Political Law Must Read Cases

8/17/2019 Political Law Must Read Cases

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MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW)

POLITICAL LAW

HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,Dee!"e# 1, 1994 The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for thepurpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence andof guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the eld of internationalrelations."

n view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty! it is dicult to deter#inewhether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. So#ewriters even suggested that the treaty created two international persons $the Holy See and Vatican City.

The Vatican City ts into none of the established categories of states! andthe attribution to it of "sovereignty" #ust be #ade in a sense di%erent fro#that in which it is applied to other states. n a co##unity of national states!the Vatican City represents an entity organi&ed not for political but forecclesiastical purposes and international ob'ects. (espite its si&e and ob'ect!the Vatican City has an independent govern#ent of its own! with the Pope!who is also head of the )o#an Catholic Church! as the Holy See or Head of State! in confor#ity with its traditions! and the de#ands of its #ission in theworld. ndeed! the world*wide interests and activities of the Vatican City aresuch as to #a+e it in a sense an "international state".

HEIRS O$ DIOSDADO M. MENDO%A v&. DPWH, G.R. No. '04, *+-9, '014

,e reiterate that the (P,H is an unincorporated govern#ent agencywithout any separate 'uridical personality of its own and it en'oys i##unityfro# suit. The then -inistry of Public ,or+s and Highways! now (P,H! wascreated under /ecutive 0rder 1o. 234! series of 3563 70 2348. 0 234abolished the old -inistry of Public,or+s and the -inistry of Public Highwaysand transferred their functions to the newly*created -inistry of Public ,or+sof Highways.

MOST RE. PEDRO D. ARIGO, /# Ao&2o/ o3 P+e#2o P#/e& D.D.e2. . v&. SCOTT H. SWI$T / 5/& /2- as Commander of the U.S.7th Fleet e2..G.R. No. '06710, Se2e!"e# 16, '014

f the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign govern#ent done by itsforeign agent! although not necessarily a diplo#atic personage! but acting in


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his ocial capacity! the co#plaint could be barred by the i##unity of theforeign sovereign fro# suit without its consent. However! a public ocial#ay be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever da#age he #ayhave caused by his act done with #alice and in bad faith! or beyond thescope of his authority or 'urisdiction.

n this case! the 9S respondents were sued in their ocial capacity asco##anding ocers of the 9S 1avy who had control and supervision overthe USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or o#ission resulting in theunfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the T)1P was co##ittedwhile they were perfor#ing ocial #ilitary duties. Considering that thesatisfaction of a 'udg#ent against said ocials will re:uire re#edial actionsand appropriation of funds by the 9S govern#ent! the suit is dee#ed to beone against the 9S itself. The principle of State i##unity therefore bars thee/ercise of 'urisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift!)ice and )obling.

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1'8'7, M#5 19,1998

)epublic ;ct 1o. provided for the syste# of initiative and referendu#for local legislation and national statutes! without providing for initiative forthe a#end#ent of the Constitution. ; petition was led to a#end theconstitution regarding ter# li#its. However! the SC held that theconstitutional provision on people?s initiatives under the 3562 Constitution7;rticle @V A B8 re:uired i#ple#enting legislation to be e/ecutory. ).;. lac+ed the i#ple#enting rules for people?s initiatives and such lac+ could notbe cured by Co#elec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its

legislative authority to Co#elec! so Co#elec could not validly pro#ulgaterules on the #atter as it was not e#powered to do so under law.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 18417, O2o"e# '7, '006

La#bino #ade a petition to a#end the 3562 Constitution via peoplesinitiative. However! his petition did not include the full te/t of the proposeda#end#ents. The SC ruled that the initiative did not #eet the re:uire#entsof the Constitution. ;n a#end#ent is Ddirectly proposed by the peoplethrough initiative upon a petitionE only if the people sign a petition thatcontains the full te/t of the proposed a#end#ents. To do otherwise would be

deceptive and #isleading and would render the initiative void! since thereshould be both direct proposal and authorship by the person a/ing theirsignature to the petition.

TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 11'97, M- ', 1998

Fy its very title! ;rticle of the Constitution is a declaration of principles andstate policies. The counterpart of this article in the 35=> Constitution is called


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the basic political creed of the nation by (ean Vicente Sinco. These principlesin ;rticle are not intended to be self*e/ecuting principles ready forenforce#ent through the courts. They are used by the 'udiciary as aids or asguides in the e/ercise of its power of 'udicial review! and by the legislature inits enact#ent of laws. ;s held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,

Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enu#erated in;rticle and so#e sections of ;rticle @ are not self*e/ecuting provisions!the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. Theydo not e#body 'udicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines forlegislation.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 1''176, $e"#+#- , 1998

; provision which lays down a general principle! such as those found in ;rt. of the 3562 Constitution! is usually not self*e/ecuting. Fut a provision whichis co#plete in itself and beco#es operative without the aid of supple#entary

or enabling legislation! or that which supplies sucient rule by #eans of which the right it grants #ay be en'oyed or protected! is self*e/ecuting. Thusa constitutional provision is self*e/ecuting if the nature and e/tent of theright conferred and the liability i#posed are /ed by the constitution itself!so that they can be deter#ined by an e/a#ination and construction of itster#s! and there is no language indicating that the sub'ect is referred to thelegislature for action.

OPOSA v. $ACTORAN, G.R. No. 1010, $e"#+#- 0, 199

0posa! et al. led a petition to prevent further logging licenses fro# being

issued. The Supre#e Court! recogni&ing the intergenerational e:uity of thepetitioners as the basis of their standing! held that the right to a balancedand healthful ecology is e/plicitly provided in ;rt. A 3< of the Constitution.,hile it is found under the (eclaration of Principles and State Policies! notFill of )ights! but it is not any less i#portant than any civil and political rightsenu#erated in the latter. t concerns nothing less than self* preservation andself*perpetuation and is assu#ed to e/ist fro# the inception of #an+ind. Thus! those provisions are self*e/ecuting.

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P0'1671. A+:+&2 4, '00

Considering the ;#erican origin of the Philippine religion clauses and theintent to adopt the historical bac+ground! nature! e/tent and li#itations of the Girst ;#end#ent of the 9.S. Constitution when it was included in the35=> Fill of )ights! it is not surprising that nearly all the #a'or Philippinecases involving the religion clauses turn to 9.S. 'urisprudence in e/plainingthe nature! e/tent and li#itations of these clauses. However! a close scrutinyof these cases would also reveal that while 9.S. 'urisprudence on religionclauses ows into two #ain strea#s of interpretation * &e#2/o ;


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"eevoe2 e+2#/2- 25e


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(i#aporo! while serving as )epresentative of Lanao del Sur! led a C0C forthe post of ;)-- Jovernor. He lost the latter election! and despite #a+ing+nown his desire to continue as )epresentative! was not able to return tothat oce. The Supre#e Court did not allow hi# to ta+e oce as)epresentative again. t di%erentiated a ter#! i.e. the period an ocial #ay

serve as provided for by law fro# tenure! i.e. the period that an ocialactually serves. The Constitution protects the ter#! not the tenure. Fy lingthe certicate of candidacy! (i#aporo shortened his tenure. Thus! there is noviolation of the Constitution when he was prevented fro# re*assu#ing hispost. ; ter# of oce prescribed by the Constitution #ay not be e/tended orshortened by law! but the period during which an ocer actually serves7tenure8 #ay be a%ected by circu#stances within or beyond the power of theocer.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186980, Dee!"e# , '00

); 5=23! which provided for apportion#ent of lone district of City of Cagayande 0ro was assailed on constitutional grounds! on the ground that it is not re*apportion#ent legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of an LJ9. The Supre#e Court held that ); 5=23 is si#ply a reapportion#entlegislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congressunder ;rticle V! section >7K8.

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189'81, *+- , '009

The lling*up of all available party*list seats is not #andatory. ;ctualoccupancy of the party*list seats depends on the nu#ber of participants in

the party*list election. f only ten parties participated in the B442 party*listelection! then! despite the availability of >K seats! the #a/i#u# possiblenu#ber of occupied party*list seats would only be =4 because of the three*seat cap. n such a case! the three*seat cap prevents the #andatoryallocation of all the >K available seats.

9nder Section 337b8 of ).;. 1o. 25K3! garnering B of the total votes castguarantees a party one seat. This B threshold for the rst round of seatallocation does not violate any provision of the 3562 Constitution. n thesecond round allocation of additional seats! there is no #ini#u# votere:uire#ent to obtain a party*list seat because the Court has struc+ down

the application of the B threshold in the allocation of additional seats.Specically! the provision in Section 337b8 of the Party*List ;ct stating that"those garnering #ore than two percent 7B8 of the votes shall be entitled toadditional seats in the proportion to their total nu#ber of votes" can nolonger be given any e%ect. 0therwise! the B4 percent party*list seats in thetotal #e#bership of the House of )epresentatives as provided in the 3562Constitution will #athe#atically be i#possible to ll up. However! a party*listorgani&ation has to obtain a sucient nu#ber of votes to gain a seat in the


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second round of seat allocation. ,hat is dee#ed a sucient nu#ber of votesis dependent upon the circu#stances of each election! such as the nu#berof participating parties! the nu#ber of available party*list seats! and thenu#ber of parties with guaranteed seats received in the rst round of seatallocation.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., #e#e&e2e; "- /2& P#e&/;e2, M#. A I:o2 v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. '0866, A#/ ', '01

The recognition that national and regional parties! as well as sectoral partiesof professionals! the elderly! wo#en and the youth! need not be"#arginali&ed and underrepresented" will allow s#all ideology*based andcause*oriented parties who lac+ "well*dened political constituencies" achance to win seats in the House of )epresentatives. 0n the other hand!li#iting to the "#arginali&ed and underrepresented" the &e2o# parties forlabor! peasant! sherfol+! urban poor! indigenous cultural co##unities!

handicapped! veterans! overseas wor+ers! and other sectors that by theirnature are econo#ically at the #argins of society! will give the "#arginali&edand underrepresented" an opportunity to li+ewise win seats in the House of )epresentatives.

This interpretation will har#oni&e the 3562 Constitution and ).;. 1o. 25K3and will give rise to a #ulti*party syste# where those "#arginali&ed andunderrepresented!" both in economic and ideological status! will havethe opportunity to send their own #e#bers to the House of )epresentatives. This interpretation will also #a+e the party*list syste# honest andtransparent! eli#inating the need for relatively well*o% party*list

representatives to #as:uerade as "wallowing in poverty! destitution andinr#ity!" even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in S9Vs.

The 3562 Constitution and ).;. 1o. 25K3 allow #a'or political parties toparticipate in party*list elections so as to encourage the# to wor+assiduously in e/tending their constituencies to the "#arginali&ed andunderrepresented" and to those who "lac+ well*dened politicalconstituencies." The participation of #a'or political parties in party*listelections #ust be geared towards the entry! as #e#bers of the House of )epresentatives! of the "#arginali&ed and underrepresented" and those who"lac+ well*dened political constituencies!" giving the# a voice in law*

#a+ing. Thus!to participate in party*list elections! a #a'or political party thatelds candidates in the legislative district elections #ust organi&e a sectoralwing! li+e a labor! peasant! sherfol+! urban poor! professional! wo#en oryouth wing! that can register under the party*list syste#.

REGINA ONGSIA>O REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; *OSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. '08'64, *+e '7, '01


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Section 32! ;rticle V of the 3562 Constitution! provides that the House of )epresentatives lectoral Tribunal has the e/clusive 'urisdiction to be the"sole 'udge of all contests relating to the election! returns and :ualications"of the -e#bers of the House of )epresentatives. To be considered a -e#berof the House of )epresentatives! there #ust be a concurrence of all of the

following re:uisitesM 738 a valid procla#ation! 7B8 a proper oath! and 7=8assu#ption of oce. ;bsent any of the foregoing! the C0-LC retains 'urisdiction over the said contests.

*IMENE% v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L17907, A+:+&2 , 1966

The e/pression "speeches or debates herein" in ;rt. V A 3> 735=>Constitution8 only refers to utterances #ade by Congress#en in theperfor#ance of their ocial functions! such as speeches 7sponsorship!interpellation! privilege uttered in Co##ittees or to Congress in plenarysession8! state#ents and votes cast while Congress is in session! as well as

bills introduced in Congress. t also includes other acts perfor#ed by thesa#e either in or out of Congressional pre#ises while in the ocial dischargeof their duty when they perfor#ed the acts. t does not include acts notconnected with the discharge of their oce.

$o#e& v. D#/o, G.R. No. 1048', *+e '', 199

Jordon! an incu#bent elective ocial was! notwithstanding his ineligibility!being appointed to other govern#ent posts! does not auto#atically forfeithis elective oce nor re#ove his ineligibility i#posed by the Constitution. 0nthe contrary! since an incu#bent elective ocial is not eligible to the

appointive position! his appoint#ent or designation thereto cannot be validin view of his dis:ualication or lac+ of eligibility. This provision should not beconfused with Sec. 3=! ;rt. V! of the Constitution where "7n8o Senator or-e#ber of the House of )epresentatives #ay hold any other oce ore#ploy#ent in the Jovern#ent . . . during his ter# without forfeiting hisseat . . . ." The di%erence between the two provisions is signicant in thesense that incu#bent national legislators lose their elective posts only afterthey have been appointed to another govern#ent oce! while otherincu#bent elective ocials #ust rst resign their posts before they can beappointed! thus running the ris+ of losing the elective post as well as notbeing appointed to the other post. t is therefore clear that ineligibility is not

directly related with forfeiture of oce. ". . . . The e%ect is :uite di%erentwhere it is e/pressly provided by law that a person holding one oce shallbe ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate theincu#bent of an oce fro# accepting or holding a second oce 7State e/rel. Van ;ntwerp v Hogan! B6= ;la. KK>! B36 So Bd B>6N -c,illia#s v 1eal!3=4 Ja 2==!


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=66! K4 ;L) 5K38." ,here the constitution! or statutes declare that personsholding one oce shall be ineligible for election or appoint#ent to anotheroce! either generally or of a certain +ind! the prohibition has been held toincapacitate the incu#bent of the rst oce to hold the second so that anyatte#pt to hold the second is void 7;la. $ State e/ rel. Van ;ntwerp v.

Hogan! B36 So Bd B>6! B6= ;la KK>8.

AELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L''1, M#5 4, 1949

;s there were B= senators considered to be in session that ti#e 7includingSoto! e/cluding Confesor8! twelve senators constitute a #a'ority of theSenate of twenty three senators. ,hen the Constitution declares that a#a'ority of Deach HouseE shall constitute a :uoru#! Dthe HouseE does not#ean DallE the #e#bers. ven a #a'ority of all the #e#bers constitute DtheHouseE. There is a di%erence between a #a'ority of Dall the #e#bers of theHouseE and a #a'ority of Dthe HouseE! the latter re:uiring less nu#ber than

the rst. Therefore an absolute #a'ority 73B8 of all the #e#bers of theSenate less one 7B=8! constitutes constitutional #a'ority of the Senate for thepurpose of a :uoru#. Gurther#ore! even if the twelve did not constitute a:uoru#! they could have ordered the arrest of one! at least! of the absent#e#bersN if one had been so arrested! there would be no doubt aboutOuoru# then! and Senator Cuenco would have been elected 'ust the sa#einas#uch as there would be eleven for Cuenco! one against and oneabstained

OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L18144, O2o"e# ', 1960

Section 3>! ;rticle V of our Constitution provides that "for any speech ordebate" in Congress! the Senators or -e#bers of the House of )epresentative "shall not be :uestioned in any other place." This section wasta+en or is a copy of sec.

ABA>ADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 16076, Se2e!"e#1, '007Congress did not give President the power to e/ercise discretion in #a+ing alaw! only the power to ascertain the facts necessary to e/ercise the law. Thecriteria for valid delegation are thatM738 Law is co#plete in itself! setting forththerein the policy to be e/ecuted! carried out or i#ple#ented by thedelegate 7B8 Law /es a standard! the li#its of which are deter#inate and


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deter#inable to which the delegate #ust confor# in the perfor#ance of hisfunctions.

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC IN$ORMATION, G.R.No. 180, Dee!"e# ', '00

t would be an in'ustice if a citi&en is burdened with violating a law or rule hedid not get notice of. t consists of Dpublication either in the 0cial Ja&etteor in a newspaper of general circulation in the PhilippinesE 7Civil Code ;rt. B8and the law shall only ta+e e%ect 3> days after said publication. Publicationvia the nternet alone is considered invalid since the provisions state that therules #ust be published in the 0J or in a newspaper. ;ccording to ); 625B!an electronic docu#ent serves as the functional e:uivalent of a writtendocu#ent for evidentiary purposes. Thus! it does not #a+e the nternet a#ediu# for publishing laws! rules! and regulations. The rules #ust also berepublished by the Senate after every e/piry of the ter# of 3B Senators as it

is a continuing body independent of the Senate before it! and its own rulesstate that they e/pire after every Senate.

BENG%ON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 9914,Nove!"e# '0, 1991

nvestigations #ust be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly publishedrules of procedure and #ust respect the rights of the persons appearing in ora%ected by the in:uiries. Senator nriles privilege speech that pro#pted theco##ittee investigation contained no suggestion of conte#platedlegislation! only a call to loo+ into a possible violation of the ;nti*Jraft and

Corrupt Practices ;ct. The call see#s to fall under the 'urisdiction of thecourts rather than the legislature! such as the case led with theSandiganbayan. Gor the Co##ittee to probe and in:uire into the sa#e 'usticiable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be anencroach#ent into the e/clusive do#ain of the court.

SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169888, A#/ '0, '006

n :uestion hour! attendance is #eant to be discretionary. n aid of legislation! attendance is co#pulsory. n the absence of a #andatory:uestion period! it beco#es a greater i#perative to enforce Congress right

to e/ecutive infor#ation in the perfor#ance of its legislative function. ,henCongress e/ercises its power of in:uiry! depart#ent heads can only e/e#ptthe#selves by a valid clai# of in:uiry. The only ocials e/e#pt are thePresident on who# the e/ecutive power is vested and #e#bers of theSupre#e Court on who# the 'udicial power is vested as a collegial body asco*e:ual branches of govern#ent. Gor A 3! the re:uire#ent for Presidentialconsent is li#ited only to appearances of depart#ent heads in the :uestion


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hour but not in in:uiries in aid of legislation unless a valid clai# of privilegeis #ade by the President or /ecutive Secretary.

;lthough so#e e/ecutive ocials hold infor#ation covered by De/ecutiveprivilegeE! there can be no i#plied clai# of e/ecutive privilege thereby

e/e#pting so#e ocials fro# attending in:uiries in aid of legislation.Congress has a right to +now the reasons behind the clai# of e/ecutiveprivilege before an ocial would be e/e#pt fro# the investigation.

STANDARD CHARTERED BAN> v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BAN>S,$INANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 16818,Dee!"e# '8, '008

The e/ercise by Congress or by any of its co##ittees of the power to punishconte#pt is based on the principle of self*preservation. ;s the branch of thegovern#ent vested with the legislative power! independently of the 'udicial

branch! it can assert its authority and punish contu#acious acts against it.Such power is sui generis! as it attaches not to the discharge of legislativefunctions per se! but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of govern#ent.

ABA>ADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166817, A+:+&2 14, '00

;ny post*enact#ent congressional #easure such as this should be li#ited toscrutiny and investigation. n particular! congressional oversight #ust beconned to the followingM 738 scrutiny based pri#arily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it! its

power to as+ heads of depart#ents to appear before and be heard by eitherof its Houses on any #atter pertaining to their depart#ents and its power of conr#ation and 7B8 investigation and #onitoring of the i#ple#entation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct in:uiries in aid of legislation.

;ny action or step beyond that will under#ine the separation of powersguaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision re:uiring the President or anad#inistrative agency to present the proposed i#ple#enting rules and

regulations of a law to Congress which! by itself or through a co##itteefor#ed by it! retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove suchregulations before they ta+e e%ect. ;s such! a legislative veto in the for# of a congressional oversight co##ittee is in the for# of an inward*turningdelegation designed to attach a congressional leash 7other than throughscrutiny and investigation8 to an agency to which Congress has by lawinitially delegated broad powers. t radically changes the design or structure


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of the Constitutions diagra# of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct rolein enforcing! applying or i#ple#enting its own laws.

LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L'09, O2o"e# '7, 1968

The Constitution has B li#itations for billsM 38 Congress can not conglo#erateunder 3 statute heteregeneous sub'ects! and! B8 The title of the bill #ust becouched in language sucient to notify legislators and the public of thei#port of the single title. Co#plying with the second directive is i#perativesince the Constitution does not re:uire Congress to read a bills entire te/tduring deliberations.

BELGICA e2 . v. OCHOA *R.? S*S v. DRILON e2 .? NEPOMUCENO v.PRESIDENT A@UINO III, G.R. No. '0766, G.R. No. '049, G.R. No.'09'71, Nove!"e# 19, '01

The B43= P(;G ;rticle violates the principle of non*delegability sincelegislators are e%ectively allowed to individually e/ercise the power of appropriation! which is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate #ustbe e/ercised only through legislation! pursuant to Section B5738! ;rticle V of the 3562 Constitution. 9nder the B43= P(;G ;rticle! individual legislators aregiven a personal lu#p*su# fund fro# which they are able to dictate 7a8 how#uch fro# such fund would go to 7b8 a specic pro'ect or beneciary thatthey the#selves also deter#ine. Since these two acts co#prise the e/erciseof the power of appropriation and given that the B43= P(;G ;rticleauthori&es individual legislators to perfor# the sa#e! undoubtedly! saidlegislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution

does not! however! allow.

9nder the B43= P(;G ;rticle! the a#ount of PBK.25 Fillion only appears as acollective allocation li#it since the said a#ount would be further divideda#ong individual legislators who would then receive personal lu#p*su#allocations and could! after the J;; is passed! e%ectively appropriate P(;Gfunds based on their own discretion. ;s these inter#ediate appropriationsare #ade by legislators only after the J;; is passed and hence! outside of the law! it #eans that the actual ite#s of P(;G appropriation would not havebeen written into the Jeneral ;ppropriations Fill and thus e%ectuatedwithout veto consideration. This +ind of lu#p*su#post*enact#ent legislative

identication budgeting syste# fosters the creation of a Dbudget within abudgetE which subverts the prescribed procedure of present#ent andconse:uently i#pairs the Presidents power of ite# veto. ;s petitioners aptlypoint out! the President is forced to decide between 7a8 accepting the entirePBK. 25 Fillion P(;G allocation without +nowing the specic pro'ects of thelegislators! which #ay or #ay not be consistent with his national agenda and7b8 re'ecting the whole P(;G to the detri#ent of all other legislators withlegiti#ate pro'ects.


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TAGUIWALO, e2. . v&. A+/o e2. . J.R. No. '09'8, *+- 1, '014

The (;P did not violate Section B5738! ;rt. V of the Constitution. (;P was

#erely a progra# by the /ecutive and is not a fund nor is it anappropriation. t is a progra# for prioriti&ing govern#ent spending. ;s such!it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section B5738! ;rt. V of the Constitution. n (;P no additional funds were withdrawn fro# the Treasury otherwise! an appropriation #ade by law would have been re:uired.Gunds! which were already appropriated for by the J;;! were #erely beingrealigned via the (;P.

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANGMA>ABAYAN, e2 . v&. BENIGNO SIMEON C. A@UINO III, PRESIDENT

O$ THE REPUBLIC O$ THE PHILIPPINES, e2 .G.R. No. '09'8, $e"#+#- , '017

f the Legislature #ay declare what a law #eans! or what a specic portion of the Constitution #eans! especially after the courts have in actual caseascertain its #eaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision! thiswould surely cause confusion and instability in 'udicial processes and courtdecisions. Herein! the /ecutive has violated the J;; when it stated thatsavings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls forlegislative! instead of 'udicial deter#ination.

Section B>7>8! ;rticle V of the Constitution statesM >8 1o law shall be passedauthori&ing any transfer of appropriationsN however! the President! thePresident of the Senate! the Spea+er of the House of )epresentatives! theChief Iustice of the Supre#e Court! and the heads of ConstitutionalCo##issions #ay! by law! be authori&ed to aug#ent any ite# in the generalappropriations law for their respective oces fro# savings in other ite#s of their respective appropriations.

Section =5! Chapter >! Foo+ V of the ;d#inistrative Code provideM Section=5. ;uthority to 9se Savings in ;ppropriations to Cover (ecits.$/cept asotherwise provided in the Jeneral ;ppropriations ;ct! any savings in the

regular appropriations authori&ed in the Jeneral ;ppropriations ;ct forprogra#s and pro'ects of any depart#ent! oce or agency! #ay! with theapproval of the President! be used to cover a decit in any other ite# of theregular appropriationsM Provided! that the creation of new positions orincrease of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded fro# budgetary savingse/cept when specically authori&ed by lawM Provided! further! that wheneverauthori&ed positions are transferred fro# one progra# or pro'ect to anotherwithin the sa#e depart#ent! oce or agency! the corresponding a#ounts


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appropriated for personal services are also dee#ed transferred! without!however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the depart#ent!oce or agency concerned.

0n the other hand! Section =5 is evidently in conict with the plain te/t of

Section B>7>8! ;rticle V of the Constitution because it allows the President toapprove the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authori&ed inthe J;; for progra#s and pro'ects of any depart#ent! oce or agency tocover a decit in any other ite# of the regular appropriations. ;s such!Section =5 violates the #andate of Section B>7>8 because the lattere/pressly li#its the authority of the President to aug#ent an ite# in the J;;to only those in his own (epart#ent out of the savings in other ite#s of hisown (epart#ents appropriations. ;ccordingly! Section =5 cannot serve as avalid authority to 'ustify cross*border transfers under the (;P. ;ug#entationsunder the (;P which are #ade by the /ecutive within its depart#ent shall!however! re#ain valid so long as the re:uisites under Section B>7>8 are

co#plied with.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. No&. 14681017, M#5 ', '001

strada had constructively resigned! because both ele#ents of resignationwere present! na#elyM 3. ntent B. ;cts of relin:uish#ent 7calling for snapelection in which strada would not be a candidate! listening to Pi#entel?sadvice for resignation! negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power!declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassu#ing thepresidency! etc.8

;s for prosecution of cases against hi#! resignation or retire#ent is not a barto prosecution. 1either was there a pending i#peach#ent case when heresignedN if this were a bar to a cri#inal prosecution! then he would beperpetually i##une. Ginally! Congress has already recogni&ed ;rroyo as thenew President! and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOSIDAL ; AL$REDO S. LIM v&. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS ; *OSEPH E*ERCITO ESTRADAG.R. No. '06666, *+#- '1, '017

,hen the pardon e/tended to for#er President strada shows that both the

principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties areincluded in the pardon. The rst sentence refers to the e/ecutive cle#encye/tended to for#er President strada who was convicted by theSandiganbayan of plunder and i#posed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thelatter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved hi# of i#prison#ent. The sentence that followed! which states that "7h8e is hereby restored to hiscivil and political rights!" e/pressly re#itted the accessory penalties thatattached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence! fro# the te/t


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of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetualabsolute dis:ualication were e/pressly re#itted together with the principalpenalty of reclusion perpetua.

Gurther#ore! the third prea#bular clause of the pardon! i.e.! DQwRhereas!

Ioseph 'ercito strada has publicly co##itted to no longer see+ any electiveposition or oce!E neither #a+es the pardon conditional! nor #ilitate againstthe conclusion that for#er President stradas rights to su%rage and to see+public elective oce have been restored. ; prea#ble is really not an integralpart of a law. t is #erely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. tcannot be the origin of rights and obligations. ,here the #eaning of astatute is clear and una#biguous! the prea#ble can neither e/pand norrestrict its operation #uch less prevail over its te/t. Hence if the pardon wasintended be conditional! it should have e/plicitly stated the sa#e in the te/tof the pardon itself. Since it did not #a+e an integral part of the decree of pardon! the =rd prea#bular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to

the pardon e/tended.

NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 1064,Se2e!"e# 4, '00

/ecutive privilege is not a personal privilege! but one that adheres to the0ce of the President. t e/ists to protect public interest! not to benet aparticular public ocial. ts purpose! a#ong others! is to assure that thenation will receive the benet of candid! ob'ective and untra##eledco##unication and e/change of infor#ation between the President andhisher advisers in the process of shaping or for#ing policies and arriving at

decisions in the e/ercise of the functions of the Presidency under theConstitution. The condentiality of the Presidents conversations andcorrespondence is not uni:ue. t is a+in to the condentiality of 'udicialdeliberations. t possesses the sa#e value as the right to privacy of allciti&ens and #ore! because it is dictated by public interest and theconstitutionally ordained separation of govern#ental powers.

A>BAYAN v. A@UINO, G.R. No. 180716, *+- 16, '00

The diplo#atic negotiations privilege bears a close rese#blance to thedeliberative process and presidential co##unications privilege. t #ay be

readily perceived that the rationale for the condential character of diplo#atic negotiations! deliberative process! and presidentialco##unications is si#ilar! if not identical.

MANALO v. SISTO%A, G.R. No. 10869, A+:+&2 11, 1999

Confor#ably! as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sar#iento vs. -ison! and in the subse:uent cases of Fautista vs. Salonga!


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Political Law

Ouintos*(eles vs. Constitutional Co##ission! and Calderon vs. CaraleN underSection 3

Girst! the heads of the e/ecutive depart#ents! a#bassadors! other

public #inisters and consuls! ocers of the ar#ed forces fro# the ran+of colonel or naval captain! and other ocers whose appoint#ents arevested in hi# in this ConstitutionN

Second! all other ocers of the Jovern#ent whose appoint#ents arenot otherwise provided for by lawN

Third! those who# the President #ay be authori&ed by law to appointN

Gourth! ocers lower in ran+ whose appoint#ents the Congress #ay bylaw vest in the President alone.

t is well*settled that only presidential appoint#ents belonging to the rstgroup re:uire the conr#ation by the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents. Theappoint#ents of respondent ocers who are not within the rst category!need not be conr#ed by the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents.

MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 14906, A#/ ', '00'

;n ad interim appoint#ent is a per#anent appoint#ent because it ta+ese%ect i##ediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President oncethe appointee has :ualied into oce. The fact that it is sub'ect to

conr#ation by the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents does not alter itsper#anent character. The Constitution itself #a+es an adinterim appoint#ent per#anent in character by #a+ing it e%ective untildisapproved by the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents or until the ne/tad'ourn#ent of Congress.

PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 16498, O2o"e# 1, '007

;d*interi# appoint#ents #ust be distinguished fro# appoint#ents in anacting capacity. Foth of the# are e%ective upon acceptance. Fut ad*interi#appoint#ents are e/tended only during a recess of Congress! whereas acting

appoint#ents #ay be e/tended any ti#e there is a vacancy. -oreover ad*interi# appoint#ents are sub#itted to the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents forconr#ation or re'ectionN acting appoint#ents are not sub#itted to theCo##ission on ;ppoint#ents. ;cting appoint#ents are a way of te#porarilylling i#portant oces but! if abused! they can also be a way of circu#venting the need for conr#ation by the Co##ission on;ppoint#ents.


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DENNIS $UNA v. ACTING SECRETARY O$ *USTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA,e2 ., G.R. No. 191644, $e"#+#- 19, '01

The language of Section 3=! ;rt. V of the Constitution #a+es no reference to

the nature of the appoint#ent or designation! as such! the prohibitionagainst dual or #ultiple oces being held by one ocial #ust be construedas to apply to all appoint#ents or designations! whether per#anent orte#porary.

DENNIS A. B. $UNA v&. THE CHAIRMAN, CIIL SERICE COMMISSION,$RANCISCO T. DU@UE III, EECUTIE SECRETARY LEANDRO R.MENDO%A, O$$ICE O$ THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 19168', Nove!"e#'7, '014

The concerned J0CCs are vested by their respective charters with various

powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created.,hile powers and functions associated with appoint#ents! co#pensationand benets a%ect the career develop#ent! e#ploy#ent status! rights!privileges! and welfare of govern#ent ocials and e#ployees! theconcerned J0CCs are also tas+ed to perfor# other corporate powers andfunctions that are not personnel*related. ;ll of these powers and functions!whether personnel*related or not! are carried out and e/ercised by therespective Foards of the concerned J0CCs. Hence! when the CSC Chair#ansits as a #e#ber of the governing Foards of the concerned J0CCs! he #aye/ercise these powers and functions! which are not any#ore derived fro# hisposition as CSC Chair#an. Such being the case! the designation of (u:ue

was unconstitutional.

MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY v&. COMMISSION ON AUDITG.R. No. 171', *+#- 1, '017

The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the thenPresident strada of the grant of additional allowances and benets. -;failed to prove its e/istence. The alleged approval of the President wascontained in a #ere photocopy of the #e#orandu#... The original was notpresented during the proceedings. ; copy of the docu#ent is not in the-alacaang )ecords 0ce.

Gurther! Dthe grant of allowances and benets a#ounts to doubleco#pensation proscribed by ;rt. @7F8! Sec. 6 of the 3562 Constitution.E

DE CASTRO v. *BC, G.R. No. 19100', M#5 18, '010

Section K 7=8! ;rticle V re:uires the regular elections to be held on thesecond -onday of -ay! letting the elections fall on -ay 6! at the earliest! or


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-ay 3K! at the latest. f the regular presidential elections are held on -ay 6!the period of the prohibition is 33> days. f such elections are held on -ay3K! the period of the prohibition is 345 days. ither period of the prohibitionis longer than the full #andatory 54*day period to ll the vacancy in theSupre#e Court. The result is that there are at least 35 occasions 7i.e.! the

di%erence between the shortest possible period of the ban of 345days and the 54*day #andatory period for appoint#ents8 in which theoutgoing President would be in no position to co#ply with the constitutionalduty to ll up a vacancy in the Supre#e Court. t is safe to assu#e that thefra#ers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. nfact! in their deliberations on the #andatory period for the appoint#ent of Supre#e Court Iustices under Section K 738! ;rticle V! the fra#ers neitherdiscussed! nor #entioned! nor referred to the ban against #idnightappoint#ents under Section 3>! ;rticle V! or its e%ects on the 54*dayperiod! or vice versa. They did not need to! because they never intendedSection 3>! ;rticle V to apply to a vacancy in the Supre#e Court! or in any

of the lower courts.

GARA$IL v. O$$ICE O$ THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. '08', *+e 16,'017

Paragraph 7b8! Section 3 of 0 B considered as #idnight appoint#ents thoseappoint#ents to oces that will only be vacant on or after 33 -arch B434even though the appoint#ents are #ade prior to 33 -arch B434. 0 Bre#ained faithful to the intent of Section 3>! ;rticle V of the 3562ConstitutionM the outgoing President is prevented fro# continuing to rule thecountry indirectly after the end of his ter#.

IBP v. %AMORA, G.R. No. 141'4. A+:+&2 17, '000

Calling out ar#ed forces is discretionary power solely vested in thePresidents wisdo# but the #atter #ay be reviewed by the Court to seewhether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.

SANLA>AS v. REYES, G.R. No. 17907, $e"#+#- , '004

;ctual invasionrebellion and re:uire#ent of public safety are not re:uiredfor calling out the ar#ed forces. 1othing prohibits President fro# declaring a

state of rebellionN it springs fro# powers as Chief /ecutive and Co##ander*in*Chief. Ginally! calling out of the ar#ed forces is not the sa#e as adeclaration of #artial law.

DAID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 18196, M- , '006

Let it be e#phasi&ed that while the President alone can declare a state of national e#ergency! however! without legislation! he has no power to ta+e


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over privately owned public utility or business a%ected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether e/ceptional circu#stances e/istwarranting the ta+e over of privately*owned public utility or businessa%ected with public interest. 1or can he deter#ine when such e/ceptionalcircu#stances have ceased. Li+ewise! without legislation, the President has

no power to point out the types of businesses a%ected with public interestthat should be ta+en over. n short! the President has no absolute authorityto e/ercise all the powers of the State under Section 32! ;rticle V in theabsence of an e#ergency powers act passed by Congress.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. '11, O2o"e# '8, 199

#elda -arcos wanted to return ho#e fro# Hawaii. Her return was preventedby Pres. ;:uino. She invo+ed her rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her fro# returning to the Philippines

as an e/ercise of the Presidents residual powers. ,hatever power inherentin the govern#ent that is neither legislative nor 'udicial has to be e/ecutive. The President?s residual power is for protecting people?s general welfare!preserving and defending the Constitution! protecting the peace! attendingto day*to*day proble#s. ven the )esolution proposed in the House urgingthe President to allow -arcos to return shows recognition of this power.)esidual powers are i#plicit in and correlative to the para#ount duty tosafeguard and protect general welfare.

YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 84478, M#5 '0, 198

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a beco#ing#odesty in e/a#ining constitutional :uestions! they are nonetheless notprevented fro# resolving the sa#e whenever warranted! sub'ect only toreview by the highest tribunal. ,e have 'urisdiction under the Constitution to"review! revise! reverse! #odify or ar# on appeal or certiorari, as the lawor rules of court #ay provide!" nal 'udg#ents and orders of lower courts in!a#ong others! all cases involving the constitutionality of certain #easures. This si#ply #eans that the resolution of such cases #ay be #ade in the rstinstance by these lower courts.

MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 1064, Se2e!"e# 16, 1999

; political :uestion connotes a :uestion of policy and referred to those:uestions which under the constitution were 38 to be decided by the peoplein their sovereign capacity or B8 in regard to which full discretionary authorityhad been delegated to the legislativee/ecutive branch of govern#ent.

Political :uestions are concerned with issues on the wisdo# and not legalityof a particular #easure. ;dditionally! a political :uestion has no standards by


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which its legality or constitutionality could be deter#ined. ; purely 'usticiable issue i#plied a given right! legally de#andable and enforceable!an act or o#ission violative of such right and a re#edy granted andsanctioned by law for said breach of right.

$RANCISCO I. CHAE% v. *UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. $RANCIS *OSEPH G. ESCUDERO ; REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, *R., G.R. No. '0''4',A#/ 16, '01

; reading of the 3562 Constitution would reveal that several provisions wereindeed ad'usted as to be in tune with the shift to bica#eralis#. t is also veryclear that the Gra#ers were not +een on ad'usting the provision oncongressional representation in the IFC because it was not in the e/ercise of its pri#ary function to legislate. n the creation of the IFC! the Gra#ersarrived at a uni:ue syste# by adding to the four 7K8 regular #e#bers! three7=8 representatives fro# the #a'or branches of govern#ent. n so providing!

the Gra#ers si#ply gave recognition to the Legislature! not because it was inthe interest of a certain constituency! but in reverence to it as a #a'orbranch of govern#ent. Hence! the argu#ent that a senator cannot representa #e#ber of the House of )epresentatives in the IFC and vice*versa is! thus!#isplaced. n the IFC! any #e#ber of Congress! whether fro# the Senate orthe House of )epresentatives! is constitutionally e#powered to represent theentire Congress.

$RANCIS H. *ARDELE%A! v&. CHIE$ *USTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.SERENO, THE *UDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EECUTIESECRETARY PA@UITO N. OCHOA, *R., G.R. No. '111, A+:+&2 19,

'014

a.8 Section B! )ule 34 of IFC*445 providesM

SC. B. otes re!uired when integrity of a !uali"ed applicant is challenged. *n every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwisedis:ualied for no#ination is raised or challenged! the ar#ative vote of allthe -e#bers of the Council #ust be obtained for the favorable considerationof his no#ination.

; si#ple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a

higher voting re:uire#ent is absolute in cases where the integrity of anapplicant is :uestioned. Si#ply put! when an integrity :uestion arises! thevoting re:uire#ent for his or her inclusion as a no#inee to a 'udicial postbeco#es Dunani#ousE instead of the D#a'ority voteE re:uired in thepreceding section. Considering that IFC*445 e#ploys the ter# DintegrityE asan essential :ualication for appoint#ent! and its doubtful e/istence in aperson #erits a higher hurdle to surpass! that is! the unanimous vote of allthe members of the #$C! the Court is of the safe conclusion that DintegrityE


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Political Law

as used in the rules #ust be interpreted unifor#ly. Hence! Section B! )ule 34of IFC*445 envisions only a situation where an applicants #oral tness ischallenged. t follows then that the Dunani#ity ruleE only co#es intooperation when the #oral character of a person is put in issue. t nds noapplication where the :uestion is essentially unrelated to an applicants

#oral uprightness.

ROMUALDE% v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168011, A#/ 0, '00

The test in deter#ining whether a cri#inal statute is void for uncertainty iswhether the language conveys a suciently denite warning as to theproscribed conduct when #easured by co##on understanding and practice. This Court has si#ilarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine #erely re:uiresa reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld * not absoluteprecision or #athe#atical e/actitude.

$RAN>LN ALE*ANDRO v. O$$ICE O$ THE OMBUDSMAN $ACT$INDINGAND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, #e#e&e2e; "- A22-. M#/ O/v/ EeA. Ro&, G.R. No. 181'1, A#/ , '01

The 0ce of the 0#buds#an was created by no less than the Constitution.t is tas+ed to e/ercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointiveocials! save only for i#peachable ocers. The 0#buds#an has pri#ary 'urisdiction to investigate any act or o#ission of a public ocer or e#ployeewho is under the 'urisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans

'urisdiction e/tends only to public ocials occupying positions correspondingto salary grade B2 and higher. Conse:uently! any act or o#ission of a publicocer or e#ployee occupying a salary grade lower than B2 is within theconcurrent 'urisdiction of the 0#buds#an and of the regular courts or otherinvestigative agencies.

BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 968, Dee!"e# 1, 1990

Uorac! as ;ssociate C0-LC Chair#an! was appointed by the President asChair#an of the C0-LC. Frillantes challenged Uoracs appoint#ent forbeing contrary to ;rticle @*C! Sec. 37B8 of 3562 Constitution! where "78n no

case shall any -e#ber 7of the Co##ission on lections8 be appointed ordesignated in a te#porary or acting capacity." The SC agreed. Theappoint#ent was unconstitutional. ;rticle @*;! Sec. 3 provides for theindependence of ConCo# fro# the e/ecutive depart#ent.

DA%A v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 644, Dee!"e# '1, 199


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Political Law

The Laban ng (e#o+rati+ong Pilipino 7L(P8 was reorgani&ed resulting in apolitical realign#ent in the lower house. L(P also changed its representationin the Co##ission on ;ppoint#ents. They withdrew the seat occupied by(a&a 7L(P #e#ber8 and gave it to the new L(P #e#ber. Thereafter thecha#ber elected a new set of representatives in the Co; which consisted of

the original #e#bers e/cept (a&a who was replaced by Singson. (a&a:uestioned such replace#ent on the ground that the L(Ps reorgani&ationwas not per#anent and stable.

The L(P has been e/isting for #ore than one year and its #e#bers includethe Philippine President! and its internal disagree#ents are e/pected in anypolitical organi&ation in a de#ocracy. The test that the party #ust survive ageneral congressional election was never laid down in 'urisprudence. TheCourt ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change itsrepresentation in the Co; to reect at any ti#e the per#anent changes andnot #erely te#porary alliances or factional divisions without severance of

loyaltiesfor#al disaliation that #ay transpire in the political align#ents of its #e#bers.

AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 177001, *+#- '1, '004

;rticle @! Section 32 of the 3562 Constitution provides that in ti#es of national e#ergency! when the public interest so re:uires! the State #ay!during the e#ergency and under reasonable ter#s prescribed by it!te#porarily ta+e over or direct the operation of any privately owned publicutility or business a%ected with public interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MANILA MEMORIAL PAR> v. SECRETARY O$ DSWD, G.R. No. 18776,Dee!"e# , '01

Traditional distinctions e/ist between police power and e#inent do#ain. nthe e/ercise of police power! a property right is i#paired by regulation! or theuse of property is #erely prohibited! regulated or restricted to pro#ote publicwelfare. n such cases! there is no co#pensable ta+ing! hence! pay#ent of 'ust co#pensation is not re:uired. /a#ples of these regulations are

property conde#ned for being no/ious or intended for no/ious purposes7e.g.! a building on the verge of collapse to be de#olished for public safety!or obscene #aterials to be destroyed in the interest of public #orals8 as wellas &oning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes in'urious tothe health! #orals or safety of the co##unity 7e.g.! dividing a citys territoryinto residential and industrial areas8.


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WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY O$ MANILA, G.R. No. 1''46, *+#- '0, '009

Police power! while incapable of an e/act denition! has been purposelyveiled in general ter#s to underscore its co#prehensiveness to #eet all

e/igencies and provide enough roo# for an ecient and e/ible response asthe conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessityof the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Policepower has been used as 'ustication for nu#erous and varied actions by theState. These range fro# the regulation of dance halls! #ovie theaters! gasstations and coc+pits. The aweso#e scope of police power is bestde#onstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in ournations legal syste#! its use has rarely been denied.

REPUBLIC v. CASTELLI, G.R. No. L'06'0, A+:+&2 7, 1984

The SC said that the prices in 35>5 will apply since in 35K2! they did notpossess the property with a per#anent characteristic seeing that they were 'ust leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not also deprive theowner of the benets of the land since they were paying rent. t was only in35>5 when they led the e/propriation proceedings that they gainedpossession with a per#anent character when the lower court granted the#such possession. The price of Php 34.44 however was :uite high ta+ing inconsideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php B.>4 K.44 per s: #eters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. Theproper price is now at Php>.44 per s:uare #eters. This case is doctrinal for giving the ele#ents of a co#pensable ta+ing! to witM

3. The e/propriator #ust enter a private propertyB. Gor #ore than a #o#entary period=. 9nder warrant or color of legal authorityK. The property #ust be devoted to a public use or otherwise infor#ally

appropriated or in'uriously a%ected>. The owner #ust be ousted of all benecial en'oy#ent of the property.

HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 181101, A#/'4, '01'

Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to 'ust

co#pensation! the law on stoc+ distribution option ac+nowledges thatlandowners can re:uire pay#ent for the shares of stoc+ corresponding to thevalue of the agricultural lands in relation to the outstanding capital stoc+ of the corporation.

$IRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN *E$$ P. CUDIA O$ THE PHILIPPINEMILITARY ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS $ATHER RENATO P. CUDIA,WHO ALSO ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHAL$, AND BERTENI CATALUA

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211362.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211362.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211362.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211362.pdfhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2015/february2015/211362.pdf


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Political Law

CAUSING v&. THE SUPERINTENDENT O$ THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) O$ '014 O$ THE PMAAND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REIEW AND APPEALS BOARD(CRAB)G.R. No. '116', $e"#+#- '4, '017

Contending that Cadet Cudia was dis#issed without being a%orded dueprocess! the petitioners led the instant petition assailing the dis#issal of Cadet Cudia fro# the P-;. n order to be proper and i##une fro#constitutional inr#ity! a cadet who is sought to be dis#issed or separatedfro# the acade#y #ust be a%orded a hearing! be apprised of the speciccharges against hi#! and be given an ade:uate opportunity to present his orher defense both fro# the point of view of ti#e and the use of witnesses andother evidence. n the case at bar! the investigation of Cadet 3CL CudiasHonor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and e/istingpractices in the P-;. He was notied of the Honor )eport fro# -a'. Hindang.

He was then given the opportunity to e/plain the report against hi#. He wasinfor#ed about his options and the entire process that the case wouldundergo. Thus! the petitioners could not argue that Cadet Cudia was nota%orded due process.

ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L46496, $e"#+#- '8, 1940

The fact! however! that the Court of ndustrial )elations #ay be said to befree fro# the rigidity of certain procedural re:uire#ents does not #ean thatit can! in 'ustiable cases before it! entirely ignore or disregard thefunda#ental and essential re:uire#ents of due process in trials and

investigations of an ad#inistrative character. There are pri#ary rights which#ust be respected even in proceedings of this character.

PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L4798, M- 7, 199

t is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of thee:ual protection of the laws is not e:ual protection of the laws is not violatedby a legislation based on reasonable classication. ;nd the classication! tobe reasonable! 738 #ust rest on substantial distinctionsN 7B8 #ust be ger#aneto the purposes of the lawN 7=8 #ust not be li#ited to e/isting conditionsonlyN and 7K8 #ust apply e:ually to all #e#bers of the sa#e class.

BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 19'97, Dee!"e# 8, '010

n the instant case! the fact that other ad#inistrations are not the sub'ect of the PTCs investigative ai# is not a case of selective prosecution thatviolates e:ual protection. The /ecutive is given broad discretion to initiatecri#inal prosecution and en'oys clear presu#ption of regularity and goodfaith in the perfor#ance thereof. Gor petitioners to overco#e that

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presu#ption! they #ust carry the burden of showing that the PTC is apreli#inary step to selective prosecution! and that it is laden with adiscri#inatory e%ect and a discri#inatory purpose. However! petitioner hassorely failed in discharging that burden.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANI%ATION v.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L1197, *+e 7,198

;s heretofore stated! the pri#acy of hu#an rights $ freedo# of e/pression!of peaceful asse#bly and of petition for redress of grievances $ overproperty rights has been sustained. #phatic reiteration of this basic tenetas a coveted boon $ at once the shield and ar#or of the dignity and worthof the hu#an personality! the all*consu#ing ideal of our enlightenedcivili&ation $ beco#es 0ur duty! if freedo# and social 'ustice have any#eaning at all for hi# who toils so that capital can produce econo#ic goods

that can generate happiness for all. To regard the de#onstration againstpolice ocers! not against the e#ployer! as evidence of bad faith incollective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargainingagree#ent and a cause for the dis#issal fro# e#ploy#ent of thede#onstrating e#ployees! stretches unduly the co#pass of the collectivebargaining agree#ent! is "a potent #eans of inhibiting speech" and thereforeinicts a #oral as well as #ortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free e/pression! of peaceful asse#bly and of petition.

BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169, A#/ '7, '007

; fair and i#partial reading of F.P. 1o. 664 thus readily shows that it refersto all +inds of public asse#blies that would use public places. The referenceto "lawful cause" does not #a+e it content*based because asse#blies reallyhave to be for lawful causes! otherwise they would not be "peaceable" andentitled to protection. 1either are the words "opinion!" "protesting" and"inuencing" in the denition of public asse#bly content based! since theycan refer to any sub'ect. The words "petitioning the govern#ent for redressof grievances" co#e fro# the wording of the Constitution! so its use cannotbe avoided. Ginally! #a/i#u# tolerance is for the protection and benet of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the e/pressions in the rally.

CHAE% v. GON%ALES, G.R. No. 16, $e"#+#- 17, '00

t is not enough to deter#ine whether the challenged act constitutes so#efor# of restraint on freedo# of speech. ; distinction has to be #ade whetherthe restraint is 738 a content*neutral regulation! i.e.! #erely concerned withthe incidents of the speech! or one that #erely controls the ti#e! place or#anner! and under well dened standardsN or 7B8 a content*based restraint orcensorship! i.e., the restriction is based on the sub'ect #atter of the


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utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction deter#ines the test by whichthe challenged act is assayed with.

THE DIOCESE O$ BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST RE.BISHOP ICENTE M. NAARRA ; THE BISHOP HIMSEL$ IN HIS

PERSONAL CAPACITY v&. COMMISSION O$ ELECTIONS AND THEELECTION O$$ICER O$ BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAIL . MA*ARUCONG.R. No. '078', *+#- '1, '017

,hen petitioners! a (iocese and its Fishop posted tarpaulins in front of thecathedral which ai#ed to dissuade voters fro# electing candidates whosupported the )H Law! and the C0-LC twice ordered the latter todis#antle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which i#posed a si&eli#it on ca#paign #aterials! the case is about C0-LCs breach of thepetitioners funda#ental right of e/pression of #atters relating to election. Thus! the C0-LC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins

were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidatestherein were not consulted regarding its posting. t was part of thepetitioners advocacy against the )H Law. Iurisprudence which sets the li#itto free speech of candidates during elections but do not li#it the rights of broadcasters to co##ent on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners!as the petitioners are private individuals who have lost their right to giveco##entary on the candidates when the C0-LC ordered the tarpaulinre#oved. Second! the tarpaulin is protected speech. The si&e of thetarpaulins is funda#entally part of protected speech! as it is i#portant toconvey the advocacy of the petitioners! who are also part of the electorate.-ore i#portantly! every citi&ens e/pression with political conse:uences

en'oys a high degree of protection. ,hile the tarpaulin #ay inuence thesuccess or failure of the na#ed candidates and political parties! this does notnecessarily #ean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for orposted Din return for considerationE by any candidate! political party or party*list group. The C0-LC! therefore! has no 'urisdiction to issue its order as itlac+s the re:uisites of a valid content*based regulation of speech. Third! thetarpaulins and their #essages are not religious speech! as they do notconvey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. ,ith all due respect tothe Catholic faithful! the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are notbinding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in thePhilippines as regards the )H Law does not suce to :ualify the posting by

one of its #e#bers of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enu#eration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes anydoubt as to its nature as speech with political conse:uences and not religiousspeech.

IN RE *URADO, A.M. No. 9'08 SC A#/ 6, 1997


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Liability for published state#ents de#onstrably false or #isleading! andderogatory of the courts and individual 'udges! is what is involved in theproceeding at bar $ than which! upon its facts! there is perhaps no #oreappropriate setting for an in:uiry into the li#its of press freedo# as it relatesto public co##ent about the courts and their wor+ings within a

constitutional order.

SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148781, M- 7, '001

S,S and a#ahalan Publishing see+ to en'oin C0-LC fro# enforcing Sec.>.K of ); 544< 7Gair lection ;ct8 which prohibits the publishing of electionsurveys 3> days before the election of national candidates and 2 days beforethe election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveyscovering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violatestheir right to free speech and e/pression. The SC held that the resolution isinvalid as because 738 it i#poses a prior restraint on the freedo# of

e/pression! 7B8 it is a direct and total suppression of a category of e/pressioneven though such suppression is only for a li#ited period! and that 7=8 thegovern#ental interest sought to be pro#oted can be achieved by #eansother than suppression of freedo# of e/pression.

RHONDA AE S. IARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAID SU%ARA !v&. ST. THERESAFS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHE%A T. ESCUDERO, AND

*OHN DOES!G.R. No. '0'666, Se2e!"e# '9, '014

The concept of privacy has! through ti#e! greatly evolved! with technological

advance#ents having an inuential part therein. This evolution was brieyrecounted in for#er Chief Iustice )eynato S. Punos speech! %he Common&ight to 'rivacy, where he e/plained the three strands of the right to privacy!vi&M 738 locational or situational privacyN 7B8 infor#ational privacyN and 7=8decisional privacy. 0f the three! what is relevant to the case at bar isthe #/:52 2o /3o#!2/o #/v-usually dened as the right of individuals to o2#o /3o#!2/o "o+2 25e!&eve&.

SPOUSES BILL AND ICTORIA HING v. ALEANDER CHOACHUY, SR.; ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 18986, *+e '6, '01

;n individuals right to privacy under ;rticle B


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places where there is reasonable e/pectation of privacy! unless the consentof the individual! whose right to privacy would be a%ected! was obtained.Si#ply put! a person have a "reasonable e/pectation of privacy" in hisproperty! whether he uses it as a business oce or as a residence and thatthe installation of video surveillance ca#eras directly facing his property or

covering a signicant portion thereof! without his consent! is a clear violationof their right to privacy.

AGLIPAY v. RUI%, G.R. No. L47479, M#5 1, 1998

Jregorio ;glipay! the Supre#e Head of the Philippine ndependent Church!led for a writ of prohibition against Iuan )ui&! (irector of Posts! to stop hi#fro# selling postage sta#ps which co##e#orated the ==rd nternationalucharistic Congress organi&ed by the Catholic Church in -anila. Petitioneralleges that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public #oney for the benet of any religious deno#ination. The Court denied

the petition. The (irector of Posts acted by virtue of ;ct 1o. K4>B whichappropriated B5 7pay #unicipal license fee for theperiod covering 35K> to 35>= and a#ounting to >! 6B3.K>8. ;FS paid inprotest and led a case to declare said 0rdinances void and to see+ a refund. Trial court dis#issed case. SC ruled that 0rdinance =444 is valid as it #erelyre:uires a #ayors per#it. 0rdinance B>B5 is also valid but cannot be #adeto apply to ;FS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the freee/ercise of religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free e/ercise anden'oy#ent of religious profession and worship carries with it the right todisse#inate religious infor#ation. ;ny restraint of such right could only be

'ustied li+e other restraints of freedo# of e/pression on the grounds thatthere is clear and present danger of any substantive evil! which the State hasthe right to prevent.

EBRALINAG v. DIISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 97880, M#5 1,199


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Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and ele#entarystudents fro# Cebu who were e/pelled for not participating in the agcere#ony of their schools. They are represented by their parents. ;s Iehovahs ,itnesses! they consider the ag as an idol which! according totheir religion! should not be worshipped. They believe that the ag cere#ony

is a for# of worship which is prohibited by their religion. )espondentscounter by invo+ing ); 3B! (epart#ent 0rder 6 and the ruling of Jeronav. Secretary of ducation which upheld that all students should participate inthe ag cere#ony. The Court reversed the Jerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. /pelling the# based on their religious beliefs would be acurtail#ent of their right to religious profession and worship and their right tofree education.

I:e&/ N/ C#/&2o v. CA (1996)

The glesia ni Cristo 71C8 operates a TV progra# titled D;ng glesia ni Cristo.E

The Foard of )eview for -otion Pictures and Television classied suchprogra# as rated @! being not t for public viewing as it o%ends andconstitutes an attac+ against other religions. The SC held that 1C isprotected by ;rt. ! Sec. K of the Constitution. The Foard failed to show anyi##inent or grave danger that would be brought about by the telecast of theshow. ;lso! the show itself is not an attac+ against! but rather a criticis# of!other religions. Such ground 7i.e.! criticis#8 is not a valid ground in order toprohibit the broadcasting of the show. SC also ar#ed -T)CFs power toregulate these types of television progra#s citing the 35B3 case of Sotto v)ui& regarding the (irector of Posts power to chec+ as to whether or notpublications are of a libelous character.

RUBI v. PROINCIAL BOARD O$ MINDORO, G.R. No. L1408, M#58, 1919

The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid e/ercise of policepower.

CHAE% v. PEA, G.R. No. 1'70, *+- 9, '00'

The right to infor#ation includes ocial infor#ation on on*going negotiationsbefore a nal contract. The infor#ation! however! #ust constitute denite

propositions by the govern#ent and should not cover recogni&ed e/ceptionsli+e privileged infor#ation! #ilitary and diplo#atic secrets! and si#ilar#atters a%ecting national security and public order.

STONEHILL v. DIO>NO, G.R. No. L19770, *+e 19, 1968

Two points #ust be stressed in connection with this constitutional #andate!na#elyM 738 that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause! to be


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deter#ined by the 'udge in the #anner set forth in said provisionN and 7B8that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be sei&ed.

1one of these re:uire#ents has been co#plied with in the contestedwarrants. ndeed! the sa#e were issued upon applications stating that the

natural and 'uridical person therein na#ed had co##itted a "violation of Central Fan Laws! Tari% and Custo#s Laws! nternal )evenue 7Code8 and)evised Penal Code." n other words! no speci"c o%ense had been alleged insaid applications.

PEOPLE O$ THE PHILIPPINES! v&. MAR> *ASON CHAE% Y BITANCORALIAS NOY! G.R. No. '08970, Se2e!"e# '', '014

The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accusedduring custodial investigation. )epublic ;ct 1o. 2K=6 even e/panded itsdenition to Dinclude the practice of issuing an Winvitation to a person who is

investigated in connection with an o%ense he is suspected to haveco##itted! without pre'udice to the liability of the Winviting ocer for anyviolation of law.E This #eans that even those who voluntarily surrenderedbefore a police ocer #ust be apprised of their Miranda rights. Gor one! thesa#e pressures of a custodial setting e/ist in this scenario. Chave& is alsobeing :uestioned by an investigating ocer in a police station. ;s anadditional pressure! he #ay have been co#pelled to surrender by his #otherwho acco#panied hi# to the police station.

MARIETA DE CASTRO v&. PEOPLE O$ THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 18168', $e"#+#- 0', '017

The right to re#ain silent and to counsel can be invo+ed only in the conte/tin which the -iranda doctrine applies when the ocial proceeding isconducted under the coercive at#osphere of a custodial interrogation. Thereare no cases e/tending the# to a non*coercive setting. The rights areinvocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. ; personundergoing a nor#al audit e/a#ination is not under custodial investigationand! hence! the audit e/a#iner #ay not be considered the law enforce#entocer conte#plated by the rule. Fy a fair analogy! -arieta #ay not be saidto be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated byany police or law enforce#ent ocer. She was under ad#inistrative

investigation by her superiors in a private r# and in purely voluntary#anner. She was not restrained of her freedo# in any #anner. She was freeto stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to sayanything.

PEOPLE O$ THE PHILIPPINES v&. MEDARIO CALANTIAO - DIMALANTAG.R. No. '094, *+e 1, '014


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The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and sei&ure incident to a lawfularrest is "to protect the arresting ocer fro# being har#ed by the personarrested! who #ight be ar#ed with a concealed weapon! and to prevent thelatter fro# destroying evidence within reach." t is therefore a reasonablee/ercise of the States police power to protect 738 law enforcers fro# the

in'ury that #ay be inicted on the# by a person they have lawfully arrestedNand 7B8 evidence fro# being destroyed by the arrestee. t see+s to ensurethe safety of the arresting ocers and the integrity of the evidence underthe control and within the reach of the arrestee.

*AIME D. DELA CRU%! v&. PEOPLE O$ THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. '0084, *+- ', '014

; person apprehended or arrested cannot literally #ean any personapprehended or arrested for any cri#e. The phrase #ust be read in conte/tand understood in consonance with ).;. 53. Section 3> co#prehends

persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under ;rticle of the law. Hence! a drug test can only be #ade upon persons who areapprehended or arrested for violations of the (angerous (rugs ;ct. To #a+ethe provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any cri#enot listed under ;rticle of the (angerous (rugs ;ct is tanta#ount to undulye/panding its #eaning. Gurther#ore! #a+ing the phrase Da personapprehended or arrestedE in Section 3> applicable to all persons arrested orapprehended for unlawful acts! not only under ).;. 53 but for all othercri#es! is tanta#ount to a #andatory drug testing of all personsapprehended or arrested for any cri#e. -oreover! Da waiver of an illegalwarrantless arrest does not #ean a waiver of the inad#issibility of evidence

sei&ed during an illegal warrantless arrest.E

THE PEOPLE O$ THE PHILIPPINES vs. ICTOR COGAED Y ROMANAG.R. No. '004, *+- 0, '014

0ne of these 'urisprudential e/ceptions to search warrants is Dstop andfris+E. DStop and fris+E searches are often confused with searches incidentalto lawful arrests under the )ules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawfularrest re:uire that a cri#e be co##itted in (agrante delicto, and the searchconducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is doneto ensure that there are no weapons! as well as to preserve the evidence.

The balance lies in the concept of DsuspiciousnessE present in the situationwhere the police ocer nds hi#self or herself in. This #ay be undoubtedlybased on the e/perience of the police ocer. Hence! they should have theability to discern $ based on facts that they the#selves observe $ whetheran individual is acting in a suspicious #anner. Clearly! a basic criterionwould be that the police ocer! with his or her personal +nowledge! #ustobserve the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. t is the police


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ocer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police ocer should not adopt the suspicioninitiated by another person. This is necessary to 'ustify that the personsuspected be stopped and reasonably searched. ;nything less than thiswould be an infringe#ent upon ones basic right to security of ones person

and e%ects. Police ocers cannot 'ustify unbridled searches and be shieldedby this e/ception! unless there is co#pliance with the Dgenuine reasonEre:uire#ent and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.

MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 16071, *+e , '006

The right against self*incri#ination is accorded to every person who givesevidence! whether voluntary or under co#pulsion of subpoena! in any civil!cri#inal or ad#inistrative proceeding. The right is not to be co#pelled to bea witness against hi#self.

GOT. O$ HONG>ONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 17687, A#/ 19, '008

f bail can be granted in deportation cases! we see no 'ustication why itshould not also be allowed in e/tradition cases. Li+ewise! considering thatthe 9niversal (eclaration of Hu#an )ights applies to deportation cases!there is no reason why it cannot be invo+ed in e/tradition cases. ;fter all!both are ad#inistrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of theperson detained is not in issue.

*OSE *ESUS M. DISINI, *#., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY O$ *USTICE, ET

AL., G.R. No. '07. $e"#+#- 1, '014

Charging o%enders of violation of ); 3432> and the )PC both with regard tolibelN li+ewise with ); 522> on Child pornography constitutes double 'eopardy. The acts dened in the Cybercri#e Law involve essentially thesa#e ele#ents and are in fact one and the sa#e with the )PC and ); 522>.

RENATO M. DAID v&. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE O$ THEPHILIPPINESG.R. No. 19911, M#5 1, '017

(avid argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is anatural*born Gilipino citi&en! and that by re*ac:uiring the sa#e status under).;. 1o. 5BB> he was by legal ction Ddee#ed not to have lostE it at the ti#eof his naturali&ation in Canada and through the ti#e when he was said tohave falsely clai#ed Philippine citi&enship in his -iscellaneous Lease;pplication. However! while Section B declares the general policy thatGilipinos who have beco#e citi&ens of another country shall be dee#ed Dnot


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to have lost their Philippine citi&enship!E such is :ualied by the phraseDunder the conditions of this ;ct.E t provides that those natural*born Gilipinoswho have lost their citi&enship by naturali&ation in a foreign country shall re*ac:uire their Philippine citi&enship upon ta+ing the oath of allegiance to the)epublic of the Philippines.

CO@UILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171914, *+- 1, '00'

; person loses Philippine citi&enship and do#icile of origin by beco#ing a9.S. citi&en after enlisting in the 9.S. 1avy! as residence in the 9.S. is are:uire#ent for naturali&ation as a 9.S. citi&en. This results in theabandon#ent of do#icile in the Philippines. The person #ay only be said tohave been do#iciled in the Philippines again once he repatriates or by an actof Congress! but the period before this act of reac:uisition will not count inthe residency re:uire#ent for elected ocials. His status during that periodis one of an alien who has obtained an i##igrant visa and has waived his

status as a non*resident.

REPUBLIC O$ THE PHILIPPINES v. A%UCENA SAAEDRA BATUGAS,G.R. No. 1110, O2o"e# 8, '01

; Petition for 'udicial declaration of Philippine citi&enship is di%erent fro# 'udicial naturali&ation under C; K2=. n the rst! the petitioner believes he isa Gilipino citi&en and as+s a court to declare or conr# his status as aPhilippine citi&en. n the second! the petitioner ac+nowledges he is an alien!and see+s 'udicial approval to ac:uire the privilege of beco#ing a Philippineciti&en based on re:uire#ents re:uired under C; K2=.

ELECTION, PUBLIC O$$ICERS AND ADMINISTRATIE LAW

YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 018, Nove!"e# 17, 19'

;bano was a native of -eycauayan who studied in -anila! where he wasregistered to vote. ;fter co#pleting his studies as a lawyer! ;bano returnedto -eycauayan and ran for oce though his cancellation of votersregistration in -anila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the#ails on ti#e. n ruling in ;banos favor! the Court e/plained that theregistration of a voter does not confer the right to voteN it is but a condition

precedent to the e/ercise of the right. )egistration is a regulation! not a:ualication.

SETLANA P. *ALOS*OS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, e2 ., G.R.No. 1914, $e"#+#- '6, '01


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; change of residence re:uires an actual and deliberate abandon#ent! andone cannot have two legal residences at the sa#e ti#e! otherwise theresidence of origin should be dee#ed to continue.

CASAN MACODE MA@UILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO - CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 197649,A#/ 16, '01

(ual citi&ens by naturali&ation are re:uired to ta+e not only the 0ath of ;llegiance to the )epublic of the Philippines but also to personally renounceforeign citi&enship in order to :ualify as a candidate for public oce. f by theti#e an aspiring candidate led his certicate of candidacy! he was a dualciti&en en'oying the rights and privileges of Gilipino and foreign citi&enship.He was :ualied to vote! but by the e/press dis:ualication under SectionK47d8 of the Local Jovern#ent Code! he was not :ualied to run for a localelective position. Fy being barred fro# even beco#ing a candidate! his

certicate of candidacy is thus rendered void fro# the beginning.

Feing a non*candidate! the votes cast in his favor should not have beencounted. This leaves the :ualied candidate who obtained the highestnu#ber of votes. Therefore! the rule on succession under the LocalJovern#ent Code will not apply.

OLIIA DA SILA CERA$ICA v&. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.'0716, Dee!"e# ', '014

The C0-LC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to C0Cs.

The Court e#phasi&ed that the duty of the C0-LC to give due course toC0Cs led in due for# is #inisterial in character! and that while theC0-LC #ay loo+ into patent defects in the C0Cs! it #ay not go into#atters not appearing on their face. The :uestion of eligibility or ineligibilityof a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cogni&ance of theC0-LC. The deter#ination of whether a candidate is eligible for theposition he is see+ing involves a deter#ination of fact where parties #ust beallowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus! in si#plyrelying on the -e#orandu# of (irector ;#ora Ladra in cancelling i#berlysC0C and denying the latters substitution by 0livia! and absent any petitionto deny due course to or cancel said C0C! the Court nds that the C0-LC

once #ore gravely abused its discretion.

LUIS R. ILLA$UERTE v. COMELEC ; MIGUEL ILLA$UERTE, G.R.No. '0669, $e"#+#- '7, '014

Section 26 of the 0#nibus lection Code states that the false representationin the contents of the Certicate of Candidacy 7C0C8 #ust refer to #aterial#atters in order to 'ustify the cancellation of the C0C. -aterial


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#isrepresentation under the 0#nibus lection Code refers to DOualicationsfor elective oceE 7residency! age! citi&enship! or any other legal:ualications necessary to run for local elective oce as provided in theLocal Jovern#ent Code8 coupled with a showing that there was an intent todeceive the electorate.

GON%ALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19'76, M#5 , '011

,e nd it necessary to point out that Sections > and 2 of )epublic ;ct 7).;.81o. *day period for ling "sec. 26" petitions under the oec is changed to >days counted fro# the last day for the ling of C0Cs. The clear language of Section 26 certainly cannot be a#ended or #odied by the #ere referencein a subse:uent statute to the use of a procedure specically intended foranother type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction thatrepeals by i#plication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Courtunless the intent of the legislators is #anifest. n addition! it is noteworthythat Loong! which upheld the B>*day period for ling "Section 26" petitions!

was decided long after the enact#ent of ).;.


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,hen there has been no valid substitution! the candidate with the highestnu#ber of votes should be proclai#ed as the duly elected #ayor.

EMILIO RAMON E.R. P. E*ERCITO v&. HON. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS ; EDGAR EGAY S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. '1'9,Nove!"e# '7, '014

San Luis led a dis:ualication case against co*gubernatorial candidate'ercito. The C0-LC Girst (ivision and C0-LC n banc granted thedis:ualication petition. n the said petition! San Luis alleges that 'ercitowas distributing an D0range CardE with the intent to entice voters to vote forhi# and that 'ercito e/ceeded the allowable a#ount for ca#paign funds.'ercito alleges that a preli#inary investigation should have been conductedprior to the decision of the C0-LC. n this regard! the Supre#e Court ruledthat! ;s conte#plated in paragraph 3 of C0-LC )esolution 1o. B4>4! a

co#plaint for dis:ualication led before the election which #ust be in:uiredinto by the C0-LC for the purpose of deter#ining whether the actsco#plained of have in fact been co##itted. ,here the in:uiry results in anding before the election! the C0-LC shall order the candidate?sdis:ualication. n case the co#plaint was not resolved before the election!the C0-LC #ay #otu propio or on #otion of any of the parties! refer thesaid co#plaint to the Law (epart#ent of the C0-LC for preli#inaryinvestigation.

PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1161, Nove!"e# '7, '009

Penera was dis:ualied as a #ayoralty candidate for engaging in electionca#paigning before the ca#paign period. The Court ruled in her favor. ;candidate is any person aspiring for or see+ing an elective public oce! whohas led a certicate of candidacy. ;ny person who les a certicate of candidacy within the period for ling shall only be considered as a candidateat the start of the ca#paign period for which he led his certicate of candidacy. ;ccordingly! a candidate is only liable for an election o%ense foracts done during the ca#paign period! not before. ;ny unlawful act oro#ission applicable to a candidate shall ta+e e%ect only upon the start of theca#p

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