POLITICAL LAW CASES 2010-2012

ADMIN LAW & PUBLIC OFFICERS

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA et al; G.R.

No. 184740; February 11, 2010 sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,

concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been

appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members

and their deputies and assistants.

Facts:

On October 4, 2006, President Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of

DOTC, vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista wasdesignated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the

department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.On September 1, 2008, following

the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-

Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.On

October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concernedcitizen and lawyer, filed the

instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is

proscribed by the prohibition on thePresident, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their

deputies andassistants to hold any other office or employment.On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of

this petition, Bautista wasappointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she

assumedher duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.

Judicial review; requisites.

the courts power of judicial review, like almost all other powers conferred by the

Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,

direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Respondents assert that the second requisite is absent in this case.

Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when

(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of

the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and

(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

The question on standing is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the

outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the

presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the

Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be

accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the

tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law

in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of

transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes

upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members

of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in

government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him

with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.

Public officials; multiple office.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive

officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as

provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office.

The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation

of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and

functions on said officials.

Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation

when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her

designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of

her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly

persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as OIC of

MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as

DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for

Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes

the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the

following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports

Authority General Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank

of the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and

temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office

pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs

the duties and functions of the office.

The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices,

refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,

words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2,

Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in

possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of

the functions and duties of the office.

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of

powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of

the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of the times and

the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent

with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be

avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of designating members of

the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various

government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous

public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant

betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime.

It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people

that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions

under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the

holding of multiple governmental offices and employment.

SAMSON vs. RESTRIVERA G.R. No. 178454, March 28, 2011 DOCTRINE:

The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which

are unfair or irregular.

Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not

service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not

qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the

Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be

connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

FACTS:

Petitioner is the department head of the Population Commission with office atthe Provincial Capitol,

Trece Martirez City, Cavite. Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent

Julia A. Restrivera, to have the latters land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens

System. Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent

to cover the initial expenses for the titling of respondents land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish

her task because it was found out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return

the P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave

misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the

Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and

suspended her from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to

abide by the standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of

committed service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of

title over the latters land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over a case involving aprivate dealing by a government

employee or where the act complained of is notrelated to the performance of official duty?

HELD: YES.

The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint against petitioner although the act

complained of involves a private deal between them. Section 13(1), Article XI of the 1987

Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any

person any act or omission of anypublic official or employee when such act or omission

appears to be ILLEGAL, UNJUST, OR IMPROPER.

Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Actof 1989, the jurisdiction of

the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance

committed by any public officer or employee during his/her tenure.

Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but

NOT LIMITED, TO ACTS OR OMISSIONS WHICH ARE UNFAIR OR IRREGULAR. Thus, even if the

complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is

within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or

omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that

the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

PEOPLE V. LUIS J. MORALES GR 166355 MAY 30, 2011 Facts:

Luis Morales, the acting president of Expocorp at the time relevant to the case, was charged by the

Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau. He was charged of unlawfully selling a Mercedes

benz issued to him without the requisite public bidding nor approval of the Board of Directors of Expo

Corporation and thereafter failed to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned vehicle to the

account of Expo Corporation, to the damage and prejudice of the Corporation and the public interest as

well.

Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense

charged. He alleged that Expocorp is a private corporation and that he is not a public employee or official.

He added that Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation because it was not created

by a special law, it did not have an original charter, and a majority of Expocorps capital stock is owned by

private individuals.

Sandiganbayan ruled that ruled that the position of a president of a government-owned or controlled

corporation clearly falls within its jurisdiction. However, before Morales could be held accountable as

Expocorps president, it must first be established that Expocorp is a government-owned or controlled

corporation.

Sandiganbayan ruled, citing Laurel v Desierto, that Expocorp is a private corporation; that it was not

created by a special law nor did it have an original charter. It was organized under the Corporation Code

and was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. According to the Sandiganbayan,

Expocorp could not derive its public character from the fact that it was organized by the NCC. Hence, its

officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On

this basis, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the information against Morales.

Issues:

a. Whether or not Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the executive

functions of the National Centennial Commission and the sovereign functions of the government, and

should be considered as a public office.

b. Whether or not petitioner, as president of Expocorp, should rightfully be considered as a "public officer",

falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandigangayan.

Ruling: Petition is denied.

Expocorp is a private corporation as found by the Sandiganbayan. It was not created by a special law

but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and

Exchange Commission. It is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-

owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock

corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government.

Under Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Sandiganbayan shall exercise jurisdiction over

criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by

public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations,

in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

But since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation,

Morales, as Expocorps president who now stands charged for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019

in this capacity, is beyond the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

MACALINTAL VS. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - G.R. NO. 191618

NOVEMBER 23, 2010 Facts:

Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-

President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts

established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative

functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the

formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does

not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant

of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-

President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not PET is constitutional; Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral

Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII

of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the

Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the

additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to

decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into

effect.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which

provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be

established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of

electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a

presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of

law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise

of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C

(for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the

Constitution.

Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146,

August 25, 2010. Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities.

Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in

the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL).

The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to

how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that

the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on

installment basis.

The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every

calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part

and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people.

It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of

officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to

ERADICATE CORRUPTION, PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT, AND ENSURE THAT

ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS LEAD JUST AND MODEST LIVES.

It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject

to reasonable administrative regulations.

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers.

The Court rejected respondents contention that he was deprived of his right to due process

when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him on the basis

of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainants

assertions.

Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to

anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the

complaint OR based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a

probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true.

The use of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers

the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the

said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without

supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is

probable cause

other rulings

I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or

employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a

wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held

civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing.

Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding

against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.

Res judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the

decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid and

final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate

and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.

The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case

subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's

side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are

given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are

sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR

MILLCORPORATION vs.CA and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION (G.R.

No. 180462 February 9,2011)FACTS: In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to

theeffects of El Nio and La Nia phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure

stablesugar prices, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series

of 1999 (EO 87),facilitating sugar importation by the private sector.Section 2 of EO 87 created a

Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction to determine proceduresfor sugar importation as well

as for collection and remittance of conversion fee.Under Section 3 of EO 87, sugar conversion is

by auction and is subject to conversion fee to beremitted by respondent Sugar Regulatory

Administration (SRA) to the Bureau of Treasury.On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar

Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding Rulesproviding guidelines for sugar importation. Under

the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three working days from

receipt of notice of the bid award and the75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.The

Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if theimported

sugar fails to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee isforfeited in

favor of the SRA.The SRA forthwith authorized the importation of 300,000 metric tons of sugar,

to be made inthree tranches.The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the

publication of the invitation to bid.Several sugar importers submitted sealed bid tenders.

Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar MillCorporation (Sugar Mill) and South Pacific Sugar

Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged aswinning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

tranches.Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amountingto

P14,340,000.00, while Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amountingto

P28,599,000.00.As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only

10% of theirsugar import allocation. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining sugar

import allocationblaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations sought

immediate reimbursementof the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to

P38,637,000.00.The SRA informed the sugar corporations that the conversion fee would be

forfeited pursuant toparagraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules. The SRA also notified the sugar

corporations that theauthority to reconsider their request for reimbursement was vested with

the Committee on SugarConversion/Auction.The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach

of contract and damages in the RegionalTrial Court.In its notice of appearance, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRAs legal department to assist the

OSG in this case.

The RTC ruled in favor of the sugar corporations and held that paragraph G.1 of the BiddingRules

contemplated delay in the arrival of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation.It

concluded that the forfeiture provision did not apply to the sugar corporations which

merelycancelled the sugar importation.On 5 January 2007, the OSG received its copy of the RTC

Decision. On 24 January 2007, thedeputized SRA counsel, Atty. Raul Labay, received his own

copy of the Decision and filed anotice of appeal on 7 February 2007.The sugar corporations

moved to expunge the notice of appeal on the ground that only the OSG,as the principal

counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be made. The sugar corporationsstressed that a

lawyer deputized by the OSG has no authority to decide whether an appeal shouldbe made.The

OSG filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG pointed out

that in its notice of appearance, it authorized SRA counsel Atty. Labay to assist the OSG in

thiscase.The RTC granted the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. The OSG then moved

forreconsideration however it was denied.A motion for execution was granted by the

RTC.Aggrieved, the SRA filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65

seekingto set aside the orders issued by the RTC as well as the writ of execution.The Court of

Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal. The

appellate court thus directed the RTC to give due course to the appeal that Atty.Labay timely

filed.

RULING:

The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the

OSG to represent the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order

No.18, Series of 1986, in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the

servicesof lawyers.

In National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation this Court ruled that the

deputization by the OSG of NAPOCOR counsels in cases involving the NAPOCOR included the

authority to file a notice of appeal. The Court explained that the OSG could have withdrawn the

appeal if it believed that the appeal would not advance the governments cause. The Court held

that even if the deputized NAPOCOR counsel had no authority to file a notice of appeal, the

defect was cured by the OSGs subsequent manifestation that the deputized NAPOCOR counsel

had authority to file a notice of appeal.In the present case, records show that both the OSG and

the deputized SRA counsel were servedcopies of the RTC decision subject of the appeal. Thus,

what applies is National Power Corporation v. Vine Development Corporation.

Applying here the doctrine laid down in the saidcase, deputized SRA counsel Atty. Labay is,

without a doubt, authorized to file a notice of appeal. Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to

file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured whenthe OSG subsequently filed its opposition to

the motion to expunge the notice of appeal. As the OSG explained, its reservation to "approve

the withdrawal of the case, the non-appeal, or otheractions which appear to compromise the

interest of the government" was meant to protect theinterest of the government in case the

deputized SRA counsel acted in any manner prejudicial togovernment. Obviously, what required

the approval of the OSG was the non-appeal, not theappeal, of a decision adverse to

government.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Nieto A. Racho; G.R. No. 185685 January

31, 2011 The Court finds merit in the petition.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari

because the Court is not a trier of facts.36 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings

of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,

unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and

the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they

are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are

not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of

evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record

From the records, it is undisputed that Racho admitted the bank accounts, but explained that the deposits

reflected therein were not entirely his. Racho proffered that some of the money came from his brothers

and nephew as part of their contribution to the business that they had planned to put up. He presented a

Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated January 28, 1993, and Joint Affidavit of his siblings that echoed his

explanation.

In the appreciation of the said documents, the Ombudsman and the CA took opposing views. The

Ombudsman did not give weight to the SPA due to some questionable entries therein. The CA, on the

other hand, recognized the fact that Racho never denied the existence of the bank accounts and accepted

his explanation. Accordingly, the CA decreed that although Racho was remiss in fully declaring the said

bank deposits in his SALN, the intent to make a false statement, as would constitute dishonesty, was

clearly absent.

The pivotal issue in this case, however, is whether or not Rachos non-disclosure of the bank deposits in

his SALN constitutes dishonesty.

The Court views it in the affirmative.

Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 301938 explain the nature and importance of

accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn SALN, thus:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after

assuming office, and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of

every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation

or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of corresponding Department

Head, or in the case of a Head Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of

the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and sources of his income,

the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the

next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two

months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the

fifteenth day of April following the close of said calendar year.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. If in accordance

with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Nine, a

public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in

the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to

his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal.

Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into

consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown.

Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official,

his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any club or

association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-

official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of

proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of

this Section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances

hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the

public official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth

is completed.

Xxxx Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed

and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of

preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for

official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. "Unexplained"

matter normally results from "non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all

public officials and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of

accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, the public

are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance

mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A. 137941 states that

"whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of

property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee

and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said

property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."

By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required to make a

complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable

accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such matters.

Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired money or property manifestly

disproportionate to his salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have

illegally acquired it.

Xxxx what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source

of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is "explained wealth" which the

law does not penalize.

In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank accounts containing substantial deposits

but he also failed to satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or even identify the

sources of such accumulated wealth. The documents that Racho presented, like those

purportedly showing that his brothers and nephew were financially capable of sending or

contributing large amounts of money for their business, do not prove that they did contribute or

remit money for their supposed joint business venture. Equally, the SPA that was supposedly

issued by Vieto, Dido and Henry Racho in favor of Racho on January 28, 1993 to show their

business plans, contained a glaringly inconsistent statement that belies the authenticity of the

document

Definitely, a document that was allegedly executed in 1993 could not contain a statement

referring to a future date "registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999." This certainly renders the

intrinsic and extrinsic value of the SPA questionable.

Thus, the SPA and Joint Affidavits which should explain the sources of Rachos wealth are

dubious and merit no consideration.

Dishonesty begins when an individual intentionally makes a false statement in any material

fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his

examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition

to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity

or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,

deceive or betray.

It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon ones ability to perform his duties with the

integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.53 Section 52 (A)(1), Rule IV

of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats dishonesty as a

grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction.

Indeed, an honest public servant will have no difficulty in gathering, collating and presenting

evidence that will prove his credibility, but a dishonest one will only provide shallow excuses in

his explanations.

It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not

automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly

disproportionate to the employees income or other sources of income and the public

officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he

become susceptible to dishonesty because when a public officer takes an oath or office, he or

she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable

skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of

duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful persons

use in the management of their affairs

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO et al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA et

al; G.R. No. 180050; April 12, 2011 FACTS:When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official

population of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics

Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the

land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. R.A.

No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of

802.12 square kilometers.

Hence, Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was

held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed

province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID.

Respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, is exempted

from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which states that "[t]he land

area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands."

Constitutional Law

Locus Standi.

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues

upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. It

cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to

Recall Entry of Judgment is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit

Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed, according to the

Supreme Court, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the

case, such that if the Resolution ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election to their respective

positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to

naught.

Moot and academic Principle; Exception.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the

courts from resolving a case.

Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

(1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

(2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is

involved;

(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the

bench, the bar, and the public; and

(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Local Government Code

Local Government; Requisites for creation of province.

The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic

viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents.

The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area,

are all designed to accomplish these results. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the

creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the

clear intent of the framers of the LGC.

However, there is an exemption provided in the Local Government Code in terms of the land

area requirement. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more

islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and

Section 450 of the LGC, if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a

component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for

the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under

Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court found no reason why this exemption should not

apply also to provinces.

In fact, the Supreme Court observed that considering the physical configuration of the Philippine

archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the

land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,

logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for

municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted

in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2)

of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461

of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. The Court thus upheld the validity of

Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO LAUGA; G.R. No. 186228; March 15,

2010 FACTS:

Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone

at home while his father was having drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave

because appellant has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also

went out with some neighbors. At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid

inside the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the

victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter by threatening her

with his fist and a knife. Soon after, the victims brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he

scolded the victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house. While on their way to their

maternal grandmothers house, victim recounted to her brother what happened to her. They later told the

incident to their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found

appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which he

obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he was unable to

control himself. The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with

modification the ruling of the trial court.

Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the

credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to

Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not

assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement

Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"

the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman xxx may be deemed as law

enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the

Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, SC had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay

bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of

keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."

Also, xxx pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as

amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as

implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level." The

composition of the Committee includes, among others:

(1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman;

(2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan;

(3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa;

(4) a Barangay Tanod; and

(5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch

Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature

of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government

unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay

level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the

specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the

authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-

related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights

provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda

Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was

taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

VICTORINO B. ALDABA et al vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; G.R No. 188078;

January 25, 2010 Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a

legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population

requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of

Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through

House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of

223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor

Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos

will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional

for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in

Congress.

RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

The Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a population of at

least 250,000." The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000,

whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time

for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is

unconstitutional.

Requisites (certification):

(1) certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official

by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).

(2) certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his

designated certifying officer.

(3) intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

In the case at bar:

(1) it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

(2) It was the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO who issued the certification, he was unauthorized

to do so

(3) the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos

population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.

BUKLOD NANG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC V RAMOS AND

SONS, INC.; 645SCRA40; GR 131481, March 16, 2011 Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Zoning ;Zoning Classification is

an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent domain.

Zoning Classification is an exercise by the local government police power, not the power of

eminent domain.

A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,

prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present

and future projection of needs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; By virtue of a zoning ordinace, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe,

define and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the

present, but also on the future projection of needs.

By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define and

apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the

present, but also on the future projection of needs.

To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures thereon would

completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality.

Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by

the local legislature of the current use of the land.

Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before

the lower tribunal for its consideration

As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its

consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor

raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration

or on appeal.

Same; Same; Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be

considered by the reviewing court , as may it be raised at any stage.

There are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be raised for the first time on appeal.

Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by

the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue not

properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when

there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of

public policy. Buklod, however, did not allege, much less argue, that its case falls under any of these

exceptions.

Constitutional Law; Social Justice; Never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because

they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for

poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law

It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, the court is called upon to tilt the balance in favor of

the poor to whom the constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it

justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply

because they are rich, for the justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to

the mandate of the law. Vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important

because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who

under our constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.

FACTS:

The subject of the controversy involves several parcels of unirrigated land, a part of the 372-hectare land

owned by the respondent (EMRASON). It was acquired in 1965 for the purpose of developing into a

residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". The Municipal Council of Dasmar, Cavite, acting

in pursuance of the Local Autonomy Act, enacted an ordinance providing subdivision regulation and

penalties for violation thereof. In 1972, EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and development

its 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision. The Municipal Council approved the said

application through the issuance of a resolution.

Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property

development. However, the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay due to the

fact that the property in question was mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the

Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation.

On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or

CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.

During the Aquino administration, DAR was tasked with to acquire additional lands from the nearby areas

as part of its conversion project. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the property of EMRASON. The DAR

Secretary sent out 4 notices of acquisition to EMRASON which the latter protested. EMRASON filed with

the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the first 3 sets of the notices and was then referred to the Office

of the Regional Director. The issue therein was to determine whether or not the subject property is

covered by the CARP and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.

DAR conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property. The Legal Division of DAR rendered a

decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered

thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP.

The DOJ Opinion adverted to clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June

15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. The DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to

the DAR Secretary assailing that the Legal Divisions decision ran contrary to the department's official

position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified

beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to

deliver to them the balance of 39 hectares x x x".

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an order affirming the Notices of Acquisition and directing the OAR field

officials to pursue the coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of EMRASON.

EMRASON to the Office of the President but such was dismissed stating that EMRASONs property has

remained AGRICULTURAL in classification and therefore falls within the coverage of the CARP for its

failure to comply with the requirements of the Municipal Ordinance, Admin Order 152 and Certification of

the HSRC and HLURB.

The matter was brought before the CA where the latter issued a TRO (TRO enjoining the DAR Secretary

and Deputy Executive Secretary from implementing the their decision and resolution until further orders

from the court. CA later on granted EMRASONs writ of preliminary injunction. While the DAR Secretary

filed for MfR, DAR already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the

subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA

enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the

subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to

intervene as an indispensable; that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved; and that

the Petition for Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a

petition for certiorari before SC.

CA allowed the intervention of Buklod because the latter's participation was "not being in any way

prejudicial to the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal

complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by

EMRASON.

CA ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classified as

residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.

ISSUES:

(The main issue of the case is WON the subject property could be placed under the CARP but for

Constitutional Law purposes ---- >) WON the Zoning Ordinance and the Resolution approving the

reclassification of the land issued by the Municipality of Dasmarinas is in accordance with the powers of

such LGU.

RULING:

SC affirms the decision of the CA, in favor of EMRASON

The Local Autonomy Act of 1959

a precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991, provided;

SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal

and regularly organized municipal district councils

Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in

municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or

regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the

City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may,

however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning

and zoning. (Emphases supplied.)

The Municipal Council of Dasmarinas approved Ordinance No. 1 which laid down the general

subdivision regulations for the municipality; and Resolution No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, which approved the

application for subdivision of the subject property.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 or the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to

adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law

does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that

Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the

intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision.

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other

use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be

utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the

land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion;

Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.

Under the present Local Government Code, the authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality.

By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the

land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the

future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures

thereon would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or

municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping

by the local legislature of the current use of the land.

the regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning

and reclassification is an exercise of police power.

NAPOCOR VS TUAZON GR 193023 FACTS:

Napocors transmission line traversed on respondents property. Respondents demands that they be paid

full value of their land as just compensation. NAPOCOR argues that it shall only pay easement fee

pursuant to section 3-a(b) its charter, R.A. 6395, which prescribes a formula for easement fee.

(In this case, instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right of way

agreement with Mr. Tuazon which included the payment for damages on improvements, easement

tower and occupancy fees and, additional damaged improvements provided under RA 6395.

Respondents thereafter filed a case to demand just compensation but this was dismissed by the RTC

based on the motion of NAPOCOR stating that the respondents were already rendered full satisfaction of

their claims. CA, however, reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the demolition of the land as well

as the installation of the transmission lines constitutes taking under the power of eminent domain.

Thus, respondents should be entitled to just compensation. CA also ruled that NAPOCOR cannot hide

under the mantle of RA 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of the respondents/appellants since the

determination of just compensation is a judicial function.)

ISSUE:

WON the installation of the transmission lines is a form of taking under the power of eminent domain and

does not establish a right-of-way easement & WON the determination of just compensation is a judicial

function

RULING

Petition of NAPOCOR is devoid of merit. The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is

a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or

official of the government. The formula provided in NAPOCORS charter is not binding on the court. It is

only a guide.

Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. The determination of just

compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation

laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just

compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded

and how to arrive at such amount.

The failure of the respondents predecessor-in-interest (Mr. Tuazon) to oppose the installation of

transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. This cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents

right to just compensation

Private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as

just compensation.

SC remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation

SYLLABUS:

Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; Just Compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the

land traversed by the transmission lines.

in holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by

the transmission lines, we said: granting arguendo that the petitioner acquired over

respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view

that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition

of such an easement fails within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion

finds support in similar cases in which the SC sustained the award of just compensation for

private property condemned for public use.

Same; Same; Courts pronouncement in Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) that the exercise of the power of

eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned

property without loss of title or possession remains doctrinal and should be applied

the application of Gutierrez to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases

are comparable. The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines

traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered

life and limb, but restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement

in Gutierrez -- that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the

imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or

possession therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.

Same; Same; Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts

we have held in numerous cases that section 3-A (b) is not conclusive upon the courts. In

NAPOCOR vs Maria Bagui, et al, we categorically held: Moreover, Section 4A(b) of RA No. 6395,

is not binding on the court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just

compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just

compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the

factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the courts own judgment

as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

Same; Same; the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to

the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government

the determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the

discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the

government. This judicial function has constitutional raison detre; Art. III of the Constitution

mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just

compensation.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA (654 S 559 , JULY 27,

2011) RE: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA

Agrarian Reform Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation;

The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law), is essentially a JUDICIAL FUNCTION WHICH IS VESTED IN THE RTC acting

as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) is not

an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to

be file within the 15-day period stated in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (DARAB) Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. --- To resolve the

conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and to

the bar, that the BETTER RULE is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica

and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just

compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but

an original action, the same has to be files within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules;

otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in record with law

and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated

petition before the SAC, e.g. one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land

valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of

uncertainty as to the true value of his property.

There exists no compelling reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of

judicial action for the determination of just compensation. --- Petitioner clearly slept on its rights

by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed 15-day period or a reasonable time

after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Even assuming there was already a

consummated sale with respect to the 151.1419 hectares and LBPs valuation thereof had been

fully paid to the respondent, the amount already paid by LBP shall be deducted from the total

compensation as determined by the PARAD. Notably, LBP exhibited lack of interest in the

discharge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in the summary

administrative proceeding despite due notice of the hearings. Clearly, there exists no compelling

reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for

determination of just compensation.

Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgments;

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer

be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions

of fact and law, and whether it may be by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of

the land;

Exceptions --- The only exceptions to the general rule on the finality of judgments are:

nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,

void judgments, and

whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its

execution unjust and inequitable.

Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of

occasional errors.

New Sun Valley vs Sangguniang Barangay GR 156686 July 7, 2011 Facts:

The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSV

Resolution No. 98-096 entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open

Rosemallow and Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic The New Sun Valley Homeowners

Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), opposed the ordinance and filed a Petition[5] for a "Writ of Preliminary

Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Paraaque City. NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would:

(1) "cause grave injustice and irreparable injury" as "[the] affected homeowners acquired

their properties for strictly residential purposes";

(2) that the subdivision is a place that the homeowners envisioned would provide them

privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places";

(3) and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the subdivision.

The maintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit

to the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles was

controlled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to public use of

the roads in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the homeowners association has a right to the protection of the law that would entitle it

to injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 (they can prevent the

sangguniang barangay from opening the roads to the public)

Ruling:

the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely

Rosemallow and Aster Streets - have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and

the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Paraaque since the

year 1964

Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of Paraaque, the road lots

in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the

commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant.

homeowners association was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built

obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic

The barangay resolution had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be

considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public

road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.

Other rulings:

(1) Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or

municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision

over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed

powers and functions.

(1) We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a

recent case, wherein we held:

(2) The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.

The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their

functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective

competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for

the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to

shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.68

(3) It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangays actions to see if it acted within

the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved

within the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court

committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for petitioners failure to exhaust

administrative remedies, as the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure

and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable

in this case because the subject roads belong to the City Government of Paraaque.

(4) the local government units power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under

the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an

ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling

within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance

must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when

necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

City of Pasig v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 185023 dated August 24,

2011 Facts:

The Payanig properties are parcels of land located in Pasig City, which were surrendered to

the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) by Mid-Pasig Land Development

Corporation (MPLDC) through Jose Campos as ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos. The

Pasig City Treasurer assessed MPLDC for real property taxes (RPT) when it failed to pay the same

and declared the properties delinquent. At a public auction where there was no bidder, Pasig

City bought the properties and issued a certificate of sale in its name. The Republic, through

PCGG, argued that the same was exempt from real property tax, the properties being now

owned by the Republic.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the auction sale and directed Pasig City to re-compute real

property taxes based only on the lots being leased.

The Payanig properties though owned by the government are not properties of public

dominion exempt from taxes and from auction sale because they are not intended for public

use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,

shores, roadsteads. Neither are they intended for some public service or for the

development of the national wealth. MPLDC leased portions of the properties to different

business establishments.

Hence, the portions of the properties not leased to taxable entities are exempt from real

estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real

estate tax

National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay G.R. No.

165828. August 24, 2011. NPC Charter; prescription.

The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395

(the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an

action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the

right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.

The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs

from the action for damages.

It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of

just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory

prescription.

Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and action for

damages; distinction.

An action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from

an action for damages.

o The former, also known as inverse condemnation, is intended to recover the value of

property taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of

the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.

o On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages.

When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19

and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in damage to

another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. The two actions are

different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the

Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the

former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private

property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that

the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature

of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the

constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation.

Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value.

The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the

time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant

to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395.

The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of

the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either

when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it

would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without

the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent

of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners

since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. Reckoning just

compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation

proceedings is warranted.

Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals.

In this case, the CA upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of

Php30,000.00/month from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per annum by finding NPC

guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to construct the tunnel without their

knowledge and consent. However, the SC found that the granting rentals is legally and factually

bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated.

Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in its place prescribed interest of 12%

interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the

full liability is paid by NPC.

Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking.

There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not

completely and actually dispossessed.

It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be

an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of

acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.

Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights

of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful

manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly

deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the

possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. In this case, NPC constructed a

tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal

expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at least informing them

beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and

interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from introducing any

developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale

or mortgage. This was considered by the SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay ju