Preventing School Violence Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Potential Incidents of School...

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Preventing School Violence Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Potential Incidents of School Violence Presented by: Frederick S. Calhoun and Richard M. Wilson

Transcript of Preventing School Violence Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Potential Incidents of School...

Preventing School ViolenceIdentifying, Assessing, and Managing Potential

Incidents of School ViolencePresented by:

Frederick S. Calhoun and Richard M. Wilson

CONCERNS:What do

our communitiesfear?

Slide 2 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Virginia Tech: April 16, 2007 32 victims dead 27 victims wounded or

physically injured Perpetrator suicide ~ 100 witnesses or directly

impacted individuals

~ 33,000 persons impacted on the Blacksburg campus

Slide 3 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Northern Illinois UniversityDekalb, IL: February 14, 2008

Slide 4 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

CONTEXT:What do we face?

OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS

Slide 5 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

On-Campus Violence

Source: US Dept. of Education Office of Post-Secondary Education

Type of Violence 2004 2005 2006 2007

Murder 16 11 8 46

Sexual Assault 2689 2722 2717 2704

Robbery 2077 2055 1981 1962

Aggravated Assault 2995 2906 3022 2834

Arson 1072 1024 975 790

Injurious Hate Crimes 30 32 51 31

Illegal Weapon Arrests 1377 1450 1412 1446

Slide 6 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Beyond The Tip of the IcebergBeyond Mass Shootings:• A broad range of issues impact

the safety & well-being of campuses.

– Harassment & Bullying– Bias-related incidents– Stalking– Domestic abuse– Sexual assault– Substance abuse– Mental illness– Suicide

Slide 7 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Mental Health on Campus

Centers Dealing With: PercentObsessive Pursuit Cases * 38Hospitalization of Student 87Student Suicide 26Client Suicide 22

* 271 cases of obsessive pursuit were reported: 80 students were injured 9 students were killed by their pursuer.

Source: 2007 National Survey of University Counseling Center Directors

Slide 8 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Mental Health on Campus

Counseling Center Clients Reporting: Percent*Non-suicidal self-injury 21Seriously considered suicide 25Prior suicide attempt 8Seriously considered harming others 8Afraid of losing control & acting violently 7Intentionally harmed another person 5

*Note: Includes prior to and after starting college.

Source: Center for the Study of Collegiate Mental Health (CSCMH): 2009 Pilot StudySlide 9 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Mental Health on Campus

College Students Reporting: Percent*

Felt so depressed, difficult to function 43Diagnosed with depression 5Seriously considered suicide 9Attempted suicide** 1

*Note: Includes 1 or more times in the last school year.

** Approximately 1100 college students suicides each year.

Source: American College Health Association -National College Health Assessment (Spring 2008; N=80,121)

Slide 10 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Mental Health on Campus

Counseling Center Clients: Percent

Clients with severe mental health issues 49

Impaired ability to maintain enrollment 8

Severely distressed but treatable 41

Source: 2007 National Survey of University Counseling Center Directors

Slide 11 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

CONTEXT:•What do we know?

•THE NATURE & PROCESS•OF TARGETED VIOLENCE

Slide 12 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Joint Project of the:US Secret ServiceUS Department of EducationFederal Bureau of Investigation

Attacks: 1900 – Present272 incidents

Joint Project of the:US Secret ServiceUS Department of EducationFederal Bureau of Investigation

Attacks: 1900 – Present272 incidents

Targeted Violence On Campus

Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.

Slide 13 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Targeted Violence On Campus

Slide 14 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Incidents: 1909-2009* (n = 281)

02468101214161820

11 0033 88

11

1313 19192525

4040

7979

9292

0102030405060708090

100

1900s 10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s 80s 90s 2000s

*Data collected through 2008, projected for 2009 based on average per year for decade.

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Targeted Violence On CampusAbout the IncidentsOccur on and off-campus

• 80% on-campus (residence, grounds, class/admin)• 20% off-campus (residence, public area)

Precipitating events present: 83%Targeted one or more specific persons: 73%Pre-incident threat/aggression to target: 29%Pre-incident concerns reported by others: 31%

About the IncidentsOccur on and off-campus

• 80% on-campus (residence, grounds, class/admin)• 20% off-campus (residence, public area)

Precipitating events present: 83%Targeted one or more specific persons: 73%Pre-incident threat/aggression to target: 29%Pre-incident concerns reported by others: 31%

Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.

Slide 15 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Targeted Violence on Campus

About the Perpetrators:Age: 16 – 64Gender: Male (80%); Female (20%)Status:

• Current / Former Student: 60%• Current / Former Employee: 11%• Indirectly Affiliated: 20%• No known Affiliation: 9%

About the Perpetrators:Age: 16 – 64Gender: Male (80%); Female (20%)Status:

• Current / Former Student: 60%• Current / Former Employee: 11%• Indirectly Affiliated: 20%• No known Affiliation: 9%

Source: U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Dept. of Education, & Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.

Slide 16 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Facts About Campus Attacks

Most (over 75%) consider, plan, and prepare before engaging in violent behavior;

Most (over 75%) discuss their plans with others before the attack.

Perpetrators of serious campus violencedon’t “just snap.”

These incidents are not impulsive or random.

Source: U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Dept. of Education (2002).Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative.

Slide 17 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Facts About Targeted Attacks

No unique profile of the campus attacker. Most have concerned several others with troubling

behavior before their attacks. Most are suicidal or at a point of desperation prior to

their attacks.

We cannot know whether to be concernedbased on a subject’s appearance – but we can tell by their behavior.

Source: U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, (2002)Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative.

Slide 18 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

A Perpetrator’s Poem• Sinking into bed

• Homicidal thoughts filling my head• Suicidal thoughts not gone, but fleeing

• Because it’s other people’s death I’m seeing• Suicide or homicide

• Homicide and suicide• Into sleep I’m sinking• Why me I’m thinking?

• Homicidal and suicidal thoughts intermixing• I know my life’s not worth fixing

Slide 19 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Implications for Prevention Many targeted attacks can be prevented. Information about a subject’s ideas and plans for

violence can be observed or discovered before harm can occur.

Information available is likely to be scattered and fragmented.

Key is to act quickly upon an initial report of concern, see who else has a piece of the puzzle, then pull all the information together to see what picture emerges.

Slide 20 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Implications for Prevention

– Assessment involves asking: Is this person on a pathway toward violence?

– Using a team can be particularly effective for gathering and evaluating information, and intervening if necessary.

– Threat assessment and case management is not an adversarial process. Engagement with a person of concern can be critical to preventing violence or harm.

Slide 21 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

• Assessment Approaches

Slide 22 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Current Prevention Approaches

– Mental health violence risk assessment

– Automated decision-making

– Profiling

– Threat assessment

Slide 23 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Mental Health Risk Assessment

– Also known as a clinical assessment of dangerousness

– Evaluates a person’s risk for more general/prevalent types of affective violence

– Not intended (nor effective) for evaluating risk of a targeted attack

– May supplement threat assessment process but is not a replacement

Slide 24 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Automated Decision-Making

• Two Areas of Concern:– The statistical or mathematical process for making

the evaluation is unknown

– No correlation between satisfaction with using the automated tool and the accuracy of the decision made

Slide 25 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

“Profiling”

– Most commonly used as an investigative tool to describe the person or type of person who committed a particular crime

– It is retrospective in that it uses clues from a crime that has already occurred to narrow down possible suspects

– When used with respect to evaluating risk of violence, profiling is prospective, not retrospective

Slide 26 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Prospective Profiling

Slide 27 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Profiling – Two Major Failings

– It identifies far more people that match a profile but do not pose a threat

– It fails to identify a person whose behavior suggests real concern but whose traits or characteristics do not match the profile

Slide 28 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Preventing School Violence

• Preventing school violence depends on everyone:– Controlling their own behavior and– Reporting inappropriate behavior they may

witness.

Definition ofSchool Violence

Violent acts, including physical assaults, threats of assault oral and/or written remarks or gestures that communicate a direct or indirect threat of physical harm which otherwise frighten or cause a reasonable individual concern for his or her personal safety or the safety of others, when directed towards persons at UT Facilities or Operations, or while on or because of their official duty.

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• Verbal or written threats

• Verbal abuse

• Inappropriate references to weapons

• Inappropriate references to death, suicide, violence, assassinations, or terrorism

• Obsessive interest in another employee

• Claims of mental illness prompting problematic behavior

• Bullying

• Suspicious activity

• Stalking

• Violent or threatening gestures

• Research into the personal life of another employee

• Frightening other employees

• Intimidating behavior

• Brandishing a weapon, whether its real, a toy, or imaginary

• Aggressive emotions

• Violence against inanimate objects

• Throwing things randomly

• Inappropriate physical contact with another employee

• Physical assault

• Damaging or destroying property

• Acting out anger

• Use of fists, feet, or body as a weapon

• Use of a firearm

• Use of an edged weapon

• Use of bombs or incendiary devices

• Use of weapon of opportunity, such as loose objects or equipment

• Throwing things at another person

Spectrum of Inappropriate Behaviors

Four Types of Aggressors

• Student

• Employee

• Domestic Partner

• Criminal

Understanding Four Types of Aggressors

• Identifying the type of aggressor helps us to:– Understand the aggressor’s motive or

grievance– Select appropriate threat management

strategy

Nature of Violence

• Violence is a process of incremental behaviors

• Specific actions assailant must perform

• Behaviors form basis for identifying problem individuals and for assessing risk

• Focus on actions and behaviors -- process of violence -- rather than words

Paths to Violence

Five Easy Pieces

Nature of Threats

• Those who pose threat may never make a threat

• Conversely, those who make threats may never pose a threat

• Focus shift from what individuals say -- threats they make -- to what individuals do

• Assess threateners and actors

Intimacy Effect

• Degree of intimacy within relationship affects validity of threatening statements

• More intimate relationship, more likely threats will be carried out – Domestic violence, workplace and school

settings

• Threat value diminishes as intimacy recedes– Public figures, presidents, celebrities, judges,

abortion providers

Intimate

Threat More Likely Carried Out

Intimacy Effect

Distant

Threat Less Likely Carried Out

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Contemporary Threat Management Process

Phase 1Report of Inappropriate Behavior

• Inappropriate Behaviors are noticed and reported by targets, staff, colleagues or families

• All employee training provides employees with the knowledge of what to report

• CTM depends on strong communications link between employees, BAT, TAT, and Student Deans

Phase 1 - Ensure Target Safety

• Safety overriding goal of CTM

• First reaction always ensure employee’s immediate safety

Phase 1 - Gather Initial Facts

• Facts feed assessments

• Gather initial facts, then set initial protective response

• Avoid conjectures and exaggerated fears

Contemporary Threat Management Process

Phase 2 - Initial Assessment

• Assess known facts and circumstances

• Prepare for on-going assessments

• Assessments guides protective response, protective fact finding and threat management

Phase 2 - Credible Threat

• Made by an individual who has the apparent capability of inflicting harm

• Made in a manner that causes people to be aware they are the target of the threat

• Place individuals in reasonable fear for their own safety and/or the safety of others, including their immediate family

Four Assessment Approaches

• What are the circumstances and context?

• Is the subject acting like a Hunter?

• Is the subject acting like a Howler?

• What is the subject’s justification, alternatives, consequences and ability (JACA) ?

Measuring the Circumstances and Context

• The Circumstance and Context Factors

• Once you have your facts, you want to examine them within the context and circumstances in which they occur because facts can be misinterpreted.

Assessing Individuals of Violent Intent

• Circumstances looks at the inappropriate behavior directly.

• Context looks at what else is going on when that behavior occurs.

Accepting Good News

• Assessments factor positive news

• Inhibitors, positive behavior changes, life-style changes, life improvements, refocus

Avoid the What If? Game

• Assess only facts

• Avoid conjectures

• At all costs, never engage in What If? questions

Identifying Problem Individuals

• Two Types of Problem Individuals– Hunters, who actually intend violence– Howlers, who want to frighten or emotionally

connect

Hunters Hunt

• Most importantly, hunters are known by their behaviors

• They follow the path to intended violence

Path to Intended ViolenceGrievanceGrievance

Expressed feelings of injury, injustice, anger, fear, revenge, outrage, or ideology

IdeationIdeation

Delivered Inappropriate Behavior, discussed plans for violence, identified with assassins, fixated on violence, fascinated with weapons, interested in specific anniversaries

Research & Research & PlanningPlanning

Stalked, researched target, made suspicious inquiries, gathered information on target’s personal life

PreparationsPreparationsAcquired weapon, assembled equipment, arranged transportation, respected significant dates, conducted final acts, costumed

BreachBreach Approached target with weapon

AttackAttack Assaulted target

Marks of a HowlerInappropriate Inappropriate

Behavior Behavior Written or Over Written or Over

TelephoneTelephone

Subjects who write or telephone keep safe distanceSubjects who write or telephone keep safe distance

Veiled-SubjectVeiled-SubjectSubject saying someone else will cause the harmSubject saying someone else will cause the harm

Defer HarmDefer HarmHowlers like to postpone any harmHowlers like to postpone any harm

Conditional Conditional HarmHarm

Howlers like to make if…then promisesHowlers like to make if…then promises

Make Habitual Make Habitual or Chronic or Chronic

ThreatsThreats

Some subjects just like to threatenSome subjects just like to threaten

General Rule

• Hunters hunt and rarely howl; howlers howl and rarely hunt

Except• In intimate or interpersonal relationships, howlers

continue to threaten as long as the threats obtain the howler’s goal.

• As soon as the target challenges the threats, the howler becomes increasingly likely to start hunting.

Hunters Hunt

• Hunters engage in attack-related behaviors.

• They do things in furtherance of their plan to commit violence.

Howlers Howl

• Howlers draw attention to themselves by making threats or other inappropriate communications, but they do nothing else.

Rule of Threat Management

• Always keep in focus what the subject is doing in order to identify a subject as a hunter.

Howlers vs. Hunters

• Howlers use their communications to cause a reaction, to frighten or enamor, to upset or provoke

• Communicating is action aplenty; it results in the end they seek

• Hunters want a more tangible result

• They intend to take violent action to rectify their issues

• For them, justice is expressed in force, vengeance in blood, affection in approaching

Contemporary Threat Management Process

Phase 3Appropriate Protective Response

• Devise appropriate protective response for the target

• Always respond

Phase 3Appropriate Protective Response

• Devise appropriate protective response for the target

• Always respond

Phase 3Conduct On-Going Assessments

• Factor new facts into on-going assessments

• Changes in circumstances prompt re-assessments

Contemporary Threat Management Process

Phase 4 - Select Threat Management Strategy

• Gauge threat management strategy to current assessment

• Maintain flexibility in applying strategies

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Phase 4 - Manage Case

• Changes in strategy must be readily available

• Strategies must be flexible, adaptable, and abandon-able

Phase 4 - Develop Follow-Up Strategy

• CTM cases can go on for months or years.

• Coordinator needs process for following up on the subject

Defusing the Risk• Consider all approaches

• Situation changes precisely because a strategy has been employed

• Change requires re-evaluation of case, assessment, and strategy

• May result in using another strategy or combination of approaches

• Process not endless -- but often seems like it is

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Legal Considerations and Information-Sharing

Slide 75 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

What Rules May Apply?

– Federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act

– State public accommodations laws / disability-related employment laws

– Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act;

– Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)

– State Patient-Health Care Professional Privileges

Slide 76 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Information Sharing: FERPA FERPA is not an impediment to effective threat assessment

and case management. FERPA governs records only, not observations,

communications, etc. FERPA does not govern law enforcement records.

• If created and maintained by law enforcement, for law enforcement purpose.

Guidance from ED encourages information sharing where public safety is a concern.

FERPA does not permit a private right of action.

Slide 77 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Disability Law Considerations

– Ensuring due process

– Direct threat provisions

– Not assuming every threat assessment case involves mental illness

Slide 78 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Information Sharing: HIPAA

– Confidentiality is held by client, not mental health provider.

– In cases where privacy laws apply, can try these strategies:

• Ask subject for permission to disclose.

• No legal prohibition against providing information to health professionals.

• Inquire about Tarasoff - type duty.

Slide 79 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Case Management Resources• Case Management options can include any mix of the following:

– Outpatient counseling/mental health care.– Emergency psychiatric evaluation– Pastoral counseling– Mentoring relationship– Academic / work accommodations– Separation from the institution– Social skills training– Behavioral contract– Parental / family involvement– Law enforcement involvement– Diversion programs– Management by walking around/alliance– Others?

CASE STUDY

Slide 81 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

SOURCE: OIG Report #140-07: Investigation of the April 16, 2007 Critical Incident at Virginia Tech. Prepared by: Office of the Inspector General for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services – Commonwealth of Virginia

ConcernedStudents

TheIndividual

HealthCenter

JudicialAffairs

CARETeam

VA TechPolice

CounselingCenter

ResidenceLife

Faculty

Slide 82 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Counseling Center Involvement

– Insure that the nature of psychological difficulties is understood, i.e., individuals with a mental illness are far more likely to be victims than perpetrators.

– Utilize knowledge about human behavior to inform the TAT

– Make suggestions as to when mental health evaluations would prove useful

– Interpret findings of mental health assessments

Slide 83 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

Consultation with Administration

– Advocate for the TA process – including resources for training

– Advocate for management decisions made by the TAT

– Maintain the confidentiality of clients

– Strongly suggest dual referral of individuals of concern (counseling & administrative)

Slide 84 © G. Deisinger, Ph.D. & M. Randazzo, Ph.D.

De-EscalatingVolatile

People/Situations

De-Escalating Situations

• Setting the Stage• Maintain personal space• Avoid excessive familiarity• Use caution in touching person• Minimize distractions• Maintain intermittent eye contact• Remain calm• Slow down the process• Continually assess for danger

De-Escalating Situations

• Engaging the Person• Monitor own reactions & stress• Treat the person with respect• Listen carefully & express concern• Focus on problem-solving• Be aware of non-verbal messages• Understand but do not encourage

disordered thinking or venting• Stay calm

De-Escalating Situations

• Assess Behavior and the Situation• Observe behavior• Elicit responses & listen:

– Attitude - subdued, combative, volatile;– Awareness - time, date, place, identity;– Speech pattern / content;– Mood - content & appropriateness;– Thoughts - content & clarity of

expression;– Internal reactions to person

• Gather data - staff, history, consultation.

De-Escalating Situations• Recognize Barriers to Cooperation

• Poor Communication• Previous Interactions• Anger/Hurt• Stress• Fear of Outcome / Unknown• Not Understanding Value to Self• Low Self-Efficacy• Disability.

De-Escalating Situations• Resolving the Situation

• Be consistent• Maintain reasonable limits• Respond to needs and feelings• Exercise creativity in problem solving• Give firm, clear directions• Use authority with firmness• Give limited choices• Be truthful

De-Escalating Situations• Do:• Stay calm• Listen carefully & express concern• Focus on problem-solving & alternatives• Isolate the situation but not yourself• Be aware of non-verbal messages• Be consistent & enforce reasonable limits.

De-Escalating Situations

• Do NOT:• Over-react• Make accusations• Be hostile or threatening• Be defensive• Reject all demands without consideration• Get in a power struggle

Contact Information

Richard M. Wilson, MPA, CPPSigma Threat Management [email protected]

Frederick S. CalhounThreat Management [email protected]