PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

20
PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Transcript of PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

Page 1: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION

RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Page 2: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

READING

Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6

Page 3: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
Page 4: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

OUTLINE

1. Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation

2. Presidentialism or parliamentarism?

3. Proposals for reform

4. The legislative arena

5. The plight of political parties

6. The judicial branch

7. Sources of disenchantment

Page 5: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES

Survival and consolidation of democracyAvoidance of the past (and military coups)Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior

crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?

Page 6: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?

Presidentialism:Head of government (president) is directly electedFixed term in officeCannot be removed by legislature (except through

impeachment)Selects cabinet ministersHead of government is also head of stateSeparation of legislative-executive powers

Page 7: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?

Parliamentarism:Voters elect MPs MPs select head of government (PM)MPs approve cabinet appointmentsPM (and cabinet officers) dependent on continuing

confidence of parliamentHead of government (PM) is not head of stateFusion of legislative-executive powers

Page 8: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS

Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime

Avoid polarization from zero-sum gameAvoid paralyzing deadlockThus superior durability of parliamentary regimes

Page 9: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS

Clarity of fixed time horizonChecks and balancesDemocratic election of head of governmentNot the cause of immobilism (PR the cause)Empirical findings result from “selection bias”

Page 10: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

BrazilArgentinaChileWhy not?

Insistence on election of chief executive Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty Low esteem for congress, parties Politics of nostalgia

Page 11: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS

Electing presidents:Plurality vs. MROMRO a “magic bullet”Reelection or not?

Power domains:Constitutional or partisan?Bureaucracy, judiciary, militaryDecree authority

Page 12: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

Electoral Systems:SMDs and two-party politicsPR and multi-party politicsEffects of district magnitudeClosed-list vs. open-list ballotsThe problem of term limits

Institutional Performance:Essentially “reactive” legislaturesRemoving presidents?

Page 13: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST (1996-2007)

Church ~ 70%Armed Forces ~ 50%Media (TV+print) ~ 40%Congress ~ 30%Parties ~ 20%

Page 14: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Diversity of party systems

Levels of popular confidence

Page 15: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

Figure 6-1. Average Number of Political Parties: Selected Countries, 1940-77 and 1978-2000

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

Number of Parties1978-2000

1944-1977

Page 16: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

Counting Political Parties:

N = 1 / (Σ pi2)

Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)

Page 17: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

Figure 6-3. Levels of Confidence in Political Parties, 1996 and 2000

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Mexico

Ecuador

Colombia

Chile

Central America

Bolivia

Brazil

Argentina

Percentage responding "a lot" or "some" confidence

1996

2000

Page 18: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

Authoritarian Regimes Control of courts Emphasis on legalities Rule by law ǂ rule of law

Advent of Democracy Deference to executive authority Weak checks and balances Extrajudicial killings (meta bala)

A Continuing Challenge Mexico: 1994 reforms, drug trafficking threats Venezuela: packing of courts Strong in Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica; 12/18 countries in bottom

one-third of all (World Bank on “rule of law”)

Page 19: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT

Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law)

Constraints on modern-day democracyInadequate policy performance Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal” democracyThus 55% would support authoritarian government if it

could improve economic situation (2004)

Page 20: PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT

Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998)Lula, Brazil (2002)Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)…

Reliance on democratic electionsVote as popular protestPossibilities of winningChallenge of governing