Policy-oriented foresight as a tool for strategic policy ...use of policy-oriented foresight by...

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Policy-oriented foresight as a tool for strategic

policy-making. An assessment of opportunities and

difficulties 1

Ellen F OBÉ K.U.Leuven – Public Management Institute

Marleen B RANS K.U.Leuven – Public Management Institute

Paper presented at the 33rd EGPA Annual Conference in Bucharest, Romania

7-10 September 2011

1 This paper is part of a research project commissioned by the Policy Research Centre -

Governmental Organization in Flanders (Belgium).

Policy-oriented foresight as a tool for strategic policy-making.

An assessment of opportunities and difficulties

K.U.Leuven Public Management Institute

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Introduction

Evidence based policy has become an important means for governments to support and

provide input for the policy-making process in a more complex policy environment (Davies et

al., 1999; Nutley et al., 2002; Pawson, 2002; Shaxson, 2005; Sutcliffe and Court, 2005;

House of Commons, 2006). This paper focuses on policy-oriented foresight as a particular

kind of evidence for strategic policy. Contrary to other sources of evidence for policy, such as

advisory bodies or policy evaluations, policy-oriented foresight has gained to a much lesser

extent the attention of scholars in the policy analysis literature. The paper therefore wants to

fill this gap and provide more insight in policy-oriented foresight as a source of evidence for

policy, supporting in particular strategic policy making.

Policy-oriented foresight assesses long-term societal developments and can help

governments anticipate the challenges, problems and opportunities related to them (Bell,

2003). It generates opportunities for governments to take up their role in envisioning, creating

and preparing for the future, but also engenders certain difficulties due to its long-term

horizon, for example with regard to policy relevance or implementation of ideas. However,

since governments are (at least partly) able to give shape to society, policy-makers have an

evident responsibility for the future (de Jouvenel, 1972). This paper therefore focuses on the

use of policy-oriented foresight by policy-makers. The central question is in what ways policy-

oriented foresight can influence the strategic policy process and thus serve as a tool for

strategic policy-making. The paper is structured as follows:

Firstly, the complexity of the policy environment is described and linked to strategic policy.

The emergence of wicked problems increase the need for and importance of strategic

decision-making. Secondly, policy-oriented foresight is described more closely from a

theoretical perspective as a means to support strategic decision-making. Thirdly, the paper

considers the aspect of knowledge utilization from a product-related and from a process-

related perspective. This concept forms the analytical framework on which the analysis of

three case studies is built. Three Flemish policy-oriented foresight studies were analyzed.

We explored the way in which each foresight was conducted in the three policy domains and,

more importantly, analyzed and compared the influence of each of these exercises on




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strategic policy-making within their respective policy domains (innovation policy,

environmental policy and nature policy). Given the relatively new nature of policy-oriented

foresight in Flanders, the paper provides some interesting insights in the elements

influencing strategic policy-making. Aspects such as the involvement of policy-makers,

stakeholder support, or the presence of other sources of evidence for policy, can positively or

negatively affect this influence. The opportunities and difficulties the three cases met are

described. Finally, the conclusion reflects on the findings in the paper.

Strategy and wicked problems

Governments are more and more confronted with an increasingly complex and dynamic

policy environment. Complex challenges or “wicked problems” as they are often referred to

(Rittel and Webber, 1973), are marked by high scientific uncertainties and societal dispute

(Bogenschneider and Corbett, 2010). Additionally, wicked problems are highly dynamic in

nature, originate from multiple causes and include many smaller, interdependent problems. It

is therefore difficult to identify wicked problems. Moreover, if decision-making on wicked

problems fails, it can result in highly negative, societal impacts. A classic example of a

wicked problem is climate change. There is no clear scientific knowledge about all its causes

or drivers and the problem itself has led and still leads to high societal, political and scientific

dispute and debate. There is no agreement between different stakeholders on whether and

how this problem should be dealt with appropriately. Additionally, the ecologic, economic and

social impacts which climate change will generate, if decision-making should fail, are

supposed to be extremely high – although insights about these effects also remain uncertain

(Enserink and Kwakkel, 2010; Pielke, 2010).

Wicked problems challenge traditional ways of decision-making by governments. Because

complex issues make the formulation of policy goals more difficult, it is more important and it

becomes more necessary to be able to identify these problems and their solutions properly.

Dror captures this dilemma as follows:




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“While major processes posing critical problems to humanity and its sub-parts are

changing rapidly, capacities essential for coping with the critical problems are

changing very slowly. This leads to a growing capacity deficit of human problem-

coping abilities” (2007:84).

Capturing more complex and dynamic problems is certainly of crucial importance with regard

to strategic policy-making. As Habegger emphasizes:

“Policy-makers in government (but also leaders in business or civil society

organizations) are increasingly forced to assess their environments systematically

and to identify the relevant upcoming issues early on. They must think ahead

strategically in order to reduce ‘‘surprises’’, to increase the room for maneuver, and to

improve the overall flexibility of governance. (2010:49)”

Contrary to ‘normal’ policy-making, strategic policy-making considers policy problems from a

broad, societal perspective (Mulgan, 2009). The holistic approach of strategic policy-making

implies also that the complex and dynamic nature of wicked problems is felt more strongly

and that their broad and substantial effects over time need to be taken into account (Hickson

et al., 1987; Dammers, 2000). A long-term perspective in policy-making is critical to the

success of societies, because it allows for the creation of new policies and of important

strategic innovations (Mulgan, 2009).

Strategic policy is therefore inherently future-oriented (Scott et al., 2004). It is contrary to

policy-making on the medium-term where the improvement of existing programs is a central

focus, and opposite to short-term policy-making which deals with tactics, events and crises,

as political or economic challenges confronting policy-makers (Howlett, 2008; Mulgan, 2009).

Table one illustrates the different policy-making horizons and the type of policy issues they

can be linked to. Short-term crisis management often crowds out policy decisions that take

into account the long-term and consider broad societal effects (Pollitt, 2008). Policy-makers

are more and more pressured by day to day crises which require immediate solutions,

especially when they are fueled by media attention and higher public scrutiny. As a

consequence, strategic policy-making is pressured as well.




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Table 1. Horizons of decision-making

Horizon

Policy issues

Examples

Long-term

Strategic, innovative and generational policy issues

Pensions, climate change, sustainable development

Medium-term

Implementation and incremental adaption of existing policies

Adapting healthcare spending programs, improving environmental standards

Short-term

Tactical policy issues, political or economic events and crises

Strikes, media reports, riots, corruption scandals

Source: Adapted from Pollitt (2008)

Additionally, if decision-making takes place on the short-term, it implies that the range of

policy options available to policy-makers becomes smaller. A lack of anticipation and a

reduced availability of policy options, in turn, increases the risk of having to settle for

suboptimal policy solutions. This is especially problematic with regard to wicked problems,

because they can produce long-term societal effects due to their highly dynamic and

complex nature. These problems therefore require a long-term, strategic focus.

Strategic policy-making also implies that policy makers develop a vision of and for the future,

translate this into policy goals and turn these into specific actions to achieve these goals in a

systematic way (Dammers, 2000). It is important that policy-makers are systematically

action-oriented through the visions they develop and the policy goals that they set. This

strategic, long-term approach marks the difference with the re-actions to short-term

developments and challenges (van der Laan, 2008).




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Policy-oriented foresight

Evidence based policy has become an important means for governments to support a more

complex, dynamic and uncertain policy process (Davies et al., 1999; Pawson, 2002;

Shaxson, 2005; Sutcliffe and Court, 2005; House of Commons, 2006; Nutley et al., 2009). It

aims to provide knowledge, information and expertise to increase the effectiveness and

efficiency of policies. Its relevance also stems from a heightened accountability awareness of

policy-makers, due to increased public scrutiny and the need for societal support

(Sanderson, 2002; Sharp, 2005).

Policy-oriented foresight, as discussed in this paper, can be considered as a specific source

of evidence for policy. The knowledge, information and insights it provides, are particularly fit

to support long-term, strategic decisions by governments. Foresight has followed the

emergence in the 1930’s and 1940’s in the United States and France of forecasts aimed at

supporting military and economic strategic planning processes (Fobé and Brans, 2009).

Foresight, on the other hand, takes into account more closely the increasing complexity and

uncertainty of the policy-environment.

We can define policy-oriented foresight as the process of developing a wide range of views

on how the future could possibly develop, enabling policy-makers to understand these

options sufficiently well to be able to decide what strategic decisions can be taken today to

create the best possible tomorrow (Horton, 1999).

Policy-oriented foresight can be distinguished from other forms of evidence based policy on

several levels (Garrett, 1999: von Schomberg et al., 2005). It serves as a strategic tool for

policy-making, in the first place because it tries to ensure effective long-term public policy.

Policy-oriented foresight explicitly incorporates a long-term view in its assessment (Van

Asselt et al., 2010). This long-term perspective in policy-oriented foresight often includes

horizons of ten, twenty, or even fifty or a hundred years within which societal effects of

policies are assessed. Of course, with an expanding time horizon in foresight, the

uncertainties of the policy-environment increase as well.




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Secondly, and closely related to this long-term horizon, policy-oriented foresight is not a

prediction of the future but a systematic assessment of dynamic and possible future

developments (Dammers, 2000). The aspect of uncertainty is central to policy-oriented

foresight (Andersson, 2009). The future does not yet exist and is therefore (at least partly)

unknown to us (de Jouvenel, 1972; Bell, 2009). This uncertain character of the future is

important with regard to the knowledge policy-oriented foresight can bring to the policy-

making process (van Asselt et al., 2007). It is not purely scientific in nature, but often refers

to creative possibilities which the future encompasses, thereby making use of quantitative as

well as qualitative or more narrative methods based on a multi-disciplinary approach

(Slaughter, 1999; von Schomberg, 2005; Van der Duin et al., 2008; Bell, 2009; Fuerth, 2009).

Policy-oriented foresight is, thirdly, also action-oriented, which is considered by van der Laan

(2008) as its most valuable aspect. Policy-oriented foresight is based on the assumption that

governments have the capacity to (at least partly) influence the future (de Jouvenel, 1972). It

can provide policy-makers with a strategic vision to anticipate the alternative ways in which a

future, changing society could develop, posing different policy questions and demands

(Horton, 1999; van der Duin et al., 2008; Fuerth, 2009). Policy-oriented foresight can improve

‘governmental critical choices (…) [and identify] instruments with the help of which societal

trajectories can be redirected away for (sic.) undesirable futures and towards desirable

futures, subject to uncertainty and inconceivability’ (Dror, 1996:559).

Habegger distinguishes three phases in a foresight process, resulting in the formulation of

strategic decisions. These are illustrated in Table two. Each of the phases has a different aim

in the strategic policy process. The information used in these phases also increases in value

for the process and becomes more decisive with every step (Habegger, 2010). Of crucial

importance is the transition from the second to the third phase, where insight in alternative

futures is transformed into strategic decisions, and when actions to reach these policy goals

are decided upon (Horton, 1999).




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Table two. Three phases of policy-oriented foresight

Phase Early detection of information

Generating foresight knowledge

Developing strategic policy options

Description Identification and exploration of issues, trends, changes and developments

Assessment and understanding of policy challenges

Identifying possible futures or envisioning desired futures and policy actions

Aim Avoid strategic surprises and take countermeasures against threats

Capture the alternative implications of a strategic issue

Looking forward purposely and take the best course of action

Value chain

Information Knowledge Insight Action

Source: Adapted from Habegger (2010)

Perspectives on influence of foresight

Policy oriented-foresight provides the opportunities for policy makers to develop strategic

policy, however, whether it is actually used as a strategic policy-making tool remains to be

seen. The influence of evidence on the strategic policy-making process is often referred to

from the perspective of policy-makers as knowledge utilization. Studies on knowledge

utilization have gained particular attention in the policy evaluation literature (Vedung, 1997),

however, it is also an important focus in the foresight literature (see for example Glenn et al.,

2001; in ’t Veld, 2001; European Commission, 2006).

As seen from a positive perspective, influence constitutes the link between the insights

policy-oriented foresight provides for the policy-making process and the strategic actions this

can lead to. It can be assessed from three perspectives or dimensions, i.e. the source of

influence, its intentional character and the moment at which influence takes place (Kirkhart,




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2000). This paper focuses in particular on the first dimension of influence of policy-oriented

foresight. The source of influence of policy-oriented foresight can be product-related or

process-related. Product-related influence is the influence of the output of foresight, i.e. the

results of the study presented in a report or another form of communication. Process-related

influence is the result of the foresight process itself, i.e. of the extent in which policy-makers

were involved and/or consulted during the foresight process (Greene, 1988; Patton, 1997;

Kirkhart, 2000).

Firstly, the results of policy-oriented foresight can influence the policy-making process in

different ways. We differentiate between four types of product-related influence:

• The insights which policy-oriented foresight provides are directly used in official policy

documents, such as laws or strategic plans. This instrumental influence can be

regarded as the traditional perspective on knowledge utilization (Weiss, 1978;

Caplan, 1979; Bekkers et al., 2004). For actors delivering evidence to the policy-

making process, this type of knowledge utilization is undoubtedly of high importance.

It is often an implicit assumption when executing policy-oriented foresight, and

sometimes even explicitly formulated as a goal of the exercise.

• Conceptual influence of policy-oriented foresight takes place over a longer period of

time, namely when policy-makers take strategic decisions that are based on the

evidence provided by foresight. Because policy ‘grows’ and evidence is first

interpreted by policy-makers, knowledge utilization can also be more indirect (Weiss,

1980). In this view on influence, policy-oriented foresight provides new insights or

changes existing visions on certain problems and challenges, and is thereby able to

affect strategic policies in the long run. This type of knowledge utilization is also

referred to as “enlightenment” of policy makers (Weiss, 1979, 1980, 1982).

• Agenda-setting influence of policy-oriented foresight implies that new topics,

previously not under attention of policy makers can now be discerned on the policy-

making agenda. In this view, the knowledge in policy-oriented foresight inspires

policy-makers and the political debate instead of (in)directly supporting the policy-

making process (Bekkers et al., 2004).

• Political-strategic influence takes place when political actors legitimize or oppose

governmental actions based on policy-oriented foresight. In this fourth type of




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product-related influence, the results of policy-oriented foresight are incidental to (the

persuasiveness of) the political argument in which they are used (Weiss, 1991;

Bekkers et al., 2004).

Patton asserts that knowledge utilization can also refer to ‘ways in which being engaged in

the processes of evidence generation can be useful quite apart from the findings that may

emerge from these processes (1997:88)’. Policy-oriented foresight can also have a

significant process-related influence on policy actors, because it can enhance the role and

capacity of strategic thinking by the actors at which it is aimed (van der Laan, 2008). Van der

Heijden et al. (2002) refer to this as the development of a ‘sixth sense’ within organizations.

The involvement of actors in a foresight process can simply create a better understanding of

its possible added value to the policy-making process. Indirectly, this can enable a product-

related use of foresight, since it makes policy actors more receptive or open to its outcomes.

It can also enhance the capabilities of policy-makers to think beyond traditional policy-making

boundaries (posed by short-term policy issues and traditional policy solutions) and stimulate

creativity and innovativeness in a dynamic and complex policy environment. Additionally,

from a process-related perspective, policy-oriented foresight can facilitate policy learning

capabilities and augment the flexibility and adaptability of organizations (Senge, 1990; van

der Heijden et al., 2002; van der Heijden, 2005).

Research approach

In Flanders (Belgium), there has been increasing attention in various policy domains since

2000 for policy-oriented foresight as a means to develop a coherent and strategic vision on

policy. This paper assesses the influence of three foresights which were selected because

they are exemplary of this development. The three cases were conducted in different policy

domains, i.e. innovation policy, nature policy, and environmental policy. The foresight study

on technology and innovation was a first exercise in the policy domain and can be

considered important since it was explicitly aimed at bringing about a strategic, long-term

vision and at making policy choices in technology and innovation in Flanders. The

environmental and nature foresights are also the first exercises of this type on a Flemish




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government level and are also aimed at capturing and anticipating long-term developments

and supporting strategic policy within their respective policy domains.

The qualitative analysis of the influence of policy-oriented foresight is based on 16 interviews

with 23 actors. The interviews firstly included the actors who conducted the foresight,

however, Flemish administrative actors, political actors such as members of ministerial

cabinets, as well as societal actors were also interviewed. The three cases are described

below.

A foresight study identifying six strategic clusters for Technology and Innovation policy in

Flanders served as a first case for analysis. It was conducted from 2005 to 2006 by the

VRWI, a strategic advisory council in the policy domain of science and innovation which

advises the Flemish government on its science and technology policy. The VRWI is a multi-

actor environment where scientific, private industrial, societal or governmental stakeholders

in the field of science and innovation meet. The VRWI set up the foresight on its own

initiative. Consultation with its diverse group of stakeholders determined the specific aim of

the foresight, which was to provide ‘a long-term reference point for technology and innovation

in Flanders’ (Smits et al., 2006:10). The foresight in general was highly participative. It made

use of the Delphi method, a foresight method typically used for expert consultation. The

study itself was based on the involvement of a diverse and wide range of stakeholders in

different stages of the process. The future of technology and innovation in Flanders was

assessed in three steps and on a horizon of about ten years, i.e. 2015. This resulted in the

formulation of specific policy priorities for six sectors of technology and innovation in

Flanders. These are also referred to as strategic clusters for technology and innovation. A

significant part of the experts consulted via the Delphi method, also agreed to evaluate the

factors critical for the achievement of the six priorities. The VRWI then transformed these

critical factors into specific policy recommendations. It actively and intensely diffused the

report containing the results of the foresight among its principal stakeholder groups

(universities, industry and government).

A second case is the Flanders Environment Outlook 2030 (MIRA-S), published by the

Flemish Environment Agency (VMM) at the end of 2009, as part of its obligation to produce a




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biannual State of the Environment Reporting (Decree of April 5, 1995 holding general

conditions on environmental policy). MIRA-S, which has 2030 as its horizon, was explicitly

aimed at providing input for the development of the Environmental and Nature Policy Plan

2011-2015 which is produced by the Cell for Policy Planning at the Department for

Environment, Nature and Energy. Three policy scenarios were described in the foresight,

varying in their ambition toward the state of the environment and requiring increased

budgetary efforts. A business-as-usual scenario referring to current policy, a scenario with

European targets and goals, and a ‘visionary’ scenario safeguarding the environment for

future generations (Van Steertegem, 2009) were then applied across various themes in

policy domains which have an impact on the environment (agriculture, mobility,…). Scientific

and societal stakeholders were involved in various degrees throughout the process. The

MIRA steering committee included a select group of stakeholders, among which were also

members of the Department for Environment, Nature and Energy. The committee was

consulted on the structure of the foresight report, which itself was designed by an internal

team of experts, called the MIRA team. The content of the different chapters was produced

externally, i.e. by various scientific expert groups. The MIRA team monitored and edited the

foresight and formulated specific policy goals and recommendations in each of the chapters

(Van Steertegem, 2009). It therefore has a normative character. Before the report was

finalized, a broad range of stakeholders could provide substantive comments and had the

opportunity to be listed as a reader at the end of each chapter. The report was diffused

among different stakeholders, i.e. the Flemish minister for the Environment, members of the

Department for Environment, Nature and Energy, societal/environmental organizations and

scientists.

The Nature Outlook 2030 , as a third case, is closely linked to the Environmental Outlook

2030. The Research Institute for Nature and Forest (INBO) is an organization of the Flemish

Government responsible for developing a biannual State of Nature Reporting. This resulted

at the end of 2009 in the Nature Outlook 2030 (NARA-S). The aim of the foresight was to

provide input for the Nature Policy Plan, which itself is part of the Environmental Policy Plan

2011-2014 (Decree of October 21, 1997 concerning nature conservation and the natural

environment). The study focuses on the consequences of environmental quality and the land

use to biodiversity, and makes use of two of the three policy scenarios in the Environmental




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Outlook. More precisely, the business-as-usual and the European scenario were reused and

form the base on which two nature policy scenarios are built, next to a reference scenario.

These scenarios, with a horizon of 2030, approach nature as a part of the open space in

Flanders from two diverging perspectives. The two scenarios were developed in consultation

with stakeholders, among which members of the Flemish Nature administration. They lead to

different evolutions, chances for development and bottlenecks for future nature policy and

the topics therein. Contrary to the Environmental Outlook, the scenarios’ development in the

Nature Outlook is based on equal (and constant) budgets. This was decided upon after

consultation with the chief of staff of the minister of Environment and Nature. The different

chapters in the report were produced predominantly by members of the INBO itself, of which

the majority was part of the NARA team. This select team of researchers within INBO was

also responsible for coordination with other actors providing input for the chapters, i.e.

scientists within INBO, as well as scientists and experts external to the organization.

Stakeholders were provided with the opportunity to be listed as a reader at the end of each of

the chapters. The study concludes with some policy recommendations in light of the two

scenarios. It was diffused among a political, administrative and societal stakeholders.

The influence of policy-oriented foresight in Flemish policy-making

Did these three policy-oriented foresight exercises influence the Flemish government’s

strategic decision making in their respective policy domains? Through a product-oriented

perspective the influence of the results of the three cases on strategic public policy was

assessed. A process-oriented perspective looked at their influence when facilitating a

forward-looking attitude within government.

With regard to the study on technology and innovation , the analysis shows that the policy-

oriented foresight had a significant impact on strategic policy in Flanders. We could not only

discern a significant product-related influence on policy. More importantly, the foresight might

also prove to serve as a reference point to policy-makers for future foresights, which in turn

will give shape to long-term technology and innovation policy in Flanders.




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A product-related influence on policy was not achieved immediately but gradually developed

over time. The foresight report was published in 2007, at the end of the then Flemish

government’s legislative period. Strategic policy directions had already been decided upon

and were further enacted toward the end of the legislature. With the installment of a new

Government, however, the results of the foresight did have a significant influence on its

strategic policy in several ways. We have discerned an important direct instrumental,

conceptual and agenda-setting influence on policy. This influence has taken place on a

middle-range term, i.e. 3 to 5 years after the foresight was conducted. There does not seem

to have been any political, strategic influence.

First, there is reference to the results of the foresight in official strategic policy documents,

such as the broader strategic framework project ‘Flanders in Action’. This strategic

framework was set up by the Flemish government to make Flanders a frontrunner region in

the social as well as in the economic domain. The references in the strategic framework were

also translated into the Flemish government’s Policy Note 2009-2014 on innovation policy

and the related policy briefs and actions. More recently, in May 2011, the Flemish

government approved a conceptual brief giving shape to a more hands-on strategic policy

approach in technology and innovation in Flanders. The focus on a “challenge driven”

innovation approach was particularly inspired by the strategic orientation provided in the

VRWI study (Flemish Government Conceptual Brief on Innovation Policy, 2011).

Thus, the foresight technology analysis has had an important direct instrumental influence on

public policy in Flanders, but it is also well known and diffused among a broad range of

actors in the policy domain. From the interviews it was clear that the foresight served as a

knowledge base for political and administrative actors in government, indicating a possibly

important conceptual influence. However, to assess this properly, further research is needed.

The report had an important agenda setting influence as well. The interviewees indicate an

increased political awareness for the need to make strategic choices within the policy

domain. This need was captured in the foresight itself and formed the basis for its execution.

The conceptual brief recently approved by the Flemish government, and its reference to the

foresight study is important here. It marks a development away from the hands-off approach




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which was traditionally applied within the policy domain. In the past government policy was

predominantly technology-pushed or supply driven in nature. Through the foresight study, the

Flemish government now had come to consider, accept and even implement a more

demand-driven approach when deciding upon innovation policy at the strategic level. The

study prominently placed this subject on the policy agenda, which was then enacted upon.

Additionally, the foresight has also had an important process-related influence. It is

considered a first and important exercise in the policy domain and has introduced a certain

dynamic within the diverse group of stakeholders. From the interviews it became clear that

several actors (political as well as administrative) now consider the execution of a follow-up

foresight. This new study would serve as a necessary and important tool to further develop

long-term, strategic policy in the field of technology and innovation. A new foresight exercise

would be necessary because the former policy-oriented foresight already dates from 2006

and its horizon is 2015. A new study is seen as important due to the fact that stakeholders

within the Flemish government are convinced of the added value a foresight study could

bring to strategic policy on technology and innovation.

Secondly, the Flanders Environment Outlook 2030 was analyzed. This policy-oriented

foresight had a limited impact on strategic environmental policy in Flanders. The analysis

showed that there was to some extent a product-related and process-related influence on

public policy and on policy-makers.

With regard to a direct, instrumental influence on policy, MIRA-S was explicitly aimed at

providing input for the Environmental Policy Plan 2011-2015. This strategic plan holds eight

challenges for environmental policy in Flanders, the strategic policy goals to which these

challenges are linked, and the indicators used to monitor progress (Department for

Environment, Nature and Energy, 2011). The strategic policy goals were not based on MIRA-

S, which also formed the basis for only a few of the 80 indicators set in the plan. Instead the

strategic policy goals were taken from other policy documents, such as European directives

and the Flemish government’s ‘Pact 2020’. The latter is linked to the strategic framework

Flanders in Action and served as a basis for the Flemish Government’s Coalition Agreement

of 2009. The strategic goals the Pact 2020 incorporates are also not linked to or based on




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the policy-oriented foresight. The Pact 2020 was set up by the Flemish Government itself in a

separate process, and published earlier than the foresight, namely at the beginning of 2009.

The Environmental Policy Plan 2011-2015 does often refer to the policy scenarios in the

foresight. From the interviews, it became clear that these references served mostly as an

illustration of or reflection on the possible developments in 2030. They can be considered a

‘look toward the future’ (Flemish Government, 2011) for the targets in the strategic plan

which were set at 2015.

Thus, the MIRA-S policy scenarios were not used to set long-term strategic targets for

environmental policy in Flanders, contrary to what was declared in the Policy Note 2009-

2014 of the Flemish minister for Environment and Nature. The instrumental influence of the

Environment Outlook 2030 on public policy in Flanders was therefore limited. Some

interviewees refer to the possibility of a conceptual influence of the foresight. It is well known

to and broadly diffused among a wide range of actors in the policy domain. Most of these

stakeholders consider the foresight as a thoroughly executed scientific report and a valuable

first attempt to look beyond traditional policy horizons. The business-as-usual scenario in the

foresight did make it clear to several actors that current policy would not suffice to reach the

environmental targets already decided upon. Additionally, the members of the Parliamentary

Commission of Agriculture also discussed the report’s chapter on agriculture. These insights

might prove to be important for policy-makers later on, when deciding about environmental

policy (or agricultural policy). It needs to be noted, however, that the study was published at

the end of 2009 and that it seems too early to come to a definite conclusion about if and how

the foresight has added to the knowledge and insights of policy-makers.

As to an agenda-setting function of the foresight, the interviews show that MIRA-S did have

an influence, albeit not so much on the political agenda as on the agenda of the Flemish

administration. The foresight refers to the different policy domains which have an impact on

environmental policy, such as agriculture, mobility, spatial planning, etc. Several interviewees

assert that there now is an increased awareness of policy-makers of the need for

coordination across these domains with regard to policy-oriented foresight. More precisely,

rocesses had already been started up to develop a foresight within the Departments of

Spatial Planning and of Mobility, when the Environmental Outlook was published. It was




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deemed important to attune certain assumptions in the foresights under development. The

initiative was taken by the Flemish minister for Spatial Planning who states in his Policy Note

2010-2011 that his administration will take the lead in these consultations in order to come to

a shared and efficient approach for future foresights across various, but related policy

domains.

The policy-oriented foresight also had a political-strategic influence. The Flemish Green party

in particular has made several interpellations in the Flemish Parliament within which it made

reference to the Environmental Outlook 2030. As an opposition party it made use of the

information in the foresight not only to question the minister for Environment and Nature, but

also the minister for Energy. Additionally, environmental stakeholders consider the study to

be of high importance because it provides them with some arguments to hold the minister

accountable for an environmental policy which they perceive as insufficient to reach aspired

environmental policy goals.

Although the direct instrumental influence of the foresight was limited, we discerned to a

certain extent other types of product-related influence. Process-related influence was quite

limited, since there was little involvement of political and administrative stakeholders during

the foresight process. The interviews even showed some skepticism toward the knowledge

and information which a policy-oriented foresight could bring to the policy process in the

future, if it would be delivered in the same form as the current foresight. On the other hand,

the study did lead to the recognition of a long term, forward look as important and necessary

to policy-makers, who also emphasized the need and the will to become more involved in

this process in the future.

The Flanders Nature Outlook 2030 had an impact on strategic nature policy in Flanders.

Firstly, the study had to some extent a product-related influence on strategic nature policy,

which can be situated mostly at the conceptual level. There does not seem to have been any

political-strategic influence of the foresight. Second, the Nature Outlook 2030 also had a

significant process-related influence on policy-makers. The different elements of influence of

the foresight on policy are discussed below.




18

As was also the case for MIRA-S, NARA-S was explicitly aimed at providing input for the

Environmental Policy Plan 2011-2015, within which the Nature Policy Plan is incorporated. A

direct, instrumental influence of the Nature Outlook in the strategic plan remained limited,

however, since specific strategic targets and goals had already been decided upon. As a

basis for these strategic policy goals served the Flemish Government’s Coalition Agreement,

the Flanders in Action plan, and European legislation and agreements. The Policy Plan did

reflect on long-term developments for nature and land use policy, for which it refers to the

Outlook 2030. However, as with MIRA-S, the references need to be seen as an illustration of

future developments. They did not entail strategic choices for nature policy in the Plan. The

Nature Outlook also holds an interactive tool for land use of which the Flemish administration

intends to use this further as a tool to anticipate certain developments. However, this has not

yet been the case.

NARA-S was published at the end of 2009, which makes a comprehensive assessment of its

conceptual influence difficult. However, certain elements indicate a significant conceptual

influence of the foresight. These are related to the two policy scenarios in the study, which

reflect an important strategic choice in nature policy between two, different approaches.

From the interviews it became clear that the scenarios provided policy-makers with insights

into the possibilities and constraints which these two strategic choices entail. Additionally,

these insights are confirmed to be of relevance to political actors because they are based on

equal and constant budgets. Indirectly, the knowledge and information in the nature policy

foresight may thus provide policy-makers with the basis for future strategic decisions in this

policy domain.

Related to this, we found that the Nature Outlook, due to its financial assumptions,

reemphasized the need to make strategic choices in nature policy. As this was already on

the policy agenda, however, the agenda setting influence of the foresight regarding this topic

is regarded as limited.

We discerned a product-related influence of the Nature Outlook 2030 on strategic decision-

making in the nature policy domain, although this influence was limited. There was a

significant process-related influence of the policy-oriented foresight on policy-makers, and




19

more precisely on members of the nature policy administration. In the interviews, several

stakeholders emphasized that the involvement in the foresight process produced a certain

dynamic which led to anticipation of input from the foresight. Actors also asserted that the

foresight stimulated a more forward look on nature policy, apart from a product being

available to provide input for the required strategic planning processes in the policy domain.

They ascribed this to the fact that they had been consulted before and during the process.

An exploration of opportunities and difficulties to influence strategic decision-making

The analysis showed that the three cases had a different influence on strategic decision-

making in their respective policy domains. The case of technology and innovation had an

important instrumental, agenda setting and process related influence. The environmental

foresight mostly had an agenda setting influence on strategic decision-making, and influence

of the foresight on nature policy can be described as predominantly conceptual and process-

related.

In this section some of the opportunities and difficulties are explored which influenced the

impact of these cases on strategic policy making in their respective policy domains. We

consider opportunities as those elements which could predominantly increase the influence

of the foresight on the strategic policy process, on the condition of being managed well.

Those elements which could mostly impede the influence of the foresight if not approached

properly, are referred to as difficulties. It needs to be noted that this is an exploratory

assessment and that further research into the variables possibly affecting the influence of our

three foresight cases on policy-making is needed.

Eight opportunities or difficulties for foresight to be used as a tool for strategic policy-making

are discussed below. They have also been identified in other studies on the influence of

foresight on policy (Dammers, 2000; Glenn et al., 2001; in ’t Veld, 2001; European

Commission, 2006; De Smedt, 2006; Van der Duin et al., 2009; Fuerth, 2009; Institute for

Alternative Futures, 2010) and relate to aspects of the foresight process, to characteristics of

the foresight as a product, and to elements of the political context in which the foresight takes




20

place. Table 3 illustrates the extent to which each of these elements could be discerned in

the three foresight cases. The relative strength of these aspects differs from case to case

and varies from --- (highly negative) to +++ (highly positive). The combined presence of each

of these aspects as opportunities and difficulties could explain the varying degrees of

influence of each foresight on the strategic policy process.

Table 3. Elements affecting the capacity of foresight to influence strategic policy-making

Strategic Clusters for Technology and Innovation

Environmental Outlook 2030

Nature Outlook 2030

1. Involvement of policy-makers + - +

2. Timing - - -

3. Facilitation of diffusion +++ - -

4. Stakeholder support +++ - -

5. Time horizon +/- - -

6. Quality +/- + +

7. Openness of policy-makers + - +/-

8. Absence of advice competition + --- -

A first element refers to the involvement of policy-makers in the foresight. This can be

achieved before, during or after the foresight process. Involvement of policy-makers can be

highly intensive in nature (actors providing input and interacting with foresight practitioners)

or much less intensive (policy-makers being presented with results and receiving information

on the process). Both in the technology and innovation case, as in the case on nature policy

we saw that the involvement of policy-makers was used as an opportunity to “recruit the

problem owners” (European Commission, 2006), in other words, to limit the distance

between the foresight and the policy-process. Certain policy needs or imperatives were

assessed (such as the reference to constant budgets in the nature policy scenarios), which

increased the relevance of the studies toward policy-makers.




21

Secondly, the timing of the results of the foresight can have an impact on the influence of the

foresight on the policy-making process. A well timed report, i.e. a report diffused when

strategic decisions yet have to be decided upon, could positively affect a direct instrumental,

agenda-setting or political-strategic influence of the foresight. In none of the three cases

assessed in this paper was timing used optimally. On the contrary, all three foresights were

published after strategic decisions had already been taken. The technology foresight

however, was reintroduced during a new legislature and could therefore be linked to a new

process within which strategic decisions were taken.

This brings us to a third element, namely the extent to which the diffusion of results is

facilitated by certain actors. These actors are able to ‘translate’ (and promote) the technical,

often specialist, language in a foresight to relevant knowledge and insights for policy-makers.

This bridging function strengthens the opportunity of a foresight to influence the strategic

policy process. After its publication in 2007, the technology foresight was actively promoted

by the VRWI strategic council chairman and secretariat among political and administrative

stakeholders. Additionally, this was done for a long period of time, i.e. toward a new

legislative period in 2009. This opportunity was not used by VMM and INBO. These

organizations can to a much lesser extent actively promote their outputs.

Stakeholder support can positively affect the influence of the foresight. It shows policy-

makers at which the foresight is aimed that there is a (broad) societal consensus on its

results. The VRWI foresight process was highly participative in nature and built on a broad

stakeholder consultation process. This is considered one of the strengths of the foresight

study and had a highly positive impact on its influence on strategic policy. The Environmental

and Nature Outlooks, on the other hand, were predominantly based on scientific expertise.

The lack of societal stakeholder involvement (and support) is considered a weakness and

poses difficulties for the foresight studies to convince policy-makers of their relevance.

Although strategic policy decisions are taken on the long-term, a long-term time horizon in

the foresight may pose some difficulties with regard to its influence on policy-making. In this

case, the study risks being too far removed from the policy cycle and from what policy-

makers may consider as relevant. The Environmental Outlook and the Nature Outlook had a




22

time horizon of 2030, though they were also explicitly linked to the Policy Plan 2011-2015.

The disconnection between these two horizons impeded a direct instrumental influence of

the foresight on the strategic decisions in the plan.

Of course, the quality of the data provided in the foresight can advance the use of the

foresight for strategic policy making. The quality of the foresight refers to analytical rigor,

reliability and objectivity of its results. These elements may increase the usefulness of a

foresight for policy-making. In general, the quality of the data in the Environmental Outlook

and in the Nature Outlook was positively appreciated. The appreciation of the information in

the foresight might over time have a positive impact on the conceptual influence of both of

these studies on the strategic policy process and on policy-makers.

Next, the openness of policy-makers refers to the way policy-makers perceive the results of

the foresight, i.e. whether they regard the study as relevant in a policy-making context. This

aspect is related to previous elements, such as involvement of policy-makers and the quality

of the data. When there is little openness toward the foresight and the results it presents, the

product-related influence of the study might be affected negatively. Policy-makers positively

valued the technology foresight, and considered it a study able to provide relevant insights

for the strategic policy process. Policy-makers, especially political actors, seem to be much

less open toward the Environment Outlook. This foresight is to a much lesser extent

considered relevant for the policy process by policy-makers. The increasing budgetary

implications of its scenarios are considered as not realistic or realizable, and the normative

assumptions related to the scenarios implicitly limit the discretion of policy-makers in making

strategic choices for policy.

Finally, other sources of evidence for policy, aimed at supporting the strategic policy-making

process can affect the influence of foresight. The absence of other sources of policy advice

provides opportunities for a foresight to influence the strategic policy process, while high

advice competition limits this opportunity. The environmental policy domain is characterized

by a high advice competition. Competition in this policy domain predominantly stems from

European legislation which reduces the strategic decisions which can be taken on the




23

regional level. For the Environment Outlook 2030 this seemed to be the most important

difficulty affecting its influence on strategic policy-making.

Conclusion

This paper looked at policy-oriented foresight as a means to come to strategic decision-

making in public policy. There is an increased need for strategy due to the emergence of

wicked problems. The complex nature of these policy problems requires foremost a long-

term perspective in policy-making. Policy-oriented foresight explicitly incorporates long-term

societal developments in its assessment, and can help governments anticipate the

challenges, problems and opportunities related to them. That is, if policy-oriented foresight

actually influences policy.

In Flanders (Belgium), there has been increasing attention since 2000 for policy-oriented

foresight as a means to develop a coherent strategic vision. The paper assessed the

influence of three policy-oriented foresights from a product-related and from a process-

related perspective. The three cases were important, first foresight exercises on a Flemish

policy level in their respective policy domains (technology and innovation, environment and

nature policy). A qualitative analysis of influence was based on interviews with political,

administrative and societal stakeholders. From the analysis it became clear that the cases

influenced public policy in different ways and to varying degrees. A direct, instrumental

influence could only be discerned in the case on technology and innovation, even though it

was an explicit goal of the two other cases as well. These two cases do have the potential to

influence policy in a conceptual way, although further research on this is needed. The

process-related influence of the cases is also important. As a first exercise, the three cases

seem to pave the way for future foresight exercises in Flanders.

Additionally, certain elements affecting the influence of the foresight on strategic policy-

making were explored. These elements relate to the foresight process, the foresight results

and the political context of the foresight. It is important and necessary that foresight

practitioners address these different elements as much as possible. The involvement of




24

policy-makers before, during and after the process, for example, increases the relevance of

the study and makes it more adapted to certain policy needs. The “recruitment of problem

owners” can also positively affect the openness of policy-makers toward the results of the

foresight. In this way, possible difficulties for influencing public policy can be transformed into

opportunities. Of course, this is more easily achieved with elements relating to the foresight

itself than with aspects of the specific policy context. Nevertheless, a reflection on and

anticipation of possible difficulties is highly advisable for foresight practitioners who not only

want to be policy-oriented but who also aim to influence policy-making.




25

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