Success and Failure on the Populist Right: The Case of Wilders and Verdonk

Research Proposal

Matthijs van Tuijl

0850845

Master Thesis Political Behaviour and Communication

Leiden University

18-03-2011

Prof. Dr. Galen Irwin

Word count: 6666

‘I want to be Prime-Minister’1 was Rita Verdonk’s claim on October 18 2007, when

she founded her movement Trots op Nederland (TrotsNL, Proud of the Netherlands). At that

point in time that was not an unrealistic claim, with the opinion polls having her at 25 seats 2.

Geert Wilders with his Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Freedom Party), lost half of his support

in the polls to Verdonk when she announced her new party3. However, on June 9 2010, the

day of the Dutch General election, Wilders managed to secure 24 seats and Verdonk was

voted out completely by the people.4 How is it possible that Rita Verdonk could not win any

seats in the end and that Geert Wilders showed a significant growth?

That there was a potential for Verdonk to be successful was clear prior to the general

election in 2006, when she was involved in a fierce battle for the leadership of the Liberal

party (VVD) with now Prime-Minister Mark Rutte. She just lost, but did manage to get more

votes during that election than Rutte. With 620,555 votes, she got almost 100,000 votes more

than her party leader5. Verdonk was forced to leave the VVD after an internal dispute, with

the leadership contest, in practice, still going on after the elections. When she left, as figure 1

shows, she remained popular and was therefore for a while seen as a serious force within

Dutch politics. Geert Wilders, himself also a former VVD MP, having left the party a few

years earlier, enjoyed growing support after the elections until Verdonk founded her new

movement. At that point in time there were two new right wing parties looking for the favour

of the Dutch voter, only one was capable of claiming victory in the end.

Verdonk and Wilders have often been called populists, due to their approach to

politics (Lucardie 2007; Vossen 2010). While the reasons behind the political success of

populist parties have been studied in detail, focusing on elements as political leadership (or

charisma), protest voting and issue preferences (Eatwell 2005; Van der Burg and Mughan

2007), there is still no definite answer on how they manage to succeed and what elements are

most important. While there are many examples in Western Europe of populist parties

effectively claiming an influential position within their countries’ politics, the parties that do

not make it have received less attention.

What is interesting about the movements of Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders, as figure

1 shows, is that it was not just success or only failure. There were many ups and downs in

popularity in the years between elections. What happened during these years? Why did

1 ‘Verdonk wil in Torentje; ‘Trots op Nederland’ moet Fortuyn evenaren’ , De Telegraaf, October 18 20072 Nieuw Haags Peil, November 4, 20073 Nieuw Haags Peil, October 21, 20074 ‘Tweede Kamer 2010’, Kiesraad, June 9, 20105 ‘Proces-verbaal Tweede Kamer 2006’ , Kiesraad, November 27

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Verdonk not make it in the end while Wilders did will therefore be the puzzle of this thesis.

The findings of this study could contribute to a better understanding of the development of

populist parties in general. What explains the differences in electoral outcome for them? It

leads to the research question of this study.

What explains the success of the PVV and the failure of Trots op Nederland in the period

2006-2010?

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Figure 1.

1. Theory

In order to find an answer to the research question it is first necessary to look at what

these parties or movements actually are. It is claimed that Wilders and Verdonk are populists,

but what that is still remains somewhat ambiguous. Even though it is not the focus of this

study to define populism, it is important to know what we are actually dealing with. When

that definition is more clear, characteristics of the PVV and TON can be compared to that to

see if they fit the picture. If they can be qualified as populist parties, there is a possibility to

look at explanations for success and failure of populist parties and test these for Verdonk and

Wilders.

1.1. Populism

In Europe there is have been growing number of right wing populist parties entering the

arena and successfully claiming a position in national parliaments. According to some, the de-

alignment process that has taken place across Europe, has led to the rise of these new parties,

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focusing more on party leaders and less on a fixed ideology (Dalton et al., 2002: 22, 31-32).

The FPÖ in Austria and the Danish People’s Party are just two examples of parties that even

managed to participate, in some form, in their countries’ government.

Populism is a concept that is not that easy to define in terms of when a party can be called

a populist party. It is a concept that has many features and is has developed over time. In his

study on populism, Paul Taggart (2000) describes this process and defines modern populism

as the New Populism, which has its roots in Western Europe. He sees it as a movement of

multiple parties across countries with some defining characteristics. First of all, it is reaction

to bureaucratised welfare states and corruption within the existing political parties. Secondly

these parties reconstruct politics around a key issue, either taxation, immigration and

nationalism or regionalism. Thirdly, they organise themselves differently from existing

parties, as a result of distrust of political institutions. Party membership is only active and

direct in the form of elected officials and personalised leadership is prevalent. Fourth, they

like to establish a link between the people and themselves and place themselves outside of the

centre of the political spectrum (Taggart, 2000: 75).

Canovan explains this link to the people more clearly by distinguishing between three

different types: the united people (as in a nation), our people (in an ethnic sense) and the

ordinary people (against the privileged) (Canovan, 1999: 5). These separate types make the

faces of populism more clear. It can focus on a certain ethnic group and be an excluding

factor or it can rebel against the elite and be the voice of the common man. The elite is seen as

corrupt and going against the general will. Cas Mudde considers that to be the centre piece of

populism, the restoration of the will of the people in a country. In that way, populism is a very

moralistic ‘ideology’ (Mudde, 2004: 543-544). In this view, the common man is no longer in

power, the elite is and that is de facto a bad thing. Populist parties are there to restore popular

control over a nation.

The important thing to realise from the New Populism of Taggart is that these parties are

effectively trying to find a niche in politics based on dissatisfaction with modern politics.

They see politics as no longer representing the people and try to re-establish that link with

them by focusing on issues that appeal to certain groups in society. As Taggart explains, the

people are here portrayed as an unity within a heartland. That heartland can best be seen as an

imaginary place that emphasises all the good and virtues aspects of life. It is however not all

inclusive. It is to a large extent based on nationalism of an ‘organic community’, excluding

certain groups in society (Taggart, 2000: 95, 97). Related to this is the creation of conspiracy

theories. The elite conspires together, no longer protects the heartland and there should be

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something done about that. This is argued to be a major factor to mobilise support (Ibid.:

105).

Leadership is also a defining feature of populist parties. With populist parties you can

have two types of leadership. The more common is the type based on charisma, centred

around leaders with a large popular appeal. When, however, this is not present, it is argued

that in that case it tends to be authoritarian (Ibid.: 103). The result of this leadership is the

creation of a populist mood. The idea is that something needs to change fundamentally and

the country needs to be reshaped. This mood has the power to encourage otherwise non active

citizens to participate in politics and to get out and vote (Canovan, 1999: 6).

Interesting points are raised by Mudde in clarifying some basic elements of populism,

related to democracy and leadership. As he argues, when it comes to democracy, populist

parties want responsive government not necessarily direct democracy. They want the outcome

to be representative of the will of the people, but those people do not have to participate

directly, as long as they are heard. On the point of leadership, he says that the people want

their leaders to be in touch, but not be one of them (Mudde, 2004: 558-559). This marks some

interesting aspects of populist parties and can explain the apparent paradox of authoritarian

leadership and listening to the will of the people. That will needs to be represented by the

political leaders, but the people should not take over from them. Other scholars present a

somewhat different picture and argue that populist parties will demand more direct

democracy. Democracy should in that view be seen as an ideal that includes ‘referenda,

popular consultation and direct elections of office- holders (Keman and Krouwel, 2007: 25).

1.2. Wilders and Verdonk as Populists

In order to analyse the success and failure of populist parties in the case of Wilders and

Verdonk, it is important to establish what kind of characteristics they share with this populist

image just sketched. If they are populist leaders, then it is possible to test explanations of

success and failure of populism for them. If they differ from the ideal populist picture, then

this can be taken in account when conducting this study.

Koen Vossen, comparing Wilders and Verdonk in terms of populist tendencies, has

distinguished seven features of populism comparable to the points mentioned above (see table

1) . Some of them, the ‘folksy style’ and ‘voluntarist approach’, are somewhat similar to other

points. The folksy style more or less relates to how politicians act, being one of the people,

speaking with the same language. The voluntarist approach relates to politics not having to be

as complex, the peoples’ qualities are enough to govern (Vossen, 2010: 25). These two points

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clearly focus on the incompetent elite in comparison to the people. It again stresses the fact

that the political organisation has become filled with an unnecessary bureaucracy that needs to

be fixed. The voluntarist approach also moves away from a politician as a professional. The

common man should be represented and therefore there is no need for professionals.

(Vossen, 2010: 34)

Wilders

As shown in table 1, Vossen has some doubts about the basic idea of Geert Wilders as

a populist in the traditional way. He calls Wilders a half-hearted populist, mainly because he

is a professional politician and he is not glorifying the people to the extent that a true populist

would do. Instead Wilders also criticizes the people on occasions (Vossen, 2010: 30). The

interesting thing about this is that Wilders is a former MP for the VVD, as is Rita Verdonk,

but in contrast to her, he spent quite some more time there. He had been active for the

parliamentary party since 1990, working as a policy advisor. Known as a hard worker,

Wilders lived politics. This is illustrated by the fact that when he was forced to leave

parliament after the 2002 elections, he was devastated, having no alternative for politics

whatsoever (Fennema, 2010: 66). Wilders can therefore with reason be called a professional

politician and not so much a ‘common man’.

He does however not completely refrain from populist rhetoric. When he presented his

candidates for the 2011 elections for the provinces he emphasised the importance of the

citizens in contrast to the elite. He claimed he wanted to return Limburg to the people of

Limburg. According to him, politics in the Netherlands focuses too much on the elite in the

Hague, which needs to change 6. This phrase was later repeated by Prime Minister Mark

Rutte, who’s government relies on the support of the PVV. A leading opposition MP then

accused the PM of using ‘PVV rhetoric’7. This example shows that Wilders indeed from time 6 ‘PVV: Limburg terug naar Limburgers’, RTL Nieuws, December 10, 20107 ‘Rutte gebruikt PVV retoriek’, Trouw, March 5, 2011

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to time uses this populist feature and can even be argued to successfully influence the

government with it.

What Wilders more clearly emphasises is his fight against the elite. He has managed

to create a link between progressive politics and the anti-establishment idea of populism. He

has created an image of the Dutch elite as a leftist elite with an inclination for cultural and

moral relativism (Vossen, 2010: 27 ). It might be this explicit definition of the elite that

explains how being a professional politician at the one hand but mixing that with some form

of populism at the other. It is just a certain part of the political spectrum that is completely on

the wrong path. Wilders wrote a ‘declaration of independence’, his starting point for his

movement. In it he explicitly mentions that elite let ‘this’ happen and now throw their hands

in the air and say there is nothing they can do about it anymore (Fennema, 2010: 103).

With this he focused on the cultural aspects. This also shows his focus on the

progressive elite, conspiring against society. He made a distinction between the Labour party

of Wouter Bos, which he thought to be pampering, and the VVD. The people that did not

want it to go completely wrong, should vote VVD (Ibid., 105). The exponent of this focus on

the cultural and moral relativism of the Dutch elite, is his own conspiracy theory about Islam

taking over Europe (Eurabia). As Vossen shows, Wilders actively spreads this image of

islamification, referring to many experts in the field. With this he is trying to give weight to

his claims and focus his campaign on the issue of immigration of Moslim immigrants

(Vossen, 2010: 27).

Vossen gives no definite answer on whether Wilders is a charismatic leader, calling it

difficult to measure in his case because of the closed nature of the party. However, the style of

leadership is more important in his case. Wilders is the only member of his party, trying to

control the internal decision making (Ibid.:28). This relates to the points made by Taggart on

authoritarian leadership. Wilders, whether charismatic or not, should then more be seen as an

authoritarian leader.

Paul Lucardie (2007), also shows the special position Wilders has put himself in. He

qualifies Wilders as a right-wing, semi- hearted liberal nationalist and populist (181). As well

as Vossen, he acknowledges that the behaviour of Wilders is not one of standard populism.

Wilders focuses on freedom, but it is limited and very inconsistent with respect to (Islamic)

religion. The populism, although by some seen as limited is according to Lucardie clearly

noticeable in his reference to the people and the corrupt elite (2007: 179-180).

Geert Wilders, although not being the ideal type, can therefore be characterised as a

populist politician. His anti-elite politics and the focus on Islam as the key issue around

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immigration are clear indicators. Wilders is a professional politician and in that way linked to

the establishment, but still manages to create an image of being a person that wants to

distance himself from ‘the politics in the Hague’. Claiming to return the country to the people

is a good example of that. The leadership elements can also be found, although maybe not in

the classic charismatic way. Half-hearted or not, Wilders still scores very high on some

defining features.

Verdonk

Where Wilders is a somewhat more complicated story in terms of populism, Verdonk

seems all the more to fulfil the standard definition of a populist. As can be seen in table 1, she

scores on all the criteria that are outlined. Research on her speeches and interviews show a

clear distinction between the corrupt elite and the people as the virtuous element in society.

There is a distrust of the people caused by the elite (Vossen, 2010: 30). Note here that

Verdonk does not care for the elite being left or right wing, it is just the elite. Unlike Wilders

she tries to take on the entire establishment and does not even leave out her own former party.

She mentioned Mark Rutte as being too left wing and therefore also being out of touch with

the people. When founding her movement she did not want to take sides either and think in

the old way of how the political spectrum was divided. She did not want to be mentioned left

or right, but wanted to think in old and new (Lucardie, 2007: 181). With this she cannot be

seen as more distinguishing herself from the establishment or elite and taking the side of the

people. From her history it does make sense for her not just to criticise the left, since she was

ousted by the VVD party leaders, but favoured by the people during the elections. In general

we can see Verdonk trying to frame that image of her party taking on politics in general.

The other important point to qualify Verdonk as a populist is that she places emphasis

vigorously on voluntarism and direct democracy. In her view the people should govern and

we do not need politicians to sort out the best solutions. This is best illustrated by the fact that

she wanted citizens to discuss with each other what the best solutions to certain problems are.

The real knowledge of ordinary people would improve this country (Vossen, 2010: 31). What

we see here is Verdonk moving away from the politician as a professional in politics.

Politicians should listen to the people and she goes to extremes to establish that link. She also

did not present a real party manifesto until very late. She presented her plans to the public just

a couple of months before the elections. She then focused on taxation, subsidies and other

public spending8.

8 ‘ToN richt pijlen op ambtenaren’ De Telegraaf, April 8 2010

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The personality of Verdonk was therefore very important. As Vossen stresses, she mainly

has relied on her own popularity and the image she had built during previous the years. Trots

op Nederland is very apolitical, in that way and more a feeling. (Vossen, 2010: 32-33).

Because of that lack of content of what the party is really about, it is difficult to clearly

explain what kind of party or movement it is. It could only somewhat be qualified as a

nationalist party. She does emphasize Dutch culture and the relevance of putting that up front,

but not as extreme as Wilders does it. She could therefore best be seen as a populist liberal-

conservative (Lucardie 2007: 182). The clear difference here is that Wilders actually wants to

tackle the influence of Islam in society, whereas Verdonk does not see that danger. She sees it

more in terms of not letting the Dutch society fade away in general. By focusing on taxation

and more power to the people, she fits very clearly in the classic image as depicted by

Taggart.

1.3. Success and Failure

With this outline of populism and Wilders and Verdonk as populist leaders it is now

possible to look at the elements that explain success and failure. In general there are three

reasons that can be defined why people vote for populist parties: the protest vote, in reaction

to other parties; voting for the charisma or leadership or voting for substance of policy

preferences.

The protest vote comes from what Immerfall sees as a neo-populist agenda. He focuses

on what the emphasis of a populist party is and sees its appeal accordingly. He argues it to be

important for such a party to hold together what he calls, a neo-populist coalition. This is

aimed at exploiting country specific issues, mainly focused on the economic situation of the

nation, in order to attract voters (Immerfall, 1998: 250). Populism here is seen as a reaction to

what is happening in a country and the reason of existence is an appeal to the people. Populist

parties, by showing what is wrong, have a reason to exist. Voters then react to this by seeing

the establishment as incompetent failing to take care of the nation, and vote for the party that

raised those questions (Ibid., 258). This explanation of the populist vote has nothing to do

with the appeal of leadership or what plans are presented to the people. It is the basic idea of

framing the image of the corrupt elite that has let the people down and is not representing the

general will anymore.

As Taggart explains, there are a problems with the way populist parties behave or are

organised, especially in this way. One of these is the criticism of established parties. Populist

parties want to distance themselves from established parties, but are forced, by the way

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politics is organised, to behave in a similar way. As a consequence, they have a large risk of

internal conflicts or collapsing (Taggart, 2000: 100). In practice it comes down to a very

simple logic. At first a populist party successfully explains why the old parties are not the

right choice for the voter. With this they create momentum for them to grow in support.

However, since this is not based on concrete plans or policy they fall in the trap they have

created for themselves. Once the people notice that they are not capable of fulfilling their

needs either, the image of a strong counter party disappears and the party collapses.

Roger Eatwell sees the importance of charisma in leaders for explaining the success of

populist parties. Whereas it is a concept that cannot be defined very easily and can take on

many forms, he focuses on the personal presence of the leader. It is about being able to create

the right image on television and to catch the right sound bite and not so much about the

physical attraction of the party leader. The focus of the publicity tends to be on the personality

of the leader and this creates electoral appeal (Eatwell, 2005: 108). This approach takes away

the idea of charisma just being about the leader and puts the emphasis on his actions. It still

remains a personalised attraction, but of a different nature.

Taggart sees problems with charismatic leadership in the long run. He argues it to be

unstable and not very reliable. Politicians can never be certain how to effectively sustain their

charisma and it is therefore very unstable (Taggart, 2000: 102). As long as politicians are seen

to be charismatic and are capable of catching the public eye, they will continue to be popular.

However relying on charisma alone seems to form a problem in the long run. A new

contender can come along and take away the support or people will start to see through the

charismatic mask.

Van der Burg and Mughan (2007) conclude from their study of Dutch populist leaders

that they do not have a greater effect on the voting behaviour than their counterparts from the

established parties. Even for Pim Fortuyn, arguably a very charismatic man, no significant

difference between his leadership appeal and that of other politicians was found (Van der

Burg and Mughan, 2007: 44). This puts further pressure on the effectiveness, if any, of just

the leader as a token to attract votes. Even though in a best case scenario it helps to improve

voting for the party, it seems to be the case that a populist party cannot rely on the leader

alone.

There is more to it and Mughan and Paxton (2006) try to explain this with a case study of

anti-immigrant feelings in Australia. What they find is that policy preference is highly

significant as an explanation for the populist vote. Only if there is correspondence between

what voters want and what parties offer them, will they vote for them (Mughan and Paxton,

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2006: 354, 357). It seems that voters have an idea of what they want to happen in a country

and need parties to defend this or to bring this forward. It can effectively boost the claim

made by many populists that the old parties are not representing the will of the people. It

could be the case that it is then more than a protest vote and basic rhetoric and gives a chance

for parties that can actually find a niche in politics to grow and become important.

Ivarsflaten, shows the volatility of populist parties when it comes to issues and thereby

also acknowledges the importance. She shows that the saliency of (especially the economic)

issue is important (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 489). The populist voter does look at issues and does

take the state of the nation into account and is not simply affected by rhetoric or leadership

appeal. Van der Burg and Fennema (2003) firmly support this conclusion and conclude from

their analysis of the development of anti-immigrant parties, that voters vote according to their

issue preferences. They argue that voters for those parties vote for the same reasons as any

other voter. Some evidence even hints that they are even more issue voters. (Van der Burg

and Fennema, 2003: 66. 70-71). It seems that we should not underestimate the voters for

populist parties. There is evidence that they are not the simplistic voters as some people hold

them to be. The strength of a party does not just rely on the leadership or on a protest vote. It

depends heavily on which issues are salient and whether a party manages to bring them

forward in a right way. There are therefore many ways for a populist party to go wrong and it

depends on the context whether such a party is successful or not.

1.4 Sub-questions/Expectations

Based on the literature and the characterisation of both Wilders and Verdonk, it is possible

to formulate some sub questions to analyse the success and failure of their parties. As seen

above there are three main reasons for the success of populist parties; these will serve as a

guide for explaining the differences between the two parties and finding an answer to the

research question. From this it is possible to distinguish between the following sub questions.

Q1: What was the influence of the ‘protest vote’ for Wilders and Verdonk?

It follows from the literature that the protest vote can be one of the reasons why people

vote for populist parties. The protest vote is a result of the party emphasising the difference

between the old and the new. The establishment has failed the people and the new (populist)

party is there to re-establish the link between the people and the government. For the protest

vote explanation to contribute as an important factor of success, we would expect to see the

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populist party to rally against the old parties and their politics. Furthermore the emphasis

would be on the old elite that has failed the people and the importance of restoring that faith

and giving power back to the people. An important explanation for failure here is the inherent

implications of this strategy. When parties run into problems themselves (mostly internal),

this will backfire and the protest vote will no longer be of any use to the populist party. If they

no longer have the image of being the new that will get rid of the habits of the old, we will

expect to see failure.

Q2: What was the influence of leadership as an explanation for success and failure?

A second explanation of success can be found in the leadership appeal or

personification of politics. It works either through charisma or authoritarian leadership.

Whereas charisma is not an easy concept to define, for the purpose of this study it will be

operationalised in a comprehensive way. Here it will just mean the personal appeal of a leader

to attract voters. For this to work out, we will expect to see little or no emphasis on issues or

ideas, but attention for the leader in general. It is expected that voter appeal will go up when a

lot of attention is given to the populist leader. The danger here is the unstable factor of

charismatic leadership. It seems that emphasising just the personal appeal of the leader for too

long can pose a problem and an unstable basis for a party to continue to grow further or hold

its position. Authoritarian leadership can be a further explanation for a populist party to

maintain a strong position. This type of leadership is expected to be very important for

holding the party together and we can expect to see differences with regards to voter

preferences for parties.

Q3: What is the influence of issue preferences and saliency?

The final sub question relates somewhat to the second. What is more important, having a

leader with a substantial charismatic appeal or talking about the issues and focusing on

improving specific things? For this question we would expect to see attention to issues

relating to voter appeal. It is also expected that certain issues will result in more support of

voters than others. When parties talk more about salient issues or create saliency for an issue

they are expected to increase their voting potential. Failing here could be the result of two

different things. First of all, it could mean that the specific party is unable to create any

substance to link themselves to. This could mean that the party focuses more on leadership

potential or has other reasons not to focus on the issues. The other explanation is that a party

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emphasises an issue that apparently is not that salient to the general public or where they take

a (in the eyes of the public) wrong stand on.

2. Methodology

The three sub questions and subsequently the research question, will be answered by

looking at the period between 2006 and 2010. In this period, as seen in figure 1, some

interesting developments took place with respect to the voting potential of the two

politicians/parties. Verdonk joined the race for the populist vote. Verdonk and Wilders both

had their ups and downs in the polls, eventually resulting in Verdonk dropping to nothing and

Wilders reaching an all-time high. It can therefore be qualified as a period with many changes

and different sides. This makes it an interesting period to analyse.

The analysis will be divided into six periods where we see most of the changes happen, as

indicated in figure 1. The first period is the arrival of Verdonk. Here we see her rising to 25

seats in the polls, taking away half of the potential PVV voters. These are also the first signs

that there seems to be a strong correlation between the two parties with respect to vote

preference of the electorate. It can be seen as the most abrupt shift in the polls in these four

years. The second period is the first drop of Verdonk and one of recovery for Wilders.

Interesting here is that it seemed to have been a period without any major events (except for

the discussion about the military mission in Uruzgan). This goes on until the start of the third

period, early 2008, when the discussion about Wilders’ film Fitna broke out. Surprisingly this

is not a period of growing support for the PVV, it is Verdonk that had her second surge in the

polls. If the focus really was on Fitna as much as it seems, then this could point at an

interesting development. During the second part of this period this image somewhat returned

to the previous status quo until the start of the fourth period. This marks the beginning of the

end for Rita Verdonk. In September and November of 2008 she was confronted with the

departure of two key figures within her party who both criticised TON in the media. The drop

in the polls followed almost instantly. Interesting here is that Wilders did not profit from this

development, the PVV retained its position for most of that period. The fifth period then is the

staggering growth of the PVV to their all-time high of 32 seats in the polls in early 2009. The

developing story here was the decision to prosecute Wilders for his Islam views. This was

spread out over several months, with the initial decision not to prosecute him being overruled

later on. The final and sixth period that is interesting for analysis is the drop of the PVV in the

polls just before the general election. It seems to correspond with the aftermath of the cabinet

crisis and the local elections.

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From these periods a reconstruction is made to see what explains success and failure of

these parties. The reconstruction itself will be on the basis of a newspaper analysis of De

Telegraaf. With a newspaper analysis it is possible to see what actually happened during this

periods. It is possible to see what kind of attention and how much was given to the parties and

what the focus of the attention was. If there are differences between articles of leadership

appeal for Verdonk and Wilders or on certain issues, than this could be clear indicators of

success and failure when linked to the relevant polls. The search term ‘Rita Verdonk’ for the

period September 21, 2007 (the day before the 2006 general election) to June 10, 2010 ( the

day after the 2010 general election) resulted in 649 De Telegraaf hits. A similar search for

‘Wilders or PVV’ resulted in 2378 hits.

The reason to take De Telegraaf as the focus of this study is that this paper is well

known for its right wing, often populist, sympathies. The long-time motto of the paper: ‘De

krant van wakker Nederland’, relating to the newspaper being there for the active Dutch

people, is also a reference to this populist appeal. De Telegraaf, because of that, should be the

paper that follows the development of these populist parties closely. It will also be more likely

to portray a certain picture of the parties with respect to their potential of representing the

people. By analysing newspaper content through Nexis Lexis, a reconstruction can be made of

the periods selected. Note here that the aim of this research is not to establish causality

between media coverage and populist success. Rather the media coverage is used to create the

essential narrative.

To answer the three sub question on the basis of this reconstruction and the related

opinion polls, there are some features will be looked for. For the first question expressions of

the ‘protest vote’ are important. The focus will be on whether the two populist parties try to

create an image of the elite versus the people and the new party against the establishment. Is it

possible to see one party being better equipped to go against politics as usual and show an

anti-establishment agenda? Do they create an image of wanting to give the power back to the

people? If it is possible to link this protest vote idea to success and failure in the polls than it

can be argued to be of influence.

For the second question the focus will be on leadership. It could be the case that with the

media attention it is very much a picture of Verdonk and or Wilders and not so much the party

or the idea. The idea here is that there is negative or positive information about the leaders

that can be linked to success and failure in the polls. Related to this is what characteristics are

mentioned. Is it the case that a certain image is created of a leader concerning their leadership

qualities or their personality that leads to more or less support?

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The third sub question can be answered by looking at the issues. Here the story is

twofold. Since the question is somewhat related to the second sub question the first part is: are

there any issues that are linked to the parties? If it is the case that the emphasis is on

leadership and not on substance, then that is an important part of the puzzle. The second part

is, when issues are present, what kind of issues and stands these parties are linked to. Can

these issues and them pressing on them be linked to the success or failure of these parties? In

short these will be the indicators to answer the sub questions. Each of them can have a

separate influence on the polls, but is also important to keep in mind their combining effect on

these parties’ results.

In addition to the media narrative of De Telegraaf, there are also some interesting data

that can be linked to the opinion polls. Peil.nl carried out separate research on important

moments over these four years. Many relate to the confidence in the party leaders over time,

but they also focus on specific issues when they appeared to be more salient or played a role

in decision making on that moment in time. The Dutch election study 2010 can also be used

to back up the story. Feeling thermometer scores for the parties (both TON and the PVV) and

the sympathy scores for the party leaders (both Wilders and Verdonk) were included with

these surveys, providing us with data on the importance of both. For Wilders some additional

questions were asked: What issue comes to mind when thinking of the PVV and do you agree

with the PVV on that issue? What other issue comes to mind when thinking of the PVV and

do you agree with the PVV on that issue? How much would you trust Geert Wilders with

being Prime-Minister?

3. List of References

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Studies, 47: 2-16.

Dalton, R. J., McAllister, I. & Ferdinand Muller-Rommel (2002) ‘Political Parties in a

Changing Europe’, in Luther, K. R. & Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, Political Parties in

the New Europe, Oxford: OUP.

Eatwell, R. (2005) ‘Charisma and the Revival of the European Extreme Right’ in Rydgren, J.,

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Movements of Exclusion: Radical right wing populism in the western world, New

York: Nova Publishers.

Fennema, M. (2010) Geert Wilders: Tovenaarsleerling (third revised edition). Amsterdam:

Prometheus.

Immerfall, S. (1998) ‘The Neo-Populist Agenda’ in Betz, H-G. and S. Immerfall (Eds), The

New Politics of the Right: Neo-populist parties and movements in established

democracies, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Ivarsflaten, E. (2005) ‘The Vulnerable Populist Right Parties: No Economic Realignment

Fuelling Their Electoral Success’ , European Journal of Political Research, 44: 465-

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Keman, H. en Krouwel, A. (2007) ‘The Rise of a New Political Class: Emerging New Parties

and the Populist Callenge’, The NET Journal of Political Science, 5 (1): 20–39.

Lucardie, A. (2007) ‘Rechts‐extremisme, populisme of democratisch patriotisme?’ Jaarboek

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Mudde, C. (2004) ‘The populist Zeitgeist’, Government & Opposition, 39 (3): 541-563.

Mughan, Anthony and Pamela Paxton (2006) ‘Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Policy Preferences

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358.

Taggart, Paul (2000) Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. 

Van der Brug, Wouter and Meindert Fennema (2003) ‘Protest or Mainstream? How the

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Wing Populist Parties’, Party Politics, 13(1): 29-51.

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