PLJ Volume 44 Number 1 -03- Vicente Abad Santos - Civil Law - Part Two

8/2/2019 PLJ Volume 44 Number 1 -03- Vicente Abad Santos - Civil Law - Part Two

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* '- CIVIL LAW-PART TWOPROPERTY

Vicente -4bad SantosOI. INTRODUCTION

The year under review- 968- roduced a good harvest of decisionson the law of property. Most of the decisions merely repeat previousapplications of the law so that the judgment could be anticipatedin the light of the given facts. It is not possible to be critical withdecisions of this type because, like a pair of old shoes, Ithey givecomfort and support the stability of the law so essential in the fieldof property.

We have criticized a few of the decisions. One deals with co-ownership, which we think was not correctly decided. Another dealswith public property, which we think was decided wrrectly but leftsomething to be desired in the process of reasoning. We shall be happyto know the reaction of our readers to our criticisms.

As before, the present survey has been delimited by the editor ofthis publication to cases, if any, applying the provisions of Book I1of the Civil Code (excluding trademarks, trade-names and registry ofproperty) and the titles on occupation, donation and prescription ofBook I11 of the same code.11. CLASSIFICATIONF pRopwTy

There are two basic classifications of property in the Civil Code.Accorlng to its nature, property is classified into immovable or realand movable or personal. Depending on ownership, property is classifiedinto public and private. To be sure, thcre are other classifications ofproperty but they are less important than those already mentioned,e.g., corporeal and incorporeal, fungible and non-fungible, present andfuture, divisible and indivisible, urban and rural, generic and specific,and principal and accessory.

A. The nature of propertyArticle 415 of the Civil Code does not define what is real property.

Instead, it lumps a number of seemingly unrelated items and dubsthem as immovable property. Thus, we find in the list not only proper-

* Professor and Dean, College of Law, University of the Philippines.


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19691 CIVIL LAW 7 sties which are real by nature (land) but also others so consideredby attachment (paintings), by destination (machinery) and by analogy{contracts for public works).

In Government Service Insurance System v. Calsons, Inc.,l theSupreme Court held that machinery permanently placed on land be-came real property. In that case, the corporation borrowed from theSystem a sum of money secured by a real estate mortgage on severalparcels of land, together with improvements then existing or whichmay be placed thereon later. The contract provided, inter alia, thatthe mortgagor shall not sell, dispose of, mortgage or encumber anyof the mmtgaged properties without the consent of the mortgagee.The mortgagor removed and disposed of the machinery installed i nthe building, which was standing on the mortgaged properties. Themortgagor justified its action by contending that the machinery wasnot included in the mortgage. But the Supreme Court held the con-tention groundless. It said:

The mortgage was on the lands together with all the buildingsand improvements now existing or which may hereafter be constructedthereon. And the machineries, as found by the trial court, were permanentlya tk l i e d to the property, and instalIed there by the former owner to meetthe needs of certain works or industry therein. They were therefore partof the immovable pursuant to Article 415 of the Civil Code, and neednot be the subject of a separate chattel mortgage in order to be deemedduly encumbered in favor of appellee.ZTo the same effect, see, among other cases, Bischoff v. P o ~ n a r , ~C ea v. V i I l a n ~ e 2 ; a , ~u Unjieng v. hfaba1aca-t Sugar CO.,~ erkenkotter

v . Cu Unjiens; Davao Sawmill Co. I ) . Cmtillo, Engineering Supplies,Inc. v. C a r t of Appeals,q and Peoples Bank and Trust Co. u. DahicanLumber C O . ~

B. The ownership of properLyAmong properties of public dominion are shores. And the Spanish

Law of Waters of 1866 stipulates:By shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the

movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reachedby the highest equinoctial tides. Where the tides are not appreciabIe, theG.R. No. 19867, M a y 29, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 891.l I d . at 897-898.12 Phil. 690 (1909).418 Phil. 538 (1911).58 Phil. 439 (1933).61 Phil. 663 (1935).3 Phil. 709 (1935).96 Phil. 70 (1954).CIVILCODE,art. 420.QG.R. No. 17500, May 16, 1967, 20 S.C.R.A. 84 (1967).


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76 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during ordinarystorms and tempests.llIn C a g m p a n g v. Morano,2 the plaintiff sought to recover a parcelof land abutting on the sea, which, he claimed, had been forcibly

entered by the defendant who, in turn, pleaded occupancy by virtueof a foreshore grant from the government.At a pre-trial, it was agreed:. . . Should the lot in question be reached by the ordinary highesttide, then the plaintiff shall concede that the lot rightfully belongs tothe defendant and will relinquish any of his claim and interest in thesame. Should the hdings of the court be the other way, then the de-fendant should abandon the lot in question in favor of the plaint8 . . .At an ocular inspection conducted by the trial court? it was found:. . . [T]bat the lot in question is not reached, much less, covered bythe highest ordinary tide. It can only be reached or covered by the highesttide during the months of May,- June and July or during the months whenthe highest tide of the year will occur.

It gave judgment for the defendant but despite the pre-trial agree-. ment the plaintiff appealed, urging reversal. In affirming, the SupremeCourt said:

As the lot was covered by the highest tides from May to July,and there is no showing that these. tides are due to abnormal conditions,the land i s obviously part of the shore and public property. Hence, legalpossession thereof appertains to the national government or its grantees.No error was, therefore, oommitted in holding that appellee Mvrano, beingsuch a grantee, has the supedor right to possession as against the plaintiffwho exhibited no State grant.laIt should be noted that the quality of being a shore is not necessarily

an original condition. Thus, a piece of land? though privately owned,can become a shore if it is eroded by the ebb and flow of the tideand the owner makes no attempt to stop the advance of the sea sothat the land becomes submerged in water in ordinary tides. If suchshould occur, the land becomes part of the shore and the owner losesownership over it. It i s a de f case of eminent d0main.l

The Civil Code divides the property of provinces, cities and munic-ipalities as either property for public use or patrimonial property.15Their property for public use consist of roads and streets, squares, foun-tains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service

*l?irt. 1.lG.R. No. 25738, March 14, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 1040.13Zd. at 1042-1043.l4 Government v. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112 (1929).l5Art. 423.


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19691 CIVIL LA W 77paid for them. All other property by them possessed is patrimonial, whichshall be governed by the Civil Code, without prejudice to the provisionsof special laws.le

The case of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zam-boanga, shows how the Supreme Gout used the phrase the provisionsof special laws to arrive at a classification of provincial propertiesdifferent from that given in the Civil Code.

The municipality of Zamboanga used to be part, in fact the capital,of Zamboanga province. In 1936, the, municipality of Zamboanga be-came a city and in the charter creating it was included the provisionthat-

Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon u p nthe transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid forby the City of Zamboanga at a price to be &ed by the Auditor Gen-eral.*In 1952, Republic Act No. 711 divided Zamboanga province into

two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. After the division,the City of Zamboanga started to pay to Zamboanga del Norte itsshare of the value of the abandoned properties but in 1961, the charterof the former was amended by providing that-

All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former provinceof Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are herebytransferred , fr ee of charg e, in favor of the mid City of Zamboanga.laZamboanga del Norte then filed a complaint against the City of

Zamboanga which sought, inter alia, that the amendatory statute, Re-public Act No. 3039, be declared unconstitutional for depriving theplaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation.

The issue, as stated by the court, was: Were the abandonedproperties owned by the province in its public and governmental capa-city or were they owned in its private or proprietory capacity? Inthe case of the first, the property is public and Congress has absolutecontrol over it; in the case of the second, the property is patrimonialand the owner cannot be deprived of i t without due process andpayment of just compensation.

The Supreme Court held that under Articles 423 and 424 of theCivil Code, municipal corporations have only two kinds of properties:property for public use and patrimonial property. These articles provide:

l 6 A r t . 424.G.R. No. 24440, March 28, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 1334.Corn. Act No. 39 (1936), sec. 50.l8 Rep. Act No. 3039 (1961), sec. 1.


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78 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44 A r t . 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is

divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.Property for public use, m the provinces, cities and munic-

ipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works forpublic service paid or by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

Art. 424.

All other property po-ssessed by any of them is patrimonial and shallbe governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of speciallaws.The test, it said, as to whether property is for public use is its

free and indiscriminate use by anyone.The Supreme Court held that, under the Civil Code classification,

two lots used as high school playgrounds were property for publicuse whereas the rest of the abandoned properties were patrimonialproperty. Even the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites andthe school sites will be considered patrimonial property, said the court,for they are not for public use. They fall, added the Court, under thephrase public w-orks for public service for, under the e j usd m g e ne r i srule, such public works to be for public use must be for free andindiscriminate use by anyone just like the preceding enumerated proper-ties in Article 424, paragraph 1.

But the Court did not rely on its interpretation of ,the Civil Code todetermine the plaintiffs right to compensation. It relied instead on theprinciples constituting the law of Municipal Corporations because Article424, paragraph 2, provides that the applibation of the Code shall be with-out prejudice to the provisions of special laws and citing Hinunangan o.Director of and Municipality of Batangas v . Cantos,21 Tan-toco c . Municipal Council of Iloilo, held that property devoted topublic service is deemed for public use and under this norm, it is enoughthat the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes likelccal administration, public education, public health, etc. As a result,of the 50 lots that had been abandoned by the province, 24 were de-clared by the court to be property for public use because they weredevoted to governmental purposes and noncompensable, and 24 weredeclared patrimonial in nature and therefore, compensable.

This case can stand some criticism.(1) If, under the Civil Code, the test for determining whether

property is for public use is its free and indiscriminate use by anyone,then a high sohool playground, contrary to the courts holding, i s not

2 0 2 4 Phil. 124 (1913).21 91 Phil. 514 (1952).49 Phil. 52 (1926).


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mn1969

property for public use because its use is not open to everyone butto high school students only. A high school playground is thereforepatrimonial property.

(2 ) According to the Supreme Court, [flor purposes of thisarticle (424), the principles obtaining under the laws of municipal cor-porations can be considered as special laws. It is believed, however,that the Civil Code refers to statute law for it speaks of prmisionswhich cannot include principles constituting the law of MunicipalCorporations. This is not to say that it was wrong for the court toapply said principles for, as it said, [tlhe controversy here is morealong the domains of the law of Municipal Corporations-State v.Province - han along that of Civil Law. The point we wish tomake is that it was not necessary to torture the coda1 provisions inorder to justify a different classification.111. OWNERSHIPN GENERAL

A. The jus windicandiOne of the rights included in the ownership of property is the jus

vindicandi-The owner has . . . a right of action against the holderand possessor of the ding in order to recover it.23It is hornbook law that in the recovery of real property, the owner,

depending on the cause of deprivation, has the following actions avail-able to him: (a) the summary action for forcible entry (where pre-liminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from thefiling of the complaint under Article 439 of the Civil Code) or illegaldetainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and isbrought within one year in the municipal court; (b ) the accion pub-liciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenaryaction in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and( c ) acci6n de reivindicaci6n7 which seeks the recovery of ownership,including the jus u t d i and the jus fmendi, also brought in the Courtof First Instance.

This was pointed out in Emilia v. Budo, In that case, the plain-tiff prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from continuingwith the construction of a house on a piece of land which the formerclaimed to belong to her. The trial court issued an ex-parte preliminaryinjunction but after a summary hearing on a motiondissolved the preliminaq- injunction and dismissed the

to dismiss, i tcomplaint. In

2 3 C ~ v ~ODE, rt. 428, par. 1.24 G.R. No. 23685, April 25, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 183, 189.


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80 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL.. 44that hearing, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of a sur-veyor that the house under construction was outside the plaintiffs hand.The plaintiff appealed.

In dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court said:The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicialpronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the well-

ingrained precept that injunctions are not available to take property outof possession or control of one party and place it into that of anotherwhose title has not clearly been establi~hed.~5The Court then pointed out the three kinds of actions available to theplaintiff, supra.

The reason why injunction is not the proper remedy has been givenin the case of Santos v. De as follows:

This court, on more than one occasion, has held that injunctionwill not be granted to take property out of the possession or control ofone party and place it in that of another whose title has not been clearlyestablished by law. (Devesa us. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273; Palafox us . Madamba,19 Phil. 444; Evangelista vs. Pedrehs, 27 Phil. 648). The doctrineproceeds on the familiar rule that the writ of injunction is an equitablerelief, and that the determination of title is a legal remedy. In jurisdictionswhere courts of equity are separate and distinct from courts of law,such distinction is by no means a matter of indifference. Indeed, it isa matter of jurisdiction, for courts of equjty, by their nature, can onlyadminister equity. Thus, following this principle, this court has furtherheld that, where the defendant raised the question of title, injunction is notthe pmper remedy. (Asombra vs. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil. 883;Liongson vs. Martinez, 6 Phil. 948.)Nonetheless, even if a case had been initiated as one for injunction,

it can be treated by the court as an ordinary action in order to avoidmultiplicity of suits between the same parties considering that Philippinecourts administer both law and equity.2

In the EmiZia case, both parties claimed ownership over the sameportion of land. Clearly, as the Supreme Court pointed out, a legiti-mate issue of ownership emerges. The plaintiffs suit should properlyhave been an accion rdnvindicatoria. And in line with the Santos andother cases, the court, instead of dismissing the complaint, could haveremanded the case to the lower court with instructions to amend thecomplaint so that the question of ownership could be raised. But thecourt did not remand because it was afraid, in view of the voluminousrecord of the case, that confiision might arise.

25 Id . at 187.2 6 6 0 Phil. 573, 574-575 (1934).27 Santos v. De Leon, supra.


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CIVIL LAWAn owners right to recover possession of his property may, in cer-

This is illustrated inain cases, have to give way to public interest.City of Legaspi v. A. I;. Ammen Transportation Co., Znc.,as

In that case, the defendant had earlier successfully reconstitutedits title to a piece of land situated in the. now City of Legaspi. Itafterwards sought to eject the occupants on the land, including th eCity of Legaspi which had constructed a public road thereon. Froma judgment ordering the city to vacate the road, appeal by certiorariwas made by the city.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment but made the following.. - 1 ,-a: I I L # - ,dm, -I - . . . r l lLeservation: - -

Such a problem thus gives rise to a matter of public interest. For-tunately, it is not a new one m this jurisdiction. The appmpriate solutionwas indicated in the leading case of Alfonso w. Pasay City, where thisCourt, through Justice Montemayor, held: In the present case, Mfonsoremains up to now, he owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4388 ofthe Cadastral Survey of Pasay, becanse W ig registered land, the City ofPasay or its predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not and could notacquire it thru prescription. As registered owner, he could bring an actionto w v e r possession at any time because possession is one of the attributesof ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the .City of Pasay is neither &venient nor feasible because it i s now andhas been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for theCity of Pasay to make due compensstion, wllich it could and should havedone years aso since 19F.106 Phil. 1017, 1022 [1960].)

I 1.I . I I C P 1-r f l P i I - f 1 1 f f I ,I I J i t . .Anln lnm I . J i m I I , - 1 I L ,

The owner of property has, among other rights, its enjoyment and- I t ,B. Limitakm dn ownership - .

disposal, without other limitations than those established by 1aw.7p8An example of a limitation on the right of ownership is given in

the twin cases of Director of Foreshy, c. A~ui i02 ,~~nd PinugcamuliganInhAgro Development Corp. v. Peralta? whose facts and issues neednot here be stated.

Under Section 1829, paragraph 1 of the Revised Administrative M e ,[elvery private owner of land containing timber, firewood and ohexminor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Directorof Forestry. If the title is not registered, the crwner is made to paycharges for cutting, gathering and removing forest products from hisown Zand and he must, moreover, have first secured a license from the

28G.R. No. 22377, November 29, 1968.a e C ~QDE, rt. 428, par. 1.30G.R. No. 24796, June 28, 1988, 23 S.C.R.A. 1183.a l G . R . No. 25159, June 28, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 1184.

-. .


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82 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44Director of Forestry otherwise his cutting, etc. are illegal and subjectto the payment of a penalty.32 Accordingly-

". . . [Rlegistmtion of titles by the owners of private woodlands withthe Bureau of Forestry results in an exemption 'from the payment offorest products gathered therefrom for commercial or industrial purposes.'If an owner fails to so register, he is obliged to pay forest charges, asprescribed in Sections 264 and 265 of the Tax Code. . . . However, asprovided in Section 266, if an owner does not register his title, b u t hedesires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products fromhis land. he may 'secure a license from the Director of Forestry in ac-cordance with the Forest law and regulations.' If he does not, under thesame Section 266, his cutting, gathering and removing of timber and otherforest products from public forest produds 'shall be considered as unlawfulcutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests andshall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases.' And this wouldbring into play Section 267,where the charges on forest products 'unlaw-fully cut and gathered, in any public forest without license, or, if underlicense, in violation d he terms thereof . . . shall be increased by threehundred per centum.' "33

IV. RIGHTOF ACXXSSIONIn industrial accession, the law pays particular attention to the

good or bad faith of the builder, planter or sower. Subject to a fewexceptions, he who acts in bad faith has no rights but, on the contrary,the law vents on him its full retributive justice. On the obher hand,he who acts in good faith is treated leniently by the law and isgiven certain rights. Thus, a person who builds, plants or sows in goodkith on the land of another is entitled to indemnity from the ownerof the land if the latter does not choose the other options given tohim.34 But he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the landof another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right toindemni,tys5

' I . . . Good faith, or the lack of it, i s in its last analysis a questionof intention; but in ascBTtau11'ng the intention by which one is actuatedon a given occasion, we are necessarily controlled by the evidence as tothe conduct and outward acts by which alone the inward motive may, withsafety, be dezermined. So it is that 'the honesty of intention,' 'the honestlawful intent,' which constitutes good faith implies a 'freedom fmm know-ledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry,' andso it is that proof of such knowledge overcomes the presumption of goodfaith in which the courts always indulge in the absence of proof to theoontrary. 'Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible factthat can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mindazTax CODE,sea. 266 and 267.33Director of Forestry v. Muiioz, supra note 30 at 1200-1201."CIVIL CODE,art. 448.3 5 C ~ ~ ~ODE, art. 449.


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19691 CIVIL LAW 83which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs. (WilderUS. Gihan, 55 Vt., 504, 505; Cf. Cardenas us. Miller, 108 Cal., 250;Bream-Renoudet, Cypress Lumber Co. us. Shadel, 52 La. Ann., 2094-u)98;Pinkerton Bros. Co. us. Bromley, 119 Mich., 8, 10, 17.)3The case of 1 . M . Tuason & C o . v . L ~ r n a n l a n , ~ ~nswers the questionas to whether or not a person can be a builder in good faith on a

piece of land registered under the Torrens system.In that case, Lumanlan had built a house on the registered proper-ty of the plaintiff and in her counterclaim to the ejwtment suit, she

contended that she was a builder in good faith. But the SupremeCourt, relying on its previous decision in Tuascm & Co. v. Macalindong,88held that there being presumptive knowledge of the Tarrens titlesissued to Tuason 8- Co. and its predecessors-in-interest since 1914, thebuilder cannot, in good conscience, disregard the plaintiffs registeredtitle and was therefore a builder in bad faith.

The Tuason cases have reversed the decision in Labajo v . EnriqUez,39where a person who had occupied by mistake anothers Torrens registeredland, was deemed to be a possessor in good faith, and sustained thedissenting opinion of Justice Sabino Padilla in .the same case, as follows:

It appears that the parcel of land acquired by purchase by thedefendant and the one adjoining it owned by the plaintiffs are registeredunder the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496). The f a c t that the defendantfound it unoccupied or abandoned and that he was made to believethat the parcel of land he had acquired by purchase included the adjoiningparcel of land owned by and registered in the name of the plaintiffs,does not render him a possessor in good faith. Were this a matter of afew square meters and with a standing wall pointing out the boundaryof the parcel of land acquired by the party who c l a i m s to be a possessorin good faith of a small adjacent strip of land within the area of anadjoining registered parcel of land belonging to another, good faith ofthe f o m r might be accepted and believed, as held in Co Tao us. ChanChim, 46 off. Gaz. 5514. But one who purchases a parcel of landregistered under the Torrens system must be presumed to know the areaand boundaries of the acquired parcel of land. Assuming that he was toldthat the adjoining parcel of land owned by another, also registered underthe same system, was included in the parcel of land he had acquired bypurchase, that does not make him a possessor in good faith of the p dof land belonging to the other. . . . . 4 0The case of Lumango F. Usrnan,l also dealt with accession in

bad faith.a s h u n g Y ee v. F. L. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil. 644, 651-652 (1918).38G.R. No. 15398, December 29, 1962.39102 Phil. 908 (1958).4 o Z d . at 911-912.

G.R. No. 23497, April 26, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 230.

G.R. No. 25359, September 28, 1968, 25 S.C.R.A. 255.


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84 PHILEPINE LAW JOURNALIn that case, the plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendant

several parcels of land. The trial court gave judgment to the plaintiffsbut JoseAngeles, an intervenor, claimed reimbursement for the coconuttrees planted by him on the property in litigation.

Presumably, the trial court made no findings as to whether or notAngeles was a planter in good faith and presumably also, it failedto take into account the case of Rernardo v. Bata~lun,~which recog-nizes the primacy of the landowners right but on equitable grounds,entered the following judgment:

On the other hand, the plaintiffs are ordeed to reimburse to thedefendant-intervenor, JOSE ANGELES, the sum of 84,500.00 epresentingthe value of the 3,000 coconut trees introduced by him and his predecessorsin interest on Lots 892, 893 and SQ4. Should plaintiffs fail to do sowithin ninety (90) days from the date this decision becomes M,hethree lots shall be ordered sold at public auction, the prooeeds of whichshall be applied to the 84,500.00 herein adjudged to Jose Angeles, and thebalance to be delivered to the plaint%.The Court of Appeals found that the intervenor had bought thelots in question with knowledge that they were rhe subject of a

litigation between plaintiffs predecessors and the defendants but ongrounds of equity, affirmed the lower courts judgment with the solemodification that the indemnity was reduced from 14,500 to 2,500despite this statement:

The [trial] Court found for a fact that around 3,000 coconut treeswem planted on those lots aforementioned, some of them already fruit-bearing. It appears f m he records that not an, but a portion, of the3,000 were planted by intervenor Jose Angeles. The value placed by thelower couit of F1.50 per fruit-bearing coconut tree is reasonable enough,inasmuch as the lower court wa s in a better position to make the assess-ment, it being more closely in contact with the alnditiolls and circumstan e Sof the locality. We are not prepared to disturb such &ding for lack ofevidence to warrant such an action on our part.Is the intervenor a planter in good faith? The Supreme Court,

on the basis of the Court of Appeals finding that he had knowledgethat the lots in question were under litigation, held him to be apurchaser and a builder in bad faith. It held:

. . . The praision applicable to this c898 is, accordingly, Article 449of the Civil Code, which provides that, (h)e who builds, plants or sowsin bad faith on the land of another. loses what is built, planted or sownu< t h t right to indemnity.

Obviously, (the alleged equity in favor of Jose Angeles, on whichthe lower courts have relied, cannot prevail over the aforementioned expressstatutory provision to the contrary, apart from the fact that he who seeksequity must come with dean hands.

.

42 66 Phil. 598 (1938).


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19691 CIVIL LAWDespite bad faith, a builder, planter or sower is entitled to re-

imbursement for necessary expenses. In this connection, it should benoted that said trees are improvements, not necessary expenses of pre-servation, which a builder, planter or sower in bad faith may recoverunder Articles 452 and 546, first paragraph, of the Civil Code.In Angela Estnte, Inc., c. Court of First I~wtance,~ ne of thedefendants, a sugar central company, had been granted a conventionalright of way over the plaintiffs haciendas. After the expiration ofthe contract term, the ceatral claimed that it was a possessor in good:faith of the right of way traversing the haciendas and invoking Article44.8 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that, [tfie owner of theland on which anything has been built, sown or planted in goodfaith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sow-ing or planting, after payment of the indemnity. . . argued that itsrailroad tracks, locomotives and cane cars may not be removed with-out payment of their value.

The Supreme Court, relying on the case of Alburo v . ViZZanuev~,~held that the central could not validly claim to good faith becauseit knew and recognized that the strip of land traversed by its rail-road tracks was owned and possessed by the plaintiffs.

,

In the Alburo case, the Supreme Court held that Art. 361 ofthe Spanish Civil Code, now Article 448 of the Philippine Civil Code,is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one buildsor sows or plants on land in which he believes himself to have aclaim of title. . .45 However, this principle was not applied in Jaciav. J a ~ i e r , ~ ~here a person who built a house on his fathers landwith the consent of the latter, was held to be a builder in good faith;and in Bernard0 c. Bdaclan, where a person who was allowed bythe owner of the land to clear the same and make improvementsthereon, was held to be a possessor in good faith.v. CO-OWNERSHIP

1. T he nature o# a co-ou~ncrs nterestI t is axiomatic that the interest of a person in property owned incommon with others is spiritual or intangible rather than physical

or concrete. True, he is the absolute owner of his share and he cando as he pleases with it, but he cannot point to any particular portion43 G.R. No. 2i084, July 31, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 500.45Id. at 280.4 9 7 Phil. 261 (1907).4 7 Supra note 42.

447Phil. 27i (1907). . 181 ;


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86 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44of the property owned in common as his. Accordingly, while he hasthe right to freely sell and dispose of his individual interest, he hasno right to sell a divided part of the property. If he is the ownerof an undivided half of a #tract of land, he has a right to sell andconvey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot intotwo parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bo ~nds.~

Supposing a co-owner violates the injunction stated above, whatwould be the effect of the sale? The answer was given in Lopez u.Cuagcmg4@where a co-owner of an hacienda sold to a third partya portion thereof designated as Lot 178-B measuring 10,832 squaremeters where the buyer subsequently erected a distillery and otherbuildings. To the question, what rights did the buyer acquire in thesale, the Supreme Court said that it transferred to the buyer an abstractshare equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the hacienda.The fact that the agreement in q tion purported to sell a concreteportion of the haci r the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must berecognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Quado res nonvalet ut ago, valeat quontum oalere potest. (When a thing is of noforce as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have).O

Estoque v . Pajim~la,~eals with a sale by a co-owner of adefinite portion of the common property.

In that case, a piece of land became the common property ofthree persons through inheritance. On October 28, 1951, one of the co-owners w1d her share to the plaintiff, definitely identifying it as the1/3 portion located on the southeastern part of the property andspecifically bounded on the north by De Guzman street, on the eastby P m d a s street, on the south by Perez street, and on the west bythe remainder of the lot, with an area of 840 square meters.

On October 29, 1959, the day following the plaintiffs acquisition,the plaintiffs vendor acquired the shares of the other co-owners, whichshe in turn sold on December 30, 1959, to the defendant.

Plaintiff sought to exercise a right of redemption from the defendanton the basis of Art. 1620, Civil Code, which reads:

A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in casethe shares of al l the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a thirdperson. If the price of the diemtion is grossly excessive, the redemptionershall pay only a reasonable one.*8 Lopez v. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567, 568-56Q (1906).4974 Phil. 601 (1944).50Id . at 609.s l G . R . No. 24419, July 15, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 59.


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19691 CIVIL LAWShould two or more cecmmers desire to exercise the riglit of redemption,they may only do so in proportion to the share they may rerpectively havein the thing owned in common.

The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state acause of action and appeal was made directly to the Supreme Courtwhich affirmed the order of dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffnever .became co-owner with her vendor after th e latter had acquiredthe shares ,of the others for what was sold to the plaintiff was aclearly specified portion and not a mere undivided interest.

This unusual decision, to say the least, disregards the principleenunciated in the Impez cases mentioned above. For these cases al-ready hold that a co-owner can sell only his ideal share in the prop-erty owned in common even when he purports to sell a concrete portion.

The criticism on the Estoque case is reinforced by the case ofDiversified Credit Corporation v . Rosado,52 where a lot awned in commonby thirteen persons was by them sold to the plaintiff. Prior to the sale,one of the co-owners and her husband had built a house on a portionof the lot with conjugal funds. In an action to eject the buildersfrom the lot, the defense was that 1/13 of the lot had become con-jugal property because of Article 158, paragraph 2, Civil Code, whichreads:

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during themarriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to thepartnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spousewho owns the same.It was contended that as the building of the house at the expenseof the conjugal partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share ofthe co-owner (the wife) into community property, the sale made infavor of the plaintiff was void insofar as said 1/13 share is concernedbecause the wife had ceased to own such share from and after thebuilding of the house.

Rut the Supreme Court found this contention untenable, saying:We find appellants thesis legally untenable. For it is a basii prin-

ciple in the law of mwne rship , both under the present Civil Code asin the code of 1889, that rn individual co-owner can claim title to definiteportion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof.Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quotaor proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all theco-owners. The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this court. InLopez vs. Ilustra. 5 Phil. 567, it was held that while a co-owner has theright to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, he has no rightto sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common. If he is theowner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to sell

- 5 2 G . R . No. 27935,December 24. 1968.


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88 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44and convey an undivided half, but lie has no right to divide the lot intotwo parts, and m v e y the whole of one part by metes and bounds.' Thedoctrim was reiterated in Mercado us. Liwunag, L-14429, une 20, 1962,holding that a co-owner may not convey a physicit1 portion of the lando w i d in c o r n . And in Suntos u. B w m c o ~ ' o , -20136, June 23, 1965,it was ruled that a co-owner may not even adjudicate to himself any de-terminate portion of land owned in common.

"Since the share of the wife, . . . was at no time physically de-termined, it cannot be validly claimed that the house c o t u t m d by herhusband was built on land belonging to her, and Article 158 of the CivilCode cannot apply. Certainly, on her 1/13 ideal or abstract undiviMshare, no house could be erected. IGecessarily, the claim of conversion ofthe wife's share from paraphema1 to conjugal in character as a result ofthe ~0mtmct.1on must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis."2. Prescription in facor of a co-oummN o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Hemay, at any time, demand patition insofar as his share is concerned.And no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir againsthis co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizesthe co-owner~hip.~~The reason why prescription does not ordinarily run in favor of

a co-owner or co-heir against the others is because the former's possessionis not adverse." And even where a co-owner acquires a Torrens titlein his own name to property owned in Common, he can be compelledto stmmder to each of his co-owners his appropriate share and aproceeding for partition is an appropriate remedy by which to enforcethe right."5

St8, as the law indicates, a co-owner may acquire the share ofanother by prescription provided he has ceased to recognize the owner-ship. But the repudiation must be clear, complete, conclusive and leaveno shadow of d ~ u b t . " ~nd the co-owner must be in possession forthere can be no prescription without possession.s7

Sun Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,58 was gn action filed byCrisanta San Buenaventura in 1962 against her sister, Julia, for thepartition of a pi of land inherited from their grandfather in 1937.The defense was adverse possession since 1944. The trial court dismissedthe complaint, the Court of Appeals reversed, and review was soughtin the Supreme Court which, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals

5 3 c k I L CODE, art. 494.54Codova v. Codova, 102 Phil. 1182 (1958).53 Ca&o v. Castro, 57 Phil. 675 (1932).5'3Bargay0 v: Cammot, 40 Phil. 857 (1920).57 Pmcho v. Villanueva, 99 Phil. 611 (1956).58G.R. No. 23980, January 31, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 462


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19691- - , - - - - -

8,- , - # , CIVIL LAW 89on the ground that Julia had acquired ownership of the propertythrough Prescription. Said the Supreme Court:

This is borne out by the fact that, admittedly, she [Julia] had notonly held it since 19.44, but, also, built and maintained thereon a houseas early as 1947; that she resided therein continuously, since then up tothe presenc that on June 8 , 1952, Julia had caused the land to be surveyedin her name; that on March 31, 1958, she applied for a free patent thereto;that she mortgaged the land . . . ; that she objected, in her name, to theinclusion o said land in the application for registration Eled by a thirdparty; that Crisanta did not oppose said application; that Crisanta hadd, since 1944, either for the pussession of the land, or forthe enjoyment of any of the derived therefrom; that she did notd e ny demand for its partition; until March, 1962, or on the eve of theinstitution of this case; and that such one and only demand for partitionwas evidently preparatory to the filing of the complaint herein.

VI. SERVITUDES1. Acquisit ionServitudes are acquired either by title or by prescription. M y

continuous and apparent servitudes can be acquired by prescriptionwhereas any kind of servitude can be acquired by title. A servitudeof way has been held to be discontinuous so that it eannat be acquiredby pres~ription.~t can be acquired by title only which is the juridicalact which gives birth to the servitude. Son, pues, titulos, corlstitutivosde Eos s m i d u m b r e s c u d q u i e r a q u e s e a su clme, la ley , la donmidn,el contrato y el tmtamemto.o There are also equivalents of title,namely: a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate,a final judgment, and an apparent sign between two estates establishedby the owner of both.

In Angela Estate, Znc. 2). Court of First the centralclaimed that it had acquired a legal easement. . . through 45 yearsof continuous use of the railroad tracks under the. . .contracts.

The Supreme Court did not discuss this contention, which ispresumably grounded on prescription. But in the light of the Ronquillocase, supra, the central could not have acquired a right of way asclaimed. Moreover, even assuming $&at a right of way can be acquiredby prescription, it is manifest that the centrals possession was notadverse so that it could not ripen into a real right.-___

59 Ronquillo v. Row, 103 Phil. 84 (1958).60 4 MANRESA,COD~GOC r v r ~ ,594-595 2nd ed. 1890, North Negros Sugar C o ,Inc. v. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 664, 696 (1936).62 Supra note 43. (on accession).

CIVIL CODE, arts. 623, 624; Amor v. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403 (1943).


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PIIILIFPINE LAW JOURN,-iI, [VOL. 44The central also contended that it had a right to a compulsory

right of way under the provisions of the Civil Code. The SupremeCourt observed:

By express provision of articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code,the onmer of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after hehas established the existence of four requisites, namely, (1) the estate issurrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a publichighw-ay; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation wasnot due to the proprietors own acts; and (4 ) the right of way claimed isat a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as con-sistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to apublic highway may be the shortest. The onus is upon the owner of thedominant estate to show by specific averments in his complaint the existenceof the requisites or pre-conditions enumerated. . . .

And the court rejected the contention because the central was in facteasily accessible from various points through existing provincial roadsThe court also noted that in one crop year, most of the cane milledwas hauled to the central by the use of trucks and truck-trailers.Finally, the court said: It may be true that the railroad tracks providean economical and convenient means of transportation to and fromthe mill sites. Unfortunately, our Civil Code speaks of necessity andnot of comfort and c~nvenience.~~

This case reiterates the ruling made in Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,lnc. o. Capitol Subdivision, I ~ C . ~ ~o the same effect, Bacolod-MurciaMilling Co., Inc. o. Q ~ e r u b i n . ~ ~

2. ExtinctionServitudes are extinguished, according to Article 631 of the CivilCode:

* ( l )By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominantand servient estates;

(2 ) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements,this period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to beused; and, with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which anact contrary to the same took place;

(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition thatthe easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent con-dition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use, unlesswhen the use becomes possible, s&c;ent time for prescription has elapsed,in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;e 3 1 d . at 511-512.64 G.R. No. 25887, Tulv 26. 1966. 17 S.C.R.A. 731.


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1060J CIVIL LAW 91( 4 ) By the expiration of the term or the [email protected] of the condition;if the easement is temporary or conditional;( 5 ) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;(6) y the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant

and servient estates.In the case of a right of way, it is also provided that:

If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to beneoessary because its owner has joined it to another abutting on a publicmad, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the easement beextinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity.The interest on the indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rentfor the use of the easement.SSThe case of Benedicto v. Court of dealt with a claim

that a servitude of way had been extinguished by nonuser and bythe cessation Q the necessity for a passageway.

The servitude came about as follows: Miriam Hedrick owned aparcel of land abutting on San Marcelino St. in Manila on whichwere constructed two chalets of equal size and similar shape. Betweenthe two buildings was a passageway for reaching the rear portionof the land.

In 1917, Hedrick sold part of the land including one of the housesto Claro Recto. In the deed of sale, the following was stipulated:

SEXTO. Que entre la porcion vendida a Claro M. Recto y la quequeda en poder de Miriam R. Hedrick hay un pas0 para vehiculos, deunos tres a cuatro metros de anchura proxjmamente mnstituido por mitado iguales partes sobre cada una de dichas porciones, y ambas partes deesta escritura se obligan cada una a respetar el derecho de la otra a usarde toda la extencion de dicho pas0 para todo el tiempo y todas las necesi-dades de cada UM de las & propriedades, la vendida por la presente aClam M. R e d o y la que queda en poder de Miriam R. Hedrick, siendoobligatorio este pact0 para todos 10s que con posterioridad adquirieran porcualquier titulo las fincas mencionadas.The above covenant was inscribed in Rectos title as well asin

those of his successors, the latest being Salvador Benedicto. The portionretained by Hedrick was in turn sold to successive vendees, the latestbeing Vicente Heras.

In 1941, Heras demolished the house on his land. In 1946, Bene-dicto walled h e passageway by constructing a fence. And in 1955,Heras filed action to demand the reopening of the passageway betweenhis property and that of Benedicto.

6 6 C r v ~ ~ODE,art. 655, par. 1.67G.R. No. 22733, Sepember 25, 1968, 25 S.C.R.A. 145.


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92 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL. [VOL. 44The trial court found that the right of way was entirely within

the property of Benedicto, contrary to the stipulation in the Hedrick-Recto deed of sale that it should be between their properties, witheach contributing an equal portion of his property.

The trial court rejected Benedictos claim that the servitude hadbeen extinguished by nonuser and by the cessation of the necessityfor a passageway and ordered that it be maintained. From a decisionof the Court of Appeals affirming that of the lower courts, Benedictosought a review in the Supreme Ch r t .

To the Benedicto claim that when Heras demolished his build-ing in 1941, the property gained direct access to San Marcelino Streetwith the result that since then there has been no need for the passage-way, the Supreme Court said that as inscribed in the titles, the servitudeis perpetual in character and its continued existence must be up-held and respected although its necessity might have ceased.

.4nd to the other Benedicto claim that the servitude had beenextinguished by nonuser for 10 years, the court pointed out that therewas no indubitable proof of nonuser. And even if nonuser be conceded,said the court, i t could have started only in 1946 when the passagewaywas walled and since the present action was filed in 1955, the pre-scriptiyh,g . -lapsed.VII. DONATIONdb-4,

A person cannot be obliged to received anything against his will.It is for this reason why the Civil Code is so repetitious on the needfor acceptance in respect of donations inter vivos. Thus, Articles 725,738, 741, 742, 745, 746, 747, 748 and 749 of the Civil Code mentionacceptance of a donation.

Article 745 of the Civil Code provides that [tlhe donee mustaccept the donation personally, or through an authorized person witha s p i a l power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficientpower; otherwise, the donation shall be void.

In Gennto 2;. Lol.enzu,ps Simona Genato was the owner of twocertificates of stock, Nos. 7 and 18 each for 265 shares in GenatoCommercial Corporation. On December 24, 1942, she delivered thecertificates of stock to Florentino Genato and told him to transferthem. Each of the certificates had been endorsed by Simona Genatoto Florentino Genato and Francisco Genato and upon receiving thecertificates, Florentino, who was then Assistant Secretary-Treasurer oft%e Corporation, cancelled them a n d in lieu thereof, issued certificate-8G.R. No. 24983, May 20, 1968, 23 S.C.R.A. 618.

~


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PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44Zonga manu, brevi mnnu, constiticturn poissesorium ), cuasi tradicidn,ministerio d e la ley.

The case of Yuliongsiu v. Philippine National holds thatconstructive delivery is sufficient to validate a pledge., the plaintiff borrowed a sum of morney from thedefendant anmdas security, executed a contract of pledge over itsvessels which were not actually delivered to the creditor but remainedin the debtors possession who shall hold said property subject tothe order of the Pledgee.

When the debtor defaulted, the crediter took possession of thevessels and pursuant to the terms of the pledge contract, sold the same.

In questioning the defendants actuations, one of the argumentsadvanced by the plaintiff was that the pledge was not effective becausethere was only constructive and not actual deIivery of the vessels tothe defendant. It should be noted that according to Article 2093 ofthe Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the co,nstitution ofa pledge is that the thing pledged shall be placed in the possessionof the creditor, or of a third person by c a m o n agreement. Plaintiffcited the case of Betita v. G n n ~ o n , ~ ~here it. was held that thedelivery of po erred to in article 186374 implies a changein the actual of the property pledged and that a meresymboiic delivery is not sufficient. However, the Supreme Court said:

. . . But then there is also Banco Espdol-Fil ip ino v. Peterson, 7 Fhii.409 ruling that symbolic delivery would suffice. A n examination of thepeculiar nature of the things p d in the two cases will readily dispelthe apparent contrad between the two rulings. In Betita 0. Ganaon,the objects pledged- arabaos- ere easily capable of actual, manualdelivery unto the pledgee. In Bunco Esp&LFiZipino D. Peterson, the objectspledged- oods contained in a warehouse- ere hardly capable of actual,manual delivery in the sense that it was impractical as a whole for theparticular transaction and would have been an unreasonable requirement.Thus, for purposes of showing the transfer of control to the pledgee,delivery to him of the keys to the warehouse sufficed. In other words,the type of delivery will depend upon the nature and the peculiar circum-stances of each case. The parties here agreed that the vessels be deliveredby the pledgor to the pledgor who shall hold said property subject tothe order of the pledgee. Considering the circumstances of the case andthe nature of the objects pledged, i.e., vessels used in maritime business,such delivery is sufficient.711d. at 239-240.72 G.R. No. 19227, February 17, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 585.73 49 Phil. 87, 93 (1926).74 Now 2093.


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19691 CIVIL LAW

1. Extinctive prescription and lachesThe Civil Code provides for both acquisitive and extinctive pre-

scription. Acquisitive prescription is also known as adverse possession;extinctive prescriptioa as limitation of action. It is sometimes saidthat the two kinds of prescription are in their operation, correlative.This is not so. The Civil Code itself provides, for example, that [alctionsto recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time thepossession thereof is lost, unless the possessor has acquired the owner-ship by prescription for a less period. . . .76 This shows that theoperation of t,he two kinds of prescription is not correlative. Andthe reason lies in the fact that they are based on different considerations.Thus, a writer has said:

usucaption and prescription cortinued to exist concurrently until thetime of Justinian but were essentially different in theory if not in operation.Prescription was a statute of limitations. Whereas usucaption expressly veststhe property and raised a new title in the occupant, prescription did noth-ing more than bar the right of action The concept most fundamental to asystem of title by possession is that the relationship between the occupantand the land in terms of possession is capable of producing legal con-sequences. In other words, it is the possessor who is the ador. Under astatute of limitations, however, one does not look to the act of the possessorbut to the neglect of the owner. In the former the important feature isthe claimant in possession, and in the latter it is the owner out of possessionwhich controls.T7Because of the similarfty between extinctive prescription and laches,they are often confused with each other. But they should not be

because-Laches is merent from the statute of limitations. Prescription isooncemed with the f ac t of delay, whereas laches is concerned with the

effect of delay. P d p t i o n is a matter of time; laches is principallya question of inequity of permitting a claim to be e n f o d , this inequitybeing founded on some change in the condition of the property or therelation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches ap-plies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is basedon fixed time, laches is not.?*The above was the explanation given in Nielson & Co. , Inc . w.Lepanto Consol idded Mining CO. , ~ nd quoted in MigueE v. CataZino.80

75Art . 1106.7 8 Al . t . 1140.7 7 Montgomery, The Historical Development of the Prescriptive Acquisitioti7 8 3 0 C.J.S.,. 55% See also 2 POMEROYSQUITY URISPRUDENCE,77 (5th ed.).?@G .R .No. 21601, December 17, 1966, 18 S.C.R.A. 1040, 1053.80G.R. No. 23072, November 29, 1968.

of Land Titles, 26 PHn. . J. 353, 356-357 (1951).

8


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I -9ci PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [ V O L . 44In the Miguel case, a non-Christian named Bacaquio was the

owner of a piece of land covered by an original certificate of titleissued in 1927. He sold the land in 1928 without the written approvalof the provincial governor of the Mt. Province, contrary to bhe Adminis-trative Code of Mindanar, and Sulu, made applicabla to the Mt.Province and Nueva Vizcaya by Act3 Nos. 2798 and 2913.

In an action by the heirs of Bacaquio to recover the land fromthe heir of the vendee, the Supreme Court said that the 1928 salewas technically invalid and Bacaquio remained owner of the land untilhis death in 19.13 but nonetheless, ruled against the plaintiffs:

For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapm, father ofdefendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter,possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943,when the seller die4 and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding thedeceased, also remained inactive, witbout taking any step to revindicate thelot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court.Even granting appellants proposition that no prescription lies against theirfathers recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years(1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitabledefense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the court below correctly so held.Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, deIayand inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expensein cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereonfor 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when thepossessctrs efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to makeeasy profit at his expense.To the same effect, Arcuino 21. Aparis.81 Both the Miguel and Arcuino

cases cited Lucas o. Gamponia.RZCases on acquisitive and extinctive prescription decided duringthe year under review have not been novel so they are here summarily

reported.Fabian c. F ~ b i a n , 8 ~as an action for reconveyance of a piece of

land on the ground that the defen ts acquired and registered thesame through fraud. Held, the cause of action accrued in 1928 andit was only in 1960 when the action was commenced so that it isbarred by laches and by prescription. The defendants have, moreover,acquired ownership of the land by adverse possession.

Quetul io ~j.De la Cuesta,s was an action to recover a piece ofland which was allegedly usurped by one of the defendants in 1948.

* * G . R . No. 23424, January 31, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 407.a2 100 Phil. 277 (1956).a3 G.R. No. 20449, January 29, 1968,22 S.C.R.A. 231.a4 G.R. No. 25083, January 31, 1M8, 2 S.C.R.A. 420.


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19691 CIVIL L A W 97Held, the complaint was filed only in 1964 and it has prescribed becausethe law applicable is Section 40 of Act 190, otherwise known as theCode of Civil Procedure, which provides for a ten-year prescriptiveperiod for actions to recover title to or possession of real property orany interest therein, counted from the date of the amrual of thecause of action.

Cunrto v . L ~ n n , ~ ~as an action by a widow to recover her halfof alleged conjugal properties which the husband had sold under anallegedly fictitious and simulated contract in 1947 to one of the defend-ants. The action was commenced in 1963 and the defendants pleadedprescription of action. HeZd, it is well settled, not only in our juris-prudence, but also by specific legal provisions that the action ordefense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not

Municipality of Opon v . Caltex ( Ph il . ) Z ~ C . ~ as an action torecover municipal taxes which had been illegally imposed. The defensewas the lapse of the two-year prescriptive period provided in section306 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Held, the period for pre-scription of action to recover municipal license taxes in six years underarticle 1145(2) of the Civil Code for the National Internal RevenueCode clearly refers exclusively to claims for the refund of nationalinternal revenue taxes.

R i d Surety & lnsurnnce Co. v. Macondray & Co. , Znc.,s8 was asuit commenced on February 10, 1%4 by an insurer against a carrierfor insured cargo which should have been discharged on or beforeNovember 4, 1962 but was not. Defendant invoked the prescriptiveperiod provided in section 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,which stipulates one year in respect of claims for loss or damage asopposed to the plaintiffs claim for the application of the general statuteof limitations. Held, the failure to discharge the cargo was a loss withinthe purview of the Act and the action has therefore prescribed.

Pahang v. S o t t ~ , ~ ~as an action for compulsory recognition as anatural child. One of the defenses was prescriptiun of the action be-cause plaintiff commenced the suit when she was already over 47 years old.Held, an action for recognition, if brought within the lifetime of thepresumed parent, is impresciptible for the status of persuns is outsidethe commerce of man and cannot be acquired or lost by prescription.

85 G.R. NO. 232i9, January 31, 1968. 22 S.C.R.A. 459.8%Iipton v. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 (1906);Corpus v. Bel.h.an, 97 Phil. 772 (1955);Quetulio v. Ver, 99 Phil. 1048 (1956);CIVILCODE, rt. 1410.E7G.R. No. 21853, February 26, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 755.88 G.R. No. 26064,February 29, 1968, 22 S.C.R.A. 902.8*G.R. No. 211i5, July 15, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 33.


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98 PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44Philippine N a t i m a l Bank v. O ~ e t e , ~ O as an action upon a judg-

ment whiah became final and execufory on January 23, 1953. Thesuit upon the judgment was commenced on January 30, 1963, beyondthe 10 years provided in Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. But thebank invoked Article 1155 of the same code which provides, inter alia,that prescription of actions is interrupted when there is any writtenacknowledgment of the debt by the debtor and the bank pointed topartial payments made on the judgment. Held, Article 1155 of theCivil Code refers to actions to collect not based on a judgment soughtto be revived. Moreover, that provision requires a written acknowl-edgment so that payment, if not complied with a communication signedby the payor, would not interrupt the running of the period of pre-scription.

Veluz v. V e l u ~ , ~ ~as an action for reformation of an instrumentcommenced in 1958, based on fraud alleged to have been discoveredin 1953. In Carh t a v. B e n a r e ~ , ~ t was held that such an action pre-scribes in four years but in Con& u. Ciiencq9 the period was fixedat ten years. Held, the Conde case which is of a later date shouldprevail. The court said also that the Cadotn case is different becauseit referred to annulment and not reformation of contract. But in thatcase, it was said: . . the remedy of plaintiffs is either annulmenton the ground of fraud, or reformation of the contracts to make themexpress the parties true intention and agreement. In either case, theaction should be filed within four years from the time the cause ofaction accrues, i.e., from the discovery of the fraud. Moreover, theperiod of prescription of action on a written contract as in the CarZotacase appears to be ten years under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code.

Davao Coal Mining Syndicate, Ltd . v. L a ~ r e n t e , ~ ~ealt, amongother things, with a petition by Laurente for the revocation of an orderdirecting the cancellation of an encumbrance over a piece of landover which he might possibly have an interest as a purchaser butwhich interest was not shown by primary or even secondary evidence.Held, Laurentes claim is too vague and unsubstantial to give him astanding in court. What is worse is that Laurente allowed more than20 years to elapse without asserting the alleged conveyance in hisfavor, when a period of 10 years sufficed under A ct 190 (then inforce) to bar any claim to or over real property. Nor has Laurenteadequately explained such laches on his part.

gO G .R . No. 24997, July 18, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 8.g1 G.R. No. 23281, July 31, 1968, 24 S.C.R.A. 559.82G .R . No. 6.432, June 30, 1955.94 G.R. No. 20075, November 27, 1968.9599 Phil. 1056 (1956).


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19691 CIVIL LAW Y9Nielson & Co., lnc. c. I m n n t o Consolidated Mining CO . , ~ ~as

a resolution on a motion for reconsideration by the defendant ofthe decision rendered on December 17, l%6,ss n laches. To thecontention that the Supreme Court erred in reversing the finding ofthe lower court that Nielsons action had prescribed by consideringonly the first claim and ignoring the prescriptibility of the other claims,held:

In our decision We stated that the claims of Nielson are basedon a written document, and, as such, the cause of action prescribes in tenyears. Inasmuch as there are different claims which accrued on difFerentdates the prescriptive periods for all the claims are not the same.

PLJ Volume 44 Number 1 -03- Vicente Abad Santos - Civil Law - Part Two

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