Webb vs de leon

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against

them without conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide

2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation

4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:1. NO. 2. NO. 3. NO. There is no merit in this

contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.

4. NO.

REASONS:1. The Court ruled that the DOJ

Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the

evidence submitted more fully.

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

Manotoc vs ca

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Lacson vs executive secretary

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination

whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

Held: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction

which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the

accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

Francisco vs ca

Facts:

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.

Issue:

(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

Held:

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.

Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.

The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of eight months

imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou

Facts:The Presidential Anti Crime Commission requested the filing of charges against Sanchez inconnection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez. DOJ conducted apreliminary investigation. A PNP Commander µinvited¶ Sanchez for questioning. He was identifiedby two people who executed extrajudicial confessions implicating Sanchez as principal in therape-slay. He was put on arrest status and taken to DOJ. A warrant was subsequently issuedfrom the RTC of Manila. Cases were filed in the RTC of Laguna but the case was transferred tothe RTC of Manila. Motion to quash was filed because1) Only the Ombudsman had the competence to investigate and 2) As a public officer, he canonly be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

Issues: 1) Did the Ombudsman have the sole competence to investigate? 2) Can he be tried in the regular courts?

Held and Ratio:1) No. Though the Ombudsman is empowered to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of publicofficials, the authority is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority

2) Yes. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner¶s office as municipal mayor

because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.

People vs. Guillen No. L-1477, January 18, 1950 Facts

Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, JoseFabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, asthe information filed against him provided.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was laterfound after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the lowercourt found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced withthe highest capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas and company.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime.

Ruling:

The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was not fully realized when the bomb

was kicked out of the stage, preventing him from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of multiple attempted murder.

21. People v. City Court of Manila Facts: 15 Oct. 17, 1972 - Diolito dela Cruz figured in an accident 16 Oct. 18– an info for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (SPIRI) was filed

against private respondent driver of the truck17 Oct. 18 – the victim died18 Oct. 20 – private respondent was arraigned on the charge of SPIRI; he pleaded guilty19 Oct 24 – an info for homicide thru reckless imprudence (HRI) was filed against priv. Resp.20 Nov. 17 – city court of Mla dismissed above info on the ground of double jeopardy

Issue: WON there was double jeopardy

Reasons: 21Molo v. People – held that where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

22 Above case not applicable in the instant case bec. there was no supervening event

23 (kasi nga patay na si Diolito nung na-convict si Gapay for SPIRI, if it were the other way around, i.e. na-convict muna si Gapay bago namatay si Diolito, walang double jeopardy kc may supervening event na)

53. PEOPLE v. NUNEZ (310 SCRA 168; 1999) Facts: Accused Demetrio Nunez had carnal knowledge of her 14 yr. old daughter Janeth Nunez in their own house one evening. Procedure: •

Janeth voluntarily instituted a case which led to the filing of an information But said info. merely charged accused with rape under art. 335 of RPC and alleged that the accused had carnal knowledge of his daughter, without alleging the minority Janeth.

• Accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. •

Trial commenced and prosecution presented its witnesses Dr. Ledesma, who conducted the medico-legal examination on the victim; PO2 Raul Tonzo, who arrested the accused; and the Social Welfare assistant who interviewed the victim- complainant

•

During second hearing, a re-arraignment was held upon manifestation of defense counsel Atty. Te (taga-PAO sya, pero malamang hindi si Teddy Boy natin to, as you may see later) that accused was willing to make a plea of guilty. The accused pleaded guilty as charged, and the court after

having ascertained its voluntariness of the plea, entered his plea. (but it was clear from the records that in making the plea of guilt, the accused was made to believe by both Atty. Te and the trial court that a plea of guilt would mitigate his liability).

• Defense waived its right to present its own evidence and merely submitted the case for decision. • Trial court convicted accused of statutory rape under sec. 11, sub-par. 7 of RA#7659, and sentenced him to death penalty by lethal injection pursuant to RA#8176 •

On automatic review, accused claimed that the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellant’s improvident plea of guilty to a capital offense and in failing to conduct a searching inquiry to fully determine whether the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea.

HELD: 125 A plea of guilty may only be considered as mitigating when seasonably interjected, that is, before the prosecution presents its evidence. 126Furthermore, the penalty of death is indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, accused’s re-arraignment was indeed flawed. However,

It is settled that a decision based on

an irregular plea may nevertheless

be upheld where the

judgment is supported by other

adequate evidence on record. In the

case at bar, the

evidence supports the finding of guilt

of the accused: oral testimony of

complainant and

medico-legal finding of laceration on

victim’s hymen and labia.

With regard to the imposable penalty, the Court held that:

THE FACT OF MINORITY AND

RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE

ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT

BEFORE DEATH PENALTY CAN

PROPERLY BE

IMPOSED. IN QUALIFIED RAPE,

BOTH THE FACT OF MINORITY OF

THE VICTIM AND

THE ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AS

WORDED IN RA#7659, MUST

BE ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION. IN THE CASE AT

BAR, ONLY THE RELATIONSHIP

OF THE PARTIES WAS ALLEGED.

Thus, THE COURT URGED THE

PROSECUTING FISCALS WHO

ARE CHARGED WITH

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

PREPARING INFORMATIONS TO

STATE WITH

PARTICULARITY THE ATTENDANT

CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDED

FOR UNDER SEC. 11

OF RA#7659.

57) PPL V. REYES • There was a case (PPL v ESTRELLA) in the court of Judge Reyes • Prosecutor made VERBAL MOTION to amend info on said case – to change date of offense from AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64 • Petition was denied by Judge Reyes – the change cannot be allowed since it would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused • Hence this petition via Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary injunction • The ESTRELLA CASE: 127 For Qualified Theft of truck vs. Estrella and 3 others in Municipal court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija 128 Info alleges: committed on AUGUST ’64 129 On November ’69, City Fiscal of San Jose (now a City) filed info (in respondent court) stating

the same facts BUT that the crime was committed AUGUST ’69130 On Jan. ’70 Estrella was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY131 The info was read in Tagalog so he could understand it

132 Although the Prosecution was present at the arraignment, they did not move or allege any intent to amend date or even inform court of such mistake 133 May 21, 1970 – TRIAL DATE 134Before PPL presented evidence, prosecutor makes VERBAL MOTION to ammend info

AUGUST ’69 to AUGUST ’64 135Accused having come to court to defend offense of 1969, vehemently objected to such motion 136Judge defers judgement on motion and asks 1st witness to testify 1371st witness, Alcantara, states that offense was committed in 1964 138Defense does not question such witness since his statements were not for the offense charged 139 After Parties submit memoranda on the amendment issue, Judge DENIES motion saying it would prejudice the rights of the accused 140 Judge denies Recon saying AN HONEST MISTAKE IN THE INFO CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BASED ON THE CONSTITUTION 141 Argument that TIME is immaterial to Theft does not hold ISSUE: WON there was Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part of the Judge when he denied the amendment (change of date) on the ground that it would impair the

accused’s substantial rights guaranteed by the constitution? SC SAYS:NO GAD •

ROC Rule 110 S. 13 (now S 14) says when Accused has already been arraigned and pleaded, amendment may be allowed only as to form and cannot be done when it shall prejudice substantial rights

62. POSADAS v OMBUDSMAN 2000 IF-THEN RULES in this case:

157 IF there no probable cause for the filing of an information against an accused THEN the court may enjoin criminal prosecution to protect the citizen’s right to be free from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution

NATURE: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Prohibition. FACTS:

158 Roger Posadas, then UP Diliman Chancellor, asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina, Sigma Rho member, in a rumble between Sigma Rho and another fraternity on December 8, 1994

159 Orlando Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his team went to UP à attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan & Raymund Narag, members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina

o On the basis of positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leonardo Lachica & Cesar Mangrobang o Taparan and Narag were then at the UPDP Station, for a peace talk between SJ & Sigma Rho

160 Posadas, Marichu Lambino (Asst. Legal Counsel), Rosario Torres-Yu

(Vice-Chancellor) & a certain Atty. Villamor (counsel of the suspects) objected to the arrest on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them

à suspects not arrest as a result of the intervention but Posadas and Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI office the next day

161Dizon filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor charging Posadas, Lambino, Torres-Yu, Villamor and Col. Eduardo Bentain (Chief of Security Force of UP Police) with violation of PD 1829 – making it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension & prosecution of criminal offenders

162 Information filed stated that: petitioners “xxx delayed the investigation and prosecution of the heinous case by harboring an concealing xxx suspects thus leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect Joel Carlo Denosta xxx”

163On motion, Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case à recommendation disapproved by Office of the Ombudsman – directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.

164 Hence, this petition to set aside the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering the prosecution of petitioners. ISSUES:

165WON there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of PD1829 – None 166 Court held

o Regardless of petitioners’ suspicion, they could not have authorized the arrest without warrant or even effected the arrest themselves à only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not caught in flagrante delicto

§ Special Prosecutor in recommending dismissal: UP officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.

167 WON courts may enjoin criminal prosecution

GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and therafter, to file corresponding information with the appropriate courts

EXCEPTIONS: 168 BROCKA v ENRILE (cited in VENUS v DESIERTO) 1. To afford protection to constitutional rights of the accused 2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid oppression

or multiplicity of suits3. When there is prejudicial question which is sub judice4. Acts of officer are without or in excess of authority5. Prosecution under an invalid law, ordinance or regulations6. Double jeopardy clearly apparent7. Court has no jurisdiction over the offense8. Case of persecution rather than prosecution9. Charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance

10. Clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash has been denied 11. SC issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the threated unlawful arrest of petitioners àHERE, petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest

169SALONGA v CRUZ PANO applies – Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for citizens’ right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution

** Petitioners challenge to PD 1829 as unconstitutional not necessary à case disposed of on some other ground xx Petition granted. Ombudsman & agents prohibited from prosecuting for violation of pD1829 par.1[c], while Sandiganbayan ordered to dismiss information in Criminal Case no 22801.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS [G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002] PANGANIBAN, J: FACTS:For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two minor daughters.

When first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. When the case was submitted for decision, the prosecution moved to reopen the case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the Marriage contract of the parents. This motion was granted over the objection of the defense counsel. Before the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through his counsel, moved for the change of his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted.

Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived its right to present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution. The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions.

ISSUE:Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD:NO. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal

prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Information. The facts stated in the body of the Information determine the crime that the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital of the essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as defined by law is alleged in the Information.

Since the Information fails to allege the essential elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him would be violated.

People vs. Mercado

FACTS: This is an appeal by the prosecution form an order of the Court ofFirst Instance of Pampanga whereby said court declared itself withoutjurisdiction to take cognizance of and decided two criminal cases pendingbefore it, for theft of large cattle, against the appellee Francisco Mercado,on the ground that, although the stolen animals were afterwards broughtby the appellee to the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, where theywere found in his possession, said crimes had taken place and had beencommitted in the municipality of Gapan, of the Province of Nueva Ecija.On June 21, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba, Province of Pampanga,Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused,Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, did, then and there, voluntarily,maliciously, illegally and criminally, take, steal, and carry away two malecarabaos belonging to Pedro A. Ladores, worth sixty pesos (P60) each andto his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P120 and a malecarabao valued at ninety pesos (P90), owned by Leon Ladores. Thecommission of both having been commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and

consummated at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, and without the

knowledge and consent of the owner.The informations were filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in theCourt of First Instance of said province after receiving the report of thepreliminary inquiries made, upon complaint, by the justice of the peacecourt of Candaba, Pampanga, where the case originated. The appelleewaived his right to a preliminary investigation and asked that the two casesbe remanded to the Court of First Instance for trial and final judgment.Lower court ruled that the cases are not triable in Pampanga.Hence, this appeal.ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Pampanga has jurisdiction to try anddecide the two cases in question, it being alleged in the informations bywhich they were commenced that the accused stole the carabaosdescribed therein in Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija, which is beyondthe jurisdiction of the court, in order to bring them, as he in fact didafterwards, to Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in hispossession.

HELD: In criminal proceedings, the

rule is that one can not be held to

answer for any crime committed by

him except in the jurisdiction where it

was committed. Said rule is based

on the legal provision which

prescribes the essential requisites of

a good complaint or information, one

of which is the allegation that the

crime was committed within the

jurisdiction of the court where the

complaint or information is filed and

that said court has authority to try it