Re-Orienting US-Iran Negotiations Into the US's Favor

TO: Professor William Habeeb

FROM: Ben Turner

CLASS: MSFS-623: International Negotiation

SUBJECT: Re-Orienting American Negotiation Strategy with Iran

I. Introduction

The negotiations between the United States and Iran since the Islamic

Revolution in 1979 can be characterized plainly by an utter lack of official

negotiation. Ever since the American-backed Shah was deposed in Iran and

replaced by the ayatollahs, Iran and the US have talked primarily through

backchannels, less-than-high-level diplomats, and through popular media.

With the new American president, Barack Obama, has come

unprecedented movement from the American camp towards changing the

tone of American relations towards Iran. While Iran has initially reacted

with extreme suspicion and skepticism, the argument that the environment

is ripe for negotiation can be made. Both nations have many common goals,

such as regional and Iraq security, economic reconciliation, and avoidance

of all-out war. Iran is gaining leverage through its nuclear program and

through increasing its regional influence, making it prudent for the United

States to negotiate with Iran sooner rather than later.

With so much to talk about, and at a good time to start negotiating,

the main problem the two countries will have is establishing a common

agenda -- finding Zartman's and Berman's "formula" for their two very

different Best Alternatives To a Non-Agreement (BATNAs) remain a looming

obstacle for anything beyond pre-negotiation (or Zartman's and Berman's

"diagnosis" stage) and unfortunately such BATNAs are well-engrained into

both countries' popular mentalities.1

1 Hopmann, Terrence. "The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts", University of South Carolina Press, 1996, pp. 77-85. Also: Habeeb, William. "Power and Tactics in International Negotiation", Johns

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What potential actions can the US take against Iran with a new

Obama Administration? What are the levers which would most compel Iran

to act favorably to American invocations for new agreement?

II. Background

Both Iran and the US have a long history of grievances against each

other. After Iran underwent the Islamic Revolution, it overthrew the Shah

who was receiving American backing and then approved of student-led

capture of the American embassy in Tehran, famously referring to it as "a

den of spies".2 Since that time, Iran has always been deeply upset by the

US meddling in its affairs whether it actually was or not. Saddam Hussein,

Iran's Iraqi neighbor, saw the Islamic Revolution as an opportunity to strike

-- one of his many miscalculations that led to many peoples' lives lost and an

eventual stalemate between Iran and Iraq. The US took Hussein's side in

the war, threatened by the Revolution in Iran, furthering distrust between

the US and Iran. Later, progressive Iranian leaders would have major

trouble consolidating gains in decreasing anti-American sentiment and

opening up to the US because of this long, sordid history.

By the time President George W. Bush had absorbed the humiliation

of the 9/11 attacks and labeled Iran as part of an axis of evil, Iran's

progressive movement was completely derailed -- in fact it would become a

theme that American actions would always find harsh Iranian reactions.

Bush's further incursion into Iraq, deposing Hussein, while at the same time

being unable to solve a North Korea in pursuit of nuclear weapons, led Iran

to believe that its security was in grave danger from a neoconservative

theoretical movement in the American political establishment and that

Hopkins, 1988, pp. 29-33.

2 PBS Frontline. "American Experience: Jimmy Carter". http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/sfeature/sf_hostage.html

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recent historical precedence (North Korea) would prove the threat of

nuclear arms to be Iran's most pragmatic strategy for national security.

Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush have used sanctions upon Iran

to contain it as it has adopted this new nuclear strategy. While this has hurt

Iran economically, it has also played into the hardliners' hands: along with

the US halting any negotiations with Iran, sanctions have helped the Iranian

hawks point out to the people that Iran is under siege from the US and must

seek to protect itself through nuclear nationalism. Robert Baer, a former

CIA officer and author of the 2009 book "The Devil We Know", about Iran's

imperial ambitions, says, "Effective sanctioning of Iran is a dream. Iran’s

regime is still standing after thirty years of sanctions—still able to buy

anything it wants from China and Russia. Some of America’s closest allies,

such as Turkey and Japan, trade with Iran as if there were no sanctions at

all."3

From American hawks such as John Bolton to official statements from

Iran's governing councils, everyone is in agreement that Iran wants to

ensure its capacity to build nuclear weapons, whether it actually builds one

or not. At the end of President Bush's tenure, he changed his stance on Iran

somewhat so that the US would support Europe's attempts to negotiate with

Iran, but this has led to nowhere, probably because the terms up for debate

are different for the Europeans (international security) and for the Iranians

(regional security and security against Americans), and because the US

needs to be involved in negotiations as the dominant security hegemon.

This establishes the main players in this process as Iran and the US -- no

one else has enough influence or power to affect either nation in its

ambitions with the other.

On the Europeans' attempts at negotiations with Iran:

3 Baer, Robert. "The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower", Crown, 2008. Kindle version, highlight location 4032-34.

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"The European talks went nowhere, and six months after the

U.S. concessions, the Iranians accelerated their nuclear program by

starting to enrich uranium. On the last day of May 2006, under

pressure from European allies to open talks with Tehran, the U.S.

offered to join the Europeans at the negotiating table — but only if

Iran first agreed to suspend its program of uranium enrichment. And,

hoping to press the Iranians to comply, Washington spent the next

two years trying in vain to forge a consensus in the U.N. Security

Council for meaningful sanctions. Last week, Rice announced that she

had agreed to send Burns despite Iran's firm refusal to stop enriching

uranium."4

In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and has since stayed, occupying it with

over 130,000 American troops. A resulting insurgency and Shi'ite/Sunni

sectarian violence has destabilized the entire country. This event perhaps

more than any other has made negotiation talks ripe -- for Iran, failure in

Iraq means massive destabilization despite a great Shi'ite Reawakening.

Iran is also deeply unsettled having American troops both to its west and to

its east. For the US, it needs Iran's help to bring stability back to Iran's

neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq, and the US also faces a greatly worsening

BATNA, which Iran is well-aware of.

III. BATNAs and Goals

Terrence Hopmann describes the goal of negotiation as hoping "to

achieve mutually beneficial outcomes that will at least serve the basic

interests of all parties affected by a particular decision".5 The key is that

both side's primary goals are addressed within the negotiation's agenda.

But for the last decade, the US and Iran have not had mutually compatible

BATNAs. The US's BATNA is that it can block Iran from having the capacity

4 Calabresi, Massimo. "U.S. and Iran: A One-Sided Negotiation", Time Magazine, 21 Jul 08.

5 Hopmann, p. 27. of 20

to build nuclear weapons while using the United Nations Security Council

and Non-Proliferation Treaty as legalistic ways to slow Iran down. Iran has

already celebrated its nuclear program is unstoppable and as a pillar of its

international policy, and has stalled in discussions and European

negotiations while continuing its work on its program. Says Ray Takeyh of

the Council for Foreign Relations, "It's been a slow-motion capitulation

since 2005. There's no other way of interpreting it."6

The US speaks of Iran shutting down its enrichment program as part

of a pre-condition for larger negotiations. George Friedman, founder of

Stratfor (a geopolitical strategy thinktank), remarks:

"From the Iranian point of view, the United States has made

two fundamental demands of Iran. The first is that Iran halt its

military nuclear program. The second, a much broader demand, is

that Iran stop engaging in what the United States calls terrorism. This

ranges from support for Hezbollah to support for Shiite factions in

Iraq. In return, the United States is prepared to call for a suspension

of sanctions against Iran. ... For Tehran, however, the suspension of

sanctions is much too small a price to pay for major strategic

concessions. First, the sanctions don’t work very well. Sanctions only

work when most powers are prepared to comply with them. Neither

the Russians nor the Chinese are prepared to systematically comply

with sanctions, so there is little that Iran can afford that it can’t get.

Iran’s problem is that it cannot afford much. Its economy is in

shambles due more to internal problems than to sanctions. Therefore,

in the Iranian point of view, the United States is asking for strategic

concessions, yet offering very little in return."7

6 Calabresi, Time Magazine.

7 Friedman, George. "Iran's View of Obama", Stratfor Global Intelligence, 23 Mar 09. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090323_obamas_new_year_greeting_and_view_iran

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Tehran for its part seeks international recognition of its place as at

least a regional power, but even greater than that, an emerging

superpower. Iran's words to the US through public letters from

Ahmadinejad to Bush and Obama do not talk of uranium enrichment but

instead of humiliation, recognition, and imperialism. In Ahmadinejad's own

words:

"The people of many countries are angry about the attacks on

their cultural foundations and the disintegration of families. They are

equally dismayed with the fading of care and compassion. The people

of the world have no faith in international organizations, because their

rights are not advocated by these organizations. ... We increasingly

see that people around the world are flocking towards a main focal

point -- that is the Almighty God. Undoubtedly through faith in God

and the teachings of the prophets, the people will conquer their

problems. My question for you is: 'Do you not want to join them?'"8

Essentially Ahmadinejad, running as a populist hardliner, is making a

liberalist claim that the US's policies, particularly in the Muslim world,

bring oppression and corruption. While Ahmadinejad certainly has little

power in setting Iranian policy, his words echo the Iranian grievancies that

without a halt to US aggression against Iran, there can be no concessions

from the Iranian side.

More recently, Obama sent a message to the Iranian Republic (a key

distinction for it recognized the regime) on the Persian holy day of Nowruz.

His video was heralded by the west as a new opening for change in tone.

The response from the Ayatollah Khatami was dismissive: "The Iranian

nation is the same nation that put all options of Bush under the table and

8 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud. "Ahmadinejad's Letter to Bush", WashingtonPost.com, 09 May 06. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050900878.html

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into the history’s dustbin. ... Obama is now toeing Bush’s line regarding

Iran."9

Baer lists six interests that Iran wants to discuss with the US:

"Based on their actions and what they’ve told Western officials,

they seem to have six core interests: Internal security. Iran is 89

percent Shia and 9 percent Sunni. The Sunnis are a small minority,

but Iran still looks at them, as well as the Kurds in Iran, as its Achilles’

heel. ... Iraq. Iran is there to stay. Nothing short of a regime collapse

in Tehran will change that. Empire aside, Iran does have a vital

interest in putting an end to the chaos in Iraq. ... Energy. Iran wants a

better price for its oil, modern technology to more efficiently lift it,

and alternative energy sources for the day it runs out of oil. This

would include nuclear power plants. ... An Iranian empire. Short of

drastic action, Iran won’t cede its dominion in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria,

the Gulf, and Gaza. Iran will insist on dominion in the Gulf after the

United States leaves. It will hold itself out as the protectors of the

Shia as well as the Palestinians. ... Control of Mecca. Iran wants

control of Mecca. For 1300 years, the Shia have been second-class

Muslims. With Iran’s newfound military predominance, there’s no

longer any reason to accept the status quo. It’s unclear what precisely

Iran’s mullahs will demand, but it will probably be co-administering

both Mecca and Medina along with Saudi Arabia. ...

Recognition/equality. At the bottom of it all, the Iranians want to be

treated fairly. Iran wants to be recognized for what it is: a stable

country that has lived within the same borders for thousands of years,

the most powerful country in the Gulf, OPEC’s second-largest

producer, a regional economic power, and a major influence in

Islam."10

9 Johnson, Bridget. "Tough-talking Iran demands 'change' from Obama", TheHill.com, 02 May 09. http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/iran-talks-tough-while-demanding-change-from-obama-2009-05-02.html

10 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 3902-3932. of 20

The US is hung up on nuclear proliferation and also on Ahmadinejad's

infamous comments about Israel's existence, which seem to be primarily a

distraction from the key issues. The US is also hung up on Iran being a

terrorist state, having just released a new intelligence report saying Iran is

the most active state sponsor of terrorism. But as Baer put it, "Americans

have missed Iran’s critical transition, its metamorphosis from a Shia

rebellion and a terrorist state to a classic military power."11 This gets into

the fact that Iran has been adding to and improving its BATNA, which will

be discussed later.

So for now, the BATNAs are incompatible and the negotiation agenda

does not match. This must change in order for there to be further

movement.

IV. Power

The US has largely ignored Iran diplomatically, applied economic

sanctions not universally supported by other key international players, and

has rattled its saber by moving naval vessels such as the aircraft carrier

USS Nimitz into the Persian Gulf. It has relied on European negotiations

and has accepted Iranian help fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan after the

9/11 attacks. But the US has given little; nor should it necessarily need to,

given that the US is by far the largest and most influential military and

security power in the world, particularly in the Middle East. Regionally, the

US has a lot of sway with Iran's near neighbors, such as Saudi, Israel, Iraq,

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Egypt.

Such power, defined by William Habeeb as "the way in which A uses

resources in process with B so as to bring preferred outcomes in

relationship with B"12, has been quantified as "aggregate structural power":

11 Baer, Kindle version, highlight location 1249-50.

12 Habeeb, p. 15. of 20

Pp = (C+E+M) x (S + W)

where Pp is perceived power, C is critical mass (population size + territory),

E is economic capability, M is military capability, S is strategic purpose, and

W is will to pursue national strategy.13

The US has large amounts of all these inputs, except perhaps W when

it comes to the Middle East. However, what it is lacking most is specific to

the Middle East and not represented in this equation: regional relevance.

And this is where Iran has an advantage. Iran's issue-specific power

has been growing in the Middle East while the US has allowed actors to

move against it by doing nothing. The US holds influence but only

superficially with clientelistic governments willing to allow it. Iran has won

over the south of Iraq, the Shi'ite majority, and has infiltrated senior levels

of the Iraqi government. Iran has also supported the successful Hezbollah

model in Lebanon and is actively interested in Hamas in the Palestine, to

ward off Israeli attacks. Iran is appealing to the Shi'ite groups in the Gulf

countries, winning them away from the Saudis who mistreat them. Iran,

culturally and religiously, has far more relevance in the Middle East than

the US ever could have.

Iran has all but won Iraq and knows that this has not been without

significant damage to the US:

"Iran senses that with Iraq failing, it’s on an equal footing with

the United States in the Gulf. Along with that, there’s a growing

confidence in Tehran today that the United States will finally have to

come around to recognizing Iran’s true stature in the world as the

only important player in the Middle East—a superpower, even. Iran is

confident that America will have to accept the inevitable, that we’ve

13 Habeeb referencing Cline, p. 19. of 20

been wasting our time with the Gulf Arabs, and that we have to come

to terms with Iran."14

Indeed, Baer continues to say that he is disappointed with American

handling of Iran and Iraq:

"But in fact, the one certainty about the Iraq War is that the

United States will see Iran’s imperial ambitions played out more

clearly there than in Tehran. If it’s in Iran’s interests to have chaos in

Iraq, then chaos there will be. If Iran intends to draw the United

States into a quagmire, a quagmire is what we’ll get. Our war with

Iran will be fought in Iraq, through proxies, on the periphery of Iran’s

empire. How could we have missed this so badly?"15

Iran has been building its conventional military capability: the Strait

of Hormuz, an important bottleneck where much of the world's oil is

shipped through, is rumored to be defended now with Silkworm missiles

hidden along Iran's coastline, as a threat against any foreign attack. Baer

says that "[w]hat’s particularly odd about Iran’s advancement in

conventional military tactics is that the West has largely ignored it,

choosing instead to focus almost obsessively on whether Iran is developing

nuclear weapons. It’s more evidence that we are miscalculating the nature

of the Iranian threat."16 Iran has been exporting explosively formed

penetrators to Iraq, anti-tank arms to Lebanon, and small arms everywhere.

Iran knows that the security community is reluctant to strike it, and

has been improving its defenses silently while continuing its nuclear

enrichment program publicly. It has vastly improved its BATNA, and Iraq

has provided it with a huge opportunity to swing issue-specific power to

bear against the US's aggregate structural power. As Vali Nasr, author of




"The Shia Revival" put it, ""The wars of 2001 and 2003 have fundamentally

changed the Middle East to Iran's advantage," he says. "The dam that was

containing Iran has been broken."17

V. Culture and Personality

William Zartman claims that culture "is every bit as relevant as

breakfast, and to much the same extent"18, as the traditions and customs of

the diplomatic community override those of each side's cultures. However,

negotiations between the US and Iran are considerably unique: both

parties do not regularly meet each other, and if they do it's with very

specific, cold instructions. There is no formal ambassadorial contact

between the two nations. The entire relationship is defined almost

completely by culture, whether it be media culture or national security

culture or street culture. So, what are the cultural backdrops within this

relationship?

The United States has chosen not to engage Iran actively, making few

serious overtures at overcoming past differences. Much of this has to do

with the excellent job Iran did at vilifying itself in the western media and by

establishing itself for decades to come as the major nation of state-

sponsored terror. President Bush's "axis of evil" policy and aggressive use

of hegemonic military power as advocated by the neo-conservatives put Iran

on a hit list of countries unwilling to participate in the international

experiment of democratization. Bush as a singular individual exemplified

American personality towards Iran, indicating disbelief in Iran's meddling

regional affairs, shock at its nuclear ambitions to become part of the

nuclear "club", and intransigent towards negotiation.

17 PBS Frontline. "Showdown with Iran", 23 Oct 07. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/etc/synopsis.html

18 Zartman, William. "Culture and Negotiation", United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, SAGE, 2003, p. 17.

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Iran thinks of the US as having no culture, whereas its own culture is

rich in history and predisposed by fate to allow for Persian superpower

status -- it is expanding its influence and must improve its security for

potential showdowns against Turkey and Saudi. Iran's senior leadership

was forged from the Islamic Revolution, which managed to expel US

influence from Iran. The leaders use this nationalist and Shi'ite superiority

when their popularity flags or when they need support for policies. Anti-

Americanism is regular in weekly Muslim speeches.

Iranians have never forgotten that they used to control much of the

Middle East, and they see themselves as laying the building blocks for re-

emerging as a world power. Iranians do not forget the perceived injustices

committed against them in the past; thusly, it has become a point of pride

for Iranians to show immediate reaction to every American move.

Iranian leaders respond enthusiastically to American presidents'

missives. US detainment of Iranian operatives in Iraq led to an outbreak of

Shi'ite militia violence and a harsh outcry from the Iranian government.

Ahmadinejad's being voted in could have been seen as a nationalist reaction

to increasingly hostile American rhetoric. Is it possible that the Iranians are

so deeply obsessed with American behavior? "You will not find a single

instance in which a country has inflicted harm on us and we have left it

without a response. So if the United States makes such a mistake, they

should know that we will definitely respond. And we don't make idle

threats," Mohammad Jafari, head of the Iranian National Security Council.

Ahmadinejad is not seen as someone who has much power within the

Iranian system or who speaks for Iran's core policy issues. Yet he is who

the Americans and the media vilify. Meanwhile, the Supreme Leader and

his Council, working through an opaque system but with fairly democratic

voting procedures, steer the Iranian boat much more wisely, and in fair

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estimation, in a way more conducive with American foreign policy.

Ahmadinejad is up for re-election in June of 2009. If he is voted out and

replaced with someone less of a firebrand, this may improve relations with

the US since the US and its media are so obsessed with flippant Iranian

comments about Israel and criticism of American policy.

Obama realizes Ahmadinejad's relative insignificance as an actor to

try negotiation with:

"Today, Obama rebuked the Iranian leader, saying his remarks

were harmful to Iran's standing in the world as well as to U.S.-Iranian

relations. He also said that he has found many of the Ahmadinejad's

statements to be "appalling and objectionable", but implied the

possibility of improving relations with Iran via Supreme Leader

Khameni."19

Meanwhile, Barack Obama has been voted into the White House in

the US and has received global support for his measured, intellectual

approach to policy-making. While Iran (and the Middle East as a whole) has

been skeptical of Obama's choices for foreign policy experts (Hillary Clinton

at State, an Iran containment hawk in Dennis Ross), it must surely

understand that it has an opportunity to make major inroads with Obama

that it could not with Bush. Obama for his part is eager to improve the US's

footing on its Iran policy after perceiving it as languishing under Bush.

Obama is more likely to see Iran within the context of larger issues that are

not necessarily specific to America's interests, meaning that an agreement

where "all these issues are linked" (Habeeb's high probability test of

whether negotiations will succeed) is far more imaginable. In short, Obama

could have the capability to understand what Iran wants, whereas Bush did

not.

19 Connolly, Katie. "Obama Calls Ahmadinejad's Speech 'Harmful'", Newsweek blog, "The Gaggle", 21 Apr 09. http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2009/04/21/obama-calls-ahmadinejad-s-speech-harmful.aspx

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VI. Strategy and Tactics

Iran knows that the longer it waits, the more its negotiating position

improves. It is winning influence in the Middle East, coming closer to being

able to build a nuclear weapon, is creating a buffer state in Iraq, has the

power to bleed the US with insurgency in Iraq and Israel in Lebanon and

the Palestine, and it is too large for international movement to be taken

against it, even by Israel. It is not clear whether the US realizes this sorry

state of affairs yet, since urgency has not been taken to change the game

back into the US's favor.

Iran also knows that the US has labeled itself as a promoter of liberal

values and human rights, and that the US feels weakened by its incursions

into Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore Iran attempts to take a moral high

road, promoting eradication of poverty and oppression, hoping it will

resonate with the European and American populaces. Iran has been using

the media actively to push the US into unsavory political positions.

The US has remained fairly passive in its strategy and tactics, acting

through the UNSC and passing messages through European ambassadors

(such as the fax the US received from progressive Iranians promoting a

"Grand Bargain", which Bush ignored). The US military has sought to

actively engage Iranian proxies in Iraq, going so far once as to make a raid

on Mohammad Jafari, a senior commander in the Iranian Quds Force and

deputy of the National Security Council in Iran, when he was rumored to

have been in Iraq. But any actions the military has taken against Iranians

has been met with release orders and apologies from the American

government, to maintain a tense stalemate between the two countries in the

proxy state of Iraq.

The US has been fairly unsuccessful in leveraging world opinion

against Iran in any meaningful way -- Iran is not likely to be cowed by

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international sentiment decrying its hunger for nuclear capability. And yet

the US keeps trying. A passage in an Arabic News article puts it bluntly:

"The new package proposed to Iran says in part "Formal

negotiations can start as soon as Iran's enrichment-related and

reprocessing activities are suspended." Since Iran has indicated that

it would not accept such a position, such package can be considered

as dead on arrival in light of Iran's strong position on this issue, even

though Iranian officials did not hurry to declare so. Also, it is not clear

why such a package would have been proposed to Iran knowing the

package's fate other than to possibly give Iran the illusion that it is

benefiting from this process of negotiation, when such a process may

only be allowing the slow but certain imposition of more official

sanctions on Iran whether thru the UN Security Council or by the 5+1

member countries."20

VII. What the Americans Should Do

It is more difficult to paint a rosy picture for the Americans than it is

for the Iranians. The Iranians have been far more involved in regional

affairs, despite American occupations of two Muslim nations, because of

their regional relevance and a Shi'ite re-emergence as a result of Iraq's

borders opening up.

But the US is running out of time. Not in terms of whether it can stop

Iran from getting nuclear weapons (it couldn't, at least without great cost),

but in terms of the US being able to maintain leverage to affect Iran's core

interests. Containment has too many holes and not enough allies to

maintain it, and it also runs against a populace that is, while increasingly

progressive, also fervently nationalistic. Outright attack has been shown by

Iran's strategy and tactics to be untenable (and Robert Gates said as much

20 "Iran - Europe negotiation package on the nuclear issue", ArabicNews.com, 16 Jul 08. http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/080616/2008061613.html

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himself: "The United States could go to war with Iran, but the outcome is

uncertain. As President Bush’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, said in a

2008 New York Times interview, taking on Iran is not an option."21

First of all, what the US should do is leave Afghanistan and Iraq

completely. Iran has benefited from American provision of Iraq security --

Iran can use its militias and connections to foment or reduce chaos when

needed, while it allows Maliki to consolidate power for the Shi'ites in the

Iraqi government. The US leaving Iraq would tear away the veil of secrecy

Iran enjoys in Iraq, and it would force Iran, with a long border with Iraq, to

have to provide security for the fledgling defective democracy itself. An

alternate option Robert Baer proposes is, "Why not allow the Iranians to

take direct control of the parts of Iraq they already control through proxies?

This would be more efficient, and there would be less violence. Let the

Iranians take direct responsibility for the cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Basra,

which would force Iran to be more cautious and less the spoiler."22

Baer continues:

"All of a sudden, it would be Iran deciding whether it wanted to

be directly responsible for keeping a lid on the anarchy, and whether

it wanted to send in its own troops and start killing Iraqis. A direct

Iranian role in Iraq would involve Iranians killing Sunni and even

Shia, turning the conflict into a civil war. Everything Iran achieved in

Lebanon, turning the Shia and the Sunni against Israel and the United

States, would be lost. The Iranians would suddenly be the occupiers,

and as such would absorb the full political impact of running a foreign

country. They’d no longer be able to hide behind their proxies. It is



unlikely Iran would do well as pure colonial power, burdened by the

inevitable blame that comes with occupation."23

Second, as part of a larger strategy, the US should curtail its ties with

Israel, Saudi, and Egypt while maintaining that national integrity will be

preserved by military force (a mistake not conveyed to Saddam Hussein

regarding Kuwait, leading to his invading it). This will reduce much of the

impetus for anti-Americanism and anti-occupation within the Middle East

region. The US will have to complement this with fulfilling its energy needs

through investment in green power. But this will also show that the US is

taking on a neutral, security-seeking role in the region -- no one would

doubt the US's seriousness for negotiation if it disengaged from countries

seen as having too much influence over the US. But from an American point

of view it is also shoring up American strengths and allowing it the

flexibility to re-focus its security needs as needed.

Third, the US should drop sanctions upon Iran, which do not work and

further anti-American sentiment within Iran.

After that point, the US should offer full negotiations with Iran. Iran

will be desperately seeking to figure out a new balance for its security on

both its western and eastern flanks, and will not enjoy being able to rally

anti-American support on Yowm Al-Juma'a (Friday) in the mosques. A

further commitment by the US towards human rights and internal security

would defuse much of the rhetoric from Iran before it could even respond.

The US enjoys aggregate structural power and should thus seek to

change the macro-environment towards its own ends. This trumps Iran's

issue specific power. The US will have taken initiative in the pre-

negotiation or diagnostic stage of the negotiations, putting Iran on the

defensive after having perceived itself as having the upper-hand for so long.


This also sets the stage for the formula stage of potential negotiations.

The US should openly concede Iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon

(but deter it from stockpiling them), and its right to enrich fuel for energy.

The US will not need to bait Iran with economic incentives anymore, but it

will be able to place the burden of responsibility of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty upon a now nuclear Iran. Meanwhile, Iran will get the status it has

always sought, and realize that what it hoped to gain wasn't as great as

what it actually got.

By the time the detail stage of the negotiations comes, Iran will pretty

much require economic cooperation to save its long-sagging economy, and

it will need to find regional agreements to provide security for a radically

changed Middle East. If Iran wants to be a regional power, then it will have

to deal with the burden of it. Iran even may be willing to negotiate in

exchange for American partnership against Sunni insurgents in Iraq and the

Taliban in Afghanistan.

VIII. Conclusion: Recognizing Ripeness

The time and macro-environment is ripe (as Richard Haas defines it24)

for US-Iran negotiations. Not only has Iraq changed the Middle East

situation, but it has the potential to change it dramatically again. At the

same time, the US has elected a measured president and Iran is having

presidential elections shortly. With Iran's impending nuclear coming-out

party, the ante is increased and the US must take the lead to prevent other

regional interests from increasing their own defensive postures. Not only

all that, but also, as Habeeb says, "The actors may also recognize that

24 Haas, Richard. "Conflicts Unending", Yale University Press, 1990. of 20

changes have occurred in the nature of their relationship. The actors may

perceive that relative power positions have changed: 'The former upper

hand slips, or the former underdog improves his position.'"25 Iran is now

much stronger relatively than it was before -- this affects the US's ability to

deter or influence it.

In terms of what to look for, it is required that the US change its

assumptions about what Iran wants, while seeing Iran as part of a larger

regional puzzle. For Iran, it might need to prepare for unpredictability and

movement from the Americans, since right now it dismisses all American

actions as being predictable and out of touch.

However, these are big steps to take and much of the foreign policy

community's worldview when it comes to the US and Iran is deeply rooted.

At the end of the day, both sides will need to realize that "[w]ithout the will

to reach an agreement, there will be none,"26 and so part of the challenge

will be convincing the citizenry within each country that something

productive, a non-zero-sum agreement, can be reached. Otherwise, the

negotiations so obvious within the framework of this paper will never have

an opportunity to take place.

Says George Friedman, Stratfor founder:

"U.S.-Iranian negotiations are always opaque because they are

ideologically difficult to justify by both sides. For Iran, the United

States is the Great Satan. For the United States, Iran is part of the

Axis of Evil. It is difficult for Iran to talk to the devil or for the United

States to negotiate with evil. Therefore, U.S.-Iranian discussions

always take place in a strange way. The public rhetoric between the

countries is always poisonous. If you simply looked at what each

country says about the other, you would assume that no discussions

25 Habeeb, p. 29.

26 Zartman, William and Berman, Maureen. "The Practical Negotiator", Yale, 1982, p. 66. of 20

are possible. But if you treat the public rhetoric as simply designed to

manage domestic public opinion, and then note the shifts in policy

outside of the rhetorical context, a more complex picture emerges.

Public and private talks have taken place, and more are planned. If

you go beyond the talks to actions, things become even more

interesting. ... We have discussed this before, but it is important to

understand the strategic interests of the two countries at this point to

understand what is going on. Ever since the birth of the Islamic

Republic of Iran, Iraq has been the buffer between the Iranians and

the Arabian Peninsula. The United States expected to create a viable

pro-American government quickly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and

therefore expected that Iraq would continue to serve as a buffer. That

did not happen for a number of reasons, and therefore the strategic

situation has evolved."27

With so many sticking points between the two countries, what it might

take most of all is two leaders willing to put their reputations on the line

and to sell their plans. It seems that Obama is willing to do this, but who

will represent Iran? Will it be the toothless president (who might be

beneficial towards movement, depending on who wins the June elections),

or will the Supreme Council decide to take a chance?

27 Friedman, George. " The U.S.-Iranian Negotiations: Beyond the Rhetoric", Stratfor Global Intelligence, 12 Feb 08. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/u_s_iranian_negotiations_beyond_rhetoric

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