PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

IN FUTURE COALITION OPERATIONS

Edited by

Thomas J. Marshall

with

Phillip Kaiser

and

Jon Kessmeier

December 1997

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this reportmay be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by callingcommercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or viathe Internet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

*****

Selected 1993 and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute Homepagefor electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank General William Crouch,former Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, andLieutenant General Robert E. Gray, former DeputyCommander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, without whosevision and support this book would not have been possible.Additionally, Colonel John Drinkwater, Mr. Paul Quintal,and Ms. Rachel Mokelke, each from Headquarters, U.S.Army, Europe and Seventh Army, provided the energy andtalent to skillfully guide the study from conception tocompletion. The authors would also like to thank thenumerous experts and practitioners who generouslycontributed their time and insights to this study, inparticular, Robert Kaplan, St. Thomas Aquinas College;Eric Newsom, U.S. Department of State; Jaromir Novotny,Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic; Colonel GeneralLeontiy Shevtsov, Supreme Headquarters Allied PowersEurope; and Lieutenant General (Ret.) Bernard Trainor,Harvard University. Finally, the insights and tirelessefforts of John McDonald, Assistant Vice President andDivision Manager with Science Applications InternationalCorporation, were invaluable for synthesizing the disparate experiences and viewpoints of study members into usefulactions to improve future coalition operations.

iii

v

vi

FOREWORD

Each year, the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) undertakes a conference-study program on a matter ofstrategic significance, with several objectives. The topicrelates to USAREUR’s mission; anticipates futurerequirements; contributes toward building democraticnorms within the militaries of emerging democracies; andserves to inform the USAREUR staff, higher headquartersand other U.S. Government agencies of active measures toimprove current practices. Examples of topics in the lastseveral years are Preventive Diplomacy, Planning andConducting Large Scale Emergency Operations, andMilitary Support to Democratization in Europe.

In 1996, USAREUR undertook to study “Problems andSolutions in Future Coalition Operations.” That topic wasgermane not only because of the U.S. Government’sparticipation in several current coalitions, but also becauseUSAREUR will continue to be in the vanguard,participating in a wide variety of multinational operations.While coalitions may be a way of life for most militaries,changes in the geostrategic environment over the pastseveral years have created new challenges and opport-unities for U.S. participation. Protecting the Kurds in Iraqafter the Gulf War, supporting humanitarian reliefoperations in Rwanda, deploying a preventive diplomacyforce to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia toguard against a spillover of the Balkan conflict, andproviding forces to support the implementation of theDayton Accords for Bosnia have tested the United States’ability to work with new partners, in support of newmissions, in unfamiliar parts of the world.

There are important similarities and differencesbetween these new coalition operations, and large militaryoperations and bygone NATO plans for operations inEurope against the Warsaw Pact. In fact, some of theformer Warsaw Pact states are now partners in coalitions

vii

with the United States Other countries from Africa andAsia Minor have participated as well. These new partnershave not only not trained together, but often have verydifferent military traditions and cultures.

Another new issue is the activity of nonmilitary andnongovernmental actors in the area of coalition operations.Civil organizations including large engineering firmsbrought into contract support services and privatevolunteer organizations implementing a variety ofprograms may impact on coalition operations. Mediaorganizations are active and unfettered, which would not bethe case in large-scale military operations. Furthermore,rather than being under the direction of a strong lead nation or existing alliance, some operations may be mandated byan international organization such as the United Nations,with an ad hoc command structure subordinated to aregional organization.

Although similarities exist between new coalitionoperations and large scale military operations, many factors have a stronger influence in a coalition situation.Differences in languages, terminology, military doctrine,equipment, capabilities, and command organization may all have been present in previous operations, but may beexacerbated by the level of interaction among units andlimited preparation time available to most coalitions.

The 1996 USAREUR program addressed coalitionoperations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, aswell as typical peacekeeping and humanitarian assistanceoperations. The program was not designed to address large-scale combat intensive military operations on the order of aDesert Shield/Desert Storm. While some of the findings and recommendations from this study apply to largeroperations, the focus was on improving lower leveloperations which are becoming more frequent, have ahigher probability for confusion and misunderstanding, less planning time, and a myriad of participants in addition tothe military.

viii

There were two stages to the program. The first stageconsisted of two workshops. One workshop drewparticipants from Eastern Europe, Russia, Georgia, andUkraine; the second from Africa (see List of Participants).The overall purpose of the workshops was to define theproblems in future coalition operations, drawing from theexperience of recent and potential future participants. Each workshop had the same core group of facilitators andWestern European attendees. Six topics were addressed atthe workshops, each facilitated by a U.S. military expert inthat area. The topics were: history and culture; forces andorganization; technology; training and doctrine; logisticsand resources; and command and control. While the topicsthemselves are important, the selection of the six distincttopics was a device for organizing the effort and does notimply separation in practice. In fact, many of the areasoverlapped and are interrelated. For that reason, theauthors have selected four areas to report on, subsumingforces and logistics within the context of the overalldiscussion. For each of these topic areas a “guidelines”paper was prepared as a read-ahead that laid out the issuesto be addressed and what product the workshops shouldproduce. The results of the workshops were used to frameissues and propose possible solutions, presented at stagetwo of the program—a high-level multinational conferenceat Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, in Heidelberg,Germany. Following the Heidelberg conference a report offindings and recommendations for improving futureoperations was widely disseminated.

This book reports in greater depth on four significantaspects of coalition operations: historical and culturalinfluences, command, technology, and doctrine andtraining. Steve Bowman identifies points of friction causedby historical and cultural differences among forces, and how they influence the decision to join a coalition, agreement ongoals, and organization of operations, among other things.Some of the challenges are logistical problems caused byreligious and cultural requirements, equipment avail-ability, and the capability of various forces. Language andterminology differences can cause miscommunications and

ix

negatively affect operations. An example related to manytypes of peace operations is the role to be played by policeforces as opposed to military forces. Military forces shouldnot be used for missions outside their normal operations. Itmay be necessary to integrate the police forces ofparticipating states into the coalition, or engage the police of the host nation. How effectively this is accomplisheddepends on an appreciation by the lead nation commanderof the recipient nation’s culture and experience.

Command and control issues will continue to dominatethe formation and operation of future coalitions. Thomas-Durell Young discusses the difficulty of establishing unity of command and suggests that the best that planners maypresume a leader will achieve is unity of effort. Nations arereluctant to place their forces under foreign command, andwill seek to retain the greatest amount of control over themas possible. This may pose severe problems if the situationescalates in intensity, requiring additional leadershipauthority during an operation. Young also addresses threemodels for command and control — lead nation, parallel,and integrated command — and the difficult task of transfer of authority. One clear finding that could be addressedtoday, within NATO, is the lack of common definitions andgraphics among potential coalition partners.

Asymmetries in technology among coalition partnerspose the greatest threat to cohesion and effectivenessduring combat operations. Steven Metz examines manyissues of asymmetry, including different degrees of relianceon technology, utilization of different forms of technology,and using it for different purposes. Interoperability ofcommunications equipment is one specific example noted by the author. The rapid development of commercialtechnology offers the means to standardize communications among disparate partners, given the willingness of the more advanced states to share such technology.

Military doctrine is so closely associated with nationaltraditions there is little hope of standardization amongpartners in a coalition. Avoiding the trap of attempting toforce one’s doctrine on a coalition, commanders should

x

concentrate on seeking agreement on generaladministrative and operational principles for the givenoccasion. Michael Smith suggests preparing regionaldoctrinal considerations that take into account nationaldifferences and provide a template that can be customizedfor a specific operation. Likewise, dictionaries could beprepared that would provide common understanding ofterminology. Permanent institutions for regionalinformation exchange and training would help developtrust among potential coalition members that would pay offwhen a crisis requiring quick coalition formation occurs.

Generally speaking, analyzing the obstacles, andpreparing, planning, and training to address them, willmitigate their effects on coalition operations. Developingcommon operating principles and institutionalizingcoalition training will improve the likelihood of success.

The authors express their appreciation to the U.S. ArmyWar College for undertaking to publish this modest effort tounderstand an issue that is likely to be of increasingimportance to U.S. military forces in the foreseeable future.

THOMAS MARSHALLMcLean, Virginia

xi

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCESON COALITION OPERATIONS

Steve Bowman

SETTING THE CONTEXT

Coalitions have been part of warfare since the earliesttimes. Both Troy and the Greeks had their own coalitionsduring the Trojan War. The wars of Alexander the Greatversus the Persians were likewise coalitions on both sides.Frederick the Great's European wars included threedifferent coalitions—with countries changing partners inthe various coalitions. The Napoleonic wars eventually had seven different coalitions, which continually changed withthe fortunes of war. The last coalition had 14 nationsworking together to defeat Napoleon. All of the UnitedStates' overseas wars have been fought as part of a coalition, except the Spanish-American War.

Before the 20th century, coalitions usually formed on atransitory basis to fight a war, then were disbanded. Thecurrent century has seen the development of long-termalliances in peacetime, as well as short-term coalitions intimes of war. All major wars in the 20th century have beencoalition wars except for the Russo-Japanese and Iran-Iraqwars. In the last major conflict, the 1990-91 Persian GulfWar, a coalition of 37 diverse nations pulled together toaccomplish common goals, then disbanded once again.

Historically, the main reason coalitions have formed hasbeen to overcome a common threat or situation that anindividual nation could not face alone. Fear often has beenthe driving factor holding a coalition together. To defeat thecommon threat coalition members usually have had to give

1

up some prerogatives of independence for the good of thewhole. When the threat is severe, nations have given upmore sovereignty. When the threat has receded, individualpolitical goals often have changed within the coalition.

This chapter will address some of the major points offriction historically affecting coalitions. Examples areprimarily taken from the wars of the 20th century. Theintent is to allow the reader to understand that there arenumerous friction points in coalition operations that arecommon to nearly all coalitions.

HISTORICAL POINTS OF FRICTION

Goals.

The first friction point is goals. A common goal or goalsmust be an overriding interest for a nation to join a coalition. The more serious the threat, the easier for a nation tosacrifice some national goals for common ones. Politicalgoals must drive military goals—and must be agreed uponbefore execution of coalition operations begins. Reachingagreement on goals and the means to achieve them is oftendifficult. During World War II, the United States and GreatBritain agreed on the goal of overthrowing Nazi Germany.However, the United States wanted a direct assault into theEuropean continent to accomplish this; the British wantedto go through the “soft underbelly” of the Balkanarea—common goals, differing means of attaining them.

Goals also change over time within a coalition, aspolitical and military situations change. Smaller coalitionpartners often feel bullied and under-appreciated by thelarger power(s), which tend to take control of the coalition.This is to be expected in coalition operations. Bismarckmade this point when he stated that there always must be arider to direct the horse. At the same time larger coalitionpartners may feel they carry inequitable risks and burdens,both in number of casualties and amount of nationaltreasure spent in the coalition effort.

2

Logistics.

After common goals, logistics is probably the mostimportant, and difficult, single friction point in moderncoalition operations. As shown in World War II, logisticalproblems can affect the strategic direction of a coalitionoperation. For example, the Allied invasion of southernFrance had to be postponed because, logistically, there werenot enough landing craft available to support the landingswhen they were originally planned. Generally speaking, notwo nations have the same logistical or administrativedoctrine. Larger coalition partners often must supportsmaller allies, causing significant strains on resources.

Logistics also must be considered from a coalitionperspective, not a national perspective. Planners mustensure that national military forces within the coalition donot compete with each other for scarce supplies within thearea in which the coalition is operating, driving up pricesand denying the resources to the local population.

Capabilities.

Another friction point is capabilities. Within any givencoalition, allied partners are not equally capable. Coalitionleadership must be sensitive to this and give individualcoalition forces missions they are able to accomplishsuccessfully. Understanding that all nations in thecoalition do not have the same capabilities, the variouscoalition partners can then share the burdens of thecoalition equitably—not equally—as each nation con-tributes what it can to accomplish the coalition mission.

Training.

Training is the glue which holds a military forcetogether. However, training levels vary in different armieswithin a coalition, and represent a fourth point of friction.Resources and standards for training are widely divergent.

3

In some cases, as in Desert Storm, circumstances may allowforces to train before commencement of actual operations,bringing the various national forces closer to a common level of training. Those forces which are trained to different orlesser standards must be used within the limits of theirtraining state. For combat forces, it is better to train to atough, high intensity standard, than “train down” to a lesser combat ready standard for units designated for coalitionpeace support operations. This standard should be usedinstead of training to a “peace support level” and having tobuild up to a higher combat level if the situation changes, orif a new crisis requires re-employment of combat forceselsewhere. It is a coalition leadership problem to assignmissions appropriately and diplomatically.

In some cases, as in Desert Storm, circumstances may allowforces to train before commencement of actual operations,bringing the various national forces closer to a common level of training. Those forces which are trained to different orlesser standards must be used within the limits of theirtraining state. For combat forces, it is better to train to atough, high intensity standard, than “train down” to a lesser combat ready standard for units designated for coalitionpeace support operations. This standard should be usedinstead of training to a “peace support level” and having tobuild up to a higher combat level if the situation changes, orif a new crisis requires re-employment of combat forceselsewhere. It is a coalition leadership problem to assignmissions appropriately and diplomatically.

Equipment.

Equipment quality, quantity and interoperability aresignificant challenges for coalitions, with interoperabilitybeing the most significant single factor that may causefriction. Planners must exploit interoperability where itexists and make allowances where it does not. As anexample of the problems of mixing types of equipment,planners must ensure that former Soviet-equipped units donot operate adjacent to western-equipped units. The danger of fratricide from instinctive training reaction on the part oftroops under the stress of combat could be disastrous.Communications equipment interoperability is anothersignificant problem for modern coalitions. Unequalcommunications capabilities may require lead nations tocompose specialized communications units for multi-national operations. Where severe interoperabilityproblems exist, the coalition commander may choose toemploy geographically separate zones for national forces inorder to lessen the impact of the interoperability gap.

Even such basic equipment as footwear must beanalyzed for coalition operations. “Standard” footwear forall UN forces was furnished by the United States to thevarious contingents during the Korean war. However,Turks needed extra wide boots, while Asian personnel

4

required boots that were extra narrow and short. Bootsdeveloped for U.S. feet simply did not fit other members ofthe coalition.

Doctrines.

Historically, coalition leaders have had to consider theimpact of differing doctrines within the coalition. Doctrinereflects national character and determines force structureand procedures. Understanding and adjusting for thedifferences in national doctrines are required. Somedifferences can be overcome through training exercises.Liaison officers with exceptional skills also can helpovercome doctrinal friction within the coalition forces. TheGerman army in World War II was highly successful inusing such liaison teams to ensure smooth operations withnon-German units. The Desert Shield training is anotherexample of how national armies learned more about how tooperate with other forces. The use of the Combat ManeuverTraining Center, in Hohenfels, Germany, to help train units in current doctrine for peacekeeping or peace enforcementoperations is another example of how multinational unitscan learn common doctrinal procedures. Coalition leadersmust understand that some coalition forces may have to beassigned special missions or be augmented from othernational forces because of significant doctrinal differences.

Intelligence.

Another factor that must be considered is intelligence.Sharing intelligence is always a sensitive issue, involvingnational collection rules that make full sharing extremelydifficult. Although this can severely test coalitionleadership, strong coalitions can make it work. The besthistorical example of this is the sharing of the ULTRA datain World War II.

The historical and cultural differences between nationswithin the coalition and in the country to which the forcewill be deployed must be part of the IntelligencePreparation of the Operation which will be used by all

5

planning staffs, at the coalition and national levels, logisticas well as tactical staffs.planning staffs, at the coalition and national levels, logisticas well as tactical staffs.

Language.

From the earliest coalition operations, languageproblems have remained a constant point of friction. Lack of understanding in day-to-day operations can equate todisastrous miscommunications in combat actions. Mostanalysts agree that English should be the common language of future coalitions. All coalition partners must thusimprove language capabilities at key levels within theirmilitary forces, although not necessarily at all levels. One ofthe problems already being encountered by several EasternEuropean armies is that young officers are learning Englishso well that they are being hired away from the military andinto the civilian sector. Many English speakers fromEastern Europe have no, or very limited, troop and fieldexperience. Highly experienced older officers speakRussian, not English.

While English appears to be the common language offuture coalitions, consideration of a second language,Russian or French for example, could greatly improvecommunications for some future coalition operations.Virtually all senior leaders in Eastern European armiesspeak and understand Russian. In some coalitionoperations, there may be a conscious choice, because of thecomposition of the coalition force, to make Russian theprimary common language, with English as a secondarycommon language. English-speaking nations must beprepared with sufficient language-qualified personnel toreact to such requirements. A similar situation could betrue for a coalition made up mostly of African nations. Alarge number of African militaries educate their officersusing the French language. There may be situations whereFrench is the designated primary language for the coalition. As a minimum, there will be situations where Russian orFrench, or another language, will be used as a secondcommon language for certain coalition operations. Eachsituation should be evaluated on its own merits, with

6

consideration of forces available as a critical factor indetermining the language or languages that should becommon to the coalition.

Linguists alone cannot overcome the problem. Trainedliaison teams knowledgeable in military terminology anddoctrine, as well as in the language are important forsuccess. Such teams can greatly assist with understandingof such concepts as “commander's intent” that may beunclear to personnel with English as a second language.Developing these skills is expensive and difficult; however,it is nothing compared to the cost of not having thosepersonnel at a critical moment.

Lack of common terminology is another type of languageproblem that hampers effective coalition operations duringboth preparations for and conduct of military operations ofall types. Acronyms and extensive use of abbreviationscreate a special problem for military forces joining acoalition. In a crisis situation, language and terminologydisconnects could mean the difference between success andfailure. Coalition operations may require orders to bedeveloped with a full and accurate description of tasks to beaccomplished, instead of working for brevity as is the case in most NATO operations—and certainly is the case for U.S.operations orders.

Leadership.

Another common historical friction point in coalitions isleadership. General Eisenhower discussed the difficultiesof coalition leadership in a memorandum to Lord LouisMountbatten, who had been designated Supreme AlliedCommander, Southeast Asia, in 1943. Some of his thoughtsare important to coalition leaders in the modern world.

The written basis for allied unity of command is found indirectives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The truebasis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officersassigned to an allied theater. Since cooperation, in turn,implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a commoncause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy

7

to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directlyupon the individuals in the field. . . . It will never be possible tosay the problem of establishing unity in any allied command isever completely solved. This problem involves the humanequation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance,frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularlywith all persons of the opposite nationality, andfirmness, are absolutely essential.“ [emphasis added] ”. . .never permit any problem to be approached in your staff on thebasis of national interest."1 [emphasis in original]

The requirements for leading a coalition are far moredifficult than leading a national force. Coalition politicsoverride coalition military logic—a factor future coalitionleaders must clearly understand. Coalition leadership must be persuasive, not coercive, and sensitive to national needs.Future coalitions will require new Eisenhowers,Schwarzkopfs, or Khalids. National forces, especially inpotential lead nations, must consider how to develop suchleadership traits in future military leaders.

A coalition commander usually will not have unity ofcommand. The best that usually can be hoped for is unity ofeffort within the command. If unity of command is notpossible, however, at least a clear chain of command is anabsolute necessity. Common rules of engagement and asingle controller for airspace are also necessary commonprinciples. The coalition commander must anticipate andplan for national vetoes of controversial or culturallydivergent plans or operational concepts. In some cases, thecoalition may opt not to accept forces from a nation whichcould be expected to severely limit the power of the coalitioncommander over its forces.

Coalition leadership can be in a number of forms. Theideal command would be an integrated standing command.However, the ad hoc nature of most coalitions will meanthat a lead nation approach will probably be the best thatcan be anticipated. At times, a parallel command structuremay be the best that can be achieved, as occurred duringOperation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Whatever thecommand arrangement, the coalition commander must be

8

responsible for coordinating all military infrastructurewithin the theater of operations. The presence of civiliangroups, NGOs and PVOs, will make the coordinationrequirements even greater and may require co-location ofthe civilian “command group” with the military com-mander. As the level of intensity of operations gets higher,the command authority required by the coalitioncommander gets greater. Prudent planning should alwaysconsider the requirement to escalate the level of intensity as dictated by the situation.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AS POINTSOF FRICTION

Another major area of potential friction for futurecoalitions comes from cultural differences. Again, these arenot new problems but have existed in coalitions throughouthistory. Each member of a coalition has its own culture thatis different—to a greater or lesser extent—from any othernation. These differences—in religion, class, tolerance,work ethic, standards of living, and national tradition—must be considered and planned for in future coalitions.

Religion.

A coalition may consist of a great variety of religions:Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Islam,Buddhism, Judaism, Hindu, and others. Each may havespecial requirements that must be considered whenplanning coalition operations, including religious holidaysand festivals and different types of food which may or maynot be consumed. Planners should consider what wouldhave happened to the coalition formed against SaddamHussein in 1990 if Israel had decided to join the war effortagainst Iraq.

Another example of religious requirements relates to the Greek contingent in the UN coalition in Korea. The Greeksrequired live lambs for a religious rite. U.S. Quartermasterpersonnel made great efforts to comply with this unusualrequest. However, they did not understand that Greek

9

culture for this rite required all lambs to be female. Thusthe Greeks felt slighted for the insensitivity to theirreligion—and the Americans felt unappreciated for theprodigious efforts they expended just to get any kind oflambs to the Greek troops.

In the same vein, Muslims could not eat pork and Hindus could not eat beef. In addition to religious requirements,cultural traditions may also lead to dietary demands. Forexample, in the coalition in Korea, Asians wanted more rice, and Europeans wanted more bread.

Class and Gender Distinctions.

Other cultural differences involve class and genderdistinctions. U.S. officer/soldier distinctions are not nearlyas great or as strictly enforced as many armies of the world.Regarding gender issues, women make up nearly 20 percent of the American Army, yet are not even allowed to serve inthe armed services of many other nations. Planners mustassess what impact these issues may have on a coalition and how such distinctions may be incorporated into coalitionplanning.

Discipline and Cultural Tolerance.

Levels of discipline and cultural tolerance vary greatlybetween armies. Some armies may not be able to work nextto each other. Planners must determine which forces canrelieve each other during coalition operations, and whichones must be kept apart.

Work Ethic.

The work ethic is another cultural factor that varieswidely between nations. Although one nation's army has adifferent work ethic than another, it will not necessarily besuperior or inferior. However, the difference maycomplicate cooperative efforts.

10

Standards of Living.

Standards of living are another cultural factor that canhave an impact on future coalitions. A great number ofpossible coalition partners for the United States wouldprobably consider U.S. soldiers to have a wastefully “rich”standard of living, even in field operations. Yet Americansoldiers generally operate under much poorer standardsthan their U.S. civilian counterparts—the society fromwhich they come. So, relatively, U.S. soldiers do notconsider themselves to be pampered, even if the cultures ofsome other nations may think U.S. troops live too well.

National Traditions.

One more example of cultural differences has to do withnational traditions. For example, casualties are a majorarea of concern to the United States. A relatively smallnumber of casualties caused the U.S. military to withdrawfrom Lebanon in 1983 after the bombing of the Marinebarracks. There was a similar reaction to casualties inSomalia in 1993. Planners and policymakers must take into consideration that the U.S. Congress and public are verysensitive to this issue, even though to other cultures suchreactions may be difficult to understand.

In the Korean War, the large coalition of nations fighting produced several examples of cultural misunderstandings.For instance, Abyssinian troops came to Korea withwhatever weapon they had when called into service. TheU.S. Army then issued them all new American-madeweapons. No one in the U.S. Army understood that theEthiopian culture required a warrior to return home withthe same weapon he departed with—not to do so was anindicator of personal defeat.

In dealing with problems of various cultures, it isimportant to remember that “different” has nothing to dowith “better” or “worse.” Avoiding such value judgementswill require both education and training. The morepersonnel available who are experienced in the cultures of

11

various coalition partners, the smoother the operations ofthe coalition are likely to be. Yet maintaining suchqualifications is very difficult, especially during periods oftight budgetary restrictions.

The importance of understanding the language andculture of the nation in which the coalition is operatingcannot be ignored. In some cases, such preparation may beas important as ensuring a common language among thecoalition partners. It is critical that committed militaryforces adopt the local language as soon as possible in orderto conduct day-to-day operations. This is particularly truefor forces who will be in daily contact with the localpopulation. If local translators are used, as they certainlywill be in many cases, lower level leaders must clearlyunderstand that these translators know little or nothingabout military terminology or doctrine. Extreme care mustbe taken to ensure that accurate information is exchangedwith the local population.

Other examples of cultural differences came to lightduring the Gulf War in 1990. The British and French,traditional world powers, needed to be given “major power”status in the operations for political reasons, even thoughthey had relatively small forces in the theater. BecauseFrench law prohibited conscripts from being forced to serveoutside of France, the French units had less manpower than expected by planners, even though the “entire unit” wascommitted to the operation. The Arab forces, because oftheir unique culture, language, religious, and, in somecases, logistic similarities were grouped together underparallel command and control arrangements. Culturalaspects thus played a significant role in the execution ofoperations.2

COMBINING NATIONAL FORCESINTO SUCCESSFUL COALITIONS

Because nations will only participate in future coalitionoperations if it is in their own national interest, it isimportant to determine the best fit for national forces.

12

Forces of all nations are structured for national purposes,not necessarily those of the coalition. While it is desirablethat national force contributions meet specific needs forforce balance and minimum size requirements forintegration into the coalition effort, these conditions oftenwill not be met. The force commander must integrate allelements into the coalition force and maximize theircontribution regardless of need, size, or special competence.Nations may also contribute to future coalitions in otherways than committing forces, e.g., facilities, infrastructure,funding, and other resources. Future coalitions will need torecognize such contributions clearly, demonstrating thatsuch contributions greatly add to the capabilities of theoverall coalition.

Forces of all nations are structured for national purposes,not necessarily those of the coalition. While it is desirablethat national force contributions meet specific needs forforce balance and minimum size requirements forintegration into the coalition effort, these conditions oftenwill not be met. The force commander must integrate allelements into the coalition force and maximize theircontribution regardless of need, size, or special competence.Nations may also contribute to future coalitions in otherways than committing forces, e.g., facilities, infrastructure,funding, and other resources. Future coalitions will need torecognize such contributions clearly, demonstrating thatsuch contributions greatly add to the capabilities of theoverall coalition.

During wartime, determination of whether to join acoalition can be based on relative success on the battlefield.For example, during World War II Italy and Romaniaswitched sides moving from the Axis to the Allies. Thisoccurred as Axis prospects for victory dimmed, and thegovernments of these two nations changed.

Deciding whether to join a coalition in peacetime can bemuch more difficult. Multiple factors must be taken intoconsideration including: the impact on nationalsovereignty; costs in resources and manpower; the impacton the nation's military forces caused by placing assetsunder coalition, not national, control; potential political-economic benefits to be gained; political factors, such as theimpact joining the coalition will have on internal politicalopposition parties—will the military forces returning from a coalition operation return to find the governmentoverthrown and severe political difficulties facing them; and the overall impact on national interests. 3

Perceived affiliations of some members of the coalition to various factions in the conflict by the local population couldbe a problem for the coalition. Members must be perceivedas neutral to be acceptable to a host nation in which peaceoperations are being conducted. Former colonial powers inAfrica carry a certain amount of “baggage” with them. Caremust be taken when putting them into a country which still

13

harbors hostility toward its former rulers. On the otherhand, in some cases a former colonial power understandsthe culture and history of a region in conflict and may be theideal coalition partner.

It is necessary to understand historical and culturalissues when considering when to use or not use neighboringstates as part of an operational coalition. Neighboringstates should be considered for use in conflict preventionoperations. However, neighboring nations should not beused in any type of enforcement operations, because of thedanger—whether perceived or real—that the neighboringnation could make political or economic gains at the expense of the country in which the operation is being conducted.

A significant effort must be made to prepare the localpopulation to understand and accept the coalition forcesoperating in their country. Public information programsthat are culturally attuned to the local population, and highvisibility improvement projects, must be implementedearly. Information operations will require training, but willbecome a force multiplier when local populations areprepared for coalition operations.

Training for Successful Coalitions.

Training will continue to be a national responsibility. Itshould focus on basic soldier skills and generalized trainingwhich can support coalition and peace support operations.Specialized training in support of future coalitionoperations should be conducted after assignment of specificmissions. The potential exists for increased sharing ofresponsibility for training of coalition forces at theoperational and strategic echelons. Because most potentialcoalition partners have conscript forces with relativelyshort periods of service, training to decrease historical andcultural differences should be concentrated on officers andNCOs.

Training for coalition operations should concentrate ontwo major areas: headquarters elements which should betrained through use of command post exercises, and

14

training and education of officers and NCOs. Experiencehas shown that headquarters elements, whether existingmultinational headquarters or a national headquartersthat has been designated to assume a lead nation role in afuture coalition operation, require additional preparation to command coalition operations. In addition to enhancedcommunications and augmented language capabilities,specific mission training is necessary. Much of this trainingcan be done in advance through the use of command postand computer assisted exercises, and seminars andworkshops for key personnel. Emerging distance learningtechniques may enhance training and education ofindividuals and units. Training in public affairs and civilmilitary operations can be added to this package. Suchtraining is rare or nonexistent in most of the nationalmilitary forces of Eastern Europe and Africa.

As stated earlier, experience has shown that fieldtraining exercises have transient value because of rapidturnover of short-term conscripts in the majority of armiesof Eastern Europe and Africa which will take part in futurecoalition operations. National armies should train their own soldiers in national doctrines and tactical execution.

The main advantage of field training exercises betweennational forces is that cultural and historical differencesbetween nations decrease greatly after working together.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish and Germanarmy units began training together, for the first time sincethe German invasion in 1939. The initial training wastraumatic for the Poles. But as time passed, the units beganworking better and better together, overcoming culturaland historical differences. These kind of bilateral trainingexercises should work for any nation. Such training is ofgreat value to units which will work together in designatedcoalition operations.

NEW MISSIONS AND PARTICIPANTS

A key factor to keep in mind is that military forces,historically and culturally, are not always well-suited to

15

civil conflicts of the type that future peace-supportoperations may deal with. Military forces in the majority ofnations are organized, trained and maintained to fight andwin wars, using all available force to be victorious in theshortest possible time. Such a “conflict/victory” culture may be just the opposite of what is desired for peace supportoperations as currently envisioned. Coalition militaryforces should not be used in ways that are outside theirnormal operations. As an example, military units shouldnot be used as police in hunting war criminals. There areorganizations trained to conduct police operations. UseMilitary forces should be used in the roles for which they areintended within the coalition operations.

Another challenge for future coalitions will be theproblem of interaction with Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organiza-tions (PVOs). In peace support operations, NGOs and PVOsmake up the third corner of a triangle which has the peacesupport coalition and the contending forces at the other twoangles. This is much different from conventional militaryoperations and has its own “culture shock” for untrainedforces. NGOs and PVOs have their own agendas and meansof operating, which may clash with “conventional militarythought” processes. In peace support operations, NGOs and PVOs have every right to operate in the same areas ascoalition military forces. Therefore, military planners mustprepare for interaction with these organizations.

Still another factor which has become an essential partof peace support operations, that is outside the normalculture of virtually all military organizations, is nego-tiation. For peace support operations, coalition militaryunits must learn to persuade, not force. This includeslearning to use one of the most effective means ofpersuasion, the media. This is a challenge with which allfuture coalitions will have to contend.

16

CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

Problems in forming coalitions because of historical andcultural differences are a common theme throughouthistory. It should not surprise anyone that such problemswill exist for future coalition operations. Successfuloperations of coalitions are difficult at best. Nations ofunequal strength and different mind-sets must worktogether to achieve coalition goals—which are set bypolitical decisionmakers who control the various militaryforces. The political mandate must be “translated” into aclear and achievable mission statement. Each nation willhave its own national interests, political realities, andhistorical experiences which will determine how that nation reacts in a future coalition operation.

A broad base of coalition partners is needed to assuresufficient support for the operation and perceivedimpartiality within the nation where the coalition will becommitted to action. As the coalition begins to take form,national interests, which always take priority, willinfluence the ability of political leaders of the variousnations must agree on the goals for the coalition operationthat the military can then implement.

Military doctrine is embedded in the ethos, traditions,heritage and national roles of the various armies of theworld. Because of this, common doctrine is not achievable inthe short term. Nevertheless, development of commonoperating principles for peace support operations canreduce the potential for friction within the coalition forcecaused by cultural and historical differences.

Common operating principles must be developed beforethe requirement to commit actual forces. In order to develop generic common operating principles for the conduct ofpeace support operations, workshops need to be conductedto define agreed-upon principles. With such genericprinciples already accepted, coalition partner nations canrefine specific requirements for the conduct of operations tomeet the impending crisis.

17

Organizations which have the ability to develop andcoordinate such agreements on common principles includeNATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE), and perhaps the WEU for Europeannations. In Africa, functioning sub-regional portions of theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) may be the agencies to accomplish the requirements. The UN could likewiseassume the role in Africa or elsewhere.

The agreements attained would allow coalition partnersto have basic principles that serve as templates for futurecoalition operations. Such templates should includeorganizational frameworks and logistic support. With suchcommon operating principles already agreed upon, themilitary will be better able to take the political goals given to the coalition and turn them into an achievable operationalmission quickly and efficiently.

A generalized template might specify, for example, thatcombat units should be deployed in brigade strength as aminimum. Brigade-sized units are capable of serving in amixed-nation higher unit, because tactical implementationof orders will follow national tactical doctrine. This isdependent on the intensity of the conflict. The more intensethe level of conflict, the less capable mixed units willperform. Logistical units can be employed in smallerpackets than combat units, as specialized units can beincorporated into the overall logistical plan. This will allowmost interoperability and technological problems to beaddressed at the brigade and higher level, helping avoidfragmentation of coalition command and control capa-bilities.

Lower level integration exacerbates differences incapabilities, communications, and culture. Focus can beplaced on critical areas to improve interoperability:communications, intelligence, computers, munitions andfuels. Developing protocols and other common procedureswill help resolve differences among the various nationalforces and may eventually lead to common doctrine forcoalition peace support operations.

18

Strong consideration should be given to creating astanding headquarters for coalition operations, usingalready established organizations such as NATO, WEU,OSCE, or the UN. Specified national headquarters could bedesignated to become the lead nation for coalitionoperations in specified regions. As a minimum,multinational planning exercises using a regional leadnation concept could significantly improve initialoperational response to emerging crises. Such trainingexercises will help overcome the initial confusion of coalition operations and will assist in overcoming cultural problemsby identifying them in a training situation before an actualcrisis occurs. Such training exercises must look beyond theproblem of initial entry into a peace support operation andmust carry the scenario into worst case situations where the character of the operation degenerates into higher intensitycombat.

Education of officers and NCOs will help changepreconceptions and misperceptions concerning the rolesand abilities of other national forces. The Marshall Centerhas shown this to be the case for the nations of EasternEurope. Training along the lines of that offered by theMarshall Center should be expanded into national militaryschools. Something like the Marshall Center or the Schoolof the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, should beconsidered to support education and training of officers andNCOs from African nations. The focus on education andtraining to overcome cultural and historical biases will paydividends both within the coalition and within the countries in which the coalition will conduct operations.

The activities of the Marshall Center are doing a greatdeal to overcome the potential for futuremisunderstandings. However, the center is currentlyrestricted to relatively senior personnel. The level ofparticipation should be expanded to include more juniormilitary personnel from Eastern European nations, eitherat the Marshall Center or another location in Europe.

Current logistics planning for coalition operations shows that logistics is one of the weakest elements of such

19

operations. Part of this is because the great majority ofnational armies cannot support themselves logisticallyoutside their own national boundaries. This requires eithera lead nation to fill the logistics gap or an inordinate amount of time for initial deployment of forces and great difficultiesfor logistical sustainment. NATO or the United Statesshould sponsor an assessment of logistics requirements forpotential coalition operations. With this assessment,logistic planning forums should be initiated with thosenations which could be expected to participate in futurecoalitions. This planning should identify initial logisticrequirements with which coalition units should deploy,determine reasonable national logistic support require-ments, and discuss such difficult issues as cost sharing forcoalition operations. Logistic command postexercises(CPXs) could exercise national logistic capabilitiesand develop templates which could provide generalguidelines for future operations.

In addition to language training there are other,simpler, concepts concerning the use of language thatshould be adopted for coalition operations. Dictionaries ofcommon terms must be developed and distributed,including logistical as well as tactical terms. Acronyms andabbreviations should be avoided in order to assure a clearunderstanding of terms within a coalition. Operational andlogistic plans and orders should be written in greater detailand clarity to ensure that there are no misunderstandings.This is directly counter to current U.S. policies, which try tominimize verbiage and attempt to make plans as brief aspossible, while still being complete. Coalition plans anddirectives must be written so that it is nearly impossible tomisunderstand what is supposed to happen. This willrequire conscious effort, especially on the part of thosenations which use English as a first language.

Changes in the world situation since 1989 provideopportunities for Western nations to work in coalition withformer adversaries from Eastern Europe in peace supportoperations. These opportunities are new and challenging.The leaders of military forces from throughout Europe and

20

Africa are now working in partnership with the UnitedStates to prepare for future coalition operations. The ideaspresented here are not the answers to the issues. Butperhaps they will broaden the thought processes of thosetasked to form a future coalition and allow them to plan andconduct operations more effectively and efficiently. Stepstaken now, to develop common operating procedures, totrain together, and to educate future leaders will helpensure that future coalitions will have a much better chance of successfully accomplishing the assigned mission.Perhaps someday historians will look at this period of timeand determine that a new era of successful coalitionoperations resulted from the actions that are now in theirearliest stages.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight DavidEisenhower: The War Years III, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970,pp. 1420-1422.

2. Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” Parameters,Summer 1993, pp. 74-83, passim. This is an excellent article forconsidering a wide variety of factors concerning coalition warfare.

3. Thomas R.Stone, “On Coalitions,” Military Review, September1984, pp. 31-32.

21

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND IN COALITION OPERATIONS

Thomas Durell-Young

It is a truism that effective command is a sine qua non for the successful prosecution of military operations. Whilesuperb generalship may not ensure a successful militaryengagement or campaign, there are precious few examplesof poor command leading to victory. If one accepts theproposition, widely held among Western militaries, that“unity of command” is a crucial element of effectivecommand, then one must ponder why it is that it is sodifficult to achieve. Whether due to politics, personalities,or a combination of both, achieving unity of commandconsistently presents itself as a difficult aspect of civil-military relations in democratic governments.

One should not assume, however, that achieving unity of command is a problem that should only be associated withunsophisticated military establishments. In the UnitedKingdom, for example, it was only in spring 1996 that the“Permanent Joint Headquarters” was established toprovide a permanent structure over which a joint commandof British forces will be effected in peace supportoperations.1 In the Federal Republic of Germany, despitesome recent organizational reforms, which by Bonn'sstandards are quite significant, that country still does notpossess a standing “J-3 operations directorate” as one would expect of a power of Germany's standing. 2 Even in theUnited States, it was only following the enactment of the1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act thatclarity was established concerning the commandrelationship between the combatant commanders and theNational Command Authorities. 3 Clearly, effecting anunambiguous national command structure is an ongoing

23

challenge even to democratic governments with stronginstitutions and traditions of ensuring civilian control overthe military.

An understanding of the difficulty of achieving unity ofcommand at the national level is essential in order toappreciate the seemingly insurmountable problems ofcreating an effective command organization within acoalition of sovereign states. To the existing difficultiesnations bring to these operations must be added competingnational interests (i.e., politics), sensitivities (i.e.,personalities), and less than unified national politicalobjectives.4 Moreover, international security organizations, which are essential in providing needed political legitimacyto coalitions, have also become increasingly active ininfluencing coalition operations, often with their ownagenda, (e.g., UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Finally, in the post-Cold War world, it is evident thatmilitary forces, within coalitions, are being increasinglyused for peace support operations. Due to the lack of strongpolitically-unifying forces in such operations, developingcoalition command arrangements has often provenfrustrating.

While not minimizing the problems associated withascertaining clear command lines at the national level, itmust be acknowledged that all of the difficulties presentwithin nations are compounded with new ones in coalitions.Simply stated, the task that confronts coalition leaders is toovercome justifiable national political and militarysensitivities to enable the designated coalition commanderto accomplish his assigned mission. The purpose of thisessay is to outline potential solutions for political-militaryofficials in their approach to the nettlesome issue of“command.”

First, it is important that readers have a clearunderstanding of command authority terminology andappreciation of the subtleties and nuances that plaguethem. Second, a discussion of the limitations under whichforeign commanders must operate will be presented. Third,

24

a case will be made that command authorities for coalitionland operations should be determined from the mission(s)assigned to the force. Implicit in this statement is that thecommand authorities recommended by military authoritiesfor the coalition force should be based, as much as possible,upon military considerations. Fourth, the issue of command structures and coalition operations will be examined, with aview toward assessing some of their specific strengths andweaknesses in specific coalition operations. Finally, theessay will conclude with observations about why coalitionplanning should provide for the eventuality that only unityof “effort,” rather than unity of “command,” is politicallypossible.

Terminology: Definitions.

Command authorities must be one of the most widelymisunderstood of military subjects. While there has been aplethora of essays and books written on “command andcontrol,”5 command authorities are rarely sharply defined,let alone analyzed from the perspective of a commander'srequirements as determined by his missions. 6 Indeed,otherwise groundbreaking essays dealing with multi-national military operations often deal only superficiallywith this subject.7 What has been missing is a systematicand disciplined approach to ascertaining which commandauthorities are appropriate for commanders, particularlywithin a multinational context.

In a rather contradictory fashion, in workshops anddiscussions with senior Eastern European and Africanofficers, the current writer has discovered a tendency to useterms common to NATO command authorities, yet (liketheir NATO country counterparts) there is lessunderstanding of their exact definition. Indeed, afundamental problem in addressing command authoritiesin coalitions is that there is no universally acceptedinternational nomenclature. Thus, perforce, one must relyupon Western, i.e., NATO, terms, given the lack of anyviable alternatives. Yet, one should not assume thatadopting Alliance terminology will prove a panacea. Even

25

as sophisticated and well-developed an alliance as NATOhas difficulties in this regard.

In NATO-agreed usage, there are four levels of Alliancecommand authorities. These are:

• Operational Command (OPCOM)

• Operational Control (OPCON)

• Tactical Command (TACOM)

• Tactical Control (TACON)

In Chart 1, the official definitions of the terms arepresented as they appear in AAP-6. 8 A comparison of thefour terms is presented in Chart 2. In its most simplisticform, OPCOM provides to a commander the greatest degreeof authority over his assigned forces, while TACON provides the least.

An important distinction must be made betweenOPCOM and OPCON. The principal distinguishing factorbetween these two levels of command authority is thatOPCOM allows a commander to assign and reassignmissions of subordinate forces, as well as task organize (or“fragment”) subordinate assigned units, in addition to those authorities found in OPCON (e.g., to assign and reassigntasks, direct local movement). TACOM and TACON provide the least authority to a commander by allowing him only toexercise tactical level control, such as deploying forces,directing movements and maneuvers for a short or specifiedduration, or limited to a specific area.

To complicate this otherwise straightforwarddescription of NATO command authorities, there aredistinctions between national and NATO definitions ofcommand authorities. France, for example, defines“OPCOM” (“commandement operationnel”) as constituting“national command,” and therefore not transferable to acoalition or Alliance commander. 9 The United States doesnot have national doctrinal definitions for OPCOM orTACOM, but its definition for TACON is identical to

26

NATO's definition.10 However, the U.S. definition ofOPCON substantially differs from the NATO definition.

CHART 1

DEFINITIONS OF NATO COMMANDAUTHORITIES

OPERATIONAL COMMAND:

The authority granted to a commander to assignmissions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deployunits, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegateoperational and/or tactical control as may be deemednecessary. It does not of itself include responsibility foradministration or logistics. May also be used to denote theforces assigned to a commander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL:

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forcesassigned so that the commander may accomplish specificmissions or tasks which are usually limited by function,time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain orassign tactical control to those units. It does not includeauthority to assign separate employment of components ofthe units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, includeadministrative or logistic control.

TACTICAL COMMAND:

The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasksto forces under his command for the accomplishment of themission assigned by higher authority.

TACTICAL CONTROL:

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control ofmovements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Source: AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms 1992, pp. 2-0-2; 2-T-1.

27

(See Chart 3 for a comparison of NATO and U.S.definitions.) This variance in definitions exists despiteWashington's agreement to the NATO definitions by virtueof it's acceding to AAP-6, “NATO Glossary of Terms andDefinitions.”

These differences, as recognized in the U.S. Army'srecently published, FM 100-7, Decisive Force, resulted innot inconsequential difficulties for NATO forces (despitetheir long history of cooperation) operating together duringOperations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Even a key U.S.policy document dealing with peace support operations does not strictly adhere to established definitions. PresidentClinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, whichexplicitly addresses U.S. policy toward multilateral peaceoperations, uses a definition of OPCON which does notconform to that established by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) in the Unified Action Armed Forces Joint Pub 0-2.Rather, it resembles the JCS's definition of TACON, or theNATO definition of OPCON. One could question whetherthere are now three U.S. recognized definitions of “OPCON.”Indeed, although not official, the initial and second draftJoint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16, uses the description as given by PDD-25, in place of thatwhich is officially sanctioned by the JCS (see Chart 4).

In short, there is no end in sight among NATO nations tothe lack of universally-accepted definitions of commandauthorities. Additionally, one should not conclude that theadoption of internationally-accepted nomenclature anddefinitions will necessarily solve this problem. It is notinfrequent for a nation to add or remove authorities fromthe command authority granted, e.g., OPCOM(-), orOPCON(+). In sum, both officials and planners need to beaware that command authority definitions are notinternationally standardized, conflict with many similarnational definitions, and are often modified for specificoperations.

28

Nuances of Multinational “Command.” Five keypoints need to be understood at the outset to comprehendproblems associated with command in coalition operations.First, and foremost, nations only surrender nationalcommand (“Full Command” in NATO parlance) of theirforces in the face of the most extreme circumstances, andtherefore, it is quite rare. Important matters of discipline,pay, promotion, etc., remain solely within nationalcommand channels as inherent manifestations of nationalsovereignty. Thus, one must distinguish between nationalcommand and the possible operational employment ofarmed forces. For example, in addressing the issue of theoperational employment of the U.S. armed forces, theClinton administration's PDD-25 makes the point quiteclear that “American forces have served under theoperational control of foreign commanders since theRevolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception.”Conversely, the document stresses, “The President retainsand will never relinquish command authority over U.S.forces.”

Second, nations and politicians are generally loath toassign their forces to a foreign commander. Becausemilitary forces are a sine qua non of a state's most basicmanifestation of sovereignty, it is not surprising that theyare not lightly delegated to foreign commanders. It is oftenthe case that instead of ascertaining which levels ofcommand a coalition commander requires to accomplish hismission, national authorities attempt to relinquish the least amount of authority, thereby retaining as much control over their forces as possible. Moreover, once authority has beendelegated to the coalition commander, national authoritieshave historically been reluctant to reexamine and expandthese authorities. For example, a study among CentralRegion NATO armies was unable to find one contemporaryinstance where a multinational force commander engagedin peace support operations had his command authoritieschanged when his mission changed, consciously or as aresult of “mission creep.” Thus, it is safe to assume that the

29

command authorities a coalition commander begins withare what he will have throughout his command.

Third, and related strictly to NATO (albeit informativefor coalition considerations), a combination of these twoimportant national sensitivities has resulted in a reluctance on the part of some NATO states to place their nationalforces under OPCOM of allied commanders, particularly inpeacetime. This is despite the fact that there are noconstitutional or legal impediments in Central Regioncountries to placing their forces under the OPCOM of anallied commander. The key sensitivity among many alliedofficials is the fear of an inability to control missionassignments and that their forces will be “fragmented”.

However, a strong case can be made for the operationalrequirement that land coalition commanders require agreater, level of command authority. Unlike their naval and air counterpart, armies have their own sui generischaracteristics when assigning them to a non-nationalcommander. Land combat forces consist of combined armsteams, made up of various subset formations, each of whichmay have different mission-essential tasks assigned tothem. Ships and aircraft, on the other hand, can be thoughtof as integral platforms of weapons and capabilities whichcan be delegated in their entirety to non-nationalcommanders to carry out specified tasks. Hence, for naviesand air forces, TACOM and TACON are entirelyappropriate.

Depending upon the missions and mission-essentialtasks, a land coalition commander (who might haveformations located over a wide geographic area) could wellrequire a wide-range of command authorities in order toaccomplish his assigned objectives. For instance, he mayneed to assign new missions and tasks, reassign forces, ortask organize subordinate forces. Indeed, given potentialmission instability in some peace support operations, agreater level of command authority than initiallyanticipated could be needed in order to protect the force.These conditions dictate that coalition commanders must

30

possess sufficiently strong command authorities to permitthem to perform such tasks.

Fourth, perhaps as a result of this reluctance on the partof nations to cede command authorities to foreigncommanders, there is a problem of delegating commandauthorities.

Because of the lack of internationally-recognized andaccepted command authority definitions, this condition isNATO-specific. NATO command authorities do notuniversally allow their delegation to a subordinatecommander. For example, under current provisions,OPCOM can only be returned to its originating source andcannot be delegated by a commander to a subordinate. Anallied commander possessing OPCOM can only delegateOPCON to a subordinate commander. Conversely, an allied commander with OPCON can delegate OPCON, but onlyafter obtaining national consent (see Chart 2). Thislimitation is yet another manifestation of countries'insistence upon retaining authority over their nationalforces.

Fifth and finally, there is no consensus within NATOregarding whether an allied commander can do somethingnot explicitly proscribed under his command authority. One school interprets command authority definitions in astrictly catholic sense, i.e., unless specifically stipulated, aNATO commander cannot exercise other authorities, stated or implied (e.g., under OPCOM, a multinational forcecommander can assign missions). The other schoolinterprets command authorities as allowing for the NATOcommander to exercise his command unless it is explicitlystated otherwise (e.g., under OPCON, a multinational forcecommander cannot employ unit components separately).While no unified interpretation exists, the first schoolappears to be more frequently accepted in the Alliance.

While acknowledging that the NATO experience incommand authorities is not applicable to all other alliances,let alone coalitions, it is instructive nevertheless. That oneof history's most celebrated and highly-integrated

31

peacetime alliances has been unable to overcome thesecommand problems illustrates the inherent difficulty ofalliance and coalition command. Therefore, one shouldapproach the issue of command authorities in coalitionoperations with an informed view regarding the lack ofagreement over terminology and the sensitivities nationspossess when delegating command of their forces to aforeign commander.

Defining Command Authority Requirements. From the above review of the nuances and problems whichsurround commanding coalition operations, one shouldhave a better appreciation of the difficulty of achieving“unity of command”. Simply stated, countries arefrequently more concerned with maintaining control overtheir national contributions than they are willing to accedeto the common coalition effort. An exception to this rule,however, is that in offensive, high-intensity and politicallyperilous operations (e.g., Desert Storm), countries haveproven capable of overcoming their reluctance to grantsufficient command authorities to the coalition commanderin the interest of achieving a successful campaign.Achieving this elusive goal has perhaps been aided by theWestern practice of the military force commanding thecoalition subordinating some of its own units to thecommand of foreign force commanders, thereby fostering adegree of reciprocity and trust.

Where most contemporary coalition operations arelikely to face command authority challenges, however, is the conduct of peace support operations. There is littleinternational consensus as to exactly which missions fallunder the title of peace support operations. The mostcomprehensive and probably widely acknowledgeddefinition of these types of missions is found in NATOdocument MC 327, “Peace Support Operations.” Thisdocument identifies six peace support operational missions:

Conflict Prevention

32

Peacemaking

Peacekeeping

Humanitarian Aid

Peace Enforcement

Peacebuilding

A challenge to senior military leadership is to argue onmilitary grounds that a seemingly innocuous peace supportmission could well require high command authorities (e.g.,to protect the force should conditions/missions change).Thus, in peace support operations, or indeed evenwarfighting, it is imperative that sound militarily-derivedrationales for the appropriate command authorities bepresented to senior political leadership.

Notwithstanding acknowledging the authority ofpolitical considerations and guidance, in principle, theplanning of all military operations should begin with thedefinition of the exact mission(s), from which flows statedand implied tasks. A hypothetical phasing of missionplanning should include the following:

Phase O: Planning and Preparation (N.B.: a coalitionforce commander will have planning responsibilities,however, he may have: 1) little or no authority over assigned forces, 2) only limited knowledge of the number of forcesassigned, and their arrival time in theater, and 3) littleguidance when Transfer of Authority (TOA) will take place.)

Phase 1: Deployment

Phase 2:Employment

Phase 3:Operations

Phase 4:Redeployment

From the planning phases of a specific mission (be itwarfighting or a peace support operation), mission-essential tasks can be derived. Particularly as regardsphases 2 and 3, the expected intensity of military operations can be discerned. It is also in these phases in peace support

33

operations that a coalition is most likely to experiencemission instability and “mission creep”.

Before assessing directly the command authoritiesrequired in warfighting campaigns and peace supportoperations, in a generic sense, there are a number ofimportant considerations which should be addressed.These include:

the composition and size of the forces under the coalitioncommander's authority (i.e., a battalion, brigade, etc.);

the likelihood of a change in mission;

the state of rules of engagement—ROE (which ideallyshould be universally employed by coalition forces);

the potential need to task organize forces; and,

whether there may be a need to conduct offensiveoperations.

Starting with warfighting campaigns, an examination of common mission-essential tasks in the phases of anoperation will demonstrate the necessity to plan foroffensive operations. The coalition commander will requirethe ability, for example, to reassign missions, task organizehis forces, delegate sufficient authority when required, andbe prepared to protect the force. Thus, from a militaryperspective, he should have the highest level of commandauthorities possible, political realities allowing.

While defining command authority requirements isstraightforward for warfighting campaigns, it is much morecomplicated when approaching peace support operations.At the political level, nations are not as willing to submittheir political interests to the common objective as theywould be during a warfighting campaign. At theoperational level, in addition to common tasks, which aregeneric for all peace support operations, there are also tasks(both stated and implied) which are specific for eachmission. In a general sense, a coalition commander will only need a low level of command authority for missions such asHumanitarian Aid. Conversely, a coalition commander

34

charged with conducting a Peace Enforcement mission,which could include offensive operations, would require ahigh level of command authority. Engaging in the otherfour peace support missions identified in MC 327 (ConflictPrevention, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, andPeacebuilding), would necessitate a coalition commander tohave authorities at a level somewhere betweenHumanitarian Aid and Peace Enforcement.

Greater specificity in the definition of commandauthorities for peace support operations is difficult to makein a general sense. However, essential considerationswhich may not be immediately obvious to civilian officialsinclude:

How can the coalition commander respond to “missioncreep” with his given command authority? For example,protection of the force may require the ability to taskorganize which is only allowed within NATO underOPCOM.

Are coalition political mechanisms established to allowthe coalition commander to have his request for changes incommand authority addressed in a timely fashion? If not,then a higher command authority than that immediatelyforeseen may be required by the commander in order to have the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.

Are both national and coalition ROE in accordance withthe command authorities given to the commander?Restrictive national ROE could well negate a high level ofcommand authority. An endorsed, formatted, menu of ROE, even if individual nations' ROE are different, would enablethe commander to have a full understanding of nationalrestrictions.

Finally, are ROE, command authorities, and theforces/resources available to the coalition commander inagreement, to enable him to accomplish his mission(s)?

In sum, the primary factor in assessing commonauthority requirements in peace support operations is theability of the coalition force commander to:

35

possess command authority necessary to execute hismission(s),

protect the force, and

have his request for changes in command authorityaddressed in a timely fashion.

Given the extreme political sensitivity nations haveconsistently shown when placing their forces under foreigncommanders, and their concomitant reluctance to revisitcommand authority decisions, prudence dictates thathigher authorities than are necessarily required toaccomplish the mission should be requested in the initialplanning phase. This would enable the coalitioncommander to ensure the security of his force, as well as bein a position to react swiftly to an unforeseen change inmission.

Such a proposal may be novel and impolitic for militaryauthorities to recommend to their national politicalauthorities. However, one must consider two compellingfactors. First, the frequency of participation in peacesupport operations, at least from the perspective of somecountries (e.g., the United States), has increasedconsiderably since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, thereis no indication that this is about to change in theforeseeable future. Second, land forces employed in theseoperations tend to be battalion or brigade size, and often donot possess a combined-arms, self-sufficient capability toprovide adequately for their own self-defense, particularlyin the case of a change of mission, (i.e., to one of greaterintensity).

A seemingly benign Humanitarian Aid mission canquickly become unstable and turn violent, as the BelgianArmy discovered in April 1994 in Rwanda. Nationalpolitical and diplomatic authorities need to be made awareof the impact of the command authority requirements, priorto contributing to coalition operations. Barring thissolution, it is imperative that coalitions create politicalconsultative arrangements that will enable rapid attention

36

to the coalition commander's requests to changes in hiscommand authority.

Command Structure Considerations. If one acceptsthe proposition that from a military perspective commandauthorities in coalitions should be made or at least stronglyinfluenced, by the mission(s) and composition of the force,then this should also hold true for the particular commandstructure chosen. As in the case of matching ROE to thedelegated command authority, a command structure should be selected that best suits the political realities and military requirements of a specific operation.

In a general sense, one can identify three types ofstructures: lead nation, parallel or integrated. It should benoted that these structures are not necessarily mutuallyexclusive. The Russian contribution to IFOR/SFOR inBosnia-Herzegovina and the “sui generis” commandrelationships of its brigade commander to the U.S. divisioncommander and the Deputy for Russian Forces inIFOR/SFOR, almost defy strict structural definition. To besure, as is the case with command authorities, a choice incommand structures will be highly dependent upondecisions made by national political, and perhaps eveninternational, authorities. Yet, political-military adviceshould be prepared for consideration by politicalauthorities.

Probably most important, given that each coalition isalmost by definition unique, it makes little sense to attemptto establish guiding principles for selection of commandstructures which would be universal in their application.Rather, what may be more useful is to identify somestrengths and weaknesses which may surface in selectingan appropriate structure.

An integrated coalition command structure probablyprovides the most political advantages. Participatingcountries are represented in the command headquarters inprincipal staff billets, not solely as liaison officers, thereby

37

allowing contributing governments to monitordecisionmaking. An obvious disadvantage is the varyinglevels and types of staff training throughout the world,which could have an adverse effect upon the efficientworkings of the headquarters. If a coalition consists ofstates with a history of close military cooperation andsimilar staff procedures, an integrated structure may beappropriate, although, even in this case, creating aneffective integrated staff could still take time. For aheterogeneous, ad hoc coalition with a high-intensitymission, an integrated structure may be inappropriate.

A lead nation command structure, conversely, may bring certain political disadvantages. Normally, a large nationwill provide the command headquarters, staffed withliaison officers (which may or may not be integrated into thestaff elements), and will exercise command over operations.While some nations might chafe at such an arrangement,there may be less obvious advantages. For instance, if thelead nation is the United States or a major European state,smaller contributing nations may feel reassured thatshould the operation change for the worse, the lead nationcould respond quickly and effectively, as well as provide thebest protection for the force. However, many countries thatcontribute forces to peace support operations have coloniallegacies that could reduce their willingness to accept such astructure because of national political sensitivities, if thelead nation is its former colonial master.

A parallel command almost appears to be a counter-intuitive structure, given the apparent lack of unity ofcommand. Yet, as demonstrated in the case of Desert Storm, where Western and Arab/Muslim forces had their ownseparate chain of command, such a command organizationcan be successful. It should be noted, however, that giventhe sizeable presence of U.S. forces and the role taken byGeneral Schwarzkopf in planning the campaign, one couldmake the argument that a parallel structure worked in thiscase, due to the presence of a lead nation. In other words, aparallel structure without an explicit or implicit lead nation

38

may not be able to develop and maintain an essential unityof purpose in the conduct of operations.

Conclusion: Unity of Command, or Effort? In recent years, one can observe a noticeable move toward describingand defining “command” in a technological manner, i.e.,“command, control and communications” (C3), and morerecently, “command, control, communications, computers”(C4). Given the phenomenal increase in the capabilities andcapacities of microprocessors, such emphasis on the meansto increase and (hopefully) manage information provided toa commander is both understandable and warranted.Superior knowledge of the battlefield and the ability toconcentrate forces at the most opportune time to close uponthe enemy is, without doubt, a capability that should not beunderrated, or ignored.

Yet “command”, whether exercised nationally, or withina coalition, is an inherently politically-bound activity.Military forces, one of the most basic manifestations ofnational sovereignty, are jealously guarded by nationalauthorities, who only reluctantly surrender them to aforeign commander. Hence, obtaining the requisitecommand authority for a coalition force commander toenable him to accomplish his mission is likely to be bothcomplicated and hindered by political considerations. Inaddition, the issue of command in coalition operations canbe complicated by the lack of internationally-recognizednomenclature of command authorities, let alone anappreciation of the nuances which govern the issue ofcommand.

Thus, while not disparaging the importance of “C3" or”C4", “command” remains at its most basic foundation, apolitical, not technological, issue and its nuances andsubtleties can only be fully understood within this context.An appreciation of this fact is essential when approachingcommand in coalition operations. Normal national politicalsensitivities over the command of armed forces iscomplicated and compounded by contending national

39

interests and objectives, let alone, different approachescountries take toward military operations.

The reason for stressing the importance of politicalconsiderations and nations' natural sensitivities over thematter of command is key in understanding why “unity ofcommand”, a widely accepted principle of war in Westernmilitaries, is so difficult to achieve. To be sure, in awarfighting campaign, national political sensitivities areoften subjected to military necessity. For instance,although Paris placed its land and air forces operating inDesert Storm in the Arabian peninsula “only” under theTACON of the U.S. theater commander, GeneralSchwarzkopf, the fact remains the French government didso, despite a bruising debate in French National Assembly.

Where achieving unity of command is likely to be themost difficult is within the context of peace supportoperations. Governments and international organizationshave all too often discounted the potential for mission shiftin these operations (the experience of UNPROFOR inBosnia-Herzegovina comes to mind) and the concomitantneed for the coalition force commander to protect the forcewhen threatened. Notwithstanding the best efforts ofmilitary officials to argue for military rationales forappropriate command authorities to support the objective of unity of command, the historical record does not supportoptimism.

It is for this reason that in the planning process forcoalition operations, it would be prudent to presume thatthe best the coalition commander may hope to achieve isunity of effort, vice unity of command. While this may seemto be unduly deterministic, political-military officials needto be aware of the political challenges they will face whenproposing the need for unity of command in a coalition. Inconsequence, should “unity of effort” be the most thecoalition commander can hope to have, then he can advisehis political authorities of his need for some conditionalauthority which will enable him, in extremis, to protect theforce. To be sure, this is hardly an ideal solution to acomplex and crucial aspect of “commanding” an operation.

40

Nonetheless, acceptance of this political reality could beinstrumental in fore-arming a future coalition commanderfor the realities he is likely to face.

Nonetheless, acceptance of this political reality could beinstrumental in fore-arming a future coalition commanderfor the realities he is likely to face.

CHART 1

DEFINITIONS OF NATO COMMANDAUTHORITIES

OPERATIONAL COMMAND:The authority granted toa commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinatecommanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and toretain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as maybe deemed necessary. It does not of itself includeresponsibility for administration or logistics. May also beused to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL:The authority delegated toa commander to direct forces assigned so that thecommander may accomplish specific missions or taskswhich are usually limited by function, time, or location; todeploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tacticalcontrol to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logisticcontrol.

TACTICAL COMMAND:The authority delegated to acommander to assign tasks to forces under his command forthe accomplishment of the mission assigned by higherauthority.

TACTICAL CONTROL:The detailed and, usually, localdirection and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Source: AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms 1992, pp. 2-0-2; 2-T-1.

41

CHART 2

COMPARISON OF NATO COMMANDAUTHORITIES

MOST CONTROL LEAST CONTROL

A U T HORITY

O P C OM

O P C ON

T A C OM

T A C ON

A S S I GNMISSION

YES

A S S I GN TASKS

YES YES

REASSIG NFORCES

YES

GRANTED TO ACOMMANDER

YES

EMPLOY UNITCOMPONENTS

SEPARATELY

NO

REASSIG NOPCOM

YES

R E T A IN OPCOM

YES

DELEGA T EOPCON

YES Y E SW / A P P RVL

42

DELEGATE TO ACOMMANDER

YES YES

SUPERIOR TOTACOM

YES

A S S I GN TACOM

YES

R E T A IN TACON

YES YES

DELEGA T ETACON

YES YES

DIRECT FORCES

YES

DEPLOY FORCES

YES YES

LOCALDIRECTION &CONTROLO FMOVEMENTS ANDM A N E U VER

YES

ADMINISTRATIVECOMMAND

NO

43

D A Y -T O - D A YDIRECTION

NO YES

ADMINISTRATIVECONTROL

NO

L O G I ST I C SSUPPORT/COMMAND

NO

L O G I ST I C SCONTROL

NO

CHART 3

COMPARISON OF NATO AND U.S. COMMANDAUTHORITY DEFINITIONS

MOST CONTROL LEAST CONTROL

A U T HORITY

O P C OM

O P C ON

T A C OM

T A C ON

GRANTED TO ACOMMANDER

NATO

REASSIG NO P C O M( i e . ,R E T U R NIT)

NATO

44

R E T A IN OPCOM

NATO U.S.

DELEGA T EOPCON

NATO N A T Ow / a p r v l/U.S.

DELEGATE TO ACOMMANDER

NATO NATO

SUPERIOR TOTACOM

NATO

A S S I GN TACOM

NATO

R E T A IN TACON

NATO NATO

/U.S.

NATO/

U.S.

DELEGA T ETACON

NATO NATO

A S S I GNMISSION

NATO

A S S I GN TASKS

NATO U.S. NATO

DIRECT FORCES( G I V EORDERS)

NATO

/U.S.

REASSIG NFORCES

NATO

DEPLOY FORCES

NATO NATO NATO/

U.S.

45

LOCALDIRECTION &CONTROLO FMOVEMENTS &MANEUVER

U.S. NATO

/U.S.

EMPLOY UNITCOMPONE N T SSEPARATELY

NATO-NO

U . S . -YES

ADMINISTRATIVECOMMAND

NATO-NO

D A Y -T O - D A YDIRECTION

NATO-NO

NATO

/U.S.

NATO/

U.S.

ADMINISTRATIVECONTROL

NATO-NO

L O G I ST I C SSUPPORT/COMMAND

NATO-NO

L O G I ST I C SCONTROL

NATO-NO

46

“FULL COMMAND” (NATO ONLY: NO NATOCOMMANDER HAS FULL COMMAND OVERFORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM BECAUSE NATIONSASSIGN ONLY OPCOM OR OPCON

KEY: - “NATO” - SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED INA NATO PUBLICATION

- “NATO-NO” - SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED INA NATO PUBLICATION

- “U.S.” - AUTHORIZED IN U.S. DOCTRINE

- BLANK - NOT MENTIONED IN ANY NATOPUBLICATION

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICALASYMMETRY ON

COALITION OPERATIONS

Steven Metz

Overview. Americans have an infatuation withtechnology so deep that it borders on obsession. This hasdeep roots in history. As the United States grew andmatured throughout the 19th century, the rapid expansionof the frontier led to persistent labor shortages. Technology, by substituting machinery for human muscle, offered apartial solution. What began, then, as a practical reactionto an economic problem eventually had a profound impacton national perceptions and attitudes. Today, the beliefthat technology can solve social, economic, or even politicalproblems is ingrained. Americans reach for technology asan instinctive reaction to a whole range of dilemmas.

This trust in the curative power of technology has been amajor influence on American thinking about national

47

security. Key elements of the Americanweltanschauung—the high value of individual life, aninward-looking orientation, and a willingness, albeit areluctant one, to accept global responsibility—have led to agreat demand for economy in American strategy,particularly an economy of blood. The stress on technologyin American defense policy must be seen in this context.Qualitative superiority—of which technology is animportant part—allows the U.S. military to meet thenation's many global security commitments with thesmallest possible force, deter aggression through strength,and limit casualties when deterrence fails and forcebecomes necessary. Given the strategic situation that theUnited States currently faces with its combination ofwidespread responsibilities and the need to retain publicsupport by minimizing costs, trust in technology is a logicaland pragmatic reaction.

Today, the connection between technology and securityis codified in American strategy. For instance, the 1992National Military Strategy of the United States stated,“advancement in...technology is a national securityobligation.” While the 1995 version of the national militarystrategy dropped this phrase, nearly all the currentprograms and activities of the U.S. Department of Defenseremain premised on technological superiority (howeverdefined). “[W]e will continue,” stated Undersecretary ofDefense Paul G. Kaminski, “to maintain technologicalsupremacy on the battlefield...Our forces are being designed to achieve dominant battlefield awareness and combatsuperiority through the deployment of fully integratedintelligence systems and technologically superior weaponssystems.” This is not empty rhetoric. Programs areunderway to build concepts, doctrine, and force structure tomake maximum use of emerging technology including theArmy's Force XXI and Army After Next Project, the AirForce's Spacecast, and the Marine Corps' Project SeaDragon.

If the acquisition and fielding of advanced technologywere the only requirements of U.S. national security

48

strategy, the lives of American policymakers would be much easier. But strategy is always an uneasy compromisebetween competing needs and demands. For instance, theability to operate with coalition partners is equally vital.According to General John M. Shalikashvili, “Although ourArmed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength,we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forcesin nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, ourprocedures, programs, and planning must recognize thisreality.” This is a traditional theme in American strategyand, like the stress on technology, is a pragmatic response to pressing problems. Coalitions stretch defense resourcesand spread costs among the participants. A well-designedand well-led coalition blends the skills of its componentforces to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts.Coalitions can also bring political and strategic benefitssuch as an increased ability to mobilize and sustain publicsupport.

Despite the trends toward increasing use of technologyand coalitions, the two are not always perfectly compatible.Under some circumstances, the quest for technologicalsuperiority can erode the effectiveness of coalitions. As ageneral rule, the greater the similarity between militaryforces, the easier it is for them to work together. Technologycan create major differences between the techniques,capabilities, preferences, doctrine, and force structure ofcoalition partners. To ensure that technological differencesdo not erode the effectiveness of a coalition, requiresdeliberate effort and well-designed programs. In thecurrent global security environment, this should be a highpriority for American military leaders and strategicplanners, and for the leaders of other militaries whoanticipate operating in coalition with the United States.

Framing the Issue. Taken alone, the type or amount oftechnology that a military force possesses does notdetermine whether it can operate effectively with any other. Technological asymmetry between coalition partners is thekey variable. When assessing technological asymmetry, it

49

is easy to fall into a mental trap and conclude that somecoalition partners are “more advanced” or “superior” toothers with the implication that the “backward” partnersmust be brought up to the level of the more advanced. Suchnotions attach distracting value assessments and assume arigidly linear pattern of technological development. Realityis more complex.

From the perspective of political decisionmakers andmilitary strategists building a coalition, it is more useful tothink in terms of three types of technological asymmetry.The first is when coalition partners have a different degreeof reliance on technology. Some militaries may be unable toperform basic functions such as planning, movement, andtarget acquisition without complex technology, while others are less dependent. A second type of asymmetry ariseswhen coalition partners rely equally on complex technologybut utilize different forms. For instance, the U.S. military is now exploring nonlethal weapons such as low-energy laserweapons, isotropic radiators, non-nuclear electromagneticpulses, high-power microwaves, infrasound, liquid metalembrittlement, supercaustics, anti-traction technology,polymer agents, combustion alteration technology,calmative agents, and visual stimulus and illusiontechnologies. While eventually many of these will berejected as impractical, illegal, or unethical, some have orwill be integrated into the arsenal of the U.S. military. Tomake use of them, the U.S. Department of Defense isdeveloping doctrine, procedures, and strategy. It iscertainly logical to use new technology to meet the demandsof a security environment which demands a minimumhuman cost in the application of military force. Butnonlethal weapons could generate complications for futurecoalitions. It is easy to imagine a peace support coalition afew years from now where the U.S. component makes greatuse of nonlethal weapons while other coalition partners donot, thus creating considerable planning and executionproblems for the force commander. A third variant oftechnological asymmetry arises when coalition partners,equally reliant on similar technology, use it for differentpurposes. For example, two partners might both have

50

advanced nonlethal weapons, but one might use themstrictly for force protection and rear area security while theother uses them in conjunction with lethal fires duringoffensive operations (e.g., to immobilize armored vehicles orenemy soldiers before destroying them with conventionalfires).

Of course, asymmetries of one kind or another haveaffected military coalitions throughout history, but they area mounting problem in the contemporary strategicenvironment. This is particularly true of technologicalasymmetry. In an absolute sense, the range of availablemilitary technology is wider than ever; its developmentcontinues unabated, particularly in the United States. Infact, some analysts argue that a technological revolution isunderway that will further add to the gap between armedforces that master it and those who do not. This carriesprofound implications for the commanders and architects offuture coalitions.

The military-technical revolution, or revolution inmilitary affairs, promises to alter all dimensions of militaryactivity from the tactical to the strategic. At the tacticallevel, scientists, engineers, and military planners aredesigning new technologies to supplement humancapabilities and make the soldier an integrated sensorsystem and strike platform. This has spawned a number ofprograms. The U.S. Army's Project Land Warrior, forinstance, is blending advanced communications, newweapons systems, and an array of defenses to augment thecapabilities of dismounted soldiers. The high-tech headgear of future soldiers will include audio-visual communications, eye protection from tunable laser and ballistic injuries,night vision, respiratory and auditory protection, chemicaland biological protection, and a heads-up display with aweapons interface. Project Land Warrior is one part of thebroader and more ambitious Force XXI Program. This isdesigned to develop the doctrine, concepts andorganizations to make maximum use of new technologies,especially those based on digital information. Some parts ofthe Force XXI Army are far along in the development

51

process. Elements of what is being called the “digitized”U.S. Army of the next century have been field tested inexercises where scouts are equipped with the DismountedDigitized Solder System which enable spot reports andinstructions to be sent to lower and higher echelons withinseconds without voice communication.

Emerging technology promises even more profoundchange in coming decades. The rapidly developingtechnology of command, control, communication, andintelligence (C3I), in conjunction with high-technologytraining using simulations, promises to give advancedmilitaries the ability to find and strike targets over longdistances, synchronize highly complex operations, andoperate at a much faster pace than previously possible.Optimists hold that technology may soon provide militarycommanders a near-perfect picture of the battlefield withthe ability to know where all friendly and most enemy forces are at any given time and, more importantly, to trulyunderstand what is happening across the battlefield.Eventually the integration of advanced C3I technology, new doctrine, and new force structures may allow a radicalalteration of the basic design of the battlefield withcommanders hundreds or even thousands of miles awayfrom subordinate units still able to retain effective tacticalcontrol. Rather than the traditional linear architecturewith clearly defined fronts, the future battlefield may seesmall, networked units operating in a nonlinear fashion,each acting semi-autonomously but contributing to theattainment of common goals in super fast-paced and tightlysynchronized operations. As Barry R. Schneider phrased it,Desert Storm-type operations may give way to a “DispersedStorm.” Some analysts are already talking of chaos theory,fuzzy logic, and other forms of nonlinear thinking replacinglinear, Newtonian logic as the foundation for 21st centurymilitary operations.

Even today, emerging technology is opening the way forprofound changes in operational concepts. According toGeneral John Shalikashvili:

52

By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct themost intense joint operations. Instead of relying on massedforces and sequential operations, we will achieve massedeffects in other ways. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effectsthrough the tailored application of joint combat power.Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacksconcurrently that formerly required massed assets, appliedin a sequential manner.

By 2020, all operations by military forces which haveintegrated the latest technology may reflect concepts suchas “pop up” warfare where strike platforms are hidden andquiet except during engagement or movement, or “fire antwarfare” where large numbers of small, relatively cheap,unmanned weapons platforms swarm on enemy targets.

Stealth and the technology associated with precision,stand-off weapons systems already allow the United Statesand some other nations to strike with near-impunityagainst all but the most advanced opponents. The sametechnologies, in conjunction with ongoing improvements inforce protection, whether missile, nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) defenses or individual soldier protection,will probably decrease the risk to the soldiers, marines,sailors, and airmen of those states that develop andimplement them. Robots and other unmanned “brilliant”systems will increasingly assume the most dangerousbattlefield tasks. This is already underway in mine clearing and reconnaissance, but eventually unmanned systemsmay take over nearly all close engagements. As atechnology forecast prepared for the U.S. Army stated, “Thecore weapon of twentieth-century land war has been thetank, but the core weapons of the twenty-first century manybe unmanned systems, operating mostly under computercontrol.” Already, technology is making possible the“deconstruction” of weapons systems where the sensor,system controller, and the strike platform itself arephysically dispersed, thus making it extremely difficult foran opponent to locate the human directing the system.

53

Advances in information warfare may allow military forcesto erode the effectiveness of an opponent electronically, thus rendering the application of traditional force much easieror, in the most optimistic scenarios, irrelevant. It may nolonger be necessary to destroy the armed forces or industryof an enemy or even to seize territory, but only to demolishthe enemy's command and communication system from afar using nonlethal means. Added to other forms of nonlethalweapons, information warfare has the potential to make“dirty” combat based on killing and physical destructionobsolete.

Advances in information warfare may allow military forcesto erode the effectiveness of an opponent electronically, thus rendering the application of traditional force much easieror, in the most optimistic scenarios, irrelevant. It may nolonger be necessary to destroy the armed forces or industryof an enemy or even to seize territory, but only to demolishthe enemy's command and communication system from afar using nonlethal means. Added to other forms of nonlethalweapons, information warfare has the potential to make“dirty” combat based on killing and physical destructionobsolete.

If all this technology matures and is fielded by theUnited States and others, it is easy to imagine how difficultit would be to forge a coalition combining some partnerswhich have adopted the new forms of warfare and otherswhich continue to rely on traditional techniques. Eventoday, the gap between armed forces pursuing newtechnology and new forms of warfare and those who are notis turning into a chasm. And key characteristics of thecurrent strategic environment amplify the problems oftechnological asymmetry. During the Cold War, alliancesdesigned for warfighting were the most important form ofmultinational military cooperation. The formality and longlife span of such organizations gave their architects theopportunity to identify and transcend dangerousasymmetries, whether technological or not. This is less truein the current strategic environment where a convergence of political interests among most nations of the world causesvery diverse armed forces to join together with very littlenotice. For the time being, at least, heterogeneous, ad hoccoalitions have replaced longstanding, formal alliances asthe dominant form of multinational military cooperation.Not only do contemporary coalitions sometimes combinepartners unaccustomed to working together, but they oftenmust act so quickly after formation that there is little timeto work out incompatibilities. Time can serve as a palliativefor many asymmetries, but contemporary militarycoalitions often do not have the luxury of time.

54

Other characteristics of the current strategicenvironment also amplify the potentially debilitatingeffects of technological asymmetry. Because they often areformed for peace support rather than warfighting,contemporary coalitions are politically fragile. Nationsinvolved in a peace support operation seldom have a direct,vital interest in the conflict they seek to resolve. As a result,their willingness to bear costs and risks is lower than intraditional warfighting, thus forcing a coalition commanderto take all possible efforts to minimize casualties on the partof all participants. In addition, contemporary coalitions donot lend themselves to a hierarchical organization withjunior partners forced to assume a role dictated by seniorpartners. This has profound strategic implications.Asymmetries, whether caused by technology or some otherfactor, are easier to deal with in hierarchical coalitionswhere the lead nation can impose discipline or compliance.Neither Napoleon nor Hitler, for instance, had qualmsabout forcing their junior partners to accept tasks that thecoalition leader deemed appropriate. This has seldom beenreplicated in the post-Cold War strategic environment.

The political costs of withdrawal from contemporarycoalitions is often small for all except the major participantsor lead nation, particularly in coalitions formed forhumanitarian relief or peace support rather thanwarfighting. This means that even when there is a greatdisparity between the lead nation's national power and themilitary prowess of coalition partners, the perception ofequity is a political necessity. A coalition commandercobbling together a force from participants with variedmotives and a weak commitment to the common cause mayhave to eschew the most militarily effective solutions totechnological asymmetries and accept greater tactical andoperational risk to preserve unity and sustain politicalsupport. Under such conditions, asymmetries that mighthave been only minor nuisances under other circumstancescan prove debilitating.

Admittedly, even in heterogeneous, fragile, andvoluntary coalitions, not all technological asymmetries are

55

debilitating and not all debilitating asymmetries can betraced to technology. But enough adverse effects derive from technological asymmetry that the issue warrants carefulconsideration by strategists and coalition commanders.Identifying potentially debilitating asymmetries anddeveloping solutions is thus a vital part of the planning andleading of modern coalitions.

In a general sense, the danger to a coalition posed bytechnological asymmetry is determined by five factors. Thefirst (and most obvious) is the aggregate level of asymmetry. It might seem that a little asymmetry would be easier toovercome than a large amount. But when glaringdifferences exist, it is easier for national components to begiven independent missions and for force commanders totake the difficult steps needed to overcome the problems.Moreover, asymmetries which initially appear less pressing can be more difficult to transcend if for no other reason thanthat their effect is easily underestimated. In NATO, forinstance, it has been harder to overcome minor variation inthings such as communications systems than it was to solvemajor differences. When obvious technologicalasymmetries exist in a coalition, the participant rich intechnology often assumes responsibility for transcending orbypassing the problems which emerge from the gap. Whenthe asymmetries are important but not glaring, it is moredifficult to assign responsibility for overcoming them.

The second factor determining the danger thattechnological asymmetry might pose to a coalition is theperiod of time between the deployment of forces and thecommencement of operations. The more time available, thegreater the chances that solutions can be found for the mostdebilitating asymmetries. Third is the intensity and pace ofthe operations the coalition will undertake. The moreintense and fast-paced the operations, the greater thedanger that technological asymmetry will complicate orprevent completion of key strategic and operational tasks.History is replete with instances whereasymmetries—some technological and some related totraining and leadership—forced a coalition to act more

56

slowly than the commander would have wished. Examplesinclude Rommel's experience with the Italians or vonManstein's with the Rumanians. The fourth factordetermining the danger that technological asymmetryposes to a coalition is the technology of the enemy. Atechnologically proficient enemy will be better able toidentify and manipulate technological asymmetries in acoalition. The fifth factor is the political strength or fragility of the coalition. A warfighting coalition where the nationalsurvival or vital interests of the participants are at stakewill be more likely to take difficult steps to overcometechnological asymmetry or to bear its costs than a morefragile coalition where participants will withdraw if thecosts and risks of the operation exceed fairly low limits.Taken together, these factors allow coalition planners todevelop an overall assessment of risks posed by asymmetry.Such an assessment should be a standard part of planningfor contemporary military coalitions.

Problems. Technological asymmetry can generateproblems for coalitions both in terms of support and theemployment of forces. A coalition commander whose force is riven with such asymmetries may be forced to use his assetsin a way that increase risks and diminishes the probabilityof success. This can happen in several ways. At the mostbasic level, technological asymmetry can complicate orprevent effective interoperability by hindering coordination between units from different nations and increasing thecoalition's logistics, maintenance and support burden byforcing it store and move a wider range of material. But, atthe same time, technology also provides help with thecomplexities of managing an extensive inventory ofsupplies, parts, and other materiel. More serious problemscan arise when a coalition commander must shape hisconcept of operations to the capabilities of the partner which had done the least to acquire and field the technologynecessary for fast-paced, complex operations. While slowerand simpler operations are not always inferior, anythingthat limits the choices available to a commander has the

57

potential to complicate the completion of key missions or toincrease risk and cost.

Technological asymmetry can also generate strategiclevel effects that threaten alliance cohesion, primarily bycreating a perception of unequal burden-sharing or riskamong the participants. For instance, if some militariesdevelop and field advanced technology for soldier protectionand then join a coalition with partners lacking it, thecoalition commander would have three options. He couldignore the asymmetry and hope that the coalition partnerswithout soldier protection technology do not abandon thecause when their casualties exceed those of partners whichdo have such technology. He could design the operation sothat coalition partners with advanced soldier protectiontechnology assumed the most dangerous roles. Or he couldattempt to have the nations with advanced soldierprotection technology share it with those lacking it, thusincreasing the risk of casualties for the nations which gaveup the equipment and boosting the chances that theirpublics might demand withdrawal from the coalition.Clearly, none of these is desirable.

Technological asymmetry, then, can generate a range ofproblems for a coalition from the tactical to the strategiclevels. Many of these are extraordinarily complex, with thesame technology that augments military capabilitiessometimes generating new dilemmas.

Solutions . Specific solutions to technologicalasymmetry, whether operational or strategic, will naturally depend on the circumstances. The political mandate of thecoalition, its military mission, composition, and enemy alldetermine to what extent and in what ways a commanderhandles internal technological differences. It is possible,though, to sketch some general approaches to asymmetrythat political leaders, coalition commanders, and planningstaffs might consider. These approaches fall into threecategories: (1) activities prior to forming a coalition; (2)activities during the diplomatic activities associated with

58

the formation of a coalition; and, (3) activities during theplanning and execution of coalition military operations.

Prior to forming a coalition. While it is impossible tofully prevent technological asymmetries among coalitionpartners, it is both possible and important to keep themfrom becoming debilitating or posing an obstacle to theaccomplishment of key missions. This can best be done inadvance of the formation of a coalition. Because the UnitedStates will often assume the role of lead nation in futuremultinational coalitions, the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, the Joint Staff, and the regional unified commands should pay particular attention to establishing a conceptualand doctrinal framework for dealing with technologicalasymmetries. Each of the regional unified commands, forinstance, should develop long-term programs to assess theasymmetries that exist between the United States andpotential coalition partners in their area. The unifiedcommands (especially Atlantic Command) and the servicesshould develop exercises, simulations, and wargamesdesigned specifically to identify the most dangerous forms of technological asymmetry in existing and future militaryforces. This will require U.S. planning staffs such as theJoint Staff, the service staffs, and the J-5 sections of theregional unified commands to pay particular attention toany long-term, future-oriented force development programs implemented by potential coalition partners. At the sametime, historical studies should be undertaken to develop adata base of responses to asymmetries that have been usedin the past. And, officers who might someday command acoalition or work on a high-level coalition staff should bemade aware of the effects of technological inequality andpossible solutions. To facilitate this, the various U.S. warcolleges should incorporate the study of the problemsassociated with coalition operations into their curricula andwargames (if this has not already been done).

As appropriate concepts and attitudes are developed toalleviate or forestall the debilitating effects of technologicalasymmetry, nations which might play a central role infuture coalitions—again with the United States in the

59

lead—should move toward more concrete programs. Undercertain conditions, technology sharing might prove useful.Most often, though, this option will only work with fairlysimple things such as communications equipment. Recentconflicts such as the Gulf War showed that possession ofcomplex technology alone does not always lead to dramaticimprovements in military effectiveness. Technology issimply one part of a synergistic system that includesresearch, development, training, doctrine, support systems, concepts, attitudes and leadership. Given this, sharingtechnology with potential coalition partners will not helpunless the other components of the system can also beexported and absorbed by the recipient. Many militaryforces are simply not capable of undertaking the rapid andradical change in training, force structure, and doctrinethat new, complex technology requires. In the future, theinformation revolution may create technologically savvysubcultures in all states from which military leadership canbe drawn. Today, though, only military forces oftechnologically-focused cultures like the American,Japanese, German, and a few others can do this. For most,complex or strange technology would be under-utilized andmoney better spent on simpler but more usable equipment.

There are also political problems with technologysharing. States with complex technology will often hesitateto share it with potential coalition partners. With allies,there is some expectation of continued cooperation and afoundation of shared interests, so technology sharing ispolitically feasible. But this does not always hold in asecurity environment where it is difficult to predict futurefriends and enemies, and where ad hoc coalitions are therule. There is always the risk that shared technology will beturned against its originators or transferred to a thirdparty. Because of this, the focus of any programs to forestalldebilitating technological asymmetry should be onprocedural solutions rather than technology sharing.

During the formation of a coalition. During the actualprocess of forming a coalition, the nature of the mission andthe enemy or threat become clearer, so potentially

60

damaging technological asymmetries can be identified withgreater certainty. At this stage, military planners andadvisers must make the architects of the coalition aware ofsuch asymmetries as civilian leaders balance the politicaladvantages of including as many partners as possible in acoalition against the cost in military effectiveness that canarise in an asymmetric force. Political leaders must be opento the idea of rejecting a potential partner when the military disadvantages of participation greatly outweigh thepolitical gains. If political leaders do decide to include amilitary force that adds technological asymmetry to acoalition, they should consider specifying a role thatminimizes the degree to which that partner erodes militaryeffectiveness and limits the choices available to the coalition commander. In general, technology is most crucial for C3Iand offensive operations. Military strategists should advise political leaders to seek a contribution outside these areasfrom states that have done a less comprehensive job atintegrating the latest technology.

During planning and execution. Once a coalition isformed and operational planning begins, the role of thecoalition commander and his staff in dealing withtechnological asymmetry increases. The objective is still tobalance military effectiveness with the political objectivesand parameters of the coalition. In less risky and dangerous operations or where a coalition is particularly fragile, thecommander may decide that political conditions justifyaccepting reduced effectiveness and shape the operationaccording to the least proficient coalition partner. Theresult would be a plan of operation that unfolds more slowlyand is less complex than one that might be undertaken by acoalition composed solely of more technology-reliantpartners. Under some conditions, this may provide anadvantage to the adversary.

In peace enforcement or warfighting where the dangersand risks are greater, a coalition commander is less likely toallow the limitations of the least capable partner to dictateactivities and will, instead, seek ways to transcend anydebilitating technological asymmetries. In a broad sense,

61

there are two ways to do this. The commander can attemptto ameliorate asymmetries by improving the capabilities ofcoalition partners which have done a less comprehensive job of acquiring and fielding technology. Again, technologysharing might seem the most obvious way of doing this, butthe time it takes a military force to absorb new technologyand develop the expertise to make maximum use of itdiminishes the utility of technology sharing. In mostinstances, some sort of liaison relationship will be morefruitful. This is particularly true for the technologyassociated with communications and intelligence. It wouldbe fairly simple to attach a C3I cell from moretechnologically proficient coalition partners to theheadquarters of others. But, such a liaison system must beplanned in advance. Technologically proficient coalitionpartners must deploy enough communications andintelligence units that some can be detached to serve asliaisons without eroding the effectiveness of their own units. And, effective liaisons must have language and inter-cultural skills. Because of this, things like the U.S. Army'sforeign area officer program and Special Forces will be vitalto the success of future coalitions.

The second approach is to use some sort of division oflabor rather than attempting to make the coalitionhomogenous. This could be geographic, with moretechnologically proficient coalition partners assigned thesectors of the battlefield where their ability to operate at arapid tempo, strike deep, and engage a greater number ofenemy targets and units would have the greatest utility.Desert Storm used this technique. But, a battlefield division of labor could also be based on tasks rather than geography,with more technologically adept coalition partners assigned jobs best suited to their skills such as battle management,intelligence, deep strike, and missile defense. Clearly, thespecific approach taken will depend on circumstances, but acoalition commander aware of the advantages anddisadvantages of alternative approaches to technologicalasymmetry will always have an advantage over one who has not considered them.

62

Conclusions. How much and what kind of technology amilitary force acquires reflects a number of factorsincluding available funding, the national technical andscientific base, national culture, and the strategic situation.During protracted wars, combat serves as the final arbiterof what works and what does not, so all nations, combatantsand noncombatants, tend to move toward similartechnology. In the current strategic environment, mostmilitary technology has not faced the ultimate test. Thisencourages technological heterogeneity. Each of thetechnologically-focused militaries around the world has itsown vision of future armed conflict. This, in combinationwith the fact that most of the world's armed forces are notundergoing rapid technological change at the present time,contributes to an ingrained asymmetry that will continue togrow for the foreseeable future.

Still, technological asymmetry is not always an obstacleto effective and smoothly functioning coalitions. Generally,the more intense the operations, the greater the risks posedby asymmetry while, at the same time, the greater theincentives to deal with any problems arising from it. Inhumanitarian relief or peace support operations,technological asymmetry will seldom generateinsurmountable problems. In peace enforcement orwarfighting, though, it could prove very dangerous.Political decisionmakers and coalition commanders mustremain sensitive to technological differences in suchsituations.

As with any problem, the more that technologicalasymmetries can be foreseen and solutions implemented inadvance, the better. While it is impossible to predict whichstates will join the United States in all future coalitionoperations, the current strategic environment does allowU.S. leaders to identify likely partners and attempt toforestall problems. This requires a coherent, long-termprogram which includes exercises, simulations, andwargames designed specifically to identify and findsolutions to debilitating technological asymmetries. This

63

program should help potential coalition leaders andcommanders—both U.S. and foreign—understand theimpact of such asymmetries on military operations in partthrough production and dissemination of a catalog of thetypes of technological asymmetries that have affected pastcoalitions and the solutions that commanders employed.For the United States, such a program to minimize thedeleterious effects of technological asymmetry on militarycoalitions would be a useful step, given the persistentstrategic imperatives to make maximum use of advancedtechnology while operating in coalition whenever possible.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

DOCTRINE AND TRAINING:

THE FOUNDATION OF EFFECTIVE COALITIONOPERATIONS

Michael Smith

A coalition is, by definition, an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more states for common action. Its actionstake place outside the bounds of established alliances,usually for single occasions, or longer cooperation in anarrow sector of common interest. Differences in nationalhistories, command and control procedures, logisticalconcepts, technological capabilities, and force compositionsand organizations combine to present coalitions withimposing obstacles to effectiveness. However, the commonthread among these obstacles and the greatest confoundingfactor coalitions face is their ad hoc nature.

There can be little doubt that the ability of coalitions toovercome these challenges is directly proportional to thecommitment that potential coalition partners give todeveloping general doctrinal principles to guide their

64

operations, and to training. No other factors hold as muchpotential for successful mission execution.

The Importance of Common DoctrinalConsiderations.

Limited warning, limited time until execution ofoperations, language difficulties, and differing nationalcultures and defense policies add complications that wouldchallenge even long-standing, well-trained alliances.NATO has been in existence for approximately 50 years,and, as an alliance, is a higher form of multinationalorganization than a coalition. Despite their long associationwith one another, NATO members still meet on a regularbasis to develop and refine doctrinal concepts.

This underscores the doctrinal challenge facingcoalitions which rarely have weeks, let alone years, tocoordinate the most fundamental operational principles.When a military organization lacks a common doctrine it isdifficult to achieve unity of effort. There may not beagreement on, or a mutual understanding of, fundamentalmilitary activities such as maneuver, mobility,countermobility, fire support, command and controlprocedures, intelligence operations (especially intelligencesharing), force protection, support operations, civil affairs,and rules of engagement.

To overcome the problems associated with the lack of acommon doctrine, regional organizations should developregional doctrinal publications which identify doctrinal“considerations” for commanders and planners. The term“considerations” is used because it is unlikely that anythingmore detailed or prescriptive would be adopted andendorsed by all potential coalition members from a region.Moreover, coalition partners may come from outside theregion of operations and may not be inclined to adopt theregional organization's doctrine.

The publication would catalogue key considerations forcommanders and planners to evaluate for applicability to

65

their coalition's situation. It should be based on existingmodels (e.g., UN, NATO, etc.) and capture the wide varietyof doctrinal principles, techniques and, most important,lessons learned from previous coalitions. Such a publication would mitigate the ill effects of the ad hoc, limited warning,and limited time until execution nature of coalitions.

Once developed, these regional doctrine considerationscould become standards, around which national forces trainto prepare for coalition operations. This is criticallyimportant and would be the single most importantcontributor to a coalition's efficiency and effectiveness.

An inherent problem with the development of a commoncoalition doctrine is that some militaries view doctrineprescriptively while others view it descriptively. Regionalorganizations would have to determine the authority of thedoctrinal considerations they develop. Clearly therecommendation of the term “considerations” rather thanactual doctrines is an attempt to address differinginterpretations of the term doctrine.

It would be wise for regional organizations to focus onoperational-level doctrinal concerns. However, someexplorations of tactics, techniques, and procedures willwarrant the regional organization's attention.

Finally, the regions themselves must develop theseconsiderations, or at least modify existing documents totheir needs. Such an approach should make the publicationmuch more implementable by them.

The Difficulty Posed by Shifting Objectives.

It is inherently difficult to get several different nations to agree on the objectives of coalition operations. However, anoperation's objective must be clearly defined and commonlyunderstood to attain the desired end-state. That alone is adaunting challenge. What makes this endeavor profoundlydifficult is that current day operations are so complex, andthe political end-state evolves or shifts as the political and

66

military situation develops. In addition, the mission to beperformed is usually a hybrid of tasks. Because thecoalition did not exist prior to the crisis that spawned it, thecomplete composition of the coalition is unforeseeable. Thecoalition, quickly constituted, will not have trained together for even the most fundamental tasks. So, just when thecomplexity of the military situation requires flexibility,adaptability, and versatility, coalitions, which owing totheir ad hoc nature lack a common doctrinal and trainingfoundation, find themselves grossly unprepared for thetask-at-hand. This is where regional doctrinal publicationsand training will pay off.

The Challenge of Terminology and Graphics.

Those familiar with joint operations of the U.S. militarycan attest to the challenges the U.S. Services face even withone another in terms of terminology and graphics.Coalitions, normally already separated by differentlanguages, face significant problems of differingterminology and graphics. This may undermine the goal ofachieving unity of effort, and generally create confusion.

Like the doctrinal considerations publication referred toabove, regional organizations need to develop anddistribute a publication which standardizes theterminology and graphics a coalition would need to conducta wide range of operations. Building on an existingpublication would markedly reduce the travails associatedwith such an effort. This document would need to be moreprescriptive than the doctrinal considerations publication.When complete, this too should enjoy standard use bypotential coalition members in their routine trainingexercises.

What’s in a Name?—UN Protection Force Bosnia. Peace support terms are not understood well, and aremarkedly different between the United States, othernations, and NATO. During the U.S. Army’s Battle

67

Command Training Program’s (BCTP) Peace OperationsSeminar at the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),concerns were raised about peace support terms usedthroughout the workshop and in the different headquarters’ operations plans. Of particular importance was theinsistence of the ARRC commander and his staff that theterm “enemy” does not fit in peace support operations. Theysensed the term had negative political and militaryovertones. For the sake of graphic clarity it becamenecessary to develop a standard symbology for terms whichapplied to peacekeeping organizations and factions so theycould be shown on a map. In multinational organizations,clarity and simplicity are essential in communicating themessage. The following terms also generated discussionand required clarification:

Enemy vs complying factions

Rules of engagement vs rules of employment

Lead nation

Role specialization

Mutual support

OPCON vs OPCOM

Peace support

Peace implementation

PSYOPS vs operational information

The Importance of Institutionalizing RegionalEducational Exchange and Training.

Where regional organizations exist, they attest to somecommonality of outlook and interests upon which militaryleaders can build. However, most regional organizations(with the exception of NATO and a few others) havevirtually no infrastructure to support the education and

68

training of potential coalition partners. As a result, eachtime a coalition is formed, there is a tremendous challengein developing trust and confidence between coalitionmembers, and in developing efficiency and effectiveness inmilitary operations.

Military leaders generally recognize the need to enhance the level of interaction between potential coalitionmembers. Senior officer dialogues, officer exchanges,education of potential liaison officers, and similar activitieshave been suggested as programs which would improvecoordination between regional armed forces. Additionally,it would be wise for regional organizations to establishpermanent or semi-permanent organizations orinstitutions for information exchange and interaction. Low-level events like platoon exchanges are not advisable asthey are of little value in enhancing the ability to conductcoalition operations.

Training, is the “center of gravity” for successfulcoalition operations. In order to be effective, coalitiontraining must be based on some form of doctrine, must havestandards, and should be routinely assessed to ensurecompliance with stated objectives. Command PostExercises (CPXs) are the overwhelming training vehicle ofchoice. This is largely due to the requirement of coalitionoperations to solve inter-armed forces integrationchallenges. Most of these challenges center on the actions ofcommanders and planners at higher echelons. FieldTraining Exercises (FTXs) which are extremely expensiveand resource intensive, do little to address the challengesthat most coalitions face.

Doctrine and Training: Challenges and SolutionsFor Lack of Common Doctrine and Training . . .UNOSOM II (1993).

Approximately 9,000 U.S. military personnelparticipated as part of the multinational United Nationsforce of about 28,000 peace enforcement troops from 29

69

nations in the United Nations operation in Somalia(UNOSOM II).

UNOSOM II followed the UNOSOM mission of 1992 andthe formal deployment of U.S. military personnel toSomalia in December of 1992 (UNITAF). The overallcommander was a Turkish general who was assisted by aU.S. deputy. This coalition, in some measure, faced everychallenge mentioned in this chapter.

The planning and conduct of combined operations wasadversely affected by the organization of UNOSOMheadquarters and the differences in training and doctrineamong national contingents. The UNOSOM IIheadquarters was staffed in accordance with the traditional UN model of determining staff positions based on nationalcontributions rather than with an eye toward optimizingstaff performance. The staff was composed of more thantwenty of the participating nations, and was assembled “onthe ground” in Mogadishu over the course of four months.On 4 May 1993, when UNOSOM assumed control ofoperations in Somalia, less than 25 percent of the staff hadarrived in theater.

To ameliorate the problems of planning in a multi-national headquarters, the United States placed its staffofficers in many key positions. To avoid the impression ofU.S. domination, staff section heads were provided by othermajor participants, but the deputies were U.S. officers. TheU3 plans cell was dominated by U.S. officers. As a result,UNOSOM II was able to follow U.S. procedures in thecommand estimate process to great effect. While there wasconcern about causing friction within the staff or within thecoalition because of the appearance of the United Statesdominating the UNOSOM staff, any adverse impact waseventually overcome. Despite all of this, the conduct ofplanning and execution remained at an unacceptable levelbecause it did not solve the problem of effectivelycommunicating orders to subordinate headquarters.

Although contingents from NATO nations brought ahigh level of staff training and compatible procedures, and

70

the officers of many nations proved to be highlyprofessional, the significant disparity in training anddoctrine among other participants made the planningprocess slower and more complicated than the situationrequired. First, planners had to determine what variouscontingents were capable of doing before assigningmissions. Second, negotiations were conducted todetermine what various contingents were willing to dobased on guidance from their national capitals or the viewsof the contingent commanders.

Each nation providing military forces to Somalia underthe UN Charter placed certain restrictions on their forces(to include the United States). These restrictions, combined with differing views on basic military doctrine required theUNOSOM II staff to consult extensively with nationalcontingents in an effort to build consensus for a proposedmilitary action, a task that many military staff officers werenot accustomed to performing. While such efforts slowedthe planning process, failure to do so produced orders thatresulted in little action being accomplished.

To complicate matters further, many coalition forces didnot recognize or accept the concept of “implied” tasks in anorder, thus requiring UNOSOM II planners to “specify” alltasks in orders to subordinate units. This was not initiallywell-understood by U.S. officers on the UNOSOM II staff,and they prepared operational orders in the style andformat used by the U.S. Army. Over time, orders becamemuch more detailed and specific.

Although English was the official language of UNOSOMII, language barriers within the UNOSOM II staff as well asbetween UNOSOM II HQ and national contingents madeplanning and execution of combined operations much moredifficult. U.S. doctrinal terms were not universally accepted or even understood, and when combined with basiclanguage problems, made translation of the commander’sintent a difficult challenge. Language barriers, combinedwith a heavy reliance on interpreters and liaison officers topass command information, resulted in critical informationbeing filtered and portions invariably lost. To overcome this

71

problem, U.S. staff officers had to limit their reliance onU.S. doctrinal terms and make extensive use of the“briefback” process, in which contingent commandersbriefed their understanding of the orders back to theUNOSOM II staff.

Though there is no substitute for clear commander-to-commander communication in a combat operation, theprovision of high quality liaison officers from nationalcontingents to the UNOSOM II staff was very important tothe success of combined operations during both theplanning process and subsequent execution. Fortunately,nations uniformly provided talented officers with the bestavailable English ability as liaison officers. Duringcombined combat operations controlled by UNOSOMheadquarters, they were present in the Joint OperationsCenter and were an invaluable asset in promoting clearunderstanding of orders and units requirements.

A Final Word. The international system of today andthe foreseeable future is characterized by the preeminenceof the United States. Despite its strength and militarycapabilities, the United States has repeatedlydemonstrated its desire to defer to regional organizations tosolve regional problems. When it senses its involvement isrequired, the United States, as a matter of policy, willnormally seek the assistance of other countries. Most of thecountries and regional organizations of the world havearrived at the same conclusion regarding the importance ofregional coalitions. The Organization for African Unity(OAU) has brokered sub-regional coalition responses toconflicts throughout the continent. Its interactions with the members of the Economic Community of West AfricanStates(ECOWAS) led to deployments of armed forces inLiberia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. Even the newlyreorganized Republic of South Africa has adopted policieswhich embrace the notion of forming regional militaryorganizations to assist in solving regional and extra-regional conflicts.

72

This penchant for regional solutions and coalitions isalso present in South America, where Rio Protocol countries organized a force to respond to the 1995 Peru-Ecuadorborder dispute. Likewise in Asia, ASEAN, the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations now-routine discussions ofregional military interactions provide additional examples.

However, articulating a common objective, achievingunity of effort, and directing and coordinating all forcestoward the common objective, is very difficult. Historyprovides examples of possible solutions, but each operationand coalition is different. As a result, achieving unity ofeffort overarches each coalition's conduct of operations.

The challenges posed by differences in national culturesand histories, command and control procedures, logisticalconcepts, technological capabilities, force compositions andorganizations, and doctrine and training all relate to oneanother in coalition operations. Some factors cannot bechanged—they are inherent to multinational coalitions.But doctrine and training can be developed and modified,and hold the most promise to improve the efficiency andeffectiveness of coalition operations. Publication of regionalcoalition doctrine considerations, common terminology, and institutionalized training and exchange for coalitionoperations would be significant steps to improve suchoperations. Implementation of these steps would enhancethe chance for successful missions, and would mostassuredly save lives.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1996 USAREUR Workshop on

“Problems and Solutions in Future CoalitionOperations”

List of Participants

73

Lieutenant Colonel Jean d'Andurain

French Military Mission to Allied Land Forces CentralEurope

Lieutenant General Anyu Anguelov

Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the BulgarianArmed Forces

Colonel Mohamadine Bahamou

Liaison Officer of Morocco to SHAPE

Captain Craig I. Bell

International Programs Manager

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Major General David L. Benton

Chief of Staff

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Linda Blodgett

Acting Deputy, Political Military Branch

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Admiral Claude Borgis

74

Director

Operations Planning Division

Joint Staff, France

Colonel Stephen Bowman Director

U.S. Army Military History Institute

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle Barracks, PA

Mr. James Boyle

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Colonel George Brock

Director General, Joint Operations and Plans GeneralHeadquarters, Burma Camp, Ghana

Major General Adem Copani

Defense Advisor to the President of Albania

Colonel William David Crosson

Chief, Civil Affairs Operational Planning Team (CINCSupport)

Colonel Erich Dallinger

75

Liaison Officer to the Partnership Coordination Cell

PCC SHAPE

Brigadier General Constantin Degeratu

Deputy Chief

Operations Directorate of the General Staff

Ministry of National Defense, Romania

Colonel Cheick Diarra

Cheif, Malian Group of Observes in Rwanda

Ministry of Defense, Mali

Major General Peter Dobo

Deputy Chief of Material-Technical Main Directorate

Hungarian Home Defense Forces

Colonel John P. Drinkwater

Chief

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Dr. Martin Falk

76

Science Advisor to the Commander in Chief

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Colonel Mbaye Faye

Deputy Chief of Joint Staff for Operations

Senegalese Army

Colonel Roger Ferrando

Operations Planning Division

Joint Staff, France

Colonel (Ret.) William G. Foster, Consultant

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Francescon

Plans Directorate (J-5)

HQ, U.S. European Command

Major Ray Gamble

International Relations Specialist

Office of the Political Advisor

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

77

Lieutenant General Robert E. Gray

Deputy Commander in Chief

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Major General Gunther Greindl Director General,International Policies

Ministry of Defense, Austria

Lieutenant Colonel Russell B. Hall

Deputy Director of Training

7th U.S. Army Training Command

Dr. Kenneth Hamburger

Adjunct Professor

St. Thomas Aquinas College

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Hamilton

Chief, Plans Branch

Plans, Operations and Systems Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff fo Logistics

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Robert D. Kaplan

Contributing Editor of the Atlantic Monthly

Colonel Vladimir Karaffa

78

Deputy Chief

Defense Study Institute of the Armed Forces of theCzech Republic

Lieutenant General Richard F. Keller

Chief of Staff

HQ, United States European Command

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kertesz

Deputy Head of Operational

Department

General Staff Operational Directorate

Hungarian Home Defense Forces

Jon A. Kessmeier

Analyst

Strategic & Arms Control Policy Division

Science Applications International Corporation

Brigadier Ivan Koreta

Commander 1st Division

Uganda People's Defense Forces

Brigadier General Stanislaw Koziej

Director, Defense System Department

Ministry of Defense, Poland

79

Bruce Laferriere, Commander

1st Transportation Movement Control Agency,Germany

Vice Admiral (Ret.) John B. LaPlante, Consultant

Brigadier Jacobus A. Laubscher

Commander, 7th South African Division

Colonel Jay E. Lawson

Chief, European Division, Plans & Policy Directorate

(J-5)

HQ, US European Command

Colonel Daniel H. Layton

Office of International Security and PeacekeepingOperations

Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Colonel Vello Loemaa

Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the EstonianDefense Forces

Zurab Lomashvili, Ph.D.

Deputy Director

Department of International Organizations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Georgia

80

Colonel Isaac Longwe

Director of Military Operations

Headquarters Malawi Army

Major Ross Lozon

International Program Manager

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Thomas J. Marshall

Assistant Vice President and Manager

Strategic & Arms Control Policy Division

Science Applications International Corporation

Lieutenant Colonel Thulaganyo Masisi

Battalion Commander

Botswana Defense Force

John W. McDonald

Assistant Vice President and

Division Manager

Science Applications International Corporation

Dr. Steven Metz

81

Henry L. Stimson Professor of Military Studies

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle, PA

Colonel Mahmoud Mezoughi

Commander, 2nd Mechanized Brigade

Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Tunisia

Rachel T. Mokelke

Political-Military Advisor

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Helmut Muhl

German Liasion Officer

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Brigadier Elton Mwaketa

Director of Operations

Zimbabwe National Army

Mr. Eric D. Newsom

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs

82

U.S. Department of State

Ing. Jaromir Novotny

Chief of Foreign Affairs Directorate

Ministry of Defense, Czech Republic

Captain Michael Pene

Delegation aux Affaires Strategiques

Ministere De La Defense, France

Major General Daniel Petrosky

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Carla L. Post

Coordinator, Conference Services

Science Applications International Corporation

Colonel Valeriy S. Prokudin

Deputy Chief

Chief of Staff of the Operations Group of the RussianArmed Forces General Staff at SHAPE

Paul N. Quintal

Deputy Chief International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

83

Dr. Ronald L. Rasch

International Relations Specialist

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army CommandGroup

Brigadier General Richard Retout

Chief, French Military Mission to Allied Land ForcesCentral Europe

Colonel Sebastian John Roberts

Directorate General of Development & Doctrine

Ministry of Defense,

United Kingdom

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Scharpenberg

Contingency Plans Branch

Operation Directorate

HQ, U.S. European Command

Joel Selzer

Executive Assistant to the Commander

1st Transportation Movement Control Agency,Germany

Colonel General Leonity Shevtsov

84

Deputy IFOR Commander for Russian Forces

IFOR Coordination Center (ICC)

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Major James Shumway

Chief, Engineer Operations

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering

Topography Office

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Major General Ihor P. Smeshko

State Expert, Director of Strategic Planning andAnalysis

National Security Council of Ukraine

Colonel Michael Smith, Director

Joint Doctrine Directorate (ATDO-J)

HQ, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Stepanov

IFOR Coordination Center (ICC)

Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers Europe

Thomas W. Sweeney

Professor of Strategic Logistics

Center for Strategic Leadership

U.S. Army War College

85

Carlisle, PA

Colonel Istvan Szalai

Chief, Hungarian Partner Liaison Team

Partnership Coordination Cell

Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers Europe

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Bernard E. Trainor

Director, National Security Program

Harvard University

Hans Van Winkle

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff , Engineer

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Maj. General Ing. Emil Vestenicky

Chief of Staff of Ground Forces

General Staff, Army of the Slovak Republic

Dr. Kenneth H. Watman

Director of Requirements

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Strategy and Requirements, U.S.

Jon B. Whitford

Chief, Policy Branch

86

Plans Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Karin Wolflova, Interpreter

Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

Research Professor

National Security Studies

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Carlisle, PA

Colonel Walter L. Zink

Federal Armed Forces Office for Studies & Exercises,Germany

CONTRIBUTOR

THOMAS J. MARSHALL is Assistant Vice Presidentand Manager of the Strategic and Arms Control PolicyDepartment at Science Applications InternationalCorporation (SAIC). Mr. Marshall has an extensivebackground in national security planning with particularemphasis on strategic policy, European security, and all

87

aspects of arms control treaties. Prior to his retirementfrom the U.S. Army in 1983, Mr. Marshall served as thesenior military advisor to the INF delegation. Recently, Mr.Marshall has been active in supporting Partnership forPeace Programs with U.S. Army Europe and researchingconcepts on democratization, as well as managing adeveloping national security program at SAIC.

JON KESSMEIER is Principal Investigator in theRegional Security Division at Science ApplicationsInternational Corporation. Mr. Kessmeier’s background isin European security and arms control. He has conductednumerous studies and analyses for the U.S. Army, Europe,the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the StateDepartment.

STEPHEN L. BOWMAN served as Director of theUnited States Army Military History Institute at the U.S.Army War College. Colonel Bowman's recent assignmentsinclude Deputy Brigade Commander of the Berlin Brigade,a separate infantry brigade in Berlin, Germany (1990), andDirector of War Studies, on the faculty of the U.S. Army War College (1992).

MICHAEL SMITH is Director, Joint DoctrineDirectorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Colonel Smithis responsible for developing Joint Doctrine on behalf of theDepartment of the Army and the Joint Staff. He is a LightInfantry officer whose past assignments have included:Associate Professor, U.S. Military Academy; Chief, G3Exercises; Infantry Battalion S3 and Infantry Brigade S3;Commander, 5-21 Infantry Battalion (Light); Chief, FutureInfantry Concepts, Dismounted Battlespace Battlelab.

88

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG is Research Professor ofNational Security Affairs with the Strategic StudiesInstitute at the U.S. Army War College. From 1992 to 1995Dr. Young held the U.S. Army War College's Henry L.Stimson Chair of Military Studies. During 1994-95 he wasExecutive Committee Chairman, CR-CAST Working Group on Command Requirements of a Multinational ForceCommander. From 1988 to 1992, he was a National Security Affairs Analyst in the Strategic Studies Institute. Prior tothat he was a country risk analyst, consultant, and staffmember in the U.S. Congress.

STEVEN METZ is the Henry L. Stimson Professor ofMilitary Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Metzhas been with theStrategic Studies Institute since 1993.Prior to that, he was Associate Professor of Low IntensityConflict and Third World Studies at the Air War College and Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College. He has also served asan advisor to U.S. political organizations and campaigns,and has testified in the U.S. Senate. Dr. Metz's currentresearch deals with African security affairs and the futuresecurity environment.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

89

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Mr. Thomas J. Marshall

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler

90