Regional cooperation and growth in Southern Africa

Regional Cooperation a,nd Growth in Southern Africa Stephen Wright

Regional cooperation has flourished in many areas of the world and has helped boost economic production and provide greater competitiveness in the globalized market. Following the dramatic changes in South Africa, the Southern African region is considered the most likely in the African continent to develop a common market, promote cooperation, and enhance trade and business opportunities. This article focuses upon the prospects for the Southern African market and compares it briefly against the performance of other African regions. A conclusion is reached pointing to cautious optimism about Southern African prospects. 0 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Regional economic cooperation has increased significantly over the last few years in Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas, strengthening national and regional economies by stimulating intraregional trade and helping economies to become more competitive within an increasingly globalized marketplace (Markheim, 1994; Emmerij, 1992). The African continent has lagged behind other regions in terms of competitiveness and productivity, and is potentially being marginalized within the global economy.

The Southern African region, following the end of apartheid in South Africa, appears to have the brightest prospects in the continent for business. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises 12 countries and a population of over 100 million, and through the expansion of its cooperative economic strategies,

Stephen Wright is with the Department of Political Science, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ 8601 1-5036, e-mail: [email protected].

The International Executive, Vol. 38(3) 323-336 (May/June 1996) 0 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0020-6652/96/030323-14

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with South Africa playing a pivotal role, is expected to make this region the most economically dynamic in the continent. This article discusses these prospects, and points to both positive and negative trends that affect the business environment there. Southern Africa is also briefly compared with other African regional groupings to judge how well positioned it is to avoid the economic problems faced by those other regions.

AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMIES AND REGIONALISM REVIEWED

The post-cold war era of the 1990s has contributed to decreasing levels of investment in Africa by European Union (EU) countries (African Business, May 1995). More than half of Africa's countries, including many in Southern Africa, are following structural adjustment programs (SAPs) enforced on them by the International Mone- tary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Despite IMF claims (Osunsade, 1993), there have been marginal (and debatable) economic results. The SAPs have had negative social and political repercussions on African societies and have not as yet enabled African states to regain competitiveness or to foster greater regional cooperation.

The global sweep of democratization encompasses Africa, but many countries, including those with high economic potential such as Angola, Nigeria, and Zaire, are struggling unsuccessfully to develop open and participatory forms of government and to improve human rights protection, factors important to lessen risk and facili- tate stable and equitable economic development (Chege, 1992; Lan- caster, 1991-1992). African stock markets appear to be on the rise (Kleinman and Morrisey, 1994); privatization has been pursued in a number of states with the prodding of the World Bank, but not with dramatic successes (Callaghy, 1994). Ominously, the AIDS epidemic threatens many in the work force and stands to undermine the economic fabric of the continent. Seventy percent of the world's HIV positive cases are now found in Africa (Africa Recouery, 1992; World Bank, 1992).

Unfortunately, the performance to date of most African regional organizations has not dramatically improved economic output or of- fered increased business opportunities. Various common markets are being developed across the continent. In North Africa, there is the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UAM), established in 1989; in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975; in Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), established in 1983; in Eastern and

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Southern Africa, the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), established in 1981 and recently reformed into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and in Southern Africa, overlapping with COMESA, are the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC. SADC was organized in August 1992 to replace the less structured Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), established originally in 1980. South Africa belongs to SACU and SADC, but not COMESA.

These organizations have struggled without much success to promote regional markets and attract international investment. Critical weaknesses have undermined these common market arrangements, although not as seriously in Southern Africa as in other regions. These include the poor structural location of African economies within the international division of labor, the relative decline of state power and institutions, the increase of parallel markets and (illegal) trans-border trade, massive corruption and greed exhibited by the political elites, and the abysmal record on human rights and democracy.

Regional organizations have wrestled to overcome such handicaps and develop viable markets, but have been hampered by other economic difficulties. In order to judge the business and trade opportunities in Southern Africa, one must be aware of these potential pitfalls and see how well SADC works to avoid them.

Guy Martin (1992) summarized the failings of common market ventures in developing countries into four categories: (1) uneven distribution of benefits and costs within the regional grouping, despite attempts at compensatory mechanisms; (2) institutional deficiencies, including human, financial, and administrative ones, as well as those caused by competing demands of national sovereignty; (3) political-ideological factors, where countries within the same region maintain very diverse ideological persuasions, making cooperation more difficult; and (4) continuance of external dependence, espe- cially in terms of the Europe/Africa relationship and the Lome conventions.

Rolf Langhammer (1992) came to similar conclusions. He found that common reasons for failure were that (1) expansion of intraregional competition was discouraged, failing to stimulate national economies; (2) supply patterns were more competitive than comple- mentary, largely because African countries within regional markets often produce similar goods; (3) short-term distribution conflicts dominated the more propitious medium-term considerations of al- locative efficiency; (4) vulnerability of weak national and regional markets to external shocks; (5 ) lack of one strong national economy to compensate others in the region for short-term losses; and (6) most

visibly, no organization reached the status or take-off point of either true preferential trade area or free trade area. Faezeh Foroutan (1993) similarly concluded that,

. . . the structural characteristics of the SSA [Sub-Saharan African] economies, the pursuit of import-substitution policies, and the very uneven distribution of costs and benefits of integration arising from economic differences among the partner countries, have thus far pre- vented any meaningful trade integration in SSA.

Bax Nomvete (19951, a former Secretary General of the PTA, con- curred and added to the list poor transport infrastructure, high bank- ing transaction costs, and poor administrative procedures.

Lack of political will and consensus can also be considered critical factors in weakening potential regional cooperation. Linguistic and cross-cultural differences between neighbors, combined with person- ality clashes among authoritarian rulers, have also been allowed to inflame opinions and inhibit economic cooperation and limit the development of regional trade and markets. These markets have not proved sufficiently strong to be integrated or diverse enough to provide opportunities to develop comparative advantage, or robust enough to withstand open competition from overseas companies. En- couraged by structural adjustment to promote exports of primary products, economies have remained integrated with, and subservient to, the industrial world and have struggled to promote greater market integration within the region. Both SADC and ECOWAS, for example, feature recorded intraregional trade at around only 5 percent of total trade.

Attempts to reinvigorate both regional and continental cooperation are increasing, drawing together alliances of local and international business to promote trade and economic growth in the continent. African leaders met in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1991 and established a program to create by 2025 an African Economic Community (AEC), a continent-wide common market, comprising more than fifty Afri- can states.

There has been little practical articulation useful for an international businessperson as to how the transition to an economic community will occur. The Abuja agreement (Africa Recovery, 1991) out- lines six stages of transition:

Firstly, strengthening existing regional economic communities and establishing new ones (five years); secondly, improving intra-community trade and sectoral integration (eight years); thirdly, establishing free trade areas (ten years); fourthly, setting up an Africa-wide customs union (two years); fifthly, establishing an African common market (four years); and sixthly, finalizing the AEC (five years).


Little progress has been achieved in the first stage of strengthening existing organizations. Besides favorable economic conditions, the success of the AEC depends upon political will, self-confidence, and leadership, things in relatively short supply in recent years, although many are looking to South Africa to be a catalyst.

Much of Africa’s economic future also depends upon the level of inward international investment, but this has remained low. During the 1980s, Africa received only 6.2 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) to the Third World. Singapore received double that of the whole African continent; Nigeria alone received almost half of Africa’s foreign investment (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1994: 171). Given such limited incoming resources, regional planning, commitment and loyalty by administrators would seem to be essential and vital for the growth of regional trade. Regions also need to diversify into less traditional economic areas, such as tourism, services, technology, food production, small business exchanges, and intra-African joint ventures.

PROSPECTS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

Having briefly reviewed the issues and performance of regionalism in Africa, we need now to focus on Southern Africa to judge whether these difficulties are replicated or avoided in that region, to assess the economic potential that regional cooperation could create there, and to highlight how South Africa can be expected to develop its own and its neighbors’ economies. The significance of Southern Africa is that the region contains the continent’s strongest and most developed economy, South Africa, which is now gaining greater attention from international investors in the postapartheid era.

Regionalism in Southern Africa

SADCC was originally established in April 1980 to break the influence that South Africa exerted over the region’s economies. SADCC drew together South Africa’s neighbors in a loosely structured ven- ture (hence the term “conference” rather than “community”), not espousing a common market, but assisting in sectoral cooperation through regular consultations. In this respect, SADCC was structured quite differently from other regional organizations. Such looseness could also be attributed to the failure many states had experienced previously in other regional endeavors.

As an organization targeted against apartheid South Africa and growing out of the liberation movement and cooperation between the Front-Line States, SADCC did better than most organizations in

328 WRIGHT

gaining widespread international support and foreign aid, but was only marginally successful in raising FDI and domestic investment, and failed to establish alternative trade patterns. The strength of South Africa pulled neighboring states into its economic orbit despite the efforts of SADCC. Furthermore, the political instability caused by continuing civil wars in Angola and Mozambique (absorbing as much as 40 percent of state expenditure in each by the end of the 1980s), combined with destabilization measures undertaken by the apartheid regime, severely undermined SADCC’s chances at integration.

Wars in Southern Africa during the 1980s cost the region $65 billion, more than twice the achieved GDP and three times the received aid, and over 1.6 million people lost their lives (Thompson, 1992). During the same decade, despite the organization, SADCC’s trade with South Africa increased rather than decreased, an indication of the strength, both economic and military, of South Africa. Intra-SADCC trade (excluding South Africa), remained at a relatively minor 4 percent of total trade, an indication of the great diffi- culty in developing regional trade linkages (Swatuk, 1994).

The transformation of SADCC to SADC in 1992, combined with the evolution of a “new” South Africa in 1994, have altered the char- acter of the organization into a more market-driven organization, but have not necessarily increased the region’s cohesion. Peace in Angola and Mozambique raises hopes for greater respect for freedom and human rights and for a better economic environment and transporta- tion infrastructure, although in the short-term it has led to a fall in foreign aid. SADC has a membership of 12 states, having added South Africa in 1994 and Mauritius in 1995 to the ten existing members of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As in other regional organizations, there is considerable historical, cultural, and ideological dissimilarity between its members.

On.paper, SADC is committed to developing free trade and abol- ishing internal tariffs by the end of the decade. A Draft Protocol on Finance and Investment signed in 1995 called specifically for a common financial market within 6 years, with a regional central bank and full currency and payments cooperation. In August 1995, a SADC summit agreed to create a Southern African Economic Com- munity, with free trade by 2000, free movement of people, and a single currency (The Economist, September 1995). In contrast to plans for the AEC, this is a short deadline. Can Southern Africa succeed where other regions have failed? Possibly but unlikely, at least on schedule, because of current frictions and the widespread use of tariffs in the region, among other reasons.

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South Africa’s economic dominance is obvious: with about 30 percent of SADC’s population, its gross national product (GNP) is four times that of the other members combined and is 20 times larger than its closest rivals, Angola and Zimbabwe. Its trade balance with the region increased significantly in 1994. Its goods more easily found regional markets, whereas fellow members find it more difficult to sell to South Africa. This is both because of protectionism displayed by South Africa-not just in goods but also in labor, with significant numbers of the more than three million illegal workers being expelled in 1995-and also because the country produces many of the same goods itself and needs to import more sophisticated industrial goods from outside Africa.

There are already signs of tension within the region about the “new dominance” or “hegemony” of South Africa, notwithstanding the charisma of President Nelson Mandela and an African majority government. Several Zimbabwean producers, for example, com- plained of South African “dumping” in Zimbabwe during 1995, as well as against protectionism in textiles and foodstuffs. The potential dominance of South Africa is also accentuated now when con- tras ted against the earlier decentralized, nonhierarchical structure of SADCC.

SACU, established in 1910, ties the currencies of Lesotho, Swazi- land, and Namibia to the Rand. Botswana, also a member, maintains a separate currency arrangement. SACU provides an example of one of the tightest regional market arrangements in Africa, with a nomi- nal free flow of goods and common external tariff, although com- plaints of nontariff barriers abound. South Africa helps its weaker neighbors through revenue sharing payments made to offset trade imbalances. For both Lesotho and Swaziland, these payments in recent years have accounted for more than one-third of total government revenue, thus making a mockery of their membership in SADCC and their apparent efforts to break free from South African influence. Tensions within SACU are also growing, as South Afri- cans become more reluctant to make these compensatory payments and as governments in Botswana and Namibia seek to protect their own infant industries against South African competition.

The common problem of competing organizations is seen with the third overlapping organization within the region, COMESA. Encom- passing all the region with the very notable exception of South Africa, COMESA has been established to promote greater integration than its predecessor, the PTA. The large geographical sweep of COMESA, with its 23 members, has led to the likelihood of its division into two subgroups, northern and southern, a split oficially supported by SADC. It is anticipated that SADC itself will make the southern

component of COMESA redundant, and some favor the gradual har- monization of SACU and SADC.

South Africa: Engine for Growth? The end of apartheid, encapsulated by the national elections of April 1994 that gave the African National Congress (ANC) 62.5 percent of the vote and a dominant share of the government, has altered both the scope and potential of South Africa’s role in the region. The end of SADC’s resistance to South Africa has dramatically expanded the country’s trade opportunities in the region, but the end of apartheid has also significantly altered the country’s domestic economic con- text. In the 12 months following the April 1994 elections, some 500 major capital projects were begun at a total value of 106.8 billion Rand. These projects embraced all sectors of the economy, from manufacturing to trade to mining, and provided new business prospects for investors (African Business, March 1995).

Mining, of course, remains at the heart of the economy and its exports. Gold accounted for 62 percent of exports in 1993, followed in order by platinum, coal, and diamonds. South Africa’s strategic position in African mining was evidenced by its hosting of the Sub- Saharan Africa Oil and Mineral Conference in March 1995. Cer- tainly, mineral exploitation, combined with new oil and gas field explorations beginning in Spring 1995, form the basis for South Afri- ca’s economic growth, at least in the short term, though greater diver- sification is needed. The value of these minerals places the Johan- nesburg Stock Exchange as the tenth largest in the world, with a market capitalization of $227 billion.

Since 1994, South African investment in SADC countries has risen sharply. The relative regional strength of South African manufacturing has given advantage in such fields as retail, the hospitality industry, and breweries in the new environment of an open SADC. Those economies have also been weakened in their capacity to coun- ter South African imports because of widespread implementation of World Bank policies of structural adjustment-in Angola, Mozam- bique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-which has opposed protec- tionist tendencies in favor of an open trade regime and which has undermined a SADC philosophy of internally derived policymaking. Structural adjustment has also encouraged these economies to maintain high primary export profiles. South Africa, not tied to IMFI World Bank policies, already provides more than one-quarter of all goods to Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and provides 70 percent of SADC’s total exports. But the small size of these markets and relative poverty of their populations do not give South African businesses


significant benefit and, as noted above, is leading to some resentment and calls for protection (Herbst, 1995).

Greater potential lies in the prospect of being able to expand into EU markets, opened further by the end of apartheid. But South Afri- ca’s attempts during 1995 to gain privileged access to Europe through the Lome conventions were thwarted by the EU, allegedly on the grounds that the South African economy was too strong to qualify for such complete access and that such an arrangement would draw fire from the World Trade Organization. Nevertheless, the EU allocated in 1995 more assistance to South Africa than to all the other Lome countries. Discussions are aiming to develop gradually a free-trade area, with South Africa still initially protecting itself somewhat against European goods, and greater bilateral ties between Europe and South Africa (Holland, 1995).

Significantly, because of long years of isolation during the apartheid era as well as an overreliance on the mining industry, South Africa has fallen behind in its use and development of technology. Few consider South African manufacturing to be competitive enough at this stage, because of high costs and low quality, to compete openly on the global market (Shaw and Nhema, 1995; Carim, 1994; Swatuk, 1994).

Other internal factors could also possibly derail South Africa’s strong economic position within the region. Despite being Africa’s largest consumer of electricity, some 55 percent of homes and 87 percent of schools in the country do not possess it. Unemployment currently stands at 4.7 million, half under 30 years old, forming 32.6 percent of the work force in mid-1995. Each year 400,000 school leavers flood the labor market, many with poor educational abilities because of apartheid, and the government admitted that only 3-4 percent of them would find a job in 1995. Added to this, the population is projected to rise from the current 41 million to 70 million by 2020. To lower the unemployment level significantly requires an economic growth rate of 8-10 percent-growth in 1994 was 2.3 percent, the highest in the decade, with a figure of 3 percent projected for 1995 (Financial Times, May 1995).

Linked to this is the fact that the expectations of the black majority, stoked high by the end of apartheid, are virtually impossible to meet fully. As Kaire Mbuende, the SADC Executive Secretary, said in 1994:

I do not believe that South Africa has the capacity to be the locomotive for growth in the region. It has its own problems. It will have to clear its educational and housing backlog for the majority of blacks and that is an enormous challenge. (Business Day, 1994)

A considerable element of the economic strength of apartheid South Africa was the exploitation of cheap African labor, something not available now as the government is committed to raising the living standard of the majority of South Africans. The apparent need to cater to the white minority to maintain business confidence-for instance, having the National Party member, Derek Keys, as Minis- ter of Finance-could easily backfire and lead to growing resentment and instability within the country, raising risk and stemming foreign investment. The next elections in 1999, in which President Mandela has already announced he will not stand, are already looming as vital for security and stability. Similarly, the work underway in drawing up a final constitution for the country is fraught with pitfalls, notably over the degree of devolution to the nine provincial assemblies, and implicit in that the power balance between the eth- nic groups within the country..

Other factors are also at work in stemming the anticipated rush of foreign investors to South Africa. The government has been very slow to privatize state controlled industry and is moving cautiously. Patience, however, could be a virtue because Telkom (telecom- munications), Eskom (electricity), and Transnat (transport) are con- servatively estimated worth $8.4 billion (The Economist, August 1995). Currency restrictions, expected to be lifted early in 1995, remained in place, partly out of fear that loosening could allow a Mexico-style crash in the near future.

Economic policy during the apartheid era has left five conglomerates dominating the private sector, with three or four companies often having between 60 and 80 percent control in some sectors. From a domestic/political viewpoint, this stranglehold is blocking the growth of black business in the country, another sensitive issue. The Mandela government is moving slowly toward loosening the power of these conglomerates, facing their firm opposition; and foreign investors remain somewhat wary of how this will unfold and con- cerned about the lack of opportunities until greater competition is facilitated (Financial Times, September 1995). Limited efforts by the Mandela government to lower the high tariffs on motor cars and textiles, and thus open up these sectors to greater international expo- sure, have also caused controversy within the domestic business community (Financial Times, June 1995).

South Africa and SADC: Regional Development? It is evident that Southern Africa shares some of the problems affect- ing regional cooperative ventures elsewhere in the continent. What advantages does Southern Africa have to succeed where other re-


gions have failed? It is true that South Africa could become “an engine for growth” in the region, but the country has various difficulties to overcome. Domestic economic growth and redistribution of wealth, themselves potentially conflicting goals, take precedence over regional agendas, and current policies being undertaken by South Africa reflect that. Despite optimism, there appear to be difi- culties to overcome in developing trade options within the region, similar to other parts of the continent, and South Africa’s long-term prospects appear to pull it more outside of the continent into tougher competition with Europe, the United States, and Asia. As one South African political economist concluded, “for South Africa, the region looks (and, in many cases is) a distinctly discouraging and desolate place” (Vale, 1992).

While apartheid was still present in South Africa, SADC had an external ruison $&re to help maintain cohesion, and encouraging foreign aid donors to support it. Investors are less sympathetic and require solid economic evidence before making commitments. The region has potential, but frictions may erode the expectations for SADC and regional cooperation (Morna, 1995). The African Devel- opment Bank recently concluded that gains from regionalism tend- ed to accrue to the most advanced within the region, thus leading to a potential risk of deindustrialization for the less developed and the need for compensatory mechanisms (Keet, 1994). Structural adjustment has reinforced these tendencies by minimizing protectionism, and there is a scenario that could see SADC developing into a rea- sonably strong South African core and little else. The ANC is proba- bly more committed to an equitable South Africa than to an equitable region, and succeeding simultaneously in both is a herculean task.

Yet one must not lose sight of the fact that this is a region of some genuine potential within Africa. South Africa is already making strides to become the continent’s industrial and technological leader and working to use that as a basis for beneficial integration into the global economy. Large international companies, such as Honeywell, Proctor and Gamble, and Eastman Kodak, are returning to South Africa and leading the way for others. Neighbors such as Angola, Botswana, and Namibia could also capitalize on their own mineral wealth to develop more diversified economies. The end of debilitating wars in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa can free up much needed resources and energies to construct a more solid economic base (Blumenfeld, 1995).

Whereas the general record and economic performance of African regionalism, and also the African Economic Community, are admit- tedly somewhat bleak, the Southern African region offers brighter,

334 WRIGHT

albeit limited, prospects and business opportunities for the investor willing to look to the longer term.

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Regional cooperation and growth in Southern Africa

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