power dynamics in negotiation - University of Southern California

POWER DYNAMICS IN NEGOTIATION

PETER H. KIMUniversity of Southern California

ROBIN L. PINKLEYSouthern Methodist University

ALISON R. FRAGALEStanford University

Power is widely acknowledged to affect negotiator performance. Yet few efforts havebeen made to integrate the most prominent theories of power into a cohesive frame-work that can account for the results from a broad array of negotiation-relevantresearch. We address this limitation by proposing a dynamic integrative model thatdecouples power into four components: (1) potential power, (2) perceived power, (3)power tactics, and (4) realized power. Implications, propositions, and future directionsare discussed.

Negotiation has been defined as “an interper-sonal decision-making process by which two ormore people agree how to allocate scarce re-sources” (Thompson, 2000: 2). As such, manyview it as a central aspect of organizational life.The growing complexities of work relationships,the increased reliance on teams to make deci-sions, and the rise of new organizational formshave placed unprecedented pressure on manag-ers to become effective negotiators. Thus, schol-ars and practitioners alike have focused onidentifying the mechanisms that can improvenegotiator performance (Lewicki, Saunders, &Minton, 1999).

One factor that is widely acknowledged toaffect negotiator performance is power (e.g.,Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). A negotiator’s powermay be critical for the quality of his or her suc-cess, because it can determine the allocation ofrewards in an agreement (Kim, 1997; Mannix,1993a; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Thegreater one’s power relative to the power of oth-ers, the more resources one should be able toclaim. As a result, the negotiation literature isreplete with recommendations to improve one’spower position (e.g., Thompson, 2000).

Yet those who wish to improve their powershould realize that power may be influenced bya wide range of factors, and they are likely to beoverwhelmed by the varied and often inconsis-tent lists of characteristics, properties, strate-gies, and descriptions that have been offeredwith regard to this topic (Mooney, 1984). Al-though researchers have made many efforts toprovide comprehensive, research-based frame-works on power (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1980;Emerson, 1962; Weber, 1947), much work remainsif we are to integrate these approaches into acohesive framework that can account for the re-sults from a broad array of negotiation-relevantresearch. Such a model should offer a clearlyspecified conceptual framework that describeswhat power is, where power comes from, howpower is perceived, and how power can be usedor changed. In this article we attempt to addressthese issues by proposing a dynamic model ofnegotiator power.

Our treatment of negotiator power beginswith a review of some prominent theories oforganizational power and a discussion of thepotential benefits and limitations if we were toapply each to the context of negotiation. Next,we propose a dynamic model of negotiatorpower that integrates and extends these seem-ingly disparate theories to retain their respec-tive benefits and address their respective limi-tations. This dynamic model decouples powerinto four distinct components—(1) potential

We thank Paul Adler, Jay Kim, Shirli Kopelman, ClausLangfred, Julia Liebeskind, Kyle Mayer, Andrew Molinsky,Steven Postrel, and Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks for their assis-tance with this paper.

� Academy of Management Review2005, Vol. 30, No. 4, 799–822.

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power (the underlying capacity of negotiators toobtain benefits from their agreement), (2) per-ceived power (negotiators’ assessments of eachparty’s potential power), (3) power tactics (be-haviors designed to “use” or “change” the powerrelationship), and (4) realized power (the extentto which negotiators have claimed benefits fromthe interaction)—to enhance its generalizabilityto noisy, real-world environments where power-related information may be incomplete, inaccu-rate, or asymmetrical. Finally, throughout thisanalysis, we propose specific propositions thatcan be tested in future empirical research.

PROMINENT CONCEPTIONS OF POWER

Most conceptions of power are founded onWeber’s (1947) classic definition of power as theprobability that a person can carry out his or herown will despite resistance. The majority of the-orists who have written about power would ex-press agreement with this broad definition(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980). However, there aremany subtle and not-so-subtle differencesamong their various perspectives. Arguably, themost commonly referenced appraisals of powerare (1) French and Raven’s (1959) five bases ofpower; (2) Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson’s(1980) typology of influence tactics; and (3) power-dependence theory, first proposed by Emerson(1962). We begin by briefly reviewing the majorcharacteristics of these frameworks.

French and Raven (1959) suggest that thereare five bases of power, which stem from differ-ent aspects of the relationship between an actorand the target of his influence attempts (seeTable 1). Specifically, they argue that A’s powerover B is determined by (1) A’s ability to providebenefits to B (reward power), (2) A’s ability topunish B if B does not comply with A’s wishes(coercive power), (3) A’s possession of specialknowledge or expertise (expert power), (4) A’slegitimate right to prescribe behavior for B (le-gitimate power), and (5) the extent to which Bidentifies with A (referent power). Raven’s (1974)later versions of this typology add information(i.e., knowledge regarding the inner workings ofthe organization or the relation of the organiza-tion to the environment) as a sixth base ofpower. Moreover, other scholars have distin-guished these bases of power, which determineone’s ability to manipulate the behavior of oth-ers, from the sources of power (e.g., personal

characteristics), which determine how we cometo control these power bases (Bacharach &Lawler, 1980).

Kipnis et al. (1980), with subsequent exten-sions by Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) and Yukl andTracey (1992), in contrast, focus on identifyingand categorizing the tactics commonly used bymanagers when attempting to get others to com-ply with a request. Taken together, these pro-grams of research identify nine dimensions ofinfluence—pressure, legitimation, exchange, co-alition, ingratiation, rational persuasion, inspi-rational appeal, consultation, and personal ap-peal (see Table 2)—and consider how one’spower relationship with others can influence thelikelihood that these different influence tacticswill be used. Yukl and Tracey (1992), for exam-ple, found that inspirational appeal, ingratia-tion, and pressure were used most in a down-ward direction; that personal appeal, exchange,and legitimation were used most in a lateraldirection; that coalition was used most in lateraland upward directions; and that rational per-suasion was used most in an upward direction.They also found that uses of rational persua-sion, inspirational appeal, and consultationwere most effective and that uses of pressure,coalition, and legitimation were least effectivefor exerting influence in organizations.

TABLE 1French and Raven’s (1959) Typology of

Power Bases

Power Base Description

Reward power A’s power over B is a function of howmuch B can be rewarded and theextent to which B believes that Acontrols these rewards.

Coercive power A’s power over B is a function of howmuch B can be punished by B andthe extent to which B believes thatthis punishment can be avoided ifB complies with A’s wishes.

Expert power A’s power over B is a function of B’sperception that A possesses somespecial knowledge or expertise.

Legitimate power A’s power over B is a function of howmuch B believes that A has thelawful authority to influence B.

Referent power A’s power over B is a function of howattracted B is to A and, thus, howmuch A can influence B’s feelingsof personal acceptance, approval,and self-esteem.

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Finally, power-dependence theory (Blau, 1964;Emerson, 1962) provides a framework for concep-tualizing relative and total power. More specif-ically, Emerson states, “The power of A over B isequal to and based upon the dependence of Bupon A” (1962: 32–33). Dependence, in turn, isbased on two dimensions: (1) it is directly pro-portional to the value attributed to the outcomeat stake, and (2) it is inversely proportional to theavailability of this outcome through alternativesources. Thus, A’s power over B is directly re-lated to the degree to which B is dependent on A(i.e., the extent to which B receives greater ben-efit from the relationship with A than B can getfrom alternative relationships). Similarly, B’spower over A depends on the degree to which Areceives greater benefit from the relationshipwith B than A can get from alternative relation-

ships. Furthermore, because this frameworkconsiders power to be non-zero sum in nature,an increase in A’s power does not necessarilydecrease B’s power, and vice versa. Each party’spower is independently determined by the oth-er’s dependence. Thus, power dependence dis-tinguishes relative power from the total power(i.e., the sum of each party’s power) in the rela-tionship (Lawler & Bacharach, 1987).

Although each of these frameworks can in-form our study of power, none of them is com-prehensive enough to account for the others or toguide us in the dynamic context of negotiation.French and Raven (1959), for example, discussthe bases upon which power may be derived, butthey pay little attention to how these powerbases determine one’s power relations with oth-ers or the implications of these power relationsfor the tactics that a powerholder might choose.Power-dependence theory conceptualizes rela-tive and total power quite clearly, but it payslittle attention to how one’s valuation of a rela-tionship or the valuation of one’s alternativerelationship is determined, or how one’s poweris likely to be used. Finally, Kipnis and col-leagues (1980) discuss power use, but they focuson what people do only after a power relation-ship has been determined, without consideringits antecedents or relational determinants.

Moreover, and most important for our presentdiscussion, these theories were not necessarilyintended to capture the specific kinds of powerdynamics one might find in the negotiation con-text. Thus, none of these theories has ade-quately emphasized the interactive dynamicsinherent in negotiation, the role of individuals’power perceptions, or the ways in which powerrelationships can change over time, all of whichneed to be incorporated into any comprehensivemodel of power in negotiation. As a conse-quence, prior power frameworks provide manyimportant conceptual notions regarding poweras a construct but do not fully explicate whatpower is, where power comes from, how poweris perceived, or the ways in which power can beused or changed.

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF NEGOTIATOR POWER

Below we build a model that combines potentialpower, power in use, and realized power in thenegotiation context (see Figure 1). In general, weargue that potential power is determined by the

TABLE 2Yukl and Tracey’s (1992) Typology of

Influence Tactics

Influence Tactic Description

Pressure The actor uses demands, threats, orintimidation to increase thetarget’s compliance.

Legitimation The actor attempts to legitimize arequest for compliance or claimthe right to request it byreferencing existing policy ortradition.

Exchange The actor uses implicit or explicitpromises to reciprocate if thetarget complies.

Coalition The actor obtains the aid of othersto help persuade or pressure thetarget to comply.

Ingratiation The actor attempts to make afavorable impression andimprove the target’s mood beforerequesting compliance.

Rational persuasion The actor uses logical argumentsand factual information tosupport the viability ofcomplying with the request.

Inspirational appeal The actor makes an emotionalappeal for compliance byappealing to the target’s valuesand ideals.

Consultation The actor seeks the target’sparticipation in the decision-making process and theimplementation of the request.

Personal appeal The actor appeals to the target’ssense of loyalty or friendshipbefore requesting compliance.

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FIGURE 1A Dynamic Model of Negotiator Power


two-dimensional mutual dependence configura-tion developed in power-dependence theory andthat French and Raven’s (1959) typology of powerbases can help inform how these dimensionsare derived. We further contend that negotiators’perceptions of these dimensions may divergefrom their potential values in a variety of waysowing to imperfect information and negotiators’bounded rationality. As a result, we proposethat power perceptions will drive tactical deci-sions, which can influence negotiators’ mutualdependence and mediate the relationship be-tween potential and realized power. In doing so,we consider a number of power-use and power-change tactics and their implications for theloss and accumulation of power. Finally, we ar-gue that the extent to which negotiators realizepower from the focal interaction will affect theirpotential power in future interactions. Taken to-gether, these arguments emphasize the dynamicnature of power relations and highlight numer-ous implications for those seeking to managesuch relations effectively in negotiation.

Potential Power

Potential power is defined as the underlyingcapacity of negotiators to obtain benefits fromtheir agreement. Thus, we follow the guidanceof Bierstedt (1950), Wrong (1968), and other re-searchers who distinguish between potentialpower and its use. Consistent with power-dependence theory, we argue that a negotiator’spotential power is a function of the counterpart’sdependence and that dependence is, in turn,based on two dimensions: (1) the counterpart’svaluation of the negotiation and (2) the value ofthe counterpart’s best alternative if an agree-ment in the focal negotiation is not reached.This conceptualization of potential power al-lows us to incorporate prior negotiation re-search, which has typically operationalizedpower in terms of power-dependence theory’stwo dimensions. Negotiation researchers typi-cally have altered the power relationship be-tween negotiators by manipulating either (1) thebenefits negotiators can bring to the bargainingtable (i.e., their contributions) and, hence, theircounterparts’ valuations of the negotiation (Kim,1997; Mannix, 1993a) or (2) the value of negotia-tors’ best alternatives to the negotiated agree-ment (i.e., their BATNAs; Pinkley et al., 1994).

We can, furthermore, draw on French andRaven’s (1959) typology of power bases to under-stand how these valuations of the negotiationand its best alternatives may be formed. Thepower-dependence framework is based on theprinciples of social exchange (Blau, 1964), whichare, in turn, rooted in economic theory. Thus, thevalues a negotiator attributes to these two di-mensions of potential power refer to the eco-nomic notion of utility—the general psychologi-cal assessment of the benefit the negotiatorwould obtain from each of these options (i.e., thenegotiation and its best alternative). Althougheach negotiator is likely to derive these utilitiesdifferently, owing to the idiosyncratic nature oftheir preferences, the French and Raven typol-ogy identifies at least some of the reasons whysuch utility may be derived (Bacharach &Lawler, 1980).

Specifically, we argue that negotiators’ valu-ations of a negotiation are determined by theirassessments of its implications for such factorsas rewards, punishments, knowledge, legiti-macy, and identification (e.g., its potential tooffer more financial gains, entail fewer legalliabilities, provide more useful information,etc.). Likewise, we contend that negotiators’ val-uations of their alternatives are based on theirassessments of whether, and the degree towhich, these benefits could be obtained throughother means. Thus, rather than having to dis-cuss the implications of these myriad bases ofpower individually, this conceptualization al-lows us to pursue a higher level of analysis thatcan encompass these power bases, integratethem into a coherent framework, and therebypresent a more parsimonious depiction of powerrelations.

Limitation. The problem with this conceptual-ization of potential power, however, is that it isultimately hindered by power-dependence the-ory’s inherent lack of specification. Based onEmerson (1962) and Blau’s (1964) discussions ofpower dependence, one might infer a variety ofrelationships between its two dimensions—thevalue of the relationship and the value of itsbest alternative (e.g., an additive, multiplica-tive, or more elaborate function). More formally,for any two negotiators A and B, if we use Ua(b) todepict A’s valuation of the negotiation with B,Ua(alt) to depict A’s valuation of his or her bestalternative to that negotiation, Ub(a) to depict B’svaluation of the negotiation with A, and Ub(alt) to


depict B’s valuation of his or her best alternativeto that negotiation, these discussions of powerdependence at best suggest that we can depicteach negotiator’s potential power with the fol-lowing equations:

A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence

� f(Ub(a), Ub(alt))

B’s Potential Power � A’s Dependence

� f(Ua(b), Ua(alt))

where B’s dependence is positively and mono-tonically related to Ub(a) and negatively andmonotonically related to Ub(alt), and A’s depen-dence is positively and monotonically related toUa(b) and negatively and monotonically relatedto Ua(alt).

That is, if

B’s Dependence � Db and A’s Dependence � Da

then

�Db

�Ub(a)� 0

�Db

�Ub(alt)� 0

�Da

�Ua(b)� 0

�Da

�Ua(alt)� 0

As one might imagine, the enormous range ofpossible relationships encompassed by this for-mulation severely limits this theory’s predictivecapability (i.e., given that it is unclear which ofthese relationships to use for these calcula-tions). For this reason, at least one subsequenttreatment of power-dependence theory that hasgained prominence has been more specific, bypositing the relationship between its two dimen-sions explicitly as a ratio (Bacharach & Lawler,1980: 147). Specifically, these researchers con-tend that

A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence �Ub(a)

Ub(alt)

B’s Potential Power � A’s Dependence �Ua(b)

Ua(alt)

Our review of the power literature reveals, how-ever, that few efforts have been made to assessthis claim, let alone present a competing formu-lation. We next attempt to address these limita-tions to develop a more refined and accurateconceptualization of potential power in negoti-ation.

Power dependence revisited. Power-depen-dence theory suggests that parties will possessthe same levels of dependence, and hence po-tential power, when each party’s preference forthe relationship relative to its alternative is thesame. Thus, Bacharach and Lawler’s (1980) de-piction of dependence as a ratio of its two di-mensions would imply that any two negotiators,A and B, will have equal potential power when

A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence

�Ub(a)

Ub(alt)�

Ua(b)

Ua(alt)� A’s Dependence

� B’s Potential Power

The details of such a scenario can be communi-cated through a 2 � 2 matrix for each pair ofactors in a negotiation (see Figure 2a). We canobserve that any two negotiators possess thesame potential power when each negotiator’svaluation of the relationship and each negotia-tor’s valuation of his or her best alternative arethe same (see Figure 2b). However, this formu-lation also suggests that negotiators can pos-sess the same potential power when they differon their valuations of these two dimensions, solong as the ratio between one’s valuation of therelationship and one’s valuation of alternativesis the same for each negotiator (see Figure 2c).Thus, by this logic, the two parties depicted inFigure 2c should be equally capable of receiv-ing benefits from the negotiation.

Although this conclusion may sound plausi-ble at first glance, research on the implicationsof a negotiator’s BATNA suggests that this is anuntenable solution (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994).This research suggests that negotiators wouldnot accept an agreement that would make themworse off than they would be with their BATNAs.Yet, if we consider the values depicted in Figure2c and assume that negotiators’ contributions(i.e., the benefits each negotiator can bring tothe negotiation table) may be added to deter-mine the total value of the potential agreement(Utotal � 110 � 220 � 330), the equal distribution


of these benefits (i.e., the distribution that wouldbe implied if both negotiators are viewed asequally powerful) would mean that A’s sharewould exceed his or her BATNA by 65 points (i.e.,165 � 100), but B’s share would fall short of his orher BATNA by 35 points (i.e., 165 � 200). Since Bis unlikely to accept an agreement with A thatwould make him/her worse off than just accept-

ing his/her BATNA (Pinkley et al., 1994), this dis-tribution should result in an impasse, despitethe fact that Utotal was large enough to allowboth parties to obtain benefits that would haveexceeded their BATNAs. Thus, the assumptionthat the two negotiators depicted in Figure 2cpossess equal potential power, and thereforeshould obtain equal outcomes from the negoti-

(a) Generalized Formulation of Potential Power

Ratio formulation: A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence� Ub(a)/Ub(alt); B’s Potential Power � A’s Dependence � Ua(b)/Ua(alt); Total Power � Ub(a)/Ub(alt) � Ua(b)/Ua(alt).

Revised two-stage formulation: A’s Potential Power �Ua(alt) � (Ub(a) � Ub(alt)); B’s Potential Power � Ub(alt) � (Ua(b) �Ua(alt)); Total Power � Ua(alt) � (Ub(a) � Ub(alt)) � Ub(alt) � (Ua(b)

� Ua(alt)).

(b) Negotiators with Equal Valuations of Dimensions

Ratio formulation: A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence� 110/100 � 1.1; B’s Potential Power � A’s Dependence �110/100 � 1.1; Total Power � 1.1 � 1.1 � 2.2.

Revised two-stage formulation: A’s Potential Power � 100� (110 � 100) � 110; B’s Potential Power � 100 � (110 � 100)� 110; Total Power � 110 � 110 � 220.

FIGURE 2Potential Power

(c) Negotiators with Unequal Valuations of Dimensions

Ratio formulation: A’s Potential Power � B’s Dependence� 220/200 � 1.1; B’s Potential Power � A’s Dependence �110/100 � 1.1; Total Power � 1.1 � 1.1 � 2.2.

Revised two-stage formulation: A’s Potential Power � 100� (220 � 200) � 120; B’s Potential Power � 200 � (110 � 100)� 210; Total Power � 120 � 210 � 330.

(d) Considerations Underlying Each Dimension

Q � quantity � amount of resources; P � probability �likelihood of obtaining resources; W � weight � importanceof resources.


ation, is unlikely to hold true. This suggests thatan alternative formulation (i.e., something otherthan the depiction of dependence as a simpleratio of its two dimensions) is needed to deter-mine the potential power of these two negotia-tors. We propose such an alternative formula-tion below.

One conclusion we can draw, given the notionthat negotiators must obtain benefits that are atleast equivalent to their BATNAs if an agree-ment is to be reached, is that A must obtain atleast Ua(alt) or 100 points and B must obtain atleast Ub(alt) or 200 points of utility from theirnegotiation. However, once the potential bene-fits from the association exceed the value of anegotiator’s BATNA, the threat of departure (i.e.,utilizing this BATNA by walking away from thenegotiation rather than reaching an agreement)loses its credibility, given that such a departurewould now reduce the benefits received by thenegotiator. Thus, whereas negotiators’ BATNAsestablish the minimum level of benefits theyhave the potential to obtain, the potential toacquire benefits that remain after this criterionis satisfied (i.e., Utotal � (Ua(alt) � Ub(alt)) or 330 �(100 � 200) � 30), which we call “surplus utility,”is likely to be determined in other ways. Indeed,research suggests that once the benefits from anegotiation exceed the values of negotiators’BATNAs, negotiators tend to distribute rewardsin direct proportion to their contributions (Kim,1997; Kim & Fragale, 2005; Mannix, 1993a).

Negotiator contributions affect the potential toacquire this surplus utility via the threat thatthese contributions might be withdrawn if theyare inadequately reciprocated (Blau, 1964). In-deed, evidence indicates that negotiators tendto reciprocate such benefits explicitly and to thedegree that they have been provided by theircounterpart (Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982;Thompson, 1990). Since a negotiator can reducethese benefits up to the point where they barelyexceed the counterpart’s BATNA, while stillmaking it worthwhile for that counterpart to re-main in the negotiation, the benefits a negotia-tor can contribute beyond the value of the coun-terpart’s BATNA should affect the negotiator’spotential to obtain this surplus utility. In Figure2c we can determine the benefits A can contrib-ute to the negotiation beyond the value of B’sBATNA, and hence A’s potential to obtain sur-plus utility, by subtracting the value of B’sBATNA from the utility he or she associates with

the negotiation (i.e., Ub(a) � Ub(alt) or 220 � 200 �20). Similarly, we can determine the benefits Bcan contribute to the negotiation beyond thevalue of A’s BATNA, and hence B’s potential toobtain surplus utility, by subtracting the valueof A’s BATNA from the utility he or she associ-ates with the negotiation (i.e., Ua(b) � Ua(alt) or110 � 100 � 10).

Thus, whereas Bacharach and Lawler (1980)depict potential power as a simple ratio of itstwo dimensions, our analysis suggests that po-tential power may be more accurately assessedthrough a two-stage process whereby negotia-tors’ BATNAs determine the potential to obtainpresurplus utility and negotiators’ contributionsthat are in excess of their counterparts’ BATNAsdetermine the potential to acquire the surplus.We can, therefore, calculate A’s potential powerby combining the utility A could obtain from hisor BATNA with the surplus utility A could obtainfrom his or her contribution (i.e., Ua(alt) � (Ub(a) �Ub(alt)) or 100 � (220 � 200) � 120). In the samevein, we can calculate B’s potential power bycombining the utility B could obtain from his orher BATNA with the surplus utility B could ob-tain from his or her contribution (i.e., Ub(alt) �(Ua(b) � Ua(alt)) or 200 � (110 � 100) � 210). Theseresults also indicate that B’s potential powerwould be substantially larger than A’s, since Bwould have the potential to obtain 210 units, or63.6 percent of the total value of the agreement(Utotal � 330), versus A’s 120 units, or 36.4 percentof Utotal. Our analysis, therefore, offers predic-tions that differ dramatically from Bacharachand Lawler’s (1980) depiction of dependence as aratio, which suggests that the potential power ofA and B would be the same.

Proposition 1: Potential power is de-rived through a two-stage processwhereby negotiators’ BATNAs deter-mine their potential to obtain pre-surplus utility and negotiators’ contri-butions that are in excess of theircounterparts’ BATNAs determine theirpotential to obtain surplus utility.

We should emphasize, however, that the real-ization of this potential power is not automaticbut, rather, depends on negotiators’ perceptionsof this potential (i.e., perceived power), their ef-forts to change these perceptions (i.e., power-change tactics), and both the manner and extentto which they attempt to extract benefits from


the negotiation (i.e., power-use tactics). Each ofthese factors, furthermore, should exert a dis-tinct set of influences on the 2 � 2 dependencematrix depicted in Figure 2a (i.e., affect potentialpower). The values depicted in this potentialpower matrix are, therefore, not fixed; they arelikely to be altered at multiple stages through-out a negotiation. Thus, we will discuss howthese changes can occur.

Perceived Power

We define perceived power as negotiators’ as-sessments of a party’s potential power in therelationship. Thus, each negotiator is presumedto develop perceptions of his or her own poten-tial power and the potential power of his or hercounterpart. To the extent that a negotiator ob-tains information about the BATNAs and contri-butions of the negotiating parties, his or herpotential power should positively influenceeach party’s perception of the negotiator’s po-tential power in the interaction. This effect ofpotential power and perceived power is de-picted by the arrows leading from potentialpower to A and B’s perceptions of potentialpower in Figure 1.

Proposition 2: A negotiator’s potentialpower will positively influence eachparty’s perception of that negotiator’spotential power in the relationship.

However, given substantial evidence that peo-ple actively work to interpret and construe theirsocial environments (e.g., Kim, Diekmann, &Tenbrunsel, 2003; Neale & Bazerman, 1991), ne-gotiators’ perceptions of each party’s BATNAand contribution may also depend on the situa-tion. Although the number of ways in whichthese perceptions may be influenced is likely tobe substantial and their comprehensive por-trayal is beyond the scope of this paper, we canattempt to classify these influences by consider-ing how perceptions of negotiators’ BATNAs andcontributions are assessed in greater detail.Specifically, we argue that the values negotia-tors attribute to their BATNAs and contributionsare based on considerations of quantity (i.e., theamount of resources), probability (i.e., the likeli-hood of obtaining those resources), and weight(i.e., the importance of those resources; see Fig-ure 2d), and that inferences regarding each ofthese criteria can affect the link between po-

tential and perceived power, as we describebelow.1

Quantity. In general, the objective amount ofresources available from a BATNA or contribu-tion should positively influence a negotiator’svaluation of that dimension. However, there aremany occasions where negotiators have incom-plete information about the resources theseBATNAs and contributions would provide. Nego-tiators are often instructed not to reveal theirBATNAs (Lax & Sebinius, 1986), for example, tolimit their counterparts’ knowledge of the re-sources afforded by that dimension (e.g., a jobcandidate may not tell a potential employerabout the salary offered by another employer).Negotiators may also fail to evaluate their ownBATNAs carefully and, hence, may possess onlya limited sense of the resources that optionwould provide (e.g., a job candidate may agreeto a salary level with an employer withoutknowing the salary that could be obtained froma comparable employer). Similarly, negotiatorsmay be relative strangers and, therefore, pos-sess incomplete knowledge of the resources rep-resented by their counterpart’s potential contri-bution (e.g., an employer may have littleknowledge of the technical expertise that a jobcandidate would bring to the job, if hired). Thislack of familiarity may also prevent negotiatorsfrom conveying details of their own contribution(e.g., a job candidate may not realize that his orher knowledge of foreign languages could beseen as an asset and, hence, may fail to men-tion this competency on his/her application).Thus, knowledge about these resource quan-tities should strengthen the relationship be-tween the potential and perceived values of thesedimensions.

Proposition 3: Knowledge of the quan-tity of resources afforded by a BATNAor contribution will positively influ-ence the link between the potentialand perceived values of these dimen-sions.

1 These considerations of quantity, probability, andweight correspond to the recognition in the economics liter-ature that value is determined, respectively, by the supply ofgoods— that is, an objective component; the assessed like-lihood of obtaining these goods—that is, an expected com-ponent; and one’s psychological assessment of thesegoods—that is, a subjective component (Nicholson, 1989).


Lack of information about the objective quan-tity of resources offered by these dimensions, incontrast, may cause perceived power to divergefrom potential power in systematic ways. Re-search on the false consensus effect, for exam-ple, suggests that people tend to believe thattheir own views are widely shared and that thiseffect is particularly likely when there is greaterlatitude for subjective construal (Gilovich, 1990).Thus, if a negotiator is unaware of the quantityof resources afforded by the counterpart’sBATNA (e.g., a job candidate does not know whoelse is being interviewed by the employer) butconsiders this party’s contribution to be strong(e.g., there would be substantial benefits af-forded by this employment opportunity), the fo-cal negotiator is likely to assume that otherswill be interested in reaching an agreementwith this counterpart and, hence, attributehigher value to the counterpart’s BATNA (e.g.,the job candidate is likely to think that the em-ployer has several other qualified applicantsinterested in the position) than if the counter-part’s contribution were weak.

Along similar lines, research suggests thatsince items that are difficult to obtain are oftenbetter than those that are easy to obtain, peopleoften infer the value of a good based on itsscarcity (Cialdini, 1984). Thus, if a negotiator isunaware of the quantity of resources afforded bythe counterpart’s contribution (e.g., a job candi-date knows little about the benefits afforded bya given employment opportunity) but knows thatthe counterpart’s BATNA is strong (e.g., therehave been many highly qualified applicants forthis position), the focal negotiator is likely toinfer that it will be harder to reach an agree-ment with that counterpart (i.e., infer greaterscarcity) and, hence, attribute higher value tothe counterpart’s contribution (e.g., the job can-didate is likely to assume there will be greatemployment benefits) than if that counterpart’sBATNA were weak. These considerations sug-gest that, in the absence of perfect informationabout the quantity of resources provided by aparty’s contribution or BATNA, respectively, theperceived value of a negotiator’s BATNA willpositively influence the perceived value of thatparty’s contribution, and vice versa.

Proposition 4: The perceived value of anegotiator’s BATNA (contribution) willpositively influence the perceived

value of that party’s contribution(BATNA).

Probability. The values of these BATNAs andcontributions should be determined, however,not only by the objective quantity of resourcesthey have the potential to afford but also by thelikelihood that these resources will be obtained.This notion underlies the economic principle of“expected value,” which assesses the value ofan uncertain outcome by multiplying the valueof an outcome by the probability that outcomewill occur (Nicholson, 1989). The expected valuefor a BATNA or contribution that may provide$100,000 but only has a 50 percent chance ofdoing so, for example, would be $50,000 (i.e., 0.50� 100,000).

There are many occasions, however, in whichthe probabilities for such outcomes are rela-tively unknown. These ambiguities can arise,for example, because of uncertainties in the en-vironment, lack of familiarity, and the difficultyof writing perfect contracts (Williamson, 1975).For this reason, knowledge about these proba-bilities should strengthen the relationship be-tween the potential and perceived values ofthese dimensions.

Proposition 5: Knowledge of the likeli-hood resources will be obtained froma BATNA or contribution will posi-tively influence the link between thepotential and perceived values ofthese dimensions.

Lack of information about these probabilities,in contrast, may lead the potential and per-ceived values of these dimensions to diverge insystematic ways. Specifically, we suggest thatone important factor that may influence the in-ferences negotiators make about these probabil-ities is the amount of trust they have in theircounterparts. Negotiators with low trust in theircounterparts should believe that there is ahigher likelihood, compared to those with hightrust, that their counterparts will fail to contrib-ute the resources that were promised or thattheir counterparts may have artificially inflatedthe resources that would be afforded by thecounterparts’ BATNAs. For this reason, a lack oftrust is likely to lead negotiators to lower theirassessments of their counterparts’ contributionsor BATNAs, respectively, even in cases where


these suspicions may be unfounded (e.g., Kim,Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).

For example, a skeptical consumer purchas-ing a used car may question the seller’s claimthat the car is reliable and therefore perceivethe salesman’s contribution to be relatively low,whereas a more trusting consumer, who fullybelieves the salesman’s claim, may perceive thesalesman’s contribution to be relatively high.Thus, in the absence of perfect informationabout the likelihood of obtaining resources froma negotiation or its best alternative, respec-tively, the level of trust negotiators place in theircounterparts should positively influence theperceived value of their counterparts’ BATNAsand contributions.

Proposition 6: The level of trust nego-tiators place in their counterparts willpositively influence the perceivedvalue of their counterparts’ BATNAsand contributions.

Weight. Finally, the values of negotiators’BATNAs and contributions should be deter-mined not only by the objective quantity of re-sources they entail and the probability of receiv-ing those resources but also by the subjectiveimportance of those resources for the negotiator.The negotiations literature distinguishes thequantity of resources from the importance ofthose resources, in particular, by discussing thedifference between negotiator interests and pri-orities (Lax & Sebinius, 1986). Whereas a nego-tiator’s interests concern any resource thatwould offer a benefit to the negotiator, a nego-tiator’s priorities concern which of these re-sources would provide a larger benefit than oth-ers. Thus, negotiators may offer substantialconcessions on an issue and a reliable guaran-tee that those benefits would be provided andyet fail to increase the value of their contribu-tion significantly if this issue is of minor impor-tance to the counterpart (e.g., offering a businessowner exclusive access to a proprietary technol-ogy and guaranteeing this offer with an enforce-able contract may do little to improve one’s con-tribution if this technology fails to serve thebusiness owner’s primary strategic goals).

To avoid such mistakes, negotiators shouldseek to identify the importance each partyplaces on the issues under discussion. However,false assumptions (e.g., the fixed-pie bias), mis-communication, and a variety of other factors

may prevent the importance each negotiatorplaces on these issues from being completelyknown. For this reason, knowledge about theseweights should strengthen the relationship be-tween the potential and perceived values ofthese dimensions.

Proposition 7: Knowledge of the im-portance of resources offered by aBATNA or contribution will positivelyinfluence the link between the po-tential and perceived values of thesedimensions.

Lack of information about these weights, incontrast, may lead the potential and perceivedvalues of these dimensions to diverge in system-atic ways. Specifically, we suggest that one im-portant factor that may affect the importancenegotiators place on the resources afforded bythese BATNAs and contributions may be theirfocus of attention. This focus is significant be-cause evidence suggests that our evaluations ofa given option can be directly influenced by itssalience (e.g., Ensari & Miller, 2002). Thus, anyfactor that increases the salience of theseBATNAs or contributions should increase the as-sessed importance of the resources afforded bythese respective dimensions. Negotiators whoconsider an impasse to be likely, for example,should focus greater attention on their BATNAs(given their expectation that these BATNAs willneed to be used) and, hence, weigh the re-sources afforded by these BATNAs more heavilyin their subjective appraisals than the resourcesafforded by their counterparts’ contributions. Incontrast, negotiators who expect to reach anagreement should consider the use of theirBATNAs to be less likely and, hence, weigh theresources afforded by the counterparts’ contri-bution more heavily in their subjective apprais-als than the resources afforded by their BATNAs.

Research suggests, furthermore, that a keyfactor that affects the likelihood of reaching anagreement is the amount of surplus utility avail-able in the negotiation (i.e., the amount of re-sources remaining after all parties haveclaimed resources equivalent to their BATNAs).The greater the surplus utility, the more oppor-tunities that exist for negotiators to reach anagreement and, thus, the greater the likelihoodthat the negotiating parties will avoid an im-passe (Lax & Sebinius, 1986). Thus, we expectfactors that affect the likelihood of reaching an


agreement, such as the amount of surplus utility,to exert opposing effects on the perceived val-ues of negotiators’ BATNAs and contributions.

Proposition 8: The amount of surplusutility will positively (negatively) in-fluence the perceived value of negoti-ators’ contributions (BATNAs).

This discussion illustrates how the link be-tween negotiators’ inherent valuations of theirBATNAs and contributions (i.e., potential power)and their perceptions of those dimensions (i.e.,perceived power) may diverge in a variety ofways, owing to potentially fallible inferencesconcerning quantity, probability, and weight. In-deed, in subsequent research scholars mayidentify additional ways in which such consid-erations may lead these potential and perceivedvalues to diverge. These influences suggest thatnegotiators’ potential power is likely to be trans-formed, as it is being perceived, from Figure 3ato Figure 3b, and that it is ultimately this per-ceived power that will drive negotiators’ tacticaldecisions.

Power Tactics

Power tactics concern negotiators’ efforts touse or change the power relationship. Whereaspower-use tactics concern the ways in whichnegotiators may attempt to leverage existingpower capabilities, power-change tactics con-cern the ways in which negotiators may attemptto alter the power relationship, typically to im-prove their own power relative to that of theother party (Lawler, 1992). Since the efforts en-tailed by power-change and power-use tacticsinherently differ, we discuss each type of powertactic in turn.

Power-change tactics. One conclusion negotia-tors may draw on perceiving their power relation-ship is that they do not possess enough poten-tial power, relative to that of their counterpart, toobtain desired outcomes. As a result, negotia-tors may attempt to improve their potentialpower. We expect that negotiators will be morelikely to initiate power-change tactics whenthey perceive their own potential power, relativeto that of their counterpart, to be low rather thanhigh. Thus, as indicated in Figure 1, we suggestthat negotiators’ perceptions of their potentialpower will drive their implementation of power-change tactics.

Proposition 9: Negotiators will bemore likely to initiate power-changetactics when they perceive their ownpotential power, relative to that oftheir counterpart, to be low ratherthan high.

We can furthermore draw on our prior concep-tualization of potential power to identify thekinds of power-change tactics that can be used.Specifically, in efforts to discuss the implica-tions of power-dependence theory for tacticalchoice, scholars have identified four basic pow-er-change tactics (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980;Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Lawler & Bacharach,1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978): in their attemptsto alter the power relationship, negotiators may(1) improve the quality of their BATNA (e.g., ob-tain a job offer from another employer), (2) de-crease the quality of the counterpart’s BATNA(e.g., dissuade others from applying for the po-sition), (3) decrease their valuation of the coun-terpart’s contribution (e.g., reduce their interestin the employment opportunity), or (4) increasethe counterpart’s valuation of their own contri-bution (e.g., take classes to improve their tech-nical skills).

These tactics involve changes to the two di-mensions of dependence identified in power-dependence theory. Tactics 1 and 3 seek to re-duce a negotiator’s dependence on his or hercounterpart and, hence, to alter the power rela-tionship by reducing the counterpart’s power.Tactics 2 and 4 seek to increase the counter-part’s dependence on the negotiator and, hence,alter the power relationship by increasing thefocal negotiator’s power. Thus, power-depen-dence theory not only offers a foundation forevaluating negotiators’ potential power, as dis-cussed earlier in this article, but also provides abasis for understanding how this power rela-tionship can be changed (i.e., by altering theseBATNAs or contributions).

The problem with this conceptualization ofpower-change tactics, however, is that it doesnot consider whether, or when, any of themshould be preferred. Researchers have recog-nized that particular aspects of the bargainingsituation can limit the “feasibility” of usingsome of these tactics to change the power rela-tionship (e.g., Jacobson & Cohen, 1986). Negotia-tors’ abilities to improve their BATNAs may beconstrained, for example, by their organization’s


lines of communication, rules, or traditions(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980), and their abilities toimprove their contributions may be constrainedby such factors as inadequate talent, opportu-nity, or time. But the primary question ofwhether or when, beyond these idiosyncraticconstraints, certain power-change tactics maybe more effective at altering the power relation-ship than others remains largely unexplored(see Kim & Fragale, 2005, for an exception). Weexamine these issues by drawing on our prioranalysis of power perceptions.

In our discussion of perceived power, we sug-gested that (1) the perceived value of negotia-tors’ BATNAs will positively influence the per-ceived value of their contributions, and viceversa (derived from our discussion of quantity);(2) the level of trust in the relationship will pos-

itively influence the perceived value of negoti-ator contributions and BATNAs (derived fromour discussion of probability); and (3) theamount of surplus utility will positively influ-ence the perceived value of negotiators’ contri-butions and negatively influence the perceivedvalue of their BATNAs (derived from our discus-sion of weight). We suggest that each of theseconsiderations should affect the relative bene-fits of power-change tactics that target one di-mension of dependence rather than the other.

On the one hand, the potential for the per-ceived value of negotiators’ BATNAs to posi-tively influence the perceived value of their con-tributions, and vice versa (i.e., Proposition 4),should reduce the significance of choosing be-tween power-change tactics that target BATNAsversus contributions to some degree.

(a) Potential Power

FIGURE 3Transformations of the Potential Power Matrix

(b) Perceived Power

PI � perceptual influences.

(c) Perceived Power After Power-Change Tactics

PC � Adjustments due to power-change tactics.

(d) Potential Power After Power-Use Tactics

PU � Adjustments due to power-use tactics.


Proposition 10: Power-change tacticsdesigned to increase (decrease) thevalue of negotiator BATNAs will alsoincrease (decrease) the value of nego-tiator contributions, and power-change tactics designed to increase(decrease) the value of negotiator con-tributions will also increase (decrease)the value of negotiator BATNAs.

On the other hand, insofar as these effects arelikely to be only partial rather than complete,the choice between power-change tactics thattarget negotiators’ BATNAs versus contributionsshould still be significant, and the other percep-tual influences we have identified may illus-trate how their implications may diverge.

To the extent that the perceived values of ne-gotiator contributions and BATNAs are dimin-ished by a lack of trust (i.e., Proposition 6), theperceived value of a given change in each ofthese dimensions should be smaller when trustis low rather than high. However, beyond thisgeneral observation, we might also expect thatthe susceptibility of these perceptions to thelack of trust would be smaller for BATNAs thancontributions, since the implementation of one’sBATNA does not depend on whether this dimen-sion is perceived accurately by the counterpart(e.g., an employee’s ability to take a job offerwith another firm is not affected by whether hiscurrent employer actually believes that the em-ployee possesses this alternative offer). Increas-ing one’s contribution, in contrast, is of littleavail if the counterpart does not believe thatthese resources will be provided and, hence,discounts the perceived value of this dimension(e.g., an employee’s offer to work longer hourswill not improve the employer’s perception ofthe employee’s contribution if the employer be-lieves the employee is unlikely to follow throughwith his promise). As a result, we expect that thelevel of trust will increase the effectiveness ofpower-change tactics that target negotiator con-tributions to a greater degree than the effective-ness of power-change tactics that target negoti-ator BATNAs.

Proposition 11: The level of trust willincrease the effectiveness of power-change tactics that target negotiatorcontributions to a greater degree thanthe effectiveness of power-change tac-tics that target negotiator BATNAs.

Moreover, we have argued that the amount ofsurplus utility, which influences the likelihoodof reaching an agreement, positively influencesthe perceived value of negotiators’ contributionsand negatively influences the perceived valueof negotiators’ BATNAs (i.e., Proposition 8). As aresult, a given change in negotiators’ BATNAswill be perceived to be larger when the likeli-hood of reaching an agreement is low ratherthan high (i.e., surplus utility is small ratherthan large), and a given change in negotiators’contributions will be perceived to be largerwhen the likelihood of reaching an agreement ishigh rather than low (i.e., surplus utility is largerather than small). Thus, we expect that theamount of surplus utility will positively influ-ence the effectiveness of power-change tacticsthat target negotiators’ contributions, and nega-tively influence the effectiveness of power-change tactics that target negotiators’ BATNAs,for altering the perceived power relationship.Indeed, this proposition is supported by recentempirical evidence, which suggests that thebenefits of improving one’s contribution in-crease, and the benefits of improving one’sBATNA diminish, as the amount of surplus util-ity grows (Kim & Fragale, 2005).

Proposition 12: The amount of surplusutility will positively (negatively) in-fluence the effectiveness of power-change tactics that target contribu-tions (BATNAs) for altering theperceived power relationship.

We should also note that although we havefocused on power-change tactics that target thedimensions of potential power (i.e., BATNAs andcontributions) and their implications for negoti-ators’ perceptions of the power relationship (i.e.,perceived power), it is also possible for power-change tactics to target these perceptions di-rectly (Ikle, 1964). A negotiator may work to im-prove his or her BATNA, for example, or simplymislead the counterpart into believing that hisor her BATNA is better than it actually is. Alter-natively, a negotiator may believe that the coun-terpart’s perception of the counterpart’s BATNAis inflated and, thus, attempt to improve theaccuracy of this perception, rather than lowerthe counterpart’s BATNA itself. However, to theextent that power-change tactics that directlytarget perceptions are intended to shift theseperceptions further from (rather than closer to)


negotiators’ inherent valuations of theseBATNAs and contributions, the implications ofsuch efforts are likely to be unstable and, hence,relatively short-lived (i.e., given Proposition 2).

These power-change tactics, furthermore, arenot restricted to a specific moment in a givenpower relation but, rather, can be initiated onmultiple occasions throughout the course of arelationship. Negotiators may implement power-change tactics in anticipation of an upcomingnegotiation, they may utilize such tactics duringthe course of the negotiation (e.g., as they striveto identify issues that may be of worth to theother party), and they may even interrupt thenegotiation midcourse to initiate power-changetactics before the negotiation is concluded.

These power-change tactics can also be pur-sued in an iterative fashion, whereby negotia-tors initially conclude that they possess insuffi-cient power to obtain desired outcomes, attemptto increase this power with one or more of thesepower-change tactics, evaluate the effects ofsuch attempts on their perceived power relation-ship, and then initiate additional power-changetactics if the desired increase in power has notyet been obtained. Indeed, the need to initiateadditional power-change tactics may be quitelikely, given that each negotiator may have at-tempted to shift the power balance in their favor,thereby canceling out some of the effects of theirinitial efforts (Diamantopoulos, 1987). Thus, thelinks among potential power, perceived power,and power-change tactics establish a feedbackloop (as depicted by the arrow leading from Ne-gotiators A’s and B’s power-change tactics backto potential power in Figure 1) that may be fre-quently repeated, in order to transform the de-pendence matrix (from Figure 3b to Figure 3c),before a given attempt at power use.

Power-use tactics. Once sufficient power hasbeen achieved in the minds of negotiators, thosenegotiators should be inclined to use this powerto obtain desired outcomes. And, given that per-ceptions of greater potential power, relative tothat of one’s counterpart, should increase thelikelihood of obtaining these rewards, negotia-tors should be more likely to employ power-usetactics when they perceive their own power, rel-ative to that of their counterpart, to be high thanlow. Thus, as indicated in Figure 1, we suggestthat negotiators’ perceptions of their potentialpower will drive their implementation of power-use tactics.

Proposition 13: Negotiators will bemore likely to initiate power-use tac-tics when they perceive their own po-tential power, relative to that of theircounterpart, to be high rather thanlow.

Researchers have identified a variety ofpower-use tactics negotiators may employ. Aspreviously mentioned, Kipnis et al. (1980), withsubsequent extensions by Kipnis and Schmidt(1983) and Yukl and Tracey (1992), identify ninedimensions of influence—pressure, legitima-tion, exchange, coalition, ingratiation, rationalpersuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation,and personal appeal (see Table 2)—and con-sider how one’s power relationship with otherscan influence the likelihood that these differenttactics will be used. Yet the presentation of thisoverwhelming number of tactics without theconcomitant provision of an organizing frame-work ultimately renders such efforts too cumber-some as a basis for theory.

Lawler (1992) offers a more helpful startingpoint for a theoretical analysis of power-use tac-tics, making a broad distinction between concil-iatory and hostile power-use tactics and consid-ering when they are likely to be employed.Whereas conciliatory tactics refer to positiveacts, such as communicating a willingness tocoordinate or collaborate, hostile tactics refer tonegative acts, such as communicating an incli-nation toward competition, intimidation, or re-sistance. By drawing on power-dependence the-ory and research on punitive power, Lawlerdevelops two propositions concerning how thepower relationship affects the incidence of theseconciliatory and hostile behaviors. First, be-cause the existence of unequal power shouldcause negotiators to disagree over the legiti-macy of power differences and how such differ-ences should affect the negotiated solution,each negotiator will employ more hostile andfewer conciliatory power-use tactics when theirrelative power is unequal than when it is equal.Second, because higher total power (i.e., thesum of each negotiator’s potential power) in-creases negotiators’ stakes in reaching a rea-sonable solution, they will employ fewer hostileand more conciliatory power-use tactics whentotal power is high than when it is low. Each ofthese propositions has received empirical sup-port (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Lawler &


Bacharach, 1987). Thus, we can observe that thisanalysis offers a parsimonious and empiricallydefensible conceptualization of power-use tac-tics that can complement our prior discussionsof potential and perceived power.

Yet this analysis also has some important lim-itations. Research on power-use tactics is justi-fied by the notion that the realization of one’spotential power is not automatic. Some efforts toextract benefits can be more effective than oth-ers. However, because Lawler’s (1992) analysisis primarily descriptive in nature, it considersneither the relative effectiveness of hostile ver-sus conciliatory tactics nor the reasons why dif-ferences in the effectiveness of such tacticsmight occur. As a result, this analysis offerslittle prescriptive guidance on how to use one’spower effectively in the context of negotiation.We attempt to address these concerns by con-sidering more closely the implications of effortsto extract benefits from a relationship.

The difficulty of power use arises from the factthat one negotiator’s gain in benefits typicallyentails some loss in benefits for the other(Lawler, 1992). Indeed, a comparison of the kindsof power-use tactics that have been identified inthe literature reveals that their differences arisenot from the benefits they would offer the initi-ator, given that the initiator’s benefits are essen-tially kept constant for the purposes of thoseanalyses, but rather from the implications ofsuch actions for the target. Specifically, we canobserve that the magnitude of the target’s lossfrom a power-use tactic can either be exacer-bated or mitigated depending on the type oftactic employed. Whereas conciliatory power-use tactics, such as communicating a willing-ness to coordinate or collaborate, are designedto extract benefits in ways that mitigate theharm to a target, hostile power-use tactics, suchas communicating an inclination toward compe-tition, intimidation, or resistance, are designedto extract benefits in ways that actually exacer-bate the target’s harm.

The costs incurred by a target through an ini-tiator’s use of power can be influenced in avariety of ways, which we can illustrate by con-sidering the tactics identified by Kipnis and hiscolleagues (see Table 2). A negotiator may re-duce these costs (1) by consulting with the targetto identify differences in their preferences thatwould offer opportunities for mutual gain (seeLax & Sebinius, 1986, Chapter 5, for a review), (2)

by making inspirational appeals that would le-verage the target’s own preferences so the tar-get would find making these concessions lessdistasteful, or (3) by using rational persuasion togive the target the satisfaction of believing thatthe concessions were at least appropriate andfair (see Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, for a review).In contrast, a negotiator may increase thesecosts (1) by pressuring the target, through de-mands, threats, or intimidation, so the target notonly loses the benefits of the extracted conces-sions but also suffers the additional costs ofnegative emotions, the loss of control, and dam-aged self-esteem; (2) by enlisting the aid of oth-ers to magnify this pressure, and thereby in-crease these psychological costs to the target; or(3) by referencing existing policies to imposemany of these same kinds of psychological costswithout enlisting the explicit aid of others. Fi-nally, power-use tactics such as exchange, in-gratiation, and personal appeal may neither in-crease nor reduce the costs incurred by thetarget in any significant way and may thereforebe considered more neutral.

These differences between the implications ofhostile and conciliatory tactics provide the basisfor several conclusions. First, we can observethat whereas hostile power-use tactics do notrequire attention to addressing the specificneeds of the target, conciliatory power-use tac-tics require efforts to understand the target’spreferences and satisfy at least some of thoseinterests in order to cause the target less harm.This suggests that power-use tactics generallywill require more effort to implement when theyare conciliatory than when they are hostile, be-cause conciliatory tactics require negotiators tounderstand their counterparts’ needs and wants.

Proposition 14: Power-use tactics willrequire more effort to implementwhen they are conciliatory than whenthey are hostile.

However, to the extent that negotiators seekagreements that would maximize their own ben-efits, targets should exert greater efforts to resistpower-use tactics that would cause themgreater harm. This resistance should, in turn,reduce the likelihood that such power-use tac-tics will be successful. Thus, given that concil-iatory power-use tactics are designed to inflictless harm on the target than hostile power-usetactics, and hence incite less resistance, we ex-


pect that power-use tactics will be more suc-cessful for extracting benefits from a negotia-tion when they are conciliatory than when theyare hostile.

Proposition 15: Power-use tactics willbe more successful for extracting ben-efits from a negotiation when theyare conciliatory than when they arehostile.

Yet hostile power-use tactics may offer an ad-vantage over conciliatory power-use tacticswith regard to their likelihood of encouragingtargets to make preemptive concessions, if thetargets expect these power-use tactics to be suc-cessful. For example, in any negotiation there islikely to be a subset of issues that one or moreparties consider to be “deal-breakers”—issuesthat all parties to the negotiation need to agreeon if an agreement is to be reached. When en-countering such an issue during the course of anegotiation, a negotiator may realize that resist-ing a power-use tactic is futile, because the ne-gotiator will ultimately have to concede on theissue anyway. In such a case, making preemp-tive concessions to prevent the successful im-plementation of a hostile power-use tacticwould be worthwhile, because the cost to thetarget of making those concessions would onlybe increased if the hostile tactic were employed(i.e., owing to the additional psychological costsimposed). However, it makes little sense to makepreemptive concessions to prevent the success-ful implementation of a conciliatory power-usetactic, because such tactics are designed to de-crease the cost to the target of making those con-cessions. Thus, we predict that when targets ex-pect a power-use tactic to be successful, they willbe more likely to make preemptive concessionswhen that tactic would have been hostile thanwhen that tactic would have been conciliatory.

Proposition 16: When targets expect apower-use tactic to be successful, theywill be more likely to make pre-emptive concessions when that tac-tic would have been hostile thanwhen that tactic would have beenconciliatory.

These conclusions contribute to research onpower use in several ways. First, these insightsextend Lawler’s (1992) descriptive analysis ofpower-use tactics not only by explaining why

negotiators may be inclined to use some power-use tactics more frequently in certain situationsthan others, but also by offering prescriptivesuggestions for those who may want to imple-ment these power-use tactics more effectively.Second, this discussion of hostile and concilia-tory power-use tactics presents a parsimoniousorganizing framework that can encompass themyriad tactics that have been identified by Kip-nis and his colleagues (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983;Kipnis et al., 1980; see also Yukl & Tracey, 1992).Finally, this analysis helps justify and elaborateWrong’s (1968) assertion that the compliance oftargets is often based simply on their subjectiveexpectation that potential power can and will beused and that this can, in turn, make actualpower use unnecessary. Our analysis not onlyexplains why such preemptive compliance mayoccur but also identifies the kinds of power-usetactics that would be more likely to elicit suchcompliance than others. By doing so, this anal-ysis helps expand current conceptions of poweruse from that of a simple one-way relationship,whereby an actor extracts benefits from its tar-get, to that of a bilateral process, whereby eachparty can initiate such tactics in an offensive ordefensive manner to maximize or preserve thebenefits, respectively, it might obtain.

Realized Power

Realized power refers to the extent to whichnegotiators claim benefits from their interaction.Given that this extraction of benefits is achievedthrough the implementation of power-use tac-tics, the type, frequency, and magnitude of anegotiator’s power-use efforts should directly in-fluence the extent to which that party has real-ized power from the relationship. Thus, as indi-cated in Figure 1, we suggest that negotiators’power-use tactics will affect their realizedpower in the negotiation.

Proposition 17: The type, frequency,and magnitude of a negotiator’s pow-er-use tactics will directly influencethat party’s realized power.

The constraint on such actions, however,arises from the fact that this realization of powercan subsequently alter the power relationship.Lawler (1992) has observed, for example, that theextraction of benefits from a relationship inflictssome cost on the target, which will reduce the


target’s valuation of the relationship (see ourprior discussion of power-change tactics) and,hence, lower the target’s dependence. This no-tion also provides the basis for the conclusiondrawn by many power researchers that extract-ing benefits from a relationship reduces one’spotential power in future interactions (Emerson,1962; Lawler, 1992), as embodied by the well-known adage “to use power is to lose it.”2

Yet this conclusion is based on only a narrowassessment of the implications, for the target, ofhaving these benefits extracted, rather than theimplications of such actions for the relationshipas a whole. We can acknowledge that the ex-traction of benefits from a relationship may re-duce the target’s valuation of the relationshipand lower that target’s dependence. However,we can also observe that, by extracting thesebenefits, the initiator of a given power-use tacticno longer relies on the target for those valuedrewards and, hence, becomes less dependent onthe target. As a result, the clearest implication ofthese combined influences is that the extractionof benefits from a negotiation (i.e., realizedpower) will negatively influence the total power(i.e., the sum of each negotiator’s potentialpower) in the relationship.3 Thus, as indicated inFigure 1, we suggest that negotiators’ realizedpower will affect their potential power in futurenegotiations.

Proposition 18: Realized power willnegatively influence the total powerin the relationship.

This conclusion does not imply that negotia-tors’ relative power is unaffected by power use.Rather, we expect that the implications of poweruse for relative power will depend on the type ofpower-use tactic employed. Specifically, giventhat conciliatory power-use tactics are designedto extract benefits in ways that reduce costs to

the target, initiators of such tactics may realizepower in ways that reduce their own depen-dence on the target (i.e., because of the acquisi-tion of desired rewards) to a greater degree thanthe reduction in the target’s dependence on theinitiator (i.e., given the mitigated costs to thetarget of the foregone benefits).

In contrast, given that hostile power-use tac-tics are designed to extract benefits in ways thatmagnify costs to the target, initiators of suchtactics may extract benefits in ways that reducethe initiator’s dependence on the target (i.e., be-cause of the acquisition of desired rewards) to alesser degree than the reduction in the target’sdependence on the initiator (i.e., given the mag-nified costs to the target from having benefitsextracted in a hostile way). Thus, we expect thatwhereas conciliatory power-use tactics will shiftrelative power in favor of the initiator, hostilepower-use tactics will shift relative power infavor of the target.

Proposition 19: Whereas conciliatorypower-use tactics will shift relativepower in favor of the initiator, hos-tile power-use tactics will shift rela-tive power in favor of the target.

These conclusions offer several insights for ananalysis of realized power in the context of ne-gotiation. First, given the loss in total power thatpower-use tactics entail, negotiators may notnecessarily want to realize as much power asthey can from a negotiation. Their decisions todo so should depend on their expectations forthe relationship, given that such actions willaffect their counterpart’s subsequent valuationof the relationship and, hence, the focal negoti-ator’s potential power in future interactions(from Figure 3c to Figure 3d). Thus, our analysisis not limited to one-shot agreements but alsohas implications for relationships of longer du-ration. In one-shot agreements, negotiators arelikely to realize as much power as they can innegotiation, whereas in ongoing relationships,negotiators will be less likely to maximize real-ized power because of the negative effects thiswill have on their potential power in futurenegotiations.

Proposition 20: The extent to which ne-gotiators realize power will be nega-tively influenced by expectations offuture interaction.

2 Although the extraction of benefits may also make clearto the target that the initiator is willing and able to employa power-use tactic and in this sense increase, to some ex-tent, the perceived level of the initiator’s potential power(March, 1966), this effect is expected to be outweighed by thedecrease in the initiator’s perceived power from having re-duced the supply of benefits available from, and hence thetarget’s valuation of, the relationship.

3 This implication holds irrespective of whether the ben-efits from the relationship are fixed or replenishing, “so longas additions to the power supply are independent of theexercise of power” (March, 1966: 64).


Second, this analysis offers an explanation forwhy Yukl and Tracey (1992) found some power-use tactics (i.e., rational persuasion, inspiration-al appeal, and consultation) to be more effectivethan others (i.e., pressure, coalition, and legiti-mation). In our prior discussion of power-usetactics, we actually drew on these examples toillustrate how such tactics can be conciliatory orhostile, respectively, and explained why theformer methods would be more successful forextracting benefits than the latter. We now ex-tend these conclusions by illustrating how suchefforts can also affect negotiators’ power rela-tionships in future interactions and how one’srelative power can be maintained more effec-tively through long-term relationships by imple-menting power-use tactics that are conciliatoryrather than hostile.

Proposition 21: Power-use tactics willbe more effective for maintainingone’s relative power through long-term relationships when they are con-ciliatory than when they are hostile.

Finally, this discussion may help explain andextend an emerging body of research on theeffects of power on those who possess it (Keltner,Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), which suggeststhat power may exert a disinhibiting influenceon social behavior. According to that perspec-tive, the powerful become less restrained in sat-isfying their desires, less attentive to the inter-ests of others, and more likely to indulge inpersonal motives than those without power. Thepresent analysis may help explain why this mayoccur. If negotiators possess greater relativepower, they can afford to use hostile power-usetactics without completely eroding their poweradvantage for the future. Thus, powerful negoti-ators may possess greater liberty to implementa wider range of power-use tactics and, hence,face greater temptations to use those that arehostile (i.e., given the lower effort hostile tacticswould require to initiate) than negotiators withless power. This reasoning also suggests thatthis disinhibition is not merely dichotomous (i.e.,negotiators either use hostile tactics or theydon’t) but, rather, may be more accurately por-trayed as a continuous relationship whereby ne-gotiators will be more likely to behave in disin-hibited ways (i.e., by increasing the frequency,magnitude, and hostility of their power-use tac-tics) as the size of their power advantage grows.

Proposition 22: The size of a negotia-tor’s power advantage will be posi-tively related to the frequency, magni-tude, and hostility of their power-usetactics (i.e., efforts to realize power).

Illustration

This range of dynamics that may arise inpower relations can be illustrated through anexample. Imagine a context in which two par-ties, A and B, are negotiating the terms of apotential joint venture. Because of differences intheir preferences and their alternatives to thisopportunity, each negotiator’s valuation of therelationship (i.e., due to the counterpart’s poten-tial contribution) and his or her best alternative(i.e., his or her own BATNA) can be representedby Figure 4a. These values provide the basis forcalculating each negotiator’s potential power sothat, based on our prior analysis, the potentialpower for A and B would be 190 and 140, respec-tively.

These valuations are likely to be transformed,however, as the negotiators form perceptions ofthis power relationship. The potential for a ne-gotiator to infer the value of the counterpart’scontribution from the value of the counterpart’sBATNA and vice versa may decrease, to someextent, differences in the negotiators’ valuationsof these dimensions. Lack of trust may lead eachnegotiator to discount the value of the counter-part’s BATNA and contribution. Moreover, therelatively large amount of surplus utility (i.e.,330 � 90 � 240) may lead the negotiators todiscount the possibility of an impasse and, thus,increase their valuations of the relationship anddecrease their valuations of their BATNAs. Suchinfluences should transform the power matrix asit is perceived from Figure 4a to Figure 4b, forexample.

These perceptions may, in turn, lead the ne-gotiators to conclude that they possess inade-quate power to obtain desired outcomes and,therefore, to implement power-change tactics.Negotiator A may choose to improve his or herBATNA (e.g., by identifying an alternative jointventure opportunity), for example, whereas ne-gotiator B may choose to improve his or hercontribution (e.g., by investing in skills thatwould help market the joint venture’s product).And although each party may achieve the samemagnitude change in his or her chosen dimen-


sion, the implications for the perceived powerrelationship are likely to differ. Whereas thelack of trust may make A’s efforts to improve hisor her BATNA more effective for changing theperceived power relationship than B’s efforts toimprove his or her contribution, this advantagemay be counteracted to some degree by theabundant surplus utility, which should leadthem to discount the value of any change to theirBATNAs and magnify the value of any change totheir contributions. The nature of these percep-tual influences, the extent to which they operate,and the types, magnitude, and frequency ofthese power-change efforts should, therefore,transform the negotiators’ perceptions of their

potential power from Figure 4b to Figure 4c, forexample, before any attempt at power use.

The characteristics of these power-use effortsshould, furthermore, depend on the negotiators’assessment of and goals for the relationship. Tothe extent that the negotiators do not care aboutthe future and also possess a relative poweradvantage, they may use more hostile tacticsand extract the maximum amount of benefitsfrom the agreement. However, to the extent thatthese negotiators expect a longer-term relation-ship (as would be likely for those who plan ajoint venture) and seek to manage this relation-ship effectively, they may use more conciliatorytactics and avoid extracting all possible bene-

FIGURE 4Illustration

(a) Potential Power

A’s potential power � 30 � (220 � 60) � 190; B’s potentialpower � 60 � (110 � 30) � 140; total power � 190 � 140 � 330.

(b) Perceived Power

A’s perceived power � 20 � (160 � 40) � 140; B’s perceivedpower � 40 � (50 � 20) � 70; perceived total power � 140 �70 � 210.

(c) Perceived Power After Power-Change Tactics

A’s perceived power � 60 � (160 � 40) � 180; B’s perceivedpower � 40 � (80 � 60) � 60; perceived total power � 180 �60 � 240.

(d) Potential Power After Power-Use Tactics

A’s potential power � 60 � (100 � 40) � 120; B’s potentialpower � 40 � (70 � 60) � 50; total power � 120 � 50 � 170.


fits so as to retain some potential power for theirfuture interactions, and thereby transform thepower matrix from Figure 4c to Figure 4d, forexample, which, in turn, provides the basis forthe next iteration of this dynamic cycle.

CONCLUSION

Our purpose in this article has been to de-velop a comprehensive theoretical model thatcan integrate the most prominent theories ofpower, account for the wide range of resultsfound in negotiation research, and offer novelpropositions that can be tested in future empir-ical work. Our efforts to do so have led us todecouple power into four distinct components—(1) potential power, (2) perceived power, (3)power tactics, and (4) realized power—and toassess their implications for those who wish tomanage power effectively in the context of ne-gotiation. Through these endeavors, we haveemphasized the dynamic nature of power rela-tions and examined each phase in this dynamicprocess with added depth and precision. As aresult, this analysis may help address numer-ous limitations that have persisted in the powerliterature.

By integrating the wide array of approachesresearchers have taken in their discussions ofpower, this analysis helps reconcile the myriadlists of characteristics, properties, strategies,and descriptions that have been offered withregard to this topic and consolidate them into amore coherent, parsimonious, and accessibleframework. By depicting power relations as adynamic process, this analysis helps addressthe criticisms that have been raised concerningthe static nature of existing power theories andthe failure of such static conceptions to capturethe complexities of power relations that arise inreal-world environments (Astley & Sachdeva,1984; Neale & Northcraft, 1991). Finally, by delv-ing into the components of power that we havedifferentiated, this inquiry extends conceptual-izations of each of these components.

Our analysis of potential power suggests thatprior formulations of this concept may be inad-equate, and it offers a revised formulation thatseems better justified by empirical research.Our discussion of perceived power draws onpower theorists’ recognition that assessmentsof power are inherently subjective in nature(Bacharach & Lawler, 1976), but it then extends

this notion by discussing how these potentialand perceived values may diverge. Our assess-ment of power tactics begins by emphasizing afundamental, but too often overlooked, distinc-tion between power-change and power-use tac-tics, and then extends prior discussions of suchtactics in fundamental ways— consideringwhen some power-change tactics may be moreeffective for altering the power relationship thanothers and then consolidating the wide array ofpower-use tactics that have been identified in theliterature into a parsimonious framework that of-fers clear, prescriptive recommendations fortheir use. Finally, our analysis of realized powerdraws on the common adage that “to use poweris to lose it” but then offers a more precise as-sessment of the implications of power use fortotal and relative power, and through such con-siderations offers much needed insight into thereasons why negotiators may vary in both themanner and extent to which they attempt to ex-tract benefits from their relationship.

This inquiry, therefore, acknowledges theenormous complexity of power relations, theirdynamic transformations, and how power-related behaviors may be influenced by bothshort- and long-term considerations. We alsoseek to address these issues in a parsimonious,logically coherent way. However, we recognizethis framework’s limitations. Although our anal-ysis of perceived power identifies several per-ceptual influences, others may exist that wehave failed to mention. We briefly noted thatsituational constraints could affect the feasibil-ity of power-related behaviors, but the impor-tance of these constraints should not be dis-counted, given that all behaviors are restrictedat least in part by the surrounding social struc-ture (e.g., Brass, 1984; Lawler, 1992). Moreover,although we have implicitly acknowledged theinfluence of parties outside the focal negotia-tion, given that they ultimately determine nego-tiators’ BATNAs, benefits may be gainedthrough more explicit treatments of the rolessuch outside parties play in determining thenature of the focal negotiation and the ways inwhich negotiator BATNAs may be changed (e.g.,Komorita & Hamilton, 1984; Mannix, 1993b). Al-though the demands of presenting a clear andconcise analysis of the enormous literature onpower that would be relevant for negotiationwere great, we have done our best to convey theelements of this research that would be most


important for the reader. However, as these lim-itations should illustrate, there is room for muchmore work in this area.

It would also be appropriate to place our dy-namic model of power in negotiation within thecontext of the broader power literature. By re-stricting our analysis to negotiation, we havefocused on cases where the focal parties areinitiating discrete, strategic acts (e.g., makingoffers, issuing threats, and selectively disclos-ing information). Yet there are many caseswhere power operates in a more routine andprosaic fashion—for example, socialization andaccreditation processes, technological systems,and insurance and tax regimes (Covaleski,Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998; Noble, 1984;Shaiken, 1984; Simon, 1988)—reflecting a modeof power that is more systemic, rather than epi-sodic, in form (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1977; Gid-dens, 1984). The interdependent process of nego-tiation, furthermore, is based on the notion thatthe targets of power are capable of agency orchoice (e.g., whether to accept a proposal, makea counterproposal, or abandon the negotiationin favor of one’s BATNA). However, there aremany cases where the use of power does notrequire the target to “do” anything—for exam-ple, physical violence, punishment, and actuar-ial practices (Hearn, 1994; Milgram, 1974; Simon,1988); in such cases, targets are treated more asobjects than as subjects (i.e., actors capable ofagency) in the power relationship (Simon, 1988).

These mode (episodic versus systemic) andtarget (subject versus object) dimensions areuseful to consider because their intersection cre-ates four quadrants that provide the basis for abroader typology of power forms (Lawrence,Winn, & Jennings, 2001). Our focus on power innegotiation, and its emphasis on an episodicform of power that treats targets as subjects,falls within the quadrant that these researchersterm influence. Thus, one might wonder whetherthe propositions that have been developed inthis quadrant would hold under conditions offorce (i.e., when power is episodic and targetsare treated as objects), discipline (i.e., whenpower is systemic and targets are treated assubjects), or domination (i.e., when power is sys-temic and targets are treated as objects). It ispossible, for example, that the episodic use ofpower, particularly hostile tactics, may not nec-essarily reduce one’s potential power in future

interactions when a target’s agency is removed(i.e., the conditions of force).

Notwithstanding these limitations, we stillfeel that our power model extends past work tointegrate new research on negotiation. One keydifference from earlier work in the area of poweris that research on negotiation has a high levelof validation and testing (e.g., see Bazerman,Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Kramer & Mes-sick, 1995; Murnighan, 1993, for reviews). Wethink our examples and the citations in the ar-ticles above should provide a good foundationfor joint empirical testing of many of our propo-sitions. Indeed, if negotiation is as central as itappears to be in building realized power, it maybe that the various quadrants of power (influ-ence, force, discipline, and domination) may allrely in some fundamental fashion on the powerdynamics of negotiation.

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Peter H. Kim is an associate professor of management and organization at the Uni-versity of Southern California’s Marshall School of Business. He received his Ph.D. inorganizational behavior from Northwestern University’s Kellogg Graduate School ofManagement. His research interests concern the dynamics of interpersonal percep-tions regarding ability, intentionality, and power and their implications for work-groups, negotiations, and dispute resolution.

Robin L. Pinkley is an associate professor of organizational behavior and businesspolicy at the Southern Methodist University’s Cox School of Business. She received herPh.D. in social psychology from the University of North Carolina. Her current researchinterests include the development of a new gain-gain approach to profitable negoti-ation, negotiator power, the use of strategic anchors and bids in negotiation, andfairness.

Alison R. Fragale is an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina’sKenan-Flager Business School. She received her Ph.D. in organizational behavior fromStanford University’s Graduate School of Business. Her research interests focus on thedeterminants and consequences of power, status, and influence in organizations;conflict resolution and negotiation; and verbal and nonverbal communication.


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