2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION

PUBLIC OFFICERS and CORPORATIONS (Atty. Rodolfo Elman)2ND EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION

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BONDOC v. PINEDARepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC,petitioner,vs.REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,respondents.Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.GRIO-AQUIO,J.:pThis case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, inMarbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as bothauthorityanddutyof the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votesEmigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votesDifference...................................... 3,300 votesOn May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: x x xAfter the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted inincreasingBondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot1Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by letter2that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.4At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:13 March 1991Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera ChairmanHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon CityDear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991,to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunalon the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.Thank you.For the Secretary-General(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled"Bondoc v. Pineda"(HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated.The decision inBondoc v. Pinedawas ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.Congressman Casamura's vote in theBondoc v. Pinedacase was, in our view, a conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it.In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991.Cabrera v. Apacible(HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 andLucman v. Dimaporo(HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.xxx xxx xxxAt the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the Tribunal.The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.ParasJ. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,JJ., took no part. Gancayco,J., is on leave.On March 21, 1991, a petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment5on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity,removal or expulsion from the political party;6that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7for if a member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;8and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP9and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review.10In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.11Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.12The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.13Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's) prejudice.14Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based onproportionalrepresentation from all the political parties, instead ofequalrepresentation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores theexclusivejurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as anonpartisancourt although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of Representatives:The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must beindependent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.The Electoral Commission is a body separate from andindependent of the legislatureand though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.xxx xxx xxxThe Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assemblymay not be interfered with by the judiciarywhen and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling inAngara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case ofSanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoraltribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be thesole judgeof the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform itsdutyunder the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and voidab initiofor being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.SO ORDERED.CSC v. BELAGANEN BANC[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,petitioner, vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN,respondent.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1]or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.[2]This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.For our resolution is the petition for review oncertiorariof the Court of Appeals Decision[3]dated January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution No. 972423 dated April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby set aside. The complaint against petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by Magdalena Gapuz is herebyDISMISSED.The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be immediately reinstated to his position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages and other rights and benefits.SO ORDERED.The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in June 1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area.Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent, Sir, kumusta yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo. She declined, explaining that she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application. However, she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the permit has not yet been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent. He merely denied having a personal relationship with Magdalena.Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation to approve Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-school.Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.Ligaya also charged respondent with:(1)delaying the payment of the teachers salaries;(2)failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers;(3)willfully refusing to release the teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and(4)failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he presented evidence to disprove Ligayas imputation of dereliction of duty.On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision[4]finding respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed from the service. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered in the two above-entitled cases, finding:a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City Schools DivisionGUILTYof thefour countsof sexual indignities or harassmentscommitted against the person and honor of complainant Miss Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City public school teacher, while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office. He is, however,ABSOLVED of all the other charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty.b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belaganlikewise GUILTYof thetwo countsof sexual advances or indignitiescommitted against the person and honor of complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school teacher of Baguio City, while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office.Consequently, respondentAllyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSEDfrom the government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his retirement benefits and other remunerations due him areHEREBY DECLARED FORFEITEDin favor of the government.SO ORDERED.[5]Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996, promulgated Resolution No. 966213[6]affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. Thus:The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a position which requires the incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan represents an institution tasked to mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to ensure that teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper discipline. Any improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral ascendancy over the teachers and students which can not be tolerated.Therefore, his misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to operate a private pre-school cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct.WHEREFORE,respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty ofgrave misconductand imposed the penalty ofDISMISSALfrom the service with all the accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS Secretary is modified accordingly.[7]On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses before the MunicipalTrial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986)[8]In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City:1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST VEXATION, RUMOR MONGERING2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE THREATS & ORAL DEFAMATION3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION and FALSE ACCUSATION4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and THREATS5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL TROUBLE MAKER6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION11. WOMENS CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and Police Chief13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency meeting and where she shouted invectives against the residents14. Incident ofJune 13, 1979Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector15. Incident ofAugust 25, 1979Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon16. Incident ofAugust 26, 1979Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting17. Incident ofSeptember 2, 1978Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz18. Incident ofSeptember 9, 1979Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting19. Incident ofSeptember 10, 1979Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning20. Incident ofSeptember 13, 1979Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the latters consent21. Incident ofSeptember 21, 1979Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her residence22. Incident ofSeptember 21, 1979Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near the premises of her residence which killed her hen.23. Incident ofSeptember 23, 1979Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She did not like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed.[9]Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility.In its Resolution No. 972423[10]dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondents motion for reconsideration, holding that:The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor significance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of having committed the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases before the regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community for wrongful behavior does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x xRespondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an alarm in any one who may cross her path.[11]In absolving respondent from the charges, the Appellate Court considered his unblemished service record for 37 years.Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising the following assignments of error:I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the Court of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme Court may review the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite convincing and overwhelming signs of its truthfulness.II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due weight to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses presented.III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized under Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22 (e) of said rules.[12]In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalenas derogatory record undermines the verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing it.The petition is impressed with merit.The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible. This is a question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts review.It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.[13]This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions, however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or aquasi-judicialbody, like petitioner herein.[14]Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of Magdalenas derogatory record. While the former considered it of vital and paramount importance in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of minor significance. This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation evidence.Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy.[15]One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:SEC. 51.Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. (a)In Criminal Cases:x x x x x x(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot sustain respondents posture.Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.[16]Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.[17]In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.[18]In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different provision applies.Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.[19]A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,[20]honesty[21]or integrity.[22]Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:SEC. 11.Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence,by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad,or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, orthe record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle thata party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.[23]With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question.[24]In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.[25]Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.Second,respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has beenarrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jailfor the purpose of impairing his credibility.[26]This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories:(a)that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility,(b)that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime,(c)that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and(d)that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.[27]Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.[28]As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebuteachof the charges against her listed by respondent.But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her testimony during the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary Antonio Nachura, thus:Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on the first floor and the second floor?A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family, background, how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was all, sir.Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice, sir.Q Why?A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir, I told him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of the premises for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already started paying the place so I said, Sir, I have some transients with me in the evening and he said, You know Mrs. Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully declined saying, Sir, I think fordelicadezaI cannot accept you. Not that I dont want you to be here but people might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my permit, sir.

ASEC R. CAPINPIN:Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went up with him or the second time?A No, sir, on the second time, sir.Q Second time?A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.Q And you were going down?A Yes, sir.Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged kissing?A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.Q Before you went down?A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and it has 16 steps.Q So, it was not on the 16thstep but still on the topmost?A Yes sir.Q Part of the floor of the building?A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?ASEC R. CAPINPIN:Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last, the biggest room that I had, he said, No. Never mind, I am not going to see that anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm and held me tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?A Yes, sir, as a boarder.Q Is that room used for transients?A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some transients.Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?A Yes, but I declined, sir fordelicadeza.Q At that time, there were no transients yet.A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there.[29]The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him that respondent kissed her and asked her for a date.Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena B. Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information That the Monday after the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get favorable recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my permit. That I proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir, kumusta yung application ko and he said, mag date muna tayo but I refused and explained that I am married, after which I proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then left the Division Office. Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the particular day?A Yes, sir.Q What time was that?A I cannot remember, sir.Q Was it morning, afternoon?A I think it was in the morning, sir.Q Morning.A Yes, sir.Q Early morning?A About noon, sir.Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting me saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I cannot do anything with the processing of her paper or application.Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any incident?A Yes, she did sir.Q What was that incident all about?A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she left.[30]With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the findings of the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the Court of Appeals outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of a witness of bad character[31]and refuse to believe one of good character.[32]As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner.[33]At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS investigating officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling the truth considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and manner of testifying.[34]In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample evidence to show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her honor.Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct and not merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.[35]Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.[36]To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.[37]In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, theelements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.[38]Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.[39]This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.[40]We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he received numerous awards.[41]This is the first time he is being administratively charged. He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides:SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be considered.x x x.The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[42]which reads in part:SEC. 53.Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.The following circumstances shall be appreciated:x x x x x xj. length of servicex x x x x xl.and other analogous cases.Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment,[43]and respondents length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,[44]the penalty of suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however, neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in the government.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 8, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213 and 972423 are AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSONBELAGAN is SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his preventive suspension.SO ORDERED.GONZALES v. CSCSECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 139131.September 27, 2002]JESUS R. GONZALES,petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE CHILDRENS MEDICAL CENTER (PCMC),respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:Petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution[1]dated January 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819,which dismissed petitioners appeal via a petition for review,[2]for his failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and its Resolution[3]dated February 16, 1999, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.Subject of said appeal before the CA were Resolutions Nos. 98-2359[4]and 98-3021[5]of the Civil Service Commission, which upheld the dismissal of petitioner from respondent Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC).The facts of this case, as culled from records, are as follows:Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine Childrens Medical Center (PCMC), a government-owned and controlled corporation created under P.D. No. 1631, as amended.At PCMC, petitioner served the patients and the public from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M., seven days a week.On March 2, 1998, petitioner started absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and without explaining the reason for his absence to his superiors.In view of the exigency of petitioners functions, Ms. Jara Corazon O. Ehera, Human Resources Management Officer III, wrote a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998 to petitioner directing him to report for work within three (3) days from receipt of said notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls.During his absence, petitioner was seen on several occasions within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the Budget Office, Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic.He allegedly visited the clinic without consulting any medical problem and when Dr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he was not found in his house.[6]On March 16, 1998, Dr. Corazon D. Rivera, officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported petitioners irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to Dr. Lillian V. Lee, Executive Director of PCMC, recommending that petitioner be dropped from the rolls.Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from the rolls, effective March 20, 1998.[7]Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).In Resolution No. 98-2359 dated September 8, 1998, the CSC upheld the action taken by PCMC, to wit:WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jesus R. Gonzales is hereby dismissed.Accordingly, the action of the PCMC Executive Director, dropping him from the rolls, is upheld.[8]The decision, however, stated that considering that the separation of petitioner was not disciplinary in character, he may be re-employed in the same agency at the discretion of the appointing authority.[9]Petitioner moved for reconsideration by the CSC of Resolution 98-2359, but it was denied.When he filed a petition for review in the CA, the petition was denied for failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court,[10]particularly for failure to attach certified true copies of material portions of the records and supporting papers.The CA Resolution[11]dated January 14, 1999, concluded:WHEREFORE, for being formally deficient, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED.In a Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance,[12]petitioner attached the certified true copies of the required papers.But the CA denied the motion in a Resolution[13]dated February 16, 1999.Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the appeal of herein petitioner based on pure technicality.2. Whether or not there is factual and legal basis for respondent PCMC to drop petitioner from the rolls for his alleged absences without leave.[14]On the first issue, petitioner argues that the dismissal of the petition by CA on mere technicality is unwarranted and unjustified since pertinent jurisprudence abounds declaring in no uncertain terms that dismissals of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the Court is to encourage hearings of appeals based on merits.[15]The same position is taken by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment[16]filed before this Court.But respondent PCMC asserts that the dismissal by the CA of the petition for review is in keeping with Section 7[17]in relation to Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.[18]InCadayona vs. Court of Appeals,[19]however, we already held that Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is not to be construed as imposing the requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies.We compared this provision with its counterpart provision in Rule 42, on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA, and noted that under the latter, only the judgments or final orders of the lower court need to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.In numerous resolutions issued by this Court we emphasized that in an appeal via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and in an original civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules 46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment, final order or resolution.[20]We see no reason why a stricter requirement should be made for petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the CA.This could not have been intended by the framers of the rules.A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[21]Further, we note that petitioner had attached certified true copies of the documents supporting his Motion for Reconsideration and Compliance.[22]As previously held, submission of a required document with the Motion for Reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46.[23]On the second issue, petitioner argues that he was denied due process[24]when he was dropped from the rolls.He avers that he received PCMCs letter dated March 5, 1998 only on March 20, 1998 and thus, had until March 23, 1998 within which to comply with the directive;[25]that in fact, he did report for work on March 21, 1998, but was barred by security personnel from entering the company because his name had already been dropped from the rolls effective March 20, 1998.He contends that his non-compliance with the return to work directive does not constitute abandonment of work as no person in his right mind would abandon his job to his own detriment.[26]For analogous reasons, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that petitioner was denied due process.The OSG states that he was summarily dismissed without affording him a hearing and the opportunity to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor.[27]The OSG also opines that the penalty of dismissal was too severe.[28]In its reply, respondent PCMC insists that the dismissal of petitioner is valid and legal, considering that petitioners actuations were clearly irresponsible.They showed lack of concern for his work and the smooth operation of PCMC.[29]Further, PCMC contends that petitioner was given ample opportunity to explain his side and to submit evidence and to explain his absence.[30]PCMC points out that they sent a letter-notice dated March 5, 1998, to petitioner and he should have taken it upon himself to report to work, even without any prompting from PCMC, considering the significance of his work.[31]Besides, PCMC claims, petitioner showed the clear intent to sever his employer-employee relationship with PCMC.Finally, PCMC avers that factual findings of the CSC on this matter are entitled to great weight and must be accorded respect and finality.[32]To avoid circuitous procedure, we shall now consider the merits of the case.This Court is not a trier of facts, and its function is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court.[33]In this case, we find no exceptional circumstance and we find no cogent reason to set aside the factual findings of the CSC in sustaining the action of respondent in the dropping of petitioner from the rolls on the ground that he was found AWOL (absent without official leave).The CSC noted that petitioner had admitted that effective March 2, 1998, he was absent without approved leave.[34]Petitioners unauthorized absences, as found by the CSC, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a ground for disciplinary action under E.O. No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987.[35]For his services are essential to the efficient delivery of medical services and the exigencies of the service require his presence in the office.We agree that there is legal basis for dropping petitioner from the rolls.It is also in accordance with law and rules, notably Section 35 Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing E.O. 292 and Paragraph 2.1 (b) of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 which provides as follows:Sec. 35.Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice.However, when the exigencies of the service require his immediate presence and he fails/refuses to return to the service, the head of office may drop him from the service even prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day period abovestated.[36](Emphasis ours.)2.1Absence without Approved Leavea. xxxb. If the number ofunauthorized absencesincurred isless than thirty (30) calendar days, written return to work order shall be served on the official or employee at his last known address on record.Failure on his part to report for work within the period stated in the order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the rolls.[37](Emphasis ours.)Petitioners assertion that he was denied due process is untenable.The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[38]Records would show that respondent PCMC had written a letter to petitioner to report for work[39]and another letter informing him that he was being dropped from the rolls, due to his Absence Without Official Leave, with the enumeration of the reasons and basis thereof.[40]That petitioner only received the notice on March 20, 1998 is of no moment.In fact, two notices were given him: (a) the notice requiring him to report for work; and (b) the notice that he would be dropped because of his absences without official leave.Further, petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to report for duty after he received the return-to-work order, but he did not report.Thus, the CSC found no error when respondent PCMC dropped petitioner from the rolls for his refusal to comply with the return-to-work order within a prescribed period.[41]Finally, it must be emphasized that under CSC Circular No. 12, series of 1994, the action dropping petitioner from the rolls is non-disciplinary in nature and does not result in the forfeiture of his benefits nor his disqualification from re-employment in the government.Likewise, dropping from the rolls of petitioner is without prejudice to his re-appointment at the discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2819 and its Resolution dated February 16, 1999 are SET ASIDE insofar as it denied petitioners appeal for his failure to comply with Section 6 (c), Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. But Resolutions Nos. 98-2359 and 98-3021 of the Civil Service Commission, dropping petitioner from the rolls of respondent PCMC, without prejudice to his re-employment in the government service, are AFFIRMED.No pronouncements as to costs.SO ORDERED.ROMAGOS v. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICTRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 156100 September 12, 2007VILMA E. ROMAGOS,petitioner,vs.METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT, EDITHA D. LUZANO and DULCE M. ABANILLA,respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 5, 2002 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the appeal2from Resolutions No. 0107133and No. 0112224of the Civil Service Commission (CSC); and the October 29, 2002 CA Resolution5which denied the motion for reconsideration.The antecedent facts are summarized as follows:Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) employed Vilma E. Romagos (Romagos) as Clerk-Processor B. On August 9, 1999, MCWD barred Romagos from entering the work premises unless she undergoes psychiatric treatment and is certified by her doctor to be mentally fit to work.6Thereafter, in a letter dated December 1, 1999,7MCWD informed Romagos that, effective January 1, 2000, she was being dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity as shown by the following evidence:First, the incident reports submitted by MCWD employees Samuela M. Suan,8Editha Luzano9and Jocelyn Lebumfacil10stating that, during office hours on January 25, 1999, Romagos suddenly and without provocation began rambling loudly and incoherently, causing alarm and anxiety among office visitors and employees;Second, the incident report issued by Jocelyn Lebumfacil11stating that, during the August 4, 1999 HRD staff meeting, Romagos suddenly and without provocation began rambling loudly and incoherently, thereby disrupting the meeting and causing unease among the staff; andThird, the November 18, 1989 Certification issued by Dr. Augustus B. Costas that Romagos is suffering from Major Depression;12and the January 11, 1991 Certification of Dr. Renato D. Obra that Romagos is under treatment for Major Depression.13MCWD also cited Romagos irregular attendance.14Romagos filed with the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) a Complaint-Appeal,15questioning the procedure and factual basis of her dismissal. The CSCRO dismissed the appeal in its Decision dated June 23, 2000,16holding that the evidence cited by MCWD in its December 1, 1999 letter, as well as new evidence presented by MCWD General Manager Dulce M. Abanilla (Abanilla), established that Romagos was mentally incapacitated, thus:Furthermore, there are other additional evidence submitted by General Manager Abanilla showing that there were incidents which happened after August 20, 1999 involving Ms. Romagos where the latter was observed to again utter incoherent words and become hysterical. A narration of the incidents which happened on September 6 and 7, 1999 are contained in the affidavits executed by Ms. Diosdada Faelnar and Atty. Vesmindo M. Santiago, the Chief of the Medical and Dental Services and the Asst. General Manager for Administration, respectively. Even as of December 1999, Ms. Romagos mental problems were still observed by the OIC of the HRD, per the Inter-Office Memorandum dated December 21, 1999, with the latter even going to the extent of asking for the assistance of the security guards out of fear on what the appellant might do.Moreover, we note the different letters and reports/studies/ researches penned by the appellant clearly manifesting her mental disorder. Her report to General Manager Abanilla dated December 27 and 29, 1999 are incomprehensible, incoherent, muddled and so disorganized that we cant help but conclude that indeed appellant is not in her right frame of mind. This observa[tion] also holds true when we examine and read the papers and letters written and prepared by the appellant dated August 6, 10, 30, 1999 and January 28, 1994.x x x xAll of these foregoing discussion would clearly prove that appellant is really suffering from some form of mental disorder and, as a natural consequence, she is incapable of discharging her functions x x x.17In her motion for reconsideration, Romagos questioned the CSCRO for giving weight to new evidence regarding her alleged abnormal behavior in September and December 1999, even when MCWD neither cited said evidence in its December 1, 1999 letter nor disclosed them to her at any time thereafter.18The CSCRO denied the motion for reconsideration in a Decision dated July 26, 2000.19Romagos appealed20to the CSC which issued Resolution No. 01-0713 dated March 29, 2001, affirming the CSCRO decisions, to wit:As culled from the records, several incidents (as evidenced by the reports submitted by several officials and employees) occurred showing the abnormal behavior of the appellant, two (2) of which are, as follows:1. Incident Report dated January 25, 1999 of Mrs. Samuela M. Susan, Senior Industrial Relations Development Officer A, the pertinent portion of which states,"I was stunned when the next thing I knew, she was already behind me at a very close range and bombarded me with insensible statements. I remained silent and intentionally observed what would be her next move while she was at the height of her outburst of deep seated anger and suspicion. She addressed to me all her sentiments telling me about corruption, illegal practices, unfair practices in a loud, emotionally charged voice."2. Inter-Office Memorandum dated January 25, 1999 of Editha D. Luzano, Officer-in-Charge of the Human Resources Department of the said agency, to wit, "On January 25, 1999, Ms. Vilma Romagos behavior became unstable again. She began talking to herself and then started scolding other people in the HRD office. Her actions caused anxieties to the other employees, thus disturbing their work. Since December 1998, she has been behaving like this."Hence, the continuous abnormal behavior of Romagos cannot be denied. The Commission is convinced that the dropping of the appellant from the rolls is justified.On the issue of due process, the Commission is not convinced that the right of Romagos to due process was violated. As specifically provided in Section 2, Rule XII of the Rul