PORT REFORM TOOLKIT - PPIAF · 2016-09-15 · Reform Toolkit. The Toolkit is designed to help...

LABOR REFORM AND RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES

M O D U L E 7

PORT REFORMTOOLKITSECOND EDITION

THE WORLD BANK

© 2007 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank

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The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) or the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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For all other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, please contact the Office of the Publisher, World Bank,1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail [email protected].

ISBN-10: 0-8213-6607-6ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6607-3eISBN: 0-8213-6608-4eISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6608-0DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-6607-3

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MODULE SEVEN CONTENTS1. Context for Labor Reform 3132. Key Labor Issues 3173. Labor Involvement in Port Reform 3184. Organizing to Address Labor Reform: A Task Force Approach 3215. The Institutional Framework for Labor Reform 323

5.1. Redefining the Concept of Social Equity 3235.2. Meeting Commercial Needs 3245.3. Fostering Competition 3255.4. Government’s Role 3255.5. Time Frame for Port Labor Reform 326

6. Developing the Workforce Rationalization Plan 3266.1. Alternatives to Dismissals 3276.2. Elements of a Staff Retrenchment Program 3286.3. Pitfalls in Designing and Implementing Severance Packages 3296.4. Rationalizing the Workforce: When and By Whom? 331

6.4.1. Prereform Rationalization 3316.4.2. Postreform Rationalization 332

6.5. Who Should Pay for the Expenses of Port Labor Rationalization? 3337. International Support for Labor Adjustment 3348. Postreform Labor Management Relations 336References 336Annex I. World Bank Labor Adjustment Projects 337Annex II. List of Organizations That Have Obtained and Renewed an

International Labour Organization Portworker Development Program License 351

BOXESBox 1: Changes in Economic Policies: Impact on Port Labor 314Box 2: Trends in Gang Strength, 1970s and 1980s 316Box 3: Labor Competition in India and Brazil 317Box 4: Factors Prompting Port Labor Reform 317Box 5: Port Labor Reform in the European Union 318Box 6: Possible Effects of Reform on Employment 319Box 7: Working with Labor Unions: The Ghana Case 322Box 8: Sample Reference Clauses in a Concession Agreement on Employee Transfer 323Box 9: The Productivity Commission of Australia 324Box 10: Institutional Framework for Labor Reform Key Findings 325Box 11: Job Security in Ports 326Box 12: Social Plans at Moulinex 328Box 13: Port Staffing Benchmarks 330Box 14: A Downsizing Decision Tree 332

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Acknowledgments

This Second Edition of the Port Reform Toolkit has been produced with the financial assistance of a grant fromTRISP, a partnership between the U.K. Department for International Development and the World Bank, for learningand sharing of knowledge in the fields of transport and rural infrastructure services.

Financial assistance was also provided through a grant from The Netherlands Transport and Infrastructure TrustFund (Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management) for the enhancement of theToolkit’s content, for which consultants of the Rotterdam Maritime Group (RMG) were contracted.

We wish to give special thanks to Christiaan van Krimpen, John Koppies, and Simme Veldman of the RotterdamMaritime Group, Kees Marges formerly of ITF, and Marios Meletiou of the ILO for their contributions to this work.

The First Edition of the Port Reform Toolkit was prepared and elaborated thanks to the financing and technicalcontributions of the following organizations.

The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)PPIAF is a multi-donor technical assistance facility aimed at helping developing countries improve the qualityof their infrastructure through private sector involvement. For more information on the facility see the Web site: www.ppiaf.org.

The Netherlands Consultant Trust Fund

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The World Bank

International Maritime Associates (USA)

Mainport Holding Rotterdam Consultancy (formerly known as TEMPO), Rotterdam Municipal PortManagement (The Netherlands)

The Rotterdam Maritime Group (The Netherlands)

Holland and Knight LLP (USA)

ISTED (France)

Nathan Associates (USA)

United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Chile)

PA Consulting (USA)

The preparation and publishing of the Port Reform Toolkit was performed under the management of Marc Juhel,Ronald Kopicki, Cornelis “Bert” Kruk, and Bradley Julian of the World Bank Transport Division.

Comments are welcome.Please send them to the World Bank Transport Help Desk.Fax: 1.202.522.3223. Internet: [email protected]

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1. CONTEXT FOR LABORREFORM Port labor from crane and equipment operatorsto stevedores to harbor pilots is one of the keysto success or failure in today’s competitive portand international trade environment. Too oftenport labor is blamed for a port’s failure to playan appropriate and productive role in portoperations and its nation’s economic develop-ment. Overstaffing, outdated and inefficientwork rules, poor skills and training, inflatedpay scales, and unreliability are among the mostprominently cited problems contributing to highcosts and inefficient operations in many ports.To be fair, outdated management practices cansometimes add to these problems by overlooking

the benefits of a more participatory approach toport management.

Ports and port labor do not exist in isolation.They are an integral part of, and in turn areaffected by, national economic and trade poli-cies, changes in markets and services, and tech-nological advances. Box 1 illustrates howchanges in economic policies occurring over thelast decades have affected port labor.

These changes in economic policies have beenaccompanied by other developments in technolo-gy, logistics, and transportation that have led tofurther reductions in the demand for dock work-ers. The shift from “port to port” to “door todoor” cargo delivery systems, for example, andthe use of inland container facilities have led to

7Labor Reform andRelated Social IssuesSECOND EDITION

This module is the seventh of eight modules comprising the PortReform Toolkit. The Toolkit is designed to help government officialsand private interests alike navigate the process of port reform to

achieve more modern, efficient, and financially viable seaports and relatedintermodal facilities and services.The labor reform module deals with some of the most critical elements ofport reform: the many labor related issues associated with port ownershipand operations. It is designed to help government decision makers identifythe key forces affecting port labor today, understand the need for reform ina competitive environment, evaluate alternative ways of approaching laborreform, and pursue reform in a way that maximizes efficiency and mini-mizes labor dislocation and risks to potential port investors and operators.

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Labor Reform and Related Social Issues

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Box 1: Changes in Economic Policies: Impact on Port Labor

Semiautonomous economic International trade: Labor-intensive technologies:policies (until mid 1980s) • Freedom in the selection • Limited degree of

of inputs, finished goods, specialization required to services, funds, and labor, operate single function lifting usually on a domestic or equipment.local basis. • Cargo handling and

• National markets were warehousing monopolies.reserved for domestic • Direct and cross subsidies.producers, inefficient • Increasing wages, avoidanceproduction methods, trade of new technologies, and low barriers, currency exchange productivity were all restriction, bias against institutionalized as measuresexports. that protected national

producers.• Political influence on decisions

as to which and how muchcargo handling equipment toacquire. Capital-intensiveequipment not viewed associally acceptable.

• Expansion of the labor forcesimultaneously with demand,fragmentation of functions,and dock worker registrationsystems. More cargo, moreworkers.

Export-oriented economic policies Global trade: Capital intensive-technologies:

(from mid 1980s onward) • Economic activities • Ports can provide services restructured, customs that are competitive and duties reduced, commercially attractive.competition intensified, • Productivity increased and domestic producers meet costs reduced by exposing the demands of port labor to market international markets locally mechanisms.

• Freedom in the selection of • Workforce reduction, more inputs, finished goods, cargo, less direct port services, funds, and labor, workers. Training and usually on a worldwide basis. retraining programs to

• Vigorous worldwide enhance skills of workers competition for goods and safe working conditions.and services requires labor • New techniques and work to respond to the needs of organizations introduced to port customers. motivate the labor force.

Participation of workers inworkplace decisions. Monetaryincentives granted on the basisof customers’ satisfaction, per-formance of cargo handlinggangs, and participation inenterprise profit share linked toindividual and team efforts.

Source: Author.

Economic Policies Characteristics End Result

many containers being stuffed and stripped byconsignors’ or consignees’ employees on theirown premises, often distant from the port.Handling systems have been extensively mecha-nized and are also increasingly automated.

Box 2 shows how the size of work gangs in anumber of ports has changed, or not, in responseto changing economic and competitive markets.In many of the ports shown in Box 2, the num-ber of workers per gang was very large, andremained mostly unchanged between 1970s and1980s despite the fact that cargoes increasinglywere being transported in containers with the useof modern equipment. In developing countries,where ports were operated for the most part bythe public sector, a combination of factors suchas surplus labor, strict application of union disci-pline, limited resources to acquire modern cargohandling equipment, poor training, and govern-ment policies to maintain or create employmentcontributed to overmanning in ports.

In the 1990s, private interests made significantcapital investments in ports around the world.Continued imposition of large work crews andrigid work rules in many ports, however, haveundermined the value of these investments, and,hence, the commercial feasibility of ports andterminals, both in developing and developedcountries. For example, until April 1998, in var-ious Australian ports there were typically 11 or12 workers per shift per gantry crane. With thenew enterprise agreement, this number wasreduced to six workers per shift per crane, andsubstantial productivity gains were achieved (seeBox 2). In the Port of Santos, Brazil, in 1997,labor and management reached an agreementreducing from 12 to 10 the number of workersper shift per crane. As a general matter, port ter-minal operators would rather employ a smallernumber of workers per shift while complyingwith safety and health regulations, and payhigher wages for a highly efficient, lean team.

Port labor reform presents a difficult challengefor government decision makers and therefore itis unlikely to take place unless forced by unfa-vorable existing conditions. As a result, the port

labor reform process is typically initiated onlywhen at least one, or more likely a combination,of the following three influences are present:

• Competition: Challenges a port or a ter-minal faces from competing terminals,either within the same port or from otherports in local or regional markets, oftenlead public officials, port users, and ship-pers to press for reforms to improve effi-ciency and lower costs (see Box 3).

• Community pressure: As a result of com-petitive challenges, the port and tradecommunity can be expected to object torestrictive port labor work practices,agreements, and regulations, all of whichlead to high labor costs, low productivity,and high prices for port services.

• Political commitment: When the two fore-going factors exist, they can galvanizeremedial action in the form of a planundertaken by a public authority or pro-posed by a candidate for public office aspart of a political platform. The intent isto reform port labor regimes to make theport more efficient and cost effective andthus improve competitiveness while reduc-ing the fiscal burden of the public sector.

Competition is the principal motivating forcebehind labor reform. In cases where ports servingthe same hinterland already face competition, thepropensity to undertake reform is usually higher(see Box 3). Regardless of whether there is directport or terminal competition, global competitionin its broadest sense compels port stakeholders,including labor, to assess their organizational andoperational cost structures, work methods, andprocedures. From this perspective, ports may beviewed as just one of several factors that con-tribute to a country’s or a region’s competitive-ness. As such, it is in a country’s overall econom-ic interests to improve port efficiency throughlabor reform and other measures.

The port and trade community, which includesmanufacturers, exporters, importers, and landand ocean carriers, because of its close businessrelationship with the port, can sometimes press


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governments to modify restrictive labor regula-tions that govern work practices in ports.Transforming these requirements into effectivemodernization plans may depend on other fac-tors, but presenting a common voice can consti-

tute an important force to initiate the laborreform process.

Finally, political commitment is essential toinitiate labor reform. Without strong support


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Box 2: Trends in Gang Strength, 1970s and 1980s

Aruba 1979 21 1983 12 –9

Auckland 1971 14 1982 14 Nil

Bahrain 1970 15 1982 10 –5

Beirut 1974 50 1983 15 –35

Bombay 1970 Ashore 13 1980 Ashore 13 Nil

In hold 8 In hold 8 Nil

Chittagong 1970 14 1982 14 Nil

Cochin 1973/74 Ashore 8–18 1982/83 Ashore 12 (average)

On board 10 On board 10

Doula 1970 14 1982 14 Nil

Freetown 1976 14 1983 14 Nil

Gothenburg 1976 9–13 1983 8–13 Nil

Guam 1970 14 1983 9 –5

Lagos 1970 16 1982 16 Nil

Madras 1970 24 1980 27 +3

Melbourne 1970 10–21 1983 10–21 Nil

Montreal 1970 3–14 1982 3–14 Nil

Oslo 1970 10 1982 “as required” –

Panama 1971 18 1982 18 Nil

Pinang 1970 9 1982 9 Nil

Port-au-Prince 1977 8 1982 12 +4

Puerto Rico 1970 22 1982 22 Nil

Rangoon 1972 26–30 1982 15 –(11–15)

Recife 1970 4–15 1983 4–16 +1

Rotterdam1 1970 6–14 1981 6–14 Nil

Tai–chung 1970 4–20 1982 4–20 Nil

Shuwakh 1980 12 1982 12 Nil

Singapore 1970 15 1982 10 –5

Turkey (all ports) 1970 11–13 1982 7–9 –4

A (Sweden) 1970 11 1982 9 –2

B (Norway) 1979 7–9 1982 5–7 –2

I (North Africa) 1971 17 1981 17 Nil

J (Australia) 1970 11–15 1982 6–15 –3

E (Taiwan, China) 1970 22 1982 12 –10

Source: Couper, A. D. 1986. New Cargo Handling Techniques: Implications for Port Employment and Skills. ILO.

Port Date Gang Strength Date Gang Strength Change

and reassurance from government decisionmakers for labor reform, the chances forreform to succeed are slim. Similarly, promisesfrom aspiring political leaders could fall shortafter an election is won. Moreover, the need toreduce government subsidies or the desire toobtain a one off cash injection by tenderingconcessions, have in the recent past been com-mon incentives for reform and port laborreform.

While a port labor reform process may be insti-gated by either competition, community pres-sure, or political push, the most favorable con-dition occurs when all three forces are presentsimultaneously (the shaded area in Box 4).

Box 5 describes the efforts of port labor reformin the European Union.

2. KEY LABOR ISSUES In numerous developing countries, as well as insome industrialized ones, existing port laborregimes, collective agreements, and managementand labor practices are inflexible, outdated, andinefficient. Consequently, they hinder the develop-ment of the commercial and operating environ-ments that ports require to respond to theincreasing demands of customers and competitivemarkets. Governments, as a result, mustappraise, in consultation with other port stake-holders, the extent to which labor regimes, col-lective agreements, and labor and managementpractices serve as a barrier to the achievementof the port’s commercial goals.

In conducting this appraisal, many issues haveto be addressed, including, but not limited to:

• Restrictions on which entities can offercargo handling and other services in theport.

• Reducing overstaffing by adapting gangsizes and other staffing to generallyaccepted levels.

• Rigid and outdated job descriptions andduties.

• Limitations on working hours and days.

• Inefficient overtime allocation at exces-sive wage rates.

• Hiring of port labor exclusively throughthe unions.

• Restrictions on output.

• Unsettled and combative workplace culture.

• Insufficient training and retraining oppor-tunities.


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Box 3: Labor Competition in India and Brazil

In 2000, Western India’s main container port,Jawaharlal Nehru Port (JNP), located withinMumbai Bay, used gangs of 4 workers for

container handling while the Port of Mumbaiused gangs of 15 workers to perform thesame task, putting more pressure on the latterto undertake labor reform sooner than theEastern Indian port of Calcutta, which usedgangs of 28 workers and had no competingport in the vicinity at that time.

Likewise, competition arising due to theproximity of the Port of Sepetiba to the Portof Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has encouraged thelatter to negotiate more flexible labor arrange-ments and tariffs than the Brazilian Port ofSantos, which at the time had no nearbycompeting port (now the container terminalshave been privatized and multiple competingterminals exist in the same port).

Source: Author.

Box 4: Factors Prompting Port Labor Reform

Source: Author.

CompetitionCommunityPressure

PoliticalCommitment

• Lack of clear and meaningful productivi-ty objectives.

• Inadequate occupational health and safetyprocedures.

Some port reformers have opened labor marketsto competition as an approach to address theseissues. In this context, the existence of inflexibleand exclusive dock labor boards or union laborpools runs counter to the desire to increasemanagement discretion over the recruitment,qualification, and use of specific employees.

Many government-owned and operated portsface not just one of these issues, but a combina-tion of them. And solving these issues is criticalto any successful port reform strategy. Simplyshifting the burden of these issues from a publicauthority to the private sector, however, will dolittle or nothing to resolve them. Box 6 showshow certain port reforms can affect employmentconditions and labor management relations.

3. LABOR INVOLVEMENT INPORT REFORM A realistic and responsible port reform initiativemust recognize and deal with the possible

adverse human and social effects that mayresult from implementation. To ensure thatdock workers’ rights and interests are properlytaken into account, the International TransportWorkers’ Federation (ITF) recommends thatpolicy makers should involve labor at all stagesof port reform.

The principal areas of interest for port laborinclude, but are not limited to:

• Stable and fulfilling employment.

• Reasonable incomes.

• Decent working conditions.

• Social security and pension provision.

• Education and vocational training.

• Health, safety, and the environment.

• Workplace democracy.

• Freedom from discrimination on the basisof race, religion, social status, or gender.

• Freedom from corruption and coercion.

Historically, trade unions have worked to advo-cate these interests. And trade unions can be


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The European Commission attemptednumerous times (2001, 2003, and early2006) to adopt a proposed directive on

market access to port services. The aim was toestablish clear rules and to set up an open andtransparent procedure for access to port services.The proposal sought to reinforce quality servicein ports with a strong focus on port labor andconcession terms. Port labor, however, supportedby several industry stakeholders, fought stronglyagainst the proposals, which included dockworker strikes in Germany, the Netherlands,Portugal, and France.

The key objective of the commission’s initia-tive, namely to increase port efficiency, would alsoallow a port service provider to employ personnelof its own choice. Self-handling would be allowedand self-handlers would be treated neither morenor less favorably than other providers of a com-parable service. Self-handling is when a port userprovides for itself one or more categories of portservices, for example when ferry operators carry

out their own loading operations. Services includecargo handling, towage, mooring, pilotage, andpassenger services and represent a major part oftotal costs of port calls for ships and of cargotransported through ports. There are, in theopinion of the commission, no reasons why self-handling should not, in principle, be allowed ifoperators believe that such action provides betteruse of their resources and increases efficiency.

Many port stakeholders (port unions, opera-tors, and shipping lines) felt that this type of liber-alization would not only undermine the positionof the regular port workers, but would also openthe door for inexperienced, poorly trained, andunderpaid port workers on an on call basis, giv-ing rise to the emergence of malafide employerswho would diminish the quality of port services.

The most recent proposal in January 2006was rejected by the commission on a vote of532 to 120.

Source: Author.

Box 5: Port Labor Reform in the European Union

expected to continue to play an important role inthe port community during and after the periodof reform implementation. Government authori-ties, when undertaking reform, must recognizethis legitimate and important role and should notview port reform predominantly as an opportu-nity to break trade unions or otherwise under-mine their role in protecting workers’ interests.

Despite the critical role that labor plays inports, many countries have designed and imple-mented port reform adjustment programs with-out the involvement of workers’ representativesand unions.

Failure of governments to secure constructivelabor involvement in port reforms can typicallybe traced to:

• Mistrust stemming from historic disputesand the recurring conflicts over capital-labor tradeoffs.

• Inadequate and untimely preparation ofport reform proposals, making it difficultfor labor to take part in consultationsand negotiations.

• Financial resources that are too limited tocover training needs created by port reform.


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Box 6: Possible Effects of Reform on Employment

• Reclassification of posts. • Greater job mobility. • Greater emphasis on profes-sionalism.

• New job patterns. • Diminished guarantee of • More discretionary power in tenure and job security. making management deci-

sions and formulating enter-prise policies.

• Labor retrenchment and direct • Need for retraining and • More emphasis on strict job losses. skill upgrading. implementation of these deci-

sions and policies.

• Gender-based employment • Longer working hours • Marginalization of unions’policies. and/or increased work influence and bargaining

load. power.

• Discrimination against shop • Payment by results • More tedious wage bargaining stewards and other labor schemes and pay freezes. with preferences for individual representatives. rather than collective

agreements.

• Medium- and long-term • Loss of seniority and • Tougher stance of employment gains due to service grades. management on workers increased investment, growth, • Wider wage differentials performance and work privatized firms, and with greater incentive discipline.diversification of services. components.

• Loss of pension rights. • Efficiency arguments and• Loss of social benefits profit-making gain importance

(for example, housing, over social objectives.transport, child care, and health insurance schemes).

• Abolition of ban on undertaking strikes and industrial actions.

Source: UNCTAD. 1995. Comparative Experiences with Privatization: Policy Insights and Lessons Learned.

Employment effects Employment conditions Management labor relations

Governments, however, have much to gain frominvolving labor early and effectively in the portreform process. Port labor is one of the mostvaluable assets of the port community. Thispool of trained personnel is a deep source ofpractical knowledge with vast experience inport operations. This source can be tapped tocontribute problem-solving expertise and inno-vation to add value to the goods and services ofcustomers.

On the other hand, labor unions themselvesmust face a number of crucial challenges toadjust and optimize their own effectivenesswhen dealing with reform. As listed by a formerITF official, the main challenges include:

• Union participation. The participation oftrade unions in the reform process is abig challenge because it requires a com-mitment from trade union leaders.Negotiation implies compromise and thismay not always be to the liking of allaffected trade union members. Unionleaders must accept that once they havenegotiated the best deal possible, it istheir responsibility to defend it stronglyto their members.

• Unification of workers’ short- and long-term interests. The issues confrontinglabor during the transition period toreform versus the period following theintroduction of reform are different. Inthe transition period, the challenge fortrade unions is primarily to defend theshort-term interests of workers. At thesame time, trade unions have to look tothe future and to defend the workers’long-term interests. This means that theyhave to understand longer term trendsaffecting the port industry and to be ableto develop appropriate policy and a strat-egy for the future.

• Increase expertise within the union.Participating actively and effectively in areform process requires trade unions tobecome thoroughly knowledgeable aboutshipping, ports, and international trade,

and to commit significant humanresources to the reform process. In addi-tion, trade union structure must allow forthe internal exchange of information anddebate. In some cases this expertise needsto be developed, as it has been withinthose unions more experienced in reformprocesses. There are several ways todevelop this expertise within a union,including training.

• Introduction of new trade union struc-tures. One obstacle to successful portreform could lie in outdated union struc-tures that divide workers into manysmall, different unions, that sometimescompete among themselves for member-ship. Efficient trade union structures, cov-ering the whole industry, should be creat-ed to enable union officials to exchangeinformation within the union, to organizethe necessary internal debate, and topresent a consistent approach in theirdialogue with public authorities.

• Finding solutions to social problemscaused by reforms. The main source ofport workers’ opposition to reform isuncertainty. Faced with the fear of unem-ployment or major cuts in income, labor’sfirst reaction is always to say no. Unlessworkers can be given an interest in theresults of the reform, they will resist anychange. Employment and income guaran-tees for port workers affected by reformare, therefore, essential in creating the cli-mate required for successful and lastingport reforms. The costs of severance pay,unemployment benefits, pensions, cashpayments for early retirement, or othermeasures must be considered a legitimatepart of the overall cost of reform. Thechallenge for the trade unions, whichcomes prior to solving social problems, isto develop their own policy on thoseissues and to reach common ground withpublic authorities and private employers.

• Reform acceptance. Unions increasinglyrecognize the need for a differentiation of


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their policies on reforms and reform.Resolutions adopted at ITF’s LatinAmerican and Caribbean and AfricanRegional Dockers’ Conferences in Lima(November 1996) and Mombasa(December 1996) indicated for the firsttime that unions acknowledged that thereis no standard model for port restructur-ing and that increased involvement of theprivate sector is an option that cannot bediscarded. The basis for this changingattitude toward reform was the increasedawareness that it is not reform thatthreatens working conditions, but theprocess through which it is implemented.

• New culture of competition. A majorconsequence of reform is an increase incompetition. This usually calls for newflexibility in working practices. There aremany forms of flexibility, and tradeunions should understand this aspect ofreform and competition thoroughly toagain find a balance between what is pre-sented as necessary and what is recog-nized as socially acceptable.

• Understanding the need for new laborrelations. Reform brings with it a com-plete realignment of labor relations. Inthe case of state-owned ports and relatedcompanies, the relationship is betweenonly two parties: government and labor.Reform means that a third party is intro-duced: the private entrepreneur oremployer. For many trade union officialsthis change requires a complete overhaulof the way they used to think about laborrelations. Moreover, it also requires frommanagers a completely different attitudeand approach. Trade unions, employers,and would-be entrepreneurs can nolonger rely on governments or otherauthorities when decisions need to bemade. In many instances, entrepreneurshave to make their own decisions, insome cases in consultation with laborrepresentatives and in some cases in con-sultation with authorities. Authorities

must learn that the state, on many occa-sions, should no longer take the lead, butshould provide an environment in whichentrepreneurs are encouraged to maketheir own decisions and in which tradeunions and employers are encouraged todevelop joint approaches to addressinglabor issues. Box 7 describes Ghana’sapproach for addressing a number ofthese challenges.

Box 8 presents an example of the reference tothe port labor clauses in a concession agree-ment.

4. ORGANIZING TO ADDRESSLABOR REFORM: A TASKFORCE APPROACH Successful port labor reform requires govern-ments, labor, and private interests to grapplewith a wide range of economic, operational,social, safety, and cultural issues. To come togrips with these myriad issues, some govern-ments have established a labor reform taskforce, often headed by the ministry of labor, toconsult with port stakeholders regarding anychanges that might be made in government poli-cies and practices to improve port productivityand cost effectiveness.

The labor reform task force should include rep-resentatives of all government agencies and pri-vate sector stakeholders affected by portreform, including:

• Ministries of transport, labor, finance,economics, and planning.

• Port authorities.

• Port labor representatives.

• Main port customers and users, includingexporters, importers, carriers and agents,freight forwarders, and multimodal trans-port operators.

• Private investors, terminal operators, andcargo handling and stevedoring companies.

The labor reform task force should conduct itsactivities in an open and transparent manner.


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Its main areas of activity should typicallyinclude:

• Commissioning or conducting studies:Many governments prefer to be assistedand guided by expert professionals, retain-ing consultancy services to work closelywith management, workers, and otherport stakeholders in assessing the weak-nesses and strengths of labor regimes, col-lective agreements, and work practices.

• Organizing seminars and workshops:These help to build consensus by allow-ing all port stakeholders to share theirviews and concerns on various issues.These events also permit employers toexplain to workers what sort of competi-tion they face, their firms’ financial

performance, and the need to addresscompetitive challenges.

• Informing the community and con-sumers: Using the media to disseminatethe results of studies and workshopshelps to keep the community and con-sumers at large informed, making it easi-er to gain their support for necessarychanges. The community and consumersneed to be enlightened as to why portlabor reform is needed, what is involved,how the main difficulties will be mitigat-ed, and what the expected benefits are tothe entire economy or country.

• Fostering the creation of joint commit-tees: Such joint committees betweenunions and private terminal operators


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As a strategic option to achieve its devel-opment objectives, the government ofGhana designed in 1998 the Ghana Trade

and Investment Gateway Project (GHATIG) withthe support of the World Bank. The primaryobjective of GHATIG is to create an environmentconducive to economic growth and develop-ment led by private sector initiatives.

Within this context, the government ofGhana has approved a policy to furtherimprove the operation of the ports, which willreduce the cost of operations and shorten theturnaround time of ships. The policy entailsincreased private sector participation in themanagement of ports. The Ghana Ports andHarbours Authority (GPHA) will be convertedinto a “landlord” port authority while the pri-vate sector will participate in port operations,particularly container handling operations, dock-yards, and sites’ maintenance and services.

The port reforms that are sought throughthe implementation of the GHATIG Projectconstitute a major change in the port sector ofGhana. The most critical issue in managingchange (that is, making change work) is over-coming the resistance to change in many ofthe stakeholders in the port industry. However,in the case of the proposed port reforms inGhana, due to the proper, professional, andtimely and proactive actions of the government(particularly the initiatives of the Minister of

Roads and Transport) and the GPHA manage-ment, the strength of the resistance to changehas been minimized. The avoidance of anyautocratic approach and the consultative, per-suasive, and participative style that has beenadopted by the government in promoting theport reform process has resulted in a very pos-itive atmosphere among the port communityfor the implementation of the port componentof the GHATIG Project. The public consultationthrough a national workshop on the accept-ability of the government’s policies pertinent toport reforms and the personal site visits of theMinister of Road and Transport to the ports tospeak, and more importantly listen, to the portworkforce and the port labor unions, coupledwith the constructive work that has beenundertaken by the GPHA management, hassecured the collaboration of the majority of thestakeholders in the port sector. It is interestingto note that representatives of the Maritimeand Port Workers Union (MDU) have joinedforces with the GPHA management in its effortto address the port rationalization issues inrelation to the port reform process. MDU rep-resentatives are now members of the organiza-tional restructuring and labor rationalizationworking team of the GHATIG ProjectImplementation Committee and attend itsmeetings on a regular basis.

Source: Author.

Box 7: Working with Labor Unions: The Ghana Case

might address issues affecting operatingefficiency and safety and can help resolveon-the-dock problems and disputes with-out formal government intervention.

• Defining government’s role regarding ports:Governments should play an active andfocused role in regulating and monitoringcompanies that operate in the port systemto ensure that safety and health laws andregulations are followed. Governments canassume an active and effective role in pro-moting the use of ports for the benefit ofthe entire community and economy.

• Developing a workforce rationalizationplan: The task force should draw up andexplain programs for staff restructuring andrationalization. In developing these pro-grams, the task force should evaluate arange of measures including incentiveschemes for early retirement, voluntary sep-aration, provision of training and retrain-ing, and career development as well asassistance in job search and outplacement.

For the task force to be in a position to workeffectively, sufficient budget must be allocatedby all participants’ organizations to make itpossible for the team to complete its tasks andwork schedule. Box 9 describes Australia’sapproach to creating a port reform task force(Box 10 provides the productivity research con-ducted by Australia’s port reform task force).

5. THE INSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK FOR LABORREFORM Port labor reform is a balancing act that mustconsider workers’ rights and social equity, portusers’ and operators’ commercial needs, theneed to foster competition, and the interactionbetween governments and port interests.

5.1. Redefining the Concept ofSocial Equity The current concept of social equity (that is, joband wage security) was developed at a timewhen governments believed they could insulate


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1. The Operator shall employ the employeesengaged in container handling operations inwhatever way who desire to work for theOperator on terms and conditions that areoverall not less than those such employeeswere drawing at the time of their terminationas employees of the [name] Ports Authority.To this purpose the Operator shall sourcenot less than [number] employees employedby the [name] Ports Authority with therequired skills:

(a) Initially from staff working on the [name]Container Terminal; if unable to sourcethe total number required, then

(b) From staff working at other locations of the[name] Ports Authority, employed in theport of [name]; and if there still is a shortfallof the total number required and theGovernment is satisfied that the Operatoris unable to obtain the required number ofemployees from the [name] Ports Authority,employed in the port of [name], then

(c) The Operator may source its employeesfrom outside the [name] Ports Authority.

2. The Operator shall undertake such consul-tation with employees and employees’representatives as the Operator in its dis-cretion deems fit. In so doing, theOperator shall have due regard to andobserve:

(a) Any applicable law.

(b) Any other agreements relating to theemployees or employees’ representa-tives concerned.

(c) The relevant contracts of employmentof said employees.

(d) All relevant consultation provisions andobligations concerning the said employ-ees or employees’ representatives.

3. Subject to applicable law, the Governmentshall transfer to the Operator suchemployment records relating to thoseformer employees of the Government whoare employed by the Operator upon hand-over as the Operator shall reasonablyrequire.

Source: Author.

Box 8: Sample Reference Clauses in a Concession Agreement on Employee Transfer

their economies from the rigors of fierce inter-national competition. Developing countries, inparticular, often pursued policies designed toreserve domestic markets for national entrepre-neurs while seeking to create broader exportmarkets through the receipt of preferentialtreatment under multilateral trade agreements.In this environment, dock workers (and otherlabor) were sheltered from the full force andeffect of international competition, or so it mayhave seemed.

Similarly, governments were temporarily sparedhaving to make difficult decisions associatedwith adjusting labor conditions and relation-

ships to conform to global market forces.Governments, therefore, guaranteed dock work-ers’ jobs, purchasing power, and benefits. At thesame time, they were often reluctant to makeinvestments in new technology or to take stepsto reduce costs and improve productivity. Theunfortunate truth is that this interpretation ofsocial equity raised the costs and prices ofimported and domestic products in nationalmarkets and contributed to a downward spiralof noncompetitiveness. As such, this concept ofsocial equity was unsustainable.

The concept of social equity today has shiftedto a commercial opportunity-oriented approach.Under this approach, job security, which ulti-mately depends on expansion of trade andtransport activities, is not achieved throughgovernment guarantees of work, but througheducation, training, and retraining programs.By this means, the enhancement of workforceskills and abilities, together with greaterparticipation in workplace decisions, lead tobetter job opportunities and improved produc-tivity. Box 11 compares past and presentaspects of job security.

For workers displaced as a result of reforms, faircompensation should be granted for the relin-quishment of their acquired rights and privi-leges. To facilitate their early reentry into thenational workforce, displaced workers should beoffered retraining programs and job search assis-tance, and above all, an institutional structurethat ensures that benefits and privileges given upby these workers will not be appropriated bysome other group within the port or trade com-munity. Labor’s possible role in this area wouldbe to ensure that training programs become anintegral component of the modernizationprocess, promote occupational health and safety,and establish a collaborative process for theselection and introduction of new equipment.

5.2. Meeting Commercial Needs Establishing interport, intraport, interunion,intraunion, and nonunion competition is key toaddressing shipping and port companies’ needsfor improved productivity and cost effectiveness.


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Box 9: The Productivity Commission ofAustralia

The Productivity Commission, an inde-pendent commonwealth agency, is thegovernment’s principal review and advi-

sory body on microeconomic policy and regu-lation. It conducts public inquiries andresearch into a broad range of economic andsocial issues affecting the welfare ofAustralians.

The commission’s work covers all sectorsof the economy. It extends to the public andprivate sectors and focuses on areas of com-monwealth as well as state and territoryresponsibility.

The commission performs its role throughthe following key activities: holding publicinquiries and reporting on a variety of mattersbrought to the commission’s attention; initiat-ing research on industry and productivityissues; reporting annually on industry andproductivity performance generally; assis-tance and regulation promoting public under-standing of matters related to industry andproductivity; providing secretariat andresearch services to government bodies,including developing performance indicatorsfor government provided or sponsored servic-es; reviewing and advising on regulationthrough the Office of Regulation Review; andinvestigating and reporting on complaintsabout the implementation of the common-wealth government’s competitive neutralityarrangements.

Source: Author.

Creating this competition usually requires eco-nomic regulatory reform, including the elimina-tion of bureaucratic obstacles to the free inter-play of market mechanisms affecting the supplyand demand of dock workers and decentraliza-tion, including the assurance that laborresponds to local market signals without cross-subsidies among related labor organizations incompeting ports.

Labor’s possible role in this area would be tonegotiate with port employers to establish jobeducation and experience requirements and pro-vide training courses that address local marketneeds.

5.3. Fostering Competition Antimonopoly laws must be applied to terminaloperators and dock labor alike to ensure thatmarket mechanisms do not result in the creation

of cartels. Labor’s possible role in competitionshould be to ensure that market mechanisms areused to compete fairly and that port operatorsdo not abuse their market power.

5.4. Government’s Role To avoid pressures to modify market outcomes,governments should remove themselves fromdirect involvement in port labor relations, col-lective negotiations, and informal dispute reso-lution. A proper commercial setting should beable to function without political influence,although the government has a major role toplay in labor rationalization and its funding.

Labor’s possible role in this area would be tonegotiate on a transparent basis without politicalmanipulation; suggest measures to improve pro-ductivity, facilitate work, and reduce costs; andshare decision authority at the operational level.


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Productivity Commission 1998, WorkArrangement in Container Stevedoring,Research Report, AusInfo, Canberra,

Australia

• Flexibility in the allocation and use of labor iscritical to stevedore workplace performancegiven the highly variable demand for steve-doring services at Australian ports.

• The container stevedoring industry is char-acterized by a system of complex, inflexible,and prescriptive work arrangements thatconstrain workplace performance. Theyimpede productivity, reduce timeliness andreliability, and increase labor costs.

• The most significant work arrangements arethe order of engagement (specifying theorder in which different types of employeesare engaged for a shift), shift premiums andpenalty rates, and redundancy provisions.

• The order of engagement, in combinationwith relatively high shift premiums and penal-ty rates, add significantly to total labor costsfor a given level of activity. They detract fromproductivity by creating incentives for perma-nent operational employees to seek overtimeand lead to poor timeliness and reliability.They can also have deleterious effects on thelives of operational employees.

• The high cost of redundancies restricts theability of stevedores to adjust manning levelsof permanent employees. The redundancyagreements also foster skill mismatches andreduce the ability of management to allocatethe best person for the job.

• There are a number of factors that impedechange, including an adversarial workplaceculture, strong union bargaining power, limit-ed competition in the labor market for oper-ational stevedoring employees, and limita-tions on competition in the industry.

• The Workplace Relations Act of 1996 facili-tates change by enabling work arrange-ments to be determined primarily at theworkplace level. Together with the second-ary boycott revisions to the Trade PracticesAct, it has also reduced some sources ofunion bargaining power.

• Responsibility for better outcomes ultimatelyrests with managers and their employees.Greater competition in container stevedoringwould increase the pressures on both sidesto change work arrangements and improveperformance.

Source: Productivity Commission. 1998. Work Arrangementin Container Stevedoring, Research Report, AusInfo,Canberra, Australia.

Box 10: Institutional Framework for Labor Reform Key Findings

5.5. Time Frame for Port LaborReform Port labor reform is an economically andpolitically challenging process. As such, it canbe expected to elicit strong political emotionsboth for and against. Consequently, the portlabor reform process should be begun andcompleted within the term of a single publicadministration. The reason for this is that thechanges to existing labor regimes that areconsidered “objective” by one administrationcould be judged to be “biased” by succeedingadministrations. Trying to carry over thisreform process from one administration to thenext often results in significant delays or eventhe discontinuation of the entire reformprocess.

Further, if port reform includes inviting poten-tial investors to operate state-owned portfacilities, it would be advantageous to con-clude the labor reform component before theproject is marketed and a request for bids istendered. This will clarify the potentialinvestors’ future labor relations and costs,

thereby reducing the degree of uncertainty andrisk and, with the right labor reforms, makingthe offering more attractive to reputableinvestors and operators.

Nevertheless, one can expect that labor reformwill be a continuing process that will involveadjustments to respond to changing marketconditions.

6. DEVELOPING THEWORKFORCE RATIONALIZATIONPLAN An effective workforce rationalization planmust be built on accurate and relevant informa-tion and must consider the full range of ration-alization alternatives, not just dismissals.

The design of a port labor rationalization planand program is one the most important phasesof the overall port reform process. To bedesigned correctly, the plan and associated pro-grams should be based on detailed, reliableinformation on the port enterprise, the work-force, and local markets. In this respect, it is


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Box 11: Job Security in Ports

Source: Author.

In the past

Job security was obtained throughpolitical alliances and the avoidanceof market mechanisms. The resultswere often not those desired and alsoincluded a de-emphasis of the need for:

• Knowledge of and experience with international port practices.

• Labor participation in managementcommittees.

• Acceptance of new cargo-handlingtechnology.

• Training programs to increase theskills of the labor force.

Job security obtained by responding tomarket mechanisms. This creates a need for formal training programs, multi-skilling, willingness to acceptnew technologies, and commonality of goals among port customers,employers, and dock labor. The usualimpact is:

• Collective agreements negotiatedto promote trade.

• Dock labor generates ideas that lead to progressive gains in productivity and efficiency.

• Employers willing to train port workers.

In the future

useful to review the lessons learned from previ-ous government labor rationalization programs.

Before developing a rationalization plan, thelabor reform task force should assemble the fol-lowing information:

• Port master plans and strategic goals forthe short, medium, and long terms.

• Estimates of required activity levels(throughput forecasts).

• Demographic information about the cur-rent port workforce, including data onemployee age, marital status, number ofdependents, level of education, length ofservice, and accumulated benefits (forexample, employer’s pension fund contri-butions, life insurance benefits, and accu-mulated holidays).

• Current staffing levels by operational,administrative, and management cate-gories, and descriptions of job require-ments.

• Estimates of minimum staffing levels byoperational, administrative, and manage-ment categories, and descriptions of newor modified job requirements.

• National and local laws, regulations, andpolicies relating to labor rationalization.

• All relevant collective bargaining andemployment agreements that describework rules, compensation, benefits, train-ing, contracting out rules, exclusivestaffing provisions, and so forth.

• Training needs and skills of workers whowill be seeking alternative employment.

• Existing government and private sectororganizations capable of assisting withretraining and job searches, and theircapacity to provide training at therequired levels.

In developing a realistic labor rationalizationplan, appraising the local labor market situationand conditions will be as important as assessingthe specific enterprise being restructured.

Displaced workers will need to be reintegratedinto local and regional markets. To facilitatetheir reentry, the labor reform task force willhave to gather information about and carefullyconsider the following factors:

• The overall macroeconomic situation ofthe country and, more specifically, theeconomic and social condition of thearea or region in which the port islocated.

• Existing employment and unemploymentpatterns, job creation schemes, and thegrowth of sectors within regions.

• The labor absorption capacity andgrowth potential of different sectors ofthe economy.

• The skills and experience of the work-force.

This information should be available to all par-ties affected by port reform because it willbecome the basis on which many decisions willbe made.

6.1. Alternatives to DismissalsToo often, labor rationalization has been equat-ed to wholesale dismissals. Labor forces can berationalized in a number of ways, however, andthe immediate dismissal of employees is notalways necessary. In a climate of cooperationand mutual respect, labor and managementhave been able to implement agreements involv-ing flexible work arrangements that preservejobs or reduce the workforce through meansother than involuntary dismissals. Some of thesearrangements and measures include:

• Normal attrition of the workforce as aresult of retirements, deaths, or resigna-tions.

• Part-time employment, flexible workinghours, reduction in working hours, vari-able work weeks, job sharing, and over-time restrictions.

• General or job category-specific hiringfreezes.


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• Absorbing cost reductions across theorganization by sharing reductions inhours of work and pay.

• Work rotation among other governmentdepartments in cases where the port is themain employer of the city and jobs in thesurrounding areas are very scarce.

Each of these alternatives merits careful consid-eration in the development of a labor rationali-zation plan. Box 12 describes one company’sapproach to labor rationalization.

6.2. Elements of a StaffRetrenchment Program Measures such as the flexible work arrange-ments described above may prove insufficient toattain workforce reductions needed to make theport enterprise commercially feasible or attrac-

tive to new investors. In such cases, policy mak-ers have to adopt other measures. A staffretrenchment program is an option that permitsgovernments to reduce large numbers of work-ers in an operationally rational and sociallyresponsible manner. To be viable, this kind ofsolution should be the result of negotiationswith trade unions or workforce representatives.Such programs typically include various meas-ures aimed at cushioning the adverse affectsworkers may suffer as a result of dislocations.

The main components of a staff retrenchmentprogram normally include:

• Compensation, with incentives for earlyretirement and voluntary separation.Retrenchment programs often permitemployees to retire with either full orreduced pension benefits at an earlier age


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Social plans can be described as agree-ments reached between labor and man-agement to develop an organized set of

measures seeking alternatives to dismissal,assistance in arranging reemployment else-where, and compensation in an effort to limitthe number of planned redundancies and min-imize the impact on workers and communities.The social planning process typically beginsafter an organization has announced that itintends to scale back the size of its workforceor even shut down operations entirely.

Following such an announcement, thesocial partners meet to find workable alterna-tives to mass redundancies. These alterna-tives tend to involve such initiatives as earlyretirement schemes, incentives for voluntaryredundancies, natural attrition, conversionfrom full-time to part-time status, reduction inworking hours, wage moderation or cuts incompensation, relocation to another work sitewithin the organization, and worker retraining.If redundancies cannot be avoided, the socialplans address such matters as an orderlyprocess for layoffs, redundancy payments, jobcounseling, job search assistance, and train-ing for new and expanding occupations. InFrance, for example, companies employingmore than 50 workers are legally required to

draw up a social plan to limit the number ofredundancies. Moulinex announced its inten-tions in June 1996 to make 2,100 workersredundant over three years, close two sites inNormandy, and transfer the head office westof Paris. It then signed an agreement with itsfive trade unions in January 1997, whichreduced the number of planned job cuts from2,100 to 1,468 through a combination ofreductions in working time and early retire-ment. Working time will be reduced by 15 per-cent for 750 workers, from 39 hours to 33hours and 15 minutes per week, paid at 97.2percent of the base salary and organized on avoluntary basis. Early retirement will be offeredto 718 employees from age 56. To prevent theloss of 600 more jobs, Moulinex will offer arelocation package of 12,195 to encourageworkers to move to other locations withinthe company. The primary objectives ofsocial plans such as that concluded atMoulinex are to maintain employment levelswherever possible, reduce disruption, andfacilitate reemployment when layoffs areunavoidable.

Source: ILO. 1998. “The ILO’s Response to the FinancialCrisis in East and South-East Asia.” Technical paper for theILO’s High Level Tripartite Meeting on Social Responses tothe Financial Crisis in East and South East Asian Countries,Bangkok, Thailand, April 22–24, 1998.

Box 12: Social Plans at Moulinex

than normal. Numerous public enterpris-es have either reduced the minimumretirement age by five years or added fiveyears to length of service. Financial incen-tives are normally calculated based on thenumber of years of service, each year ofservice entitling the separated employeeto one month’s salary, with a ceiling ofpossibly 24 months of wages.

• Compensation for involuntary separation.When the targeted workforce reduction isnot reached through voluntary programs,and workers have to be dismissed or laidoff, they normally receive a lower sever-ance payment, for example, 80 percent ofthe amount received by workers who leftvoluntarily. Dismissed workers are alsoentitled to training and outplacementassistance. Criteria to decide who shouldbe dismissed could be based on: workers’records of attendance; frequency ofpenalties or suspensions; overall perform-ance evaluations by immediate supervi-sors; and family situation (for example,marital status or number of dependents).In some countries, the standard is still“first in last out” when making redun-dancy decisions.

• Provision of training and retraining. Thetraining and retraining component of theretrenchment program is aimed at facili-tating the return of displaced workers togainful employment. Experiences in vari-ous countries, however, have revealedthat in many cases only 20 percent of thedisplaced workers take advantage of theretraining programs being offered. Themain reasons for this low level of partici-pation include timing delays, weak insti-tutional capacity of the local public sec-tor, and low educational level. To have agreater chance of success, retraining pro-grams should be demand driven, not sup-ply driven.

• Guidance and assistance in job searchingand outplacement. This component isclosely linked to retraining and is aimed

at assisting displaced personnel who willbe seeking employment. However, dis-placed personnel should be able to takeadvantage of this service regardless ofwhether they have been retrained.Services could include resume assistance;providing information about employmentopportunities; sharing information onhow to start one’s own business; estab-lishing cooperatives; and other measures.

6.3. Pitfalls in Designing andImplementing Severance Packages Retrenchment efforts involving significant staffreductions often face considerable politicalopposition. As noted above, to overcome oppo-sition and to fairly treat public employees wholose their jobs, governments often offer sever-ance pay to those workers forced to leave pub-lic employment. But problems in the design andimplementation of these compensation schemesoften reduce their efficiency and may notachieve their objectives.

Potential problems include:

• Paying too much. Workers are paid morethan would have been necessary toinduce them to leave. These increasedcosts may bring a retrenchment programto a halt because funds run out.

• Adverse selection. Severance pay pack-ages do a poor job at targeting redundantworkers; often the best workers tend toaccept the buyout because they havereadily available alternatives, while theworst tend to remain.

• The revolving door. Workers accept sev-erance pay but are later rehired when it isdetermined that their skills are needed.As a result, the severance package iswasted and downsizing is not achieved.

How do ports accurately measure the portion ofthe labor force that is excessive? Typically, agovernment- or state-owned enterprise, allowedto restructure on its own, may cut more workersthan is socially optimal, particularly if the costof downsizing is borne by another agency. When


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wages are higher in the public sector than in theprivate sector, governments tend to overestimateredundancies. Cuts are also exaggerated whenemployment in a given government agencyaffects the earnings of those it does not employ;for instance, in communities where the govern-ment agency being reformed is the primarysource of direct and indirect employment.However, agencies tend to underestimate thenumber of necessary redundancies when heavilysubsidized by the general budget. Although eachport’s situation is unique, applying certain rules

of thumb can help ports and governments iden-tify where they may be overstaffed or wheretheir productivity significantly trails other ports.Box 13 identifies a number of these benchmarks.

From a financial point of view, shrinking bloatedgovernments appears to be a very profitableundertaking, even when employees get substan-tial severance pay. Practice shows that ifemployees are given two to three years of salaryto leave, for example, then in a mere two yearsthe money spent is recovered through cost


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Box 13: Port Staffing Benchmarks

Small authority: a few million tons About 50

Average port authority: 10–20 million tons From 150 to 250

Large ports: example: 100–300 million tons 1,000

More generally, and indicative ration would be: 100,000 tons per staff per year, with large varia-tions: small ports require more than this propor-tion, large ports gain from scale economies andrequire relatively less staff; general cargo requiresmore staffing than bulk traffic.

Type of cargo Performance

Containers 1,000 TEUs of staff per year(including operational, administrative, and (for a large array of yearly throughput, from management staff) 150,000 up to 600,000 TEUs). Comment: also Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, here there are economies of scale 150,000 TEU = World Container Terminals 1997. 150 people / 600,000 TEU = 500 people

Breakbulk Cargo 40 tons per hour 2.5 tons/hour/dockerBoxes on 2 ton pallets built in the hold (fruits, frozen goods, and so forth):

Gang: 15 to 17 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)

Prepalletized boxes, handled with cages: 160 tons per hour 14 tons/hour/docker

Gang: about 13, including transfer (excluding storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)

Exotic wood in logs, handled with slings: 80 tons per hour 6 tons/hour/docker

Gang: 12 to 15 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, maintenance staff)

Exotic wood in logs, handled with hydraulic 140 tons per hour 14 tons/hour/dockerclamps: Gang: 10 dockers (excluding transfer and storage crew, crane driver, and maintenance staff)

Source: Author.

Size of the port authority Recommended staffing level

lsanchez

Inserted Text

savings and productivity improvements.However, research has found that governmentsmust take care to avoid losing the best employees,so as not to have to rehire them later.

Ironically, severance packages often have theadverse effect of inducing the most productivepeople to leave. Quite often, the best publicemployees have to be rehired, an expensive wayof getting back to “square one.” World Bankresearch has found substantial rehiring in abouta quarter of the surveyed retrenchment pro-grams. What, then, are the best mechanisms forshedding redundant public sector workers? Ifseverance packages are offered to induce volun-tary departures, how should they be designed tominimize the total cost? And are there ways tostructure such packages to induce to least pro-ductive employees to depart while encouragingto most valuable employees to stay?

Too often, severance pay is offered indiscrimi-nately, without an overall plan for continuedoperations. Some public sector employees takethe package, others stay, and only later do gov-ernments know which personnel and skillsremain. The sequence should be reversed, firstidentifying the services to be cut or transferredto the private sector; second, identifying thespecific overstaffed jobs; and meanwhile enforc-ing work hours and attendance recordkeepingto chase away “ghost” workers. Only thenshould those specifically targeted to leave beoffered a severance package.

Tailoring severance packages to observablecharacteristics, such as age, education, numberof dependents and the like, may substantiallyreduce the costs of downsizing. Care must betaken, however, not to discriminate against par-ticular categories of personnel in a manner con-trary to human rights and labor law.

Usually, the packages involve a multiple of theseparated worker’s current salary in the publicsector, the multiple being related to seniority.But these packages tend to overcompensate thepeople who accept them. World Bank researchestimates overcompensation in selected coun-tries at about 20 percent.

To keep the best employees, the research find-ings suggest developing a menu of alternativesto the standard severance package. For instance,public employees could be given the followingchoices: (a) keep their jobs; (b) leave and getseverance pay; or (c) keep their jobs, but with ahigher salary and on a fixed term contract. Thislast option would help retain the more produc-tive public employees who have good outsidealternatives and are not afraid of losing theirjobs. Without the third option, those employeeswould tend to take the severance pay and leave.

Box 14 depicts a decision tree that can helpport reformers carefully think through theprocess of workforce rationalization.

6.4. Rationalizing the Workforce:When and By Whom? Workforce rationalization can take place at anumber of points along the path to port reformand, depending on when it takes place, can beimplemented by either the government or by theprivate sector. There are pros and cons to eachof the various approaches.

6.4.1. Prereform Rationalization

Having the government initiate workforcerationalization prior to reforming other ele-ments of port ownership and operation in mostcases has several advantages:

• Presents potential concessionaires andinvestors with a “cleaner” business deci-sion.

• Reduces uncertainty and certain risksassociated with the project, permittingthe government to get the best price forthe concession.

• Places the expense of rationalization onthe government, which in most cases isthe entity that contributed most heavilyto the overstaffing, rigid work rules, andother conditions that reduced efficiency.

• May result in less disruption to portoperations as a result of work stoppages,sick outs, slow downs, and other actions.


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At the same time, having the government initi-ate workforce rationalization prior to reformingother elements of port ownership and operationcan have drawbacks, including:

• Governments may cut too few from theworkforce in response to political pres-sure, leaving potential concessionairesand investors with an oversupply oflabor.

• Governments may not structure cutbacks,severance packages, and incentives toretain the best personnel and criticalskills.

6.4.2. Postreform Rationalization

Delaying workforce rationalization until afterother port reforms have been implemented alsohas strengths and drawbacks.


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Box 14: A Downsizing Decision Tree

Source: Rama, Martin. 1999. “Public Sector Downsizing: An Introduction.” World Bank

Economic Review, Vol. 13.

Isadverse

selection a serious

concern?

Isoverstaffing an obstacle

toprivatization?

Isprivatization advisable?

yesno

Using targeting and menus to

identifyredundancies

Predict loss of

redundant workers

Set up training and other

redeployment services

Let workers choose their mix

of cash and services

Assess percentage of

redundant workers

Privatizewithout

priordownsizing

Ispredicted loss

higher than legal

compensation?

Isfull

compensation of workers

needed?

Set compensation

based on predicted loss

Settle old-agepensionliabilities

Paylegal

compensation

Assess economic returns to

downsizing

no

No

no

No

YesYes

yes

yes

On the positive side, delaying workforce ration-alization until after other port reforms havebeen implemented means that decisions in thisarea will be made by private sector concession-aires and investors who are efficiency mindedand profit oriented. This, in turn, suggests thattheir decisions about workforce restructuringwill be more attuned to operating needs andcustomer demands.

On the negative side, forcing the new concession-aires and investors to implement workforcereform can significantly increase the uncertaintyand risk associated with the reform initiative.This, in turn, can scare away potential biddersand result in a lower concession or selling pricefor the government. In addition, port labor mightbe inclined to pursue work actions against a pri-vate employer more readily than against a gov-ernment employer. Indeed, in some countries it isillegal for public employees to engage in workstoppages and other disruptive work actions.

In cases where overstaffing is not an issue andsignificant downsizing is not required, it is gen-erally preferable for the new operator andinvestor to assume the task of rationalizing theworkforce. This situation would be unlikely tooccur in seaports, however, especially those indeveloping countries. Indeed, seaports haveserved for many years as natural shelters toavert unemployment and as a source of politicalpatronage for various public administrations.

Thus, the question for policy makers is: What isthe maximum number of workers the prospec-tive concessionaire can be asked to employwithout undermining the entire port reform ini-tiative? If too many workers are imposed on thenew concessionaire, the business propositionwill be less attractive. As a result, few compet-ing bids may be submitted and the sales price orthe concession fee most probably will be signifi-cantly discounted.

A new terminal operator typically prefers tohave the freedom to determine the firm’srequired number of staff and skill mix. Thegovernment will normally have an interest inthe new terminal operator absorbing the highest

possible number of workers. In many instancesa compromise is reached between the two, butthe new terminal operator should be given theoption to further adjust the workforce size andcomposition, which may lead to further disloca-tions postreform.

For example, in Argentina in 1991, concession-aires of the five terminals at Puerto Nuevo,Buenos Aires, were required to employ 1,350workers from the public agencies previouslyoperating at the port, or to negotiate an equiva-lent number of redundancy agreements. Thenumber of workers assigned to each concession-aire was based on the business plan submittedin the bid. For example, 130 workers wereassigned to Terminal Five, but most of themwere offered and accepted severance packagesonly a few months after the new firm startedoperating. Out of the 218 workers assigned toTerminal Three, 119 of them were offered andaccepted severance packages. Of the 900 work-ers assigned to Terminals One and Two, in May1999, only 419 remained with the firm.Severance payments ranged from$15,000–$20,000 per worker.

The terminal operators at the Port of BuenosAires preferred the compensated dismissaloption to retaining an oversupply of workers.This was due in part to the distorting gaps inwages and length of vacation among workersperforming the same tasks. Because of theirlonger length of service, former public sectorworkers were entitled to higher salaries andextended periods of vacation compared tonew private sector hires. In addition, at anaverage age of 50 years, most of the trans-ferred public sector workers were “worn out”as a result of having worked in the old portunder difficult and, in some cases, hazardousworking conditions.

6.5. Who Should Pay for theExpenses of Port LaborRationalization?The expenses associated with downsizingcould amount to millions of dollars depending


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on the number of workers, levels of set com-pensation, and safety net components such astraining and outplacement assistance. Manycountries have recognized the convenience ofreducing the workforce prior to private sectorparticipation in state-owned enterprises, butoffsetting the expenses related to labor reduc-tion has been a difficult task for many govern-ments, especially in view of pressing budgetaryconstraints.

For the government of Mozambique, for exam-ple, the staff rationalization component, whichincluded staff reductions of approximately14,000, pension fund payments, staff redeploy-ment, and social mitigation as part of theMozambique Rail and Port RestructuringProject in 1999 was estimated to cost the gov-ernment $50 million. Compensation paid toworkers laid off in Chilean ports as a result ofthe deregulation of dock labor in 1981 amount-ed to a total of $30 million. Payments perworker averaged $14,300 and ranged between$10,000 and $200,000. In 1991, the govern-ment of Colombia provided $50 million tocompensate 8,000 Colombian dock workers forthe loss of acquired rights. The restructuring ofVenezuelan ports in 1991 led to the layoff of10,279 dock workers and 2,000 officials in theNational Ports Institute. All received doublecompensation from the government ofVenezuela, amounting to $182 million overall,or $14,822 per person.

When considering whether and how to paysuch sums, governments have to contrast theseexpenditures with the broader long-term goalsof port reform, which are to make ports moreefficient and cost effective in support of theoverall economy. Therefore governments, asformer employers, and the private sector, asnew employers, both have an important role toplay in the financing of the expenses associatedwith port labor reductions. Actually, it couldalso be possible, in view of the benefits to beexpected from a quick resolution of the issue, toask port customers (shipping lines, for instance)to contribute to the modernization coststhrough a temporary levy on tariffs.

7. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTFOR LABOR ADJUSTMENTA number of programs and funding sources canbe used to support port labor reform, several ofwhich are described below.

Since 1990, the World Bank (Bank) has sup-ported labor adjustment in reform and enter-prise restructuring in about 50 operationsaround the world. The main elements of Banksupport have included:

• Technical assistance for governments tohelp:

~ Develop staff inventories and profiles.

~ Identify staffing needs.

~ Develop severance and retirement pack-ages.

~ Analyze labor market characteristicsand needs.

~ Redeploy workers through active labormarket programs.

~ Design employee share ownershipschemes.

~ Establish consultative mechanisms.

~ Prepare communications programs.

• Direct financing for severance payments,provided that such financing results inimproved productivity of the sector andrelated enterprises and that social mitiga-tion measures are put in place. The firstexample of this type of support was thereform of Brazil Railways, where a Bankproject financed half the costs of the sev-erance program. For a list of other exam-ples, see Annex 1.

• Poverty alleviation programs such associal funds to provide compensatoryassistance, advice and training, placementservices, and credit for self-employment.Such funds are typically targeted to thepoor, but they have been used for stateenterprise workers in cases of extremeeconomic distress or where large-scale


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redundancies occur in concentrated areas(as in the case of mining in Bolivia andPeru).

Education and vocational training are vital tothe change process. Training should include notonly general education and broad industry-focused vocational training, but also specific jobinstruction, communication and social skillscourses, and health, safety and environmentaltraining. Sufficient and continuing funds arenecessary to finance the education and traininginfrastructure. The need for lifelong training toenable workers to cope with the permanentchanges taking place in the industry is recog-nized in the 1989 EU charter of FundamentalSocial Rights of Workers, which states that:“...every worker of the European Communitymust be able to have access to vocational train-ing and benefit there from throughout his orher working life.”

Moreover, good education and vocationaltraining are increasingly recognized and used asan instrument to improve the quality of theproducts and services of businesses and thusenhance their competitiveness. Therefore, edu-cation and vocational training are in the bestinterest of the port community as a whole.Furthermore, a lack of education and trainingmeans a lack of opportunities to teach theworkers the essence of transport economics andpolicies, the position of ports in the intermodaltransport system and its dependency on theother modes of transport, and about the forcesshaping the competitive environment.

The objective of the International Labor Office(ILO) Port Worker Development Program(PDP) is to enable governments and portauthorities of developing countries to establisheffective and systematic port worker trainingschemes. This training is designed to improvecontainer handling performance, working con-ditions and practices, safety, and the statusand welfare of port workers. See Annex II fora list of training centers or organizations thathave acquired the PDP training materialsand licenses.

The translation into Spanish of the PDP andthe training of PDP instructors and coordina-tors was undertaken under a GermanTechnical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) projectin Latin America. Since 2000, the program isregularly implemented in several Latin Americancountries. PDP is also being translated intoChinese.

Outreach for training programs has alsobeen improved through the establishment andstrengthening of training centers, managementtraining institutes, universities, and coopera-tion networks associated with the internation-al TRAINMAR Program of UNCTAD (UnitedNations Conference on Trade andDevelopment) in Central and South Americaand the Caribbean. This was achieved throughthe upgrading of local and regional trainingcapabilities and the application of the system-atic TRAINMAR methodology for the devel-opment and exchange of standard trainingmaterials as part of cooperation projectsfinanced by UNDP (United NationsDevelopment Programme), the EuropeanCommission, Germany, and France. Since1988, the three TRAINMAR networks inLatin America and the Caribbean are regular-ly and successfully developing and deliveringcourses and management training programsdirected at all categories of personnel fromthe port and transport industry.

Further information on the PDP may beobtained from: Chief, Maritime IndustriesBranch, Sectoral Activities Department,International Labor Office, 4 route desMorillons, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland,telephone (41.22) 799-7466, fax (41.22) 799-7050, e-mail: [email protected].

Further information on the TRAINMARnetworks in South and Central Americaand on the implementation of the PDP inLatin America may be obtained from:ATAS (Asociación TRAINMAR de Américadel Sur—South American TRAINMARAssociation) Montevideo, Uruguay. Web site: www.atas-trainmar.org.


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8. POSTREFORM LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS Once port reform is implemented, port labor andmanagement must continue to cooperate ifreform is to achieve its objectives. The proposedchanges in labor regimes, collective agreements,and work practices to improve productivity andcurtail cost will stand a better chance of success ifthey are reached with the agreement of all stake-holders. For mutual gains, labor and managementhave to concentrate on building stronger relation-ships through better communication and morecooperation. In that respect, it appears appropri-ate to foster the establishment of joint committeesbetween port workers and terminal operators toresolve operational problems and disputes with-out having to resort to official intervention.

Participation of port workers in workplace deci-sions has an enormous potential to motivateworkers and to enhance customers’ satisfaction.The combination of better communication andworking toward agreed objectives can set thestage for improved labor management relationsin ports that are undertaking reform. Successfullabor reform can only be achieved when thecommercial goals (efficiency and growth) of the

employers are balanced with the social goals(equity and fairness) of their employees.

REFERENCESAusInfo. 1998. “Work Arrangement in Container

Stevedoring, Research Report.” ProductivityCommission, AusInfo, Canberra, Australia.

Couper, A. D. 1986. “New Cargo HandlingTechniques: Implications for Port Employment andSkills.” ILO.

ILO (International Labour Organization). 1998.“The ILO’s Response to the Financial Crisis inEast and South-East Asia.” Technical paper forthe ILO’s High Level Tripartite Meeting on SocialResponses to the Financial Crisis in East andSouth East Asia Countries, Bangkok, Thailand,April 22–24, 1998. Web site: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/ bangkok/download/crisis/gb274.pdf.

Rama, Martin. 1999. “Public Sector Downsizing: AnIntroduction.” World Bank.

Economic Review, Vol. 13.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment). 1995. “Comparative Experienceswith Privatization: Policy Insights and LessonsLearned.” UNCTAD: New York and Geneva. Website: http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/dp22_2122 /chap5.PDF.


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337

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enta

tion

an

d as

sess

the

soci

al im

pact

of

priv

atiz

atio

n.

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


341

MO

DU

LE 7

6.H

ard

Coa

l P

olan

d03

/10/

2004

Adj

ustm

ent s

chem

es

Dow

nsiz

e em

ploy

men

t and

To

tal:

$300

N

oS

ocia

l fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

;re

depl

oy s

urpl

us la

bor u

sing

soc

ially

mill

ion

(WB

M

itiga

tion

empl

oym

ent s

ubsi

dies

acce

ptab

le m

easu

res

to m

itiga

te$2

00 m

illio

n;

Pro

ject

the

cons

eque

nces

of p

rogr

amG

over

nmen

t N

o: 2

8061

-PO

Lim

plem

enta

tion

and

the

prop

osed

$100

mill

ion)

.ne

w e

mpl

oym

ent r

estr

uctu

ring.

C

ompo

nent

1:

Com

pone

nts:

1/

Sev

eran

ce

WB

: $70

P

aym

ents

for u

nder

grou

nd w

orke

rsm

illio

n;un

der t

he 2

003–

2006

Pro

gram

; 2/

Com

pone

nt 2

: Se

vera

nce

Paym

ents

, Res

killin

g an

dW

B: $

35

Ree

mpl

oym

ent f

or s

urfa

ce w

orke

rsm

illio

n;un

der

the

2003

–200

6 P

rogr

am,

Com

pone

nt 3

: in

clud

ing:

sev

eran

ce p

aym

ents

toW

B: $

95

surfa

ce w

orke

rs a

nd re

empl

oym

ent

mill

ion

ince

ntiv

es p

aym

ents

to e

mpl

oyer

s hi

ring

elig

ible

redu

ndan

t exs

urfa

ce

wor

kers

; 3/

Sev

eran

ce p

aym

ent

com

mitm

ents

from

pre

viou

sly

impl

emen

ted

Min

ers’

Soc

ial

Pac

kage

s un

der

the

1998

–200

2 P

rogr

am.

7.R

ailw

ay

Pol

and

04/3

0/20

01A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

Aim

s to

rest

ruct

ure

Pol

ish

Sta

teTo

tal f

inan

cing

N

oR

estr

uctu

ring

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rs;

Rai

lway

s’ (P

KP

) to

incr

ease

$335

.26

mill

ion

Pro

ject

empl

oym

ent s

ervi

ces;

effic

ienc

y, im

prov

e fin

ance

s,(W

B $

101.

03

No:

217

97-P

OL

unem

ploy

men

t an

d pr

ivat

ize

sele

cted

act

iviti

es.

mill

ion)

; as

sist

ance

/insu

ranc

e;C

ompo

nent

s fin

ance

and

C

ompo

nent

1:

trai

ning

for

retr

ench

ed

supp

ort:

1/ In

com

e su

ppor

t$2

96.2

mill

ion

wor

kers

(sev

eran

ce lu

mp

sum

s;(W

B $

98.5

7 pr

eret

irem

ent b

enef

its; r

ailw

aym

illio

n, e

xcep

t le

ave;

une

mpl

oym

ent b

enef

it);

for

the

2/ L

abor

Red

eplo

ymen

t un

empl

oym

ent

Pro

gram

s (re

qual

ifica

tion

bene

fit);

trai

ning

as

wel

l as

prof

essi

onal

C

ompo

nent

2:

and

soci

al a

dvic

e an

d ot

her

$23.

68 m

illio

n fo

rms

of p

rofe

ssio

nal

(no

WB

gu

idan

ce).

Thes

e in

clud

e fin

anci

ng)

gene

ral l

abor

rede

ploy

men

t pr

ogra

ms,

and

spe

cial

labo

r re

depl

oym

ent p

rogr

ams.


342

MO

DU

LE 7

8.R

ailw

ay

Cro

atia

12/0

8/19

98A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

S

eeks

to m

oder

nize

and

To

tal f

inan

cing

IC

Rep

ort

Mod

erni

zatio

n fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

re

stru

ctur

e H

rvat

ske

$183

.0 m

illio

n N

o: 3

3204

and

(sev

eran

ce p

aym

ent)

Zel

jezn

ice

(HZ

) to

dim

inis

h(W

B $

101

12/1

9/20

05R

estr

uctu

ring

its d

efic

it an

d fin

anci

alm

illio

n);

Pro

ject

burd

en o

n th

e bu

dget

whi

leC

ompo

nent

6:

No:

185

53-H

Rcr

eatin

g a

com

pany

ada

pted

$8

2.4

mill

ion

to a

com

petit

ive

tran

spor

t (W

B $

35.4

m

arke

t. Th

e m

ajor

soc

ial

mill

ion)

issu

e fa

ced

by th

e pr

ojec

t is

rela

ted

to th

e st

aff

retr

ench

men

t and

ser

vice

s re

duct

ion

com

pone

nts.

Th

e pr

ojec

t for

esee

s th

e se

para

tion

of a

bout

7,0

00

staf

f (30

per

cent

of t

he

1998

sta

ff). C

ompo

nent

6:

Red

unda

nt s

taff

will

be

elig

ible

for

a re

dund

ancy

or

an e

arly

retir

emen

t pac

kage

.

Asi

a

1.E

nter

pris

e B

angl

ades

h05

/11/

2004

Adj

ustm

ent s

chem

es

Trig

ger

empl

oym

ent

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

Gro

wth

and

fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

;ge

nera

tion

thro

ugh

priv

ate

$480

mill

ion

Ban

k m

icro

ente

rpris

es

sect

or e

nter

pris

e gr

owth

(WB

$25

0.0

Mod

erni

zatio

n (m

icro

cred

it);

and

refo

rms

with

in th

e S

OE

s.m

illio

n);

Pro

ject

empl

oym

ent s

ervi

ces

Com

pone

nts:

1/

Ent

erpr

ise

Com

pone

nt 1

: N

o: 2

7979

(Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

grow

th s

uppo

rts

the

$20

mill

ion

Dep

artm

ent f

or

deve

lopm

ent o

f the

sm

all

(WB

$10

mill

ion)

; In

tern

atio

nal

ente

rpris

e se

ctor

thro

ugh

Com

pone

nt 4

: D

evel

opm

ent [

DFI

D]);

the

Sm

all E

nter

pris

e Fu

nd$3

72 m

illio

n tr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

(S

EF)

, as

a re

finan

cing

faci

lity

(WB

$18

0 w

orke

rs (D

FID

) w

here

fund

s w

ill b

e on

-loan

m

illio

n; D

FID

to

SM

E-f

ocus

ed b

anks

to

$77.

5 m

illio

n);

help

sca

le u

p th

eir

smal

l C

ompo

nent

5:

ente

rpris

e po

rtfo

lio;

$10

mill

ion

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


343

MO

DU

LE 7

4/ S

uppo

rt fo

r vo

lunt

ary

(ent

irely

by

retir

emen

t sch

emes

D

FID

)(V

RS

) in

SO

Es,

whi

ch

are

bein

g cl

osed

dow

n an

d/or

priv

atiz

ed—

cove

ring

retir

emen

ts (c

ontin

ue th

e as

sist

ance

initi

ated

und

er

the

Wor

ld B

ank’

s D

evel

opm

ent S

uppo

rt

Cre

dit [

DS

C],

whi

ch

supp

orte

d m

uch

of th

e fir

st tr

anch

e of

28

SO

E

clos

ures

in 2

001–

2). D

esig

ned

to c

over

the

VR

S c

osts

to

the

gove

rnm

ent o

f a

seco

nd tr

anch

e of

abo

ut

95 e

nter

pris

es s

late

d fo

r cl

osur

e/pr

ivat

izat

ion

over

the

perio

d 20

02–3

to 2

007–

8;

5/ R

etra

inin

g an

d co

unse

ling

serv

ices

for

retr

ench

ed/

retir

ed s

taff

of S

OE

, fin

ance

d co

mpl

etel

y by

D

FID

. Act

iviti

es in

clud

e sa

fety

net

pro

gram

and

so

cial

ass

ista

nce

and

soci

al

prot

ectio

n pr

ogra

m.

It pr

ovid

es a

dequ

ate

coun

selin

g an

d re

trai

ning

su

ppor

t to

retir

ed w

orke

rs.

2.U

ttar

Pra

desh

In

dia

03/2

4/20

00A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

for

Sup

port

s th

e in

itiat

ion

of

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

Yes.

ICR

Pow

er S

ecto

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

the

pow

er s

ecto

r re

form

$236

mill

ion

(SC

L-R

estr

uctu

ring

proc

ess

by e

stab

lishi

ng(W

B $

150

mill

ion)

; 45

450

Pro

ject

a ne

w le

gal,

regu

lato

ry,

Com

pone

nt

PP

FB-

No:

202

50-I

Nan

d in

stitu

tiona

l fra

mew

ork;

5: $

5 m

illio

n P

2291

cr

eate

new

pow

er

(all

WB

)P

PFB

-P22

90)

corp

orat

ions

; pre

pare

for

Rep

ort N

o:

priv

atiz

atio

n of

the

3242

3di

strib

utio

n bu

sine

ss;

05/2

4/20

05


344

MO

DU

LE 7

redu

ce th

e m

ost c

ritic

al

bott

lene

cks

in th

e po

wer

sy

stem

to im

prov

e th

e su

pply

and

est

ablis

h th

e be

nefit

s; a

nd to

bui

ld a

nd

deve

lop

supp

ort a

mon

g ke

y st

akeh

olde

rs in

the

stat

e. C

ompo

nent

5 h

elps

de

velo

p a

VR

S.

3.B

anki

ng

Pak

ista

n10

/01/

2001

Adj

ustm

ent s

chem

es

Sup

port

impl

emen

tatio

n of

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

Yes.

ICR

S

ecto

r fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

bank

ing

refo

rm p

rogr

am$5

40 m

illio

n (ID

A-3

5710

)R

estr

uctu

ring

to c

reat

e a

com

petit

ive

(WB

IDA

$30

0 R

epor

t No:

and

priv

ate

bank

ing

syst

em,

mill

ion)

; 32

588

Priv

atiz

atio

n st

rong

regu

lato

ryC

ompo

nent

1:

06/1

5/20

05P

roje

ctfr

amew

ork,

and

an

$437

mill

ion

No:

225

09-

effe

ctiv

e ba

nkin

g co

urt

(WB

$30

0.0)

PAK

syst

em. C

ompo

nent

1:

Fina

nces

the

Nat

iona

lized

C

omm

erci

al B

ank

(NC

B)

staf

f rat

iona

lizat

ion

thro

ugh

a vo

lunt

ary

sepa

ratio

n sc

hem

e, w

here

by a

se

vera

nce

pack

age

(con

sist

ing

of c

ash

com

pens

atio

n ca

lcul

ated

on

the

basi

s of

one

m

onth

pay

per

yea

r of

se

rvic

e, p

lus

com

mut

atio

n of

all

annu

al le

ave,

pen

sion

s,

and

med

ical

ben

efits

) will

be

pro

vide

d. T

he v

olun

tary

sc

hem

e w

ill b

e co

mpl

emen

ted

by th

e ou

tsou

rcin

g of

non

core

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


345

MO

DU

LE 7

staf

f and

leav

e w

ithou

t pa

y, b

ut w

ithou

t ben

efits

fo

r th

ose

in e

xecu

tive

leve

ls.

4.E

nter

pris

e C

hina

06/2

8/19

99Tr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

Th

e pr

ojec

t will

hel

p re

visi

tTo

tal f

inan

cing

IC N

ote

Ref

orm

w

orke

rs;

and

test

way

s to

fost

er$8

.14

mill

ion

Rep

ort N

o.P

roje

ctem

ploy

men

t ser

vice

s re

trai

ning

of l

aid-

off

(WB

IDA

$5

2745

4N

o: 1

9300

-CH

A(c

ouns

elin

g)w

orke

rs in

a m

anne

r th

atm

illio

n);

11/3

0/20

03is

targ

eted

at j

ob g

row

th

Cof

inan

cier

s

oppo

rtun

ities

, esp

ecia

lly

$2.2

2 m

illio

n in

the

serv

ice

sect

ors.

an

d O

ne o

f the

se w

ays

will

G

over

nmen

t be

retr

aini

ng a

nd

$0.9

2 m

illio

n;C

ompo

nent

3:

coun

selin

g to

laid

-off

Tota

l $1.

24

stat

e en

terp

rise

empl

oyee

s m

illio

n (W

B $

0.90

)to

sta

rt th

eir

own

busi

ness

es

(reem

ploy

men

t) (C

ompo

nent

3).

Eac

h co

mpo

nent

will

be

impl

emen

ted

in th

e fo

llow

ing

area

s:

Cha

ngsh

a, S

heny

ang,

W

uhan

, and

Wuh

u.

Afr

ica

1.Tr

ansp

ort

Mal

i03

/11/

2004

Adj

ustm

ent s

chem

es

Com

pone

nt A

1: S

ocia

lN

oC

orrid

ors

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rs;

and

com

pens

atio

n pl

anIm

prov

emen

t em

ploy

men

t ser

vice

s;to

miti

gate

the

impa

ct o

f the

Pro

ject

trai

ning

for

retr

ench

ed

conc

essi

onin

g of

rai

lN

o. 2

7668

wor

kers

serv

ices

to a

priv

ate

oper

ator

on

staf

f dec

lare

d To

tal:

$32.

8 re

dund

ant.

Fina

nced

m

illio

nac

tiviti

es: s

ever

ance

C

ompo

nent

pa

ymen

ts; t

echn

ical

1:

$13

.47

advi

sory

ser

vice

s an

d m

illio

nop

erat

ing

cost

s of

the

Sev

eran

ce

unit

crea

ted

to p

rovi

de

paym

ents

:


346

MO

DU

LE 7

supp

ort t

o re

dund

ant s

taff

$13.

2 m

illio

n;in

eva

luat

ing

trai

ning

nee

ds,

Adv

isor

y fin

ding

a n

ew jo

b, a

nd

serv

ices

to

prep

arin

g pe

rson

al b

usin

ess

the

unit

that

pr

ojec

ts; f

acili

tatin

g w

ill p

rovi

de

rein

sert

ion

of re

dund

ant

supp

ort t

o st

aff;

and

tech

nica

l re

dund

ant

advi

sory

ser

vice

s to

st

aff:

$0.1

6 m

onito

r th

e so

cial

impa

ct

mill

ion

of re

dund

anci

es d

urin

g an

d af

ter

the

perio

d of

im

plem

enta

tion

of th

e so

cial

and

co

mpe

nsat

ion

plan

.

2.Tr

ansp

ort

Mad

agas

car

05/0

2/20

00A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

for

Str

engt

hen

tran

spor

t S

ecto

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

;se

ctor

pol

icy

and

Ref

orm

and

tr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

m

anag

emen

t by

Reh

abili

tatio

n w

orke

rsim

plem

enta

tion

of a

Pro

ject

soci

al m

itiga

tion

stra

tegy

(AP

L-P

hase

1)

incl

udin

g ca

paci

ty-b

uild

ing

No:

203

95-M

AG

and

trai

ning

for

envi

ronm

enta

l ass

essm

ent

and

prep

arat

ion

of

a co

mpr

ehen

sive

soc

ial

prot

ectio

n an

d m

itiga

tion

prog

ram

for

the

wor

kers

di

spla

ced

as a

resu

lt of

se

ctor

rest

ruct

urin

g.3.

Priv

ate

Sen

egal

Trai

ning

for

retr

ench

ed

Pos

tal r

efor

ms

($6.

5 m

illio

nIn

vest

men

t w

orke

rs;

finan

ced

by ID

A):

Fina

nce

Pro

mot

ion

adju

stm

ent s

chem

es

the

prep

arat

ion

ofP

roje

ctfo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

com

pens

atio

n pa

ckag

es.

Trai

ning

will

gen

eral

ly

cove

r in

divi

dual

, gro

up,

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


347

MO

DU

LE 7

and

on-t

he-jo

b tr

aini

ng

of te

chni

cal s

taff.

4.E

cono

mic

N

iger

ia11

/15/

2004

Trai

ning

for

retr

ench

ed

Com

pone

nts:

2/

Pilo

t civ

il To

tal f

inan

cing

No

Ref

orm

and

w

orke

rs;

serv

ice

adm

inis

trat

ive

$179

.22

mill

ion

Gov

erna

nce

adju

stm

ent s

chem

es

refo

rms

supp

ort

(WB

-ID

A: $

140)

;P

roje

ct

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rs

rest

ruct

urin

gTr

aini

ng $

48.2

3(fe

dera

l (fr

om p

ublic

sec

tor);

in fo

ur p

ilot m

inis

trie

sM

illio

ngo

vern

men

t)em

ploy

men

t ser

vice

san

d ca

paci

ty b

uild

ing

Sev

eran

ceN

o: 3

0383

-NG

for

the

new

ly e

stab

lishe

d$4

8.23

mill

ion

Bur

eau

for

Pub

lic S

ervi

ce

Ref

orm

s (B

PS

R).

Ass

ista

nce

incl

udes

: ter

min

atio

n be

nefit

s an

d fa

cilit

atin

g re

inse

rtio

n th

roug

h tr

aini

ng

activ

ities

to a

id

rede

ploy

men

t tow

ard

new

ac

tiviti

es, a

dapt

atio

n to

ne

w jo

bs, a

cqui

sitio

n of

sk

ills

nece

ssar

y to

dev

elop

pe

rson

al p

roje

cts,

and

cu

stom

ized

cou

nsel

ing;

3/

Pen

sion

s re

form

s.5.

Rai

lway

s Z

ambi

a10

/18/

2000

Adj

ustm

ent s

chem

es

Pro

ject

aim

s a

subs

tant

ial

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

Yes.

ICR

Res

truc

turin

g fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

;re

stru

ctur

ing

of Z

ambi

a$3

1.0

mill

ion

(IDA

-343

30P

roje

cttr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

R

ailw

ays,

to in

crea

se it

s(W

B ID

A $

27);

TF-2

3134

),N

o: 2

1073

-ZM

wor

kers

oper

atin

g ef

ficie

ncy,

Com

pone

nt 2

: R

epor

t No:

redu

ce o

pera

tiona

l cos

ts,

$16.

90 m

illio

n 32

520

and

conf

igur

e its

frei

ght

(WB

$15

.2

12/2

0/20

05se

rvic

es, a

nd ta

riffs

. m

illio

n);

Com

pone

nts

2/ S

taff

Com

pone

nt 7

: ra

tiona

lizat

ion

finan

ces

$1 m

illio

n re

tren

chm

ent c

ompe

nsat

ion

(all

WB

) th

roug

h se

vera

nce

paym

ents

, and

an

addi

tiona

l 15

perc

ent

cont

inge

ncy

will

be

prov

ided

to c

ope

with

an

y va

riatio

ns; a

nd p

ensi

on

oblig

atio

ns a

nd li

abili

ties


348

MO

DU

LE 7

fund

ed b

y th

e pe

nsio

n fu

nd;

7/ S

ocia

l miti

gatio

n, b

ased

on

reco

mm

enda

tions

of t

he

soci

al a

sses

smen

ts.

6.P

rivat

izat

ion

Uga

nda

05/2

2/20

00A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

P

roje

ct a

ims

to im

prov

e th

eTo

tal f

inan

cing

N

oan

d U

tility

fo

r re

tren

ched

wor

kers

;qu

ality

, cov

erag

e, a

nd

$92.

1 m

illio

n S

ecto

r em

ploy

men

t ser

vice

sec

onom

ic e

ffici

ency

of

(WB

IDA

R

efor

m

com

mer

cial

and

util

ity$4

5.3

mill

ion)

;P

roje

ctse

rvic

es th

roug

hC

ompo

nent

1:

No:

200

16-U

Gpr

ivat

izat

ion,

priv

ate

$71.

7 m

illio

n pa

rtic

ipat

ion

in in

fras

truc

ture

, (W

B $

25.5

mill

ion)

and

an im

prov

ed re

gula

tory

fr

amew

ork.

Com

pone

nt 1

: P

rovi

des

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

and

on-t

he-jo

b tr

aini

ng to

hel

p th

e go

vern

men

t des

ign

and

impl

emen

t the

priv

atiz

atio

n pr

ogra

m, a

nd s

ever

ance

pa

ymen

ts a

nd re

depl

oym

ent

supp

ort.

7.R

ailw

ays

Moz

ambi

que

09/1

4/19

99A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

In

crea

se th

e op

erat

ing

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

No

and

Por

ts

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rs;

effic

ienc

y of

thre

e m

ajor

$1

20 m

illio

n R

estr

uctu

ring

empl

oym

ent s

ervi

ces;

port

-rai

l sys

tem

s in

(WB

IDA

P

roje

cttr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

M

ozam

biqu

e, a

nd e

nabl

e $1

00.0

mill

ion)

; w

orke

rssh

are

incr

ease

s in

thei

rin

tern

atio

nal f

reig

ht tr

affic

w

ith n

eigh

borin

g co

untr

ies.

C

ompo

nent

2: T

he a

dver

se

Com

pone

nt 2

: im

pact

of i

nvol

unta

ry

tota

l $93

.5

sepa

ratio

ns o

f a la

rge

num

ber

mill

ion,

of w

hich

, of

sur

plus

sta

ff is

min

imiz

ed

staf

f red

unda

ncy

thro

ugh

a st

aff r

atio

naliz

atio

n $8

4 m

illio

n pr

ogra

m th

at o

ffers

spe

cial

ly

(WB

$67

mill

ion)

de

sign

ed re

tirem

ent a

nd

and

$7 m

illio

n

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


349

MO

DU

LE 7

retr

ench

men

t pac

kage

s;

(sta

ff re

depl

oym

ent)

rede

ploy

men

t sup

port

to

help

wor

kers

find

alte

rnat

ive

jobs

or

beco

me

self-

empl

oyed

; so

cial

miti

gatio

n m

easu

res;

cr

eatio

n of

a p

ensi

on fu

nd

for

the

rem

aini

ng C

FM

empl

oyee

s; a

com

preh

ensi

ve

pens

ion

stud

y fo

r al

l pub

lic

ente

rpris

es in

clud

ing

CFM

.La

tin A

mer

ica

and

the

Car

ibbe

an R

egio

n

1.P

osta

l Ser

vice

s Tr

inid

ad a

nd

02/2

5/19

99A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

S

eeks

to e

xpan

d th

e co

vera

geTo

tal f

inan

cing

R

efor

m P

roje

ctTo

bago

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rsan

d qu

ality

of p

osta

l ser

vice

s,$2

3.04

mill

ion

achi

eve

maj

or e

ffici

ency

gai

ns,

(WB

$14

.85)

;an

d, b

ecom

e m

ore

resp

onsi

ve

to c

lient

nee

ds. C

ompo

nent

: V

SE

P

Volu

ntar

y se

para

tion

assi

stan

ce,

com

pone

nt

aim

ed a

t im

prov

ing

labo

r fin

ance

d by

ef

ficie

ncy,

is g

over

nmen

t’s-

the

gove

rnm

ent

finan

ced

Volu

ntar

y S

epar

atio

n

only

$2.

7E

mpl

oym

ent P

acka

ge (V

SE

P),

mill

ion

cons

iste

nt w

ith th

e co

untr

y’s

labo

r la

ws,

and

gra

nted

afte

r

cons

ulta

tion

with

the

unio

n.

Mid

dle

Eas

t an

d N

orth

Afr

ica

Reg

ion

1.Tr

ansp

ort

Tuni

sia

02/2

1/20

01A

djus

tmen

t sch

emes

P

hase

2 o

f pro

ject

that

Tota

l fin

anci

ng

No

Sec

tor

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rsfin

ance

s in

vest

men

ts in

$56.

6 m

illio

nIn

vest

men

t ur

ban

tran

spor

t as

wel

l(W

B $

37.6

); P

roje

ctas

add

ition

al in

vest

men

tsA

PL

in r

ailw

ays

and

capa

city

(Pha

se II

) bu

ildin

g in

tran

spor

t sec

tor

No:

211

51

man

agem

ent.

As

a pa

rtS

ever

ance

TU

Nof

the

inve

stm

ent p

rogr

am$3

6.2

mill

ion

to im

prov

e pu

blic

bus

ser

vice

, pr

ojec

t fin

ance

s se

vera

nce

paym

ents

to a

bout

900

re

dund

ant e

mpl

oyee

s of

pu

blic

bus

com

pani

es.


350

MO

DU

LE 7

2.C

ivil

Ser

vice

R

epub

lic

03/2

3/20

00Tr

aini

ng fo

r re

tren

ched

P

roje

ct w

ill e

stab

lish

aTo

tal f

inan

cing

No

Mod

erni

zatio

n of

Yem

enw

orke

rs;

mec

hani

sm to

redu

ce th

e$3

3 m

illio

nP

roje

ctad

just

men

t sch

emes

nu

mbe

r of

unq

ualif

ied

civi

l(W

B $

30);

No:

202

09-

for

retr

ench

ed w

orke

rsse

rvan

ts a

nd in

itiat

e a

* B

uy-o

ut

YE

Mre

stru

ctur

ing

proc

ess

inpa

ckag

es w

ill

indi

vidu

al m

inis

trie

s.

be fi

nanc

edC

ompo

nent

s: 1

/ A

mon

g by

the

ot

her

activ

ities

, inc

lude

s go

vern

men

tex

tens

ive

trai

ning

thro

ugh

spec

ific

mod

ular

cou

rses

on

new

cor

e sy

stem

s an

d sk

ills;

2/

Tech

nica

l as

sist

ance

will

be

prov

ided

to

cre

ate

a ci

vil s

ervi

ce fu

nd

and

esta

blis

h its

pol

icy

fram

ewor

k re

gard

ing

retir

emen

t, re

dund

ancy

, and

se

vera

nce

optio

ns.

Fina

ncin

g (to

tal,

Eva

luat

ion

Pro

ject

Nam

eA

pp

rova

lb

y co

mp

onen

t an

d(Y

es—

No.

and

Num

ber

Cou

ntry

Dat

eIn

terv

entio

n Ty

pe

Des

crip

tion

and

Com

pon

ents

by

inst

itutio

ns)

Rep

ort

#/N

o)


351

MO

DU

LE 7

ANNEX II. LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE OBTAINED ANDRENEWED AN INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATIONPORTWORKER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM LICENSE

List of organizations which have obtained and renewed a ILO PDP License

Hong Kong International Container Terminals Ltd. (Hong Kong, China) TEMPO, Municipal Port Management (the Netherlands) YES YES NO

Shipping and Transport College/International Maritime Transport Academy (the Netherlands YES NO

Mauritius Port Authority (Mauritius) YES YES

PORTNET Academy (South Africa) YES NO

Sri Lanka Ports Authority (Sri Lanka) YES YES

PNG Harbours Board (Guinea)

JP Training & Development SDN BHD (Malaysia) YES YES NO

MOMAF - Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries / Shipping and Logistics Bureau (Republic of Korea) YES NO

Carriers Container Council, Inc. (United States) YES YES

Colombo Nautical & Engineering College (Sri Lanka)

Jakarta International Container Terminal (Indonesia) YES NO

Wubeling and Partners, port safety Consultants, Rotterdam (the Netherlands) YES NO

The Hong Kong Polytechnic University (Hong Kong, China) YES NO

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (United States) YES YES

World Maritime University (Sweden) YES YES

Pelabuhan Tanjung Pelepas Sdn Bhd (Malaysia) YES YES

Pacific Maritime Association (United States) YES YES

AMC Search Ltd. (Australia) YES YES

Global Maritime & Transportation School (United States) YES YES

UNCTAD (Switzerland) YES YES

Klang Container Terminal Bhd (Malaysia)

Chung-Ang University (Republic of Korea) YES YES

Express Maritime Services Ltd. (Ghana) YES YES

Sea Ports Corporation Training Centre (Sudan)

Instituto de Educacion Nautica y Portuaria A.C. (IENPAC) (Mexico) YES YES

Regional Maritime Academy (Ghana) YES YES

IFIRA Wharf & Stevedoring (1994) Ltd. /(Port Vila, Vanuatu ) YES YES

Kelang Multi Terminal (WESTPORT) (Malyasia) YES YES

Hong Kong Logistics Association (Hong Kong, China) YES YES

Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A. (Greece) YES YES

Port and Coast Directory (Maritime Authority) (Brazil) YES YES

Philippine Ports Authority (Philippines) YES YES

Altamira Terminal Portuaria (ATP) (Mexico)

Internacional de Contenedores Asociados de Veracruz (Mexico)

Oriental Port and Allied Services Corporation (Philippines) YES YES

Joint Dock Labour Industrial Council (Nigeria) YES YES

Container and RO-RO Terminal (Slovenia) YES YES

Thai Laemchabang Terminal Co., Ltd. (Thailand) YES YES

Nonrenewed Organization/Institution Acquired License Valid License License

ANNEX II. CONTINUED

Kerria Ltd. (Russian Federation) YES YES

Shipping & Logistics (Australia) YES YES

P&O Ports Pvt. Ltd. (India) YES YES

Nigerian Ports Authority (Nigeria) YES YES

Malaysian Association of Productivity (Malaysia) YES YES

Indian Institute of Port Management (India) YES YES

Shanghai Maritime University (China) YES YES

Department of Maritime Transport, Ministry of Transport and Communication (Eritrea) YES YES

Arab Academy for Science and Technology, Port Training Institute (Egypt) YES YES

Modern Terminals Limited (Hong Kong, China) YES YES

Consilium Services Inc. (Canada) YES YES

Manzanillo International Terminal-Panama S.A. (Panama) YES YES

Comision Centroamericana de Transporte Maritimo (Nicaragua) YES YES

HZSAFETY B.V. (the Netherlands) YES YES

PSA Corporation Limited (Singapore) YES YES

PLIPDECO (Trinidad and Tobago) YES YES

Fundacion Puertos de las Palmas (Spain) YES YES

Chittagong Port Authority (Bangladesh) Cia. Minera Antamina S.A. (Peru) YES YES

Ministry for Competitiveness and Communications (Malta) YES YES

Arser S.A. (Turkey) YES YES

Sri Lanka Port Authorities (Sri Lanka) YES YES

Bandari College, Tanzania Harbours Authority (Tanzania) YES YES

Panama Ports Corporation (Balboa and Cristobal Terminals) (Panama) YES YES

Kenya Port Authority (Kenya) YES YES

Dubai Port Authority (United Arab Emirates) YES YES

Association TRAINMAR in South America (ATAS) (Argentina) YES YES

Source: International Labor Organisation.


352

MO

DU

LE 7

Nonrenewed Organization/Institution Acquired License Valid License License

PORT REFORM TOOLKIT - PPIAF · 2016-09-15 · Reform Toolkit. The Toolkit is designed to help...

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