Project # 3-3

GCRC-SOP 7th Year International Workshop

Project # 3-3

Project 3-3: Risk and reliability analysis for efficient design supports

1. Research Background

2. Research Purpose

3. Summary of Research Results

4. Topic1• Risk/reliability based design support system

5. Topic2• Application of SIL technique

6. Conclusion & Future work

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Requirements of research

There are various risks such as oil and gas leakage, fire,

explosion, equipment failure in offshore-plant

(United States, 2015.3*)

Risk and reliability analysis Safety design

Reducing the risk, accident prevention is

needed.

2/38Project 3-3: Risk and reliability analysis for efficient design supports

How to ensure safety Risk based design: Design a system with low risk to reduce damage

based on risk analysis Reliability based design: Safety system reduce accidents caused by

failure in system

Reliability analysis

Design Reliable system

Risk analysisRisk control

optionSafety system

Risk-based

Reliability based

SIL verification


Whole period Risk/reliability-based design technology

• 1st stage Establishment of basis of core technology for system risk/reliability analysis Application of system risk/reliability analysis technique

• 2nd stage : Development of risk/reliability-based design support system

7th year (2017) Requirement analysis of risk/reliability based design support system Application of SIL (Safety Integrity Level) technique

Safety system with basic process control system SIL verification method


2nd stage

Development of risk/reliability-based design support system

1year- Requirement analysis of risk/reliability based design support system

- Application of SIL (Safety Integrity Level) technique

2year

- Establishment of risk/reliability DB

- Modularization of risk/reliability based design factor

3year

- Application of design/analysis/validation integrated concept

- Development of risk/reliability based integrated design support system

4year- Application of simulation for risk/reliability based design support system

validation

Purpose by year


Topic 1 Risk/reliability based design support system

Cost-benefit analysis

p gReliability based optimal design

Fuzzy-based analysis

Risk based optimal design

HAZID analysis

Concept

Overall safety requirements

Hazard and risk analysis

Overall scope definition

Safety requirements allocation

11

2

3

4

5

Overall planning

Overall installationand commissioning

12

Overall safety validation13

Overall operation, maintenance and repair

14

Decommissioning or disposal

16

Overall modification and retrofit

15

Safety life cycle – IEC 61508

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System analysis

Topic 2 Application of SIL (Safety Integrity Level) technique

• SIL verification• FPSO protection relay system, LNG bunkering ESD system

Protection relay system of FPSO ESD system of LNG bunkering

Results of SIL verification


Results of Topic 1

Fuzzy-based risk assessment

Qualitative, Quantitative risk assessment

HAZID, HAZOP analysis

Risk/reliability based optimum arrangement

Establishment of basis of core technology for system risk/reliability analysis

Application of system risk/reliability analysis technique

Cost-benefit analysis

Requirement analysis of risk/reliability based design support system

SIL verification 1st year

Phast, Flacs, PFD results etc.

Definition of risk/reliability-based Input features

Configuration of deep learning algorithm

Check the risk/reliability results using SILS modeling validation, etc.

Development of risk/reliability-based design support system

GCRC 1st stage

2nd year

3nd year

4nd year

Establishment of risk/reliabilityresult based DB

Modularization of risk/reliability based design factor

risk/reliability based design support system validation

Development of risk/reliability based integrated design support system

GCRC 2nd stage

System analysis


Analysis of risk/reliability based design support system System analysis (Model based systems engineering)

Requirements diagram

Usecase diagram



• IEC 61508-5 standard defines key calculations for evaluating SIL

Block Definition Diagram – Knowledge model



Activity Diagram



Block Definition Diagram - SIL verification and PFD calculation model

Sensor Logic solver

Final element

Tripsignal

Abnormalsignal


SIL (Safety Integrity Level)

Process safety system

IEC 61508

IEC 61511

• IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems

• IEC 61511: Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

• 070 – Norwegian oil and gas application of IEC 61508 and IEC61511 in the Norwegian petroleum industry: Review and analysis report to apply SIL-related IEC standards to petroleum industry


BPCS, SIS & SIF BPCS (Basic Process Control System) SIS (Safety Instrumented System) SIF (Safety Instrumented Function)

Logic Solver

Final Element

Sensor

SIS, SIF, SIL Relationship

Logic SolverSensor Final Element

SIF


SIL & PFDAVG Safety Integrity Level : SIL

• SIL : 1~4, large number is safer PFD : Probability of Failure on Demand

Source : IEC 61508-2 Table 2

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Relationship of SIL and PFDAVG

Project 3-3: Risk and reliability analysis for efficient design supports

SIL Verification To confirm that the current system design satisfies the target SIL

Example of process safety system

Requirement(Target SIL)

Designer(Result SIL)

SIL2

SIL2

SIL3

SIL3

SIL1

SIL2

SIL1

SIL3SIL3

SIL2SIL3

SIL2SIF

SIF

SIF

SIF

SIF

SIF

Target SIL ≤ Result SIL


SIL Verification Flowchart

Check the target SIL

IEC 61511

Target SIL determination

Definition of safety instrumented function (SIF)

System selection

Risk-based safety system analysis(HAZID, HAZOP, LOPA, etc.)

Calculation of PFD for result SIL Design change

SIF determination

Target SIL ≤ Result SIL

Calculation of PFD for result SIL

No

Yes


Results of Topic 2

Case study

Case study 1

Case study 2

FPSO

LNG bunkeringSemi-submersible

LNG fueled ship


System selection AGBAMI FPSO

• Operating from 2008 at Nigeria Agbami• Operated by Chevron, product 70,000 barrels Oil/day, Capacity of 2.15 million

barrels

Agbami FPSO

Agbami oil field at Nigeria Sea

- Case study 1 -Protection relay system of FPSO


Safety system analysis AGBAMI FPSO power system (75MW-Topside)

• Protection relay system as SIF and protection zone• Generator, transformer, circuit breaker, motor, motor control center

Single line of power system Simplified power system



Definition of Safety Instrumented Function Power system of AGBAMI FPSO

• 11kV, 690V• Supply the 11kV, 690V to loads by transformer• BUS-A, B, C, F, G : 11kV• BUS-D, E : 690V• 3 Generators• 6 Transformers• 31 Circuit breakers• 6 Electrical loads• Protection zone -> SIF



Definition of Safety Instrumented Function Composition and operation

• Power line current detection by current transformer• Over current detection by relay• Circuit breaker trips by relay -> power line shutdown

CT

CT

CT

OCR

OCR

OCR

CB

RBD of protection relay system

Sensor Logic Solver Final Element

Power linecurrent Trip signal

Over Current Relay (OCR)Current Transformer (CT) Circuit Breaker (CB)



Target SIL and result SIL Target SIL determination

Calculation of PFD for result SIL

Device Failure rate ( PFDAVG Type

CT (Current Transformer) 6.9635x10-6 3.0500x10-2 Sensor

OCR (Over Current Relay) 2.2831x10-8 1.0000x10-4 Logic Solver

CB 11kV (Circuit Breaker) 4.1096x10-7 1.8000x10-4 Final Element

CB 690V (Circuit Breaker) 3.0822x10-7 1.3500x10-4 Final ElementFailure rate Source : IEEE 2007, IEEE 2012, exida 2015

Proof Test Interval = 1 year Proof Test Coverage = 1

(*Ref: 070-Norwegian Oil and Gas Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511in the Norwegian petroleum industry, Norsok Standard)



Result of SIL

1.829E-031.829E-031.829E-031.829E-031.829E-031.829E-031.829E-03

1.097E-023.657E-03

1.097E-024.136E-034.136E-03

3.657E-033.207E-03

3.657E-033.657E-03

1.097E-025.486E-03

1.097E-02

0.0E+00 2.0E-03 4.0E-03 6.0E-03 8.0E-03 1.0E-02 1.2E-02

19181716151413121110987654321

PFDAVG

Pro

tect

ion

Zone

SIL2 SIL1SIL3, 4


ResultSIL


• Fuel tank: 130 m

• LNG bunkering time :

50min(before 15, during 25,

after 10min)

• Fuel flow rate : 320 m /h• Storage capacity : 2,000 m

• Fuel line dia. : DN150

• Gas recovery line dia. : DN80LNG Bunkering vessel

LNG fuelled ship

Bunkering connection

System selection LNG ship-to-ship bunkering ESD system

Emergency shutdown system

- Case study 2 -LNG bunkering ESD system


Safety system analysis FMEA Results

• Definition of safety instrumented function through FMEA


FMEA of LNG Bunkering- Bunker Operation -

No. Item Name Failure Effect

Sev

CauseOcc

Det

RPN

Control

1 Fire on Board Fire on the vessel

fire will be extinguished bycrew according commonprocedures, bunkering will bestopped by ESD, normaldisconnection or emergencyrelease, bunker vessel willleave receiving vessel.

4 e.g. fire in accommodation 3 1 1

2 fire detection system

2Rupture of Filling Line Rupture of pipe

hose of composite design,LNG spill on receiving andbunker vessel, big gas cloud,gas alarm, ESD initiated,bunkering stopped, structuraldamage of the vessels couldnot be excluded, ignition ofgas cloud can not be excluded,

5 e.g. material failure 2 1 1

0 gas detection system

3Loss of connection

Unintended disconnection LNG spill, large gas cloud 5 5 e.g. ERC will not

be activated 3 1 15 gas detection system

4 OverpressureOver pressurization of storage tanks

if critical pressure is reachedsafety valves will open andgas will be vented toatmosphere

4e.g. loss of overpressureprotection

4 2 32

Pressure monitoring system of storage tanks


Definition of Safety Instrumented Function The function to prevent dangerous work or to take action to mitigate

dangerous accidents



Definition of Safety Instrumented Function Emergency shutdown function 'SIF-1 ~ 4’

• Consists of 4 scenarios (SIF-1~4) RBD (Reliability Block Diagram)

'SIF-1’ deck fire 'SIF-2’ pipe rupture during fueling

'SIF-3’ LNG bunkering connection broken'SIF-4’ overpressure in the LNG storage tank



(*Ref: 070-Norwegian Oil and Gas Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian petroleum industry, Norsok Standard)

Target SIL – Minimum SIL Requirements*- Case study 2 -

LNG bunkering ESD system


Calculation of PFD for result SIL (1/2) PFDAVG (Average Probability of Failure on Demand)

• PFDAVG that can cause an accident due to failure of normal operation of SIF

Σ Σ + Σ

Devices failure rate Relationship of SIL and PFDAVG



Calculation of PFD for result SIL (2/2) Deriving the SIL of the LNG bunkering ESD system

• SIL check by deriving PFDAVG value of 'SIF-1', 'SIF-2', 'SIF-3', and 'SIF-4‘• Comparing the PFDAVG, which is the result of SIL calculation, with the target SIL,

confirming the satisfaction of Target SIL 2

Function PFDAVG Result SIL

SIF-1 6.081E-03 SIL 2

SIF-2 6.059E-03 SIL 2

SIF-3 5.973E-03 SIL 2

SIF-4 6.985E-03 SIL 2

6.081E-03 6.059E-03 5.973E-036.985E-03

-0.001

0.001

0.003

0.005

0.007

0.009

0.011

0.013

0.015

SF-1 SF-2 SF-3 SF-4

SIF-1

SIF-2

SIF-3


PFD

AVG


Conclusion Risk/reliability based design support system

• Performed system analysis: requirement diagram, usecase diagram, 17 Block definition diagrams, 6 activity diagrams, 4 sequence diagrams

• Established SIL verification algorithm Protection relay system

• Defined 19 protection zones as SIFs and calculated the PFDAVG by RBD• 15 protection zones satisfied target SIL 2• Protection zone 1,3,10,12 were calculated SIL 1• Design change should be done to four protection zones

LNG bunkering ESD system• Defined four SIFs based on FMEA for LNG bunker operation: deck fire, pipeline

rupture, broken connection, overpressure of the storage tank• All SIFs satisfied target SIL 2


Future work• 2 year

Establishment of risk/reliability result based DB Modularization of risk/reliability based design factor

• 3 year Application of design/analysis/validation integrated concept Development of risk/reliability based integrated design support system

• 4 year Application of simulation for risk/reliability based design support system

validation


Publications International Journal (SCI)

• Min-jae Jung, Byeong-cheol Park, Jeong-hoon Bae, Sung-chul Shin, ‘PAUT-based defect detection method for submarine pressure hulls’, InternationalJournal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, 2092-6782, 2017.06.

• Jae-chul Lee, Ji-ho Jeong, Philip Wilson, Soon-sup Lee, Tak-kee Lee, Jong-HyunLee, Sung-chul Shin, A study on multi-objective optimal design of derrickstructure: Case study, International Journal of Naval Architecture and OceanEngineering, 2092-6782, 2017.09.

Conference Presentation• ‘2017 The society of naval architects of KOREA spring conference, 2 paper• ‘2017 The Korean society of industry convergence autumn conference, 1 paper• ‘2017 The society of naval architects of KOREA autumn conference, 3 paper• ‘2017 Naval ship technology & weapon systems seminar, 1 paper• ‘2017 International Symposium on Ocean Science and Technology, 1 paper

Education MS Graduate

• Hyung-Sik Kim


Project # 3-3

Documents

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