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EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OFAIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL

SAFETY REGULATION COMMISSIONREQUIREMENTS APPLICATION DOCUMENT (RAD)

RAD – RVSM

SRC HARMONISED REGULATORYCRITERIA FOR THE

INTRODUCTION OF RVSM WITHINTHE ECAC REGION

Edition : 1.0Edition Date : 30.05.2001Status : Released IssueClass : General Public

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Document TitleSafety Regulation Commission – Requirements Application Document – RAD - RVSM

SRC Harmonised Regulatory Criteria for the Introduction of RVSM within the ECAC Region

REFERENCE: EDITION : 1.0

RAD – RVSM EDITION DATE : 30.05.2001Abstract

This SRC Requirements Application Document has been prepared by the Safety RegulationCommission. The documents reflects the Safety Regulation Commission harmonised minimumregulatory criteria recommended to be used when assessing the safe implementation of RVSMwithin ECAC region.

KeywordsSafety Safety Case People EquipmentProcedures RVSM Regulatory Criteria ATM System

CONTACT PERSON : Antonio LICU TEL:+32.2.729.3480 DIVISION : DGOF/SRU

DOCUMENT STATUS AND TYPE

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Requirement� General Public �

Draft � Comment/ResponseDocument

� RestrictedEUROCONTROL

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Proposed Issue � Policy Document � Restricted SRC �

Released Issue � Document � Restricted SRU �

RequirementsApplication Document

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Safety Regulation CommissionSRC Requirements Application Document - RAD – RVSMSRC Harmonized Regulatory Criteria For The Introduction of RVSM Within The ECAC Region

Edition 1.0 Released Issue

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of thepresent document.

EDITION DATE REASON FOR CHANGESECTIONS

PAGESAFFECTED

A 08.02.2001 Creation of the SRC WP10.16 ALL

0.01 07.03.2001 Creation of Working Draft following SRVG 1meeting and SRC Consultation using as abase the SRC WP10.16

ALL

0.1 24.04.2001 Creation of Proposed Issue edition 0.1following SRVG 2nd

ALL

0.2 02.05.2001 Internal review of SRU on of the ProposedIssue Edition 1.0

section 2, section11, Appendix A,

Annex 11.0 30.05.2001 SRVG review, SRU second review

& Creation of Released issueALL



DOCUMENT APPROVAL

The following table identifies all authorities who have successively approved thepresent issue of this document.

AUTHORITY NAME AND SIGNATURE DATE

Head Safety Regulation Unit

(SRU)

(Peter STASTNY)

Chairman Safety RegulationCommission

(SRC)

(Philip S. GRIFFITH)



TABLE OF CONTENTS

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION SHEET………………………………………….2

DOCUMENT APPROVAL………………………………………………………….3

DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD…………………………………………………4

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………….5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………6

1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 9

2. THE ROLE AND Use of RAD - RVSM .............................................................. 9

3. Background on RVSM ................................................................................... 113.1. ICAO ....................................................................................................................113.2. EUROCONTROL EATMP RVSM Programme......................................................113.2.1. Description........................................................................................................ 11

3.2.2. Interaction with Other Programmes .................................................................. 11

3.2.3. Stakeholders..................................................................................................... 12

3.2.4. Role of the EUROCONTROL Agency ............................................................... 12

4. SRC - RVSM Programme interface ............................................................... 134.1. Generic Interface ..................................................................................................134.2. RVSM Safety Policy..............................................................................................144.3. RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case ...............................................................15

5. RVSM area of applicability ............................................................................ 15

6. ICAO position................................................................................................. 156.1. General.................................................................................................................156.2. ICAO Recommended Strategy for Implementation ..............................................16

7. Harmonised regulatory criteria ..................................................................... 16

8. Time schedule................................................................................................ 16



9. Reference Material ......................................................................................... 17

10. Glossary of Definitions and Abbreviations .................................................. 17

11. States Readiness ........................................................................................... 17

APPENDIX A: LIST OF HARMONISED CRITERIA FOR REGULATORS TO BEFOLLOWED WHEN ASSESSING THE INTRODUCTION OF RVSM INTOOPERATIONAL SERVICE

• ANNEX 1: CRITERIA CHECK-LIST

APPENDIX B: TIME SCHEDULE

APPENDIX C: REFERENCE MATERIAL

APPENDIX D: RVSM AREA OF APPLICABILITY

APPENDIX E: RVSM GERULATORY ASSESSMENT MODEL

APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document has been prepared by the Safety RegulationCommission.

The documents reflects the SRC harmonised minimum regulatory criteriarecommended to be used when assessing the safe implementation ofRVSM within ECAC region. It is to be noted that EATMP RVSMProgramme addresses 40 States out of which 2 are non-ECAC Statesnot covered by SRC.

It must be stressed that Requirements Application Documents (RAD’s)reflect the currently approved regulatory provisions (regulations,requirements and safety regulatory policies), as applied to the specificdevelopment in question - in the implementation of RVSM.

It must further be stressed that the contents of RAD’s do not representnew provisions, but application of existing generic ones in a specificcontext. Their status is of recommendations by the Safety RegulationCommission for the benefit and use of national safety regulatoryauthorities.

The SRC’s role calls for the development of harmonised ATM safetyregulatory approaches and requirements for implementation by States.SRC is required to respond to current and anticipated developments inATM across the ECAC area, and wider aspects as necessary, includingany new safety demands or expectations by the aviation community.



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EUROCONTROL SAFETY REGULATORY REQUIREMENTAPPLICATION DOCUMENT

SRC HARMONISED REGULATORY CRITERIA FOR THEINTRODUCTION OF RVSM WITHIN ECAC REGION

1. INTRODUCTION

The SRC’s role calls for the development of harmonised ATM safetyregulatory approaches and requirements for implementation by States.SRC is required to respond to current and anticipated developments inATM across the ECAC area, and wider aspects as necessary, includingany new safety demands or expectations by the aviation community.

RVSM is identified within SRC Work Programme (SRC DOC 3) as TaskC 4, whose objectives are to develop a harmonised SRC position on thesafety regulatory aspects of the RVSM Programme, to develop safetyregulatory requirements (where these are needed to supplement thegeneric ESARRs), and to co-ordinate SRC views on the acceptability ofRVSM implementation. The actions in this subtask are:

- to develop, where necessary, safety regulatory requirements coveringappropriate aspects of the RVSM Programme;

- to review the RVSM safety policy, as it continues to be developed andimplemented, and consolidate an SRC response to the Programme team;

- to undertake a technical and operational assessment of the safety arguments and supporting evidence developed within the RVSM Programme, and to notify SRC harmonised safety regulatory views onthe acceptability of the programme to enter service (this includes advising the EUROCONTROL Provisional Council);

- to agree the adequacy of data collection to validate and monitor safetyassumptions and requirements (as applicable) as documented in the safety arguments.

2. THE ROLE AND USE OF RAD - RVSM

The role of this Requirements Application Document is to present theminimum harmonised baseline to National ATM Safety Regulatorsrecommended to be used for the assessment of the safelyimplementation of RVSM.



It must be stressed that Requirements Application Documents (RAD’s)reflect the currently approved regulatory provisions (regulations,requirements and safety regulatory policies), as applied to the specificdevelopment in question - in the implementation of RVSM.

It must further be stressed that the contents of RAD’s do not representnew provisions, but application of existing generic ones in a specificcontext. Their status is of recommendations by the Safety RegulationCommission for the benefit and use of national safety regulatoryauthorities.

Note: The regulatory provisions referred to include ESAAR’s 2,3,4 and 5which, although not to be implemented as requirements until 20031, havebeen approved by SRC, Provisional Council and Commission, and aretherefore taken, as a minimum, as being a definition of EUROCONTROLsafety regulatory policy in their relevant areas.

However, further benefits of the RAD may include :-

• Providing a consistent, harmonised and visible baseline on whichthe safety regulatory assessments at ECAC level will be made,while giving enough flexibility for national safety approvalprocesses to be followed;

• Providing a harmonised basis, in the form of a task list, on whichSRC may co-ordinate the individual activities of nationalregulators, providing a common approach in which variations innational solutions are minimised;

• Providing a clear statement of the safety regulatory position forthe benefit and use by all parties, including the Programme;

• Use of the document as a regulatory report, as a means oftracking the extent to which the specific criteria have been met;

• Use of the document as an assurance check that agreedminimum harmonised safety regulatory provisions have beenmet.

Use in the above ways will facilitate the formation of the recommendationof SRC to Provisional Council in respect of the RVSM Go/Delay decision.

1 With the exception with ESARR 2 for which a phased approach implementation starting withJanuary 2000 is approved



3. BACKGROUND ON RVSM

3.1. ICAO

In the late 1950s, it was recognised that, as a result of reduction inaccuracy of pressure-sensing of barometric altimeters with increasingaltitude, there was a need above certain flight level (FL) to increase thethen prescribed vertical separation minimum (VSM) of 300 m (1000 ft). In1960 an increased VSM of 600 m (2000 ft) was established for usebetween aircraft operating above FL 290 except, where, on the basis ofregional air navigation agreement, a lower level was prescribed forincrease. The selection of FL 290 as the vertical limit for the 300 m (1000ft) VSM was not so much an empirically-based decision, but rather afunction of the operational ceiling of the aircraft at that time.

In 1966, this change-over level was established at FL 290 on a globalbasis. At that time, it was considered that the application of a reducedVSM above FL 290, on a regional basis and in carefully prescribedcircumstances, was a distinct possibility not too long in the future.Accordingly, ICAO provisions stated that such a reduced VSM could beapplied under specified conditions within designated portions of airspaceon the basis of regional air navigation agreement.

It has been long recognised that any decision concerning the feasibilityof reducing the VSM above FL 290 could not be based upon operationaljudgement alone, but would need to be supported by a rigorousassessment of the risk associated with such a reduction of theseparation.

3.2. EUROCONTROL EATMP RVSM Programme

3.2.1. Description

The Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) Programme aims toensure the introduction of a 1000ft vertical separation minimum betweenFL 290 and FL 410 inclusive throughout the ECAC Area, and in theairspace of interested participating non-ECAC States which have anoperational interface with ECAC airspace.

The target date for implementation of RVSM is 24 January 2002. Theprogramme contributes to the strategic actions of the ATM Strategy for2000+, specifically the increase of ATC capacity.

3.2.2. Interaction with Other Programmes

The RVSM programme mainly interacts with:

• Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) to assess theinteraction between ACAS and RVSM. ACAS is part of RVSMoperational environment and as such any potential safety effectshave to be assessed.



3.2.3. Stakeholders

The main stakeholders for the RVSM programme are:

• Airspace Users: who must invest to make aircraft RVSMapproved2, and who will get significant benefits on completion ofprogramme;

• CNS/ATM Service Providers: in RVSM airspace - extra flight levelswill positively affect ATC. CNS/ATM Service Providers will have tocommit to investments in ATC system changes3;

• Regulatory Authorities: who will be responsible for defining thecertification requirements for aircraft equipment and systems, andfor the on-going airworthiness certification and operationalapprovals. Regulatory authorities, supported by the JAA, willpublish certification requirements and guidance material, considerapplications and grant the necessary approvals. This work will besupplemented by contributions from the standards setting bodiesas EUROCAE, ARINC, etc.; Additionally ATM safety regulators willhave to express their acceptability to the change in the currentATM system by introducing RVSM in their national airspace. Intheir support SRC will develop a position on the safety regulatoryaspects of the RVSM Programme, in order to achieve acceptabilitycriteria of RVSM implementation.It is to be noted that the development of the safety requirementsbearing on the aircraft equipage and procedures will need tocomply with the safety assessment of the RVSM airspace in whichaircraft intended to fly (i.e. the outcome of RVSM Safety Case)

• Support Industry: aircraft manufacturers, installation andmaintenance organisations, monitoring units’ manufactures whowill have to consider standards and procedural possibilities in newsystem development.

3.2.4. Role of the EUROCONTROL Agency

The EUROCONTROL Agency is responsible for developing the overallplanning for the RVSM programme, for co-ordinating programmeexecution and for undertaking activities requiring internationalagreements and co-ordinated actions that must be undertaken incommon with each other. As overall programme manager, the Agencywill monitor progress in the plan execution, identify shortfalls early andinitiate necessary proactive actions.

The EUROCONTROL RVSM Programme shall ensure that correct andcomplete arguments are established to demonstrate that with theintroduction of RVSM, the overall ATM System will remain tolerably

2 JAA TGL 6rev1 provides a Minimum Aircraft Systems Performance Specification (MASPS) for altimetry tosupport the use of a 300 m (1,000ft) vertical separation above FL290. It establishes an acceptable means,but not the only means, that can be used in the approval of aircraft and operators to conduct flights inairspace or on routes where RVSM is applied. The document contains guidance on airworthiness,continued airworthiness and operational practices and procedures for RVSM airspace.

3 Detailed rationale of the ATM equipment changes needed are to be found in the ATC Manual for aReduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) in Europe (ASM. ET1.ST13.5000)



safe4. Their role mainly relate to the demonstration of the ‘proof ofconcept’.

A complementary objective is to co-ordinate and ensure support toStates so that local implementation of RVSM is carried out within agreedsafety minima (i.e. safe implementation of the concept, according toagreed set of safety objectives and requirements).

4. SRC - RVSM PROGRAMME INTERFACE

4.1. Generic Interface

The ultimate objective when establishing an interface process betweenthe SRC and the RVSM Programme is to ensure the production anddefinition of a harmonised safety regulatory position in respect of theacceptability of the changes to the ATM System that the EATMP isconcerned with.

The SRC and RVSM Programme established a formal interface in late1998.

In order to achieve the goal mentioned above, the objectives of theinterface process were:

a) To set up an efficient and effective interface mechanism between theRVSM Programme, the Safety Regulation Commission, and also thedesignated national authorities of each EUROCONTROL/ECACmember State;

b) To facilitate national regulatory processes for the implementation ofRVSM;

c) To offer the RVSM Programme a single communication channel forATM safety regulatory comments and issues to be addressed by theprogrammes;

d) To provide advice and comment to the RVSM Programme Team onsafety regulatory matters in order to create a safer environment;

e) To encourage the transparency of the safety management processused by the RVSM Programme;

f) To ensure compatibility with designated national authorityresponsibilities;

The first document to be scrutinised using SRC-RVSM formal interfacewas the RVSM Safety Policy. The latest one is the RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case.

4 i.e., meeting allocated safety objectives and requirements



4.2. RVSM Safety Policy

An EATMP Programme Safety Policy defines the set of safety objectiveswhich a programme must meet in accordance with applicable safetyregulatory requirements5, propose acceptable means of compliance, andidentified safety management principles6.

The RVSM Safety Policy Document sets out the Safety Policy, the SafetyObjectives and describes the RVSM Safety Sub-Programme tasks, andthe actions necessary to ensure the safe implementation of RVSM in theEuropean Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) area.

This document has passed two iterations of regulatory assessmentbetween the RVSM Programme and the SRC (starting with December1998 till September 2000). Currently the RVSM Safety Policy is viewedpositively by the Safety Regulation Commission.

The RVSM Programme principal safety objective laid down in the abovementioned Safety Policy is as follows:

“The RVSM Programme shall, as its principal safety objective, minimisethe programme’s contribution to the risk of an aircraft accident. TheRVSM Programme recognises the Safety Objectives of the ATM 2000+Strategy, in particular the general objective to improve safety levels byensuring that the number of ATM induced accidents and serious or riskbearing incidents do not increase and, where possible, decrease..Therefore, the implementation of RVSM shall not adversely affect the riskof en-route mid-air collision.“

Although, the RVSM Programme has established an explicit Safety Sub-Programme to ensure that Programme’s contribution to the risk of anaircraft accident is minimised in accordance with the principal safetyobjective, although the RVSM Safety Policy is setting up the pro-activesafety management approach, although it establishes a large spectrumof safety objectives and proposes ways in achieving the mentionedobjectives, it is the RVSM Safety Assessment Documentation toultimately prove that it is safe to introduce RVSM on 24th of January2002.

The end-to-end safety assessment determines the safety requirementsfor the EATMP Programme and the distributed related applications in thecontext of the safety requirements that define the operationalenvironment. The safety assessment analysis of the EATMP Programmeis integral to the programme development.

For the purpose of the RVSM Programme the Safety AssessmentDocumentation it will be further called as RVSM Safety Case. As it ismentioned in the RVSM Safety Policy (see section 6 of the RVSM SafetyPolicy) there will be several major deliverables of the RVSM Safety Sub-Programme including a Pre-Implementation Safety Case .

5 Such as ICAO standards, EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirements, and other applicableregulatory requirements.6 Such as the EATMP Safety Policy or other EATMP safety objectives.



The purpose of the RAD – RVSM document is to produce harmonisedregulatory criteria recommended to be used when assessing the safetyarguments. These safety arguments being principally the PISC, theNational Safety Plans, the FHA, CRM, operational trials, etc. Extensivelyexplanations on the role and the use of RAD-RVSM are to be found insection 2.

4.3. RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case

The EUR RVSM Pre-Implementation Safety Case shall provide theassurance that the objectives stated in the EUR RVSM Safety PolicyDocument are met. Evidence will be provided that (i) all identifiedhazards and risks are managed and mitigated, (ii) the collision risk meetsthe ICAO Target Level of Safety and (iii) States show they will safelyimplement RVSM through the development of national safetydocumentation.

It is expected that Pre-Implementation Safety case to contain in additionto the safety assessment process (FHA, PSSA, etc) the detailed CollisionRisk Assessment, National Safety Plans, results of the real-timesimulations and any additional evidences that will prove the objectivesestablished in the RVSM Safety Policy.

5. RVSM AREA OF APPLICABILITY

A list of the FIRs/UIRs and related maps for which RVSM will be appliedare presented in Appendix D to this paper.

6. ICAO POSITION

6.1. General

The ICAO position is reflected in several documents. The latestdocument found to be released by ICAO (including those documentspublished by the Regional European Office) is the ICAO DOC 9574-AN/934 Manual on implementation of a 300 m (1000 ft) VerticalSeparation Minimum between FL290 and FL410 inclusive, First Edition -1992. At the date of issuing the present RAD – RVSM document theICAO EUR DOC 009 was not published and recognised yet as such. Assuch the ICAO position reflected below comes from DOC 9574.

ICAO RGCSP/6 came to the conclusion that using the assessment of anTLS of 2.5x10-9 fatal accidents per aircraft flight hour, a 300 m (1 000 ft)VSM above FL290 is technically feasible.

It is important to emphasize that the ICAO assessment of TLS does notencompass all causes of risk of collision in the vertical plane. It willtherefore be necessary for the ECAC regional planning to institutemeasures to ensure that the risk associated with errors in ATCinstructions and emergency procedures do not increase in the 300 m(1000 ft) VSM environment.



Taking into account the above statements, ICAO position is that theoverall TLS to be taken into account for regional application should bebased on a not more than 5 x 10-9 fatal accidents per aircraft flight hours.

Additional information on the ICAO position is to be found in the ICAODOC 9574- AN/934 and in ICAO DOC 9536 – RGCSP6/Meeting

6.2. ICAO Recommended Strategy for Implementation

ICAO is recommending 5 steps strategy for the implementation:1. Assessment of requirements2. Assessment of system safety3. Planning and preparation4. Verification and trial5. Operational

The SRC and the National safety regulators role is to assess the systemsafety prior, during and post implementation.

7. HARMONISED REGULATORY CRITERIA

The introduction of RVSM is considered as a change to the current ATMsystem, and as such, should be assessed against ESARR 4 safetyregulatory requirements principles (see ESARR 4 section 5 SafetyRequirements). Applicable harmonised criteria should envisage all threesystem components (people, equipment and procedures) and have to beseen as forming a total aviation perspective, including both ground andairborne elements.

Additionally, the harmonised criteria for assessment the implementationof RVSM should be based on the requirement principles contained inESARR 4, ESARR 3, specifically requirements section 5.2 -Requirements for Safety Achievement - and section 5.3 - Requirementsfor Safety Assurance, and in ESARR 5 principles - detailed competencyof the personnel (in addition to the requirements of ESARR 3, section5.2.1. - Competency)

Accordingly, a draft list of harmonised criteria for regulators which areintended to be followed when assessing the introduction of RVSM (pre-implementation changeover and post/implementation) is presented atAppendix A to this paper.

8. TIME SCHEDULE

A time schedule is presented at Appendix B to this paper.



9. REFERENCE MATERIAL

A list of further reference material is presented at Appendix C to thispaper.

10. GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A Glossary of Definitions and Abbreviations is presented at Appendix Fto this paper.

11. STATES READINESS

At the date of producing this version of RAD-RVSM a significant numberof States have submitted draft and/or approved National Safety Plans tothe RVSM Programme Management.

The accurate information is to be found in the RVSM Pre-ImplementationSafety Case Edition 1.0 dated 02nd of May 2001 – Appendix G asamended by RVSM Programme.

The current States safety preparedness, as declared by the RVSMnational programme managers will continuously be tracked by SRC, aswell as the number of States providing a National safety plan.

In addition, through its safety regulatory process, SRC will separatelyassess States safety readiness, and the outcome will be considered asan input to the SRC’s recommendation to the EUROCONTROLProvisional Council/Commission in respect of the Go/Delay Decision forthe implementation of RVSM.

The SRC recommendation will be based inter-alia on those criteriapresented in Appendix A of RAD-RVSM and RVSM Programme reporton the States Preparedness.



APPENDIX A

LIST OF HARMONISED CRITERIA FOR REGULATORS TOBE FOLLOWED WHEN ASSESSING THE INTRODUCTION

OF RVSM INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE

Each proposed harmonised criteria has been allocated a preciseresponsibility (i.e. to discriminate which criteria are to be assessed at theSRC/SRU level and which at the National Safety Regulator level). Afurther mapping for each criterion with the ESARRs requirements hasbeen included.

In the Annex 1 to APPENDIX-A a detailed checklist was developed inorder to:

• show the regulatory criteria consistency with safety regulatoryrequirements and related SRC documents and policies,

• map the possible means of compliance for each criterion. Additionaltime-scale is envisaged in order to be able to construct an SRCrecommendation on the GO/DELAY decision for EUROCONTROLProvisional Council.

• Indicate the compliance achievement by whom and by when

• Highlight the each Criterion status

The regulatory model recommended to be followed by SRC to deriveharmonised criteria for the regulators using ESARRs requirements, isdepicted in Appendix F.

Each Safety Regulatory Criterion will be presented in a table as it isshown in the template table below:



Text of Criterion:

(This box will contain the text of the criterion)

Means of Compliance: (This box will contain reference to the non-exhaustive existing means of compliance)

Criterion No:

(This box willcontain areferencecriterion no.)

Requirement Mapping:

(This box will contain mappingreference to the SRC safetyregulatory requirements andpolicies. The mapping isintended to provide links to thewell established regulatoryprinciples)

Compliance assessment (bywhom):

SRC �

National ATM Safety Regulators �

ASR �

National OPS Approval Body �

Other �

Compliance status reporting date (bywhen):

(This box will contain the latest acceptabledate to report the achievement of the criterionto SRC. The date has been foreseen in orderto provide sufficient time for the status of thepreparation to be advise to theEUROCONTROL Provisional Council for theJuly and respectively November sessions.The date provided, by no mean is intendingto modify any planned date by RVSMProgramme for their deliverables andmilestones)

Tracking Status:

Achieved: ��

Partially achieved: ��

Not Achieved: ��

NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations: (This box will contain notes, remarks and recommendations foreseen fit with thecriterion by SRC. It may contain as well sub-criteria and the arguments to thedecision on why the overall criterion was declared Achieved or otherwise.)

A.1. General Criteria

RVSM –1

a) Assess the EUROCONTROL modified Collision Risk Model (CRM)Note: To agree on the parameter used in CRM (e.g. CRM Reich modeltakes into account only correct application of the procedural separation whileassuming that collisions result solely from vertical navigation errors ofaircraft);



b) To verify if the RVSM Programme met the quantitative ICAO TLS (5 x 10-9);

c) To assess if the data collected by the height monitoring systems arewithin the agreed parameters (ICAO or those modified);

RVSM –2

To assess the RVSM programme safety assessment (including FHA –Functional Hazard Analysis, and where possible, PSSA – PreliminarySystem Safety Assessment and SSA – System Safety Assessment); i.e. thecomplete RVSM Safety Case.Note: The work programme of the RVSM Safety Sub-Programme comprisesamongst other elements the objective (in their RVSM Safety Policy) toconduct a detailed Hazard Analysis, Preliminary System Safety Assessmentand System Safety Assessment of the proposed RVSM operational concept.

RVSM –3

To assess the mitigations proposed by the programme following theFHA/PSSA ;

RVSM –4

To assess any eventual safety assumptions and implications within theoverall Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA);

A.2. AIRBORNE

RVSM –5

To ensure RVSM approval to those who are operating or intend to operatewithin EUR continental RVSM area;

a) To certify the aircraft scheduled to operate within EUR continental RVSMairspace (the area of applicability is depicted in appendix E.) The three setsof controls, type approval, production release and continued airworthinesswould together constitute the MASPS.

b) To assess MASPS compliant aircraft population (i.e. to accuratelyevaluate how many aircraft scheduled to fly in RVSM area of applicabilityare MASPS approved);

c) To asses/ensure RVSM OPS approval;

d) By looking to the above aircraft population to assess the AO readiness;

e) Additionally the overall State readiness for the Airborne segment is to bechecked to ensure safe introduction of RVSM;



A.3. GROUND

A.3.1.Procedures

RVSM –6

Assess the airspace considerations (e.g. route structure, ARN V4 status).Particularly attention to be paid, not exhaustively, to the following issues:

a)LOAs - Letters of Agreement updated to reflect the introduction of RVSM(GND/GND co-ordination) and insert eventually the new route structure andsectorisation (new TCPs);

b) Check vertical spacing from Temporary Segregated Areas (TSAs),Prohibited Areas (P), Danger Areas (D), and/or Restricted Areas (R);

c) Entry/Exit points within RVSM area;

d) All possible contingency procedures;

RVSM –7

To assess compliance with the flight Planing procedures (users affected :AO, ATM agencies, AROs and CFMU);

RVSM –8

To assess compliance with ATC generic procedures (manual on RVSM –and/or ICAO DOC 7030) To verify the documentation for new procedures(e.g. OPS Manual updates);

RVSM –9

To Assess ATM/CNS provider monitoring practices;

RVSM –10

To assess State readiness in respect of ATC procedures (includingMaastricht UAC);

RVSM –11

To assess CFMU readiness on procedures (to verify the IFPS capability ofhandling the mixture of flight plans) including contingency procedures;

RVSM –12

To assess/verify the development/existence of contingency procedures forin-flight failures (including radio-communication failures);

RVSM –13



To assess/verify the development/existence of contingency procedures incase of neighbouring sectors/centres/ States failure to provide RVSM atswitchover;

RVSM –14

Assess local deviation from ICAO/EUROCONTROL publish procedures;

To verify the publication in National AIP of the deviation from ICAOprocedures;

A3.2. Equipment

RVSM –15

a) To assess evidences for FDP modifications;

b) To assess evidences for radar display modifications;

c) To assess evidences for flight progress strips (paper or electronic)modifications;

d) To assess State readiness on equipment (including Maastricht UAC);

e) To assess CFMU readiness on equipment;

A3.3. Training

RVSM –16

a) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in General RVSM procedurestraining;

b) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Procedures for Stateaircraft;

c) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Contingency RVSMprocedures;

d) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in new airspace environmentto be introduced at RVSM switchover;

e) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in RVSM transitionprocedures;

f) To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Phraseology to be used(A/G and G/G);

g) To assess State readiness on training (including Maastricht UAC);

h) To assess CFMU readiness on training (CFMU staff training);



APPENDIX A – Annex 1

CRITERIA CHECK-LIST

A1. General Criteria

Text of Criterion:

a) Assess the EUROCONTROL modified Collision Risk Model (CRM);Note: To agree on the parameter used in CRM (e.g. CRM Reich modeltakes into account only correct application of the procedural separationwhile assuming that collisions result solely from vertical navigation errors ofaircraft);b) To verify if the RVSM Programme met the quantitative ICAO TLS(5 x 10-9)c)To assess if the data collected by the height monitoring systems are withinthe agreed parameters (ICAO or those modified);

Means of Compliance: ICAO and SRC Provisions and TLS

Criterion No:

RVSM – 1


ICAO & EUROCONTROLmodified CRM; SRC POL DOC 1;ESARR 4 Req. 5.1., 5.2., 5.3.,Section 8.2.3.; ESARR 3 Req.5.2.3.

Compliance assessment (by whom):

SRC �


ASR �



15.06.2001 – initial review

15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��


Not Achieved: ��NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations:

The "Reich-Model" which was applied when establishing RVSM in the NAT Region mightnot be fully applicable when assessing the RVSM implementation in the EUR airspacetaking into account the totally different traffic conditions.

Sub-criterion RVSM 1-1: Wake VortexRVSM Programme to determine whether Wake Vortex events meet the safetyrequirements.



Regulatory suggested approach

SRC to determine whether Wake Vortex events meet the safety requirements. Todetermine if the wake vortex model adequately argues for the safety classification ofwake vortex events. To determine if the data collection process is sufficient to providecomplete, high integrity data to provide assurance that the ‘acceptable’ rate ofoccurrences will be met. To determine if the Wake Vortex model (a qualitative approach)is consistent with the CRM and TCAS models (a quantitative approach).

Sub-criterion RVSM 1-2: Operational data

RVSM Programme to ensure that the process for collecting operational data providescomplete data with high integrity.

Suggested regulatory approach

SRC to consider the adequacy of the processes for collecting and processing operationaldata, in particular the Operational Altitude deviation reports.

Sub-criterion RVSM 1-3: Height monitoring

RVSM Programme to provide assurance that the statistical and process elements for theheight monitoring data collection are complete.

Regulatory Approach

SRC to consider the policy, processes and implementation of the European ReducedVertical Separation Minimum Monitoring policy. To review the PISC in relation to thedata quality control process and statistical model presented in that paper.

Sub-criterion RVSM 1-4: CRM and operational trial

RVSM to adequately demonstrate the data collection process for validating the CRMmodel, the Operational trial etc.

Suggested Regulatory approach

SRC to assess the policy, process and results of the data collection processes to showthe integrity of the process in providing complete, unmodified data. To assess any pre-processing to remove bad or suspect data to provide assurance as to the integrity of thedata. To review the statistical work in the PISC (see Appendix F and Appendix M of PISCEdition 1.0) in assessing the reports from the regions on altitude errors to provideassurance as to the integrity of the data

Sub-criterion RVSM 1-5: CRM modification

More specifically, for the risk of collision due to lateral the loss of procedural verticalseparation (which is one of the hazards):-• Challenge/verify acceptability of ICAO TLS in RVSM European (whatever

geographical scope) airspace and against ESARR 4 principles;• Challenge acceptability of Reich based CRM by identifying ALL assumptions made

and checking their validity in RVSM European (whatever geographical scope)airspace.



Text of Criterion:

To assess the RVSM programme safety assessment (including FHA –Functional Hazard Analysis, and where possible, PSSA – PreliminarySystem Safety Assessment and SSA – System Safety Assessment);i.e. thecomplete RVSM Safety Case

Means of Compliance: EATMP Safety Assessment Methodology

Criterion No:

RVSM – 2


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3

SRC POL DOC 1; ESARR 3 Req.5.2.3, 5.2.4., 5.2.5


SRC �


ASR �



15.06.2001 first review

15.09.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��


Not Achieved: ��NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations:Note: The work programme of the RVSM Safety Sub-Programme comprises amongstother elements the objective (in their RVSM Safety Policy) to conduct a detailed HazardAnalysis, Preliminary System Safety Assessment and System Safety Assessment of theproposed RVSM operational concept.

Sub-criterion RVSM 2-1: Compliance checkingSRC and National ATM Safety regulators including ASR need to check:- that process is correct (IF) and- that outcome/product (i.e. safety case) is correct. (HOW/WHAT)

Sub-criterion RVSM 2-2: Acceptable RiskTo determine if the approach chosen to apportion risk to the FHA assessment is inacceptable.

To determine whether the process for production of the acceptable risk matrices meetsthe objective of presenting an argument that the risk is as low as reasonably practicable.

Suggested Regulatory approachTo consider the process undertaken for producing the risk tolerability matrix as regards;

• The connection to the ESARR4 probability classification of a RVSM systemprobability classification;

• The connection between a RVSM system probability classifications to theindividual hazard probability classifications given in table 20 – in appendix D -FHA of the PISC Edition 1.0;

The connection between the probability classifications in flight hours per plane, andRVSM airspace hours.



Sub-criterion RVSM 2-3: ACAS/RVSM Interaction

SRVG has identified as ACAS/RVSM interaction as major safety concerned area for thesafe introduction of RVSM. Proportion between different type of TCAS version equipageis considered relevant. RVSM programme is using in its FHA an assumptions of 6%ration percent between TCAS 6.04A and TCAS 7.0 versions.

The risk of aircraft equipped with ACAS 6.04a has to be thoroughly evaluated, and thepoint defined at which greater numbers of nuisance RAs/TAs constitute a non-tolerablerisk. The RVSM safety case should include a safety argument for the adequacy of ACAS,which can be derived from the ACAS programme work. This should be based on thedefinition of an acceptable proportion of V6.04a - V7 equipage. This is a moreconservative figure then that used in the ACASA Project (Work Package 3 ACAS/RVSMInteraction in European Airspace). Before any recommendation is to be passed to SRC tobe considered by for Provisional Council, ACAS and RVSM Programme have to presentto SRVG the current status of the aircraft fleets equipage.

Note: Several Statements form the ACASA Project and as well the limitations (likeperformance indicators for encounters involving only two aircraft, etc) have led SRVG toidentify that there is a safety issue in respect RVSM/ACAS interaction which needs to beassessed and cleared before RVSM implementation. In addition the RVSM FHA hasidentified that nuisance TAs and RAs generated by onboard Airborne Collision andAvoiding Systems is one of two hazards considered not tolerable (safety critical).

Even if accepting that TCAS is designed to be a safety improvement measure, it isconsidered that the negative effects of TCAS need to be assessed, and mitigation meansimplemented if necessary.

Suggested regulatory approach:

SRC to consider the ACASP WP3 work summarized in the PISC to consider if theargument is adequate to argue that a certain equipage rate will meet the safetyrequirements. Adequacy to include an assessment of the model and the assumptionsused to derive the rate of ‘nuisance’ TCAS alerts and the operational judgment applied todefine the ‘acceptable’ rate of these alerts.

Sub-criterion RVSM 2-4: Safety Accountabilities and Safety Case Review

RVSM Programme To ensure that the safety arguments presented are the output of adefined organizational process. That the safety accountabilities are defined for thisorganization. That these safety accountabilities are consistent and provideresponsibilities for production, review and approval of safety arguments. In particularthat the safety accountabilities are defined for each person submitting safety argumenti.e. the Safety Case, the CRM, the FHA, the Operational trials etc.

Suggested regulatory approach:

SRC to assess the documentation provided, particularly appendix E of the PISC todetermine the acceptability of the safety accountabilities defined. This could make use ofthe EATMP safety policy guidance material on cascading and defining safetymanagement responsibilities.



SRC to assess the safety arguments provided for the adequacy of the staff producingthese arguments.The process of review of the safety case by the national authorities should be evaluated.This process should cover:

• Definition of persons within the national authorities for review;• The provision of comments;• The assessment of comments;• The response to comments

Sub-criterion RVSM 2-5: FHA

Within the FHA process it is mentioned that three FHA sessions were carried out. SRVGcould not identify an audit trail to the documents associated with the FHA sessions (i.e.the qualification of attendees and their sectors of work, briefing material given,description of scenarios involved, initial assumptions, involvement of military experts etc.)It is considered that the process of the FHA has an impact on the quality of the results.

Text of Criterion: To assess the mitigations proposed by the programmefollowing the FHA/PSSA ;

Means of Compliance: EATMP Safety Assessment methodology &operational judgement7

Criterion No:

RVSM – 3


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3

ESARR 3 Req. 5.2.4., 5.2.5 and5.3.


SRC �


ASR �




15.09.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��



SRC will assess the mitigation foreseen in the RVSM Safety Assessment documentation(i.e. PISC) particularly in the areas of the major issues raised following the 2nd SRVGmeeting.

7 The Safety Assessment methodology is considered a means of compliance in what groundparts of ATM system are considered. For the airborne part of the particular case of RVSM - TGL6 Revision 1 is considered an acceptable means of compliance,



Sub-criterion RVSM 3-1: FHA Verification

That the safety requirements and assumptions made in the FHA are verified in practice.

Suggested regulatory approach

SRC to consider the national safety plans to determine if the safety requirements andassumptions flow to the necessary part of the national authorities. To consider the policy,review, and structure of evidence proposed for the assessment of the national safetyplans

Sub-criterion RVSM 3-2:Risk mitigation and strategy

That the evidence provided by the national authorities is adequate to argue that thesystem implementations meet the safety requirements.

Suggested Regulatory Approach

To consider the guidance for the national safety plans to determine if adequate details ofthe national implementations will be provided.

Sub-criterion RVSM 3-3:Confirmation and evidence of safety requirements andassumptions

RVSM Programme and States to ensure that the safety requirements and assumptions inthe various safety assurance documents are met in practice. These safety assurancedocuments include; the FHA, the CRM, the JAA TGL, the EUROCONTROL RVSM ATCManual etc.

Regulatory approach

SRC and National ATM Safety Regulators to review the PISC for the existence of avalidation process to ensure that safety requirements are met in practice, and that thenecessary safety assumptions are true in the environment. This may be through thenational safety plans, the individual safety assurance documents, or other means.

SRC and National ATM Safety Regulators to review the safety assurance documents forsafety requirements and assumptions. To assess the process and evidence for verifyingeach safety requirement and assumption.

SRC and National ATM Safety Regulators to determine whether the policy, process andevidence described in the PISC are sufficient to provide evidence that the safetyrequirements and assumptions have been applied in practice.

SRC and National ATM Safety Regulators to determine whether the PISC presentlyprovides an adequate placeholder to allow future versions to confirm that therequirements and assumptions have been verified. The PISC should provide referenceto the evidence of this verification.



Text of Criterion:

To assess any eventual safety assumptions and implications within theoverall Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).

Means of Compliance:

RVSM CBA

Criterion No:

RVSM – 4


ESARR 3 Req 5.1.3.


SRC �


ASR �



05.04.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��


Not Achieved: ��NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations:SRC has not yet received any written information on the RVSM CBA, but RVSMProgramme has ensured the SRVG group (during SRVG 2nd meeting) that no safetyassumptions were taken when the CBA was developed. As such SRVG recommended toclose the actions on this criterion and declared it achieved. The only written sourceavailable to SRU was the CBA presentation kept during the RVSM Approval andMonitoring Requirement Workshop (26-28 Nov. 1999).

(Intentionally left blank)



A2. Criteria for AIRBORNE segment:

Text of Criterion:

To ensure RVSM approval to those who are operating or intend to operatewithin EUR continental RVSM area.a)To certify the aircraft scheduled to operate within EUR continental RVSMairspace (the area of applicability is depicted in appendix E.) The three setsof controls, type approval, production release and continued airworthinesswould together constitute the MASPS;

b)To assess MASPS compliant aircraft population (i.e. to accuratelyevaluate how many aircraft scheduled to fly in RVSM area of applicabilityare MASPS approved);

c)To assess/ensure RVSM approval;

d)By looking to the above aircraft population to assess the AO readiness;

e)Additionally the overall State readiness for the Airborne segment is to bechecked to ensure safe introduction of RVSM.

Means of Compliance: TGL6 Revision1

Criterion No:

RVSM – 5


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.a. and 5.2.


SRC �


ASR �

National OPS Approval Body8 �

Compliance status reporting date (by when):

15.09.2001

Note: An initial report is required by 15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��



In addition to the work to be performed at national level, SRC will verify with the RVSMProgramme User Support Cell the monitoring data available.

8 Depending on the National institutional arrangements those OPS approval bodies might bedifferent from the National ATM Safety regulators (bodies and/or functions) or they could beidentified using different references (e.g. State Certification Authorities, etc)



Following the SRVG 3 meeting one additional sub-criterion have been added in order tostrengthen RVSM 5 although it may be already covered by the current text of the RVSM5 criterion .

Sub-criterion RVSM 5-1:- Crew training- To assess evidences of Flight Crew Training in Operating Procedures (RVSMOperations, Contingency Procedures and Flight Planning Procedures)

- To assess evidences of additional Flight Crew Training in relevant aspects of ACAS,wake vortex turbulence and mountain wave within RVSM airspace

A3. Criteria for GROUND Segment:

A3.1. PROCEDURES

Text of Criterion:

Assess the airspace considerations (e.g. route structure, ARN V4 status)Particularly attention to be paid, not exhaustively, to the following issues:a) LOAs - Letters of Agreement updated to reflect the introduction of RVSM(GND/GND co-ordination) and insert eventually the new route structure andsectorisation (new TCPs);

b) Check vertical spacing from TSAs, P, D, and/or R areas;

c) Entry/exit point within RVSM area;

d) All possible contingency procedures. Means of Compliance: Common Format, Cross-Border, Inter-CentreLetter of Agreement ASM.ET1.ST015 DEL01/02 (date 1st of March 2001)and operational judgement.

Criterion No:

RVSM – 6


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.b), 5.2.


SRC �


ASR �



Date: 15.09.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��





NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations:SRC – will only assess the general documentation of the airspace changes (ARN V4dates), dates of publication and the availability of the document “Common Format, Cross-Border, Inter-Centre Letter of Agreement ASM.ET1.ST015 DEL01/02”.

The following list is covering some identified constraints mainly in the transition areas,where it is strongly recommended to the ATM national regulators, to assess themitigation means put in place to minimise the risk induced by the introduction of RVSM :→ Collocation of RVSM area boundary with State Borders where, in some cases, radar

vectoring is prohibited , and there are specific Systems to permit flights in nationalairspace (a flight via alternative routes is impossible);

→ RVSM area boundary is established between the States applying different Air Rulesand ATS procedures;

→ Collocation of RVSM area boundary with boundaries of Participating areas ofORCAM (SSR codes allocation scheme);

→ RVSM East area boundary is established between the States applying ICAO FlightLevels and Metric Levels of former USSR for vertical separation;

→ The equipment of the ATC Centres involved in RVSM/Non-RVSM/Metric conversiondiffers with technology, standards, protocols and level of automation;

→ The Horizontal Separation Minima applicable in ACCs vary from 5 NM up to 17 NM;→ Not infringing ICAO SARPs, the aircraft may be in first contact 2-3 (up to 5) minutes

after crossing RVSM/Non-RVSM/Metric boundary;→ There is no indication of flying in potentially dangerous conditions of the Transition

areas for pilots. Therefore the pilots sometimes leave the frequency of the last/firstACC sector without monitoring it.

The map with the content of ORCAM participating areas has been dispatched duringSRVG 2nd meeting (4-5th of April 2001) and the States falling in the transition area and atthe interface between two different ORCAM participating areas are urged to reinforce theaircraft identification procedures in their ACC OPS Manuals. The FIRs concerned areparticularly the following ones: Bodo, Rovaniemi, Tampere, Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius,Simferopol, Ankara and Nicosia.

Potential Mitigation strategies for the above constraints (to be mapped accordingly) arelisted below for the benefit of both safety regulators and service providers.The States potentially affected by the above mentioned issues are urged to make theappropriate actions to secure and document the mitigation strategies in the appropriatenational regulations, procedures, manuals, etc.

→ To allocate ICAO FL/Metric Level Transition Task to ATC Centres situated outside theRVSM area.

→ To create dualised unidirectional routes in RVSM/Non-RVSM/Metric transition areaswhere practicable.

→ To implement Flight Level Allocation Scheme (FLAS) with “opposite” FLs onunidirectional routes where applicable.

→ To indicate in, Radar Label and, if it is required, in OLDI/SYSCO messages, keepingthe number of fields and characters to minimum.

→ To insert the appropriate requirements in the ATC procedures for Position Reportingin order that the position reports shall be made before or immediately upon passing asignificant point located on the boundary of RVSM/Non-RVSM or ICAO FL/MetricLevel areas.

→ To review the safe-critical procedures applied in Buffer area “EAST”→ To agree on Common Format of the Letter of Agreement between ATC Centres in



Buffer area “EAST.” (to be checked with APDSG/ANT)→ To develop Common Contingency Procedures for Radar and Radio failures

applicable in the transition areas of CIS and ECAC states (to be checked withAPDSG/ANT)

To develop techniques/procedures/separation minima for Procedural Control to beapplied in RVSM/Non-RVSM Transition and RNAV areas (to be checked withAPDSG/ANT)

Text of Criterion:

To assess compliance with the flight Planing procedures (users affected :AO, ATM service providers, AROs and CFMU).

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000; ICAODOC 7030

Criterion No:

RVSM - 7


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.b), 5.2


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001

Note: Initial reports are required by 15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��



NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations: None




Text of Criterion:To assess compliance with ATC generic procedures (manual on RVSM –and/or ICAO DOC 7030) To verify the documentation for new procedures(e.g. OPS Manual updates)

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000;ICAO DOC 7030

Criterion No:

RVSM – 8


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.b), 5.2


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001


Status:

Achieved: ��


Not Achieved: ��NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations: None




Text of Criterion:

To assess ATM/CNS providers monitoring practices.

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000;ICAO DOC 9574- AN/934

Criterion No:

RVSM - 9


ESARR 3 Req. 5.3 particularly5.3.2. & ESARR 4 Req. 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �




15.09.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��


Not Achieved: ��NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations:SRC to assess only the central RVSM programme monitoring practices.




Text of Criterion:To assess State Readiness in respect of ATC procedures (includingMaastricht UAC)

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000,ICAO DOC 7030, RVSM National Safety Plans;

Criterion No

RVSM – 10


ESARR 4 Req. 5.2.d & 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �


Compliance status reporting date (by when)

15.09.2001


Status:

Achieved: ��



SRC will use this criteria to assess the overall State Safety Readiness using the reportsfrom RVSM programme and from the National ATM Safety regulators including ASR




Text of Criterion:

To assess CFMU readiness on procedures (to verify the IFPS capability ofhandling the mixture of flight plans) including contingency procedures.

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000,ICAO DOC 7030

Criterion No:

RVSM – 11


ESARR 4 Req. 5.2.d & 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �




15.09.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��






Text of Criterion:To assess/verify the development/existence of contingency procedures forin-flight failures (including radio-communications failures)

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000 andICAO DOC 7030

Criterion No

RVSM – 12


ESARR 3 Req. 5.2.4. andESARR 4 Req. 5.2 and 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001

Note: initial reports are required by 15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��



The criterion is considered within SRVG to be an important one. In addition to theNational ATM regulators, who should check if the procedures and the manuals havebeen updated, SRC has a role in checking with the RVSM Programme what has beenaccomplished centrally.




Text of Criterion:To assess/verify the development/existence of contingency procedures incase of neighbouring sectors/centres/ States failure to provide RVSM atswitchover.


Criterion No:

RVSM – 13


ESARR 3 Req. 5.2.4. andESARR 4 Req. 5.2 and 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001


Status:

Achieved: ��



NOTES/Remarks/Recommendations: This criterion is fundamental in respect of SRCrecommendation to Provisional Council for the Go/Delay decision.SRC does not have designated representation from all ECAC States and as such has novisibility of the ATM regulatory process in all States affected by RVSM Programme (seein Appendix E - the Area of applicability).Currently, SRC Membership includes 27 States (26 EUROCONTROL Member Statesand one ECAC non-EUROCONTROL Member State). The following States have nodesignated SRC representation: Albania, Armenia (not affected by RVSM Programme),Monaco (not affected by RVSM Programme), Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia. Latvia,Lithuania, Malta, FYROM, Iceland (already in NAT RVSM). Additionally SRC has novisibility on the following four States involved in the RVSM Programme: Federal Republicof Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro), Bosnia- Herzegovina (it is covered in the CroatianNational Safety Plan), Tunisia and Morocco .The SRC regulatory assessment process will address those ECAC Member States withno designated representation at SRC through their representatives in the ProvisionalCouncil and through the RVSM Programme, while for the remaining four States, allassessments will be done through the RVSM Programme line of reporting.The SRC recommendation will make use of this criterion mainly to assess the implicationof the uncompleted SRC visibility on all 40 States involved in EUR RVSM Programmeand particularly for the implications brought up by the last four States mentioned above,for which no regulatory independent assessment process can be envisaged and will beconstrained by the above mentioned issues.This criterion will be revisited by SRVG at its September 2001 Meeting in order to cross-check if the one of prime assumption of the PISC Edition 1.0 - i.e. all the States are readyto Go has - changed in time.



Text of Criterion:

• Assess local deviation from ICAO/EUROCONTROL publish procedures

• To verify the publication in National AIP of the deviation from ICAOpublished procedures.

Means of Compliance: RVSM ATC Manual - ASM.ET1.ST13.5000,ICAO DOC 7030;

Criterion No:

RVSM - 14

Requirement Mapping: Art. 38of Chicago Convention; ESARR3 Req. 5.2.5. and 5.3.4; ESARR4 Req. 5.3.


SRC �


ASR �



15.10.2001

Note: Initial reporting is required by 15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��






A3.2. EQUIPMENT

Text of Criterion:

• To assess evidences for FDP modifications• To assess evidences for radar display modifications• To assess evidences for flight progress strips (paper or

electronic) modifications• To assess State readiness on equipment (including

Maastricht UAC)• To assess CFMU readiness on equipment


Criterion No:

RVSM - 15


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.c., ESARR 3Req. 5.2.4.


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001

Note: Initial reporting is required by 15.06.2001

Status:

Achieved: ��



Following the SRVG 3 meeting three additional sub-criteria have been added in order tostrengthen RVSM 15 although it may be already covered by the current text of the RVSM15 criterion .

Sub-criterion RVSM 15-1:- OLDITo assess evidences for On-Line Data Interchange (OLDI) modifications, whereapplicable.

Sub-criterion RVSM 15-2:- STCATo assess evidences for Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) compatibility to RVSMenvironment, where applicable.

Sub-criterion RVSM 15-2:- MTCDTo assess evidences for Medium Term Conflict Detection (MTCD) compatibility to RVSMenvironment, where applicable.



A3.3. TRAINING

Text of Criterion:- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in General RVSM

procedures training- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Procedures for

State aircraft- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Contingency

RVSM procedures- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in new airspace

environment to be introduced at RVSM switchover- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in RVSM transition

procedures- To assess evidences of the ATCOs training in Phraseology to

be used (A/G and G/G)- To assess State readiness on training (including Maastricht

UAC)- To assess CFMU readiness on training (CFMU staff training)


Criterion No:

RVSM - 16


ESARR 4 Req. 5.1.c., ESARR 3Req. 5.2.1.


SRC �


ASR �



15.09.2001


Status:

Achieved: ��




E

APPENDIX B

TIME SCHEDULE

The time schedule it is distributed in the below Microsoft Project GANTT Chart

ID Task Name Start Finish1 RVSM PISC Activities in 2001 Fri 01/09/00 Wed 27/02/02

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr2001 2002

dition 1.0 Released Issue

2

3 Remaining PMM Meetings Tue 09/01/01 Tue 09/10/01

4 PMM9 Tue 09/01/01 Tue 09/01/01

5 PMM10 Tue 03/04/01 Tue 03/04/01

6 PMM11 Wed 18/07/01 Wed 18/07/01

7 PMM12 Tue 09/10/01 Tue 09/10/01

8

9 Remaning PSG Meetings Thu 01/03/01 Wed 21/11/01

10 PSG8 Thu 01/03/01 Thu 01/03/01

11 PSG9 Thu 31/05/01 Thu 31/05/01

12 PSG/Sp - Go/Delay Decision Fri 21/09/01 Fri 21/09/01

13

14 ACG Meetings Wed 28/02/01 Fri 30/11/01

15 ACG11 Wed 28/02/01 Thu 01/03/01

16 ACG12 Tue 05/06/01 Wed 06/06/01

17 ACG13 Wed 12/09/01 Thu 13/09/01

18 ACG14 Thu 29/11/01 Fri 30/11/01

19

20 SRC Relevant Meetings Tue 13/02/01 Tue 26/02/02

21 SRC10 Tue 13/02/01 Wed 14/02/01

22 SRC11 Thu 31/05/01 Fri 01/06/01

23 SRC Decision for PC11 Fri 22/06/01 Fri 22/06/01

24 SRC12 Wed 17/10/01 Thu 18/10/01

25 SRC Review for PC12 Fri 19/10/01 Fri 19/10/01

26 SRC13 Tue 26/02/02 Wed 27/02/02

27

28 SRVG Meetings Fri 23/02/01 Wed 19/09/01

29 SRVG1 Fri 23/02/01 Fri 23/02/01

30 SRVG2 Wed 04/04/01 Thu 05/04/01

31 SRVG3 Mon 21/05/01 Tue 22/05/01

32 SRVG4 Mon 17/09/01 Tue 18/09/01

33

34 SRU RVSM Technical Contract Wed 21/02/01 Wed 17/10/01

35 TASK 1 Thu 15/03/01 Thu 19/04/01

36 Milestone 1 Wed 21/02/01 Wed 14/03/01

37 Deliverable 1 Thu 15/03/01 Thu 15/03/01

38 Milestone 2 Wed 21/02/01 Tue 27/03/01

39 Deliverable 2 Wed 28/03/01 Wed 28/03/01

40 Milestone 3 Fri 16/03/01 Tue 10/04/01


42 Milestone 4 Thu 29/03/01 Wed 18/04/01


44 TASK 2 Thu 19/04/01 Tue 29/05/01

45 Milestone 5 Thu 19/04/01 Tue 22/05/01




49 Milestone 7 Tue 22/05/01 Wed 20/06/01


51 TASK 3 Fri 14/09/01 Wed 17/10/01



54 Milestone 9 Wed 12/09/01 Wed 19/09/01




58

59 PC/CN Thu 05/04/01 Fri 09/11/01

60 PC/CN10 Thu 05/04/01 Fri 06/04/01

61 PC/CN11 Thu 12/07/01 Fri 13/07/01

62 PC/CN12 Thu 08/11/01 Fri 09/11/01

63

64 Pre Implementation Safety Case Fri 01/09/00 Fri 17/08/01

65 Issue PISC Version 0.1 Fri 01/09/00 Fri 15/09/00

66 Issue PISC Version 0.2 Mon 18/09/00 Fri 26/01/01

67 Review PISC Version 0.2 Mon 29/01/01 Fri 16/02/01


69 Review PISC Version1.0 Mon 19/03/01 Fri 27/04/01


71

72 RVSM Proposed Swithcover Thu 24/01/02 Thu 24/01/02

09/01

03/04

18/07

09/10

01/03

31/05

21/09

28/02

05/06

12/09

29/11

13/02

31/05

22/06

17/10

19/10

26/02

23/02

04/04

21/05

17/09

G;T;B;J

15/03

28/03

11/04

19/04

G;T;B;J

23/05

30/05

21/06

G;T;B;J

12/09

19/09

17/10

05/04

12/07

08/11

00%

0%

0%

0%

0%

24/01



APPENDIX C

REFERENCE MATERIAL

ICAO DOC 9574 AN/934 Manual on Implementation of a 300 m (1000 ft) verticalseparation minimum between FL 290 and 410 inclusive

IACO DOC 7030 – Regional Supplementary Procedures

ICAO DOC 9536 – RGCSP6/Meeting

EUROCONTROL ASM.ET1. St13.5000 - ATC Manual for a Reduced VerticalSeparation Minima in Europe

JAA – TGL6 Guidance Material on the approval of aircraft and operators forflight in airspace above FL 290 where a 300m (1000 ft) vertical separationminimum is applied.

EUROCONTROL - DNV – Hazard Analysis of Reduced Vertical Separation

ESARR 2 – Reporting and Assessment of Safety Occurrences in ATM

ESARR 3 – Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM Service Providers

ESARR 4 – Risk Assessment and Mitigation in ATM

ESARR 5 – ATM Services’ Personnel

SRC POL DOC 1 – ECAC Safety Minima for ATM

SRC DOC 1 – Safety Minima Study – Review of Existing Standards andPractices

SRC DOC 2 – Aircraft Accidents/Incidents and ATM Contribution – Review andAnalysis of Historical data



APPENDIX D

RVSM AREA OF APPLICABILITY

RVSM shall be applicable in that volume of airspace between FL290 andFL410 inclusive in the following flight information regions/upperinformation regions (FIRs/UIRs):

Amsterdam, Ankara, Athinai, Barcelona, Beograd, Berlin, Bodo,Bratislava, Bremen, Brest, Brindisi, Bruxelles, Bucuresti, Budapest,Dusseldorf, France, Frankfurt, Hannover, Istanbul, Kaliningrad, Kishinau,Kobenhavn, Lisboa, Ljubljana, London, Madrid, Malmo, Malta, Milano,Munchen, Nicossia, Oslo, Praha, Rhein, Riga, Roma, Rovaniemi,Sarajevo, Scottish, Shannon, Skopje, Sofia, Stavanger, Stockholm,Sundsvall, Switzerland, Tallin, Tampere, Tirana, Trondheim, Varana,Vilnius, Warszawa, Wien, Zagreb.

RVSM shall be applicable in either all, or part of, that volume of airspacebetween FL290 and FL410 inclusive in the following FIRs/UIRs:

Canaries (AFI Region), Casablanca, Simferopol, Odessa, Lvov, Tunis

(See map EUR RVSM area distributed separately due to file size)

Transition tasks associated with the application of a 300m ( 1 000 ft)vertical separation minimum within EUR RVSM airspace, shall be carriedout in all or parts of the following FIRs/UIRs:

Ankara, Athinai, Barcelona, Bodo, Canaries (AFI region), Casablanca,France, Kishinau, Lvov, Madrid, Malta, Nicosia, Odessa, Riga,Rovaniemi, Simferopol, Tallinn, Tampere, Tunis, Vilnius, Warszawa.

(Maps with RVSM Eastern Transition Interface and respectively RVSMMediterranean Transition airspace are distributed separately due to thefiles size). The volume of airspace mentioned above for the transitionpurposes of RVSM it is referred as “EUR RVSM Transition Airspace”.

In addition to the European RVSM Transition Airspace described above,State Authorities may establish designated airspace for the purpose oftransitioning non-RVSM approved civil aircraft operating to/from NATRegion, within following FIRs:

Bodo (Domestic), Stavanger, Trondheim, Scottish, Shannon, London,Brest, Madrid, and Lisboa.


Edition

APPENDIX E

RVSM REGULATORY ASSESSMENT MODEL

1.0 Released Issue



APPENDIX F

GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System

ACC Area Control Centre

ARO ATS Reporting Office

ATCO Air Traffic Controllers

ASR Agency Safety Regulation Unit

Assessment An evaluation based on engineering,operational judgement and/or analysismethods.

Assumption Statement, principle and/or premises offeredwithout proof.

Altimetry System Error ASE The difference between the altitude indicatedby the altimeter display assuming a correctaltimeter barometric setting and the pressurealtitude corresponding to the undisturbedambient pressure.

ATM The aggregation of ground based (comprisingvariously ATS, ASM, ATFM) and airbornefunctions required to ensure the safe andefficient movement of aircraft during allappropriate phases of operations.

ATM Service A service for the purpose of ATM.

ATM Service-Provider An organisation responsible and authorised toprovide ATM service(s).

CBA Cost Benefit Analysis

CFMU Central Flow Management Unit

CNS/ATM The aggregation of functions used in provisionsof CNS (communication, Navigation,Surveillance) services and used by ATM.

CNS system All the hardware and software that make up afunction, tool or application that is used toprovide one or more air traffic managementservices. The CNS system is an enabler of theprovisions of ATM services.



Designated Authority The competent body designated by Stateauthority, responsible for aviation safetyregulation.

EATMP European Air Traffic Management Programme

ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference

Environment of operations The environment of operations consists of thephysical and institutional characteristics of theairspace within which operations occur. Theenvironment includes ATM services beingprovided, technologies used, airspaceorganisation, ambient conditions and people.

Error A mistake in specification, design, orimplementation or an occurrence arising as aresult of incorrect action or decision bypersonnel operating or maintaining the system(flight crew, Air Traffic Controller, serviceprovider or maintenance personnel).

ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety RegulatoryRequirement

Failure The inability of any element of the Air TrafficManagement System to perform its intendedfunction or to perform it correctly withinspecified limits.

Failure Condition A condition having an effect on the aircraftand/or its occupants, either directly or indirectlythrough loss of separation, which is caused orcontributed to by one or more failures or errors,considering flight phase and relevant adverseoperational (density of air traffic, TMA etc..) orenvironmental conditions.

FDP Flight Data Processing System

FHA Functional Hazard Assessment

FIR Flight Information Region

FLAS Flight level Allocation Scheme

GND Ground

Hazard A potentially unsafe condition.

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation



IFPS Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System

LOAs Letters of Agreement

MASPS Minimum Aircraft Systems PerformanceSpecifications

Mitigation or Risk Mitigation Steps taken to control or prevent a hazard fromcausing harm and reduce risk to a tolerable oracceptable level.

National ATM SafetyRegulatoryBody

The competent body designated by Stateauthority, responsible for the safety regulationof civil aviation.

Occurrences Accidents, serious incidents and incidents aswell as other defects or malfunctioning of anaircraft, its equipment and any element of theAir Navigation System which is used orintended to be used for the purpose or inconnection with the operation of an aircraft orwith the provision of an air traffic managementservice or navigational aid to an aircraft.

ORCAM Originated Code Allocated Method

Passing frequency The frequency of events in which two aircraftare in longitudinal overlap when travelling inopposite direction on the same route atadjacent flight levels and at the planned verticalseparation.

PSSA Preliminary System Safety Assessment

Quantitative Safety Levels Numerical expression to define levels of safety

RAD Requirements Application Document

RGCSPS Review of the General Concept of SeparationPanel

Risk The combination of the overall probability, orfrequency of occurrence of a harmful effectinduced by a hazard and the severity of thateffect.

Risk Assessment Assessment to establish that the achieved orperceived risk is acceptable or tolerable

Risk Mitigation See mitigation

RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum



Safety Freedom from unacceptable risk.

Safety Achievement The result of processes and/or methods appliedto attain acceptable or tolerable safety

Safety Assurance All planned and systematic actions necessaryto provide adequate confidence that a product,a service, an organisation or a system achievesacceptable or tolerable safety

Safety Management System(SMS)

A systematic and explicit approach defining theactivities by which safety management isundertaken by an organisation in order toachieve acceptable or tolerable safety

Safety Monitoring A systematic action conducted to detectchanges affecting the ATM System with thespecific objective of identifying that acceptableor tolerable safety can be met.

Safety Records Information about events or series of eventsthat is maintained as a basis for providingsafety assurance and demonstrating theeffective operation of the safety managementsystem.

Safety RegulatoryRequirement

The formal stipulation by the regulator of asafety related specification which, if compliedwith, will lead to acknowledgement of safetycompetence in that respect.

Safety Survey A systematic review, to recommendimprovements where needed, to provideassurance of the safety of current activities,and to confirm conformance with applicableparts of the Safety Management System.

Severity Level of effect/consequences of hazards on thesafety of flight operations (i.e. combining levelof loss of separation and degree of ability torecover from the hazardous situation).

Severity Class Gradation, ranging from 1 (most sever) to 5(least severe), as an expression of themagnitude of the effects of hazards on flightoperations.

SRC Safety Regulation Commission.

SSA System Safety Assessment.



Target Level of Safety – TLS A generic term representing the level of the riskwhich considered acceptable in particularcircumstances

TCP Transfer of Control Point

TSA Temporary Segregated Area

UAC Upper Area Control Centre

UIR Upper Flight Information Region

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RAD – RVSM - Eurocontrol | - Driving excellence in ATM …€¦ · · 2014-08-14european...

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