Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 12 (1984/85)235--251 235 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam -- Printed in The Netherlands

PSYCHOSOCIAL ORIGINS OF CONFLICT OVER PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES

ALAN MILLER

University of New Brunswick, Department of Psychology, Bag Service No. 45444, Fredericton, N.B. E3B 6E4 (Canada)

(Accepted for publication 18 October 1984)

ABSTRACT

Miller, A., 1985. Psychosocial origins of conflict over pest control strategies. Agric. Ecosystems Environ., 12: 235--251.

The achievement of consensus on strategies of pest control continues to be an elusive goal, one that is hindered by continuing, and often acrimonious, conflict. Psychosocial factors, such as personal biases, play an important, often hidden role, in maintaining mutual misunderstanding and hostility. One result of personal biases, such as intellectual preferences or styles, is that radically different perceptions of the "problem" are held by antagonists. As a consequence, there is little chance of developing common ground upon which to discuss solutions. In this paper, the role of intellectual style in the spruce budworm controversy is outlined, together with a discussion of the more general prob- lems that personal biases create in the development of integrated pest management strategies.

INTRODUCTION

The ach ievement o f consensus on strategies o f pest con t ro l has b e c o m e an elusive goal, one t ha t Geier (1982) likens to a game p layed for high stakes by dis t inct parties, each wi th its own set o f vested interests . Thus , " each pa r t y . . . sees pest con t ro l opera t ions f rom its o w n par t icular view- po in t , d e t e rmined by the special in teres t tha t a pa r ty takes . . . Because o f this, each pa r ty would bend the rules o f the game o f pest con t ro l to its own advantage -- o f t en w i t h o u t t oo m u c h cons idera t ion for the inter- ests o f the o ther (s ) . . . , howeve r legi t imate those might b e " (p. 253).

I t fo l lows tha t conf l i c t r a the r than consensus is the p r e d o m i n a n t con- sequence . Ideally, one wou ld like to see these disputes min imized or, at the ve ry least, t u rned in to cons t ruc t ive dialogue. However , as Geier notes , we are far f r om this h a p p y state, one tha t requires, n o t on ly pa t ience , bu t also an unders tand ing o f the " g a m e " , i.e., w h o the part ies are and the special interests t h e y may be incl ined to pursue. I t is the la t te r t ha t is o f in teres t here. In wha t fol lows, I shall examine the way in which one

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set of special interests, personal biases, influence the conception of, and research on, pest control problems. The spruce budworm problem is used as the case in point.

THE ROLE OF PERSONAL BIASES IN DISPUTES

All environmental problem-solving is conducted on at least two levels. On the surface there is often the appearance of rationality, with the various parties offering arguments, exchanging viewpoints, discussing or disputing the interpretation of data, and in various other ways attempting to com- municate. Indeed, all concerned may have, or believe themselves to have a genuine interest in actually solving the problem at hand. Yet communica- tion may not be achieved, with the result that " the debate on a whole spectrum of environmental issues abounds with charges of irrationality, sentiment and emotion -- on both sides. Too often, the protagonists face each other in a spirit of exasperation, talking past each other with mutual incomprehension. It is a dialogue of " the blind talking to the deaf" (Cot- grove, 1982, p. 33). At the root of these problems in communicat ion and understanding lie differences in the paradigms subscribed to by each side (Barmark and Wallen, 1979a; Cotgrove, 1982; Perkins, 1982). Paradigms, acting as coherent sets of beliefs and values, provide a frame of reference within which actions and events are interpreted, and made meaningful. The biasing effect of one's own paradigm is due to the difficulty one has in understanding, or accepting, behaviour based on alternative paradigms. Thus, " to adopt a new paradigm is frequently akin to a conversion ex- perience. Once you have come to see the world from the new viewpoint, it is hard to switch and to imagine how you saw it before" (Cotgrove, 1982, p. 33).

As no single paradigm provides a monopoly on the " t ru th" , and as ad- vances in pest control strategies would seem to require greater co-operation between disputing factions, it is crucial that individuals attain greater in- sight into the influence of paradigms on their own, and others', behaviour. This is no easy matter, for paradigms act at a covert level, with little or no conscious awareness. However, some aspects of paradigms are more amenable to analysis than others. For instance, while paradigms are com- posed of a set of beliefs and values, together with assumptions about legi- t imate forms of thinking and reasoning, it is relatively easy to gain insight into the former, but not the latter. Thus, one of the most subtle and least recognized forms of personal bias is that of one's thinking and reasoning style, i.e., intellectual style. Because it is seldom recognized or understood, its influence on communicat ion is pervasive and frequently disruptive. The nature and consequences of "intellectual styles" are, therefore, the focus of this paper.

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INTELLECTUALSTYLES

An intellectual style is a consistent way of approaching problems. Rather than reflecting disciplinary knowledge or level of intelligence, a style has to do with the manner in which a problem is tackled, i.e., do individuals take a broad or narrow perspective; do they avoid subjective information; are they factually orientated; do they prefer detailed analyses to broad syntheses, and so on. Underlying these differences in style are fundamental beliefs about knowledge, how it should be developed and used. The version of intellectual styles discussed here is a synthesis of ideas from a number of sources, all of which use the notion of psychological dimensions (Ack- off, 1974; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978; Carvajal, 1982; Cotgrove, 1982).

A psychological dimension is a way of depicting how people differ in some significant psychological way. Dimensions are usually bipolar, con- trasting opposed characteristics. It is assumed that individuals can be al- located a posit ion on the dimension which represents their preferences or behaviour. Although we may, on average, occupy a particular position on a dimension (i.e., behave in a consistent way), it is recognized that we vary over time, depending on situation and mood. This variation, how- ever, is likely to be within strict limits, for few of us seem able to adopt radically different styles at will. Two dimensions are commonly used to depict intellectual styles: the objective--subjective and separation--integra- tion dimensions.

Objective--subjective dimension

People differ in the extent to which they prefer to deal with "facts" as opposed to what they see as the subjective world of opinions, feelings and values. The objective end of this dimension represents a belief in facts as the only legitimate basis for knowledge, together with a conviction that intellect and reason can, and should, be kept separate from that of emotion and speculation. This objective view is further based on the belief there is a "real" world out there which is independent of the observer and can be mapped by the senses, given the availability of appropriate techniques. Those with a subjective view would tend to ridicule, or at least question, this belief in objectivity, dismissing it as a naive fantasy. To them, the not ion that one can be "object ive" in the sense of eliminating one's personal biases, or controlling one's emotional involvement, is simply wishful thinking. On the contrary, the subjective view holds that emotion and feelings provide a valuable source of information.

Separation--integration dimension

This dimension depicts differences in the degree to which analysis or synthesis is preferred in dealing with problems. Separation implies the

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reduction of the problem to a "manageable" size and the further s tudy of its individual components. It is assumed that explanations of the problem are to be attained by summation of information derived from the separate s tudy of these individual parts. Thus, the separation end of the dimension involves a reductive-analytical approach to problem-solving. Those who subscribe to a more integrative style argue that it is not possible to under- stand problems solely on the basis of analysis for there are emergent prop- erties of any system over and above the sum of its parts. Thus, instead of putting strict boundaries around a problem and proceeding "inwards" to a detailed analysis of its sub-components, the integration approach places a problem in its broader context , seeking understanding of the prob- lem through its relations with a larger whole. This is a holistic-systems strategy.

Types of thinking

Cotgrove (1982) and Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) have used these di- mensions to define four types of thinking or intellectual style (Fig. 1). Cotgrove's interest has been in describing styles shown by industrialists, trade unionists, environmentalists and other social groupings. However, Mitroff and Kilmann have identified virtually identical styles amongst groups of scientists, details of which are summarized in Table I. This finding of consistent intellectual differences amongst scientists helps one under- stand why there are so many conflicts within the scientific communi ty for, as we shall see later, those with different styles often find it difficult to communicate. The four styles described in Fig. 1 bear some similarity to distinctions previously used in discussing pest control and agricultural methods. For instance, Perkins' (1982) distinction between adherents

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240

of the chemical control paradigm as opposed to proponents of integrated pest management clearly parallels the reductionist and holistic styles, re- spectively. In addition, the analytical and holistic sciences underlying con- ventional and alternative agriculture (van Melsen, 1980) resemble the dis- tinction between reductionist and humanist styles. However, the advantage of the two-dimensional typology offered here is that it allows for greater precision in describing differences in thinking and reasoning.

Rather than spending more time on an abstract discussion of these styles, it would be more useful to examine the way in which they influence beha- viour in a particular case, the spruce budworm problem.

INTELLECTUAL STYLES AND THE SPRUCE BUDWORM PROBLEM

The spruce budworm (Choristoneura fumiferana) is an endemic pest that has reached epidemic levels of infestation in the spruce-fir forests of eastern Canada, particularly in New Brunswick. The insect became a significant pest only when the Provincial forest industries became dependent on the product ion of pulp and paper for their commercial viability. In an a t tempt to protect valuable sof twood species, the provincial government has undertaken, since 1952, a chemical spray programme which covers an area of 3 million hectares annually. The spray programme is implemented each year in the face of growing resistance from environmental groups who demand that the use of chemical pesticides be s topped on the grounds of public health hazards and damage to the environment. Thus, the "spruce budworm problem", like so many environmental issues, is an often acri- monious argument involving scientists, bureaucrats, industrialists, producers, environmental groups and a perplexed public. To complicate matters further, the debate takes place in the context of changing world markets and in- creasing international competi t ion. The questions of interest here are: how do the four intellectual types perceive the budworm problem and how does this perception influence the kinds of solution that are generated? What one would anticipate is that each intellectual type would tend to see a different "problem", or to focus on different aspects of it. Not only would this limit the kind of solutions produced, but it also means that there is little common ground upon which to establish dialogue with other types. In what follows, an a t tempt is made to depict the behaviour of each intellectual type, bearing in mind that it is necessary to simplify the discussion. One cannot, in the limited space here, deal with all the varia- tions that are likely to occur within each type.

Reductionist (analytical scientist)

This is the style of thinking that predominates among government and industrial scientists, as well as amongst those bureaucrats whose training is scientific. In essence, it reflects the reductive-analytical training at the

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core of tradit ional scientific and technical education. Such individuals see themselves as impartial, objective, technical persons involved in obtaining the kind of scientific informat ion that will allow the ref inement and im- provement of the basically sound pest management strategies already in place. Typically, they contrast themselves with what they see as the over- emotional , irrational and largely uninformed environmentalists who ap- pear bent on disrupting the ongoing scientific process, a process that is best left to technical experts. For example, the former Minister of Natural Resources (Bird, 1979, p. 2) notes in a presentation to the Canadian Pest Management Society:

"The real danger we face in our forest industry' today is not the budworm itself, the real danger lies . . . in that adverse public influence . . . which (is) based on in- accurate information, on hearsay, on gossip, on innuendo and on fear. I f . . . a nega- tive public influence is permitted to grow and to prevail, then the budworm battle will be lost, not through failure of the spray programme . . . but rather through our own failure to maintain public confidence in the difficult decisions which must be made if we are to save our softwood forests and the lifestyle in N.B. which is so dependent upon them."

The "separa t ion" aspect of this style is seen in a t tempts to limit the "prob- l em" by asserting the primacy of its technical and engineering aspects. This does not mean that reductionists are unaware of the political and social elements, but rather that they do not see the latter as part of the "real p rob lem" and, thus, not really within their professional jurisdiction. Hence the words of admonishment f rom Bird, pointing out tha t scientists need to expand their concept ion of their responsibility and reassure the public: "To build public confidence and to maintain a positive public influence concerning the budworm protect ion programme . . . to com- municate with our citizens effectively about the problems and the solu- t ions" (p. 3). The implication is tha t the reductionist 's view of the prob- lem is correct , that the solutions they have developed are the best available and tha t scientists should take an active role in convincing the public tha t this is so. This belief that the technical experts should "educa te" the public for the public's own good, together with the view that the public is some- thing of a nuisance, is a theme of ten advanced by resource managers (Mil- ler, 1982a).

It follows from the above that the percept ion of the "spruce budworm prob lem" by reductionists is very narrow. This limited view is founded on the belief that the basic aim of the pest control programme should be to minimize damage to the host species, thereby protecting the economic viability of the pulp industries. Thus the problem is defined as a budworm epidemic, a single insect species tha t has exceeded tolerable levels and needs to be brought back under control . The terms used in describing policy reflect these basic assumptions. One sees, for example, concentra- t ion on the insect in "pest con t ro l" , on biocidal strategies in "spray pro- g ramme" and on protect ing the host in "crop protect ion programme".

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Since b r oa de r ecological and socio-poli t ical fac tors are n o t par t o f the p r ob l e m def in i t ion , and are no t re f l ec ted in the available t e rmino logy , t he n t h e y c a nno t be i nco rpo ra t ed in to p rob lem solut ions. As Baskerville (1976, p. 1) notes: " t h e historical c rop p r o t e c t i o n p rog ramme has been t r ea ted as a simple, s t ra igh t forward p r o c e d u r e and this has a ided in the f o r m a t i o n o f a r a the r unrealist ic view of the p rob lem on the par t of m a n y profess ionals" .

Given the r educ t ion i s t pe rcep t ion o f the p rob lem as largely technical , and a m a t t e r o f insect con t ro l , i t fol lows tha t the solut ions which have been deve loped are pr imar i ly technica l and biocidal. The so lu t ion to the b u d w o r m p rob lem is to kill t he insect in suff ic ient number s so as to mini- mize damage to the hos t species. As n o t e d earlier, this is seen as being highly successful , a l though wi th some u n f o r t u n a t e side effects , while al- te rna t ive strategies are said no t to be available:

"There are some simple, yet profound truths . . . The budworm protection pro- gramme has been a tremendous success. It has preserved our forest environment and our forest economy. Another truth is that there are no options presently avail- able to deal with the budworm, except the existing spray programme. Of the entire f i f teen optional areas of research and development mentioned by Dr. Baskerville in his 1976 report, none except the spraying of insecticides has been advanced to even reasonable levels of effectiveness. The main truth is that, although the spray programme is not very desirable . . . it is the only option available to us at this time, and may remain so for years to come." (Bird, 1979, p. 5).

I t wou ld be interes t ing at this po in t to cons ider h o w the reduct ion is t s deal wi th cri t icism and evidence t ha t is co n t r a ry to the i r beliefs. Perkins (1982) argues tha t the chemical con t ro l paradigm has fallen o u t of favour among research en tomolog is t s in agricul ture, a l though this demise has no t ye t been re f l ec ted in farming pract ice . Presumably , amongs t scientists, t he re has been a shif t towards m o r e ecological ly-based strategies such as to ta l popu l a t i on m a n a g e m e n t (TPM). In o rder to make this shif t it would be necessary for those involved to recons ider the way in which t h ey per- ceive the p rob lem, b roaden ing it to i nco rpora t e o th e r aspects o f the envi- r o n m e n t . A similar change appears to be occurr ing in New Brunswick with regard t o the spruce b u d w o r m p rob lem, a l though the re remains an en- t r e n c h e d b o d y o f professionals who, ra the r t h an re- formula t ing the prob- lem, s imply reaf f i rm the i r c o m m i t m e n t to establ ished percep t ions , advo- cating m o r e intensive e f for t s along the same lines:

"Our funding of research, testing and monitoring activities must cont inue to in- crease. Only by the most caut ious se lect ion o f the best chemical formulations we can find, by careful development of the best application techniques, and by intensive control and monitor ing of the results of our efforts, can we successfully combat the budworm" (Bird, 1979, p. 7).

However , critics o f the analyt ical scientist 's way o f perceiving and dealing with t he " p r o b l e m " will n o t be placated. T h e y argue tha t the analyt ical approach is no t impar t ia l and object ive , as scientists claim, b u t ra ther :

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shows an unfortunate tendency (as we have noted) to reductionist views and technological determinism: a partiality toward the needs of t he major forest industries; a passion for secrecy; a strong wish to maintain managerial control in the hands of technical experts and, an unwillingness to incorpo- rate public views into the decision-making process. Perhaps most damning of all is the criticism that the reductionist approach leads the analytical scientists to deal only with the symptoms of the problem (the budworm plague) rather than the roots of the problem (inadequate forest policy).

Holists (systems theorists)

Holists share with the analytical scientist a faith in objectivity, scientific method, empirical data and rational procedures, but differ over the question of reductionism. Rather than the narrow perspective of the analytical scientist, the holist seeks to develop a more comprehensive picture of the problem at hand, one that takes into account its many, inter-connected parts. Systems modellers are a good example of what might be called ob- jective holism. They appear to believe that it is possible, given time and effort, to depict the complex relationships in ecosystems in mathematical terms, their goal being to develop the techniques for doing so. In addition, there is no implication of the anti~stablishment rhetoric that one usually associates with the humanist style. Systems theorists seem to be comfortable working within the established order.

The spruce budworm problem has been the focus of intensive modelling efforts involving scientists at all levels from provincial to international (Holling, 1978). The MFRC--UBC model that has emerged is, perhaps, the most comprehensive insectNforest simulation extant (Cuff and Basker- ville, 1983). Underlying this model is a perception of the budworm problem that differs in significant ways from that of the analytical scientist. The shift in perception is typified by use of the term "budworm--forest prob- lem". This subtle change in title reflects a more comprehensive view in which the problem is seen, not primarily as an insect infestation, but a question of forest--insect dynamics and ecosystem resilience. Expansion of the problem definition, in this way, opens up the possibility of more varied "solutions", of which the biocidal strategy is but one. According to the holist perspective, a solution to the "budworm--forest" problem would involve the development of a more resilient ecosystem (in contrast to the brittleness of current monocultures) through the development of adaptive management strategies (Holling, 1978). The latter would require the use of ecological models in policy formation together with a more varied repertoire of pest control procedures; in other words, the devel- opment of appropriate forms of total population management and inte- grated pest management. Thus, "solutions" are seen as long-term, compre- hensive and involve re-structuring of the forest base.

Unfortunately, adoption of this holistic perspective has been slow, and

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progress towards holistic goals limited. Those involved in budworm model- ling in New Brunswick are finding that their models are not being used, at least to the extent that they would wish. Indeed, this seems to be a widespread phenomenon, with ecological modellers finding that their ef- forts are not informing policy formation to any significant degree, and leaving them wondering why (Clarke, 1983). In response to this problem, holists could make some a t tempt to question their assumptions and re- conceptualize " the problem". As with analytical scientists, however, many appear to redouble their efforts along the same lines, seeking more and better data, and even more comprehensive models. The question, however, is whether this is a sensible strategy for, as van Melsen (1980) notes, the ideal of an holistic science, with its implication of total knowledge, may be unattainable.

Critics would argue that the big, ecosystem models are too complex and esoteric to be of much use, since their builders are often the only people who can understand them (Clarke, 1983; Mar, 1974). Furthermore, large models may give the appearance of soundness, but on closer inspection reveal empirical gaps filled by guesswork and assumption. When one adds to this the fact that many models have never been checked against empirical observation, then questions of validity become significant (Cuff, 1983). The more vociferous critics of quantitative modelling argue that the activity is an exercise in speculation that shows signs of delusions of grandeur, taking positivist and rational thought to its logical and absurd conclusion (Hoos, 1974). The most damning criticism of budworm and other similar a t tempts at modelling is that it totally omits the psychosocial domain. This appears to result from a number of factors, not the least of which are the predominantly biophysical training of modellers together with the difficulty in incorporating qualitative psychosocial variables into quan- titative models. Since, psychosocial variables are no t part of the definition of the "budworm-- fores t" problem, then they cannot become part of the solution. Holists, therefore, are limited to primarily biophysical solutions, unless they are willing and able to expand their problem definition.

Humanists

Of all the intellectual types discussed here, humanists are the most varied and the most difficult to typify. There are, however, some common char- acteristics underlying this way of thinking. Most humanists do not reject objectivity, but are suspicious of a total reliance on it. Rather, they would seek a greater respectability for the subjective aspects of thought, such as intuitions, feelings and values, as well as a more central role for lay people in environmental decisions. It follows that humanists tend to take an in- tegrative view, one that can include both subjective and objective data, as well as technical and psychosocial factors. However, the more extreme examples of this type of thinking may depend on their "sense" of the

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problem at hand, basing this, and possible solutions on an ideological com- mitment to, for example, the oneness of Man and Nature. Thus, there may be a certain impatience with analytical detail and, hence, an unfamil- iarity with the complexities of technical data.

Humanists are to be found scattered throughout the scientific community, but are more concentrated, and perhaps more evident, in environmental interest groups. Many of the latter would see themselves as protecting human rights against the growing totalitarianism of science, technology and big business, a trend they see as being both politically dangerous and dehumanizing in scale. A particular target for their anger is the technical expert, who, they argue, simply fuels technological depredations while profes- sing objectivity and impartiality. Thus in formulating the "problem", environ- mentalists, and other humanists, have three main aims: to point out the subjective bias in the work of technical experts; to obtain participation in the environmental decision-making process, thereby breaking the mono- poly of the technical expert; and to resist "bigness" in environmental man- agement in the form of centralization of power and industrial concentra- tion. In contrast to these trends, they seek to encourage decentralization, small-scale industry and a form of resource pluralism (Cotgrove, 1982).

Given these aims, it follows that humanists emphasize the psychosocial, "human" aspects of environmental problems. Thus, the budworm prob- lem is seen by the humanist as a budworm--forest--people issue, with the "people" aspect being composed of, not only the general public, but also technical and bureaucratic personnel. The latter, therefore, are seen as part of the problem as well as, potentially, part of the solution. Although the problem is expanded to its broadest perspective by some humanists, there is also a tendency to pay less attention to its technical aspects. This difference in orientation means that solutions to the budworm dilemma are sought in somewhat different directions from that of the analytical scientist and holist. For example, the question becomes not how to kill the moth (analytical scientist) or how to develop a more resilient ecosys- tem by technical means (holist) but, rather, how to develop a man--forest interaction that will guarantee the development of a healthy society and forest resource. For many humanists, this does not simply mean full em- ployment in current forest industries and continued dependence on business monopolies, monocultures and the whims of world markets, but implies a radical restructuring of the forest and its dependent forest industries in pursuit of decentralization of power and individual self-sufficiency. Consequently, a humanist solution to the "budworm--forest--people" problem has political overtones. It requires, for implementation, the devel- opment of a political decision-making structure that encourages genuine public participation in environmental policy making and a continuing dialogue over such matters as pest control strategies. An interesting example of this view has been produced by a New Brunswick environmental group (Schuyler, 1982):

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" T h e p r imary goal of fo res t ry m a n a g e m e n t should be to m a x i m i z e t he p r o d u c t i v e use of the fores t - - and b y " p r o d u c t i v e " I m e a n t h a t the fores t sus ta ins b o t h e c o n o m i c and rec rea t iona l act ivi t ies to t he m a x i m u m e x t e n t possible w i t h o u t ha rming or e rod ing the fores t as a resource . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the sp ray p r og r am has b e e n used for over t h i r t y years as a subst i - t u t e for p r o p e r fores t m a n a g e m e n t . Like t he World War I general w h o has no n e w

ideas, t he on ly t h ing i n d u s t r y and g o v e r n m e n t officials can c o m e up w i th is more spray. The Canad ian F o r e s t r y Service says t h a t the b u d w o r m s i tua t ion in the New Brunswick fores t parallels the s i t ua t ion in 1974 and t h a t insuf f ic ien t con t ro l in 1975 caused d e t e r i o r a t i o n in the h e a l t h o f the forest . Yet in 1975 , 6.8 mi l l ion acres were sprayed - - m u c h o f i t twice - - w i t h t h r ee or four d i f f e ren t chemicals , and in 1976 , 10 mi l l ion acres were sp rayed wi th five d i f f e ren t chemicals . Wha t in heaven ' s n a m e is " s u f f i c i e n t " ? When, a f t e r t h r ee decades , t he b u d w o r m is spread ing and t he fores t is in worse shape, it is shock ing ly clear t h a t the spray p rog ram has fai led as an effec- t ive m a n a g e m e n t too l . In New Brunswick we need a mixed fores t and we need a wider var ie ty o f e c o n o m i c act ivi t ies to go w i th t h a t m i x e d forest . This means r e t h i n k i n g our ideas a b o u t h o w to use the forest . I t means ge t t ing fresh ideas a b o u t h o w to resusc i ta te the fores t e c o n o m y . For all of t he jobs t h a t fo res t ry supposed ly provides , t he re is e n o r m o u s u n e m p l o y m e n t in N e w Brunswick . C a n ' t we figure o u t b e t t e r ways to use the fores t to sus ta in h igher e m p l o y m e n t and a hea l th i e r e c o n o m y ? Must we c o n t i n u e to d e p e n d so heavi ly o n pu lp a n d paper , which , in New Brunswick , means d e p e n d e n c e o n soft- w o o d s and o n sp rays?"

Thus, while humanists reject a total reliance on chemical control, they appear to go beyond advocacy of integrated pest management, adding a political dimension to their request (or demand) for a reformulation of forest policy. This is a very different perception of the spruce budworm problem from those described so far for it offers the option of seeing the budworm issue as a non-problem. In other words, there is a "spruce bud- worm problem" only as long as the Province of New Brunswick places such emphasis on the pulp and paper industry.

Critics of the humanist position argue that such views are technically and economically naive. Everyone, including the technical experts, would like to have a mixed forest, with a different species composit ion and age structure, together with a more diversified industrial base, but the techni- cal difficulties are immense. Even if some of the latter could be solved, one is still left with developing new markets, training people in new skills, relocating skilled workers and, investing in new industrial plant. On top of this, there are the political problems involved in achieving public con- sensus, and persuading the electorate to bear the cost of a massive restruc- turing. In the meanwhile, the more immediate problem of protecting soft- woods still remains. Thus, the humanist perspective is seen by critics as idealistic.

Mystics

Although the role of mystics in the budworm case is indirect and in- tangible, it is nevertheless important, for it provides a philosophical back-

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ground to the debate. For the mystic, the origins of environmental prob- lems lie within the individual psyche, caused by Man's wrong relations with Nature which, in turn, derive from unexamined conflicts within us. As a consequence, we have developed a distorted view of ourselves and our place in nature, one that displays the kind of arrogance that lends itself to the destruction we see around us (van Melsen, 1980}. Thus, the budworm problem may be seen as a budworm--fores t - -people problem but, in actuality, it is really a symptom of a deeper malaise, our warped consciousness. Solutions to the "problem", therefore, are necessarily per- sonal and introspective, a matter of coming to grips with our distorted values and irrational desires. Once this healing process begins, then the environmental consequences of this unhealthy mentali ty can be dealt with (Roszak, 1973). This "myst ical" view, if that is the right way to describe it, is now a well established component of a growing criticism of positivist science and its consequences (Jones, 1983; Nandy, 1983). As such, it ap- pears to offer the fundamental truth that our "environmental problems" are in large part a function of our excessive demands on a fragile ecosys- tem and that we need to undertake a fundamental re-appraisal of our values.

To its critics, however, the remoteness of this perspective from the prac- ticalities of the "real" world makes it appear naive, even criminally negligent. For example, in New Brunswick, the mystical view is associated with the minority position of non-intervention in the forest, i.e., the chemical spray programme should be s topped and nature allowed to take its course. The immediate consequence of this would be massive sof twood destruction followed by additional problems such as increased fire hazard and large- scale unemployment . Evidently, to the mystic, these risks are worth taking in pursuit of the more important, long-term goal of a healthy man--environ- ment relationship. However, even this goal may be unrealistic for, as critics have pointed out , calls for the development of a healthy psyche, with its implications of moderat ion and frugality, have echoed down the cen- turies, particularly in religious thought. One might question the extent to which the majori ty listen to these admonitions: "Despite (evidence) that people have begun to rediscover the moral ideal of self-imposed re- straint, the obstacles to a wholesale move in that direction remain very imposing. It may well turn out that human appeti te will not be, cannot be, moderated. On a planet teeming with four or eight or twelve billion people, examples of restraint may remain what they are now: a series of minor, isolated gestures, unthinkable to the starving, unacceptable to the aspiring, unappealing to the aff luent" (Worster, 1983, p. 174).

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEST CONTROL

I have a t tempted to show, in rather stereotypical terms, the way in which the four intellectual styles influence the perception of problems and their solutions. In each case, the "p rob lem" is seen differently, with

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the consequence that radically different solutions are proposed. It is un- for tunate that the proponents of each style tend to believe that they see to the heart of the matter and, therefore, know best how to deal with the problem. However, it is clear from the above that each intellectual style leads only to a partial perception of the budworm problem, and that none can be seen as the whole " t ruth" . To get closer to the latter, I would suggest the need to integrate all four perspectives, in the hope that the weaknesses of each will be compensated for by the strengths of others. For example, the narrowly technical perspective of the reductionists could be supplemented by the broader view of the holists and the sociopolitical sophistication of the humanists. On the other hand, the flights of fancy indulged in by the humanists and systems modellers would be brought under the scrutiny of the analytical scientists. The implication of this is that pest management needs to be based on an integrated perspective which can only be achieved through constructive dialogue amongst the four in- tellectual types. Any other conceptual base will be incomplete and not lead to a solution. Whether this co-operation can be achieved is a question to which we now turn.

It is unfor tunate that representatives of each intellectual style tend to be firmly convinced of their recti tude and the wrong-headedness of everyone else, for this produces more conflict than constructive dialogue. For example the verbal and sometimes physical battles between reduction- ists and humanists are well known. In connection with the budworm prob- lem, the titles of Elizabeth May's (1977, 1982) writing on the subject conveys something of the nature of the dialogue. Perhaps less well known are the debilitating arguments that frequently occur, within the scientific communi ty , between the analytical scientists and the systems theorists. In one project after another, it is reported that the two groups experience great difficulty in co-operating with one another (Barmark and Wallen, 1979a; Miller, 1983, 1984a). Given this tendency toward conflict, the question is what can be done to enhance cooperation?

If it were simply a matter of getting opposed parties together for rational discussion and negotiation, then there would be little problem. Clearly, however, matters are not so straightforward. First, the four intellectual styles are not sets of att i tudes that can be adopted and then discarded at will, depending on mood and situation. They are much more deep-seated, exerting a pervasive influence on the individual's behaviour, of ten at a covert level. As Barmark and Wallen (1979b) point out, to confront scien- tists differing in intellectual style "can be more complicated than merely confronting theories. It is to confront two research styles, two ways of being scientists, two kinds of personal knowledge, two kinds of scientific ideals. Rational and irrational factors made the confrontat ion difficult. One tradition sees the other as a threat". In addition, Hudson (1966) and Witkin et al. (1979) have found that similar styles to those described here are adopted early in childhood, become embedded in the individual's per-

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sonality and appear to be resistant to traditional forms of education. Thus, despite good intentions, proponents of each style may find it difficult to co-operate with one another in the absence of professional help; a matter to be discussed shortly. A second barrier to co-operation has to do with the identity developed by proponents of each style. Perkins {1982) argues that the professional identity of research entomologists has revolved around service to the technically sophisticated farmer. Thus their motivations, purposes, and often financial support are closely linked to the needs of capital intensive agriculture. Similarly, in New Brunswick, the reductionist and holist scientists would appear to be closely identified with the goals of both the Provincial government and the forest industries. In other words, they seek to work within, and derive their professional identify from, the established order. On the other hand, the identity of humanists and mystics includes a strong anti-establishment component, one that seeks to wrest power from the technocrats and bureaucrats. One can see that there would be a fear on both sides that in "fraternizing with the enemy" one might lose one's sense of purpose and that, after becoming familiar with opposing views, one's own allegiances may become less compelling. This fear of being co-opted, and then neutralized, is exceptionally strong amongst environmental groups, as I found recently in attempting to set-up a conflict resolution study involving the various styles.

To be successful in overcoming these fears, and other psychological barriers to co-operation, one needs the help of behavioural methods that are not commonly associated with environmental management. Thus, in talking of short-term expedients, there is reason to be optimistic, for the problem of conflict resolution is an old story about which much is known. Thus, the fields of industrial relations and management science, as well as psychology have much to offer. For instance the conciliation and mediation techniques that are successful in dealing with industrial disputes are currently being applied to environmental issues {Accord Asso- ciates, 1983). In addition, a variety of conflict resolution and problem- solving strategies are also available {Miller, 1984b).

The long-term strategy for improving level of co-operation requires educational reform in two areas: the encouragement of more interdisci- plinary forms of education and, more attention to what might be called "personal development". With regard to interdisciplinarity, Furtick {1976, p. 32) notes: "There must be major changes in the educational and re- search patterns in the plant protection disciplines. Efficient research and training programs based on an integrated approach cannot be easily accom- modated under the rigid disciplinary approaches long institutionalized in centers of higher education and research". Similarly, the debilitating effect of personal biases, and other "irrational" processes, on the devel- opment of management schemes suggests the need for less preoccupation with the myth of rationality (Nandy, 1983) and more time being devoted to the development of self-insight and psychosocial understanding. Details

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of how this might be achieved are discussed elsewhere {Miller, 1982b}. Even if these reforms were to be adopted, however, successful co-oper-

ation would still require some genuine willingness to participate in the proceedings by the opposed parties. This willingness stems from the re- alization that one does not, after all, hold a monopoly on the truth and that one can engage in dialogue with profi t and wi thout fear of losing face, status or prestige. This is a difficult mental atmosphere to create, but a t tempts must be made if integrated forms of pest management are to be successfully implemented.

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