Responsibility in Engineering
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Transcript of Responsibility in Engineering
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Responsibility in
Engineering:Impediments to
Responsible Action
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Responsibility for harmful actions by:
Intentional reasons
Recklessness Negligence
Brief Review..
Human Dimension: Attitudes, Frames of Mind
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ENGINEERS PEOPLE
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1. SELF-INTEREST
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1. Self-Interest
Concern for our own interest tempts
us to act contrary to our professional
ideals
EGOISM Extreme means to satisfy
ones interest, even at the EXPENSE
OF OTHERS
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1. Self-Interest: Columbia Accident
NASA Managers advance their careers
by being associated with successful
and on-schedule flights at the expenseof the safety of the crew.
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1. Self-Interest: How to resist?
Contemplation and Rationalization:
Ask ourselves if we would approve of
others treating us in the same way we
are treating them
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2. SELF-DECEPTION
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2. Self Deception
Our rationalizations may seem to
betray a willful lack of self-
understanding Intentional avoidance of truths ,
difficult to confront self-consciously
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2. Self Deception: Columbia Accident
NASA managers convinced
themselves that past successes are anindication that small defects would
not cause problems.
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2. Self Deception: Remedy
Working in teams, Open
communication with colleagueshelp correct biases
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3. FEAR
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3. Fear
Fear of acknowledging mistakes,
punishment, bad consequences
Whistleblowing Cases
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3. Fear: Columbia Accident
Columbia Accident Investigation
board observed that fear of
retribution inhibited the
expression of minority opinions
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3. Fear: Remedy
Group resistance is more likely
to bring about changes in anorganization
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4. IGNORANCE
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4. Ignorance
Ignorance of vital information
Lack of awareness: willful avoidance- aturning away from information to avoid to
deal with challenges it may pose
Lack of imagination, failure to persist,
pressure from deadlines, not looking in
the right places
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4. Ignorance: Columbia Accident
High- level managerial decisions were
based on insufficient knowledge
based on facts; dissenting viewpointare filtered out
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5. EGOCENTRIC TENDENCIES
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5. Egocentric Tendencies
Interpret situations from a limited
perspective
Special form of ignorance
Similar viewpoints and perspectives
with others
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5. Egocentric Tendencies
Test run with typical consumers are
needed in engineering and design
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5. Egocentric Tendencies: Columbia Accident
NASA Managers made decisions
from an exclusively managementperspectives: schedule, politics
and cost.
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6. MICROSCOPIC VISION
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6. Microscopic Vision
Similar to egocentric tendencies
Microscopic vision is highly accurateand precise but our field of vision is
limited
Fail to see things at an ordinary level
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6. Microscopic Vision
Engineers sometimes need to raise
their eyes from the world of science
and technical expertise and look
around to understand the
implications off their actions
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6. Microscopic Vision: Columbia
Accident
NASA organizational structure:
Each has a specialized job, not
responsible for the work of others
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7. UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE
OF AUTHORITY
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7. Uncritical Acceptance of
Authority
Most engineers have bosses, and expected to
defer to authority in their organization
Milgrams Experiments
Decrease the engineers sense of personal
accountability for the consequences
Distances the engineer from the public
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7. Uncritical Acceptance of
Authority: remedy
Group dynamics: Support Critical
Response
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8. GROUPTHINK
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8. Groupthink
Situations in which groups come to agreement atthe expense of critical thinking
Illusion of invulnerability
Shared stereotypes
Illusion of morality
Self-censorship
Illusion of unanimity
Direct pressure on dissenting opinions
Mindguarding against contradictory views
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