Resolution ArtII Par 2.2 2.3 2.4

8/3/2019 Resolution ArtII Par 2.2 2.3 2.4

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Republic of the Philippines Senate

Pasay City(Sittino as an Impeacliment Court)

IN RE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF Case No. 002-2011HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICERENATO C. CORONAx - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xNOTICE

In the matter of the MEMORANDA filed by Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,through counsel and the Panel of Prosecutors of the House of Representativeson January 24 and January 25, 2012 respectively, notice is hereby given to theparties that the Senate Impeachment Court, has made available the attachedextended RESOLUTION of the Court anent its Ruling on the matter, made inOpen Court on January 25, 2012.Pasay City, Philippines, January 30, 2012.

ATTY. EMMA LI 0 REYES

The HonorableMembers of the Prosecution PanelHouse of RepresentativesQuezon CityAtty. MARIO LUZA BAUTISTAAtty. JOSEPH JOEMER C. PEREZPrivate Prosecutorsclo House of RepresentativesQuezon City

Clerk of Court of the SenateSitting as an Impeachment Court

The Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona Supreme Court Manila Justice SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (Ret.)Atty. JOSE M. ROY IIIAtty. JACINTO D. JIMENEZAtty. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.Atty. GERMAN Q. LlCHAUCO IIAtty. DENNIS P. MANALOCounsels for Chief Justice Coronac/o Suite 1902 Security Bank Center6776 Ayala Avenue, Makati City


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Republic of the Philippines Senate Impeachment Court Pasay City

In the Matter of the Impeachment Senate Impeachment CourtOf Chief Justice Renato C. Corona Case No. 002-2011l(------------------------------------------------l(

RESOLUTION

This resolves the issue of whether or not the Prosecution may present evidenceto prove the allegations in Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 under Article II of the ImpeachmentComplaintThe resolution of this issue becomes imperative in view of the Defense'sconsistent objections to the Prosecution's presentation of evidence exposing theproperties of respondent Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, his wife, children andchildren-in-Iaw, including all transactions involving said properties. The Defense'smanifestation that it would object to any and all presentation of evidence that tend to

give flesh to Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 all the more rendered necessary the resolution ofthe issue at once.The Defense contends that all evidence which have nothing to do with Article II,that is, the alleged failure of respondent Chief Justice to disclose his Statement ofAssets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) to the public, must be considered immaterialand irrelevant. The Defense emphasizes that Article II of the Grounds for Impeachmentdoes not charge respondent Chief Justice of failing to disclose properties in his SALN.Neither does it charge him of inaccurate disclosure of properties in his SALN norundervaluing the disclosed properties therein. Further, the Defense points out thatArticle II of the Grounds for Impeachment does not charge respondent Chief Justice ofill-gotten wealth and/or graft and corruption. Thus, all evidence which are totally alien tothe allegation that respondent Chief Justice failed to disclose his SALN to the public areimmaterial and irrelevant and the allowance of the same will constitute a violation ofrespondent Chief Justice's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause ofthe accusation against him.For the Prosecution's part, it posits that the gravamen of the charge in Article II isnot the respondent Chief Justice's mere failure to file and disclose his SALN. The dutyto disclose the SALN to the public necessarily implies, the Prosecution asseverates, aduty to be truthful, honest and accurate in the contents thereof such that the Courtshould allow the introduction of evidence which will show the properties of therespondent Chief Justice which he allegedly did not include in his SALN. With respect to

the allegation of ill-gotten wealth, the Prosecution contends that it is too late in the dayfor the Defense to question or object to the presentation of eviden.ce with respect toParagraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of Article II of the Grounds for Impeachment. The Prosecutionclaims that the Respondent Chief Justice specifically denied these paragraphs in hisAnswer. Thus, it is the Prosecution's contention that the issue in this respect hasalready been joined. The Prosecution further stresses that the Defense, through its leadcounsel, Retired Justice Serafin Cuevas, already manifested that it is going to abide bythe ruling of the Court's Presiding Officer allowing the Prosecution to present evidenceon allegations in Paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Article " of the Grounds for
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Impeachment. Moreover, the Prosecution contends that it is not the designation of theoffense which is controlling but the allegations which directly apprise the accused of thenature and cause of the accusation against him.The above asseverations are incorporated in the respective Memoranda of theparties which the Court required them to submit. The Defense filed its Memorandum onJanuary 24, 2012; while the Prosecution filed its Memorandum on January 25, 2012.At the nucleus of this issue are Paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of Article II of theGrounds for Impeachment, thus:

2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public hisstatement of assets and liabilities and net worth as requiredby the Constitution.2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of

Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets,liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft andcorrupt practices act.2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused

of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets ofhigh values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits.It has been reported that Respondent has, among others, a300-sq. meter apartment in a posh Mega World Propertydevelopment at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, ashe is constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of theConstitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities andNet Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and dulysupported by his income as a public official? Since hisassumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice,has he complied with this duty of public disclosure?

The test for sufficiency of the complaint demands that the pleading must not onlybe formally correct, but should also be substantially sustainable. In other words, it mustonly allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary matters or conclusions of law. 1 But when is acomRlaint formally and substantially sufficient? The case of Militante, 11/ vs. Edrosolano,et.a/ 2 provides an authoritative answer:ax X X The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in apetition to constitute a cause of action is whether or not,admitting the facts al/eged, the court could render a validjudgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer ofthe petition. X x x"

Thus, taking the foregoing jurisprudential instruction as guide, this Court is of theview that even if the allegation in Paragraph 2.4 of Article II is hypothetically admitted, avalid judgment cannot be rendered on the basis of said admission.First, the admission will only relate to the fact that: "Respondent is likewise

suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets ofhigh values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits." The admission will notextend to the fact that respondent "accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquired assets ofhigh value and kept bank deposits with huge accounts." This is because the allegation,1 Remitere, et.al. vs. Vda. De Yulo, et.a l., 16 SCRA 251239 SCRA473


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as it is written, provides that respondent Chief Justice is "suspected" and "accused,"such that the allegation will only be restricted to the admission of being "suspected" and"accused," of accumulating ill-gotten wealth, not to mention its being a conclusion oflaw.Second, this Court cannot over-emphasize the rule that mere suspicion oraccusation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Suspicion, no matter howstrong, must not sway judgment.3 The principle has been dinned into the ears of thebench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 4Guided by the cited authorities above, this Court is of the view that even if theallegations in Paragraph 2.4 is hypothetically admitted, the Court still cannot render avalid judgment thereon as the admission will only be limited to being "suspected" and"accused" of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values andkeeping bank accounts with huge deposits. And jurisprudence is more than illuminatingwhen it says that suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 5The introduction of evidence on Paragraph 2.4 will, likewise, violate the right ofthe respondent Chief Justice to due process, specifically his right to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation against him. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987Constitution mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense withoutdue process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shallbe informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Similarly, the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took effect on December 1, 2000,provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be informed ofthe nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict an accused for anoffense not alleged in the complaint or information violates such right.6 The cardinal

requisite is that the accused be informed of the fact imputed to him. To satisfy thisrequisite, the information must describe the act with sufficient particularity.7 The purposeof this constitutional guaranty was explained in U.S. vs. Karesen8:

First. To furnish the accused with such a description of thecharge against him as will enable him to make his defense;and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal forprotection against a further prosecution for the same cause;and third, to inform the court of the facts al/eged, so that itmay decide whether they are sufficient in law to support aconViction, if one should be had (United States vs.Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement maybe satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; thesemust be set forth in the complaint with reasonableparticularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a3 People vs. Tayag, 385 Phil. 1150, G.R. No. 132053 (March 31, 2000)4 People v. Salidaga, G.R. No. 172323 (January 29,2007) Citing People v. Batidor, 362 Phil. 673, 685-686 (1999)5 People vs. Domingo R. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189. June 25, 1999], citing people v. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127, July 7,

6 People v. Cruz, 259 SCRA 109 (1996), citing People v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 (1995) and People v. Joya, 227 SCRA 9(1993).7 Matilde, Jr. vs. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456; People vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 747, cited in Bernas, The 1987 Constitution ofthe Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2009 ed., p.523-524s 3 Phil. 223, (1904),

1997


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specific allegation of every fact and circumstancesnecessary to constitute the crime charged. II

This Court believes that allegation in Paragraph 2.4 of Article II does notsufficiently inform the respondent Chief Justice of the nature of the accusation againsthim. Is he charged with accumulating ill-gotten wealth? Or is he merely suspected ofaccumulating ill-gotten wealth? The Court observes that Paragraph 2.4 of Article II, as itis written, will not surmount the requirement of sufficient particularity for the respondentChief Justice to be able to know the exact description of the charge.

In the case of Ma. Merceditas Gutierrrez vs. the House of Representatives, G.R.No. 193459 (February 15,2011), the Supreme Court ruled:"Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletoryapplication of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carryingout the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogativethe Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving intothe practicability of the application of the one offense percomplaint rule, the initial determination of which must bemade by the House which has yet to pass upon thequestion, the Court finds that petitioner's invocation of thatparticular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice i tto state that the Constitution allows the indictment formultiple impeachment offenses, with each chargerepresenting an article of impeachment, assembled inone set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It,therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need notallege only one impeachable offense." (Emphasis supplied.)

In his separate concurring opinion in the said case, Associate Justice Antonio T.Carpio stated:"Further, the impeachment complaint is not the same as theArticles of Impeachment. The impeachment complaint isanalogous to the affidavit-complaint of the privatecomplainant filed before the prosecutor for purposes of thepreliminary investigation. Such affidavit-complaint, preparedby the complainant, may allege several offenses. On theother hand, Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure refers to the formal complaint orinformation prepared by the prosecutor and filed before thecourt after the preliminary investigation. Such formalcomplaint or information must charge only one offenseagainst an accused. The Articles of Impeachment isprepared by the Committee after it votes to recommend tothe House Plenary the filing of impeachment charges. Theonly requirement in preparing the Articles ofImpeachment is that there is only one specific chargefor each article. The Articles of Impeachment, as itsname Imply, may have several articles, each chargingone specif ic offense. x x x" (EmphaSis supplied.)

Even as this Court precludes the Prosecution from introducing evidence withrespect to the assertion in Par. 2.4 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment thatRespondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits, theMembers of this Court are mindful and shall rely upon the legal presumption on the


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nature of any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent ChiefJustice as provided under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, to wit:"Whenever any public officer or employee has acquiredduring his incumbency an amount of property which ismanifestly out of proportion to his salary as such publicofficer or employee and to his other lawful income and theincome from legitimately acquired property, said propertyshall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfullyacquired."

This disputable presumption was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Republic(G.R. No. 152154, 15 July 2003). Thus:"The law raises the prima facie presumption that a propertyis unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if itsamount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the officialsalary and other lawful income of he public officer who ownsit. "

Furthermore, Republic Act No. 3019 provides:Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due toUnexplained Wealth. - If in accordance with the provisionsof Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three HundredSeventy-Nine, a public official has been found to haveacquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or inthe name of other persons, an amount of property and/ormoney manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to hisother lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal orremoval. Properties in the name of the spouse anddependents of such public official may be taken intoconsideration, when their acquisition through legitimatemeans cannot be satisfactOrily shown. Bank deposits in thename of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred bythe public official, his spouse or any of their dependentsincluding but not limited to activities in any club orassociation or any ostentatious display of wealth includingfrequent travel abroad of a non-official character by anypublic official when such activities entail expenses evidentlyout ofproportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be takeninto consideration in the enforcement of this Section,notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Thecircumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute validground for the administrative suspension of the public officialconcerned for an indefinite period until the investigation ofthe unexplained wealth is completed.

This Court is thus of the opinion that whether or not an asset is "ill-gotten", is aconclusion of fact and law which it need not resolve. This Court will therefore hear allevidence relevant to paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of the Impeachment Complaint and thesaid evidence will be assessed and evaluated by this Court in accordance withapplicable laws and jurisprudence.

In considering the matter of evidence sought to be adduced by the Prosecution toprove its allegations contained in Par. 2.3, Article II of the Grounds for Impeachment,


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the Court finds it relevant and essential to cite the decision of the Supreme Court in thecase of Office of he Ombudsman vs. Rach09, to w11:In the case of Carabeo v. Courl of Appeals, citingOmbudsman v. Valeroso, the Courl restated the rationale forthe SALN and the evils that it seeks to thwarl, to wit:"Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition ofwealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, andSection 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in theSALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimedparlicularly at curlailing and minimizing, the opporlunities forofficial corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty inthe public service. "Unexplained" matter normally resultsfrom "non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts.SALN, which a/l public officials and employees are

mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy ofaccountability of all public officers and employees in thegovernment. By the SALN, the public are able to monitormovement in the forlune ofa public official; it is a valid checkand balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properlies andwealth. "Complimentary to the above.-mentioned provisions, Section2 of R.A. 1379 states that "whenever any public officer oremployee has acquired during his incumbency an amount ofproperly which is manifestly out ofproporlion to his salary assuch public officer or employee and to his other lawfulincome and the income from legitimately acquired property,said properly shall be presumed prima facie to have beenunlawfully acquired. "By mandate of law, every public official or governmentemployee is required to make a complete disclosure ofhis assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppressany questionable accumulation of wealth because thelatter usually results from non-disclosure of suchmatters. Hence, a public official or employee who hasacquired money or property manifestly disproportionateto his salary or his other lawful income shall be primafacie presumed to have illegally acquired it.It should be understood that what the law seeks to curlail is"acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source of theundisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is"explained wealth" which the law does not penalize."(Emphasis supplied.)

It is this Court's belief that Paragraph 2.3 may be treated as an amplification ofthe accusatory language of Article II and that the allegation contained in said Paragraph2.3 has a demonstrable and logical relation to the grounds alleged in Article II. Suchallegation is relevant to the fact in issue.

This Court therefore finds that the allegation in Paragraph 2.3 that theRespondent Chief Justice has not included certain properties in his declaration of his9 G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011


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assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,is substantially and inextricably linked to the duty of the Respondent as a public officialto completely, truthfully and faithfully declare his assets, liabilities and net worth; andthat even if a disclosure may be proven to have been made, if the same may be shownto be less than the full and faithful disclosure contemplated by the Constitution, theintroduction of evidence to show such alleged omission is germane to the mainallegation expressed under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment.

IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and2.3 of Article II of the Articles of Impeachment;2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles ofImpeachment, with respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall relyupon the legal presumptions on the nature of any property or asset which may be

proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under Section 8 ofRepublic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.

SO ORDERED.January 27,2012.

Resolution ArtII Par 2.2 2.3 2.4

Documents

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