Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management...

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Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY MAGDEBURG BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff, Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Otto-von-Guericke-University, Germany
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Transcript of Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management...

Page 1: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 1

II. Human Resource Management

Variable or Fixed Salary

OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY MAGDEBURGBEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY

Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff, Marjaana Rehu, M.A.Otto-von-Guericke-University, Germany

Page 2: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 2

„... three critical aspects of organization:

• The assignment of decision rights within the company

• The methods of rewarding individuals

• The structure of systems to evaluate the performance of both individuals and business units“

(BSZ 5)

Recap Session I

Page 3: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 3

Outline

1. Incentive Problem

2. Compensation Contracts

3. Output-Based Pay

4. Input-Based Pay

5. Incentive PaySource: www.msn.de

Page 4: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 4

1. Incentive Problem

Coordination and Motivation Problem

          

 

Distribution of Output

Task

Individual

Allocation of Input Resources

Source: Wolff/Lazear (2001): Einführung in die Personalökonomik, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel, S. 51

Coordination

Who does what, when,...

Motivation

How do I get somebody to perfom a task,

improve the quality,...

=> Incentive Problem

Page 5: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 5

1. Incentive Problem

Why do Incentive Problems Exist?

Why do Incentive problems exist?

• Employee and employer have different interests

– Employer would want the employee to take actions that maximize the profit of the firms, but the employee might rather like spending his time with his/her family or play golf

– All actions of the employee cannot be monitored and/or controlled by contracts (risk for the employer)

– Employers have to compensate employees for doing undesirable tasks

Page 6: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 6

1. Incentive Problem How can Incentive Problems be Solved?

• Incentive Problems can be solved through effective compensation contracts

• Compensation contracts have two functions

– Motivate employees

– Share risk more efficiently

Source: www.euro.fi

Page 7: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 7

2. Compensation Contracts

Variable Pay Fixed Salary

Compensation Contracts

Payment by Output Payment by Input

Subjective Performance

Measures

Objective Performance

Measures

Subjective Performance

Measures

Objective Performance

Measures

Page 8: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 8

Variable Pay(payment by output)

Straight Salary(payment by input)

• Compensation depends on measure of what comes out• Amount of time spent on work does not affect workers‘ compensation

Problem: Output not always easy to measure

Examples:

• Agricultural workers: piece rates p. tray• A salesperson on straight commission• Compensation of top executives by stocks or stock options

• Compensation depends on the amount of time or effort spent on an activity• Independent of output consideration

Problem: Input also not always easy to measure• Time at work as a proxy in order to assess worker‘s effort

Examples:

• Wage per work hour• Monthly salaries• Annual salaries

2. Compensation Contracts

Payment by Input versus Payment by Output

Page 9: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 9

2. Compensation Contracts

How can the Performance of an Employee be Measured?

•Objective Performance Measure:

– Measure that is easily observable and quantifiable, e.g. parts produced, hours worked etc.

•Subjective Performance Measures:

– An evaluation which is based on personal opinion of a supervisor, customer, peers, etc.

Type of evaluat.

Databaseobjective subjective

Output revenue, dividend customer satisfaction

Input time qualification

Page 10: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 10

Basis Variables for output-based pay

Quantity of production pieces, weight, size/height

Quality of productionRejects, grade, customer‘s satisfaction, individual targets

Input reductionReduction of input factors: raw material, energy, work time

Capacity utilization slack-, repair- and waiting periods

Be on scheduleTimeliness vis à vis internal and external customers

Value of the firm stock price, economic value added

2. Compensation Contracts

Examples of Different Variables as a Basis of Output-Related Pay

Page 11: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 11

Advantages of output-based pay

Selection effect Motivation effect

• efficient workers with a high productivity will join the firm/stay

• inefficient workers with a low productivity will not join/leave the firm

• output-based pay motivates workers to put forth more effort

3. Output-Based Pay

Source: www.kone.fi

Page 12: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 12

World Book Britannica

Offered compensation scheme variable pay: W = $ 100 . x

fixed salary: W = $ 500

Labor costs of 10 sets; Cost per set

$ 1,000 $ 100 per set $ 500 $ 50 per set

What type of salesperson will stay with the firm?

high productive sp.x 5

low productive sp.x 5

Labor costs of 3 sets; Cost per set $ 300 $ 100 per set $ 500 $ 166,67 per set

3. Output-Based Pay

Selection Effect: An Example of Compensating Salespeople

Page 13: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 13

500

A (World Book)

B (Britannica)

W ...Weekly Pay

x ... Number of encyclopedia

53

300

Higher-productivity workers will leave Britannica, because they will earn more at World Book. Only lower-productivity workers will

stay at Britannica

3. Output-Based Pay

Selection Effect: An Example of Compensating Salespeople (cont.)

Page 14: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 14

• Disadvantage of piecework: Variations of output can be beyond the worker‘s control

Variable pay Straight salary

• Fixed salary doesn‘t depend on exoge- nous factors – low-risk form of compensation Workers are insured against volatilities Firm provides the insurance for risks

• Lower compensation level• Can not participate in good economic development• Weaker incentives

• Variable pay depends on invested effort and exogenous risks – risky form of compensation Firm should smooth out exogenous risks from workers‘ compensation Firm should bear exogenous risks but endogenous risks should remain with workers

• Trade-off: More riskhigher compensation • Opportunity: participate in good economic development• Stronger incentives

3. Output-Based Pay

Disadvantages of Output-Based Pay

Page 15: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 15

3. Output-Based Pay

Risk in Output-Based Pay

• The firm should bear the largest portion of risk because of risk pooling abilities

• Workers with a high average compensation should bear more risks than workers with a low average compensation.

Source: www.kone.fi

Page 16: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 16

• In spite of all the advantages of output-based schemes: A large proportion of workforce is paid by input

• Compensation depends on the amount of time or effort spent on an activity

• Independent of output consideration

Time at work as a proxy to assess worker‘s effort

Examples: wage per work hour, monthly salaries, annual salaries

4. Input-Based Pay

Source: www.euro.fi

Page 17: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 17

4. Input-Based Pay

Benefits of Input-Based Pay

• Finding the right output measure

• Costs of measurement

• Overemphasizing quantity, reduction of quality

• Risk aversion of workers

• Promoting long-run performance

However, in many cases output-based schemes could be used if only they were designed correctly!

Problems of output-based pay solved by time-based (input-based) pay

Page 18: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 18

• Piece rates could induce workers to focus on high numbers of low quality products meeting only the sufficient quality level to ‚count‘

Appropriate compensation schemes could solve this problem

Example: Typist‘s compensation

Errors p. page Price p. page Minutes p. page Revenue per hour

0 $ 8 20 $ 24

1 $ 7 15 $ 28

2 $ 5 12 $ 25

3 $ 3 10 $ 18

4 $ 0 9 $ 0

5 $ 0 8 $ 0

Compensation Schemes Balancing Quantity and Quality

Page 19: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 19

Hourly wages Monthly salary Annual salary

Input-based pay

• Production workers• Clerical workers

• Top Management• Managerial workers

Tasks: experienced and easy to prescribe

• High correlation between effort and time invested• Time input as a pretty good indicator for effort

• Low correlation between effort and work time• Time input = bad measure for effort overinvestment in easy (pleasant) tasks

Tasks: less experienced and not easy to prescribe

• Undefined set of tasks (goal), discretion over work• Importance of other incen- tives to motivate for effort (long-term, e.g. stock options)

Tasks: not experienced and difficult to prescribe; often

to be defined by top manager

4. Input-Based Pay

Using the Appropriate Time Unit

Page 20: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 20

5. Incentive Pay

Optimal Level of Variable Pay

• Since employees do not diversify their risk

– Large exogenous risks should be born by owners

Fixed salary

• However, employees are motivated by pay for performance

Variable Pay

Part of the pay should be fixed and part variable

Page 21: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 21

5. Incentive Pay

Forms of Incentive Pay

• Rewards do not need to be monetary, they can consist of anything that employees value

• E.g Piece rates and commissions Bonuses Parking spots Days off Promotion Training Stock ownership Health care plan

Housing Education for kids Retirement Plan Party

Page 22: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 22

5. Incentive Pay

Criticism to Incentive Compensation

• Often heard critics to incentive compensation:

– Money does not motivate

– It is difficult to design effective incentive schemes

• Incentives certainly entail costs

• The major problem is to design incentive schemes where the benefits exceed the costs

Page 23: Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff Marjaana Rehu, M.A. Beijing, Sept. 2002 1 II. Human Resource Management Variable or Fixed Salary OTTO-VON-GUERICKE-UNIVERSITY.

Prof. Dr. Birgitta WolffMarjaana Rehu, M.A.

Beijing, Sept. 2002 23

Furter Readings

Brickley, J. A./Smith, C. W. Jr./Zimmerman, J. L. (2001): Organizational Architecture, 2nd ed., Irwin Book Team.

Lazear, E. P. (1998): Personnel Economics for Managers, New York (John Wiley & Sons)