Article VI, Sections 24, 26 and 28 Case Digest - ABAKADA v. Executive Secretary G.R. 168056, September 1, 2005

FACTS

Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing budget, generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation for education, compensation for health workers, and a wider range of coverage for full value-added tax benefits. The petitioners, however, questioned, not only the wisdom of the law, but also the perceived flaws in its passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of its provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference, in which the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report. In due to that, the Senate and the House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the President signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law, in response to a series of petitions for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the constitutionality of the said Republic Act.

ISSUES

1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from the Senate without violating Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution?2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution?3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the Bicameral Conference Committee?4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional mandate on uniformity of taxation?5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive?

HELD

1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of the aforementioned respective houses, regarding its transmission to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution does not mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited.3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile or settle the differences in the two Houses’ respective bills, but it is not limited to the conflicting provisions of the bills. It may include matters not found in the original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If both Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in such cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they had the power to amend their respective Rules to clarify or limit even further the scope of the authority which they grant to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Petitioners’ grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot bring about such an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee because they are members of the minority, deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the members of both Houses refuse to amend the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee is an indication that it is still satisfied therewith. At any rate, this is how democracy works -

the will of the majority shall be controlling.4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small.

Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality of the decision.Bondoc vs. Pineda G.R. No. 97710, September26, 1991

Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Surto join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunalthat on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.As judges, the members of the tribunal must benon-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the

corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for whom it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The

Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

NON DELEGATION OF POWERS

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992

Feliciano, J.: FACTS: The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

RULING:

The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…” The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

Republic Act No. 6826             December 20, 1989

AN ACT TO DECLARE, IN VIEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY, A NATIONAL POLICY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. State of National Emergency. - On December 1, 1989, a rebellion committed by certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines aided and abetted by civilians gave rise to an emergency of national proportions.

The emergency continues even with the cessation of military hostilities. More than 2,000 persons who participated in the failed coup, including the masterminds and plotters, are said to be still at large. There is a clear threat to national security posed by the rebels who have just "returned to their barracks," and the fence-sitters among the military. Bombings in Metropolitan Manila continue causing loss of lives, maiming of limbs and destruction of property.

On December 6, 1989, Proclamation No. 503 was issued by the President declaring a state of national emergency.

Meanwhile, secessionist elements in Mindanao, seeking to establish a common cause with rebels and their sympathizers, or taking advantage of the instability occasioned by the coup, are reported to have taken overt acts to dismember the country.

Communist rebels have taken advantage of the situation by attacking Government personnel and installations.

The economy has suffered and continues to suffer a serious setback, severely disrupting the momentum of our economic recovery.

A state of national emergency is hereby declared.

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The mutiny and rebellion by certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines launched to seize state power, destabilize the duly constituted Government and supplant it with a military government by means of force and violence and other illegal means, has caused loss of lives and destruction of property and has set back the economic program of the Government. Due to and by reason thereof, and in order to optimize the efforts of the President to carry out the difficult task of economic reconstruction, it is imperative to grant her emergency powers subject to such limitations as hereinafter provided.

Section 3. Authorized Powers. - Pursuant to Article VI, Section 23 (2) of the Constitution, and to implement the declared national policy, the President is hereby authorized to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out any or all of the following powers:

(1) To protect the people from hoarding, profiteering, injurious speculations, manipulation of prices, product deceptions, and cartels, monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade, or other pernicious practices affecting the supply, distribution and movement of food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies, office and school supplies, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery equipment and spare parts required in agriculture, industry and other essential services, and other articles of prime necessity, whether imported or locally produced or manufactured;

(2) Towards the above ends, (a) to purchase any of the articles or commodities hereinabove mentioned, for storage, sale, or distribution for the relief of hunger and want of the population, and/or to stabilize the prices of such foodstuffs, articles and other commodities; (b) to fix the maximum selling prices thereof; (c) to regulate the fees charged by establishments in connection with the production, processing, milling, storage and distribution of such articles or commodities; (d) to seize and confiscate hoarded foodstuffs and commodities: Provided, That goods which are determined to have been seized wrongfully shall be subject to the subsequent determination and payment of just compensation; and (e) to call upon and deputize recognized nongovernment and people's organizations and volunteers as well as local government units to assist the Government to carry out these powers through the monitoring or implementation of orders, rules and regulations, as the case may be;

(3) To temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest that violates the herein declared national policy: Provided, however, That to the extent feasible, management shall be retained, under the direction and supervision of the President or her duly designated representative who shall render a full accounting to the President of the operations of the utility or business taken over: Provided, further, That whenever the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the

Government of any such public service or enterprise is no longer necessary under existing conditions, the same shall be restored to the person entitled to the possession thereof;

(4) To liberalize the importation and/or grant incentives for the manufacture, assembly, reconditioning, or importation of needed vehicles or vessels, including the necessary parts thereof, for public transportation to relieve the transportation crises;

(5) To ensure the availability of credit to the productive sectors of the economy especially in the countryside through measures such as, but not limited to, lowering the effective lending rates of interest and reserve requirements of lending institutions;

(6) To stagger the working hours of, and adopt a flexible working schedule for, employees and workers in government, and whenever it becomes necessary, in the private sector;

(7) To conserve and regulate the distribution and use of power, fuels and energy and ensure adequate supply of the same;

(8) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, Section 25, Article VI of the Constitution, to decrease expenditures of the Executive Department of the National Government and government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries through the suspension of services, activities or operations which are of no immediate necessity, and for this purpose the President shall order that all departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the government create a reserve fund equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective appropriations, except those pertaining to personnel services, construction and repair of school buildings and hospitals: Provided, however, That in all cases, the security of tenure of civil service employees shall be respected;

(9) To issue lawful orders for the recovery and accounting of all firearms, explosives and military equipage, including, but not limited to, those belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police and licensed firearms which have fallen into the possession of unauthorized persons or entities, or are being used by their holders for unlawful purposes, and pursuant thereto, adopt such measures as are reasonably necessary to take custody of such firearms, explosives and equipage and/or otherwise accomplish the purposes herein stated: Provided, That this authority can be exercised only upon specific orders of the President or her duly authorized representative;

(10) To ensure that military uniforms, equipment and supplies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police are possessed and used only by authorized officers and members thereof pursuant to law; and

(11) To undertake such other measures as may be reasonable and necessary to enable the President to carry out the declared national policy subject to the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees.

Section 4. Reports to Congress. - The President, within ten (10) days from the issuance of any of the executive acts, orders, rules and regulations promulgated and issued by her under the powers herein granted shall report to Congress the issuance thereof and the justification therefor: Provided, That within the first ten (10) days of every month, the President shall likewise submit a monthly report to Congress of all acts performed pursuant to this Act during the preceding month.

Section 5. Penalties. - Any violation of the rules or regulations issued pursuant hereto, shall be punishable with imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court: Provided, however, That if the offender is a corporation, association, partnership or any other juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the president, directors, managers, managing partners, as the case may be, who participated in the commission of the offense or who shall have knowingly permitted or failed to prevent the commission of the same. If the offender is an alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings; Provided, further, That if the offender is a public official or employee, he shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be.

Section 6. Construction or Interpretation. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a restriction of the Bill of Rights or of the Constitution.

Section 7. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to any other person or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 8. Promulgation, Effect and Enforcement of Rules and Regulations. - The rules and regulations promulgated by the President pursuant to this Act, which shall have the force and effect of law, shall be numbered consecutively and shall take effect two (2) days after their publication in case of rules and regulations that are denominated "urgent," and five (5) days in case of those without such denomination. The publication shall be effected in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

Rules and regulations with a penal clause shall be duly published in Filipino and English in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Said rules and regulations shall cease to be in force and effect upon the expiry date provided in Section 9 hereof without prejudice to benefits and rights that may have vested, and culpabilities and liabilities that may have been incurred and established after due notice and hearing.

Section 9. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation and shall be in full force and effect until the next sine die adjournment in June 1990 of the regular session of Congress: Provided, however, That adjournment for a recess shall not affect the duration of this Act: and Provided, further, That the powers granted under this Act may be withdrawn sooner by means of a concurrent resolution of Congress or ended by Presidential Proclamation.

Approved: December 20, 1989

ARANETA v. DINGLASAN 84 Phil. 368 (1949)

G.R. No. L-2044: J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-2756: J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. G.R. No. L-3054: EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido (eyng?). G.R. No. L-3055: LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents. G.R. No. L-3056: ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Facts:

As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or procedure, particularly petitioners’ personality or sufficiency of interest and the question whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside.

Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President issued in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671) o L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution in the Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. o L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Respondents refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to control exports from the Philippines) o L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225 (appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes) o L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226 (appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.

Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency, pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect Held and Ratio

YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency.

It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.

Moreover, the fact that Sec. 4, CA No. 471 (which stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide") is silent regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it only means that the National Assembly believed that there was no necessity to provide for a provision regarding the repeal of the authority itself. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.

It would anomalous to have two legislative bodies (Legislative and Executive) operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by

a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter.

Aside from these anomalies, Sec. 3—which provides that the President shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted— implies that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.

Moreover, Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, that CA No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. A new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.

What then was the contemplated period? Pres. Quezon said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." From that, the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet, as no other factor as this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority.

HELD: Thus, the Court held that the period contemplated from the foregoing was

a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body. Particularly, CA No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met, not in the first special session where the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Art. VI(9), Constitution) but in regular session on May 25, 1946 where the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. The Court further held that EO Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law (because they were issued when CA No. 671 was not in full force and effect).

Having arrived at this conclusion, the Court need not decide the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue.

What the Court in this case did is to find out the will of legislature and, once found, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty.

No legal principle can be found to support the proposition that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war has not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it.

Another peg to the ratio decidendi Acts Nos. 600 and 620 even imparts by express provision that the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." From this the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source.

The question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered.

In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate.

A Note on the System of Separation of Powers: The Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." (Thus, the

President should not retain his extraordinary powers as long as turmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines) Votes:

MORAN, C. J., concurring

PARAS, J., concurring

MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting

TORRES, J., concurring

REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting

BENGZON, J., dissenting: For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows. RESOLUTION: MORAN, C. J.:Issues:1. WON Mr. Justice Padilla is qualified to act in these casesYes. A litigant…cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered. Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. The President is not here a party.

2. WON the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perfecto before his death may be counted in their favor Under Rule 53(1) in connection with Rule 58(1) of the Rules of Court, one who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. As a case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision and a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated or delivered to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication (Art. VIII(11&12), Consti; RA No. 296(21); Rule 53(7) ROC), one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. Thus, the vote cast by Justice Perfecto, who died and ceased to be a member of the SC on Aug. 17, ‘49, cannot be counted as the decision was released for publication on Aug. 26, ‘49. Moreover, his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's will. 3. WON opinion of Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of EO Nos. 225 and 226.

The Court had made the Chief Justice make a statement regarding the issue. The Chief Justice explained that he voted for a deferment of judgment in these two cases because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to be held in a few days. A deferment of judgment struck him then as wise since judicial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed.

But now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the nullity of these executive orders appears remote and uncertain, he claims to be compelled to concur with the decision penned by Justice Tuason declaring nullity of EO Nos. 225 and 226.

While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment, the Chief Justice was moved by the belief that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure.

Such harmful consequences which would come to pass should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void have not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is remote and uncertain. But the remedy now lies in Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act.

Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.

With the votes of the Chief Justice, Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Tuason and Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to declare EO Nos. 225 and 226 null and void.

The rule, under sec. 9 of RA No. 296 and Art. VIII(10), Consti, that 8 Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of these Eos does not apply because the executive orders in question, even if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law. Under Art. VI(26), Consti, the only power which, in times of war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the EOs issued by the President in his exercise of emergency powers, may be considered only as rules and regulations and not subject to the 2/3 vote rule. Note that in the previous drafts of Art. VIII(10), "executive order" and "regulation" were included in the vote of 2/3 rule. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later deleted from the final draft. CONCLUSION IN THE RESOLUTION: The EOs promulgated by the President under CA 671 before the date of the adjournment of the regular session of the Congress in 1946 (May 25, 1946) are valid, because said Act was then still in force; but the EOs promulgated after the said date are null and void, because CA No. 671 had already ceased to be in force in so far as the delegation of powers was concerned. Therefore, are null and void (1) EO No. 192 promulgated on Dec. 24, 1948; (2) EO No. 225 dated June 15, 1949; and (3) EO No. 226 promulgated on June 15, 1949

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.

I  General Provisions 

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act.".Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. 

Sec.  3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: 

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; chana.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and 

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. 

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. .(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters. (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people. 

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces , cities, municipalities and barangays. 

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon. .

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case may be. 

Sec.  4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Sec.  5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. .

(c) The petition shall state the following: 

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition; 

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor; 

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; .

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and 

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. (e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least tenper centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. 

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.

Sec.  6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum. 

Sec.  7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. .

II  National Initiative and Referendum 

Sec.  8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum. .Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Sec.  9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines. 

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its

publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. .

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.

Sec.  10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition: 

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and .(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity. Sec.  11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee. 

Sec.  12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. .

III  Local Initiative and Referendum 

Sec.  13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution. (b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. .

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative. .

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures. 

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted. 

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections. .

Sec.  14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated..

Sec.  15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. 

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact. 

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided. 

Sec.  16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months. 

Sec.  17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,

municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved. 

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays..

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum. 

Sec.  18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure. .

IV  Final Provisions 

Sec.  19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda. Sec.  20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act..

Sec.  21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act. 

Sec.  22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. .

Sec.  23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. .    Approved: August 4, 1989

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v poea

THE DELEGATION OF THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF CONGRESS REQUIRESTHAT T HE REGULATION IS GERMANE TO THE OB JECTS AND PURPOSES OF THELAW. – All that the law requires in delegating the power of Congress to promulgate rules andregulations to administrative agencies is that they must be germane to the objects and purposes ofthe law and are not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards it has prescribed. This is10known as the principle of subordinate legislation.PEOPLE v VERA

65 Phil 56LAUREL; November 16, 1937

1931: information for criminal case a g a i n s t M a r i a n o C u U n j i e n g , e t . a l w a s fi l e d i n C F I M a n i l a . H S B C , t h e offended party, intervened.-1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng-1935: SC upholds conviction of CuU n j i e n g , m o d i fi e d d u r a t i o n o f   imprisonment. After MFR and motions f o r n e w t r i a l w h i c h w e r e d e n i e d b y SC, final judgment was entered. CuUnjieng now sought to elevate case t o

U S S C . U S S C d e n i e d p e t i t i o n f o r certiorari.- 1 9 3 6 : R P S C d e n i e d C u U n j i e n g ’ s petition for leave to file MFR or new trial, remanded the case to CFI Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng applied for probation under Act No.4 2 2 1 , w h i c h w a s r e f e r r e d t o t h e Insular Probation Office (IPO)-1937: IPO recommended denial of CuUnjieng’s application for probation. Petition for probation heard before   J u d g e V e r a ’ s c o u r t . H S B C a t t a c k e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f A c t N o . 4 2 2 1 b a s e d o n t h e f o l l o w i n g :equal p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e l a w s(its a p p l i c a b i l i t y i s n o t u n i f o r m t h r o u g h o u t t h e I s l a n d s ) ;undue delegation of legislative power( s e c t i o n 1 1 o f t h e s a i d A c t e n d o w s prov’l boards w/ power to make said l a w e ff e c t i v e o r o t h e r w i s e i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o v i n c e s ) . J u d g e V e r a e v e n t u a l l y p r o m u l g a t e s r e s o l u t i o n fi n d i n g C u U n j i e n g i n n o c e n t o f t h e crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latter’s petition for p r o b a t i o n . C o u n s e l f o r M C U fi l e s exception to the resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of a l t e r n a t i v e m o t i o n s f o r n e w reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in the case asa m i c i c u r i a es i g n e d b y 3 3 ( 3 4 ) a t t o r n e y s w a s a l s o fi l e d . ( A t t o r n e y E u l a l i o C h a v e s , 1 o f t h e 3 4 , subsequently filed a petition for leave t o w i t h d r a w h i s a p p e a r a n c e a samicus curiaeon the ground that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he s i g n e d t h e s a m e " w i t h o u t m a t u r e deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.”) HSBC filed opposition to motion for intervention. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said judgment.- 1 9 A u g u s t 1 9 3 7 : h e a r i n g o n t h e v a r i o u s m o t i o n s f o r C F I ’ s consideration. On this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC t o p u t a n e n d t o w h a t t h e y a l l e g e d w a s a n i n t e r m i n a b l e p r o c e e d i n g i n CFI Mnla.-Note Probation implies guilt by fi n a l j u d g m e n t . W h i l e a p r o b a t i o n case may look into the circumstances a t t e n d i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e f r o m i t s o w n admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and e v e r y C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e c o u l d e n j o y t h e p r i v i l e g e o f o v e r r u l i n g decisions of the Supreme Court, there w o u l d b e n o e n d t o l i t i g a t i o n , a n d   j u d i c i a l c h a o s w o u l d r e s u l t .

SSUENOTE: There were many issues in this case regarding the constitutionality of A c t N o . 4 2 2 1 b u t f o r p u r p o s e s o f   Administrative law, the focus of the digest is the non-delegation doctrine– W O N s e c t i o n 1 1 o f A c t N o . 4 2 2 1 c o n s t i t u t e U n d u e D e l e g a t i o n o f   Legislative Power, and is therefore unconstitutional and voidHELD  Y E S . S e c t i o n 1 1 c o n s t i t u t e s a n improper and unlawful delegation of  legislative authority to the provincial boards, therefore, unconstitutional and void.

Reasoning.Under the Consti, gov’t p o w e r s a r e d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g 3 c o o r d i n a t e a n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n d e p e n d e n t o r g a n s : l e g i s l a t i v e , e x e c u t i v e a n d j u d i c i a l . E a c h department derives its authority from t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e h i g h e s t expression of popular will . Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.- T h e p o w e r t o m a k e l a w s ( t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r ) i s v e s t e d i n a b i c a m e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e b y t h e J o n e s L a w ( s e c . 1 2 ) a n d i n a u n i c a m e r a l N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y b y t h e Constitution (A6,s1). The Phil ippine Legislature or the National Assembly m a y n o t e s c a p e i t s d u t i e s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b y d e l e g a t i n g t h a t power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d v o i d , o n t h e principle thatpotestas delegata non d e l e g a r e p o t e s t  , a n a c c e p t e d corollary of the principle of separation of powers.- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of  e x c e p t i o n s l i k e : ( 1 ) d e l e g a t i o n o f   legislative powers to local authorities;(2) to such agencies in US territories a s C o n g r e s s m a y s e l e c t ; ( 3 ) t o t h e p e o p l e a t l a r g e ; a n d ( 4 ) t o t h o s e w h o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f

  Administrative Law A2010Dean Carlotawithin its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.- T h e p o w e r t o m a k e l a w s ( t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r ) i s v e s t e d i n a b i c a m e r a l L e g i s l a t u r e b y t h e J o n e s L a w ( s e c . 1 2 ) a n d i n a u n i c a m e r a l N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y b y t h e Constitution (A6,s1). The Phil ippine Legislature or the National Assembly m a y n o t e s c a p e i t s d u t i e s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b y d e l e g a t i n g t h a t power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d v o i d , o n t h e principle thatpotestas delegata non d e l e g a r e p o t e s t  , a n a c c e p t e d corollary of the principle of separation of powers.- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of  e x c e p t i o n s l i k e : ( 1 ) d e l e g a t i o n o f   legislative powers to local authorities;(2) to such agencies in US territories a s C o n g r e s s m a y s e l e c t ; ( 3 ) t o t h e p e o p l e a t l a r g e ; a n d ( 4 ) t o t h o s e w h o m t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f   d e l e g a t e s s u c h l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r s (e.g., the President). The case before u s d o e s n o t f a l l u n d e r a n y o f t h e s e exceptions.- T e s t o f U n d u e D e l e g a t i o n :to i n q u i r e w h e t h e r t h e s t a t u t e w a s c o m p l e t e i n a l l i t s t e r m s a n d provisions when it left the hands of  the legislature so that nothing was l e f t t o t h e j u d g m e n t o f a n y o t h e r a p p o i n t e e o r d e l e g a t e o f t h e legislature. BUT to a certain extent m a t t e r s o f d e t a i l m a y b e l e f t t o b e filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a r u l e , a n a c t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s i n c o m p l e t e a n d h e n c e i n v a l i d i f i t does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.- I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e p r o v i n c i a l boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their p r o v i n c e s o r n o t a t a l l . T h e applicabil ity and application of the Probation

Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, a l l t h a t i t h a s t o d o i s t o d e c l i n e t o appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f t h e A c t i s n o t s u s c e p t i b l e o f a n y o t h e r interpretation.- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, w h i c h n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised u n d e r a n d i n p u r s u a n c e o f t h e l a w .  The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.- I t i s t r u e t h a t l a w s m a y b e m a d e effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or t h e a d o p t i o n b y t h e p e o p l e o f a particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a p o w e r w h i c h m a y b e d e l e g a t e d .   T h e r e i s n o t h i n g e s s e n t i a l l y l e g i s l a t i v e i n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e existence of facts or conditions as the b a s i s o f t h e t a k i n g i n t o e ff e c t o f a l a w . T h a t i s a m e n t a l p r o c e s s c o m m o n t o a l l b r a n c h e s o f t h e government.- T h e e ffi c i e n c y o f a n A c t a s a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the a s c e r t a i n m e n t o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y upon which the Act shall take effect m a y b e l e f t t o s u c h a g e n c i e s a s i t may designate. The legislature, then m a y p r o v i d e t h a t a c o n t i n g e n c i e s leaving to some other person or body t h e p o w e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e n t h e specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial b o a r d s a r e , i n p r a c t i c a l e ff e c t , e n d o w e d w i t h t h e p o w e r o f   s u s p e n d i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e P r o b a t i o n L a w i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e provinces. - While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of  a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the l a w t o b e e n j o y e d b y o t h e r s . T h e s u s p e n s i o n m u s t b e g e n e r a l , a n d c annot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can o n l y e x e r c i s e w h a t i s d e l e g a t e d t o them according to the constitution. It’ s m a n i f e s t l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e fi r s t principles of civil l iberty and natural   j u s t i c e , a n d t o t h e s p i r i t o f o u r constitution and laws, that any one c i t i z e n s h o u l d e n j o y p r i v i l e g e s a n d advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or t h a t a n t o n e s h o u l d b e s u b j e c t t o l o s s e s , d a m a g e s , s u i t s , o r a c t i o n s f r o m w h i c h a l l o t h e r s u n d e r l i k e circumstances are exempted.- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character w h i c h s h o u l d r e c e i v e d i ff e r e n t t r e a t m e n t i n d i ff e r e n t l o c a l i t i e s placed under different circumstances. W h i l e w e d o n o t d e n y t h e r i g h t o f   l o c a l s e l f -g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e propriety of leaving matters of purely l o c a l c o n c e r n i n t h e h a n d s o f l o c a l authorities or for the people of small c o m m u n i t i e s t o p a s s u p o n , w e believe that in matters of general of  g e n e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n l i k e t h a t w h i c h treats of criminals in general, and as r e g a r d s t h e g e n e r a l s u b j e c t o f   p r o b a t i o n , d i s c r e t i o n m a y n o t b e v e s t e d i n a m a n n e r s o u n q u a l i fi e d and absolute as provided in Act No.4 2 2 1 . T h e v a l i d i t y o f a l a w i s n o t tested by what has been done but by w h a t m a y b e d o n e u n d e r i t s provisions.- A g r e a t d e a l o f l a t i t u d e s h o u l d b e granted to the legislature not only in

t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f w h a t m a y b e termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. “Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the p e o p l e a n d t h a t t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e n o f u r t h e r restrained under our system than by t h e e x p r e s s l a n g u a g e o f t h e instrument imposing the restraint, or b y p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s w h i c h b y clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara case)

DecisionWHEREFORE, Act No. 4221is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, a c c o r d i n g l y , g r a n t e d . W i t h o u t a n y pronouncement regarding costs. So orderedTITLEGerochi v. DOEGR No. 15979617 July 2007 Nachura, J.

FACTS

R.A. 9136, otherwise known as t h e E l e c t r i c P o w e r I n d u s t r y Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),w h i c h s o u g h t t o i m p o s e a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted and took effect in2001.P e t i t i o n e r s c o n t e s t t h e constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented

ISSUE

W / N t h e   u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e   i s   a tax

RULING

n o   T h e   a s s a i l e d   u n i v e r s a l c h a r g e i s   n o t   a   t a x ,   b u t   a n exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power. That publicw e l f a r e   i s   p r o m o t e d   m a y   b e g l e a n e d  f r o m   S e c .   2   o f   t h e EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding e l e c t r i fi c a t i o n .   M o r e o v e r ,   t h e Special Trust Fund feature of the u n i v e r s a l   c h a r g e   r e a s o n a b l y serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is i m p o s e d   ( e . g .   t o   e n s u r e   t h e viability of the country’s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objective

DOCTRINE

It is a generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the  p r i m a r y   p u r p o s e ,   t h e   f a c t   t h a t r e v e n u e   i s  i n c i d e n t a l l y   r a i s e d does not make the imposition a tax. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates fromn e c e s s i t y ;   w i t h o u t  t a x e s , g o v e r n m e n t   c a n n o t   f u l fi l l   i t s m a n d a t e o f   p r o m o t i n g   t h e general welfare and well-being of the people