Prescription PARAS

TITLE V. — PRESCRIPTION

Chapter 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1106. By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.

In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription.

COMMENT:(1) Definition of Prescription

Prescription is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights thru the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be:

. (a) in the concept of an owner

. (b) public

. (c) peaceful

. (d) uninterrupted. (Arts. 1106, 1118, Civil Code).

. (e) adverse. In order that a possession may really be adverse, the claimant must clearly, definitely, and unequivocally notify the owner of his (the claimant’s) intention to avert an exclusive ownership in himself. (Clendenin v. Clendenin, 181 N.C. 465 and Director of Lands v. Abiertas, CA-GR 91-R, Mar. 13, 1947, 44 O.G. 923) .

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Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(2) Proof Needed

Because prescription is an extraordinary mode of acquiring ownership, all the essential ingredients, particularly the period of time, must be shown clearly. (Boyo v. Makabenta, CA-GR 7941-R, Nov. 24, 1952).

(3) Reasons or Bases for Prescription

(a) Economic necessity (otherwise, property rights would remain unstable).

Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtillar, et al. GR 68533, May 23, 1986

FACTS: Where the land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago, and is no longer a forest land, and the same has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least

three generations.

HELD: The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.

(b) Freedom from judicial harassment (occasioned by claims without basis).

(c) Convenience in procedural matters (in certain instances, juridical proof is dispensed with).

(d) Presumed abandonment or waiver (in view of the owner’s indifference or inaction).

(4) Classification of Prescription

(a) as to whether rights are acquired or lost:

1) acquisitive prescription (prescription of ownership and other real rights).

a) ordinaryprescriptionb) extraordinaryprescription

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CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106

2) extinctive prescription (“liberatory prescription;’’ prescription of actions); (“Statute of Limitations’’).

(b) as to the object or subject matter:

. 1) prescription of property a) prescriptionof real property b) prescriptionof personal rights

. 2) prescription of rights

(5) Laches

Laches (or “estoppel by laches”) is unreasonable delay in the bringing of a cause of action before the courts of justice. Thus, if an action prescribes say in ten (10) years, it should be brought to court as soon as possible, without waiting for 8 or 9 years, unless the delay can be justifiably explained (as when there is a search for evidence). Note therefore, that while an action has not yet prescribed, it may no longer be brought to court because of laches.

As defined by the Supreme Court, “laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto either has abandoned it or declined to

assert it. However, courts will not be bound by strictures of the statute of limitations or laches when manifest wrong or injuries would result thereby.” (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175).

Arradaza, et al. v. CA & Larrazabal GR 50422, Feb. 8, 1989

The principle of laches is a creation of equity. It is applied, not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.

(6) Rationale for Laches

If a person fails to act as soon as possible in vindication of an alleged right, it is possible that the right does not really exist.

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(7) ‘Prescription’ Distinguished from ‘Laches’

Mapa III v. Guanzon 77 SCRA 387

While prescription is concerned with the FACT of delay, laches deals with the EFFECT of unreasonable delay.

David v. Bandin GR 48322, Apr. 8, 1987

FACTS: A and B , husband and wife, died intestate, leaving two children, X and Y. X had been administering the property until her death in Feb. 15, 1955. Plaintiffs, the children of Y, were given their shares of the fruits of the property, though irregular and at times little, depending on the amount of the harvest. On April 23, 1963, plaintiffs, the children of Y, sent a letter of demand to the heirs of X for partition, and on June 14, 1963, or within a period of approximately 8 years from X’s death, filed their complaint against X’s heirs.

HELD: Plaintiffs cannot be held guilty of laches, nor is their claim barred by prescription. Plaintiffs were not guilty of negligence nor did they sleep on their rights.

Prescription generally does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co- ownership. While implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the rule does not apply where a fiduciary relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust.

Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR 67742, Oct. 29, 1987

In determining whether a delay in seeking to

enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important circumstance for consideration. A delay under such circumstance is not as strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable delay.

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Narciso Buenaventura & Maria Buenaventura v. CA & Manotok Realty, Inc.GR 50837, Dec. 28, 1992

The defense of laches applies independently of prescription. Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on the same change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescrip- tion is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time; laches is not.

(8) Constitutional Provision

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. (Sec. 15, Art. XI, The 1987 Philippine Constitution).

(9) Cases

Republic v. Animas 56 SCRA 871

Prescription does not run against the State, especially because the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties has become a State policy.

Aldovino v. Alunan III 49 SCAD 340 (1994)

Prescription must yield to the higher interest of justice.

Francisco v. CA 122 SCRA 538

Philippine jurisprudence shows that the filing of the complaint, even if merely for purposes of preliminary examination

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or investigation, suspends and interrupts the running of the prescriptive period.

(10) Prescriptive Period on Registered Land covered by Tor- rens System

Quirino Mateo & Matias v. Dorotea Diaz, et al. GR 137305, Jan. 17, 2002

FACTS: The land involved is registered under the Tor- rens system in the name of petitioners’ father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised with respect to the validity of the title. Immediately after petitioners discovered the existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided the land between the two of them in an extrajudicial partition. Then petitioners filed the case below to recover ownership and possession as the only surviving children of original owners, the late Claro Mateo.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bulacan, at Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are applicable against petitioners, that real actions over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that ownership can be acquired thru possession in good faith and with just title for a period of 10 years, and that ownership may be acquired thru uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of just title or of good faith. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed that of the trial court, thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches may override a provision of the Land Registration Act on impre- scriptibility of title to registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised is whether prescription and the equitable principle of laches are applicable in derogation of the title of the registered owner.

HELD: A party who had filed immediately a case as soon as he discovered that the land in question was covered by a transfer certificate in the name of another person is not guilty of laches. (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, 92 SCRA 389 [1979]). An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribe in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496 (now

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Sec. 47 of PD 1529) to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Aquirre, 7 SCRA 109 [1963]).

In fact, there is a host of jurisprudence that hold that prescription and laches could not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system. (Bishop v. CA, 208 SCRA 636 [1992] and St.

Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, supra) . With more reason are these principles applicable to laches, which is an equitable principle. Laches may not prevail against a specific provision of law, since equity , which has been defined as “justice outside le- gality” is applied in the obscene of and not against statutory law or rules of procedure. (Causapin v. CA, 233 SCRA 615 [1994]).

Upon the other hand, the heirs of the registered owner are not estopped from claiming their father’s property, since they merely stepped into the shoes of the previous owners. Prescrip- tion is unavailing not only against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor- in-interest. (Teofila de Guinoo v. CA [97 Phil. 235] and Gil Atun v. Eusebio Nuñez [97 Phil. 762]).

The CA erred in ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT 206 of Claro Mateo and issue new titles to those who are occupying the subject land. This violates the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The title of Claro Mateo could be cancelled only if there is competent proof that he had transferred his rights over the parcel of land to another party, otherwise title would pass to his heirs only by testate or intestate succession.

The fallo: The Supreme Court thereupon reverses the CA’s decision. In lieu thereof, the Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the heirs of Claro Mateo in a proper proceeding.

Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Estrella O. Querimit GR 148582, Jan. 16, 2002

FACTS: Respondent deposited her savings with petitioner- bank. She did not withdraw her deposit even after maturity date

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of the certificates of deposit (CDs) precisely because she wanted to set it aside for her retirement, relying on the bank’s assur- ance, as reflected on the face of the instruments themselves, that interest would “accrue” or accumulate annually even after their maturity.

Petitioner-bank failed to prove that it had already paid respondent, bearer and lawful holder of subject CDs, i.e., petitioner failed to prove that the CDs had been paid out of its funds, since evidence by respondent stands unrebutted that subject CDs until now remain unindorsed, undelivered, and unwithdrawn by her.

ISSUE: Would it be unjust to allow the doctrine of laches to defeat the right of respondent to recover her savings which she deposited with the petitioner?

HELD: Yes, it would be unjust not to allow respondent to recover her savings which she deposited with petitioner-bank. For one, Petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. (Art. 1173). Because the business of banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business firm.

The fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires banks to treat accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. (Canlas v. CA, 326 SCRA 415 [2000]). A bank is under obligation to treat accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. (Prudential Bank v. CA, 328 SCRA 264 [2000]). Petitioner failed to prove payment of the subject CDs issued to respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the value of the dollar deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest.

A certificate of deposit is defined as a written acknowledg- ment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor is created. Principles governing other

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types of bank deposits are applicable to CDs (10 AM Juri 2d Sec. 455) , as are the rules governing promissory notes when they contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain of money absolutely. (Ibid., Sec. 457).

The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of CDs. Thus, a bank will be protected in making payment to the holder a certificate indorsed by the payee, unless it has notice of the invalidity of the indorsement or the holder’s want of title. (10 Am Jur 2d Sec. 461). A bank acts at its peril when it pays deposits evidenced by a CD, without its production and surrender after proper indorsement. (Clark v. Young, 21 So. 2d 331 [1994]).

The equitable principle of laches is not sufficient to defeat the rights of respondent over the subject CDs. Laches is the failure or neglect, for

an unreasonable length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. (Felizardo v. Fernandez, GR 137509, Aug. 15, 2001).

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined accord- ing to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Courts will not be guided or bound strictly by the Statute of Limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so manifest wrong or injustice would result. (Rosales v. CA, GR 137566, Feb. 28, 2001).

Respondent is entitled to moral damages because of the mental anguish and humiliation she suffered as a result of the wrongly refusal of petitioner to pay her even after she had de- livered the CDs. (Arts. 2217 and 2219). In addition, petitioner should pay respondent exemplary damages which the trial court imposed by way of example or correction for the public good (Art. 2229). Finally, respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees since petitioner’s act or omission compelled her to incur expenses to

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Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES protect her interest making such award just and equitable. (Art.

2208).

Development Bank of the Phils. v. CA & Carlos Cajes GR 129471, Apr. 28, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against private respondent, claiming ownership of a parcel of land covered by a TCT, which included the 19.4 hectares being occupied by the latter. The trial court declared petitioner to be the owner of the land, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court. On appeal, petitioner claimed that its predecessor-in-interest had become the owner of the land by virtue of the decree of registration in his name. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA.

HELD: Taking into consideration the possession of his predecessor-in-interest, private respondent had been in uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Such possession ripened into ownership of the land thru acquisitive prescription , a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable

property. A decree of registration cut off or extinguished a right acquired by a person only when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance on the land which was not annotated on the certificate of title issued thereon, but not to the right of ownership thereof. Regis- tration of land does not create a title nor vest one. Accordingly, the 19.4 hectares of land being occupied by private respondent must be reconveyed in his favor.

(11) Presumptive Period re Ill-Gotten Wealth or ‘Behest’ Loans

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Aniano A. Desierto (Recovery of Ill-Gotten Wealth)GR 130340, Oct. 25, 1999114 SCAD 707

Behest loans, which are part of the ill-gotten wealth which former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies accumulated and which the Government thru the Presidential

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Commission on Good Government (PCGG) seeks to recover, have a prescriptive period to be counted from the discovery of the crimes charged, and not from the date of their commission. If the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day it was committed.

The prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or inci- dent to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Sec. 15, Art. XI of the Philippine Constitution of 1987 may be barred by prescription. Said provision applies only in civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.

Art. 1107. Persons who are capable of acquiring property or rights by the other legal modes may acquire the same by means of prescription.

Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property or rights by prescription, either personally or through their parents, guardians or legal representatives.

COMMENT:(1) Who May Acquire Property or Rights by Prescription

. (a) those who can make use of the other modes of acquiring ownership.

. (b) even minors and other incapacitated persons (like the insane).

(2) Reason for Par. 1 (Those Capable of

Acquiring Property or Rights Thru the Other Modes)

Since prescription is also a mode of acquiring ownership, it follows that if a person is capable of becoming an owner by the other legal modes, he should also be capable of acquiring the same property by prescription. Thus, if a person can become an owner by donation, he can also become an owner by prescription.

(3) Query (Re Donation by Paramour)

A husband cannot validly receive a donation from a paramour. Now then, can he acquire by prescription the property donated to him by the paramour?

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ANS.: Yes, but only by extraordinary prescription (not ordinary prescription) since he would be lacking the element of “just title.” There would be no “just title” because under the law, they are incapacitated to donate to each other. (See Art. 739, Civil Code). Note that even if a donation is VOID, it may constitute the legal basis for adverse possession. (See Tagalgal v. Luega, CA-GR 19651-R, Feb. 19, 1959).

(4) Reason Why Minors May Acquire Personally

This is because only juridical capacity is required for possession, not capacity to act. Thus, even discernment of intent to possess is not required for such personal acquisition. This is so because the law makes no distinction.

Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:

(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal representatives;

(2) Absentees who have administrators, either appointed by them before their disappearance, or appointed by the courts;

(3) Persons living abroad, who have managers or administrators;

(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.

Persons who are disqualified from administering their property have a right to claim damages from their legal representatives whose negligence has been the cause of prescription.

COMMENT:(1) Persons Against Whom

Prescription May Run

. (a) The Article enumerates four such groups.

. (b) Reason for Pars. 1, 2, and 3: These people are supposed to be protected by those in charge. If they are not properly protected thru the lat-

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ter’s negligence, a claim for damages against the latter can prosper.

(2) Query (Re Minors Without Parents, etc.)

Suppose the minors or the insane persons have no parents or legal representatives, does prescription run against them?

ANS.: While the Article seemingly implies that in such a case, prescription should not run against them, it is believed that Secs. 42, 45, and 46 of Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure) can apply to them, since implied repeals are not looked upon with favor. Thus, prescription can still run against minors, the insane, and those in jail, except that these people may still bring the action within a number of years after their disability has been removed:

. (a) 3 years — in case of recovery of land

. (b) 2 years — in other civil actions

These saving clauses are in line with some saving clauses provided for minors and the incapacitated under the New Civil Code. (See, for example, Art. 285 with respect to the right of a natural child to compel recognition after the parent’s death, if the parent dies while the child was still a minor).

If the minor has a guardian, there is NO DOUBT that prescription runs against him even during minority. (See Wenzel, et al. v. Surigao Consolidated Mining Co., L-10843, May 31, 1960).

(3) State and Its Subdivisions

No prescription can run against them, except with refer- ence to patrimonial property. (See Art. 1113, Civil Code).

Art. 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by judicial decree.

Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority

or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the guardianship.

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COMMENT:(1) No Prescription Between Husband and Wife

. (a) Reason for the law — The close relationship between them, engendered by affection or influence, may prevent one from suing the other. Hence, the general rule is — NO PRESCRIPTION. (NOTE: The Article was applied in Toriba Fontanilla Pacio, et al. v. Manuela Pacio Billon, et al., L-15088, Jan. 31, 1961).

. (b) Note that there is no prescription even if there has been a “separation of property,” for the same reluctance to sue each other may still exist.

. (c) Query —Suppose the “separation of property” is the conse- quence of legal separation, does prescription run? ANS.: It is believed that prescription will also not run, for the law does not distinguish. After all, here, the “separation of property” would be “by judicial decree.”

. (d) Exceptions — when prescription is specifically provided for by law, such as:

. 1) the prescriptive period for legal separation suits (Art. 120, Civil Code);

. 2) alienations made by the husband, without the wife’s consent. (Art. 173, Civil Code).

(2) Between Parents and Children

. (a) No prescription shall run between them during the MI- NORITY or INSANITY of the latter. A sensu contrario prescription runs if the legal disability does not exist anymore.

. (b) As a general rule, even if the child is neither insane nor incapacitated, an adverse possession cannot be predicated on the possession of the parent as against the child, or in the possession of the child as against its parent. Thus, where a father became insane, and one of his sons managed the

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CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1110-1111

farm during the rest of his father’s lifetime and remained in possession of it for the statutory period, it was held that these facts alone did not warrant the presumption of a conveyance to the son by the father or of a release to him by the other heirs subsequent to their father’s death. (1 Am. Jur. 807 and Director of Lands v. Abiertas, 44 O.G. 923).

(3) Between Guardian and Ward

No prescription runs between them during the continuance of the guardianship. This is so even if the guardian expressly repudiates the guardianship (without court approval); otherwise, the trust relationship would be rendered nugatory.

Art. 1110. Prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, runs in favor of, or against a married woman.

COMMENT:Prescription in the Case of a Married Woman This Article refers to a married woman and a stranger.

Art. 1111. Prescription obtained by a co-proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the others.

COMMENT:(1) Prescription Obtained by Co-Proprietor or Co-Owner

Reason:

In a sense, a co-owner or co-proprietor acts for the interest of the whole co-ownership. Similarly, an action for ejectment may be brought by just one of the co-owners. (See Art. 487, Civil Code).

[NOTE, however, that as between or among co- owners, there can be prescription when there is a definite repudiation of the co-ownership, made known to the other co-owners. (Laguna v. Levantino, 71 Phil. 566).]

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(2) Limitation

The prescription obtained by a co-owner must have refer- ence to the property held in common, naturally; otherwise the Article does not apply.

Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future.

Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly

renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.

COMMENT:

(1) Requisites for Renunciation of Property Acquired by Prescription

. (a) Renouncer must have capacity to alienate property (because renunciation is an exercise to the jus disponendi ).

. (b) The property acquired must have already been obtained (hence, the right to prescription in the future cannot be renounced, since manifestly, this would be contrary to public policy).

. (c) The renouncing must be made by the owner of the right (not by a mere administrator or guardian, for he does not own the property).

. (d) The renouncing must not prejudice the rights of others, such as creditors. (Arts. 6, 1114, Civil Code).

(2) Form

. (a) may be express or implied (tacit)

. (b) requires no consent on the part of the person to be ben- efited

. (c) requires no solemnities or formalities

(3) Implied or Tacit Renunciation

There is tacit renunciation when there is an action which implies the abandonment of the right acquired.

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Example:

Sonia formerly owed Esperanza but the debt has already prescribed.

. (a) IfSonia, knowing thatthedebthasprescrib ed,nevertheless still acknowledges the existence of the debt and promises to pay for it, there is an implied renunciation of the prescription. She still has a civil obligation.

. (b) If Sonia, knowing that the debt has prescribed, nevertheless voluntarily pays the debt, she cannot recover what she had paid. This would be a natural

obligation.

. (c) If Sonia, not knowing that the debt has prescribed pays it, there is no renunciation of the prescription; and she can still recover on the basis of solutio indebiti . ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: If a taxpayer, complaining re-

peatedly against a tax assessment, makes several requests for a reinvestigation thereof, he may be said to have WAIVED the defense of prescription. (Yutivo & Sons Hardware Co. v. Ct. of Tax Appeals & Collector of Int. Rev., L-13203, Jan. 28, 1961).

Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

COMMENT:(1) Things That May Be Acquired by Prescription

Generally — all things within the commerce of man.

(2) Patrimonial Property

. (a) By implication under this Article, patrimonial property of the State or any of its subdivisions may be acquired by prescription.

. (b) While it may be claimed that a direct and clear provision (Art. 1108, Civil Code — which says that prescription does not run against the State or any of its subdivisions) prevails

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Art. 1113

CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

over an implication (Art. 1113, Civil Code) , still when we consider the intent of Congress in inserting the phrase “not patrimonial in character” in the original draft submitted by the Code Commission, it is clear that patrimonial property may indeed be the subject of prescription. This is so because patrimonial properties are really in the same category as private properties.

(3) No Prescription With Respect to Public Property

Public property, however, cannot be the subject of prescription. This rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to

be public lands, under the principle that “all lands belong to the Crown unless they had been granted by the King (State) or in his name, or by the Kings who preceded him.” (Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 53).

However, the rule just stated cannot be altogether inflex- ible, as witnessed, for example, by the presence of Rep. Act 1942 (approved June 22, 1957), amending Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Com. Act 141). Thus, as amended by RA 1952, Sec. 48 of CA 141 now reads as follows:

“Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philip- pines occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First In- stance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xx x

“b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of the title except when prevented by war or force majeure . These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title

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under the provisions of this chapter (the chapter deals with judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles).”

( NOTE: However, under RA 107 , the deadline of the application was only up to Dec. 31, 1957.)

(4) Some Doctrines

. (a) AfishpondconstructedintheBambangRivercanbe ordered removed by the government, regardless of the number of years that have elapsed since the construction of said fishpond, inasmuch as a river, or a portion thereof, is property of public dominion, and cannot therefore be acquired by acquisitive prescription. (Meneses v. Com- monwealth, 69 Phil. 647).

. (b) Similarly, a tract of land, formerly low and swampy, but gradually raised by the

action of the sea, is not susceptible of prescription, and may therefore be recovered by the government despite the construction thereon of warehouses and a wharf. The land is part of the public domain. (Insular Government v. Aldecoa and Co., 19 Phil. 505).

. (c) A plaza intended for public use is likewise not subject to prescription. (Harty v. Mun. of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152).

(5) Things or Properties That Cannot Be Acquired by Pre- scription

. (a) those protected by a Torrens Title. (Sec. 46, Act No. 496) (Francisco v. Cruz, 43 O.G. 5103).

. (b) movables acquired thru a crime. (Art. 1133, Civil Code).

. (c) those outside the commerce of men. (Art. 1113, Civil Code).

. (d) properties of spouses, parents and children, wards and guardians, under the restrictions imposed by law. (Art. 1109, Civil Code).

Art. 1114. Creditors and all other persons interested in making the prescription effective may avail themselves thereof notwithstanding the express or tacit renunciation by the debtor or proprietor.

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COMMENT:(1) Right of Creditors to Make Use of Prescription

Reason for the law:

While rights may be waived, third persons with a right rec- ognized by law should not be prejudiced. (Art. 6, Civil Code).

(2) Example

Tom who is indebted to Nicole acquired a parcel of land by prescription. If Tom renounces the prescription, may Nicole make use of said land?

ANS.: Yes, to the extent of her credit, if Tom is not able to pay his debt. Tom is not allowed to prejudice Nicole.

Sambrano v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al. 101 Phil. 1

FACTS: Although the right of the State to collect the taxes had already been extinguished by

prescription, taxpayer Sam- brano nevertheless executed a chattel mortgage on his properties to guarantee the payment of the same. As a matter of fact, he actually paid part of the debt. Issue: Can Sambrano later on raise the issue of prescription?

HELD: No more, for his actuations amount to a renewal (renovacion) of the obligation or to a waiver of the benefit granted by the law to him. He is, therefore, now estopped from raising the issue of prescription. Moreover, the Court said that a prescribed debt may be the subject of novation. (Estrada v. Villaroel, 40 O.G. Supp. No. 5, 9, p. 201).

Art. 1115. The provisions of the present Title are un- derstood to be without prejudice to what in this Code or in special laws is established with respect to specific cases of prescription.

COMMENT:(1) Specific Provisions on Prescription

Specific provisions on prescription found elsewhere in the Code, or in special laws, prevail over the provisions of this

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Chapter. This is particularly true in the instances when specific periods of prescription are provided for.

(2) Examples

. (a) A legitimate child may bring an action to claim legitimacy as long as he is alive (generally). (Art. 173, Family Code).

. (b) An illegitimate child may bring an action to establish illegitimate filiation during his lifetime (generally). (Art. 175, Family Code).

. (c) The real right of possession of real property is lost at the end of 10 years.

. (d) The proceeding for the probate of a will never prescribes. (Guevara v. Guevara, et al., L-5405, Jan. 31, 1956).

. (e) The proceeding for the deportation of an alien must be brought within five years from the date the cause for deportation arose. (Sec. 37, Immigration Act). [Thus, where an alien entered the Philippines illegally in 1998, but he violated the Immigration Law in 2004 by bringing in his wife who was not lawfully entitled to enter or reside in the Philippines, the deportation proceeding

commenced in 2005 had not prescribed. This is because the cause accrued in 1999. (See Porta Perez v. Board, L-9236, May 29, 1957) .]

. (f) An action to annul a sale of shares of stock in a corpora- tion is violation of the Securities Act because there was no permit for the same, and for the recovery of the purchase price must be instituted within a period of two years from the date of the sale. Hence, if the sale is made on Oct. 23, 2003, but the action is brought on Nov. 2, 2005, the action is 10 days late, and can no longer be entertained. (See Benedicto v. Phil. American Finance and Development Co., L-8695, May 31, 1957).

. (g) In order to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Tax Appeals, the suit for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally assessed must be brought within the statutory period of two years , and the requirements provided in the National Internal

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Art. 1116


(h)

Revenue Code must be complied with. (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., L-11494, Jan. 28, 1961).

An action for accounting or reliquidation of agricultural crops under par. 3, Sec. 17 of Rep. Act 1199 should be brought within 3 years from the threshing of the crops in question. (Agaton Mateo v. Gregorio Duran, et al., L-14314, Feb. 22, 1961).

Art. 1116. Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription should elapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be required.

COMMENT:(1) Transitional Rules for Prescription

. (a) If the period for prescription BEGAN and ENDED under the OLD laws, said OLD laws govern.

. (b) If the period for prescription BEGAN under the NEW Civil Code, the NEW Civil Code

governs.

. (c) If the period began under the OLD law, and continues under the NEW Civil Code, the OLD law applies. Exception: In this third rule, it is the NEW Civil Code that will apply, provided two conditions are present:

. 1) The NEW Civil Code requires a shorter period;

. 2) This shorter period has already elapsed since Aug. 30, 1950, the date when the NEW Civil Code became effective. (Thus, the period prescribed under the NEW Code should be counted from Aug. 30, 1950. However, if by this method a longer period would be needed, a

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period that is even longer than that provided under the OLD law, said OLD law applies).

(2) Example of the First Rule Given

Paz Ongsiaco and the Heirs of theLate Augusto Ongsiaco v. Roman D. Dallo, et al. L-27451, Feb. 28, 1969

FACTS: A complaint was filed in 1966 against the family of Paz Ongsiaco for recovery of the ownership of a parcel of land in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. It was admitted by claimants that since 1924 (42 years before the basic complaint was filed in 1966), said family had been in possession of the land and that said possession was really adverse or in the concept of owner. However, it was alleged that the possession was in BAD FAITH. Issue: May recovery of the property be allowed?

HELD: Recovery cannot be allowed for the cause of action has already prescribed. Under Art. 1116, in a case like this, the law in force before the New Civil Code should apply. It is clear that under such old law, the Code of Civil Procedure, good or bad faith was immaterial for purposes of acquisitive prescription. (Sec. 41). Moreover, even the thirty-year period fixed in the New Civil Code for the acquisition in bad faith by prescription of real property had already expired when this case was filed in 1966.

(3) Example of the Third Rule Given BAR

A, with knowledge that B is not the owner of a parcel of land, buys it for a nominal sum from B in 1944, and since then has been in open, actual, continuous, and public possession

thereof, under claim of title exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants. C , the real owner of the land, who has left in 1944 by reason of the war, was able to return to the land only in 1958 and learning of A’s possession, files suit. A claims prescription of ten years, because he took possession of the land before the new Civil Code; but C counters that as

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A entered the land in bad faith, and he had not yet acquired ownership by the time the New Civil Code took effect, the period is thirty years under the New Code. Decide with reasons.

ANS.: Inasmuch as here the prescription was already running before Aug. 30, 1950, it follows that only 10 years would be required because under the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of good faith or bad faith , the period for acquiring land by prescription was only 10 years. (Sec. 41, Act 190, Code of Civil Procedure and Osorio v. Tan Jongko, 51 O.G. 6221). It, therefore, follows necessarily that in 1954, A had already acquired the property by acquisitive prescription. Hence, C should lose the case, unless of course the land is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. (Osorio v. Tan Jongko, supra).

The period of 10 years must necessarily start from 1944, and not from Aug. 30, 1950, since here, the prescriptive period under the OLD law was SHORTER. Had the period under the old law been LONGER, it is the shorter period under the new Civil Code that should apply, but this time, the period should commence from the date of effectivity of the new Civil Code — Aug. 30, 1950 — in view of the clause “but if since the time this Code took effect . . .”

(4) Example of the Exception

Under the old law the period was 10 years (as in the case of reduction of a donation of land on the ground of birth of a child), but under the New Civil Code, the period is only 4 years, counted from the birth of the first child. (Art. 763). It is clear here that the New Civil Code (4 years) will apply, even if the donation and the birth occurred under the old law, but the period should be counted from Aug. 30, 1950, unless in so doing, a period of more than 10 years would result.

(5) Some Doctrines

(a) In Estayov.DeGuzman,L- 10902,Dec.29,1958, the Supreme Court held that when the action to enforce the mortgage presented as an appeal bond in a court action became effective by the entry of the judgment of the Supreme Court on Aug. 6, 1940, the encumbrance may be cancelled after Aug. 6, 1950.

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. (b) In Ongsiako,etal.v.Ongsiako,etal.,L- 7510,Mar.30,1957, the Supreme Court held that Art. 1116 (Civil Code) prevails over the general transitory rule in Art. 2258 (Civil Code) which provides that actions and rights which came into being but which were not exercised before the effectivity of the Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation, but the exercise, duration, and procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by the Rules of Court.

. (c) In Borromeo v. Zaballero, L-14357, Aug. 31, 1960, a promissory note was executed in 1935, payable in 1937. The claim for payment was presented in the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor in Sept. 1955. The Court ruled that the ten-year period of prescription under Act 190 had already lapsed.

. (d) In Nagrampa, et al. v. Nagrampa, L- 15434, Oct. 31, 1960, the Court observed that under the old law, no special period of prescription was fixed for the revocation of donations for non-compliance with the conditions stipulated. However, under the New Civil Code (Art. 764) , the period fixed for such a case is 4 years. The suit was filed in July, 1958, al- leging that the plaintiffs had demanded compliance “five years ago, but the defendant refused.” The Court held that the entire period of four years fixed by the New Civil Code has elapsed since it took effect in 1950. Suit was filed only in July, 1958 for a violation made in 1953.

. (e) In Amar v. Odianan, L-15179, Sept. 30, 1960 , a complaint for the recovery of land was filed in November, 1948, al- leging that in April, 1948, the land had been seized by the defendant by means of fraud, deceit, and strategy. It was held that the old law, Sec. 40 of Act 190 (which provided that an action for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 10 years) was applicable, and that therefore, the action has already prescribed.

. (f) In PNB v. Galicano Ador Dionisio, L-18342, Sept. 19, 1963, it was held that a judgment that had become final in 1949 could not be revived anymore in 1960 (lapse of more than 10 years), despite written extrajudicial demand in 1954 for the satisfaction of the judgment. This is because this

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Art. 1116


case is governed not by Art. 1155 of the Civil Code, but by Sec. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which section does not state that such written extrajudicial demands interrupt the prescriptive period). The old law applies because Art. 1116 says “prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force . . .”

Prescription PARAS

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