access into Iraq, therefore the ICRC has not made a final decision regarding the redeployment of its enlarged staff contingency in Iraq. Federation HoD will enter Iraq together with the ICRC Movement coordinator as soon as security allows.

APPENDIX 6

ANNOTATED SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS UPDATES Operations Update no. 1- Period Covered, 20 March - 22 March 2003 Appeal coverage: 3.5% The JRCS has registered its first cross-border arrivals from the conflict and are now providing them with relief. Other Red Crescent NS in the region are on standby in case of population Movements in their areas. The situation remains fluid but with Federation support, the Red Crescent Societies in Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait are well prepared for several eventualities. Donors are urged to offer strong support to this appeal.


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Operations Update no. 2- Period Covered, 23 March - 26 March 2003 Appeal coverage: 5.3% Red Crescent Societies in countries neighbouring Iraq remain in high state of preparedness as increasingly major population Movements are reported within Iraq. Movements of people across borders have thus far been relatively small but the future impact of the conflict on vulnerable people is uncertain. Red Crescent Societies, with Federation support, are well braced to deal with the situation if it deteriorates. Operations Update no. 3- Period Covered, 27 March - 4 April 2003 Appeal coverage: 10.5% Red Crescent Societies in the region, supported by the Federation, continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced people in need. Extensive preparations mean that NS are still in a position to respond quickly to rapidly changing circumstances. All components of the Movement have been involved in extensive coordination to ensure that humanitarian support is delivered effectively and in accordance with strict standards and principles. Good information exchange will continue as the Federation strategy of support evolves in the coming days. Operations Update no. 4- Period Covered, 20 March - 10 April 2003 Appeal coverage: 10.6% Since the beginning of the operation, Jordan has seen a steady, although limited, flow of people fleeing hostilities in Iraq. As such, this operation update focuses on the preparedness and response efforts of the JRCS to assist TNCs on their transit through Jordan. The NS, supported by the Federation, has quickly set up an effective response plan to assist up to 5,000, with a possible extension to 25,000 people. JRCS is hosting a camp for TCNs, which hosts an average of 250 people daily. In cooperation with UN and a number of NGOs, JRCS assists the beneficiaries with basic food and non-food items, health care and water and sanitation facilities. Operations Update no. 5- Period Covered, 10 April - 17 April 2003 Appeal coverage: 11.5% The situation in Iraq remains unstable. A comprehensive disaster preparedness strategy means neighbouring NS and the Federation are still primed to respond to changing circumstances. Activities near the Iraqi border continue in case there are any future population Movements. Preparations, in coordination with the ICRC, are now underway to channel external support to Iraq as the IRCS addresses the extreme needs in-country. Operations Update no. 6- Period Covered, 18 April - 30 April 2003 Appeal coverage: 12.9% The humanitarian situation in Iraq remains uncertain as the results of initial assessments are awaited. Neighbouring NS, principally JRCS and SRCS, remain operational with their transit camps and standby preparedness. The IRRCS continues its coordinated provision of relief supplies through the ICRC. The Federation Delegation in Iraq has returned to Baghdad and planning is now actively underway among stakeholders to determine appropriate actions upon which to base the planned revised appeal. Operations Update no. 7- Period Covered, 20 March - 15 May 2003 Appeal coverage: 13% Although the number of beneficiaries crossing into Syria has fortunately not been as high as the NS and the Federation prepared for, the SARC continues to operate two camps for TNCs who continue to arrive from Iraq. In the smaller of the two camps, the last remaining residents have now left, however the larger camp continues to host a steady passage of people entering the country. Consequently, this camp is being maintained at the operational level, while the NS working with the Federation begins to plans for the second phase of the appeal, to build the disaster response and management capacity based on activities and lessons learned to date. Operations Update no. 8- Period Covered, 01 May - 25 May 2003


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Appeal coverage: 13% The humanitarian situation in Iraq remains a concern, despite the recovery efforts underway. The IRCS is beginning to re-establish itself, with successful elections of an interim leadership at the national and at some branch levels. The results of coordinated assessments planned for June will begin to determine the immediate program priorities upon which to base a revised appeal. Operations Update no. 9- Period Covered, 20 March - 2 June 2003 Appeal coverage: 15% This operations update focuses on the preparedness efforts of the IRRCS in response to the hostilities in Iraq. The IRRCS has been designated as the main national relief organisation responsible for disaster preparedness and response, including camp management, by the government of Iran. The IRRCS is involved in the Movement plans for an effective provision of assistance to the IRCS. The IRRCS has committed itself to continue providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraq rehabilitation operation. Operations Update no. 10- Period Covered, 20 March -30 June 2003 Appeal coverage: 15% This operations update focuses on the preparedness efforts of the TRCS, also called Kizilay, to assist some 80,000 people potentially forced to flee from Iraq seeking shelter in neighbouring Turkey. TRCS has been on standby and ready for action since the launch of the US-led military campaign in Iraq. Concerns over a massive influx of refugees into Turkey, however, failed to materialise. With the latest developments in Iraq and in light of the reduced threat of population Movements across the border, the Kizilay has scaled down its presence in the border areas. All the staff members deployed for the operation have now returned to their branches and efforts are being made to integrate the lessons learned into ongoing programmes of the Red Crescent.

APPENDIX 7 Disaster preparedness policy

Introduction: The readiness to predict and, where possible, prevent disasters, reduce their impact as well as respond to and cope with their consequences at international, national and local levels is central to the work of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and every individual National Society. This work, key to development, essentially involves reducing the vulnerability of households and communities in disaster-prone areas and improving their ability to cope with the effects of disasters; strengthening the capacities of National Societies in disaster preparedness and post-disaster response; determining a National Society role and mandate in national disaster plans; and establishing regional networks of National Societies that will strengthen the Federation's collective impact in disaster preparedness and response at the international level. Scope: This policy establishes the basis of Red Cross and Red Crescent action in disaster preparedness. It applies to all types


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of disaster preparedness activities at local, national, regional and international levels whether carried out by a single branch of a National Society, by an individual National Society or by the International Federation acting together. Statement: The International Federation and each National Society shall: Recognize that disaster preparedness should be one of the primary activities of the International Federation and each National Society, regarding it as the most effective way of reducing the impact of both small and localized as well as large-scale disasters. The National Society has a role to play at the branch, the national and the international level. These roles shall be complemented by the actions of the Federation at the international level. Recognize disaster preparedness as an effective link between emergency response, rehabilitation and development programmes and strive to build disaster preparedness upon the competent programming in other key areas Red Cross/Red Crescent work such as in the health sector. Recognize the Red Cross/Red Crescent role in disaster preparedness as complementary to government and thus will not replace state responsibilities. In addition, the National Society should engage in debate with the government on the focus and nature of the National Emergency Plan and encourage the assignment of a clear role and responsibilities to the National Society, supported by appropriate legislation. Advocate, where necessary, with government, donors, non-governmental organizations and the public, the need for and effectiveness of disaster preparedness. National Societies should contribute to raising awareness of hazards, levels of risks and coping mechanisms adopted by society and mitigation programmes, such as early warning systems, that may reduce the loss of lives and property when a disaster strikes. Strengthen the organizational structures at international, national and local levels required for effective disaster preparedness. In particular, prioritize the strengthening of branches and the mobilization and training of Red Cross/Red Crescent volunteers in high-risk areas and the responsibility of National Societies to prepare to be part of the Federation's international disaster response programming. Integrate or harmonize such activities with institutional development and other relevant programme areas. Improve co-ordination by promoting better co -operation and partnerships between National Societies, ICRC, governments, non-governmental organizations and other disaster response agencies at local, national, regional and international levels. Identify those persons, communities and households most at risk to disaster through assessment and analysis of risks, vulnerabilities and capacities (Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment) as a basis for prioritising location and focus of programming activities. Raise awareness of disaster hazards through public education, encouraging vulnerable people to take preventative and mitigating actions where possible before disaster strikes. Ensure that the knowledge from prediction and early warning systems can be accessed, understood and acted upon by local communities Improve the ability of vulnerable communities to cope with disasters through community-based disaster preparedness strategies that build on existing structures, practices, skills and coping mechanisms. Recognizing that a community-based approach is the best guarantee that improvement in disaster preparedness will be realized and sustained, the assisted population must participate in the planning and preparation for disasters. All activities and programmes should be sensitive to issues of gender, generation and the needs of vulnerable groups, such as the disabled. Strive to provide the financial, material and human resources required to carry out appropriate and sustainable disaster preparedness activities. In particular, maximize the strategic advantage of the International Federation to mobilize all available resources and establish regional networks of National Societies that will strengthen the Federation's collective impact in disaster preparedness. Responsibilities: National Societies and the International Federation have a responsibility to ensure that all disaster preparedness activities and programmes are carried out in compliance with this policy; that all staff and volunteers participating in such programmes are aware of the rationale and content of the policy; and that all relevant governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental partners are adequately informed of this policy.

APPENDIX 8

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