Research on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes

Research on the Effectiveness of International EnvironmentalRegimes:

A Review of the State of the Art

by

Detlef F. Sprinz

PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research & University ofPotsdamP.O. Box 60 12 0314412 PotsdamGermany

Phone: +49 (331) 288-2555/-2532Fax: +49 (331) 288-2600E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.sprinz.org

Paper Prepared for the Final Conference of the EU Concerted Action onRegime Effectiveness, Institut D'educació Contínua (IDEC), 09 – 12November 2000, Barcelona.

© Detlef Sprinz, 2000.(07 November 2000)

Detlef F. Sprinz iResearch on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes

Table of Contents

Abstract.......................................................................................................................i

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................... i

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1

2. Research on the Effect of International Environmental Regimes............... 3

2.1 Concepts of International Regime Effectiveness .......................................... 3

2.2 The Choice of Method...................................................................................... 5

2.3 Empirical Findings ......................................................................................... 11

2.4 Explaining the Degree of Regime Effectiveness ......................................... 12

2.5 Unresolved Challenges .................................................................................. 13

3. Lessons for the Study of Regime Effects in International PoliticalEconomy ...................................................................................................... 15

References................................................................................................................ 17

Abstract

This paper reviews the current state of research on the effect of internationalenvironmental regimes. In particular, the various concepts of regimeeffectiveness and methods chosen to establish causal regime effects arecompared, followed by a summary of the empirical findings on the degree ofregime effectiveness and the explanation of its variation. Subsequently, arange of research challenges is outlined which needs to be addressed in orderto make substantive progress, esp. in assessing international regimes overlonger time horizons. The paper concludes with lessons which the study ofthe effect of international environmental regimes offers for internationalpolitical economy.

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Arild Underdal and Oran Young for sharing advancematerials with me. An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the1999 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 16-20February 1999, The Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C.

Detlef F. Sprinz 1Research on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes

1. Introduction

As Zürn eloquently concludes in a major review of the progress in research on

international environmental policy, regime effectiveness has become a "driving

force in the analysis of international relations” (Zürn 1998, 649). Martin and

Simmons (1998, 742-757) more generally assert that the study of international

regime effect serves as a major field of current research in international relations.

Much of this research now originates in the environmental field. In a first phase,

major efforts concentrated on the conditions which give rise to international

regimes (e.g., Gehring 1994; Hasenclever et al. 1996; Keohane 1984; Keohane and

Nye 1989; Rittberger 1995; Young 1989a; Young 1989b; Young and Osherenko

1993). In the second phase of research, attention shifted towards regime

implementation and compliance (e.g., Chayes and Chayes 1991; Chayes and

Chayes 1993; Underdal and Hanf 2000; Victor et al. 1998; Weiss and Jacobson

1998). The ultimate question, however, remains if the international regimes

formed actually matter (Haas 1989). This paper summarizes the current research

on the state of regime effectiveness, compares the various research strategies

chosen and briefly explores the implication that the environmental regime

literature might have for other issue areas in international political economy.

In a broader sense, regime effectiveness is related to the literature on

public policy evaluation (e.g. Mohr 1988). Project evaluation routinely forms

part of the standard public policy cycle; it is applied to domestic and

comparative political domains (e.g., evaluation of public health care systems,

pension plans, military expenditures, etc.). Compared to the progress made in

the evaluation literature over the past decades, employing cost-benefit,

statistical, simulation and other types of analyses, we witness substantial growth

in the evaluation of international (environmental) regimes during this decade.

At a time when creating international regimes to combat serious actual or

anticipated environmental (and other) problems on the global scale has become


a prominent option as opposed to unilateralism, it is time to critically evaluate

the accomplishments of our research. For governments, it may be necessary to

find out which of the international regulatory regimes they have joined actually

yield returns on their investments, where progress has been minute or where

accomplishments have been so substantial that further investment seems not to

be warranted given the state of knowledge at a particular point in time.

Besides governments, the general public may also be an appropriate

audience for evaluations of international regimes. Politicians often, but not

universally, derive their mandate from the electorate; in case electorates make

informed, rational decisions, evaluative studies of their government’s

performance, the contributions by international non-governmental organizations

(INGOs), or the international regime at large may be helpful.

Evaluating performance in international policy should certainly not serve

as an end by itself. It shall guide the design of international regimes given the

state of knowledge. As a consequence, we need to specify and evaluate those

factors which account for the degree of regime effectiveness. As we do not live

in a static world, regime performance will change over time. Therefore,

evaluative instruments have to permit comparisons over time (e.g., the various

stages of the life cycle of a regime). This will, however, not suffice as the

electorate and governments may be interested to compare international

regulatory regimes across substantive domains, e.g., environmental regimes with

trade regimes. Thus, it is advisable to aim for rather generic approaches to

defining and measuring international regime effectiveness – thus allowing

equivalent aspects to be measured and compared.

In combination, the demand for tools to evaluate international regimes

leads to the following sequence of questions:

(i) How do we define regime effectiveness conceptually?

(ii) Which methods can assure that the international regime – rather

than other factors – account for the effects?


(iii) What are the empirical findings on regime effectiveness? And,

finally,

(iv) How do we explain the variation in regime effectiveness?

The answers which contemporary research on the effectiveness of

international environmental regimes offers will be summarized in Sections 2.1 –

2.4 to be followed by an overview of challenges which are insufficiently

addressed by present research (Section 2.5).

2. Research on the Effect of International Environmental

Regimes

Reviewing the state of research on the effectiveness of international

environmental regimes is considerably assisted by two recent review essays by

Jacobeit (1998) and Zürn (1998). This review will build on their findings, extend

it to the most recent research, treat the methodological considerations in more

detail, and draw attention to the implication of research on environmental

regimes to those in international political economy more broadly.

2.1 Concepts of International Regime Effectiveness

The conceptualization of “regime effectiveness” varies considerably across the

literature. In an ideal world, however, there should be some minimal

requirements which all of these conceptualizations should honor:

(i) focused, conceptual definition,

(ii) easy to measure operationally,

(iii) comparable across time and issue areas, and


(iv) permit aggregate (regime-wide) performance measures as well as

disaggregated (e.g., country-level) measures to be taken in a nested

way.1

While such requirements may be intuitively appealing, there is even

considerable divergence on the very first aspect, namely the definition of regime

effectiveness.

In “Institutions for the Earth,” Keohane et al. respond to this challenge by

asking the question: “Is the quality of the environment or resource better

because of the institution?” (Keohane et al. 1993, 7). For reasons of lack of data,

they suggest to “focus on observable political effects of institutions rather than

directly on environmental impact” (Keohane et al. 1993, 7). According to

Jacobeit (1998), much research has focused on variables of political behavior,

spanning either the economic-political domain (Keohane and Levy 1996), the

legal-political domain (Victor et al. 1998), the comparative dimension –

enhanced by the linkages between domestic and international environmental

policy (Schreurs and Economy 1997), or focusing on the processes of

international regimes, especially feedback loops over time (Oberthür 1997).

The broadest conceptualization of regime effectiveness has most likely

been taken by Young (1999a) by augmenting the problem-solving aspects of

regime effectiveness with the (i) legal approach (compliance), (ii) economic

approach (economic efficiency), (iii) the inclusion of normative principles such as

“fairness or justice, stewardship, participation,” etc., and the (iv) political

approach which is geared towards initiating actions which may ultimately lead

to the achievement of the far-reaching goals espoused by international

framework conventions (see Young and Levy 1999, 5-6). As a result of such

comprehensive approaches, constructing comparable measures of regime

1 For a more extensive list of ideal requirements, see Helm & Sprinz (2000).


effectiveness may be extremely demanding. Furthermore, the more

comprehensive the approach and the more complicated its operationalization

(see below), the more difficult it will be to assess covariation between the (i)

factors which influence regime effectiveness and (ii) degree of regime

effectiveness achieved (Jacobeit 1998, 360).

By contrast, Underdal conceives of regime effectiveness as environmental

problem-solving in terms of relative improvements over the counterfactual state

of affairs, i.e., the absence of an international regime, and in terms of

improvement relative to a collective optimum (Underdal 1997). Establishing

counterfactual performance and deriving collective optima constitute substantial

methodological challenges to which I will now turn in more detail.

2.2 The Choice of Method2

In assessing the role which international environmental regimes play,

counterfactual reasoning, process tracing, quasi-experiments, and the derivation

of optimality conditions play important roles.

Counterfactual reasoning has become an important tool in international

relations research (Fearon 1991; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). In the context of

research on regime effectiveness, it is geared to establish the performance score

in case of the absence of an international regime. By way of comparison with the

performance score in the presence on an environmental regime, the difference in

scores is attributed to the effect of the international regime. In practice, too little

attention is placed on distinguishing between the existence of a discernible effect

and its magnitude – with the former more easily established or rejected as

compared to the latter. Furthermore, given the case selection bias in favor of

2 See also Sprinz and Wolinsky (in preparation).


issue areas where we witness international regimes, counterfactuals are often

established in an asymmetric way, i.e., the counterfactual for a “no regime”

(exists) situation is rarely established.

Counterfactuals also run considerable risks in how they are non-

arbitrarily established. King et al. remind us that not only the control variable is

changing values, but also all variables which are closely connected to it (King et

al. 1994, 78) - thereby posing considerable demands on researchers in order to

assure comparability of research findings by varying more complex sets of

variables simultaneously (Jacobeit 1998, 355-356; Zürn 1998, 639). Nevertheless,

any procedure to assess regime effectiveness will have to establish

counterfactual performance.

Many studies of regime effectiveness in the field of international

environmental policy employ process tracing undertaken in a multitude of case

studies in order to establish the causal effect of international regimes (e.g.,

Bennett in preparation; Underdal 1997; Young 1999a). By familiarizing

themselves with the subject matter, expert authors try to undertake tests of

detailed theoretical implications of their theory. There are, however, a range of

challenges to be overcome to establish causal effect by process tracing.

First, as Zürn concludes, "[t]he reader ... wonders whether the method

could not be made more systematic" (Zürn 1998, 640). Second, it shares the

challenges of “one shot” counterfactuals. If the notion of process tracing is taken

seriously, then a third challenge arises in terms of a “multiplicative ‘type one’

error.” By establishing counterfactuals for comparatively short sequences

(processes), one runs the risk of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis of no

regime effect for each of the sequences with probability p. Conversely, the

researchers correctly judges with (1-p) probability. If such time sequences are

patched sequentially, then for n sequences, the correct overall assessment will

only hold with (1-p)n probability if we assume that the error probabilities are

constant for each process sequence. As a consequence, process tracing over very


long (time) sequences runs considerable risks or arriving at erroneous

conclusions. Conversely, one may think of this procedure, if rigorously applied,

as a very demanding test.

Given the challenges posed by counterfactuals and process tracing in

establishing causal effect to be attributed to a regime, the use of quasi-

experimental designs holds great promise (Cook and Campbell 1979). Since

experimental designs can rarely be employed in world politics, observations for

control groups need to be found with different values on the intervention

variable. Simple pre-post tests (i.e., focus on the change of a performance

variable before and after an intervention) clearly fail to establish a compelling

quasi-experimental design – because they cannot rule out that an unobserved

variable caused the change in the performance variable (Cook and Campbell

1979).

Much of the research on regime effectiveness is plagued by the absence of

cases where international regimes have not yet come into being or have no(t yet

any) effect. As a consequence, studying the life cycle of international regimes

ranging from their formation to their actual implementation and impact may

serve as second best solutions for the absence of proper control cases.

The methodological approaches reviewed so far largely avoid the scaling

of regime effectiveness. Two approaches in the problem-solving tradition have

taken up the challenge to operationalize the concept in numerical form, namely

Underdal (1997) as well as Helm and Sprinz (2000). The logic pursued by both

teams follows the conceptual steps suggested by Underdal:

(i) What precisely constitutes the object to be evaluated? (ii) Against whichstandard is the object to be evaluated? (iii) How do we operationally goabout comparing the object to our standard; in other words, what kind ofmeasurement operations do we perform in order to attribute a certainscore of effectiveness to a certain object (regime)? (Underdal 1992, 228-229) (emphasis in the original).


In answering these questions, Underdal (1997) develops ordinal scales for

improvement over a (no regime) counterfactual for behavioral and technical

optima.3

Helm and Sprinz (2000) go one step further. Underdal’s triad of questions

calls for the specification of three important aspects. First, it has to specified

what is to be explained, i.e. regime effectiveness in terms of (environmental)

problem-solving. Second, the lower and upper bounds into which such regime

performance may fall have to be determined. And third, a practical measure is

suggested.

Lower and upper bounds constitute the range into which scores of

problem solving will ultimately fall. Since we are assessing international

regimes, the lower bound is determined by the counterfactual of a “no regime

(exists)” situation (the counterfactual situation referred to further above) -

whereas the upper bound is represented by some form of collective optimum,

e.g., a collective cost minimum. Both boundaries can be determined in various

ways.

The lower bound is represented by the “no regime” counterfactual, i.e., no

problem solving would occur which can be ascribed to the international regime.

Thus, the actors involved in an international regime can overcome the lower

bound (where they do not cooperate) and maximize their joint welfare by way of

cooperation. In the case of transboundary or global environmental problems,

problem-solving activities undertaken by one country also profit other countries,

and vice versa. In economic theory, it can be shown that if the marginal

collective costs of using the policy instrument (e.g., emissions reductions) equate

its collective benefits, a “collective optimum” has been found (Tietenberg 1992).

Alternatives for such a collective optimum could also be derived by way of

3 For scoring results, see Section 2.3


environmental thresholds such as the absence of exceeding critical loads in the

case of transboundary acidification.4

Evaluations of the degree of problem solving takes place along the

dimension of instrument use, e.g., emission reductions.5 The lower bound is

determined by the no-regime counterfactual solution (NR) (see Figure 1) which

serves as an “anchor” point for reference: Its score reflects the degree of

instrument use in the counterfactual situation for a country (or all countries),

e.g., the degree to which a country would have reduced its emissions in the

absence of the international regime. The upper bound is reflected by the

collective optimum (CO) expressed as a score of instrument use. In most

instances, countries (or a group of countries) will execute actual policies (AP)

along the dimension of instrument use which fall into the interval [NR, CO].

Once the distance of NR to AP is related to the distance of NR to CO, we arrive

at a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness, and its score (ES) falls strictly into

the interval [0, 1] (see Helm and Sprinz 2000).

4 See Sprinz and Churkina (1999) for a method to generally derive environmental thresholds.5 Jacobeit (1998, 348) and Zürn (1998, 830) find emission-based approaches to the

measurement of international regime effectiveness particularly promising. The EUConcerted Action on Regime Effectiveness Meeting at Oslo (Fall 1999) considered a widerrange of alternative forms of collective optima. While this authors find these suggestionsvery encouraging, they may be difficult to operationalize.


Figure 1: Measuring Regime Effectiveness (general concept)

(NR) (AP) (CO)

degree of use of instrument(e.g., emission reductions)

Effectiveness Score ES = (AP – NR) / (CO – NR)

Notes: (NR) = no-regime counterfactual(CO) = collective optimum(AP) = actual performance

Source:Helm and Sprinz (2000).

This procedure can be conducted on the level of each country as well as on

the aggregate of all countries, resulting in nested effectiveness scores on both

levels! The general solution shows a range of advantages: It is not limited to a

particular policy instrument, it can be used by researchers of various

methodological orientations (e.g., more qualitatively or more formally oriented

researchers), and it is easy to interpret in the applied context by policy-makers.

Furthermore, it can be applied to a variety of types of international

environmental problems, such as transboundary and global environmental

problems (Helm and Sprinz 2000; Sprinz and Helm 1999). Given its generic

reasoning, it may also hold some promise for being extended to other

substantive domains of international political economy.

It should be noted, that the method clearly uses systematic counterfactual

scoring for the “no regime counterfactual” degree of instrument use. Since a

simple pre-post test design does not generate the no-regime counterfactual,

researchers or, preferably, independent external experts will have to score this

value. However, any effectiveness score (see Figure 1) is also crucially

dependent on the value for the collective optimum. In case economic

optimization models or other non-arbitrary mechanisms compute the collective


optimum and reasonable precautions are taken to focus on the sensitivity of the

effectiveness score, then the determination of effectiveness scores becomes

considerably independent of the researcher.

2.3 Empirical Findings

A decade ago, Peter Haas asked the pointing question: ”Do regimes matter?”

(Haas 1989). Responding to the debate between major schools of thought in the

discipline of international relations, Young’s most recent research project

concludes

[W]e can say without hesitation at the outset that regimes do matter ininternational society, so that there is nothing to be gained fromperpetuating the debate between neoinstitutionalists and neorealistsabout the "false premise of international institutions" (Mearsheimer)(Young 1999a, 249).

These findings are not entirely generalizable, as Raustiala and Victor

summarize their own findings by stating that

In virtually all of our studies, the most important turning points andfundamental pressures that have caused regulatory action have not beeninstitutions (Raustiala and Victor 1998, 698).

As regime effectiveness may be a matter of degree, it seems appropriate to

turn to those studies which have explicitly tried to score their cases. In his

analysis of 15 cases and a total of about 45 phases,6 Underdal reports “highly

preliminary findings” that, on average, scores of 0.69 (on a scale ranging from 0

to 1) are achieved if a behavioral change concept is employed and 0.41 if

progress towards technically optimal solutions are considered. Employing a

different technique but the same range of the scale (see Figure 1), Helm and

6 The phases constitute the unit of analysis for the statistical evaluation.


Sprinz (2000) find for the cases of regulating transboundary acidification in

Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s average values of 0.39 (for sulfur) and

0.31 (for nitrogen oxides). Their disaggregation procedure indicates

considerable differences in scores across countries and across pollutants (ibid.).

Overall, it seems fair to conclude that at least some international

environmental regimes have non-zero effects, but in view of the previous two

projects which employ explicit scaling techniques, it is likely that many

international environmental regimes presently do not yet exploit their full

potential. With a view to considering design elements for decision-makers, it is

important to try to explain or account for the variation in regime effectiveness.

2.4 Explaining the Degree of Regime Effectiveness

The perhaps best known explanation for regime effects are the 3 C’s put forward

by Levy et al. (1993), namely international regimes acting as

(i) enhancers of governmental concern,

(ii) enhancers of the contractual environment for mutually profitable

agreements, and

(iii) enhancers of national capacity to implement and comply with the

rules of international regimes.

While these perspectives point to major explanatory routes to be found in the

empirical domain, it remains to be demonstrated in more systematic and

comparable form to which degree they matter. Young & Levy take a cautious

approach by stating

We do not claim to have produced a set of empirically-testedgeneralizations about the sources of regime effectiveness that are validacross a range of issue areas. Our contribution lies in the specificationand application of models designed to illuminate the sources of actor


behavior and in detailed studies of a set of environmental cases chosen asvehicles for probing the relevance of these models to actual behaviorgoverned by the operation of international regimes (Young and Levy1999, 3).7

The most systematic approach to explaining regime effectiveness is taken

by Underdal (1997) who focuses on the (i) benignity of the (environmental)

problem and (ii) problem-solving capacity. Under the rubric of the benignity of

(environmental) problems, Underdal subsumes the (i) incongruity of cost-benefit

calculus for countries which may offer (dis)incentives to push for and comply

with demanding obligations and (ii) issues of problems of coordination.

Furthermore, he subsumes under problem-solving capacity the (i) institutional

setting in terms of the decision-making procedure, actor capacity, and the role of

epistemic communities and (ii) the distribution of issue-specific power in terms

of the incentives countries have to push for an international environmental

regime - a form of entrepreneurial leadership.8 In his findings, Underdal (1997)

highlights the explanatory power of issue-specific power, esp. in the context of

malign problems.

2.5 Unresolved Challenges

This review of the progress in the field of research on the effect of international

environmental regimes suggest a proliferation of concepts – with the strongest

emphasis being placed on problem-solving.9 Several projects have scaled the

7 In particular, they refer to the behavioral pathways encompassing regimes as (i) utility

modifiers, (ii) enhancers of cooperation, (iii) bestowers of authority, (iv) learning facilitators,(v) role definers, and (vi) agents of internal realignments (Young and Levy 1999, 22-28).

8 The latter aspect appears to be an extension of Sprinz & Vaahtoranta (1994).9 Hisschemöller and Gupta (1999) share this focus on problem-solving and develop a

typology of policy problems. The implications of their typology of the degree to which


degree of regime effectiveness, and at least one major effort has advanced to a

statistical, comparative analysis of the factors accounting for differences in

regime effectiveness. While such progress is desirable, there are a range of

challenges which may merit attention in the future.

First, regimes are dynamic, i.e., the may go through a life cycle (Underdal

1997). In strict terms, we can only compare equivalent regime phases across

substantive regimes. While such a procedure will increase internal and

statistical conclusion validity, it will reduce the number of cases deemed

desirable for comparative analysis. In addition, any scoring procedure will have

to adjust to the challenge posed by longer time horizons in order to make the

effectiveness scores comparable across time. A challenge is posed, for example,

if the no regime counterfactual degree of instrument use changes on occasion of

new, cost-saving technologies which are only available to some countries but not

to all of them.

Second, much of the research has focused on substantive domains where

international regimes are at least at their stage of formation. The discipline still

lacks a good study which explores under which circumstances international

regimes do not come into being. The results of such a study would provide the

strongest type of control on the findings about explaining regime effectiveness,

but it would also help in refining methods used for establishing the

counterfactual more precisely.

Third, there is little systematic exploration of the effect of enforcement

mechanisms and their impact on regime effectiveness.10 While it is plausible that

enhanced compliance verification mechanisms will improve compliance levels,

there may be a selection effect at work which lets countries sign only such

international environmental agreements which they are likely to comply with,

problems are structured is likely to be far-reaching, and a rigorous test of its implicationswould be particular welcome.


i.e., we face a serious endogeneity problem (Bernauer 1995). While regime

effectiveness avoids some of these problems by focusing on actual performance

rather than regime rules, regimes designed with strong enforcement mechanisms

may show some bifurcation: In some cases, strong enforcement mechanisms

will allow an international regime to achieve high degrees of effectiveness, in

other cases, the fear of enforcement may lead countries to strive for the smallest

common denominator – which may not be much different from the no-regime

counterfactual policy. While many scholars hold that it is difficult to enforce

international rules because of the lack of international authority, this may be an

overly pessimistic conclusion. Countries can put some of their (most likely

financial) resources a priori at the disposal of some international verification and

enforcement agency – which adds credibility to the rules they subscribed to

simultaneously. By way of example, the fiscal restraints imposed on EURO-

member countries (theoretically) work with a (semi-)automatic enforcement

system in case EURO-member countries violate fiscal rules.

3. Lessons for the Study of Regime Effects in International

Political Economy

In the early phases of research on international regimes, environmental cases

played a minor role (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1989; Krasner 1983); by contrast,

research on regime effectiveness has been dominated by the environmental

domain. In closing the cycle, it may be worth to draw some tentative conclusion

of the contribution which research on the environmental cases could have to the

larger domain of international political economy.

10 For the impact of enforcement on compliance with the rules of regimes, see Downs et al.

(1996), Mitchell (1998; 1994) and Victor et al. (1998).


First, a clear and operational definition of regime effectiveness would

provide a point of departure for the comparison of international regimes.

Ideally, such a concept of measurement is generically applicable and open to

intercalibration. Preliminary work by Underdal (1997), Sprinz and Helm (1999),

and Helm and Sprinz (2000) offers points of departure, but need refinement to

test their applicability beyond the environmental field. The measure

summarized in Figure 1 offers the greatest potential for generic application. For

example, we could compare specific environmental regimes with those in the

field of international trade. In order to investigate efforts to reduce tariff barriers

to trade, the dimension of instrument use might be labeled “average tariff on

imports” (weighted by import value) and be compared with scores developed

on the basis of emission reductions of acidifying pollutants. As the score is free

of any dimension, only the data quality of no-regime counterfactuals and

collective optima will potentially limit intercomparability.

Second, by drawing on a larger substantive domain, focused comparisons

can be undertaken between transboundary (or regional) with global regimes.

For example, we could pool (i) regional trade regimes and transboundary

pollution cases and compare them with (ii) a pool created of global financial and

global environmental regimes. Thus, we could answer the question whether the

geographical scope of regimes has effects on the degree of regime effectiveness.

Third, there is considerable scope of “correlated regimes,” i.e., a cluster of

regimes simultaneously exist and we wish to partition their effects. For example,

both the European Union and UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)

simultaneously regulate the emissions of acidifying pollutants in Europe. In

order to control for the effect of the European Union vis-à-vis the (residual)

effect of its member countries within the UNECE, effects of the EU efforts at

policy coordination and EU-wide regulation have to be controlled for in order to

arrive at effectiveness scores for the UNECE regime. As environmental

regulation has more and more economic implications and vice versa, we will


need to devise much more carefully nested, multiple counterfactuals in order to

separate regime effects.11

Research on the effect of international environmental regimes has

advanced considerably during this decade. Expansion to large-N studies is a

likely option in the foreseeable future (Breitmeier et al. 1996). The greatest

challenge lies in trying to apply the lessons learnt in the environmental field to

the larger issue area of international political economy – and reap the benefits of

comparative institutional inquiry: for academia, decision-makers, and the

informed public alike.

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Research on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes

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