Rawls III: Social justice:an ahistorical

account?

PHIL 2345

Notions of rights, liberties--historically Aristotle: humans born unequal—

no notion of universal equality Equality only of citizens

Christianity: notion of the soul—equal for all; Liberties of Englishmen:

King John at Runnymede, 1215 Magna Carta Locke: life, liberty, property

Hobbes, Rousseau— no limit on Sovereign, no bills of rights!

Universal human rights—very recent idea: Nuremburg rulings after WWII; International Court in The Hague.

Reflective equilibrium (20, 48-50)

‘going back and forth’ ‘altering the conditions of the contractual

circumstances’; ‘withdrawing our judgments, and conforming them to principle’ (2) Contrast b/w grammar and physics (49):

You could accept a new theory of grammar, but not a different celestial theory, which is fixed by physical laws.

‘It would be useless to speculate about such matters here. They are far beyond our reach’ (50

‘…does a reflective equilibrium exist?...can it be reached?’ (50)

Comments?

Are you satisfied with this account of the contracting

process?

Fixed points for any conception of justice

‘…we are confident that: religious intolerance and racial intolerance are unjust’ (19). Why? On what does Rawls base this judgment?

Less confidence re: distribution of wealth and authority;

These have to be examined using RE Why the hesitation? Some common reasons:

Time-honored view: we deserve what we have; we have earned it;

Widespread belief that there are the ‘undeserving poor’, the ‘quarrelsome and contentious’—Locke;

Not sure how to distribute these goods.

Institutions & Formal Justice One scheme of cooperation/system of rules

Known by oneself and others Mutual expectations (e.g. rules of the road vs chaos) Shared conception of justice—just vs unjust

Assignment of rights and duties Distribution of benefits and burdens of social life Different for individuals in particular situations—

strategies and tactics (54, 56-7)

Social justice as system Social justice = arrangement of major

social institutions: Parliaments Markets Property

Whole system may be just, while one rule or institution is not: E.g. laws that intrude into people’s private

lives By the same token, constituent elements

may be just, while whole system is not.

Laws ‘indifferent’ to all (Locke’s phrase) I may not like certain rules:

E.g. I may not drill in my flat on Sundays, But system is generally accepted and

meets definition as a conception of justice Because formal justice is observed:

Impartial and consistent administration of rules;

Similar cases handled similarly Different cases assessed according to existing,

known norms (e.g. case law).

Two principles of justice In provisional form:

‘…two principles of justice that I believe would be chosen in the original position’ (emph. added; 60):

Why does Rawls ‘believe’ these 2 principles would be chosen?

Purely philosophical reasons? Cultural, historical, other reasons?

First principle Equal right to most extensive liberty for each

person compatible with a similar liberty for others: Political liberties: rt to vote, stand for office Freedom of speech, assembly Liberty of conscience, e.g. religion Property Freedom from arbitrary arrest, seizure ‘as defined by the concept of the rule of law.’ What about historical development, antecedents (e.g.

U.S. Bill of Rights), culture? Are these liberties universal? If not, why not?

Second principle (62) Social and economic inequalities:

‘no restrictions on what sort of inequalities are permissible’;

it only requires that each person’s position be improved’.

Reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage; Any unequal distribution of goods/social values must be to

everyone’s advantage; May not be to the advantage of some at expense of others; No one should be left w/out a social safety net; E.g. the wealthy philanthropist; those who have more, must

return sth to society via taxes or other means (redistributive taxation).

Attached to positions and offices open to all: Equality of opportunity.

Definition of injustice:

‘inequalities that are not to the benefit of all’ (62).

Trade-off b/w liberties and economic

gains? Rawls rejects this option:

Serial ordering of the 2 principles (61, 63); any such trade-off is ruled out (63).

Yet this option is common—examples? E.g. countries where the right to strike (a kind

of assembly) is limited or outlawed; In the name of economic development.

Slavery would be most drastic example: Rousseau: ‘none [should be] so poor that he is

compelled to sell himself…’ (SC II.11).

Rousseau’s summation of slavery “Thus, from whatever angle one looks at

things, the right to slavery is null, not only because it is illegitimate, but because it is absurd and meaningless. These words slavery and rights are contradictory; they are mutually exclusive” (SC, I.4.13).

Cf. Locke, Aristotle

Intro to Question Rawls's two principles of justice are derived from a more general

conception of justice, i.e., all social values should be distributedequally unless the unequal distribution is beneficial to everyone.

Among all social values, Rawls distinguishes between basic liberties on the one hand, and all other values like wealth and income on the other hand.

Rawls then defines his two principles in such a way that thefirst principle--which protects an equal distribution of basicliberties-should always be satisfied before the second principle -which ensures any unequal distribution be beneficial to all-- issatisfied. In other words, basic liberties of citizen are alwaysequally distributed, and any unequal distribution of basic libertiesis not granted even if it is beneficial to all citizens. I

In Rawls's view, basic liberties – e.g., political liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, right to hold property etc.--are given an "absolute weight" with respect to all other social values.

Question Rawls believes it is reasonable for us not to

exchange our liberties for any social and economic advantages whatsoever.

My question is, why should we give liberties such an "absolute weight"? Is it due to our intuition?

Indeed, protection of these liberties conforms to our intuition, but how can we ensure that our intuition is correct?