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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 73

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND DEFENSE DIPLOMACY

BETWEEN INDIA AND ISRAEL: POST-9/11 AND BEYOND

Hriday Ch. Sarma*

Judging from contemporary internal and external developments, India and Israel--currently strate-

gic partners--are poised to grow into a partnership of strategic allies within the international arena

in the near future. This article studies the relationship between India and Israel, focusing on politics

and defense, from 9/11 to the present day. It gives a brief overview of the historical relationship be-

tween India and Israel, especially in the political and military realms, establishing that relationship

within a continuous trajectory which has led to the current flurry of bilateral engagements.

INTRODUCTION

As history testifies, the nations of India and Israel have each met with many destructive impedi-

ments in course of their development. However, each has emerged with distinctive characteristics

that define their respective self-identities. Only six and half decades have passed since they were de-

clared “sovereign states”--for India, in 1947, and for Israel, in 1948. Each at that point created and

consolidated existing state institutions, furthering their own internal and external sovereignty1 as in-

dependent, modern, “Westphalian” states.

From the late 6th century CE onwards, Jews and people from Bharat (the old name for India) have

engaged in trade, commerce, and the exchange of academic and scholarly ideas.2 Throughout this

period, the relationship between the Hindu and Jewish ethno-national communities has always been

congenial and characterized by mutual respect and affection. However, the relationship between In-

dia and Israel during the period between both nations gaining independence and the end of the Cold

War was marked by relative bitterness.

The influential Muslim populace residing either adjacent to or within the territories of the two na-

tions has been a crucial factor in plotting the relations between the countries at the political level.

Muslims in India played a leading role in attempting to inhibit India’s establishing and maintaining

an official relationship with the state of Israel.3 This demographic greatly determined and shaped In-

dia’s foreign policy engagement with Israel throughout the Cold War era; except for the brief rule,

from 1977 to 1979, of the Janata party, which was not as inclined towards the country’s Muslim

populace as the Indian National Congress (INC) party--the longest ruling political party in the coun-

try--had been. Also during the Cold War era, Palestinians within Israel cultivated strong bonds with

India as INC, under the leadership of the Nehru-Gandhi family, took a single-mindedly supportive

stance towards the Palestinian statehood cause.

On September 18, 1950, India finally granted full de jure and de facto recognition to Israel.4

However Nehru’s firm rebuff to Ben Gurion’s overtures initially pitted the national governments of

the two countries against one another.5 This political deadlock between the two countries continued

throughout the Cold War era. However, many authoritative security experts claim that despite the

political deadlock, the two countries managed to maintain clandestine military and intelligence con-

tacts. This study attempts to ascertain if these previous military/intelligence engagements played a

role in cementing an official relationship between the two countries after Indian Prime Minister

Narashima Rao established full diplomatic relations with Israel on January 29, 1992.6

Hriday Sarma

74 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Fall 2014)

This paper describes the political-military relationship between India and Israel, first examining

individual political and military characteristics of both states, then establishing the impact and signif-

icance of previous bilateral political-military engagements, both during the Cold War and from the

official restoration of diplomatic relations until 9/11 and beyond, into the post-9/11 era.7 Further, it

briefly describes the future bilateral strategic alliance between India and Israel, based on factual and

critical analysis of contemporary dynamics.

Such analysis is particularly significant at the moment, given that Israel and India stand at a deci-

sive juncture whereby political-military co-operation between the two is likely to significantly in-

crease in the near future,

INDIA'S DISTINCTIVE POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Indian Military Emerges from Previous British Model

The state of India inherited a British imperial model of bureaucratic-military establishment, which

was imposed on it during the 200-year British occupation of India. Many attributes of the Indian mil-

itary stemmed from this model, including civilian control over the military as a commonly accepted

norm. The first official act in British India that advanced civilian control over the military was the

Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which for the first time stipulated that the head of the military was subordi-

nate to the civilian government and could not revert to the governor-generalship during a vacancy.8

Following this, high-level civil-military conflicts emerged in British India, like the rift between Lord

Curzon of Kedleston and his commander-in-chief Kitchener of Khartoum in 1904-05. At the end of

each of these conflicts the degree of civilian control over the military further increased.

Even during the heightened phase of India’s independence movement, political leaders deliberate-

ly kept the military out of the political realm. This gave political leaders the legitimacy to command

the state post-independence based on the moral authority of their long association with the country’s

freedom struggle.

The decision not to involve the military in the freedom movement is evident from a statement

made at the time by Pandit Motilal Nehru, a prominent Congress leader, to General K.S. Thimayya

and other Indian officers urging them not to resign their commission to join the freedom movement:

“We are going to win independence. Perhaps not this year or the next, but sooner or later the British

will be driven out. When that happens, India will stand alone. We will have no-one to protect us but

ourselves. It is then that our survival will depend upon men like you.”9 His words proved fortuitous

and restricted the army to the professional sphere. Hence, the Indian officer corps in the British Indi-

an Army remained separate from class, ethnicity or political affiliations.

Even after India gained independence, the highest political stratum of India was not in favor of

enlisting the Indian military as an equal partner in the state-building process. Prime Minister Ja-

waharlal Nehru worried that giving power to the military would threaten civilian control later on.10

Nehru acted on these apprehensions in many ways, such as by elevating Krishna Menon, a loyalist of

authoritarian character, to the position of defense minister. In this way, Nehru hoped to strengthen

the iron-clad civilian grip on the military establishment.11

For its part, the military during this period

remained reticent to question the excesses of its civilian leadership on national and institutional is-

sues, which further devalued its role in the national decision-making process.

The overall outcome of these early tensions was maximum civilian control in all areas of civilian

society, and a fairly non-existent role for the military in the country’s defense policies in the early

decades of India's independence.12

This has partially carried through to the modern era: though to-

day’s military enjoys operational autonomy, the political establishment still maintains absolute con-

trol over the military at the highest levels of national security policymaking.13

Bureaucratic Functioning of the Political-Military Relationship

Political Engagement and Defense Diplomacy Between India and Israel: Post-9/11 and Beyond


In India, supreme command of the Armed Forces, comprising mainly its Army, Navy, Air Force

and Coast Guard, rests with the president. The cabinet is entrusted with the responsibility for national

defense, which it discharges through the Ministry of Defense, which in turn provides the policy

framework and wherewithal to the military to execute its instructions on all defense and security re-

lated matters. Overall responsibility for the military and Ministry of Defense rests with the Defense

Minister.14

The Defense Ministry is accountable to the Government of India for dealing with all matters relat-

ing to defense and the armed forces of the Union of India. It acts as a go-between, connecting the

Government of India with the Armed Forces. Respective chiefs of the services are responsible to the

president, through the Defense Ministry, for command, discipline, recruitment, training, organiza-

tion, administration and preparation of war.15

This hierarchy lays out a strict vertical order of engagement between the military and the political

establishment, leaving little or no space for engagement between the two domains, and keeping them

relatively insulated from one another.

Civilian Establishment Lack Of Expertise In Military Affairs

Civilian employees working for the Ministry of Defense rarely have sufficient past military expe-

rience, as conscription is not mandatory in India, unlike in Israel. Lacking military experience, they

have no clear understanding of on-the-ground security challenges, which are necessary to devise ap-

propriate policies and strategy directives. Also, officials within the Defense Ministry generally do

not have long enough tenure to develop personal expertise in military matters as they are constantly

rotated among different ministries and departments.16

In the past, even defense ministers have been alleged to lack adequate technical knowledge relat-

ing to military needs and concerns. As was the case with immediate former defense minister A.K.

Antony, who was widely considered a “status-quoist” with little enthusiasm for innovative ideas.17

Given politicians’ negligent knowledge of military technicalities, inexperienced government bu-

reaucrats have become de facto policy makers for the military. N. N. Vohra, current governor of the

Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, has described this situation as “bureaucratic control and not ci-

vilian political control of the military.”18

Individualistic Approaches of the Military Branches

Since India attained independence, the different branches within its Armed Forces have competed

with one another to further their own organizational interests. The goal of each is to accumulate the

largest share of the total annual defense budget, to procure artillery, logistics, and other resources,

and to further their self-defined strategic objectives within the political establishment.19

Traditional-

ly, the Army has been the most influential and privileged among the services. However, more recent-

ly, the Navy and Air Force have begun to challenge the Army’s predominance within the defense

establishment.

This competition among the services and institutions within the military has largely prevented In-

dia's defense establishment from establishing a functioning internal benefit sharing arrangement that

would allow each to reap optimal benefits. According to founder and director of the Defence Intelli-

gence Agency, Lt. Gen. Kamal Davar,

“the Defence Intelligence Agency cannot deliver as the Intelligence Agencies of the three ser-

vices feel threatened by it,” [and about the Integrated Defence Staff] “the services will never

allow this body to function as they feel threatened that it will start examining the basis of their

budgetary proposals, acquisition plans and force structures”.20

Hriday Sarma


Functional and Existential Synthesis

Despite these structural and functional tensions between India's political and military establish-

ments, the civil-military relationship in India has reached a state of stability in that it functions effi-

ciently without major clashes of interests. Since India’s independence, its military has maintained a

high degree of professionalism. Also, its overall strength, in terms of efficient use of personnel, tech-

nical advances, quality and quantity of weaponry, and by other measures, has been increasing rapid-

ly.

Although a few clashes between the military and political establishment have surfaced recently, as

when ex-army chief V.K. Singh challenged the Ministry of Defense head-on over a controversy re-

garding his date of birth.21

However, the structural stability between India’s military and its political

“masters” has established a dynamic wherein both efficiently discharge their respective functions in

a mutually complementary way.

ISRAEL’S DISTINCTIVE POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

IDF Backbone of the State

When the state of Israel was established on May 14, 1949, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was

entrusted with the responsibility to protect the borders of the state, while enemy states from all sides

were steadfastly attempting to obliterate Israel.It had to equally protect the country’s populace,

which included Jewish and non-Jewish groups and denominations,22

Over time, IDF has upheld these

two primary responsibilities, while also playing a contributing role in keeping the state’s economy of

the state rolling.23

Moreover, it has constantly remained in a state of readiness for war by standing at

the front lines, like along the Israel-Lebanon border, to deter enemies from attacking.24

The IDF played a pivotal role in the process of state-building, in defining the very identity of Isra-

el, and, for its part emerged as “a unique citizen army, in which ethical and political aims of the peo-

ple were preserved in life, along with, those subordinate to the overriding purposes of effective de-

fense.”25

Thus, this disciplined military institution has earned high esteem, and prestige within Israeli

society.

Furthermore, the IDF has won every single war Israel has fought (though perhaps not in absolute

terms). In the process, it has maintained a massive advantage in planning staff relative to civilian

staff, keeping a strong military monopoly on intelligence, strategic planning, security and infor-

mation supply. This has given the IDF tremendous bureaucratic and given it more power than other

Israeli institutions.26

For all these reasons, the IDF rightly qualifies as the primary agent for building

Israel's global image as a “nation in arms.”27

Politicians Take The Final Shots

Despite the dominance of the IDF, the national government and its politicians have always insist-

ed on playing a major role in the political decision-making process regarding Israel’s national inter-

ests. This insistence is in keeping with Israel’s prevailing cultural more of openly questioning the

authority while stating individual and institutional opinions.

Adept politicians, like Ben Gurion, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and others, have taken

differing approaches to ruling Israel during their long political careers. However, almost all of them

have been associated with the IDF in some major capacity. This stems from the fact that the Jews in

Israel initially pursued a military struggle to secure an independent state, paving the way for leaders

of these armed groups (such as the Irgun, Stern Gang, etc.) to subsequently become civilian leaders.

Further, once Israel gained independence, every Jewish citizen was mandated to serve a period of



conscription. Even though most Israeli mid-level political leaders have commanded in the IDF, the

realm of national politics has always remained distinct from the military domain. Professionally, the

military is subordinate to its political rulers, and all final decisions relating to national interests and

security of Israel are made in the political realm. Nevertheless, the judgment of military leaders car-

ries a great deal of weight in matters of security. Public friction between civilian and military leaders

is rare.28

Ex-Soldiers Jumping On The Political Bandwagon

In Israel, military officers often become active in politics upon retirement. Unspoken rules call for

a “cooling-off” period between military and political service, and public indignation has even erupt-

ed in cases where retired officers haven’t respected this rule. Former Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz

sparked controversy when he entered politics almost immediately after his retirement.29

Many reserve officers have stood as candidates and won seats in the Knesset in each of the sixteen

parliamentary elections held in Israel since the foundation of the state in 1948.30

While these repre-

sentatives represent the entire political spectrum, in the past, many senior officers have sided with

the left or center-left wing of the parliamentary chamber, while recently, a growing number are allied

with right-wing political parties.31

As Yoram Peri writes,

Since the 1960s, on average, 10 percent of Israel's Knesset members have been high-ranking

reserve officers. Further about 20 percent of cabinet ministers are generally high-ranking re-

serve officers, and of the three most important offices--prime minister, defense minister and

foreign minister--at least one (usually two) has been occupied by a former career officer, such

as in the governments of both Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon.32

Fusion and Fission of Political Parties

The Israeli political system has been characterized throughout its brief history by a process of fu-

sion and fission: the splitting apart and merging of its political parties.33

For example, the Labor par-

ty was founded in 1968 in a merger of the Mapai, Ahdut HaAvoda, and Rafi parties, and it immedi-

ately emerged as the country's dominant political party, only to experience a steep downturn in sub-

sequent decades. Its defeat in 1977 brought about a split within the party, with one camp led by

Yitzchak Rabin and the other by Shimon Peres.34

Further, in 2011, former prime minister Ehud Bar-

ak walked out of the Labor party to launch his own party, called Independence.35

This suggests that Israel’s political superstructure has constantly witnessed the rise and progress

of new internal dynamics from the time of the state’s formation until the present.

Permeable Boundaries between Civil and Military Domains

Throughout Israel’s modern history, the IDF has maintained a three-tiered military model, where

a large reserve component that is part of the civil society is called up at times of crisis to complement

a small professional and conscript force.36

This has created a continuous two-way transmission of

values and ideas, in areas like politics, ethics and morality, between the military and civilian spheres.

Alan Weinraub, a senior analyst with National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (USA), in his

comprehensive Master's thesis on Israeli civil-military relations, writes, “The [Israeli] military is

constantly involved in the affairs of the state as is the civilian authority in the affairs and that this

two-way influence is constant.37

Today, as in the past, the IDF’s “professional” mentality in dealing with Israel’s enemies contin-

ues to lead political discourse and decision-making. Also, the profound infusion of liberal civilian

Hriday Sarma


and political ideas into the military’s professional domain over time has exerted a subtle but certain

influence on Israel’s military strategies and operational approaches.

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND ISRAEL POST-9/11

Religion--Underlying Factor for Affinity

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in India, which came to power in 1998, was the

first in independent India’s history to proactively begin engaging with Israel. This strategy was for-

mulated in a BJP convention in October 1991, which had a clause calling for establishing full rela-

tions with Israel. The BJP, which espouses a modestly strong version of Hindu nationalism, saw in

Israel a potential ally against a religious third party, the Muslims. On the home front, BJP's align-

ment with the Jewish state was an attempt to consolidate Hindu voters by politically marginalizing

the country's Muslim community. This became somewhat clearer after gory Hindu-Muslim riots

broke out in the state of Gujarat in 2002, and the BJP-led state government, under Narendra Modi,

was allegedly reluctant to immediately rescue Muslims from the local Hindu community which had

perpetrated the violence.38

At the same time, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, a

coalition led by BJP, ultimately delayed sending in either military or paramilitary forces to nip the in

the bud, maintaining firmly that law and order is a domain that falls under the state list of India’s

constitution.39

The 2002 Gujarat riots happened at a time of intense anxiety and loathing of Muslims was fast

building within the international community, especially in the West. Then-U.S. President George

Bush was in no mood to show tolerance towards the radical Muslims due to their perceived role in

abetting violence worldwide. This biased approach by the U.S. gave flexibility to other nations

around the world, in particular those with Muslim minority populations, to behave high-handedly

towards their restive Muslim populace within their respective jurisdictions, under the pretext of curb-

ing Islamic terrorism. The Israeli political-military establishment leveraged this changed attitude

within the U.S. to further its own national interests.40

At this juncture, these two new allies, India and

Israel, also started making overtures at the national and even sub-national political levels to further

strengthen their own ties.

The U.S. Dimension

In 2003, Ariel Sharon was the first Israeli prime minister to visit India. He was accompanied by a

heavyweight delegation which included both government officials and business leaders.41

The Indian

government warmly hosted Sharon and his delegation. At the end of the summit, an 18-point joint

statement was issued that laid out the two nations’ consensus on mutual cooperation in various fields,

clearly emphasizing the joint resolve to tackle terror.42

This visit cemented the foundation for the

emerging India-Israel Axis.

India and Israel had lot more to offer each other than mere reinforcement in the fight against a re-

ligious third party. Moreover, with the Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA I) gov-

ernment coming to power in India in 2004, the country’s perception of its Muslims grew more mod-

erate, except towards secessionist and violence propagating elements within those communities.

India under the Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government during this period endeavored to forge an ami-

able relationship with the U.S., while constantly kept the Israeli lobby in the loop. India was aware of

the latter’s influence with the U.S. political-defense establishment. This strategy continued even dur-

ing UPA I & II government and ultimately paid rich dividends for India when it secured a much-

debated global civil nuclear deal with the U.S. The powerful Israel lobby, led by the American Israel

Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC), members of both of



which are well-connected with the Israeli political-military establishment, played an instrumental

role. As MIT researcher Subrata Ghoshroy wrote in 2006,

The powerful Israeli lobby worked less conspicuously, but made its substantial network avail-

able to the relative neophytes in the embassy and the Indian lobbies [such as the U.S. India

Friendship Council, US India Political Action Committee etc]. The American Jewish Commit-

tee expressed its strong support for the deal by sending a letter to influential lawmakers. Col-

lectively, they launched a massive lobbying effort by blanketing Capitol Hill with receptions,

meetings and briefings, and the like.43

The realization of the India-U.S. civil nuclear deal and the process leading to its realization may,

in fact, have turned the tables on U.S.-Israel relations. Soon after Bush met with Indian president

Manmohan Singh on 18th

July 2005, Israel discreetly began engaging in discussions with the U.S. to

secure a similar deal for itself.44

In 2006, the U.S. reportedly rebuffed an Israeli request for exemp-

tion from the NSG trade rule.45

One reason for the U.S. rejection might have been Israel’s official

silence on the issue of whether or not it possesses nuclear capabilities. It is possible that Israel may

not have completely scrapped this plan, which--if realized--would greatly tilt the balance of Middle

East power in its favor..

The increasingly powerful Hindu lobby in the U.S., which has also grown more politically con-

nected within India46

, has also been extending its relations with the Jewish diaspora in the U.S., with

the Hindu lobby willing to reciprocate the favors it previously secured with the help of the latter. For

instance, Narrain Kataria, President of Indian American Intellectual Forum, while speaking at a “Ral-

ly for Israel” in New York on April 28, 2010, to around 2500 people representing 50 Jewish, Chris-

tian, Hindu and Sikh organizations, expressed the Hindu community’s firm support for Israel's right

to exist, calling it the “frontier of [the] free world.”47

Enemy State Dimension

On 29 April 2008, Iranian President Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited India, followed by

Singh’s visit to Iran to attend the 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran in 2012. Since

then, India and Iran have been devising innovative bilateral arrangements to evade U.S. sanctions on

Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons activities, with a particular eye to continuing the energy trade

between them.48

Amos Yadlin, Director of Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), said in an inter-

view for this article “We are not at all happy with India cooperating with Iran, which calls for the

destruction of Israel. There is a possibility that the advanced technology that we share with India

might land up in the wrong hands. India needs to understand our sensitivities.” Despite this concern

within the Israeli political-military establishment, India has continued to expand its defense dealings

with Iran from the time of 9/11,49

except for a short period of overwhelming U.S. pressure from

sanctions against Iran during late 2000s and early 2010s.

Similarly, Israel has expanded its economic dealings with China--the real enemy state of India as

perceived by its higher political-defense establishment. In 2001, the two-way volume of Israel-China

trade surpassed USD 1 billion;50

and this figure steadily rose to $8 billion in 2012.51

Out of the total

volume of bilateral trade in 2012, Israel's exports contributed $2.74 billion, primarily in non-defense

items. Since Israel's civilian economy is intricately tied with its defense sector, practical delimitation

of the two sectors becomes difficult. Hence India has become increasingly concerned that China

might tweak and refit imported Israeli technology, adapting it to indigenous defense productions, in

the same way that it purchased, refurbished and re-launched the retired Soviet-Ukranian multirole

aircraft carrier Riga.52

Hriday Sarma


These cross-cutting engagements of India and Israel with each other's enemy states act as an “al-

luring” force, making further consolidation of positive relations even more imperative in order nei-

ther allows the other to become too intimate with its own enemy state.

DEFENSE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN INDIA-ISRAEL

Definition

Defense diplomacy is a means of reinforcing perceptions of common interests between engaging

state parties. It is an adjunct to military diplomacy as it pursues the recognition of (political) diplo-

macy by military means.

Prof. Anton Du Plessis in his acclaimed work on Defense Diplomacy (2008) gives an inclusive

definition for the term--“the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on their

trained expertise foreign objectives abroad”. He also emphasizes Cottey and Foster’s inclusive defi-

nition as:”the peacetime use of armed forces and related infrastructure (primarily defense ministries)

as a tool of foreign and security policy” and more specifically the use of military cooperation and

assistance.”53

These definitions make clear that defense diplomacy is deeply intertwined with the national poli-

tics of any country, especially when the country is a great power or regional power and has to ma-

neuver and assert itself in the whirlpool of regional and global geopolitics. Hence, defense diplomacy

holds great potential for both India and Israel.

Evolution of Defense Diplomacy

The intriguing defense relations between India and Israel dates back to the Cold War era, when

the two countries cooperated in specific covert military and intelligence operations. In quite a few

instances, especially in moments of crisis, India made requests for military assistance from Israel,

which it promptly provided despite the official “frozen” relationship between the two countries be-

fore the end of Cold War.

For instance, during the 1971 India-Pakistan War, Israel, then facing a shortage of arms and am-

munitions, did not hesitate to respond positively to India’s discreet request for arms, ammunition and

other weaponry to be used against the Pakistani Army. The external intelligence agency of India

(RAW) coordinated with the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad to liberate Bangladesh in 1971.54

The Indian political-defense establishment maintained a cloak of absolute secrecy regarding this po-

litical-intelligence cooperation and to this day has never acknowledged it officially.55

During this war, India faced rebuke from many Arab nations for engaging in this war against Pa-

kistan, an Islamic state. Saudi Arabia and Jordan harshly condemned India's actions, whereas Egypt

and Syria stayed neutral. Israel resolutely sided with India in criticizing Pakistan’s war crimes in East

Bengal, especially the mass murder of Bangladeshi Hindus.

Further, under the Janata party government (1977-1979), then-foreign minister Vajpayee helped

Moshe Dayan's clandestine visit to India to explore the prospect of establishing full-scale diplomatic

relations,56

even though they were ultimately only established in l992. Establishing this formal rela-

tionship spurred a spate of high-level individual and group visits of officials from the political-

military establishment of the two countries. For example, in March 1994, Israel's Air Force Com-

mander visited India. In 1996, then-Chief of Indian Defense Research and Development Organiza-

tion A.P.J. Abdul Kalam visited Israel. Israeli President Ezer Weizman visited in December 1996,

and there were many more visits between the two countries.

Thus, it is clear that defense diplomacy between India and Israel has remained on a straightfor-

ward track over many years. The notable event of official restoration of diplomatic relations simply

gave legitimacy to activities that were previously carried on clandestinely as military engagements



within a strategy of defense diplomacy. Once official relations were established, bilateral arms trade

soon became the primary component of defense diplomacy between the two countries.57

Further, this

trade has witnessed mutifold growth in the 21st century.

58

For Israel, capitalizing the Indian market became especially urgent after controversies surfaced

involving its alleged re-transfers of American technology to China, as with a $250 million Phalcon

AWACS deal that was on the table in 200059

and plans for “repairs” of Israel’s Harpy drone in

2005.60

The U.S. put intense pressure on Israel for its alleged deceit by imposing economic sanctions

and suspending cooperation on several development projects during first half of the 2000s.61

These

measures convinced Israel not to proceed with any planned “controversial” deals as well as to com-

pletely scale back its defense ties with China.62

And at the same time, Israel started cooperating with

India in all spheres of defense activities, viewing India as a strategic partner state of the U.S.

As a result, Israel has been selling and sharing its state-of-the-art defense equipment and technol-

ogy with India, for it needs a demand market capable and willing to buy what it has to offer. This

ensures a continuous inflow of money to sustaining the research and development activities of its

large defense industry.

In the early 2000s, India began to grasp the imperative to constantly upgrade its military arsenal

and maintain indigenous defense production in order to match the defense capabilities of its powerful

neighboring countries. Also, it has faced intense pressure to resist rising internal threats, like Maoism

and conflicts in the northeast arising from terrorism, ethnic conflicts, crime, and other factors. Thus,

it has been actively securing Israeli defense equipment and technology to strengthen its own Defense

Indigenisation and Military Modernization programs. In the process, it has engaged with Israeli de-

fense companies under offset contracts to co-develop or locally produce various types of weaponry,

like missiles,63

radar systems,64

electronic manufacturing services,65

and more. While many such pro-

jects are in the execution phase, key projects remain under consideration for future development,

such as joint production of a ballistic missile defense system involving state-owned companies from

both sides.66

This would shield India against nuclear strikes from both Pakistan and China.

Challenges to Smooth Conduct of Defense Diplomacy

Two critical factors have constantly put brakes to the course of post-9/11 bilateral defense en-

gagements between India and Israel. These are the sluggish and error-ridden workflow of the Indian

bureaucracy and growing competition from American defense providers that are backed by the pow-

erful U.S. government.

In 2012, the Indian Defense Ministry blacklisted Israel Military Industries along with three other

foreign manufacturers for 10 years on grounds of alleged involvement in the Ordnance Factory

Board (OFB) scam in 2009.67

This was supported on appeal by a ruling of the Delhi Court supporting

the government's action.68

Deba Ranjan Mohanty, Vice President of New Delhi's Society for the

Study of Peace and Conflict, calls this blacklisting a “lose-lose situation for both the companies

banned from bidding contracts and the country [i.e. India].” 69

Pressure from the U.S. as it exerts its veto rights against Israeli military technology exports have

caused Israel to pull out from bidding on a number of Indian defense acquisition competitions, as

with Israeli Elta Systems’ withdrawal of a proposal to supply advanced radar to SAAB Gripen fight-

ers as part of Gripen NG’s proposal for the Indian air force's medium multirole combat aircraft.70

These challenges have shoved India reluctantly into a position in which it is struggling to stay

abreast, maintaining the latest defense technology that can match its enemies’ firepower. A secretary

in the Indian Home Ministry, speaking anonymously to the Asia Sentinel, explains the prevalent situ-

ation in the country by saying, “The defense ministry has blacklisted so many artillery makers that

India is still struggling to find a replacement for the Bofors gun,71

The Israeli political-military estab-

lishment has also begun re-thinking India's reliability as consumer market for its defense items, due

to all these barriers to smooth and efficient business relations.

Hriday Sarma


FUTURE OF INDIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Today, Israel finds itself in a situation of intense chaos amid breakdown of order across the Mid-

dle East and inside the country. Externally, Israel is witnessing chaos on numerous fronts: the col-

lapse of Libya as a functioning state;72

the intense blood-bath perpetuated by Islamic State across

Syria and Iraq in pursuit of its attempt to create al-Sham Caliphate;73

Egypt’s path toward future

clashes between Muslim Brotherhood--the world's oldest, largest and most influential Islamist organ-

ization, now banned in its country of origin--and Sisi's military government that secured power with

a counter-coup74

; Turkey’s endeavors under strongman and conservative Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to

re-entrench its dominant position in the Middle East that is only made possible by castigating Israel.

Internally, Israel recently witnessed first the intensification of relations between Hamas and Fa-

tah,75

which led to collapse of the U.S. brokered peace talks with the Israeli government and Pales-

tinian authority.76

This was followed by Hamas's initiation and continuation of a gory war against

Israel, which forced Israel to target the former's terror installations and leaders.77

Currently, Israel faces heightened economic and political challenges, such as the possibility that

the EU will extending the range and scope of its boycott against Israel in the near future and the

emerging split between the U.S. and Israel. In this environment of growing uncertainty, the IDF con-

tinues to have and execute the wherewithal to protect the state and contribute immeasurably towards

sustaining the positive economic environment in the country. The Israeli political establishment must

encourage the IDF and other defense-related entities within the country, like defense firms, whether

state-owned, privately-owned, and private-public jointly-owned defense firms. They must also en-

gage with their counterparts in friendly states. This would including raising defense diplomacy with

India far beyond present arms selling-buying relationship, to a level of shared strategic interests,

codependency and joint pursuit of shared foreign policy and defense strategies at the regional and

global levels.

India, for its part, has been witnessing a drop in excessive violence perpetuated by local terrorist

(secessionist) organizations.78

Total deaths in terrorism-related violence--among civilians, security

personnel and terrorists--have fallen to 885 in 2013 from a high of 5839 in 2001.79

However the

menace of home-grown Maoism has been rising rapidly. In certain political quarters, this is now

openly acknowledged to be the biggest threat to India’s stability.80

In 2013, estimates suggested that

Maoist insurgency has spread to over 40 percent of India’s territory and has thereupon continued to

rise.81

India’s paramilitary force, with capacity-building aid from its army,82

has been spearheading

anti-insurgency operations against Maoists with modest success. UPA II desisted from involving the

army directly in the fight against the Maoists. However, the new BJP-led government will most like-

ly pursue a high-handed approach against this extreme movement for if it is allowed to grow, it will

soon pose a major practical threat to India’s territorial integrity.83

Elected in May 2014, India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, a pragmatic politician, is un-

likely to challenge China for many reasons. First, Modi has shared a personal relationship with China

in past, over the course of four successful trips to China during his tenure as Gujarat's Chief Minis-

ter; China helped Modi burnish his foreign policy credentials even before he was elected prime min-

ister.84

Second, he has appointed Ajit Doval, a former RAW head, as new National Security Advi-

sor.85

Also, the Modi government is attempting to repair a beleaguered national economy that it has

inherited from its predecessor government, a process in which India greatly needs China’s help. The

absence of any prospect of head-on collision with an enemy state puts India, both its national gov-

ernment and its military, in a position of engaging with external challenges to its territorial security

as well as to important national assets located outside the country, like Embassy offices, overseas

energy infrastructures, etc. Here, the clearest factor may be the rapidly-proliferating Islamic terrorist

groups across the Middle East, which belong to the same radical Islamist category despite the fact

that organizational goals differ from organization to organization, and despite constant fighting



among these groups. So India will continue to attempt to secure Israel’s help in different ways while

it selectively fights non-state Islamic terrorist organizations that directly target its own interests.

Sharing his views on the future growth of the relationship between Israel and India at an INSS fo-

rum discussion in May 2014, Raviv Byron, president of the India-Israel Chamber of Commerce,

said:

“India and Israel will continue to share their existing relationship for the foreseeable future. In-

dia will be open to acknowledging the existing relationship on official matters, for Modi has an

affinity for Israel. There is likely to be more exchange of state-level visits of senior officers

and ministers. Despite this, India will not go out of its way to embrace Israel at the cost of pro-

voking other countries, including Iran, and any section of its own population. Under the BJP,

Israel now has even greater opportunities to expand its economic engagement with India in dif-

ferent sectors, like agriculture, homeland security, information technologies etc. India needs

exactly what we have to offer to them.”86

More recently, Dr. Subramanian Swamy, a close associate of Modi, at a public Israel solidarity

meeting in Mumbai on August 6, 2014 organized by the Indo-Israel Friendship Association, an-

nounced Modi’s intention to undertake an official state visit to Israel in 2015. Modi’s visit will send

a global message that India embraces Israel as an intimate ally in the Middle East.87

These developments clearly demonstrate that India and Israel--two current strategic partners--now

have an added incentive to work towards shared common interests. India under strongman Modi and

his reinvigorated cabinet have already started redressing bureaucratic hassles,88

opening the domestic

market to foreign investment in important sectors, including defense.89

This technically clears the

path for Israel's deeper and more meaningful engagement with India. However, whether this poten-

tial will be fulfilled depends on the extent to which Israel’s political and military establishment is

able to claim its own piece of the “pie” of India’s estimated $180 billion allocated towards foreign

vendors in India's defense market.90

CONCLUSION

While the contemporary India-Israel relationship is still evolving, it is clear that relations between

the two countries don’t precisely fit any existing paradigm. However, by comparing and contrasting

domestic politics at the highest level and the relationship in each country between military leadership

and its civilian political counterpart, we can view the emergent broader picture of this relationship. It

is clear that India and Israel, two “civilization-states” with an ancient and intimate bond, are now

well-placed on a trajectory to become strategic allies in the international arena in the near future.

* Hriday Ch. Sarma is founder and president of the India-based Green Cosmos NGO. A special cor-

respondent for Global South Development Magazine (published by Silicon Creation--Finland), he

was a visiting research fellow with the Institute for National Security Studies and an Israel-Asia

Leaders fellow at the Israel-Asia Center for the academic year 2013-2014.

NOTES

1 Raia Prokhovnik, “Internal/external: The state of sovereignty,” Contemporary Politics, 2, no. 3,

1996. 2 Shirley Berry Isenberg , India’s India’s Bene Israel: A Comprehensive Inquiry and Sourcebook

(Bombay : Popular Prakashan.1988).

Also, Vineet Prakash, “Free Sample essay on Indo-Israel Relations,” About Preservearticles.com,

http://www.preservearticles.com/201106127840/free-sample-essay-on-indo-israel-relations.html

http://www.preservearticles.com/201106127840/free-sample-essay-on-indo-israel-relations.html

Hriday Sarma


3 In 1949, when Nehru met Israel’s ambassador in Washington he remarked on a candid note that

India (inferring his government) “must treat the thirty million Muslims (within India) most careful-

ly”. Furthermore, over the years the question of Palestine had a deep impact upon the Indian Mus-

lims and had been “a constant source of agitation.

P. R. Kumaraswamy, India’s Israel Policy (Columbia University Press: New York 2010), pp. 126 . 4“Far East”. American Jewish Committee Archives,

http://www.ajcarchives.org/ajc_data/files/1953_15_fareast.pdf 5 See what Ben Gurion remarked about Nehru.

Michael Curtis, “Israel and China : A Historic “Missed Opportunity”, In Michael Curtis, Susan Au-

relia Gitelson (ed.), Israel in the Third World, (Somerset, NJ, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1976),

pp. 222-223. 6 Arnold P. Kaminsky and Roger D. Long, eds., India Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Repub-

lic [2 volumes]: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic, Volume 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,

2011), pp. 348. For the reasons why India formally recognized Israel see:

Vijay Prashad (07 April 2013), ‘India’s Israel Policy,’ AlJazeera Center for Studies Reports,

http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/04/201347114923799215.htm 7 The current year of 2014 is witnessing utter turmoil and unprecedented events at the international

level, like Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Egyptian military counter coup, etc. With the U.S.’s com-

plete/ major pull-out of its military forces from Afghanistan by the year end, there will be a power-

vacuum left in the broad region whereby state and non-state actors will fiercely compete against each

other for perpetuating their respective dominance. This will most likely bring about a new regional

and global order. 8 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Indian Army, (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 15.

9 Humphery Evan, Thimayya of India : a Soldiers Life. (Natraj Publishers. Dehradun. 1988), pp. 124.

10 For a glimpse into Nehru’s own personal and political beliefs, see, The Discovery of India by Ja-

waharlal Nehru.

Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). 11

Military-to-military ties, particularly with the United States, were viewed with great suspicion for

fear that officers would grow empowered and absorb subversive political ideas.

Shashank Joshi, “The Indian Mutiny That Wasn’t: What’s behind the strange coup rumors in Delhi?”

Foreign Policy, April 5, 2012,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/05/the_indian_mutiny_that_wasn_t 12

“The Evolution of India’s Higher Defense Organization,” in Ayesha Ray, The Soldier and the

State in India: Nuclear Weapons, Counterinsurgency, and the transformation of Indian Civil-Military

Relations. (New Delhi: SAGE Publication, 2013), pp. 43. 13

Harsh V. Pant, “Indian Strategic Culture : The debate and its consequences,” in David Scott (Ed),

Handbook of India’s International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011). 14

The paragraph draws reference from Indian Archives on Defense.

“Defense” Indian.gov.in.archives, http://www.archive.india.gov.in/sectors/defense/index.php 15

Id. 16

Anit Mukherjee, “Facing future challenges Defence reform in India,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 156 (5),

Oct 2011. 17

D. K. Singh, Prime Minister Narendra Modi to shed UPA baggage: Goms, EGoMs to be junked,

The Indian Express, May 31, 2014.

““ 18

“Civil Military Relations: Opportunities and Challenges.” National Security Lecture 2013 by the

Hon’ble Shri N.N. Vohra- Governor J&K, (New Delhi: United Services Institution. December 6,

2013). Id. 19

Ibid at 15.



20

Id. 21

Sudha Ramachandran, “Plot seen in Indian army chief’s age row,” Asia Times, January 14, 2012,

http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA14Df01.html

Also see, Ibid 16, Hakeem Irfan. 22

Barbara Sofer, Keeping Israel Safe: Serving in the Israel Defense Forces. (Minneapolis, MN: Ler-

ner, 2008). 23

The IDF is a central force in the Israeli economy in terms of the quantity of personnel it employs

and the professional training it provides, as well as in terms of its support for the security industries

(as early as 1983, these industries’ exports accounted for 16 percent of all Israeli exports). The IDF

also promotes sales to the defense industries (Israel Aircraft Industries, Rafael, Military Industries

and Elbit). Those who purchase from these industrial concerns are primarily interested in whether the

IDF also purchases products from them.

Baruch Nevo, Yael Shur-Shmueli, The Israel Defense Forces and the national economy of Israel,

(Jerusalem : Israel Defense Forces : Israel Democracy Institute, 2005). 24

From the time of independence, Israel has upheld a strategic doctrine of offensive-defence, which

included self-defence and self-reliance as the two major components.

Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford Uni-

versity Press, 2007), p. 79. 25

Samuel Clement Leslie, The Rift in Israel: Religious Authority and Secular Democracy (New

York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 101. 26

Kobi Michael, “The Israel Defence Forces as an Epistemic Authority: An Intellectual Challenge in

the reality of the Israeli -Palestinian Conflict,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 3 (2007). 27

A. Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times. (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1977), pp. 251-252. 28

Nathan W. Toronto, “Israel” in G. Kurt Piehler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of military science. (Thousand

Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), pp. 721. 29

Amir Oren, “L’etat, c’est moi,” Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/l-etat-c-

est-moi-1.23037 30

Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy. (Washington,

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), pp. 81. 31

“The Military Politics of the Israeli Defense Forces” In Uri Ben-Eliezer, Old Conflict, New War:

Israel’s Politics Toward the Palestinians, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 32

Ibid at 31. 33

Myron Joel Aronoff, “Fission and Fusion: The Politics of Factionalism” in Power and Ritual in the

Israel Labor Party: A Study in Political Anthropology (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1993). 34

David Wurmser, “Israel’s Collapsing Labor Party,” Middle East Quarterly, September 1995, pp.

37-45. 35

Edmund Sanders, “Israel’s Labor Party splits; Ehud Barak forms new faction,” Los Angeles Times,

January 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/17/world/la-fg-israel-labor-party-20110118 36

Alan Weinraub, The evolution of Israeli civil-military relations: domestic enablers and the quest

for security, (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate College, December 2009). 37

Id. 38

Setalvad, T. “When Guardians Betray: The Role of Police.’ S. Varadarajan (ed) Gujarat: The

Making of Tragedy, (New Delhi: Penguin India, 2002), pp. 177-211. 39

Babulal Fadia, State politics in India Volume 1, (New Delhi : Radiant publishers, 1984), pp. 92-

122. 40

Gideon Sa’ar, present Israeli education minister, said, “This also increased the maneuvering room

for Israel, which half a year after Sept. 11 embarked on Operation Defensive Shield in Judea and

Samaria with the Americans’ support. Bush declared, you’re either with us or you’re with the terror-

http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA14Df01.html

Hriday Sarma


ists. Israel found itself on the right side. Terror was no longer seen as legitimate. Yasser Arafat’s ca-

chet was greatly reduced. He continued to incite terror and encourage attacks, and his downfall be-

gan with the capture of the weapons ship Karine A.”

Yossi Verter, “How 9/11 changed U.S. policy toward Israel,” Haaretz, September 9, 2011,

http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/how-9-11-changed-u-s-policy-toward-israel-1.383437 41

“Delhi Statement on Friendship and Cooperation between India and Israel.” Israel Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Sept 10- 2003,

http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/bilateral/pages/delhi%20statement%20on%20friendship%2

0and%20cooperation%20betw.aspx 42

Id. 43

Subrata Ghoshroy, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Triumph of the Business Lobby,” MIT Center

for International Studies, Sept 2006, http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_09_14_Ghoshroy.pdf 44

Mark Hibbs, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace working in the Nu-

clear Policy Program, has talked about Israel’s subtle attempts at securing a India-US like civilian

nuclear deal.

Mark Hibbs, “US rebuffed Israeli request for exemption from NSG trade rule,” Nuclear Fuel, Janu-

ary 1, 2007. 45

Id. 46

Mira Kamdar, “Forget the Israel Lobby. The Hill’s Next Big Player Is Made in India,” Washington

Post, September 30, 2007 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801350.html

Also see “Who speaks for indian americans? religion, ethnicity, and political formation.” American

Quarterly, 59, no. 3, 759-783. 47

“Hindus also joined the Protest Rally on 9/11 over Mosque on Ground Zero,” Struggle for Hindu

Existence, April 28, 2010, http://hinduexistence.org/category/hindu-jew-unity-india-israel-unity/

Also see Indian American Lobby: Hindus support Israel, the free world, against jihadi terrorism,

Youtube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xj5hwqACqXo 48

Biman Mukherji and Debiprasad Nayak “Tehran Sets Trade Deals With India Amid Curbs,” Eco-

nomic Times, May 9, 2012,

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304070304577393671154450382 49

Monika Chansoria, “India-Iran Defense Cooperation,” India Defense Review (25), January 1,

2010, Available at : http://www.indiandefensereview.com/interviews/india-iran-defense-

cooperation/0/ 50

“A Brief Introduction on Sino-Israeli Economic and Trade Relations,” Embassy of Republic of

China in the Israel, http://il.china-embassy.org/eng/jjmy/ 51

K.M. Seethi, “China, Israel and India: Flexible Coalitions,” The Diplomat, November 24, 2013,

http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/china-israel-and-india-flexible-coalitions/ 52

Andrew Tarantola, “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Is Finally Shipshape,” GIZMODO. December 6,

2013, http://gizmodo.com/chinas-first-aircraft-carrier-is-finally-shipshape-512869043 53

Anton du Plessis, “Defense Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Dimensions with Specific Refer-

ence to South Africa”, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, November 2008, available at

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1402/is_2_30/ai_n31607813/?tag=content;col1 54

Former head of counter-terrorism branch of India’s intelligence Research and Analysis Wing

(RAW) B. Raman documents in his book the crucial part played by India-Israel intelligence agencies

in the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in the Eastern part of Pakistan in

1971. He further says that Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, did not make a single decision

concerning military action in East Pakistan without the advice of RAW’s Chief R.N. Kao who was

secretly liaising with Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.

B. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane, (New Delhi : Lancer, 2007).

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801350.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801350.html

http://hinduexistence.org/category/hindu-jew-unity-india-israel-unity/



55

Id. 56

Dayan’s 1979 visit became more open as Israel Radio talked about it. However, Prof.

Kumaraswamy in his book India’s Israel Policy gives factual support for Dayan’s multiple visits to

India during Janata party rule.

Ibid at 3, pp219-221. 57

Richard A. Bitzinger, “Policy Brief: Israeli Arms Transfers to India: Ad Hoc Defense Cooperation

or the Beginnings of a Strategic Partnership ?” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/Israeli%20Arms%20Transfers%20to%20India_27

052013%20FINAL.pdf 58

Id. 59

Ze’ev Schiff, “The Spy Plane Isn’t the Only Problem,” Ha’aretz, June 21, 2000. 60

Haytham Mouzahem,”Israel faces pressure from US and China re arms deal,” World Security Net-

work, December 28, 2004, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Israel-Palestine/haytham-

mouzahem-1/Israel-faces-pressure-from-US-and-China-re-arms-deal 61

Conal Urquhart, “US acts over Israeli arms sales to China,” The Guardian, June 13, 2005,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/13/usa.israel 62

Yitzhak Shichor, “The U.S. Factor in Israel’s Military Relations with China,” China Brief 5, no.12,

May 24, 2005. 63

“India & Israel’s Barak-8 SAM Development Project(s),” Defense Industry Daily, Dec 18, 2013,

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cat/innovation/procurement-innovations/page/2/ 64

India and Israel have jointly developed the Swordfish Long-range tracking radar. India has also

acquired two GreenPine Early Warning and Fire Control radars from Israel. Elta-designed esigned

and developed EL/M 2052 multi-mode radars are set to be fitted onto India’s indigenous Tejas air-

craft to improve operational effectiveness.

“India - Israel Bilateral Defense Ties Thought Leadership Series” Aviotech. July, 2011.

http://www.aviotech.com/pdf/Aviotech___Thought_Leadership_Series___India-

Israel_July_2011.pdf 65

“ELTA Outsourced $150 Million Electronics Manufacturing Deals to India.” TechTime. December

21, 2012, http://news.techtime.co.il/2012/12/21/elta-outsourced-150-million-electronics-

manufacturing-deals-to-india/ 66

“Israel, India agree on missile defense system against China, Pakistan nuclear strikes,” The Nation,

April 05, 2014, http://www.nation.com.pk/national/05-Apr-2014/israel-india-agree-on-missile-

defense-system-against-china-pakistan-nuclear-strikes 67

Rahul Singh, “Six defense firms blacklisted over ordnance scam,” Hindustan Times, March 05,

2012, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/newdelhi/six-defense-firms-blacklisted-over-

ordnance-scam/article1-821257.aspx 68

“Israel Military Industries loses Indian blacklist challenge,” StratPost, June 5, 2013,

http://www.stratpost.com/israel-military-industries-loses-indian-blacklist-challenge 69

“Israel’s IMI banned from Indian contracts.” RP Defense, August 10, 2012, http://rpdefense.over-

blog.com/tag/Israel%20Military%20Industries/ 70

Arie Egozi, “IAI forced to withdraw support for Gripen’s Indian bid Flight”, FlightGlobal, July 6,

2009, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/iai-forced-to-withdraw-support-for-gripen39s-

indian-329271/ 71

Neeta Lal, “India’s Latest Defense Scandal,” Asia Sentinel, January 15, 2014,

http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/india-defense-helicopter-deal-scandal/ 72

Ed Morrissey, “White House narrative on Libya all but collapsed,” Hotair, September 21, 2012.

http://hotair.com/archives/2012/09/21/white-house-narrative-on-libya-all-but-collapsed/ 73

Ahmed Rasheed, Raheem Salman, “ISIS’s Reign of Terror Continues to Spread,” The Muslim Ob-

server, http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=15931

Hriday Sarma


74

“Seven killed in Egypt as clashes break out over Rabaa commemorations,” Middle East Eye,

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/seven-killed-egypt-clashes-break-out-over-rabaa-

commemorations-815670748 75

Hayden Cooper, “Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah form unity government to rule West Bank

and Gaza,” ABC News, June 3, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-03/palestinian-unity-

government/5496522 76

Richard Silverstein, Israel-Palestine peace talks hit the wall, Asia Times, April 28, 2014,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MID-01-280414.html 77

Avi Issacharoff, “Palestinian sources: Teens’ killing planned, funded by Hamas,” The Times of

Israel, August 10, 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinians-say-teens-killing-planned-and-

funded-by-hamas/#!

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http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/11/pinpoint-strikes-targeting-terrorists-avoiding-civilians/ 78

Shivananda H., “Ethnic conflict and Security Apprehension in Northeast India,” Scholar’s Voice:

A New Way of Thinking, 2, no. 1, January-June 2011, pp. 13-21. 79

The figures are stipulated by Institute for Conflict Management , a Delhi based think-tank.

David Keohane, “The better angels of India’s nature,” FT Alphaville, March 4, 2014,

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/03/04/1788792/the-better-angels-of-indias-nature/ 80

Speaking at the same forum in 2012, Singh categorized Naxalism within the ambit of terrorism

Naxalism and said : “this is a struggle in which we cannot relax.”

“Full text: PM’s speech at the Conference of chief ministers on internal security,” NDTV, April 16,

2012, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/full-text-pm-s-speech-at-the-conference-of-chief-ministers-

on-internal-security-198068 81

Asad Ismi, “Maoist Insurgency Spreads to Over 40% of India. Mass Poverty and Delhi’s Embrace

of Corporate Neoliberalism Fuels Social Uprising,” Global Research, December 20, 2013,

http://www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-to-over-40-of-india-mass-poverty-and-

delhis-embrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-social-uprising/5362276 82

“CRPF gets Army help to counter Maoists,” The Economic Times, April 4, 2006,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2006-04-04/news/27426119_1_counter-insurgency-

operations-video-footage-training-programme 83

BJP alone won 282 seats out of 543 Lok Sabha seats, which is ahead of 272 majority mark, and

together with allies the NDA coalition holds 336 seats. This puts it at a commanding position to self-

define and execute both foreign and domestic policies without being under pressure from the opposi-

tion and even its coalition partners. This means BJP can pursue a (modestly) totalitarian way to tack-

le issues it deems to securitize, de-securitize or change the order of importance while securitizing. 84

Debasish Roy Chowdhury, “Modi and China: Old friends, new challenges,” South China Morning

Post, May 17, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1513815/narendra-modis-election-win-

has-upside-if-china-plays-him-smart 85

For years Doval has advocated the improvement of internal security capacities and defense in a

practical manner. Unlike the past NSAs who preferred to look at external issues, Doval is likely to

concentrate on building India’s internal capacities.

Saikat Datta, “Ajit Doval, giant among spies, is the new National Security Adviser,” Hindustan

Times, May 28, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ajit-doval-giant-among-spies-

reports-back-for-duty-soon/article1-1223709.aspx 86

On 19 May 2014, a Forum Discussion on the topic “Prospective Changes in India’s Foreign Poli-

cies towards the Middle East and Israel, post-2014 Lok Sabha Election” was held at INSS. This was

a intimate, mostly internal event at the institute with few selected external participants. 87

“Dr Subramanian Swamy addressing a Public Meeting to express Solidarity with Israel in Mumbai

on Sunday (August 6, 2014),” Janata Party, http://www.hindusthanjanataforum.org/?p=1329

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/full-text-pm-s-speech-at-the-conference-of-chief-ministers-on-internal-security-198068

http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/full-text-pm-s-speech-at-the-conference-of-chief-ministers-on-internal-security-198068

http://www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-to-over-40-of-india-mass-poverty-and-delhis-embrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-social-uprising/5362276

http://www.globalresearch.ca/maoist-insurgency-spreads-to-over-40-of-india-mass-poverty-and-delhis-embrace-of-corporate-neoliberalism-fuels-social-uprising/5362276



88

“Reforming babus, building infra, transparency: Modi unveils 10 point priority list,” Firstbiz, May

29, 2014, http://www.firstbiz.com/economy/reforming-babus-building-infra-transparency-modi-

unveils-10-point-priority-list-86287.html 89

Asit Ranjan Mishra & Shauvik Ghosh, “Govt clears 100% FDI in defense, telecom,” Live Mint,

July 16 2013, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/hxnnl3jx9kaCHnKgsk9oQK/Govt-relaxes-foreign-

investment-rules-to-revive-growth.html 90

Prakash Nanda, “What is Modi’s military vision?,” Indian Defense Review,

http://www.indiandefensereview.com/what-is-modis-military-vision/

http://www.firstbiz.com/economy/reforming-babus-building-infra-transparency-modi-unveils-10-point-priority-list-86287.html

http://www.firstbiz.com/economy/reforming-babus-building-infra-transparency-modi-unveils-10-point-priority-list-86287.html

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