R E A S O N S , A T T I T U D E S AND T H E

B R E A K D O W N O F R E A S O N S *

ROBERT DUNN

1 Donald Davidson invokes the presence of a mental cause that is

not a reason for what it causes (as a mark of psychic division) to explain how irrational phenomena like weakness of will and self- deception, and rational phenomena like self-criticism and reform, can occur. 1 "The breakdown of reason-relations defines the boundary of a sub-division", says Davidson. 2 In this paper I develop the background for making the following point against Davidson: the mental causes in question are not reasons for what they cause, and yet their presence marks, not "the breakdown of reason-relations", but a point at which the influence of reasons is transmitted to a lower-level attitude by a higher-order one. Rather than locating a point in a causal sequence within the mind where there is a collapse of causation by reasons, the presence in the cases in question of a mental cause that is not a reason for what it causes displays the familiar pattern of trans-level rational causation.

2 Davidson offers the following simple example of (irrational) wishful thinking to illustate his thesis about the breakdown of reasons. 3 A young man believes that he has a well-turned calf, and the entire explanation of his having this belief is that he wants to believe it. His reason for wanting to believe it is that it gives him pleasure. Such a case of irrational thinking, says Davidson, is characterized by the presence of a mental cause that does not rationalize its effect. For, in such a case, the desire that causes the belief is not a reason for it.

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Davidson thinks that the ambiguity of the phrase "reason for believing" can obscure this otherwise obvous point. In the paper "Paradoxes of Irrationality", he comments:

...The wish to have a belief is not evidence for the truth of the belief, nor does it give it rational support in any other way. What his wish to have this belief makes rational is that this proposition should be true: He believes that he has a well-mined calf. This does not rationalize his believing: I have a well-turned calf. 4

Davidson returns to this theme in his later paper "Deception and Division". There he distinguishes between evaluative and congnitive reasons for believing. He writes:

...we must make an obvious distinction between having a reason to be a believer in a certain proposition, and having evidence in the light of which it is reasonable to think the proposition true. (Sentences of the form 'Charles has a reason to believe that p' are ambiguous with respect to this distinction.) A reason of the first sort is evaluative: it provides a motive for acting in such a way as to promote having a belief. A reason of the second kind is cognitive: it consists in evidence one has for the truth of a proposition. ~

3 There is an important distinction at issue here, but the question is

how best to draw it. Consider: (1) q is a reason for N's believing that p.

Davidson's remarks suggest that (1) is ambiguous between two readings. On the first reading, we have:

(la) q is a reason for N's believing: that p while, on the second, there is:

(lb) q is a reason for: N's believing that p. I agree that (1) is ambiguous between (la) and (lb). (1), construed as (la), is object-focussed. It says:

q is an object-related reason for N's believing that p. On the other hand, (1), construed as (lb), is attitude-focussed. It says:

q is an attitude-related reason for N's believing that p.

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There are, however, two dangers of misinterpretation in this line of approach. The fast is this. The difference between (1), understood as (la), and (1), understood as (lb), is not the difference in emphasis or focus between an answer to the question "What is q a reason for N to believe (to be so)?" and an answer to the question "What is q a reason for N to do?". The semantic distinction in question at (la) and (lb) is indifferent to such available versatility of focus. One can say that p is what q is an attitude-related (e.g., prudential) reason for N to believe (to be so) just as well as one can say what q is an object- related (cognitive) reason for N to believe (to be so); and one can say that what q is an object-related reason for N to do is to believe p (to be so) just as happily as one can say that what q is an attitude-related reason for N to do is to believe p (to be so).

This very last point alerts us to the second danger of misinterpretation. All claims that q is a reason for N to believe p (to be so), whatever their stress or focus of interest, say that N has, in q, a reason to have a certain attitude of belief. The point in differentiating between re_adings of (1) as (la) and (lb) is not that only attitude-related reasons for believing are reasons for having- for being the hayer of - a belief. The quotes from Davidson suggest that he thinks this. To the contrary, however, all reasons for believing that p (is so) axe reasons for having - being the haver of - that attitude. (la) and (lb) say in common that q is a reason for N to have a certain attitude of belief. The point, rather, is that only attitude-related reasons for a belief are reasons for having that attitude with respect to the having of it.

4 It is this point which provides the clue as to how we should

distinguish between cognitive and so-called evaluative reasons for believing. Cognitive reasons for believing, which are object-related reasons, are reasons for believing simpliciter. By contrast, so-called evaluative reasons for believing, which are attitude-related reasons, are, as well, reasons for wanting to believe.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate this is through the relation between the concepts of reason and value. Ascriptions of reason amount to ascriptions of value, and, in appropriate contexts, the converse also holds. 6 For example, to say that there is reason to believe p, or to want or to intend to do x, or to do x, is effectively to

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hold that there is value (merit, worth) in believing p, in wanting or intending to do x, or in doing x; and the converse. The imporumt point for present purposes then becomes this: from some, but not all, points of view ascriptions of value (and so reason) imply ascriptions of desirability (and so reason to desire).

Consider the claim that there is value in N's believing p. Such an ascription of value can be made from various points of view - the cognitive or epistemic, the prudential, the hedonic, the moral, and so on. The asymmetry that is of particular interest here is that, while the ascription of cognitive or epistcmic value to N's believing p is just that, and does not further imply an ascription of desirability, the ascription of prudential, hedonic, etc., vlaue does. For, in this case, given the relation between value and reason, we see that, whereas the ascription of cognitive or epistemic reason to N's believing p is just that (because it is simply the ascription of value), the ascription of prudential, hedonic, etc., reason to N's believing p further implies the ascription of reason to N's desiring (or wanting) to believe p (because it implies the ascription of desirability (desire-worthiness) to N's believing p).

The cognitive or epistemic point of view is that point of view which, in adjudicating the presence and degree of value, or presence and weight of reason, restricts itself to available relevant evidence (broadly construed). So, from this point of view, to say that there is value in believing that p, or reason to believe that p, is to say that there is such value or reason, relative to certain available evidence that bears on whether p is so. An auitude of beliefs being of value in the light of such evidence is a matter of its being a belief about something that is in some degree likely to be so, relative to the evidence. Now a mental attitude like belief can acquire (at least) two different sorts of properties: properties that concern what the belief is like in relation to its object (object-related properties); and properties that concern what the belief is like in relation to the having of it (attitude-related properties). It will be clear, from the remarks just previous, that, when we ascribe cognitive or epistemic value to the belief that p, we do so on the basis of a property that characterizes that belief with respect to its object, and not with respect to the having of it. So the ascription of cognitive or epistemic value (and so reason) to the belief that p is the ascription of object-, and not attitude-, related value (and so reason) to that attitude. It is this, I suggest, that insulates ascriptions of cognitive or epistemic value

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(and so reason) from ascriptions of desirability (and so reason to desire). For it it is such attitude-, and not object-, related value as attaches to a mental attitude that makes (the having of) that attitude in some way desirable (and so something which there is reason to desire). 7

Witness the ascription of prudential, hedonic, moral, etc., value to N's believing that p. This does entail the ascription of desirability (and so reason to desire) to N's having that belief. And the reason for this, I submit, is that, when we ascribe any such value to N's belief that p, we do so on the basis of a property that characterizes that belief, not in respect of its object, but in respect of N's having of it. For example, we say that it is of value for N to believe that p because that belief is one that it is in N's interest, gives N pleasure, etc., to have. It is the presence of just such value, I submit, that will render N's believing that p desirable in some way: desirable as a matter of being in N's interest, affording N pleasure, and so on. s

The upshot of our discussion so far is this. Cognitive and so- called evaluative reasons for believing are different in the following way. Whereas the former are reasons for believing, and nothing more, because they support the ascription of object-related value, which is just that, and nothing more, evaluative reasons for believing are, in addition, reasons for wanting to believe, because they support the ascription of attitude-related value, which entails desirability.

5 It now becomes noteworthy that similar distinctions are to be

drawn between kinds of reasons for wanting, intending and feeling. Consider reasons for wanting, or intending, to act. Suppose q is a

reason for N's wanting, or intending, to do x. Suppose, further, that q is a reason for N to want, or to intend, to do x by virtue of its being a reason for N to do x. That is, q is a reason for N's wanting, or intending, to do x (supports the claim that there is value in N's wanting, or intending, to do x) because it supports the claim that N's doing x is of value (desirable) in some way. In such a case, q will be a kind of reason for wanting, or intending, to act that is analogous to evidential, object-rela~ for believing: that is, an object-related reason for wanting, or intending, to act that is simply a reason for desire, or intention.

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The point here is fairly evident. In such a case, the claim will be, given q, that there is value in N's wanting, oJ" intending, to do x (and so reason for N to want, or to intend, to do x) because for N to want, or to intend, so to do is for N to want, or to intend, to do something that is of value (desirable) is some way - in N's interest (say). So the ascription here of value (and so reason) to the desire, or intention, to do x will be on the basis of a property that characterizes that desire, or intention, in respect of its object, and not in respect of the having of it. In this way, such an ascription of value (and so reason) will be insulated from the ascription of desirability (and so reason to desire). For, as I remarked previously, it is such attitude-, and not object-, related value as attaches to a psychological atitude that renders (the having of) that attitude is some way desirable. 9

Some masons for wanting, or intending, to act, however, a r e

analogues of so-called evaluative reasons for believing, and so, in addition, reasons for wanting to want, or to intend, to act. For sometimes a consideration q is a reason for wanting, or intending, to do x in the relevant way: q supports the claim that there is value in wanting, or intending, to do x (and so reason to want, or to intend, so to act), not on the basis of a property that characterizes the desire, or intention, in respect of what it is a desire, or intention, to do but, rather, on the basis of a property that characterizes the desire, or intention, with respect to the having of it. q is such a reason, for example, where it supports the claim that there is value in wanting, or intending, to do x, not because to want, or to intend, so to do is to want, or to intend, to do something that it is in one's interest to do, but because to want, or to intend, so to do is to want, or to intend, to do something that it is in one's interest to want, or to intend, to do. In cases like this, q is a reason for wanting, or intending, to act that is also a reason for the second-order desire, wanting to want, or to intend, to act, because the ascription of attitude-related value that it supports entails a corresponding ascription of desirability. 1~

Several writers have focussed on reasons for attitudes of the will which are, in my terms, also (object-related) reasons for wanting to have the attitude. Two noteable examples are Robert Merrihew Adams and Gregory S. Kavka. H Adams explores the way in which the ethics of motives (right motivation, by motive-utilitarian standards) and the ethics of action (right action, by act-utilitarian standards) can be incompatible in some cases. In my terms, an individual characteristically has, in Adams-type cases, an (attitude-

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related) reason to have a certain pattern of desire - having the pattern maximizes utility - which is also an (object-related) reason to want to have the pattern.

In his article, "The Toxin Puzzle", Kavka, for his part, puzzles over how someone can directly form the intention to drink a vial of toxin, given that, in the circumstance, inasmuch as he has a pro- reason, it is a reason to intend to drink the toxin that concerns the intending and not the drinking. The case parallels the puzzle about how someone can directly form a preferred belief, given the absence of evidence for it. In my terms, Kavka's would-be intender has an (attitude-related) reason to intend to drink the toxin (having the intention will earn him a million dollars), which is also an (object- related) reason to want to intend so to act. What Kavka's fellow lacks is an (object-related) reason to intend to drink the toxin: a reason for intending so to act which is such because it is a reason for so acting. Compare the believing-at-will case. The would-be believer is similarly situated. He has an (attitude-related) reason to have a certain belief (suppose it would please him), which is also an (object-related) reason to want to have the belief. What is missing is an (object- related) reason for the belief: a reason foc believing p (to be so ) which is such because it is evidence for p's being so.

Kavka highlights other relevant cases (reminiscent of Adams-type ones) in his discussion of the paradoxes of deterrence. These cases - "Special Deterrent Situations" - are ones in which, while it would be wrong, by the standards of utility, for a defender to retaliate upon attack, it would be right, by utilitarian standards, for the defender to form (or to have) the corresponding conditional intention. The defender, in such situations of deterrence, has a reason to form (or to have) the intention to retaliate that concerns the utility of having the intention (having the intention helps to deter) rather than the utility of the retaliatory action. So, in the terms of my distinction, the defender, so placed, has a utilitarian reason that is, at once, an (attitude-related) reason to form (or to have) a certain conditional intention and an (object-related) reason to want to have that intention. 12

Reasons for emotion, as one would expect, reflect the same division as reasons for belief, desire and intention. Some are object- related. Others are attitude-related. The former are reasons for emotion, and nothing besides. The latter are, in addition, reasons for wanting to have an emotion. Consider the case where q is a reason for

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N to regret that he did x. q might be such a reason because it goes to show (say) that, in doing x, N acted in a way that was harmful to himself. In this case, q is an object-related reason for N to regret having done x: it supports the claim that there is value in N's regretting that he did x, on the grounds that for N to have such regret is for N to regret having done something that it was undesirable to do. As an object-related reason for regret, q is, in such a case, just that, and not also a reason for N to want to regret that he did x. 13 This contrasts with the case where q is a reason for N to regret having done x because it goes to show (say) that it would be to N's advantage to have such regret (suppose it would cause his therapist to like him). For, in this case, q is an attitude-focussed reason for N to regret having done x: it supports the claim that there is value in N's regretting that he did x, on the grounds that such regret would be in N's interest to have. An ascription of attitude-related value like this entails a corresponding ascription of desirability, and so reason to desire, q, in such a case, as an attitude-related reason for regret, is also a reason for N to want to regret that he did x. 14

Object-related reasons for emotion introduce a certain complexity. Consider again the case of regret. It seems that object-related reasons for the regret that p can be of at least two kinds: (object-related) reasons for the belief that p is so and (object-related) reasons for the wish that p were not so. In my example above, q - which supports the claim that it was harmful to N to do x - is an (object-related) reason for N to wish that it were not so that he did x. But it seems (for example) that N could equally well have an object-related reason against his regret that was a consideration calling into question his supposition that he did x - in other words, a consideration that was an (object-related) reason for N not to believe it to be so that he did x. This complexity apparently reflects the point that N's regret that p crucially involves in some way both N's belief that p is so and N's wish that p were not so. It seems to be a generalizeable truth about object-related reasons for emotions that p that they enjoy a diversity that corresponds to the diversity of beliefs and desires (wishes) that enter into the analyses of the emotions for which they are reasons. 1~

6 I return, lastly, to the issue that provoked the discussion in

sections 2-5. Davidson thinks that the presence of a mental cause that

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is not a reason for what it causes is the mark of division within the mind, and that such division characterizes, not only cases of irrationality like (some) wishful thinking, akratic action, and self- deception, but also rational phenomena like self-reform, before and after. Davidson construes such division as reflecting "the breakdown of reason-relations". We are, by now, I suggest, well-placed to see the mistake here: in the cases in question, at the point where there is a mental cause that is not a reason for what it causes, we have, not "the breakdown of reason-relations," but causation by reasons across a higher-order attitude to a lower-order one. Such cases exhibit the familiar pattern of trans-level causation by reasons.

In speaking to the example of self-reform, Davidson comments:

What I have in mind is a special kind of second-order desire or value, and the actions it can touch off. This happens when a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and he acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change - the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations. The agent has reasons for changing his own habits and character, but those reasons come from a domain of values necessarily extrinsic to the contents of the views or values to undergo change. The cause of the change, if it comes, can therefore not be a reason for what it causes. A theory that could not explain irrationality would be one that also could not explain our salutary efforts, and occasional successes, at self-criticism and self-improvement.16

The following, I think, is a case in question. Suppose Jack reviews his life and judges that he would do better to be altruistically motivated (to have altruistic desires). As things are, he is sealed off from love, friendship and the like, and he judges that his life would be enriched were he to be involved in such relationships, which require, if they are not to be ersatz, genuine altruistic concern for others. Suppose, further, that Jack acts to acquire such altruistic concern, and succeeds. The situation prior to the change is this. From the point of view of his desire for his own good, Jack has, in the fact

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that it would benefit him to be altruistic, a reason to be altruistic: to desire to help others simply for the sake of so acting. Subsequent to the change, the situation is as follows. From the point of view of his self-interested desire, Jack has, in the fact that it will benefit him to be altmstic, a reason to stay altruistic: to continue to desire to help others simply for the sake of so acting. However, from the point of view of his newly acquired altruistic concern, that it benefits him to be altruistic is no reason to want to assist others. From this perspective, the only reason there is to want to help others is that so to act is to do something good in itself.

An example of self-reform like this has, I submit, the pattern characteristic of causation by reasons across levels of attitudes. Before and after the change Jack has, from the point of view of his desire for his own good, an (attitude-related) reason to be altruistic - so to be will benefit him - which is also an (object-related) reason to desire to be altruistic: an (attitude-related) reason to desire to help others simply for the sake of so acting, which is also an (object-related) reason to desire to desire so to act for such a reason. The desire for his own good, and the accompanying means-end belief, cause and rationalize Jack's desire to be altruistic (desire to desire to help others simply for sake of so acting). This second-order desire (together with the actions it causes and rationalizes) produces and sustains, in turn, the (lower-order) altruistic concern. The higher-order desire engenders and sustains, but is not a reason for, the altrustic concern, to be sure, but it matches this concern in (prudential) reasons, transmitting to it their causal influence. The model here is the causal role of an intention to act in a sequence of practical reasoning that results in intentional action. The intention's reasons are the same as those of the (lower-level) action that it causes, though it itself is not a reason for the action. The function of the intention is to mediate the causal influence of such shared reasons beyond itself to the action. Given his (formal) discussion of self-reform, Davidson, it seems, would emphasize the point that prudential reasons for being altruistic are not reasons for desire from the altruistic standpoint. But that point, we see, is really irrelevant to the point being made here. For, in the present case of self-reform, there is, even so, no "breakdown of reason-relations": a second-order desire transmits the causal influence of its object-related (prudential) reasons to a lower-order desire, which shares these reasons as attitude-related ones. Here there is the free flow of reasons across a higher-order attitude to a lower-order one.

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As I noted in section 2, Davidson offers a certain simple example of wishful thinking to illustate how his thesis about the breakdown of reasons applies to cases of irrationality. However, this case, I suggest, is of a piece with self-reform: rather than rational breakdown at the point where there is a mental cause (a desire) that is not a reason for what it causes (a belief), there is causation by reasons across levels of attitudes. Davidson's young man has an (attitude- related) reason for believing that he has a well-turned calf - it would please him to believe this - which is also an (object-related) reason for him to want to believe as much. The desire to have this belief causes him to have it, though it is not a reason for him to have it. Even so, the point at which this occurs does not mark the breakdown of reasons. For the desire corresponds to the (lower-order) belief in its(hedonic) reasons, transmitting to it their causal influence. Again, it is completely beside the way, in the present connection, that hedonic reasons for belief are not object-related ones. For this does not signify any hiatus in the chain of causation by reasons. The salient point, in such a case, is that the desire to believe mediates the causal influence of its object-related (hedonic) reasons beyond itself to the belief, which shares these reasons as attitude-related ones.

Self-deception and akrasia can be interpreted along similar lines. The (wishful thinking) self-deceiver, as Davidson construes him, accepts, like everyone else, the second-order principle of total evidence, according to which one ought to believe what one judges to be most likely, all the available relevant evidence considered. The self-deceiver accepts this principle, but desires not to believe what it counsels, for the reason that it would pain him so to believe. The desire, says Davidson, causes him to ignore (neglect) the principle, without providing him with a reason for this. 17 Even so, I would claim, the point at which this occurs does not, as Davidson thinks, mark the breakdown of reasons. For the case is one where a desire matches its (lower-order) effect in (hedonic) reasons, transmitting to it their causal influence. The self-deceiver has an (attitude-related) reason to ignore the principle - it would pain him to believe what it counsels - which is also an (object-related) reason to desire to ignore it. The desire causes him not to form the unwelcome belief, thus mediating to its effect the causal influence of the (hedonic) reason that it shares with it. Far from being an example of the breakdown of reasons, the case is a typical instance of trans-level causation by reasons. Further, it makes no difference to the chain of rational

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causation that the hedonic reason in question is no reason against belief from the point of view of epistemic rationality. For the hedonic belief, like the servant desire that it rationalizes, enters into the chain of causation by reasons in the way, and at the point, that is available to it m do this. It cannot mark even a partial breach in this chain that, at their points of contribution, neither the belief nor the intermediary desire is also a reason from a standpoint m which it is entirely irrelevant as such.

Similar remarks apply m the akratic case. Davidson's akrates contravenes his own second-order principle of continence, which says that he ought m do what he holds to be best, everything considered. Davidson offers the following example. A man who judges that it would be best, all things considered, not to return to a park, nevertheless is tempted to do so, and so not to act on his principle, because he wants m replace a branch to its original position, and so to remove a danger. The desire to replace the branch eventually causes the fellow to remm to the park, thus ignoring his principle. This desire, says Davidson, does and does not provide him with a reason for what he does. It gives him a reason not to act on his principle, without giving him a reason against the principle, and so the case is one where there is a mental cause that is not a reason for what it causes. 18 Davidson draws the wrong lesson from this case, I would suggest. The akrates, so characterized, has, as Davidson says, a reason for ignoring his principle: he wants to replace the branch. To be sure, this desire is no reason against the principle: no principle-related reason not to act on the principle. Even so, there is no "breakdown of reason-relations ~ here - not even partial breakdown. For the desire enters into the chain of causation by reasons in the way, and at the point, that is open to it to do this. It cannot even partially disturb the chain of rational causation that, at the point of its operation, the desire is not also a reason from a point of view to which it is entirely irrelevant as such: in this case, the point of view of practical rationality. Finally, I note that there is, in the causal sequence under discussion, a further point where there is a mental cause that is not a reason for what it causes: this is at the point where the intention to ignore the principle causes the akratic agent not to act on it. However, as we know, this feature of the case does not signify the collapse of causation by reasons. For the intention matches its (lower-order) effect in reasons, transmitting to it their causal

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influence. This is a point of exemplary trans-level causation by r e a sons .

I conclude that Davidson fails to provide a theory of division as rational breakdown by invoking the presence of mental causes that do not rationalize their effects. Such causes are integral to causation by reasons across levels of attitudes.

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG WOLLONGONG, N.S.W. 2500

AUSTRALIA

I should like to thank Andr6 Gallois for our many enjoyable conversations about the topics of this paper. I have also greatly profited from seminar discussions of the paper at the Universities of Wollongong and Queensland, and at the Research School of the Social Sciences, Australian National University.

REFERENCES

Adams, Robert Merrihew: 1976, "Motive Utilitarianism," Journal of Philosophy LXXIII, pp. 467-81.

Davidson, Donald: 1982, "Paradoxes of Irrationality," in Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 289-305.

1985, "Deception and Division," in Jon Elster (ed.), The Multiple Self (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), pp. 79-92.

Dunn, Robert: 1987 The Possibility of Weakness of Will (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis).

Kavka, Gregory S.: 1978, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," Journal of Philosophy LXXV, pp. 285-302.

1983, "The Toxin Puzzle," Analysis 43, pp. 33-36.

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1987, Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).

Stocker, Michael: 1987, "Emotional Thoughts," American Philosophical Qaarterly 24, pp. 59-69.

NOTES

1 Donald Davidson (1982, pp. 289-305; 1985, pp. 79-92). 2 Davidson (1982, p. 304). 3 Davidson (1982, pp. 297-98; 1985, fn 4, p. 86). 4 Davidson (1982, p. 298). 5 Davidson (1985, pp. 85-86). 6 For f~ther discussion, see Robert Dunn (1987, Ch. 4, pp. 85ff.). 7 To the extent that cognitive or epistemic value (and so reason) attaches

to believing p, p is worthy of being believed (to be so) in light of some relevent piece of evidemce. Such belief-worthiness of p is just that. It does not further imply worthiness of being desired to be believed (to be so). Value here connects, not with the will, but its cognitive counterparts. For what is worthy of being believed (to be so) in light of the evidence is what is worthy of being chosen, or decided upon, as being so, etc.

8 A corresponding point is this. Insofar as prudential, hedonic, etc., value attaches to believing p, p will be in some way worthy of being believed (to be so). Such belief-worthiness of p contrasts with cognitive or epistemic belief-worthiness of p. For the former, unlike the latter, implies worthiness of being desired to be believed (to be SO).

9 To the extent that object-related value (and so reason) attaches to wantint, or to intending, to do x, doing x will be desire-or intention- worthy. Such desirability or intention-worthiness, however, will be simply that. It will not further entail worthiness of being desired to be desired, or m be intended, to be done.

10 Inasmuch as attitude-related value attaches to wanting, or to intending, to do x, doing x will be in some way desire- or intention-worthy. Such desirability or intention-worthiness of an action entails, in addition, worthiness of being desired to be desired, or to be intended, to be done.

11 Robert Merrihew Adams (1976, pp. 467-81). Gregory S. Kavka (1978, pp. 285-302; or, 1987, pp. 15-32; 1983, pp. 33-36).

12 Cf. Kavka (1978, pp. 290-91).

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13 Correspondingly, given q, having done x is, in such a case, regrettable. Such regrettability does not further imply worthiness of being desired to be regretted.

14 Correspondingly, given q, having done x is, in such a case, at once worthy of being regretted and worthy of being desired to be regretted.

15 Michael Stocker disputes the thesis that emotions necessarily involve relevant beliefs and desires (1987, pp. 59-69). Perhaps Stocker would be sympathetic to an amended claim like this. (Object-related) reasons for emotions that p reflect the beliefs and desires that enter into the analyses of such emotions as had by "healthy and mature" persons. See his remarks on "evaluative holism", p. 68.

16 Davidson (1982, p. 305). 17 Davidson (1985, pp. 81ff., 89ff.). ts Davidson (1982, pp. 292, 294, 296-97)

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