Rbci v Floridoa

7/29/2019 Rbci v Floridoa

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RBCI v FLORIDOA.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent.

RBCI allegedthat respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.According to

RBCI, respondent and his clients, Nazareno-Relampagos group, through force andintimidation, forcibly

took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evictedCirilo A. Garay, the bank

manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.Respondent added

that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI wasalready dismissed; while

the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of theexistence of a prejudicial

question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed against himin retaliation for the

administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial court judges of Bohol.Moreover,

respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations.Respondent

added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the

affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified truecopies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent violated his oath and the CPR Canon 19.

HELD:

The Court held that respondent was guilty as charged and suspended for a year. The first and foremost

duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and

obey the laws of the land. It is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and

to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system. Canon19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. It

is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from

doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the

administration of justice. To that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to

and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and

honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is

condemnable and unethical.


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VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO,

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda.[1]

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows

Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890

square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated

Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid property. The

case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275. During the course of the

proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case

when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident.

In complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay

respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos

(PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by

receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded theadditional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a memorandum, which

he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent (20%) of the

total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services

Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement.

Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed

to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As

a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their

relationship became sore.

On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for

registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March

24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the

Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Pias City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original

and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.

On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had already been

claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000, complainant talked to

respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had

claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted thatcomplainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square

meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again,

complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon.


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In a letter[3] dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's

duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent over the

telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply, and

threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.

On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverseclaim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal services

was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not returned the owner's

duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.

In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent,

complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into

his possession.

Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon

demand. x x

In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate

of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate

of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete

payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the property covered by

the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of

PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter

portion and that he was ready and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should

complainant pay him completely the aforesaid professional fee.

Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the

amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot. He

alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed each other based

on their mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of

a memorandum, since he considered the same unnecessary.

In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%

professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of quantum meruit to justify the amount beingdemanded by him.

In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-

Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice

of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's duplicate of

OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-173,[5] dated


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December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and

Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion for

reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review[6] with this Court. The Court, in a Resolution[7]dated August 16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper disposition, pursuant

to this Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.[8

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors

affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification that respondent is

ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt

of notice. Hence, the present petition.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with modification

the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees

that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly

due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.

Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:

Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and

papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his

lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He

shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions

issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after

the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the recordsof the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice

thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and

power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the

payment of his just fees and disbursements.

An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1)

lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3)

unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.[9] Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien for the

balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of

the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his employment.[10]

In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of

professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their

agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.

As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the complainant

and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee consisting of 20% of the


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total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties only shows that respondent

will be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received.

Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle respondent to retain his

client's property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client absence a clear and

justifiable claim.

Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing

complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the

exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify

inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon demand.[11]

Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to

deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to

additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND

PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY

COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to

satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also

have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided

for in the Rules of Court.

Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable

fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which

were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset,

respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge

before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for

the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his

services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees

on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as

he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a

contract but recoverable by him from his client."[12] The principle of quantum meruit applies if a

lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to


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receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the parties

had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the

principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already

compensated by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure theowner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the title

was already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Pias City to get the

owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed by,

and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his

dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his

clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.[14] By keeping secret

with the client his acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his client.

Respondent could have easily informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of the owner's

duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in order to save his client the time and effort in going to the RD

to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing

unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary

sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with modification

the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of law

for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the complainant's owner's

duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from notice given to

respondent within which to return the title should be modified and, instead, respondent should return

the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)

months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the

owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a

repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the

personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;

and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information

and guidance.


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CUETO v JIMENEZ

FACTS:- Engr. Alex Cueto engaged the services of Atty. Jose Jimenez Jr. as notary public, being the father

of the building of theConstruction Agreement to be notarized. After notarizing the agreement, Jimenez

demanded P50,000 as notarial fee. AlexCueto paid P30,000 in cash and issued a check of P20,000.

However, Cueto requested Jimenez not to deposit the check forlack of sufficient funds. Cueto alsoinformed Jimenez that his son had not yet paid his services as general contractor.- Jimenez still

deposited the check, and of course, the check bounced (insufficient funds nga!)and the check issued by

Jimenez' son was also dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account.- Atty. Jimenez filed a

BP 22 case against Cueto. In return, Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against Jimenezand

alleged that he violated Code of Prof Responsibility and Canons of Prof Ethics when he filed BP22 so that

Jimenez canrecover the balance of his notarial fee.

ISSUE: WoN Jimenez can be held administratively liable?HELD:

YES. Atty. Jimenez is severely reprimanded.RATIO:1. It is highly improper for Jimenez in filing a criminal

case for violation of BP 22 against Cueto when the checkrepresenting the balance of his notarial fee was

dishonored because "A LAWYER SHALL AVOID CONTROVERSIES WITHCLIENTS CONCERNING HIS

COMPENSATION AND SHALL RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION ONLY TO PREVENY IMPOSITION,INJUSTICE or

FRAUD". In thecase at bar, there was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud... 1)Cueto already paid

more than half of the fee 2) In allprobablity, the reason why Cueto lacked funds was because of Jimenez'

son failure to pay (so dapat mas lenient si Jimenezsa delay ng payment sa kanya ng balance)2. AS to the

contention that P50,000 was exorbitant--> IBP and SC held that is is reasonable recompense (1% of

the5,000,000 of the contract price sought to be notarized.) and also Cueto should have inquired first

about thereasonableness. ALso, facts show that theyagreed on the amount.


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For our review is the Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for professional malpractice and gross

misconduct and recommending his disbarment.

The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2] are undisputed.

The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case

filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an administrative case filed before the

Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension Office.[3]

Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Rosario P.

Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the defendant, but

did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the

proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the

judge while the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an

administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.[4]

On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding the respondent guilty

of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and recommending to the Court his one-year

suspension from the practice of law.[5]

Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits against

the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also instituted cases against the family

corporation, the corporations accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case

where respondent tried to collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent

also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to

recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants allege that therespondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of

intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and unwarranted lawsuits against the

complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family corporation.[6] They maintain

that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension

from the practice of law meted out by the IBP against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the

respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27,[7] Rule 138 of the

Rules of Court.

In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him.

He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to file lawsuitsagainst the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and George filed against the complainants

were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]

Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was merely

exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief elsewhere by

reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees.


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Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He argues that the case that

he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of unlawful

transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the public interest.

Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional language. On the

contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to intemperate and vulgar language inaccusing him of extorting from Rosario shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.*9+

After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, we find ourselves in

agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon

those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the

conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A

lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of

it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has

been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice

law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to

hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that

the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose

misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an

office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of

justice, rather than to punish the attorney.[11] In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12] we explained that the bar

should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer

brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the

courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act

which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty

and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his

oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross misconduct

particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP Resolution suspending him

from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the respondent filed against his former client, her

family members, the family corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of

Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where

his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of

twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the

Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission

on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.[13]

In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had previously been

dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the Mercado family separately


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docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No.

97-139, all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]

Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora, as long as

he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive or purpose other than

to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed bythe respondent against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client

and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year

suspension from the practice of law.

The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being dismissed, the

timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy with a renegade member of

the complainants family, the defendants named in the cases and the foul language used in the

pleadings and motions[15] all indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and

fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger

and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in

the custody of a clients funds.

In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16] the Court pronounced that it is professionally irresponsible for a

lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto,

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no

person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised

in good faith.[17]

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of

justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of thejudiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an

instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of

cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these

objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or

prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient

administration of justice.[18] Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21

June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the

speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an

officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former client

to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility[19] provides:


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CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-

client relation is terminated.

Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course

of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the

client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information acquired by

the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel. Information as to the structure and

operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as

basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all

acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct

violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law

effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the

respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the

Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.


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UY v. GONZALES

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation

of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:

Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for

the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding

the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a

petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to

be filed, respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain

amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after

reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that

instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-

complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug,

Pangasinan for Falsification of Public Documents.*1+ The letter-complaint contained facts and

circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition

which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of

132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL

T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married,

Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12,

2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION

OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for

the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from

FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former;

that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering thesaid land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the

Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of

Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and

Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and

residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and

residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property

within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified

documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the Registerof Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in

favor of his above-named children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of

Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of

affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still

accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No.


13/34

0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully

well that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already

transferred in the name of his children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the

said check which was encashed by him;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse

to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said P340,000.00, to

the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]

With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly

disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned against

him just because he refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation. Respondents

act tarnished his reputation and social standing.[3]

In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,*4+ respondent filed his Commentnarrating his version, as follows:

On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy.

Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter acquired by purchase from

his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant

P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of

Redemption. Upon request, he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after

Christmas to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to

complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed of

Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165.

Complainant explained that he had already transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be

located despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his

desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to

prepare a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses

for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant. To these,

complainant agreed.

On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing

and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him that the petition is

ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at

the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already

left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct

infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is

withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the

petition.

Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated

when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any professional

relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public


14/34

document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled

from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]

In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the

IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no showing that

respondent received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.*8+

On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam

dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he

filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]

On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions

of which read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the VerifiedPetition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of the loss and

the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the

Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which expressly provides that A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even

after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-

client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as

early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainants

perceived lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients

confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for it outlasts the

lawyers employment (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means even after the

relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients confidences and secrets remainseffective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules ofProfessional Responsibility provides that A

lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of

employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client

with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam,

who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer interested in

pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves

consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement,

compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the

same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court

ruled that any person may bring to this Courts attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will

usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so

warrant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of

Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6)

MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the

Bar.[10]


15/34

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No.

XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this

Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on

record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of

the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for six (6) months.[11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy

expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against respondent, has no

persuasive bearing in the present case.

Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,

compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the

same.

This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a

plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest

and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public

welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the officialministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his

conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court

to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome

except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on

record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant

or his withdrawal of the charges.[12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as

legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.[13] While

it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or

private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good

demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the

circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein

respondent.

Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the

relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction or dealings


16/34

between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only

because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants)

son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to

produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,

complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title which he had

admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent

to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one,

with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces

with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer

with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have

employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised

or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case

about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought

and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]

Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently,the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by

respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with

complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the

land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of

the property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client

relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the

petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THEATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by

judicial action.

The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever

facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his professional

capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when

respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved

alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is

no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct

that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him


17/34

unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from

instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as

A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


18/34

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly maliciously filed

a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating the attoyrney client

privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she apparently made false entries in

the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically she allegedly indicated that she is married to

a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by

filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos

disbarment.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney-

client when he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant did not

even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were couched in

general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.

Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly

divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not impossible to determine if there

was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such information is a crucial link in

establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is notenough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is

placed upon the party asserting the privilege.


19/34

PALM v. ILEDAN

The Case

The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm (complainant) against

Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information obtained in the course of an attorney-

client relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted with that of his former client,

Comtech Worldwide Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer software

development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs retained

corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October

2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential

amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent suggested that

Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings, through

teleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.

Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became

uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former

officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized

disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with

respondent effective November 2003.

In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary Harrison

(Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of Directors, were

present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent objected to the

meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate inthe meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow teleconferencing.

On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account for the

amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the Corporate

Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. In

July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a

complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the proceedings before

the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads counsel.

On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against respondent before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In his Answer,2 respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on process and

procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted him about the legal

requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February 2003, Soledad engaged his services as

consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged that from February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor

Palm consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of the corporation.

Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech.


20/34

Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, complainant met with

him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the

Philippines to participate in board meetings.

Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as proxy during the

10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison instructed him to observe the conduct of

the meeting. Respondent admitted that he objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm

because the corporate by-laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the participation of board

members by teleconferencing.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for

Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for

Comtech. He alleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural

queries he handled with Comtech.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,3 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of

representing interest in conflict with that of Comtech as his former client.

The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtechs retained counsel from

February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the course of the meetings for the

intended amendments of Comtechs corporate by-laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the

intended amendment to allow members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines to

participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD noted that respondent knew that

the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the teleconferencing. Hence, when

respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm

through teleconferencing on the ground that the corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, hemade use of a privileged information he obtained while he was Comtechs retained counsel.

The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech, respondent

represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-CBD ruled that the fact that

respondent represented Soledad after the termination of his professional relationship with Comtech

was not an excuse.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein respondent be

found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)

year.4

In Resolution No. XVII-2006-5835 passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted

and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification by suspending

respondent from the practice of law for two years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.6


21/34

In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that respondents

motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a rehash of his previous arguments.

However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division recommended that respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for only one year.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors First Division. The IBP Board of Governors

denied respondents motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension from two years to one year.

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided under Section 12(b),

Rule 139-B7 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of this Court

We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client

relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

We agree with the IBP that in the course ofcomplainants consultations, respondent obtained the

information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the

Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this

in his Answer.

However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a stockholders meeting.Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a stockholder is not

necessary in a stockholders meeting because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in

the articles of incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to

participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their proxies to the meeting.

In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have

been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment,

repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by "the board of directors or trustees, by a majority

vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority

of members of a non-stock corporation."9 It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed

amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be delegated to the board of directors or trustees,

there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation was made in the present case. Further,

whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new

by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles

of incorporation and by-laws.10 The documents are public records and could not be considered

confidential.1avvphi1

It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of

confidentiality.11 The client must intend the communication to be confidential.12 Since the proposed


22/34

amendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended

by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential.

Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a

violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client, in

violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned

given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,13 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One

test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client anyconfidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.14 The Court has

ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to

refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously

represented him.15

We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The

case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer.

There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any

confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent

made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers

immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyersemployment with the client.16 The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect

the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for

matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.17

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.


23/34

ANGELITA C. ORCINO vs. ATTY. GASPAR

A.C. No. 3773 , September 24, 1997

Facts:

Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against

several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Complainant paid respondent his fees as stipulated.

Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties and performed them religiously from the preliminary

investigation with the office of the prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with the RTC of Baloc,

Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing

that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing,

complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence.

Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. Complainant became

belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her

suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. Complainant, however,

continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer

them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records.

Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not

bear the consent of complainant. The court issued an order directing respondent to securecomplainant's consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he

has secured this consent." Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor

did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer.

Hence, this complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to represent his client if said client refuses to give his

consent to the lawyers motion to withdraw his appearance.

Held:No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of

his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give

his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and

adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal

must be based on a good cause. In the instant case, respondent did not file an application with the court

for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.

Corollary issue:

Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance filed by respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based

upon a good cause?

No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer may withdraw

his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or

immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the

Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the

lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of

the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to

pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g)

other similar cases.


24/34

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence"

between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner of

private prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the foregoing instances nor can it be said that

it is analogous thereof.


25/34

ROGELIO H. VILLANUEVA, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. AMADO B. DELORIA, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the Complaint1 for Disbarment dated February 17, 1999 filed by Rogelio H. Villanueva

(Villanueva) against Atty. Amado B. Deloria in connection with HLRB Case No. REM-080592-5166,

entitled "Spouses Conrado De Gracia v. Estate of Jaime Gonzales, et al." Atty. Deloria, a former full-time

Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), appeared as counsel for the

spouses De Gracia.

Villanueva avers that a decision in that case was rendered by Housing and Land Use Arbiter,2 Atty.

Teresita R. Alferez, requiring the Estate of Jaime Gonzales to, among other things, refund to the spouses

De Gracia the amount of P69,000.00 plus interest at the prevailing commercial interest rates. The case

was eventually assigned to Villanueva upon the latters designation as Arbiter.

It appears that Atty. Deloria filed a Motion for Issuance of Substitute Judgment and for Consignation3

claiming that the Estate of Jaime Gonzales does not want to pay interest based on commercial interest

rates. Villanueva asserts, however, that Atty. Delorias allegation is belied by two motions filed by

counsel for the Estate of Jaime Gonzales which merely seek to clarify the precise interest rate applicable

to the case in order for it to fully comply with the decision.

Atty. Delorias misrepresentation is allegedly a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

(Code), particularly Canons 1,4

10,5 126 and 197 thereof, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil Code. Atty. Deloria alsoallegedly violated Canon 118 of the Code because he sought the substitution of a decision which he

knew had already become final and partially executed.

Villanueva notes that Atty. Deloria enclosed with his motion a check in the amount of P69,000.00

payable to the order of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales and Corazon Gonzales, representing the principal

refunded to the spouses De Gracia in compliance with the decision. Villanueva states that the check was

drawn against Atty. Delorias personal checking account in violation of Canon 169 of the Code.

Moreover, according to Villanueva, Atty. Deloria offered him 50% of the recoverable amount in the case

if he resolves the latters motion favorably.10 Atty. Delorias conduct allegedly violates the previously

cited canons of the Code, Canon 13,11 Rule 15.06,12 Canon 15 of the Code, Art. 212 of the Revised

Penal Code, the Attorneys Oath of Office and Art. 19 of the Civil Code.

Villanueva also alleges that Atty. Deloria used his influence as former Commissioner of the HLURB to

persuade Atty. Alferez to impose interest based on commercial rates instead of the interest rate fixed in

Resolution No. R-42113 and Memorandum Circular No. 19,14 both of which provide a uniform rate of

interest in decisions involving refunds. Atty. Deloria also allegedly used his connections in the HLURB to

prevent Villanueva from releasing an Order denying the formers motion and to prevail upon the


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agencys Legal Services Group to interpret the term "commercial rate of interest" in a way that is

favorable to his clients case, again in violation of the Code.15

Further, Villanueva claims that Atty. Deloria assisted his client in filing an unfounded criminal case

against him before the Office of the Ombudsman with the purpose of getting even with Villanueva for

denying their motion. When his client pursued this course of action, Atty. Deloria allegedly should have

withdrawn his services in accordance with Rule 22.01,16 Canon 22 of the Code.

In his Comment17 dated September 22, 2000, Atty. Deloria denies any wrongdoing and sought the

dismissal of the Complaint for lack of merit. He avers that the refusal of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales to

pay the interest stipulated in the decision is evident from the various motions it has filed. On the alleged

commingling of his funds with those of his clients, Atty. Deloria claims that the spouses De Gracia

requested him to advance the amount intended for consignation as they were then on vacation in the

United States. He also maintains that he did not exert any influence on the HLURB to rule in his clients

favor, adding that the draft order which he filed in the case is required under the rules of the agency.

Atty. Deloria counters that it is Villanueva who has exhibited partiality in favor of the Estate of Jaime

Gonzales by failing to rule on the motions for clarification filed by the latter, thereby forcing the spousesDe Gracia to wait for an inordinately long time for the decision in their favor to be fully implemented.

Villanueva, in his Reply18 dated November 10, 2000, contends that he would have been indicted by the

Office of the Ombudsman if it were true that his Order in the case was motivated by bias and partiality

in favor of the Estate of Jaime Gonzales.

In a Resolution19 dated February 19, 2001, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted a Report20 dated September 29, 2005,

finding merit in the Complaint and recommending that Atty. Deloria be suspended from the practice oflaw for two (2) years and/or be fined in the amount of P20,000.00. This recommendation was annulled

and set aside by the IBP in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-279 dated May 26, 2006. The case was instead

dismissed for lack of merit.

The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner appears to be based solely on the

Rollo of the case which the Court sent to the IBP pursuant to the Resolution dated February 19, 2001.

The Investigating Commissioner did not conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations

in Villanuevas Complaint and the truthfulness of Atty. Delorias answers thereto.

A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid

and compelling reasons.21 In Baldomar v. Paras,22 we held:

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset, the

Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the

Court deems it necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could not be

resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal

investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex-parte

investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice. x x x


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Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for investigation in disbarment and disciplinary

proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:

Sec. 8. Investigation.Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the

Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the

power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to

defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if

upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex-parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its

commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be

dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator

before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten

(10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in

accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing

shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter,the IBP Baord of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth

its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final

action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

We find that due observance of the foregoing rules is necessary for the proper resolution of this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for

further proceedings. The IBP is also directed to act on this referral with deliberate dispatch.


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Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia

A.C. No. 6166. October 2, 2009

Facts:

On May 3, 2002, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza, complainant, sought the legal services of the Atty.

Vivian G. Rubia, respondent, in regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband

Carlos Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for attorney's fees since her mother-in-law would arrive from

the United States only in June 2002, respondent made her sign a promissory note for P32,000.00, which

amount was lent by Domingo Natavio. After her mother-in-law arrived and paid the loan, respondent

furnished them a copy of the complaint for partition and recovery of ownership/possession representing

legitime but with no docket number on it. They kept on following up the progress of the complaint.

However, three months lapsed before respondent informed them that it was already filed in court. It

was then that they received a copy of the complaint with "Civil Case No. 4198" and a rubber stamped

"RECEIVED" thereon. However, when complainant verified the status of the case with the Clerk of Court

of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, she was informed that no case with said title and docket

number was filed.

Further, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for intending tofile the complaint in Davao del Sur when the properties to be recovered were located in Koronadal,

South Cotabato and Malungon, Sarangani Province, in violation of the rule on venue that real actions

shall be filed in the place where the property is situated. Complainant also alleged that respondent

forged the signature of her husband, Carlito C. Ceniza, in the Affidavit of Loss attached to a petition for

the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate of title filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Digos City, Branch 20, in Misc. Case No. 114-2202. On July 25, 2003 filed with the Office of the Bar

Confidant, Maria Earl Beverly C. Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian G. Rubia with grave misconduct, gross

ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 18 and Canon 22 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Held:

Yes. In accusing respondent of falsification of public document, complainant alleged that

respondent misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, upon

verification with the Regional Trial Court Clerk of Court, it was not. Such misrepresentation is shown by

the copy of the complaint with a stamped "RECEIVED" and docket number thereon. Apart from said

allegations, complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent deliberately

falsified a public document.

A perusal of the records shows that complainant's evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint

and the annexes attached therewith. She did not appear in all the mandatory conferences set by the

investigating commissioner in order to give respondent the chance to test the veracity of her assertions.

It is one thing to allege gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or falsification of public document and

another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.

Indeed, complainant has no way of knowing the surrounding circumstances behind the filing of the

complaint by respondent's staff because she was not present when the same was filed with the trial


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court. Complainant failed to disprove by preponderant evidence respondent's claim that the case was

not filed but was in fact withdrawn after it was stamped with "RECEIVED" and assigned with a docket

number. The Supreme Court find this explanation satisfactory and plausible considering that the stamp

did not bear the signature of the receiving court personnel, which is normally done when pleadings are

received by the court. Further, the certification of the RTC Clerk of Court that the complaint was not

filed and that "CIVIL CASE NO. 4198" pertained to another case, did not diminish the truthfulness of

respondent's claim, but even tended to bolster it. Necessarily, as the complaint was not filed, docket

number "4198" indicated in the copy of the complaint was assigned to another case thereafter filed in

court. Thus, for lack of preponderant evidence, the investigating commissioner's ruling that respondent

was guilty of falsification of public document, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, has no factual

basis to stand on.

However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent committed some acts for which she should be

disciplined or administratively sanctioned. The Supreme Court found nothing illegal or reprehensible in

respondent's act of charging an acceptance fee of P32,000.00, which amount appears to be reasonable

under the circumstances. The impropriety lies in the fact that she suggested that complainant borrow

money from Domingo Natavio for the payment thereof. This act impresses upon the Court that

respondent would do nothing to the cause of complainant's mother-in-law unless payment of theacceptance fee is made. Her duty to render legal services to her client with competence and diligence

should not depend on the payment of acceptance fee, which was in this case promised to be paid upon

the arrival of complainant's mother-in-law in June 2002, or barely a month after respondent accepted

the case.

Respondent's transgression is compounded further when she severed the lawyer-client relationship due

to overwhelming workload demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which

constrained her to return the money received as well as the records of the case, thereby leaving her

client with no representation. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal

of her services. Moreover, respondent failed to maintain an open line of communication with her client

regarding the status of their complaint. Clearly, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath which imposesupon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of

Canon 18, and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.


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MONTANO v. IBP

FACTS: Atty. Dealca, counsel for Felicisimo Montano withdrew his services for his client upon the latter's

failure to comply with their retainer agreement.

HELD: We find Atty Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22

of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and

upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when client

deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.

Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attys fees.

Rule 20.4 of Canon 290, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his

compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for

not so large a sum owed to him by complainant ( P 3,500.00), respondent lawyer failed to act in

accordance with the demands of the Code. But, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects

the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar will

mdisbarment be imposed a s penalty

In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complainant Felicisimo M. Montano

charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be sternly dealt wit administratively. Thecomplaint[1] is summarized as follows:

1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in

collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of A

Rbci v Floridoa

Documents

Transcript of Rbci v Floridoa