Philosophy, Tarnas and Postmodernism (Shephard)
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Transcript of Philosophy, Tarnas and Postmodernism (Shephard)
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Philosophy, Richard Tarnas, and Postmodernism
Richard Tarnas
CONTENTS KEY
1. Holistic Confusion
2. Richard Tarnas and the Passion
3. The Kantian Cordon
4. Official Death of Metaphysics
5. Romanticism and Nietzsche
6. Crisis of Modern Science
7. The Postmodern New Age
8. Jung and Pseudo-Metaphysics
9. Postmodern Relativism and Wikipedia
10. Negotiating Contractions in Academe
11. Avoiding a Neo-Jungian Hazard
12. Findhorn Foundation Holistic Censorship
13. CIIS and Astrology
I. Holistic Confusion
Many entries on this website comprise critical treatments of alternative or "new age"
thought. That form of thinking first arose in America during the 1960s, though speedily
being transplanted to other countries, including Britain. There was an obsessive anti-
establishment mood, and new cliches such as "higher states of consciousness." The
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advocates of this alternativism saw themselves as pioneers of a new world era, with
peace and love being widely aired as characteristic traits.
Much of the enthusiasm was inspired by the vogue for cannabis and LSD. The
extremist academics Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert created a bizarre lore about
expanding consciousness, and were influential in the psychedelic vogue for Oriental
religions. Their version did not impress many scholars of Buddhism and Hinduism.
Meanwhile, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi achieved an opportunistic celebration of
Transcendental Meditation, a bestselling novelty which claimed the Beatles as some of
the fans. Such trends had a transient aspect, leaving many disillusioned persons
wondering what was really happening.
Many gurus benefited from the new mood of alternativism. At first they were all treated
as renaissance angels of the American Dream. Eventually a number of predatory
entities revealed some very disconcerting tendencies. However, the Eastern faction
became substantially outnumbered by the Western claimants to enlightenment,
healing, empowerment, integration, and other diverse presumptions.
California became the seedbed of notorious enthusiasms, cults, and lunacies. During
the 1970s, almost any fad could quickly succeed in becoming a popular commercial
attraction. New "therapies" became legion, and the word "workshop" became
identified with entrepreneurial new age excursions into supposed "higher
consciousness."
The commercial offerings of the Esalen Institute were very influential, with the critics
being in perpetual wonderment at the consumption of doubtful activities and crazes.
One of the most influential entities at Esalen was Dr. Stanislav Grof, a resident for many
years during the 70s and 80s. His theories about psychedelic experience and
hyperventilation are not accepted in conventional medical quarters. See further Grof
Therapy and MAPS on this website.
Such books of Grof as LSD Psychotherapy(1980) aroused enthusiasm in Esalen
circles, but strong queries as to validity in other sectors. Grof's subsequent book The
Adventure of Self-Discovery (1988) amounted to a promotion of his new therapy
Holotropic Breathwork, which was commercially administered via the auspices of Grof
Transpersonal Training Inc. Some investigators were very critical as to why that book
was published by SUNY (State University of New York).
The Findhorn Foundation was the major point of entry for the Esalen enthusiasms into
Britain, a trend facilitated by the affluence of the 1980s and an international list of
subscribers susceptible to entrepreneurial workshops.The apparent success of
Stanislav Grof's trademark "therapy" of Holotropic Breathwork during the period 1989-
1993, at the Findhorn Foundation, masked suspicious events and casualties that were
covered up at every step by those in charge of the promotionalism.
I have related in other articles (and epistles) on this website how the Holotropic
Breathwork problem was more realistically diagnosed outside the Foundation. An
expert in forensic medicine at Edinburgh University was fortunately resistant to Grof
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Transpersonal Training Inc. The expensive "workshops" were nevertheless invested
by believers with an aura of unassailable authority, meaning the pronouncements of
Dr. Grof, who was also the promoter of "LSD psychotherapy."
In general, the "workshop" innovators often assumed "holistic" expertise, and some
referred to the holistic movement. These presumed experts claimed intuitive abilities,
healing powers, ecological prowess, skill in resolving conflicts, shamanistic faculties,
esoteric wisdom, self-development proficiency, and indeed numerous other variants of
the suspect enthusiasm. Critics remained unmoved, investigating what the holistic
exemplars actually did and how much money they charged.
As a conglomerate trend, these parties claimed a form of dynamic spiritual education
sufficient to change the world. This myth has been ongoing until the present day.
Phrases like "personal and spiritual transformation" are ubiquitous in the sectors to
which they appeal, but the evidence of accomplishment is far more difficult to find.
Some analysts of the phenomenon concluded that the "new age" developments
basically represented the response of persons who desired a form of alternative
religion to Christianity, which was increasingly viewed as an inadequate doctrine.
Others say that, although this theory appears to have an element of truth, there is the
problem involved of two basic new age contingents: the affluent clientele and the
entrepreneurial "experts." The affluent clientele in Western countries clearly do want a
different doctrine to that found in traditional religion, but they are misled by the
innovators in workshops, fads, and "holistic" lore.
The nominally holistic enthusiasts have often depreciated traditional education (in
schools and universities) as being inferior and anti-intuitive. Many of them have
decried analysis and critical appraisal as evils. Science is particularly abhorred in their
ranks, although scholarship is also ridiculed as being irrelevant. The sense of history
in some alternative circles has been so vestigial that records of recent events do not
exist. Except, that is, amongst the critics who have reasons for strong objection to
disconcerting "holistic" codes.
Traditional philosophy is another target of the alternativism. The former is accused of
being based on logic and analysis, which are supposedly anti-holistic and therefore to
be discounted. The reasoning involved in some of these verdicts has been considered
almost beyond belief by close assessors. In a "holistic" world where there is no due
analysis, no real sense of history, and no trained reporting, almost anything suspect
can take control. Critics say that this drawback is a more or less daily occurrence in
the circles under discussion.
2. Richard Tarnas and the Passion
There have been extensions of the alternativism that are more literate than the
generality. Some "new age academics" have contributed theories which are articulate,
but which are nevertheless in doubt elsewhere. For instance, ProfessorRichard
Tarnas authored the widely read bookThe Passion of the Western Mind (1991), which
includes a review of modern Western philosophy, though accompanied by a theme of
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contemporary "epochal transformation" (p. xii). The message is that Copernican
astronomy, the metaphysics of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and Kantian epistemology
were milestones en route to the contemporary spiritual alienation. More specifically,
those three developments are described in terms of "a threefold mutually enforced
prison of modern alienation" (The Passion of the Western Mind, repr.: London:
Pimlico, 1996, p. 419).
Descartes is a familiar target of other alternativists like Fritjof Capra, and his due
context will not be found in the American new age. The despised "Cartesian-
Newtonian" paradigm has more detail in the old age versions. See the bibliography in
my Rene Descartes, Philosopher and Scientist (2010).There are different versions of
what he believed.Descartes certainly represented a transient phase in physics, but had
a more enduring influence in the vivisection horrors attaching to biology, zoology, and
medical science. SeeAnimal Ethics, Animal Rights.
The basic complaint broached by Tarnas in his controversial Epilogue amounts to:
"The world revealed by modern science has been a world devoid of spiritual purpose,
opaque, ruled by chance and necessity, without intrinsic meaning" (Passion, p. 418). A
citizen is easily able to agree with that verdict. Yet there are different ways of seeking a
solution to the problems involved.
Descartes is rather accusingly assessed in terms of "the crucial midpoint between
Copernicus and Kant" (ibid., p. 417). The truth is that Descartes was not an academic
professor like Kant, although he was a scientist, and perhaps more of an empiricist
than a philosopher. His confusing mechanist doctrine suited the scientific temper of
his era in the revolt against religious dogmas. According to some writers, Descartes
was ideologically eliminated by Kantian empirical reasoning, along with others whom
Tarnas barely mentions in the alienation theory. Descartes was really the midpoint
between Bacon and Spinoza, the latter being almost invisible inPassion.
Some said that Tarnas was rivalling the popular book by Capra entitled The Turning
Point(1982), which more aggressively downgraded traditional philosophy in favour of
a purportedly holistic approach, in this instance a version of systems theory. Capra
was noticeably benign towards Grof LSD theory, and his general attitude was
symptomatic in several respects of Esalen "progressivism." Cf. Capra, The Hidden
Connections (2002), which makes no mention of Grof, instead favouring Anthony
Giddens and Jurgen Habermas as reference points (ibid., pp. 67ff.).
The Tarnas version of Western philosophy is comparatively amiable, though not by
any means complete. He commences with a brief version of early Greek exemplars,
culminating in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The distinctions between Aristotle and
Plato are drawn, and some credit is given to both, in which respect "we find a certain
elegant balance and tension between empirical analysis and spiritual intuition, a
dynamic beautifully rendered in Raphael's Renaissance masterpiece The School of
Athens" (Tarnas, Passion, p. 68). The supra-aesthetic dimensions of the polarity
involved were fairly extensive in the literature of Arabic-speaking philosophical
repertories, although Tarnas does not pursue this angle.
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The Stoics and Neoplatonists receive rather less profile, and Plotinus gains only two
pages, and of a generalised nature. Further, the Muslimfalasifa are missing, although
this is a common failing in presentations of Western thought (despite the fact that Ibn
Rushd was active in Spain). The Christian Schoolmen come under review, with the
lion's share of attention falling to Aquinas. Roger Bacon is only fleetingly mentioned. A
chapter on the Renaissance is followed by others on the Scientific Revolution, the
favoured subjects here being Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler, and with reference to
Isaac Newton. The accompanying "philosophical revolution" is treated in terms of
Francis Bacon and Descartes, which is a basically conventional view.
Tarnas appropriately observes that philosophy in the classical era "had held a largely
autonomous position as definer and judge of the literate culture's world view" (ibid., p.
272). Yet in the medieval period, Christianity replaced that autonomy, "while
philosophy took on a subordinate role in the joining of faith to reason" (ibid.). In
contrast, the modern period saw philosophy transfer to science and "establish itself as
a more fully independent force in the intellectual life of the culture" (ibid.).
For whatever reason, Tarnas makes only very fleeting reference to Spinoza, whose
ideological trajectory has elsewhere been viewed as significant, despite the enigmatic
nature of some components (cf. Shepherd, Baruch Spinoza, Rationalist Philosopher).
Indeed, there is very little information supplied in Passionabout Leibniz also, giving the
impression that such pre-Kantian thinkers were of small relevance. In contrast, there
are rather more substantial allocations granted to Freud and Jung, reflecting the
contemporary preoccupation with a type of psychology. The theories of C. G. Jung
have created much confusion, but Tarnas is clearly an enthusiast, not a critic in that
direction. The word archetype is generously listed in the index of Passion to a degree
quite overshadowing a fair number of philosophers.
3. The Kantian Cordon
A section entitled "Self-Critique of the Modern Mind" dwells upon John Locke (1632-
1704), Bishop Berkeley, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Tarnas
observes differences between the British empirical tradition and Continental
rationalism of the seventeenth century. The former was triumphant over the latter, but
the complexities of "Enlightenment" transition are more acute than is generally stated,
especially with the Kantian factor attached.
Locke opted for the immediacy of sensory experience, being influenced by the
empiricism of Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and the Royal Society. The provocative
idealism of George Berkeley (1685-1753) has been variously classified as empiricist
and Cartesian. Tarnas comments that "in effect, while Locke had reduced all mental
contents to an ultimate basis in sensation, Berkeley now further reduced all sense data
to mental contents" (Passion, p. 335).
The scepticism of David Hume (1711-76) early opposed the idealism of Berkeley. The
theory here moved back to sense impressions. More radically, Hume "concluded that
the mind itself was only a bundle of disconnected perceptions, with no valid claims to
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substantial unity, continuous existence, or internal coherence, let alone to objective
knowledge" (ibid., p. 340; cf. Shepherd, Pointed Observations, 2005, pp. 224-38, for a
critical version of Hume). A form of extreme scepticism was expressed by Hume, who
was inclined to deny the validity of inductive reasoning.
The outlook of Hume has been subject to varying shades of interpretation. He can be
credited with a genuine interest in psychology, though his rudimentary version is in
question. In his Treatise on Human Nature (1739-40), he stated that "reason is, and
ought only to be the slave of the passions." This hedonistic assertion does not
necessarily follow from his more credible deduction that emotion (or desire), and not
reason, governed human behaviour. Due reason has to be cultivated, and should not
be a slave.
Hume was blocked from obtaining the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University. He was
charged with atheistic heresy, though he was acquitted. Yet if "labelling Hume as an
'atheist' is misleading," he was certainly very critical of religion. Quote from Paul
Russell, Hume on Religion (2005). With regard to scientific implications, Bertrand
Russell complained that Hume "arrives at the disastrous conclusion that from
experience and observation nothing is to be learnt" (History of Western Philosophy,
second edn 1961, p. 645).
l to r: David Hume, Immanuel Kant
Tarnas goes into more detail with Kant, who is effectively his major reference point in
philosophy during the modern period. Kant was concerned to offset Hume's
scepticism, but at the same time was influenced by that negativity. He strongly
believed in Newtonian science, but in assimilating Hume, he transited from what some
describe as the German rationalism associated with Leibniz. "His solution was to
satisfy the claims of both Hume and Newton" (Passion, p. 342). That assessment may
be considered correct, though Kant does not gain full profile in the neo-Jungian
version.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was composed in the academic milieu, unlike
earlier philosophical works. There is the unventuresome insistence in the Critique that
anything not apprehended by sensory impressions cannot be experienced. Kant thus
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fell in line with Humean scepticism, and may himself have been more of a sceptic than
is often believed. He stated:
"The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure
reason will, however, be transcendentin relation to all
appearances, that is to say, it will be impossible to make any
adequate empirical use of this principle" (Critique of Pure
Reason, ed. V. Politis, London: Dent, 1934; repr. 1993, p. 241).
This pedagogic angle meant that the world of phenomena is the only field of possible
knowledge; in contrast, the noumenal or "transcendental" world is not accessible to
human experience. "The end result of his [Kant's) critical labours may seem to
resemble Hume's skepticism" (Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge
University Press, 2001, p. 246).
Views have differed as to the extent of Kant's Christian bias; he was apparently far
more of an Enlightenment intellectual than anything pietist. He relied solely on rational
criteria in his writings. "It was clear to anyone who knew Kant personally that he had
no faith in a personal God; having postulated God and immortality, he himself did not
believe in either" (ibid., p. 3). One could perhaps connect that psychology with the
basic message of his critical philosophy:
"God, immortality, and other such metaphysical matters could
never become phenomena; they were not empirical;
metaphysics, therefore, was beyond the powers of human
reason" (Passion, p. 341).
Religious faith was left free in this argument. It was only "pure reason" of the deceased
gentlemanly amateurs that was sent to ideological jail by the academic professor. One
of those amateurs (Spinoza) was a heretical Jew, still largely subterranean when Kant
wrote his Critique.
In a subsequent work, The Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant was committed to
morality. His moral philosophy implies that "morality is the exclusive domain of
reason"; the secondCritique was one in which "from the point of view of traditional
theology, Kant turned things upside down" (Kuehn, op. cit., pp. 312, 314). Yet this was
a purely rational exercise, and mysticism was debunked.
"Kant affirms that even the Stoics went astray in proclaiming
'virtue' as being fully attainable in the present life of the wise
man.... In Kant's view, holiness cannot be attained by any
creature.... Plato is duly castigated for having entertained an
'extravagant pretension' to a 'theory of the supersensible' "
(Shepherd, Meaning in Anthropos, 1991, p. 147).
Greek philosophy was curtailed by the modern academic syllabus. Yet Kant's secular
morality was commendable, and he is much superior to Hume, Nietzsche, and various
others on that score. His Groundwork of the Metaphyiscs of Morals (1785)
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demonstrates a convergence with Cicero (the Stoic), and furthermore opposed class
biases (Kant was the son of an artisan). "Any attempt to defend or justify social
differences by appealing to morals must be rejected as well; the conservative status
quo must be challenged" (Kuehn, op. cit., p. 282).
Kant pursued an a priori ideal of pure reason in the moral sphere, and contrasting with
the earlier pure reason of Leibniz and his predecessors (relating to metaphysics).
Kant's ideal emerged in the form of what he called (in German) the categorical
imperative, meaning "the unconditional command of morality," even though his
Enlightenment reasoning imposed a belief that "the ultimate condition of the
possibility of morality cannot be understood" (ibid., p. 286). Again perhaps a rather
cordoning conceptualism, and the entire presentation marked by a notoriously
convoluted style of expression.
"Everyone finds his writing difficult; it is nearly always obscure,
and sometimes it borders on the impenetrable.... his work, even
after two hundred years, is still unknown territory to most
educated people.... he [Kant] is widely regarded by serious
students of philosophy as the greatest philosopher since the
ancient Greeks" (Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers, Oxford
University Press, 1988, pp. 185-186).
Yet despite his moral worth and academic intensity, the cordoning and empirical Kant
is not particularly enviable for his situation of mental confinement to sensory
impressions. By 1777 he was a hypochondriac worried about his constipation.
Moreover, "Kant felt that it was ultimately the obstructions of the bowels that caused
distractedness and periods of confused thinking from which he was beginning to
suffer. These complaints, though comical-sounding, made his life quite miserable"
(Kuehn, op. cit., p. 239).
In contrast to some citizen complaints, the cameo by Tarnas is relatively indifferent to
contrasts in career background. Professor Tarnas writes in an academic idiom which
neglects to emphasise that Kant was the first major philosopher to fill a professorial
role, though he does usefully indicate that in later generations, the academic pursuit of
philosophy tended to become circumscribed and largely unintelligible to citizens.
For any citizen philosopher to stand up and contest circumscribed and unintelligible
matters today, the effort could too easily amount to being erased from Wikipedia by a
"postmodern" strategy of pseudonymous cult supporters assisted by an officious (if
anonymous) academic specialist in plant biology, the latter explicitly ignorant of (and
disinterested in) the issues at stake. The sympathetic academic philosopher (Simon
Kidd), who contested this censoring decision (using his real name), was outvoted by
web anonymity. This point is actually demonstrable to readers via recorded
occurrences expunged by the Wikipedia administrative system. See Wikipedia
Anomaliesand Wikipedia Misinformation. Suppression did not end with the Spanish
Inquisition, and to some extent, cordon is now an American speciality, rather than a
Eurocentric one.
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4. Official Death of Metaphysics
The ingenious reasoning of Kant argued that "although one could not know that God
exists, one must nevertheless believe he exists in order to act morally"
(Tarnas, Passion, p. 349). Professor Kant was a liberator by comparison with later
strictures. A long list of celebrated names is given in this trend, which had the effect of
"altogether eliminating the grounds for subjective certainty still felt by Kant" (ibid., p.
351). Not merely the radicals Marx and Nietzsche, but academics like Heidegger,
Wittgenstein, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Popper, Quine, and Kuhn. This process led to the
postmodernist view that underlying principles of experience are not absolute and
timeless, but "varied fundamentally in different eras, different cultures, different
classes, different languages" (ibid.), and so forth. Still at issue is whether such views
can be relied upon as an accurate judge of reality, which is not necessarily determined
or negated by prestigious rank, influential radicalism, and paradigm shifts.
Yet at first, there were idealist responses to the Kantian conceptualism. German
thinkers, most notably Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), "constructed a metaphysical
system with a universal Mind revealing itself through man" (ibid., p. 351). A big
drawback here was the Eurocentric tendency of Hegelian theory, which is arguably
not the best point of departure for what might escape the ring of sensory impressions
favoured by the sceptics. Hegel was an elite professorial entity with a verbose dialectic
that did not create the most readable corpus in the history of philosophy. "Often
Hegel's historical judgments seemed peremptory, his political and religious
implications ambiguous, his language and style perplexing" (ibid., p. 382).
Nevertheless, and to his credit, Hegel did inspire "a renascence of classical and
historical studies from an Idealist perspective" (ibid., p. 381). It was the last
renaissance, as academic philosophy thereafter contracted into contentment with the
minutiae of language and conceptualism well known in twentieth century works.
Metaphysics was dead, having been dismissed according to standards of the
prevalent laziness and convenience in psychological endeavour, a situation ideal for
someone like Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), whose private life was a problem often
criticised. The academic commentary states that:
"As philosophy became more technical, more concerned with
methodology, and more academic, and as philosophers
increasingly wrote not for the public but for each other, the
discipline of philosophy lost much of its former relevance and
importance for the intelligent layperson, and thus much of its
former cultural power" (ibid., p. 354).
5. Romanticism and Nietzsche
Meanwhile, another trend had been operative. According to Tarnas, Romanticism was
the polar complement to the Scientific Revolution, both sharing common roots in the
Renaissance, though the former enthused about aspects of experience suppressed by
the eighteenth century Enlightenment. German and British names figure prominently in
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the list of Romantic exponents, from Goethe and Herder to Blake and Byron. "While
the scientist sought truth that was testable and concretely effective, the Romantic
sought truth that was inwardly transfiguring and sublime" (ibid., p. 367). There were
idiosyncrasies in both camps, and some lunacies in Romantic ranks, which is a citizen
observation.
Friedrich Nietzsche
The Tarnas account describes Nietzsche (1844-1900) as a Romantic. There is strong
scope for disagreement in the sense of eulogy afforded. Tarnas describes the subject
in terms of "a uniquely powerful synthesis of titanic Romantic spiritual passion and the
most radical strain of Enlightenment skepticism" (ibid., p. 370). This verdict represents
the excessive academic enthusiasm that is quite often found. It is much easier to credit
that "in Nietzsche, as in Romanticism generally, the philosopher became poet" (ibid.,
p. 371).
Nietzschean concepts such as the" superman" and "will to power" reveal a basic
confusion that need not be ascribed to Romanticism but to the peculiar psychology of
the subject. In particular, the elitist complex of Nietzsche is expressed in passages that
require due critical assessment. For Nietzsche, the violence of Napoleon was
preferable to the supposed herd instinct for less damaging manifestations of social
deportment. His contempt for the Indian untouchables became known to reserved
Indologists. In citizen terms, he was an elitist prig living in an academic situation of
privilege that knew no sympathy for the working man and outcastes.
The elitism of Nietzsche was of an acute and very objectionable type; this was not the
usual class bias at all, but instead a "superman" power complex of manic dimensions.
Nietzsche opposed religious and secular morality and glorified the instincts, perhaps
because he had visited a brothel and there got into trouble; the aristocratic and
bourgeois dimensions of license do not validate caste society. His stigma of "slave
morality" can be strongly contested.
"The Nietzschean will to power frowned upon four main
contingents of slave morality: Christianity, the tradition of secular
morality associated with Kant and other German philosophers,
Socratic and related Greek philosophical traditions, and the herd
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morality of the unprivileged masses. The Indian untouchables
were included in the stigma in his Twilight of the Idols (1889), in
which caste tactics were approved by the atrocious nihilist.
Living on a university pension, he [Nietzsche] had no sympathy
for, or conscience about, the plight of so many persons less well
placed than himself.... There are some pedagogues who blandly
equate Nietzsche with Socrates in a theme of 'archetypal
sacrifice' initiating epochal transformations in the history of the
Western mind." (Shepherd, Some Philosophical Critiques and
Appraisals, 2004, pp. 244-5).
The last sentence abovecited refers to the archetypalism of Richard Tarnas
(cf. Passion of the Western Mind, p. 395). The archetypal exegesis may be said to
illustrate the extreme confusions created by Jungian and related theory. Nietzsche
tragically became insane in his last years. Critics have implied that he was
psychologically maladjusted, and dangerous in his views, rather than being any kind
of viable philosopher. Some lenient critics say that his early writing is of interest,
though his later "oracular" works are disconcerting. "The bite of conscience is
indecent," wrote Nietzsche, and such assertions are not to be commended.
In a discussion of relevance, Professor J. P. Stern (an expert on the subject) stated that
Nietzsche "is most emphatically not a democratic philosopher." This judgment was
explicitly in agreement with the description supplied by Professor Bryan Magee: "He
[Nietzsche] believed... that the individual great man, the hero, should be a law unto
himself, should not be hamstrung by consideration for lesser mortals, and still less by
petty rules and regulations" (Dialogue with J.P. Stern, in Magee,The Great
Philosophers, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 237).
Discrepantly perhaps, the brief Tarnas chapter entitled "At the Millenium" selects the
figure of Max Weber (1864-1920) along with Nietzsche, Jung, and Martin Heidegger
(1889-1976) as suitable indicators of the contemporary epochal transformation
denoted. There are marked differences between Weber and the other three, e.g.,
Nietzsche, Jung, and Heidegger are all associated with Nazism in different ways (and
in controversial arguments), unlike the sociologist Weber. Tarnas does not mention
this less romantic factor. Instead he approvingly cites (Passion, p. 413) from Thus
Spake Zarathustra, the "Romantic" novel by Nietzsche that has no relation to the
ancient Iranian prophet of Zoroastrianism. Tarnas does not make any distinction
between that literary curiosity and Iranian religion, as his index reveals. Perhaps the
envisaged epochal transition will lead to insanity and/or the neglect of due knowledge
about the history of religion.
"Our moment in history is indeed a pregnant one" says Tarnas on the same page as
his quote from Thus Spake. Abortion is a common resort in the decadent
"postmodern" society, and so even the archetypal moment may transpire to represent
miscarriage rather than birth. The "boldness, depth, and clarity of vision" evoked in the
same passage may decode to total blindness induced by social and pedagogical
misconstructions.
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In his preface to Passion, Tarnas says that "today the Western mind appears to be
undergoing an epochal transformation, of a magnitude perhaps comparable to any in
our civilisation's history" (ibid., p. xii). Other analysts are inclined to view contemporary
tendencies in terms of a potential breakdown of civilisation, accompanied by climate
change(which is not the only problem). Due education, and ecological rectification, are
not realistically in sight.
Tarnas does qualify his reflection by stating his belief that "we can participate
intelligently in that transformation only to the extent to which we are historically
informed" (ibid.). Historical information is not the same as Romantic sentiment or hero
mythology, and may even belie aspects of Enlightenment scepticism. The elusive
contemporary transformation has not so far survived due analysis.
6. Crisis of Modern Science
The Passion is more convincing in describing the "crisis of modern science," and
some remarks are quite graphic. The "classical Cartesian-Newtonian cosmology"
collapsed as a consequence of fresh discoveries in physics, and further problems of
interpretation arose.
"By the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, virtually
every major postulate of the earlier scientific conception had
been controverted.... The solid Newtonian atoms were now
discovered to be largely empty.... Matter and energy were
interchangeable. Three-dimensional space and unidimensional
time had become relative aspects of a four-dimensional space-
time continuum. Time flowed at different rates for observers
moving at different speeds. Time slowed down near heavy
objects, and under certain circumstances could stop altogether.
The laws of Euclidean geometry no longer provided the
universally necessary structure of nature.... There was now no
coherent conception of the world, comparable to
Newton'sPrincipia, that could theoretically integrate the complex
variety of new data. Physicists failed to come to any consensus
as to how the existing evidence should be interpreted with
respect to defining the ultimate nature of reality" (ibid., pp. 356-8).
The mood of relativism (and scepticism) that gained currency by the 1970s reacted to
the dependency upon belief in science. The crux of the matter is that scientists do not
know the nature of reality, while academic philosophers have failed to explain this
unknown priority in ongoing or assimilable terms. Attempts to do so are often
discredited or regarded as totally hypothetical. The postmodernist resort to forms of
relativism is no proof of competence.
Meanwhile, the technological offspring of science continue to exploit nature to a
degree that is generally concealed. Genetic engineering is only one of the offensive
manifestations of incompetence and commercial enterprise.
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7. The Postmodern New Age
The Tarnas version of postmodernism says that this phenomenon "varies
considerably according to context" (ibid., p. 395). Ingredients are described as ranging
from "pragmatism, existentialism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis to feminism,
hermeneutics, deconstruction, and postempiricist philosophy of science" (ibid.).
These are academic trends, of course; the public are generally fed with commercial
entertainment, and usually have no cognisance of the ideational influences at work in
society. Yet the academic resorts are often flawed, with "a perspectivism rooted in the
epistemologies developed by Hume, Kant, Hegel (in his historicism), and Nietzsche"
(ibid., p. 397).
The "postmodern" problem of scepticism is stated to be strongly influenced by the
analysis of language, with many contributing sources such as Nietzsche, Peirce,
Ferdinand de Saussure, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Foucault. Strong criticism can
be levelled at some of these influences, and even more so perhaps, at the
deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), described in terms of "challenging
the attempt to establish a secure meaning in any text" (ibid., p. 398). The general
postmodernist conceptualism is described in terms of "applying a systematic
skepticism to every possible meaning" (ibid., p. 399).
More pointedly, the target of postmodern aspersions is the Western philosophical
tradition since Plato. "The whole project of that tradition to grasp and articulate a
foundational Reality has been criticised as a futile exercise in linguistic game playing, a
sustained but doomed effort " (ibid., p. 400).
The present writer contributed a web entry onDerrida that included reference to the
opposition in academic ranks. The friction in viewpoint is obviously relevant to dwell
upon, contrary to some accounts which do not mention the opposition. My basic view
on deconstruction is one of strong resistance. If there are no secure meanings in texts
(however the contention is worded), deconstructionist texts may also be insecure, or
for that matter all academic texts. Truth values are so elusive in the general
postmodernist ideology that anything is at best only personal or cultural taste, and
quite relative to any permanent achievement.
In the current deceptive climate, one could almost be relieved to hear that "there is no
'postmodern world view,' nor the possibility of one; the postmodern paradigm is by its
nature fundamentally subversive of all paradigms" (ibid., p. 401).
There is, of course, a catch here. Twenty years later, the subversive paradigm is now
extensive. Furthermore, postmodernism discernibly includes (however indirectly) the
"new age" contingents and cults, which thrive in the general ignorance and confusion.
Tarnas does not say this, instead commenting that "there remain few, if any, a priori
strictures on the possible, and many perspectives from the past have reemerged with
new relevance" (ibid., p. 403). He refers to forms of intellectualism, Romanticism, and of
Eastern and Western religion, including "Neolithic European" and "Gnosticism and the
major esoteric traditions."
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Tarnas does not mention the extreme confusions caused by this new wave of the
supposedly antique. He was writing during the 1980s, at a time when, for instance,
theRajneesh sect was demonstrating strong antisocial tendencies in Oregon, a
retrogressive feat accompanied by alternative therapy and the exaltation of
Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra (favoured by Rajneesh), which had become a cult
fad of presumed supermen. According to an American sociologist, "Rajneesh's vision
of the new man was based upon Nietzsche's ideal of the individual who is absolutely
free of the constraints of family, church, governments, and cultures" (Shepherd,Some
Philosophical Critiques and Appraisals, 2004, p. 62, and citing Professor Lewis Carter).
We are told by Tarnas that "the postmodern collapse of meaning has thus been
countered by an emerging awareness of the individual's self-responsibility and
capacity for creative innovation and self-transformation in his or her existential and
spiritual response to life" (Passion, p. 404). This may indeed be an advance upon
nihilism, but there are pronounced drawbacks to the enthusiasms. I have seen the
word transformation enticingly employed so many times during the last forty years that
my response has long been one of nausea at the persistent assumption denoted. Far
too many deluded cult recruits have believed they were transformed; alternative
therapists have exploited that belief to a staggering extent in another sphere; the
"creative innovation" has included ecobiz and numerous other doubtful capitalist
ruses.
The "postmodernist" themes are said to have rooted in social sciences and the
humanities, in America and other countries. Many academic philosophers do not
appear to subscribe to those themes. Indeed, the year after Passion of the Western
Mind was published, in 1992 a petition of disapproval was filed by eminent
international Professors against Derrida, in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent his
gaining further honorary credentials. The academic situation is far more complex than
some generalising accounts imply. For instance, in Britain, analytical philosophy has
often been resistant to the Continental "poststructuralism" associated with Derrida
and Foucault. Not merely the despised metaphysical matters, but also science and
scholarship, are said to be at issue in the extreme arguments propounded.
There is a rather monotonous postmodernist theme that objective truths are a myth,
only local beliefs being in evidence. Scientists have understandably reacted to such
undermining insistences. See Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont,Fashionable Nonsense:
Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (1998), which repudiates the idea that
science amounts to social construction, i.e., meaning something improvised and
equivalent to myth. See also Sokal, Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy, and
Culture (Oxford University Press, 2008). A basic point made is that scientific discovery
occurs across local and relative social and linguistic boundaries, the databank thus
amounting to something that is substantially real and objective.
By extension, there may well be philosophical (and even metaphysical) truths that are
similarly elusive of the "local belief" lore. The necessary "universalist" endeavour is
currently in low profile. What is largely visible instead is the popular "new age" of
presumed metaphysical relevance, in which science and scholarship are frequently
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dismissed as distractions, while philosophy is regarded as a folly of superfluous logic
(indirect or partial convergences with academic postmodernism do exist, therefore).
The degree of knowledge about the past is often nil, or nearly so. The commercial
"workshop" is very often the ideal in sectors prone to entrepreneurial exploitation,
which manipulates factors of emotion and belief.
8. Jung and Pseudo-Metaphysics
One of the most celebrated and confusing writers in the twentieth century was Carl
Gustav Jung (1875-1961). His views have been copied and regurgitated in countless
formats, to the extent that he has been described as the virtual founder of the new age.
Yet Richard Tarnas is one of the votaries, a position quite evident from statements
made in Passion; he had evidently become a believer in the view that "archetypes"
govern mental functioning. Moreover, the underlying tendency of that author's
exposition is perhaps revealed by his reflection concerning a "Romantically influenced
science," where he adds that "the most enduring and seminal proved to be the depth
psychology of Freud and Jung, both deeply influenced by the stream of German
Romanticism that flowed from Goethe through Nietzsche" (Passion, p. 384; cf.
Shepherd, Some Philosophical Critiques and Appraisals, 2004, pp. 23-38, for a critical
version of Jung).
Of the two celebrity names in psychology here elevated, Jung was far closer to
Nietzsche. There are some other factors also involved.
"With his philosophical grounding in the Kantian critical tradition
rather than in Freud's more conventional rationalist materialism,
Jung was compelled to admit that his psychology could have no
necessary metaphysical implications. It is true that Jung's
granting the status of empirical phenomena to psychological
reality was itself a major step past Kant, for he thereby gave
substance to 'internal' experience as Kant had to 'external'
experience" (Tarnas, Passion of the Western Mind, p. 386).
The non-metaphysical psychology became a pervasive "metaphysical" resort of the
postmodern new age, via hundreds (and perhaps thousands) of overnight experts on
the garbled lore of "collective unconscious." The popular reception of this lore was
catastrophic for public discernment of tangible events in process.
9. Postmodern Relativism and Wikipedia
In more academic sectors, the Jungian speculations were paralleled by strong
relativist accents that have also been strikingly influential. Tarnas expresses a
confusing version of the converging doctrines and opinions:
"The postmodern philosopher's recognition of the inherently
metaphorical nature of philosophical and scientific statements
(Feyerabend, Barbour, Rorty) has been both affirmed and more
precisely articulated with the postmodern psychologist's insight
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into the archetypal categories of the unconscious that condition
and structure human experience and cognition" (Passion, p. 405).
The basic theme here is not convincing, at least to a citizen analyst unmoved by the
persuasive confusions in evidence within academic and new age postmodernism.
Jung is more well known than the other names mentioned. The philosophers Paul
Feyerabend (1924-1994) and Richard Rorty (1931-2007) have also been very influential
within intellectual circles, especially the former, whose acutely confrontational form of
relativism manifested in the philosophy of science. Not everything he said was
questionable by any means, but certain flippant emphases and attitudes were and are
objectionable. "Anything goes" has more or less become the social norm.
In my first published book, I included a citizen riposte to Feyerabend, and I still deny
the underlying drift of his faulty logic (Psychology in Science, 1983, pp. 169ff.; see
also The Resurrection of Philosophy, 1989, pp. 45ff.). The argument is not just about
science, but about how philosophers think [and the tendency tonew age relativism].
Some academics said at the time that they had never known a contemporary citizen to
comment in an annotated format upon such matters. The inherently metaphorical
nature of some Feyerabendian statements is substantial enough, despite the adulation
awarded in some endorsing academic sectors.
I should state here that I did defend the empirical relevance of scientific method
against certain nuances of Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism. There were also
social factors involved in the loaded argument. For instance:
"Feyerabend advocates a 'Free Society' in which anything goes
in the commitment to universal standards, and in which science
is treated as being of no more importance than any other subject
or approach. In contrast, I maintain that we already have an open
society in which virtually anything goes, to the detriment of true
freedom and truly universal standards" (Psychology in Science,
p. 169).
Nearly thirty years later, the so-called free society (at least in Britain) is far more
unrestrained and violent, with confusions mounting about what is most real or most
valuable. Big business dictates what goes (and what sells), and more so even than the
postmodernist innovators.
Some academics noticed a comment in one of the annotations to the book abovecited:
"I cannot say that I disagree with everything Feyerabend says,
but if Feyerabend can instate such axioms as a Professor of
Philosophy at a well known university in California, then I can
state that I am quite content to be considered an ordinary
member of the public in Cambridge" (ibid., p. 191 note 285).
The American neopragmatism of Richard Rorty has been considered confusing by
critics, science and reason gaining a relativist complexion in his theory of life. "No area
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of culture, and no period of history, gets Reality more right than any other." Truth is
elusive in such formulations. In a well known web video, Rorty states, "the less
certainty we have, the better," though such an impoverishment is not considered
desirable by everyone. Of course, certainty in some instances does transpire to be
unfounded. However, philosophers and others should be more enlightened than yob
society, which thrives upon uncertainties about justice.
So the postmodernist event has been unfolding in academic and popular circles, with
heretics (and conservative Professors) being in opposition to the high priests. All
areas of culture are the same (if we believe Rorty et al) with regard to Reality. One
popular manifestation of "postmodernism" is therefore the riot of errors and
reductionisms visible in too many Wikipedia articles, especially those concerning
religion. The vast majority of the editors and administrators of that controversial
project are anonymous, assuming exotic and insipid pseudonyms reflecting the
evasive spirit of the American web that dominates the world. The concealed entities
evidently do not wish to be countermanded for any of their mistakes, including their
support for cultic confusions that have been documented in their dismissal and
repression of citizen argument (a number of the Wikipedia pseudonymous personnel
are known to be academic entities of rather varying background). See also section 3
above.
10. Negotiating Contractions in Academe
It is possible to view Western philosophy in a manner that is not fashionable amongst
the diverse postmodernists, who sceptically evict the science of Descartes, the
morality of Kant, and the metaphysics (and political thought) of Spinoza. The
polymathy of Leibniz is quite beyond most contemporary aptitudes. In brief,
philosophy was adversely mutated by twentieth century developments which still
chewed the cud of Hume's scepticism. The major pre-Kantian philosophers were not
academics (though Hume tried to become one), and the Continental "Rationalists"
eschewed the scepticism deriving from Montaigne and other sources. The much later
Continental academic wave, now so famous and influential, were the polar reverse of
their origins.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a marginalised thinker who objected to the
increasingly academic operation of philosophy, but his independent voice was at the
fringe of contested events.
"It was not until the 20th century that nearly all outstanding
philosophers were academics. This professionalisation of
philosophy was sharply criticised early on by Schopenhauer as
being bad for the subject, and has always been controversial, but
it is now institutionally entrenched, and seems unlikely to be
reversed" (Bryan Magee,The Story of Philosophy, London:
Dorling Kindersley, 1998, p. 132).
In the face of monolithic institutionalism, the citizen thinker is not obliged to rest
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content with crumbs falling from the starvation diets of Heidegger, Derrida, Rorty,
Alfred J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle, and even Wittgenstein. A similar option of independence
exists in relation to the alternative and neo-Hegelian format of Ken Wilber (i.e., AQAL
and Quantum Theory), though he exists outside academe, or rather within the less
officious Integral Institute. Wilber believes that he can incorporate the postmodernist
sceptics in his "integral spirituality," which he has also called "integral post-
metaphysics." There is a contrasting argument.
The diet of postmodernist Michel Foucault (1926-84) extended to sadomasochistic
eroticism in acutely hedonistic environments of California, conferring the ability to
contract AIDS, which proved fatal. Academic deportment can sometimes be
questioned (Shepherd, Some Philosophical Critiques and Appraisals, 2004, pp. 245ff.).
The American postmodern media has overshadowed some other countries, though
being keen to assimilate British scepticism, Continental relativism and nihilism, and the
more commercial Jungian theory acquired from Europe. The dissenting British
intellectual citizen is, in contrast, free to take a different route that can instead feast
upon the original pre-Kantian exponents of modern Western philosophy, and the
rather substantial legacy of international thought existing before Descartes. The
history of science is incorporated in this repast (cf. my Psychology in Science, 1983),
and the focus can still probe more recent events in philosophy from Kant onwards.
The ongoing history of religions (from prehistoric eras to the present) is a relevant
accompaniment for intellectual nutrition (cf. my Minds and Sociocultures Vol. 1, 1995),
not least because the contemporary knowledge of that subject is frequently almost nil,
as Wikipedia too often demonstrates. Archaeology is an empirical ballast
(Shepherd, Meaning in Anthropos, 1991, pp. 77ff., 156). A form of citizen
sociology orsociography can also be useful to pursue for due analytical and social
health, antagonism to science not being a requisite, save in relation to the extensive
technological capitalism and laboratory horrors.
11. Avoiding a Neo-Jungian Hazard
Such a citizen recourse has the further advantage of bypassing a major obstacle in
contemporary neo-Jungian events. That hindrance is demonstrated in the Epilogue
toPassion. The main text comprises a review of entities and trends, and the underlying
affiliation of Richard Tarnas does not emerge until the closing pages.
"The most epistemologically significant development in the
recent history of depth psychology, and indeed the most
important advance in the field as a whole since Freud and Jung
themselves, has been the work of Stanislav Grof" (Passion,
p.425).
There is also the enthusiastic assertion that (neo-Jungian) Grof theory has major
implications for philosophy. Readers are further told that "the unexpected upshot of
his [Grof's] work was to ratify Jung's archetypal perspective on a new level" (ibid., p.
425). The Tarnas account was celebrated by Grof partisans. The envisaged epochal
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transformation, strongly indicated in Passion as a contemporary occurrence, has
persistent Grofian associations in the new age sector represented by the Esalen
Institute of Big Sur, California.
The Tarnas worldview thus demonstrated an underlying orientation in alternativism
associated with the controversial Esalen Institute. This is not surprising, given that
Tarnas was formerly director of programmes at Esalen, where he lived for ten years,
alongside Grof and others. His 1976 Ph.D. thesis was favourably committed to LSD
psychotherapy.
In his introduction to The Secret Chief, a web text dating to the 1990s, Stanislav Grof
stated: "Particularly valuable and promising were the early efforts to use LSD
psychotherapy with terminal cancer patients. These studies showed that LSD was
able to relieve severe pain, often even in those patients who had not responded to
medication with narcotics. In a large percentage of these patients, it was also possible
to alleviate or even eliminate the fear of death, increase the quality of their lives during
the remaining days, and positively transform the experience of dying." (The Secret
Chief is available at www.maps.org, and is noted for celebrating the illegal activities of
an experimenter in LSD therapy).
Critical assessments do not tally with Grof's optimism. Here is a non-partisan report:
"Grof describes how his [terminal cancer] patients, dosed with
LSD, 'spent hours in agonising pain, gasping for breath with the
colour of their faces changing from dead pale to dark purple.
They were rolling on the floor and discharging extreme tensions
in muscular tremors, twitches and complex twisting
movements.... there was often nausea with occasional vomiting
and excessive sweating'.... At Spring Grove Hospital a total of one
hundred [terminal cancer] patients were pressed into the LSD
torture programme which Grof called 'research,' though criminal
license is probably a more scientific description. 'Given that the
patients were all deceased within months, no study of the long-
term consequences of this therapy was undertaken.... Grof, his
many prominent supporters, and the National Institutes of Health,
never questioned the ethics of using human subjects in this type
of research'." (Shepherd,Pointed Observations, 2005, p. 13, and
citing an article by E. P. Curry in The Scientific Review of
Alternative Medicine, 2002).
The psychedelic torture pills are evidently not something to welcome, either in normal
states or in severe illness. As an ideological extension, the archetypal theme
associated with Jung has been a pervasive alternative resort, employed in very
numerous "workshops" for the affluent clientele, many of whom have probably never
read Jung in sufficient detail to ascertain the relevance of controversial theories.
Critics of the Tarnas format underlined another emphasis that is not universally agreed
upon. Tarnas stated this contention in terms of "the evolution of the Western mind has
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been founded on the repression of the feminine" (Passion, p. 442). I have already
commented upon that neo-Jungian accusation, and to quote: "We are thus presented
with a popular idea commercialised at places like the Esalen Institute"
(Shepherd, Some Philosophical Critiques and Appraisals, 2004, p. 19). The affiliation of
Professor Tarnas to philosophy is evidently one strongly influenced by postmodernist
exegesis. Another book of Tarnas is Cosmos and Psyche, but that is not under review
here.
12. Findhorn Foundation Holistic Censorship
Esalen themes (and books by Grof and Tarnas) have been influential at "holistic
education" centres like the Findhorn Foundation (Moray, Scotland). The present writer
is not a stranger to more realistic data concerning the repressed feminine, having been
acquainted at firsthand with three female dissidents suppressed and stigmatised by
the Findhorn Foundation, and in a manner that can scarcely be forgotten by any
diligent researcher. Even legal complaints have made no difference to the severely
repressive attitude of the Foundation, who have furthermore attempted in recent
solicitor correspondence to deny extant membership details, a fact which goes very
much against them. See further Kate Thomas and the Findhorn Foundation and
my Letter to Robert Walter MP.
The Findhorn Foundation College (FFC), which proclaims on the web an expertise in
"holistic education," is clearly presuming an all-rounded sense of accomplishment. In
a recent web ad for a 2010 semester, the Americanised College asserts:
"Integrating academic and experiential learning, the programme
is based in the Findhorn Ecovillage, which provides a tangible
demonstration of the links between the spiritual, social and
economic aspects of life.... Students engage in daily seminars
with faculty, experience living education through practical work
in the community, and explore themes relevant to our times such
as spiritual practice, sustainable and systemic design & thinking,
and group process & conflict resolution." (The Human Challenge
of Sustainability: Findhorn Community Semester at
www.findhorncollege.com, accessed 12/06/2010).
This form of alternative operation has to date ignored and suppressed British female
dissidents for many years, the ongoing theme of "conflict resolution" being interpreted
elsewhere as a convenient facade for funding. The presiding agents in this situation
now have the reputation of "new age brahmins," the affirmative caste who never
concede errors or wrongs. The adverse reflection is strongly associated with
aggressive Americans who tend to assume sovereignty in judgment.
The FFC have been keen to enroll American college students, and advertise some
glowing comments from that semester category. For instance, there is the reported
phrase: "What went well for me was being treated like a human being with a heart and
a soul as well as a mind." Dissidents from the Findhorn Foundation were not even
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permitted to have a mind, being censored as unworthy of review and suited to
oblivion.
One can here mention, by way of complement, that the precedent to the FFC was the
ill-fated FCIE (Findhorn College of International Education), a short-lived enterprise of
1996, in which ambitions of the faculty (Foundation personnel) were negated by the
situation of enrolled American university students who rebelled against the inadequate
"holistic education" administered to them. See furtherPropaganda Tactics (2008).
An extension of this situation applies to theScientific and Medical Network, an
alternative organisation in England led by David Lorimer, who has promoted Grof and
his disciple Christopher Bache. See my Letter of Complaint to David Lorimer (2005).
13. CIIS and Astrology
Meanwhile, Richard Tarnas became Professor of philosophy and psychology at
the California Institute of Integral Studies (CIIS), which likewise featured Dr. Grof as a
member of staff, and to the accompaniment of Grof Transpersonal Training. The books
of Dr. Grof continued to emphasise the importance of his holotropic therapy, which he
interpreted as "moving toward wholeness." The latter phrase appeared on the cover of
his Psychology of the Future (2000).
The second book of Professor Tarnas wasPrometheus the Awakener (1995), which
celebrates the astrological significances of Uranus, and moreover, strongly suggests
that astrological phenomena influence the existence of both individuals and societies.
Archetypal astrology achieved glorification in a third book by Tarnas entitled Cosmos
and Psyche: Intimations of a New World View (2006). Some of his readers were
disconcerted by the format, though the alternativist British organisation called the
Scientific and Medical Network awarded Cosmos and Psyche their Book of the Year
Prize. In this controversial volume, Tarnas favours such themes as Jungian
synchronicity, archetypal theory, and (rather pronouncedly) the Uranus-Pluto Cycle.
The Beatles, in their 1960s activity, are described in terms of "Saturn return transits"
(p. 122). Professor Tarnas has since been identified as an astrologist.
Earlier versions of astrology were in circulation amongst the Greek and Roman
philosophers, notably the Stoics. "Platonists similarly held the planets to be under the
ultimate government of the supreme Good, but tended to view the celestial
configurations as indicative rather than causal, and not absolutely determining for the
evolved individual" (Passion, p. 84). Astrological fatalism was totally rejected by later
thinkers, though elements of a scientific reformist belief in the subject were existent
during the early phase of the Royal Society (ibid., pp. 486-7).
During the 1970s, in collaboration with Dr. Grof at Esalen, Tarnas interpreted the Grof
dossier of LSD experiences in terms of "archetypal" astrology. Professor Tarnas has
been celebrated by Grof partisans for correlating the four "perinatal matrices" of Grof's
"cartography of the psyche" with "archetypal meanings" of the planets Neptune,
Saturn, Pluto, and Uranus. Grof is reputed to have endorsed this linkage, implying that
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archetypal astrology is the only means for successfully predicting the content of
experiences in LSD "psychotherapy," Holotropic Breathwork, and the "spontaneous
eruption of unconscious contents." These ideas, well known on the web, are in strong
dispute elsewhere.
The "epochal transformation" proposed by Tarnas can unfortunately be interpreted by
critics in terms of LSD psychotherapy, holotropic theory and hyperventilation,
suppression of female dissidents, synchronicity theory, archetypal theory, and
archetypal astrology. There is still no compelling reason to abandon the traditional
philosophical discipline (stretching back in variants to Plato) in favour of alternative
post-1950s practice and theory, even though the Cartesian brutality, the Kantian
cordon, Humean scepticism, and Nietzschean "will to power" can be regarded as
impediments.
My own version of philosophy, which is citizen, differs very substantially from the
current "Integral Studies" orientation favoured in American counterculture. I have
attempted to illustrate that factor on this webpage. See also my autobiographical
reflections and Tarnas-Grof. The Aristotelian class system should long ago have been
eliminated, but survives in modern science and academic philosophy.
Kevin R. D. Shepherd
January 2011 (later slightly modified)