Reorganisation of States in IndiaAuthor(s): Mahendra Prasad SinghSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 11 (Mar. 15 - 21, 2008), pp. 70-75Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40277259 .

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Reorganisation of States in India

MAHENDRA PRASAD SINGH

Through an analytical study of the process of fédéralisation of India, the author provides a picture of story of state formation in the country. It is argued that any further reorganisation of states should be based on a "cosmopolitan model of democracy" and should be anchored in theories of constitutionalism, consociationalism and multiculturalism.

Mahendra Prasad Singh (profmpsingh@yahoo.com) teaches political science at the University of Delhi.

partition of Bengal in 1905 was aimed at forestalling of newly emergent spirit of Indian nationalism in the English- educated new middle class ('nutan bhadralok') in Bengal

to prolong the British hegemony. This partition forced the British, in face of a strong popular protest in the form of the swadeshi movement, to order the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911. A further partition of the Bengal presidency followed, this time in response to popular Bihari demands, creating the province of Bihar and Orissa in 1911. In answer to a similar demand Orissa was bifurcated in 1936.

Province/Nationality Formation in British India The undercurrents of civic patriotism/nationalism in Bengal and elsewhere in the last quarter of the 19th century mingled with Hindu revivalism and with other religious revivalist tendencies waiting in the wings by the beginning of the 20th century. The movement engendered similar linguistic provincial fervour in Hindi-speaking and later Oriya-speaking parts of Bengal presi- dency. The movement for a separate province-formation in Bihar was linked partly with Hindi linguistic identity and mainly with prospects of greater employment, middle class professional earnings, and freedom from Bengali domination [Prasad 1992; Mishra and Pandey 1996]. Ironically Bengali intelligentsia had patronised the campaign to replace the Persian court language with Hindi around the last quarter of the 19th century in the Hindi-speaking part of the Bengal presidency. This campaign succeeded in its objective in 1881. It was not accompanied by the demand for making a separate province of Bihar at that time [Das Gupta 1970].

Thus began the modern historical process of nationality- formation in India. The major landmarks of this development constituted the acceptance of federalism by the Lucknow confer- ence of the Indian National Congress in 1916, acceptance of linguis- tic provinces by the 1920 Congress held in Nagpur, submission of memoranda in large numbers to the British Government of India and the India Office in London for recognition of nationalities of Oriyas, Kannadas, Andhras, Tamils, Bengalis, and Jharkhandis, and the subsequent creation of linguistic states based on such crite- ria [Ghosh 1996: 16-17]. The Indian Statutory Commission chaired by John Simon in its report submitted to the British government found that it was "manifestly impossible for us to recommend the redrawing of the map of India according to some new pattern". The report further stated that:

If those who speak the same language form a compact and self- contained area, so situated and endowed as to be able to support its existence as a separate province, there is no doubt that the use of a common speech is a strong and natural basis for provincial

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individuality. But it is not the only test - race, religion, economic interest, geographical contiguity, a due balance between country and town and between coastline and interior may all be relevant factors. Most im- portant of all, perhaps for practical purposes is the largest possible measure of general agreement on changes proposed, both on the side of the area gaining, and on the side of the area that is losing territory...1

The 1942 "Quit India" Resolution of the Congress pledged "the

largest measure of autonomy for the federating units". Politics moved into different gears in 1946 with the British government sending the Cabinet Mission to explore the political future of India. Memoranda were submitted to the mission by the Dravida

Kazagham for a sovereign state of Dravidastan and by the Communist Party of India for "17 sovereign National Constituent Assemblies based on national homelands of various Indian

peoples" and advocated "a voluntary union of national states"

[Ghosh 1996: 18].

Reorganisation of States since 1947 The British transferred power under the Government of India Act 1947 to the constituent assembly of India dominated by the Indian National Congress. The paramountcy of the British Crown over native Indian states lapsed in the same year. The govern- ment of India combined consensual diplomacy and "police action" (Hyderabad) and defensive military assistance/intervention-on- invitation (Jammu and Kashmir) to effectuate the integration of these states with the Indian union in the process of being crafted by the constituent assembly doubling as the provisional Parliament. In due course three categories of states out of the British Indian provinces and the native states were created by the constituent assembly of independent India. These categories were called Part 1 states (formerly British Indian provinces), Part 11 states (formerly smaller native Indian states that did not pose much problem in joining the Indian union), and Part in states (formerly native Indian states whose integration with India proved to be problematic either due to the desire of the rulers to exercise the option of independence (Jammu and Kashmir and Hyderabad)) or due to smaller size and numerically and geographically scattered and fragmented history [Menon 1969].

The creation of some newvprovinces by dividing the Bengal presidency by the British rulers around the first decade of the 20th century in response to popular demands was just the begin- ning of the long drawn-out process of territorial reorganisation in modern India. Such popular demands and movements multiplied following the commencement of the Constitution in 1950. The holding of the first general elections in 1952 on universal adult suffrage accelerated what the new nationalist elites, including Nehru, decried as the "fissiparous tendencies". The nationalist leaders during the freedom struggle, on the other hand, had adopted a variety of strategies to deepen the sociological founda- tions of Indian nationalism by appealing to linguistic identities. In addition to using territorial patriotism as the bedrock of civic nationalism by Congress moderates, Congress extremists had also leaned on Hinduism, and Gandhi on Indian languages and a composite religious pluralism in search of "cultural" nationalism with ethnic undercurrents. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries the rise of proto-nationalism had begun to gather religious and

regional linguistic underpinnings. Gandhi had tried to co-opt them into a pan-Indian force by advocating the reorganisation of the Indian National Congress along linguistic lines rather than on the British administrative provincial boundaries, which was the case earlier. Although Gandhi's proposal was adopted by the

Congress at its Nagpur session in 1920, his penchant for popular sovereignty reflected in his demand of 1922 for a directly elected constituent assembly for future and independent India was never

accepted by the British rulers. The constituent assembly of India, under constant pressure to

redraw India's internal borders, formed a linguistic provinces commission (chaired by S K Dar) to study the problem and write a

report. In its report submitted in December 1948 the Dar Commis- sion recommended:

Till nationalism has acquired sufficient strength to permit the forma- tion of autonomous provinces, the true nature and function of a prov- ince under our Constitution should be that of an administrative unit functioning under delegated authority from the centre and subject to centre's overriding powers in regard to its territory, its existence, and its functions. These powers are required to form new provinces and to mitigate the rigour of government by linguistic majorities, to prevent a breakdown of the administration on account of disputes amongst lin- guistic groups, to check fissiparous tendencies and strengthen nation- al feelings, and above all to build up an Indian nation.2

After Independence Shortly after independence, movements for linguistic reorganisa- tion of states gained momentum in several states. The central Congress leadership as well as the States Reorganisation Commis- sion (src) report (1956) largely accepted the linguistic principle in a few cases but wished to maintajn multilingual states for cultural homogenisation. The src report stressed "obvious limita- tions to the realisation of unilingualism at ihe state level" due to the following "limiting factors": "(i) not all the language groups are so placed that they can be grouped into separate states; (ii) there are a large number of bilingual belts between different linguistic zones; and (iii) there exist areas with a mixed popula- tion even within unilingual areas."3

The seventh amendment to the Constitu- tion supplemented by the States Reorgani- sation Act (both enacted in 1956) created the following states effective November 1, 1956 (Table 1).

However, the union government in 1956 conceded to the demand for unilingual states only in case of Andhra Pradesh, where the agitation had culminated into the self-immolation of a popular Telugu leader. Milder agitations for linguistically mixed rump states of Madras after bifurcation of Andhra, Bombay, Mysore, Punjab, and elsewhere were ignored. However, the popular linguistic movements and the inter- nal balkanisation of India persisted.

As it happened, under the pressure and persistence of linguis- tic, religious, and tribal movements, the central government yielded, creating Andhra Pradesh (Telugu-speaking), Tamil Nadu

table 1: Reorganised States in 1956

1 Andhra Pradesh

2 Assam

3 Bihar 4 Bombay

5 Jammu and Kashmir

6 Kerala 7 Madras 8 Mysore

9 Orissa

10 Punjab

11 Rajasthan 12 Uttar Pradesh

13 West Bengal Sources: The Seventh Constitutional Amendment and SRC Act, both 1956.

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(Tamil-speaking), Karnataka (Kannada-speaking), Gujarat (Gujarati-speaking), Maharashtra (Marathi-speaking), Punjab which was trifurcated into Punjab (Punjabi-speaking with a Sikh majority), Haryana (Hindi-speaking with Hindu majority), and Himachal Pradesh (Hindi-speaking with Hindu majority) in the 1950s and 1960s. This process of territorial reorganisation extended to the north-east in the 1960s and 1970s. Beginning with the bifurcation of Nagaland out of Assam (1962), the process culminated in the creation of the so-called "seven sisters" - states or the union territories - in the region: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. First Nagaland and Mizoram, and later Manipur and Assam came to be affected by separatist movements. The extent of support for separatism is arguably rather limited political fraction and subject to change. Yet the movements have persisted in varying degrees and caused breakdown to democracy and federalism necessitating invocation of emergency provisions of the Constitu- tion. A recent study of the revival of the Tai-Ahom history in Assam by the insurgent United Liberation Front of Asom (ulfa) in "search for an alternative to the label Assamese and/or Indian" surmises that "religion cannot be the central theme of this kind of history (as it is now)", and that "one could then move beyond diversity, and, build on Indian nationality that people accept as legitimate and desirable" [Saikia 2005]. 4

New Sub-State Movements Sub-state movements based on tribal or ethnic identities acquired salience in several states in the 1980s such as Gurkha National Liberation Front in the Darjeeling hill district of West Bengal, Bodoland agitation in Assam, and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in the Chhota Nagpur region mainly in Bihar but marginally also in the adjoining states of West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. To meet these sub-state demands, a new proto-federal innovation of autonomous Regional Development Councils was set up in Jharkhand, Darjeeling, Bodoland, and Ladakh areas of Bihar, West Bengal, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, respectively. Systematic studies of this substrate devolutionary quasi-federal experiment are not available because practitioners as well as academics tend to give short shrift to them. The political activists generally continue to agitate for statehood and scholars tend to be sceptical of the will and ability of those in power to act and behave federally.5

An overview of the present states and union territories of India with area and demographic characteristics is enough to demon- strate that territorial reorganisation of the federation is still lacking in linguistic homogeneity and uniform standards of literacy (Table 2). • .

The three most recent new states created in the Indian union are Jharkhand (superseding the Jharkhand Regional Develop- ment Council), Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, bifurcating the states of Bihar, up and mp respectively in the year 2000. These new states were created in response to popular demands and mass movements in the more backward regions of the three Hindi-speaking parent states. Curiously, they are the first clear- cut category of states created more on considerations of economic backwardness and discriminatory treatment by the political

elites of the respective parent states than on linguistic, religious, or tribal considerations. The new states are more endowed in natural resources than their parent states, but less in human development. Uttarakhand is less distinguishable in ethnic terms from up but is backward in terms of regional economic disparities. Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh share in common disproportion- ately large tribal populations than their parent states. However, over the years, the tribal majority in the former has been reduced to a minority by migration into the area from Bihar plains and other parts of India. The Chhattisgarh region never really mounted a regional movement of any significance. In fact, the creation of these new states is understandable more by looking at Table 2; States and Union Territories In India Today States Area (sq km) Population Literacy Principal Languages Rate(%) Andhra Pradesh

(1953,1956,1959) 2,76,754 7.62,10,007 60.5 Telugu/Urdu/Hindi Arunachal Pradesh (1971) 83,473 1,097 54.3 Nissi/Daffla/Nepali/Bengali Assam (1951, 1962, 1971) 78,438 2,66,55,528 63.3 Assamese/Bengali/ Bodo/Bora

Bihar (1950, 1956, 1968, 2000) 94,163 8,29,98,509 47.0 Hindi/Urdu/Santhali

Chhattisgarh (2000) 1,55,191 2,08,33,803 64.7 Hindi Goa (1987) 3,702 13,47,688 82.3 Konkani/Marathi/ Kannada

Gujarat (1960) 1,96,024 5,06,71,017 69.1 Gujarati/Hindi/Sindhi

Haryana (1966, 1979) 44,212 2,11,44,564 67.9 Hindi/Punjabi/Urdu 1 Himachal Pradesh (1966) 55,673 60,77,900 76.5 Hindi/Punjabi/Kinnaun 2 Jammu and Kashmir (1950) 2,22,236 1,00,69,343 54.5 Kashmiri/Urdu/Dogri 3 Jharkhand (2000) 79,714 2,69,45,829 53.6 Hindi/Santhali/Urdu

4 Karnataka

(1950,1956,1968) 1,91,791 5,28,50,562 66.6 Kannada/Urdu/Telugu 5 Kerala (1956) 38,863 3,18,41,374 90.9 Malayalam/Tamil/Kannada 6 Madhya Pradesh

(1950,1956,2000) 3,08,000 6,03,48,023 63.7 Hindi/Bhili/Bhilodi/Gondi

7 Maharashtra (1950, 1960) 3,07,713 9,68,78,627 76.9 Marathi/Hindi/Urdu 8 Manipur (1971) 22,327 "21,66,788 70.5 Manipuri/Thado/Tangkhul 9 Meghalaya (1971) 22,429 23,18,822 62.6 Khosi/Garo/Bengali/Assamese 10 Mizoram (1971) 21,087 8,88,573 88.5 Lushai/Mizo/Bengali/Lakher 11 Nagaland (1962) 16,579 19,90,036 66.6 Ao/Sema/Konyak 12 Qrissa (1950, 1960) 1,55,707 3,68,04,660 63.1 Oriya/Hindi/Telugu 13 Punjab

(1950,1956,1960,1966) 50,362 2,43,58,999 69.7 Punjabi/Hindi/Urdu 14 Rajasthan

(1950,1956,1959) 3,42,239 56,507 60.4 Hindi/Bhili/Bhilodi/Urdu

15 Sikkim(1975) 7,096 5,40,851 68.8 Nepali/Bhutia/Lepiha 16 Tamil Nadu

(1950, 1953, 1959) 1,30,058 6,24,05,679 73.5 Tamil/Telugu/Kannada 17 Tripura (1950) 1,04,91.69 31,99,203 73.2 Bengali/Tripuri/Hindi 18 Uttar Pradesh

(1950,1968,1979,2000) 2,36,286 16,61,79,921 56.3 Hindi/Urdu/Punjabi 19 Uttaranchal (2000) 53,483 84,89,349 71.6 Hindi/Garhwali/Kumaoni

20 West Bengal ~~~~

(1950,1954,1956) 88,752 8,11,76,197 68.6 Bengali/Hindi/Urdu National Capital Territory/ Delhi State (1950, 1956) 1,483 1,38,50,707 81.7 Hindi/Punjabi/Urdu Union Territories (UTs) 1 Andaman and Nicobar

(1950, 1956) 8,249 3,56,152 81.3 Bengali/Tamil/Hindi 2 Chandigarh (1966) 114 9,00,635 81.9 Hindi/Punjabi/Tamil 3 Dadra and NagarHaveli (1961) 491 2,20,490 57.6 Gujarati/Hindi/Konkani 4 Daman and Diu (1987) 112 1,58,204 78.2 Gujarati/Hindi/Marathi 5 Lakshadweep(1956) 32 60,650 86.7 Malayalam/Tamil/Hindi 6 Pondicherry(1962) 492 9,74,345 81.2 Tamil/Malayalam/Telugu Source : Adapted from Derek O'Brian (compiler and ed), The Penguin Reference Yearbook 2007, Penguin India New Delhi, 2006.

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a new federal coalitional governing framework in New Delhi since 1989. Federal politics was earlier marked by political dominance of up in particular and the Hindi-speaking region in general. Since the early 1990s this has yielded to a new federal balance of political forces in which the non-Hindi-speaking regional rimland states became politically more consequential due to growing asymmetries and disparities in economic and educational developments and non-delimitatiôn of electoral constituencies after the 1971 Census.

Current Political Map and States

Though the political map of India by now has been considerably reorganised internally to contain 28 states and seven union terri- tories, the federal union continues to be marked by a great deal of interstate asymmetries of demographics and territories as well as internal cultural heterogeneity and economic disparity within each state. Moreover, each unit includes principal linguistic, religious, internal sects/caste and subcaste/tribal minorities. Multicultural diversity and federal segmentation create majori- tarian states for minorities within a nation of a different majority overall. While such a political arrangement allows self-rule within the overall framework of shared rule, the claims of provin- cial majority is privileged and may under certain conditions turn intolerant to minorities within the province concerned. These features often lead to political and social conflicts, sometimes involving violence. Consequently, protecting rights of these "internal" minorities, internal to a federating unit as well as minorities within the major minorities and the majority commu-

nity becomes a difficult proposition.6 The experience of the Indian political system suggests that federalism as a political mechanism has been more successful in protecting the identity and interest of major national minorities that happen to be state or provincial majorities (e g, Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir, Sikhs in Punjab, Nagas in Nagaland, etc) than of internal minori- ties and "discrepant" majorities, by which is meant the national

majority community that happens to be a provincial minority in some states. In practice, national majorities or pluralities (e g, Hindus and Hindi-speaking people) or caste/tribe minorities have all often been victims of discrimination and violent attacks -in different parts of India with political and administrative

processes often failing them. The political class and the media

mostly make more of Hindu-Muslim communal violence, drown-

ing the suffering and cries of internal minorities or minorities within minorities and discrepant majority. Only the judiciary and the National Human Rights Commission (nhrc) can be said to be more consciously and consistently stirring their limbs for these

god-forsaken communities at the receiving end of the supposedly successful democracy of India. But there are limits to judicial action and nhrc's reach and effectiveness.

India - 'Multinational State' In an attempt to resolve these problems, the Indian subcontinent has explored and experimented with two major models. One is what Paul Brass has called "modern nation state", in which "loyal- ties to national community and to political structure ultimately merge so that nationalism and patriotism become one" (e g, some

Western European unilingual countries and Japan). Jinnah's "two-nation theory" that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations and the latter for that reason must have a separate state was also inspired by this model. The second model is what Brass calls "multi-ethnic" or "multinational state", which comprises "many nations bound together in a single political and territorial unit by feelings of patriotism derived from ideol- ogy, memories of a common struggle against external or alien powers, and rational calculations of common advantage in the sharing of a single political structure, but not by a common nationality". India has obviously opted for the second model, which Brass also considers relevant not only for India but also for the Indian subcontinent as a whole [Brass 1974].

Brass' model of "nationality-formation" in modern north India briefly alluded to above is applicable to the process of states reorganisation done in India subsequent to his study in the areas of the country where the classical Hindu mainstream culture prevailed and to an extent still survives. This area "may be said to stretch from Punjab to Assam and the central

Himalayan foothills of the Indian north and the southern penin- sula. Though both the north and the south are linguistically plural within the duality of the Sanskritic or Indo-European and Dravidian linguistic families. But both these macro-regions have strongly resisted overcentralisation of the federation sooner or later in independent India.

Sanjib Baruah poignantly analyses the tension and continuity between nationalism and nationality and the limits of "nation-

building" in the context of Assam. He uses the term "subnational- ism" which refers not to "some stable essence that makes it inher-

ently different from nationalism, but to describe a situation at a

particular historical moment". Baruah argues that in the Assamese case the ideology of the ulfa illustrates that India's "stubborn subnational conflicts can be located in this enduring tension and a failure to develop a pan-Indian narrative that can accommodate the entire range of historically constituted subnational aspirations and concerns". He suggests a departure from "the derivative, suffocating and quite out-of-date paradigm of nation-building" and a "return to a more confident vision of civilisational unity of the subcontinent" and a launching of "a bold project of genuine federation-building [Baruah 1999]. In a

subsequent book, Baruah goes beyond the idea of national/ civilisational federalism of his earlier work and prescribes a solution of the "insurgencies in the north-east that alternates between disorder and uneasy coexistence within India. He looks

beyond subnational and national federal structures and explores the possibility of European Union like multi-level transnational

region-building in pursuance of India's Look East Policy thai:

began in the early 1990s [Baruah 2005]. Obviously, these models have wider applicability for the enduring problems of India's north-west contiguous to Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Palk Strait on the Indo-Sri Lankan border.

Second Reorganisation Commission

The political reorganisation of India since independence has not resolved all demands for state formation. A second

reorganisation commission with a more open mind than the

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previous one seems to be called for. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government when initially formed in 2004 was apparently inclined to consider appointing such a commis- sion, but finally resisted this demand at the cost of losing one of its allies, the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, whose minister in the union cabinet, Chandrashekhar Rao, resigned midway in protest. This did not, however, affect the stability of the government. The upa chairperson Sonia Gandhi and prime minister Manmohan Singh subsequently appointed a second union-state Relations Commission chaired by the former chief justice of India, M M Punchchi, to review the federal affairs in the post-Sarkaria Commission Report (1987-88) phase instead. But as A K Singh rightly remarks, "The sub-regional identity assumés importance when inter- regional disparities and discrimination surface. This phenomenon has two dimensions: one, many of the sub-regions, despite being rich in resources, have remained economically underdeveloped either because of state neglect or because of the ill-conceived top-down approach of development; second, some regions survive at the cost of others through resource and earnings transfers." It is within this explanation sketch that A K Singh puts the demands of separate statehood for Vidarbha, Marathwada, among others some of which have already been conceded by the centre [Singh 2003].

Unresolved Issues of Internal and External Fédéralisation There are a number of major problems of reorganisation of states in India in the decades ahead. First, the north-south divide that preoccupied Ambedkar intensely in the 1950s is at least partly moderated by division of bigger north Indian states. However, another dimension of this problem has surfaced due to postpone- ment of the delimitation of electoral constituencies following a decennial headcount since the 1971 Census. After being held in abeyance earlier until 2000, the processes have now been frozen until 2026 by the 84th amendment (2001). It has already resulted in a potentially explosive question on the north-south axis as disproportionate increase of population in the two macro-regions has produced distressing representational disparities in the Parliament. The major states of the Gangetic valley have grown faster in populations and proportionately fewer seats in the Parliament. This disparity is likely to be further magnified by the time the question of delimitation of constituencies is reopened after 2026 [Bose 2000].

Second, the rise of fragmented ethnic identities and strong micro-regionalism has forced the short-sighted union govern- ments to create new states, often disregarding administrative rationality and financial viability. In the new political economy of neoliberalism, privatisation, and globalisation, when even the more resourceful central and richer provincial states are facing growing- and chronic deficits, how long the older and new poorer states can sustain their statehood is a big question. Most of these new states have been created in an ad hoc politi- cal manner without recommendations from a src like the one appointed by the Nehru government in the mid-1950s. The problem has only magnified since. A second states reorganisa- tion commission is needed.

Third, the asymmetrical federal relations of Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland with the Indian union are still not sufficiently resolved. The problems are particularly com- plicated due to insurgencies in these states. The existing special status enjoyed by these states under the Constitution need to be implemented in letter and spirit. What these formal constitutional provisions need is greater democratic substance and federal autonomy in practice. The moderates and hardliners in these states need to be seriously engaged in a democratic dialogue for meaningful alternatives in power- sharing, security of life and property for the citizens, and economic development.

Fourth, even after the creation of new states before and after independence, the union of India is still a complex mosaic of religious, linguistic, caste, and tribal minorities within and across the existing internal boundaries. Given the compact geographical template of the subcontinent and the endowment of complex demographic but an overarching civilisational unity-in-diversity, no reorganisation of states can produce inter- nally homogeneous and administratively and financially viable set of states in all cases. Hence, endless fragmentation of the Indian nation state is not a solution but a part of the problem of ungovernability and international instability. There is a strong tendency of clinging to majority-minority stra-itjacket of Hindu-Muslim communalism of the period around the violent imperial Partition of 1947. Communal violence in India today has become radically transformed. It would be obtuse to ignore the massacre of dalits and upper castes in Bihar. To think that minority communalism is less dangerous than majority communalism is not only unethical but it has also proved to be destructive of civic community and Indian citizenship. By now both Hindus and Muslims have endured "minority" syndrome or psychosis. India is now face to face with hydra-headed communalism involving not only Hindus and Muslims, but also other ethnic communities. We are challenged by the problem of guaranteeing the rights and securities of "internal minorities" (minorities within minorities, "discrepant majorities"), majorities that may be nationally so-called but are provincial minorities or vice versa. Federal solution has historically been predicated on the grant of statehood to provincial majorities within a composite federal union. Federal theory and practice is yet to adequately address to these problems. To address the problems of minorities within minorities and discrepant majorities the federal theory must self-consciously engage more thoroughly than in the past with the theories of constitutionalism and the rule of law, consociationalism, and multiculturalism.

Finally, if south Asia has to exit from the history of inter- necine feudal and colonial feuding and warfare, it must become internally democratic and move ahead to embrace the processes of regional and global integration like other supra- national regions in the world. It must make a concerted effort to emulate what David Held called "the cosmopolitan model of democracy". This model envisages a global and regional order comprising multiple and overlapping networks of political, economic, and social power and clusters of individual

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autonomy and rights "within and across each network of power" spanning states, civil societies, and regional and global organisations. These developments would give birth to "an empowering legal order- a 'democratic international law'". The emergent legal principles would "delimit the form and scope of individual and collective action within the organi- sations and associations of state and civil society. Certain

standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or civil association can legitimately violate" [Held 1994]. This cosmopolitan model of democracy in the core and peripheral nations of south Asia alone can ensure simultaneous pursuit of democracy and development and an escape from the vicious cycle of war and poverty. There is no other way.

NOTES

l Quoted in S R Maheshwari, State Governments in India, MacMillan India, New Delhi, 2000, p 20.

2 See B Shiva Rao et al (eds), The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study [with] Select Documents, Vol VI, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, p 476.

3 Government of India (Republic), Report of the States Reorganisation Commission (chair Fazal Ali), Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 1955, pp 203-05. Soon after the submission of the SRC report B R Ambedkar critiqued it mainly on the basis that the proposed reorganisation would result in great imbalance among the states due to population, especially between the north and the south. As a solution he proposed dividing the four northern states of UP, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Mahar- ashtra into smaller states. He advocated smaller states to prevent what he called the "tyranny of the communal majority". See his Thoughts on Linguistic States, Anand Sahitya Sadan, Aligarh, 1989, reprint.

4 Frank Moraes, Witness to an Era, London, 1973, p 295, also remarks: "If the unity of India was ar- tificial, so was its division. If India had to break up, it should have broken up on logical lines of language with ethnic and cultural affiliations." Quoted in Ghosh, op cit, p 10.

5 For such a priori/hasty conclusion, see A K Singh, 'Jharkhand Movement: Assertion of Socio- Cultural Identity and the Demand for a Separate State' in Rasheeduddin Khan (ed), Rethinking Indian Federalism, IUHSS, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1997.

6 For theoretical and empirical elaboration of this problématique, see Avigail Eisenburg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (eds), Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity, Cambridge Univer- sity Press, Cambridge, 2005.

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Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (affiliated to Manipal University and Kuvempu University)

invites applications for its Ph.D. in Cultural Studies

Eligibility: A Master's degree from a recognized university with 55% marks or its grade equivalent. 5% relaxation will be allowed in the case of SC/ST students.

Applications should include a covering letter and the following documents: a) the applicant's curriculum vitae, b) copies of mark-sheets of

undergraduate and graduate degrees, c) a writing sample (no more than 15 pages or approx. 4000 words), and d) a two-page research

proposal.

Broad research areas at CSCS include: gender studies, law and culture, education, film and new media, history and philosophy of culture.

Applicants with other interests are also encouraged to apply.

The application and supporting documents should be sent in an envelope marked "Ph.D. Programme" to reach The Administrative Officer, Centre for the Study of Culture and Society, 466, 9th Cross, First Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore - 560011, no later than April 30, 2008.

Shortlisted candidates will be called for an oral interview in the first week of June 2008.

Registration: The Ph.D candidates will be registered either with Manipal University or with Kuvempu University, Karnataka.

Financial Support: Selected candidates will be given fellowships/ financial assistance in the first and fourth year of their thesis work.

CSCS also offers a one-year Diploma in Cultural Studies.

For further details, write to us or visit the CSCS website at www.cscsarchive.org

Economic &Political weekly Q3S9 march 15, 2008 '5

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