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G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner, vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents.

Legal Services Division for petitioner.

Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

In this petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the presentConstitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for thenullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated

November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.

The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss,as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal.Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as ProvincialBudget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)

The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding theprivate respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the provinceof Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.

In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abellaof the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. DalisaySantos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to aMemorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to

endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested positionof PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay,Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.

In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, thenDirector Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the privaterespondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all MunicipalBudget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of thepetitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified



since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.

On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed theappointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon theaforestated recommendation of Abella.

In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitionerreiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contestedposition unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.

On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote thepetitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet theminimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of alocal budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight furtherrequired the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who arequalified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.

On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the privaterespondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the saidappointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legallyauthorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the requiredthree years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and thatunder Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the RegionalDirector or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for theposition of PBO.

On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal &Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the

petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondentDBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position sincenone of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.

On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLAruling.

On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion forreconsideration.

On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against

the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regardingthe matter.

Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions whichprompted the petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors:

A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANTSECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.



B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THEREQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.

C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOTQUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.

D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOTALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THEREQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8, Rollo, pp. 15-16)

All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondentis lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to theappointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon therecommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.

The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right andprivilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the

appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokesSection 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall beappointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management uponrecommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil servicelaw, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrativecontrol and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to thecontested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public

respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose'sappointment.

There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 thepetitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed byexisting laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that therecommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, theappointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM isexpected to reject the same.

In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the

Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.

Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, BatasPambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested uponthe Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appointthe PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated thequalifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of thesame code states that:



(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law,commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized collegeor university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and hasacquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.

The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to theProvincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intentbehind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees tothe position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part andparcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "uponrecommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be givenmandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy asguaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly bedefeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reservingto itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees

do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondentDBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:

As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among therecommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible forappointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, therecommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not acondition sine qua non to the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointingprerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a

different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking intoconsideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under thecontrol and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorizedrepresentative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role inthe local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that of aCommission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain theindependence of said officer from the local government unit, he must be primarilythe choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not beunduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meetsthe requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law,Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or

circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the local chief executivein the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider othernominees for the position vis a vis the nominees of the local chief executive. (CSCResolution No. 89-868, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31)

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of oneProvincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget andManagement and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seeminglyinnocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional



policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandateon local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, thescales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal

since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, asin this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, nationalofficers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water downwhat little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations.

President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second PhilippineCommission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the firstinstance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of theIslands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunityto manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capableand subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of

their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to beconsistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.

In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined bothexecutive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making localautonomy effective.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, indistinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or

offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may beprovided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11,Article VII, 1935 Constitution)

the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls theexecutive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He hasonly supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed bystatute.

In Tecson v . Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:

. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, thepresidential competence is not even supervision in general, but generalsupervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond theapplicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter.Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla inMondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justicein his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing or



the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform theirduties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such actionor step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modifyor nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of theirduties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would

follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebronopinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the RevisedAdministrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there beingno power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying theprocedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken.

Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementinglocal autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amendingthe Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy andReorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 whenRepublic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further

autonomous powers to local governments governments." The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofaras legal provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided underArticle II as a basic principle of government:

Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of localgovernment units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development asself-reliant communities.

An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It

called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountablelocal government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantialboundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the localgovernment code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sourcesof revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the presentConstitution.

Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlierdoctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy moremeaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for



a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted througha system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, andreferendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of localofficials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the

local units.When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of theProvincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of theconstitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoardsthe entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments todevelop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goalof meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where noneof the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from thelist of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, hemust return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets thelegal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessaryeligibilities and qualifications.

The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however,is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and

municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion areforwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the localofficials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are notformulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposedon local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs andresources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, abalancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local andnational officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointmentprocess involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.

It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the

appointments of Justices and Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution,nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. ThePresident makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her bythe Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees,and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be noreservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power'spersonal choice.

The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that



Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three othernames of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was ameaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalizedbefore the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that hisnominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government'sprerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority,

and discretion are manifest.In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that thevalue of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by thedegree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "localassemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people mayestablish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipalinstitutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law,Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).

Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on

local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which theseprovisions are based.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of theCivil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent CeciliaAlmajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered toappoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nomineessubmitted by the Provincial Governor.

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.CONTE MANGELIN, SALICALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR.,RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed asa member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government,Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.



2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional LegislativeAssembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 withthe Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May

11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they laterwithdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positionsas members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of theCommittee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. XavierRazul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in hiscapacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues withlocal government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on

the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting RegionsIX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chartthe autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod thePresident to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission asmandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of yourrespective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic)

indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to ActingSecretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that thereshall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearingof Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasangpampook ... ."

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting SecretaryAlimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVEDFROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAIDCOMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV.1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSIONIN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OFCONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANGPAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.



7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner'sadvice, with the following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte

6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore wasauthorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speakervacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chairdeclared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego



11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, JerryAn excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with thepresence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move tocall the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on theprevious motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doingso, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the PresidingOfficer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session lastNovember 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented?Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the

Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issuedenjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held byrespondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly orBatasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a



resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P.LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS

REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "hadcaused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries andemoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing hisCertificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in

the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will showthat any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that"such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emolumentswithout authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of

the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so muchamount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries

and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case beforethe Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which

should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the

respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.

We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reasonsimply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion wasdone purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt theCourt, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that theexpulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is noshowing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or notthe petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was aninvestigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand,what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, therespondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not

set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondentsaver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to

Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out

and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle,no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and

hearing contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law,does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the

opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, tobegin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft andcorruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accordedany opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now



levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.

In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendettaby the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the formerperceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaksof "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on

question which should have been resolved within the confines of theAssemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails

their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act thatcannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the

Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, noone may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it stillbe so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the mostelementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of

the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts arenonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that suchdiscretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are"autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much lessstrike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-calledautonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject tothe jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XIIby Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other

things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithinthe framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic

of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive

machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal

administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters

which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20"which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;



(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, andexternal borrowing,

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all naturalresources;

(6) Air and sea transport(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing. 21

In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have

the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central governmentdelegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden thebase of government power and in the process to make local governments "more

responsive and accountable,"23

"and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of

national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves thecentral government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it toconcentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to

law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their

judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political

power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In thatcase, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape itsfuture with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to aconstitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the

central authorities but to its constituency. 28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao underthe 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than



mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involvedherein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the presentConstitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in theproper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these twosenses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of thePhilippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall beautonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter

provided. 29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30

xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in theCordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areassharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic andsocial structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of thisConstitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the

Republic of the Philippines. 31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it

and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the otherhand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under thesupervision of the national government acting through the President (and the

Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of RegionXII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond thedomain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of theCongress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous inthe former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. Anexamination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomousgovernments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exerciseautonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits

an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and

control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the SangguniangPampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrativeservices, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shallexercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:



(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by theAutonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other socialservices, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and cultureindigenous to the Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure thatenactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation,

policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of theexpulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal asSpeaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the groundsthat: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the solepurpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the

Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and(2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessionswere invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the

Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on



[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there isdisagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called bythe petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of shortintervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insistthat, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as usedby their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that

protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion[sic] and disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, sinceclearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agreesthat the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had

yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. 38

Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt anysession. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we stillinvalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the secondplace, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly,assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that therespondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, weuphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to theaforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about hisouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced thatthe invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken asestablishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declaredwithout a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, weare not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian fromreorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at theproper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the

Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The SangguniangPampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. Nocosts.

SO ORDERED.



Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original.

2 Id., 6-7.

3 Id., 134-135.

4 Id., 134.

5 Id.

6 Id., 135.

7 Id.

8 Id., 142.

9 Id., 141.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988.

13 Id., 135.

14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.

15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AND THE LUPONG TAGAPAGPAGANAP NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION XII AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES.

16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3.

17 Supra.

18 Supra.

19 Supra, sec. 4.



20 Supra.

21 Supra.

22 Supra, sec. 35(a).

23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987), supra, art. sec. 3.24 Batas Blg. 337, sec 2.

25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.

26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958).

27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra.

28 Bernas, Joaquin, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-

5.29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1.

30 Supra, sec. 2.

31 Supra, sec. 15.

32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.

33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or not it is constitutional for

the President to exercise control over the Sanggunians is another question.

34 Supra, sec. 7.

35 Rollo, Id., 122.

36 Id.

37 Id., 145-146.

38 Id., 121.

39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).



G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATUMACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS,representing the other taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE,DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989

ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner, vs.HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in

his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, respondents.

Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos.89651 and 89965.

Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.

CORTES, J.:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and

nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, inimplementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an OrganicAct for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission onElections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budgetand Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .

After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents,which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted fordecision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a"Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment andto Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally becategorized into either of the following:



(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the governmentof the Republic of the Philippines of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation

Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of IslamicConference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]heestablishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of thesovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and

enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided forregional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shallbe created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillerasconsisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing

common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and socialstructures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of thisConstitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of theRepublic of the Philippines."

To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regionsto ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution

or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.

Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region withthe assistance and participation of the regional consultative commissioncomposed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nomineesfrom multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of theconstituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courtswith personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisionsof this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved bymajority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for thepurpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas votingfavorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteenmonths from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts forthe autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.



Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of thisConstitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shallprovide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of thegeneral welfare of the people of the region.

Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be theresponsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense andsecurity of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signedinto law on August 1, 1989.

1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised bypetitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisionsof the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreementis part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement . TheSolicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, nothaving been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state

and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor abinding international agreement.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whetherunder public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now theConstitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region inMuslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict



between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the TripoliAgreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the OrganicAct. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a bindingtreaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of theland. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactmentof the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the

latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing HeadMoney Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus,if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being asubsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734

contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought. 3

2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions whichhave been raised by petitioners.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomousregion in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on

the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent uponthe outcome of the plebiscite.

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in theplebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of theConstitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes thecreation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provincesvote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composedof the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs tobe clarified.

Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article Xof the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot beglossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous regionshall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, thereis a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act,which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the

Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall takeeffect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent unitsprovided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite whichshall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces andcities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the AutonomousRegion in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not



vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existingadministrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomousregion shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by theconstituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a

majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomousregion. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall notbe included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomousregion is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) citiesmentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. Thesingle plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will thereforebe determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in MuslimMindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No.6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION 482-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in MuslimMindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast bythe constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. Thequestion has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to amajority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or amajority in each of the constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of allthe votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII,

section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediatelyupon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for thepurpose ... Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomousregion, which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved bymajority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for thepurpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas votingfavorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,sec, 18, para, 2].

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made todepend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of themajority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of thetotality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseologyas that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of theautonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."



It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a doublemajority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in theindividual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in

which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on theother hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common anddistinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, andother relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional becauseonly the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte andMaguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen(13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such

concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics.By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. Byincluding areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others,petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous regionwhich the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards bywhich Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomousregion. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of thelegislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into

the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to theseparation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139(1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since theOrganic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be furtherbroadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order forthe other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, andtherefore is violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision hehad earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanaoshould compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historicaland cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevantcharacteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. Asearlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be coveredby the organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislativeprerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.



Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Landtenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. InDumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA392], the Court ruled that once class may be treated differently from anotherwhere the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee

of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having beenmade by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by theConstitution itself.

Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that itviolates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates thatshould there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the otherhand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law.Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran,

which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumeratingpossible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and nationallaw, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim'sreligious convictions.

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actualcontroversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art.VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actualcontroversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In

the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are noconflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an allegedviolation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not becalled upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between theprovisions the Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No.6734 which, among others, states:

. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebisciteshall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces

and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the AutonomousRegion shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, thatthe President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to mergeregions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the OrganicAct is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitutionwhich provides:



No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with thecriteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by amajority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of

administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, whichare mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes[Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of theland by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are notterritorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to mergeadministrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is apower which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate theexercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X,sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the Presidentto merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a

plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of aplebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities orbarangays, not to administrative regions.

Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act whichcreate an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomousregion of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regionalgovernment by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandatethat the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to theregional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by theOversight Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six

(6) years from the organization of the regional government.

It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional becausewhile the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall takeeffect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversightcommittee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to theregional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.

Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on theresult of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes castby constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous

region immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.

Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on theresult of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes castby constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomousregion immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734requiring an oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for adifferent date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the OversightCommittee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is



evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regionalgovernment. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustainedas there is no bases therefor.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979,

46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or partsthereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners tochallenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitionershave failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Art. II, Sec 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 provides that "[t]he plebiscite shall be

conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte,Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi- Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato,Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, andZamboanga."

2 The provinces enumerated in the Tripoli Agreement are the same onesmentioned in R.A. No. 6734.

3 With regard to the controversy regarding the alleged inconsistencies betweenR.A. No. 6734 and the Tripoli Agreement, it may be enlightening to quote from the

statement of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., the principal sponsor of R.A. No. 6734:

xxx xxx xxx

The assertion that the organic Act is a "betrayal" of the Tripoli Agreement isactually misplaced, to say the least. Misplaced because it overlooks the fact thatthe Organic Act incorporates, at least, 99 percent of the provisions of the TripoliAgreement. Misplaced, again, because it gratuitously assumes that the TripoliAgreement can bring more benefits to the people of Mulim Mindanao than the



Organic Act.

The truth of the matter is that the Organic Act addresses the basis demands of the Muslim, tribal and Christian populations of the proposed area of autonomy in afar more reasonable, realistic and immediate manner than the Tripoli Agreementever sought to do.

The Organic Act is, therefore, a boon to, not a betrayal, of the interest of thepeople of Muslim Mindanao.

xxx xxx xxx

[Consolidated Comment, p. 26].

EN BANC[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]

192 SCRA 100

Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue),Ifugao Provincial Board Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), FormerVice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal Councilors MARTIN GANO,(Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman PEDRO

W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, andDONATO TIMAGO; Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residentsORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO; Lagawe residents TOMASKIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTELUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO;Mayoyao residents PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMOIGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUELPUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY BINOMNGA,GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY



GABRIEL, and NADRES GHAMANG , Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS; The Honorable FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice;Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The Cabinet Officer forRegional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budgetand Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, NationalTreasurer , Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, beingthe only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CordilleraAutonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.

The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:

On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in aplebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for anOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."

The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showedthat the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in onlythe Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the restof the provinces and city above-mentioned.

Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified bymajority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, theSecretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating theCOMELEC resolution and provided:

". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and cityvoting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being theonly province which voted favorably — then, alone, legally and validly constitutesthe CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)

As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the firstMonday of March 1991.: nad

Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary onFebruary 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairsof the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly createdunder Executive Order No. 220.

On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-



ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted saidpetition.

On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaringamong others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera RegionalAssembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 wereabolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad

The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Regionin only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require thatthe said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELECresolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, thememorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, andRepublic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents fromimplementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declareExecutive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and theCordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect untilanother organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted byCongress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. Wetreat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and decide the case.

This petition is meritorious.

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera AutonomousRegion.

It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:

"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim

Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities,municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctivehistorical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and otherrelevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and thenational sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines." (Emphasis Supplied)

The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connotethat "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term"region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This issupported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines isdivided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.(Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of theland by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of aregion, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and culturalheritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. TheConstitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nad

The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of theConstitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in



common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be giventheir ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, beapplied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).

Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No.6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted

from only one province.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera AutonomousRegion is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of theRegional Government and local government units. It further provides that:

"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers andfunctions necessary for the proper governance and development of allprovinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within theAutonomous Region . . ."

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single

province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be facedwith the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officialsand another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislativepowers over exactly the same small area.

Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in theCordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assemblydistricts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the AutonomousRegion. chanrobles virtual law library

If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assemblyshall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward

predicament of having two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and theSangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the provinceof Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines,population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people.:-cralaw

Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and DevelopmentBoard composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and citymayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, andmembers representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in theprovincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The

Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almostsimilar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10,Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government Code). If it takesonly one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on theother hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in theregional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at theregional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made upof a single province must, therefore, fail.



Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos(P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizationalrequirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province.

These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province CordilleraAutonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.

The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areasenumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which includeBenguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has thesecond smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city abovementioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows:Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000;Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total population of thesefive provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census (ManilaStandard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).

There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated orwhich cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a RegionalCommission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) memberscoming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents'view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It wouldnever have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far aspracticable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous culturalcommunities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of acommon regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in theregion which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the nationallanguage.

The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Regionis infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugaoconstituting the Region.:-cralaw

To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violatethe letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would alsobe impractical and illogical.

Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), isnot applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.

The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by

majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found inthe Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:

x x x

". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simplemajority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent unitsand not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units puttogether, as well as in the individual constituent units."



This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at hisconclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:

x x x

". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region(CAR) as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval

by the majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. Andconsidering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and cityvoting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao beingthe only province which voted favorably — can, alone, legally and validlyconstitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).

The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for theCordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao determine — (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in theCordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, amongthose enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said AutonomousRegions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).

The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shallcomprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, thesame rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the Cordillera.However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue onwhether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera couldexist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to constituteit.chanrobles virtual law library

Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugaocan validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is

not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera AutonomousRegion. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of theCommission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomousregion, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, theFebruary 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative OrderNo. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while ExecutiveOrder No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed oramended.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]



METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner , vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solveurgent problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the bestof intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, welet the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open forpublic use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the generalwelfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at theexpense of the rule of law. Â h Y

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basicservices in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is anon-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-AirVillage, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registeredowner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through itsChairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to openNeptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The noticereads: Court

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic

"Dear President Lindo,

"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDAlaw or Republic Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority torationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe andconvenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be openedto vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.

"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarilyopen the points of entry and exit on said street.

"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance thatmay be extended by your association to the MMDA personnel whowill be directing traffic in the area.

"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritteninstruction of the President on the matter.



"I

HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?

II

IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENTBEFORE THE MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISIONROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?

III

IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPEDFROM DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TOOPEN THE SUBJECT STREET? Jlexj

V

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THESEVERAL MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTEDBEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA OFFICERS?

V

HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?"[7]

Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-AirVillage, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial andcommercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a nationalroad open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concreteperimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of NeptuneStreet intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road opento public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, anational road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Edpâ mis

Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to publictraffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in thedelivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is trafficmanagement which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insurethe safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that thepolice power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] From the premise that it has policepower, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact anordinance opening Neptune street to the public.[9]



Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as thepower vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establishall manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, eitherwith penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge tobe for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of thesame.[10] The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and

justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the generalwelfare.[11]

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature.[12] It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessinglegislative power.[13] The National Legislature, however, may delegate this powerto the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.[14] Once delegated, the agentscan exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the nationallawmaking body.[15]

A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which isconstituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs."[16] The LocalGovernment Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a "body politic andcorporate"[17]-- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of theNational Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of itsterritory.[18] Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays.[19] They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.[20]

Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units inthe Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of

the same Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz : Chief

"Sec. 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shallexercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily impliedtherefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidentalfor its efficient and effective governance, and those which areessential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within theirrespective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shallensure and support, among other things, the preservation andenrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance theright of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and supportthe development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific andtechnological capabilities, improve public morals, enhanceeconomic prosperity and social justice, promote full employmentamong their residents, maintain peace and order, and preservethe comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."[21]

Local government units exercise police power through their respectivelegislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the



sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniangpanlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, andthat of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Codeof 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniangpanlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutionsand appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or

municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, citymunicipality] provided under the Code x x x."[22] The same Code gives thesangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary todischarge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and topromote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."[23]

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several localgovernment units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely,the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities

of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924[24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila wasdeclared as a "special development and administrative region" and theAdministration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the regionplaced under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.[25]

"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact andtranscend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it wouldnot be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local governmentunits comprising Metro Manila."[26] There are seven (7) basic metro-wide servicesand the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2)

transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4)flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land useplanning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection andpollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and trafficmanagement includes the following: Lexjuris

"(b) Transport and traffic management which include theformulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies,standards, programs and projects to rationalize theexisting transport operations, infrastructurerequirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods;provision for the mass transport system and theinstitution of a system to regulate road users;administration and implementation of all trafficenforcement operations, traffic engineering services andtraffic education programs, including the institution of asingle ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"[27]



In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has thefollowing powers and functions: Esm

"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority .—The MMDA shall:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development withinMetropolitan Manila, consistent with national developmentobjectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services whichshall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs andprojects, and which shall include the packaging of projects andpresentation to funding institutions; Esmsc

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs andprojects for the delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction,subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA cancreate appropriate project management offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans,programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks andadopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic inMetro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate theimplementation of all programs and projects concerningtraffic management, specifically pertaining toenforcement, engineering and education. Upon request, itshall be extended assistance and cooperation, includingbut not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all othergovernment agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of

violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether movingor non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend orrevoke drivers’ licenses in the enforcement of such trafficlaws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose,the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulationsin Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, andmay deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or



members of non-governmental organizations to whom maybe delegated certain authority, subject to such conditionsand requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve theobjectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of

basic services to the local government units, when deemednecessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of thelocal government unit concerned." Jurismis

The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is undertakenby the local government units, national government agencies, accredited people’sorganizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well asby the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter intocontracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements withthese bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.[28]

The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Councilis composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, thepresident of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors’ League and the president of the MetroManila Councilors’ League.[29] The Council is headed by a Chairman who isappointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As thepolicy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wideplans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations forthe implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA andpromulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collectionof service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions areparticularly enumerated as follows: LEX

"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -

(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects andissue rules and regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA tocarry out the purposes of this Act;

(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the

members of the Council to be effective during the term of thesucceeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the officersand personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budgetthereof for submission to the Department of Budget andManagement (DBM);

(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies andstandards for metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service and regulatory fees,



and impose and collect fines and penalties." Jjä sc

Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven(7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management whichincludes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects torationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use

of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. Italso covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of roadregulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, trafficengineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of asingle ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service,the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and"coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic managementprograms." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketingsystem," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:

formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. Thereis no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, letalone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegatedany legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the generalwelfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charteritself, a "development authority."[30] It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national governmentagencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private

sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vastmetropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and theseare actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority . -- –x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring andcoordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatoryand supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wideservices within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomyof the local government units concerning purely localmatters."[31]

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. IntermediateAppellate Court[32] where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the MetroManila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of policepower. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,[33] whilethe second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition



discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.[34]

Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondentBAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Villageand the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as thedeveloper of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive

easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. Thesewere the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on thelots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes.Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments inviolation of the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporationushered in the full commercialization" of Jupiter Street by tearing down theperimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of thevillage.[35]

The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council

of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC).Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone,with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. TheMunicipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive ZoningOrdinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No.81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and theblock adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.[36]

We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundarybetween Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for theexclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said

street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocksbut simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, AyalaCorporation did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr

We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimateexercise of police power.[37] The power of the MMC and the Makati MunicipalCouncil to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the"deed restrictions".

In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter

Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of "trafficdecongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was opened by the MunicipalMayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to theVillage.[38] The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular trafficof Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in OrbitStreet was also made under the police power of the municipal government. Thegate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because ithindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by themayor was proper and legal.[39]



Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply tothe case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by themunicipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for theproposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22,1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The noticedoes not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter"to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenientmovement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By nostretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express orimplied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, anexamination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the

MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were notbestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex

Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.824. It comprised the Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4)cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalitiesof Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros,Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, andValenzuela in the province of Bulacan.[40] Metropolitan Manila was created as aresponse to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous

and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective localgovernments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and this coordination, "especiallyin the maintenance of peace and order and the eradication of social and economicills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of reformmeasures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State."[41]

Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with thefollowing powers: Calrs-pped

"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.—There is herebycreated a public corporation, to be known as the MetropolitanManila, vested with powers and attributes of a corporationincluding the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and disposeof property and such other powers as are necessary tocarry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be administeredby a Commission created under this Decree."[42]



The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro ManilaCommission (MMC) vested with the following powers:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - TheCommission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. To act as a central government to establish andadminister programs and provide services common to thearea;

2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow andexpend money and issue bonds, revenue certificates, and otherobligations of indebtedness. Existing tax measures should,however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified orrepealed by the Commission;

3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;

4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitangovernment and review appropriations for the city and municipalunits within its jurisdiction with authority to disapprove the sameif found to be not in accordance with the established policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;

5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances,

resolutions and acts of cities and municipalities withinMetropolitan Manila;

6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fixpenalties for any violation thereof which shall not exceeda fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or bothsuch fine and imprisonment for a single offense;

7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-makingfunctions;

8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall directthe fire services of the city and municipal governments in themetropolitan area;

9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shalldirect garbage collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;

10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which



shall direct traffic activities; Jjjuris

11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activitiespertaining to essential services such as transportation, floodcontrol and drainage, water supply and sewerage, social, healthand environmental services, housing, park development, and

others;

12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensivesocial, economic and physical planning and development of thearea;

13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation inthe affairs of their respective local governments and to propose tothe President of the Philippines definite programs and policies forimplementation;

14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscalyear an annual report to the President of the Philippines and tosubmit a periodic report whenever deemed necessary; and

15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed bythe President of the Philippines." ScÓ jj

The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area.As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special

assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriatemoney for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the cityand municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact orapprove ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinancesand resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal allordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13)municipalities comprising Metro Manila.

P. D. No. 824 further provided:

"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four

cities and thirteen municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shallcontinue to exist in their present form except as may beinconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existingcity and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall,upon promulgation of this Decree, and until December 31,1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan whichis hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.



In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as manybarangay captains as may be determined and chosen by theCommission, and such number of representatives from othersectors of the society as may be appointed by the President uponrecommendation of the Commission.

x x x.

The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to theCommission ordinances, resolutions or such measures as itmay adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance, resolution ormeasure shall become effective, until after its approval bythe Commission; and Provided further, that the power toimpose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriatemoney and the power to pass ordinances or resolutionswith penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in theCommission."

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of theSangguniang Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component cityand municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoralrepresentatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had thepower to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions ormeasures. It was the MMC itself, however, that possessed legislativepowers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by theSangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC’s approval. Moreover, the powerto impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the powerto pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in

the MMC. Sce-dp

Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMCwhich fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislativepowers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject toreview and approval by the MMC.

After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor torestore the autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence,Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided: Sjä cj

"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republicof the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays. There shall be autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy localautonomy."



The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitanregions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potentialequivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.[43] Section 11 of the same Article Xthus provided:

"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special

metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as setforth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities andmunicipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall beentitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby becreated shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."

The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create"special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval bya majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected;the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring

coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shallretain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislativeassemblies.[44] Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of theConstitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute theMetropolitan Authority, viz:

"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the Presidentmay constitute the Metropolitan Authority to be composed of theheads of all local government units comprising the MetropolitanManila area."[45]

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 andconstituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers andfunctions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA.[46] It ought to bestressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC werepassed to the MMA. The MMA’s power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila."[47]The MMA’s governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, althoughcomposed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, wasmerely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2)promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.[48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarilyresponsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. TheMMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involvingbasic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislativepower. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technicalassistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of



legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by thelocal legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments andwith the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise thelocal governments accordingly."[49]

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special

development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "specialdevelopment authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to theautonomy of the affected local government units." The character of theMMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced byseveral legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It waspresented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on LocalGovernments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of Committee consultations with the local government units in the National CapitalRegion (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,[50] and career officials

of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on LocalGovernments, the following debate took place:

"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. Thishas been debated a long time ago, you know. It’s a special… wecan create a special metropolitan political subdivision. Supremeä

Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for inthe Constitution: barangay, municipality, city, province, and wehave the Autonomous Region of Mindanao and we have theCordillera. So we have 6. Now….

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous Region, that is also specifically mandated by theConstitution.

THE CHAIRMAN: That’s correct. But it is considered to be apolitical subdivision. What is the meaning of a politicalsubdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its owngovernment, it has its own political personality, it has thepower to tax, and all governmental powers: police power

and everything. All right. Authority is different; because itdoes not have its own government. It is only a council, it isan organization of political subdivision, powers, ‘no, whichis not imbued with any political power. Esmmis

If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functionsof the Metro Manila Development Authority, it is purelycoordinative. And it provides here that the council ispolicy-making. All right.



Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority withcoordinative power. Meaning to say, it coordinates all of thedifferent basic services which have to be delivered to theconstituency. All right.

There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective… as a

political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected andguaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other localgovernment units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will bemembers and then set up a policy in order that the basic services can beeffectively coordinated. All right. justice

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive.We have to provide some funds, resources. But it does notpossess any political power. We do not elect the Governor.We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was

trying to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sueand be sued because it coordinates. All right. It coordinatespractically all these basic services so that the flow and thedistribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic,we cannot deny that. It’s before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control,water system, peace and order, we cannot deny these. It’s righton our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be theright solution? All right, we envision that there should be acoordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if youdo not want to call it an authority, it’s alright. We may call it acouncil or maybe a management agency.

x x x."[51]

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The powerdelegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgateadministrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’sfunctions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances andregulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bill’spresentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p

"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggestedrevision. I think this was already approved before, but it wasreconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to make the MMDAstronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f"… Andthen next is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approvemetro-wide plans, programs and projects and issueordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDAto carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the



powers? Does the MMDA … because that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.

HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. Whenwe say that it has the policies, it’s very clear that those policiesmust be followed. Otherwise, what’s the use of empowering it to

come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of aresolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term"ordinance" in this case really gives it more teeth, your honor.Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you have thepower to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as inthe case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he willagree that that is the case now. You’ve got the power to set apolicy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say let’s callit an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.

THE CHAIRMAN: That’s very nice. I like that. However, there is a

constitutional impediment. You are making this MMDA apolitical subdivision. The creation of the MMDA would besubject to a plebiscite. That is what I’m trying to avoid.I’ve been trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Underthe Constitution it states: if it is a political subdivision,once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I’mtrying to make this as administrative. That’s why we placethe Chairman as a cabinet rank.

HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you aresaying there is ….

THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a politicalexercise. Believe me.

HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed intoissuances of rules and regulations. That would be … itshall also be enforced. Jksmä â Ó

HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will ….

HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of suchrule, you impose a sanction. But you know, ordinance hasa different legal connotation.

HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, yourHonor. sc

THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules andregulations.



HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they areactually considering resolutions now.

THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.

HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions."[52]

The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to theHouse of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that theproposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a "national agency, not apolitical government unit."[53] The explanatory note was adopted as thesponsorship speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations ordebates were made on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill wasapproved on second reading on the same day it was presented.[54]

When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originallyconceived in the House of Representatives.[55]

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit ora public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, ArticleX of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the politicalunits directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official electedby the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of acabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties asmay be assigned to him by the President,[57] whereas in local government units,the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes theadministrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as theMMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power toenact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the localgovernment units, acting through their respective legislative councils, thatpossess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the

opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA isillegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist fromruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso

We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts tosolve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams andtraffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards andavenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motoristsand pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people’s



productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. TheMMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation systembut unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its goodintentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a privatesubdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the preservation of the rule of law. Sdjad

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

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