Philosophy of Language - Lecture 1

8/3/2019 Philosophy of Language - Lecture 1

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Signs of lifeThe meaning of a word from the semiotic and morphological point of view

Kristijan Krka

Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus in Zagreb, Department of PhilosophyZagreb School of Economics and Management, Department of MarketingSciences Po Lille, Department of Political ScienceAddress: Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract The paper consists of the following parts in all of which classical differences arecriticized, namely, the difference between non-significant and significant (signs) phenomena inthe first part, between natural and artificial signs in the second, between non-linguistic andlinguistic signs in the third, and finally between words and languages (language-games,discourses, texts, speech-acts, and dialogues) in the fourth part. Criticism of all of thesedifferences from the morphological point of view, that is to say, by offering a creation of a kindof net between mixed types of these allegedly strongly opposed sides which will present a kind

of pattern, in some way influences our strong inclination to clearly define the subject matter of the philosophy of language in the manner that the very subject matter itself is internally andexternally vague which seems to be fine for all tasks of the discipline itself. In addition suchapproach gives the philosophy of language certain inter and trans-disciplinary nature whichmakes it relevant theoretically and practically and internally for other philosophical issues andexternally for other sciences. Some consequences of such approach are to be mentioned only

passingly, consequences such as quite porous internal differences between different theories of meaning, between different approaches to philosophy of language (say in continental andBritish-US approaches), and quite porous external differences between philosophy of languageand different disciplines in various sciences (for instance in the rest of the philosophy,linguistics, semiotics, psychology, neurology, cultural anthropology, physical anthropology,etc.).Key words : artificial languages, artificial signs, causal theories of meaning, dialogue, discourse,language-games, language, linguistic signs, natural languages, natural signs, non-lingustic signs,non-significant phenomena, philosophy of language, reference, sentence, significant

phenomena, signs, speech-acts, text, theories of meaning, words.Abbreviations : PI = Philosophical Investigations, RFM = Remarks of the Foundations of Mathematics, OC = On Certainty, TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

A black cat crossing your path signifies that theanimal is going somewhere. (Groucho Marx)

A personal note

If I am allowed let me start with a personal note from my college years. When I was freshman at Jesuit College

in Zagreb, Croatia in 1990, studying philosophy there were two courses that I was especially attracted to most of all because some of the philosophers mentioned were still alive and I thought I could listen to their lectures and perhaps talk to them, and the other reason was that the professors of these courses were open for discussion. Onecourse was Analytic philosophy and the other was Contemporary philosophy (both in the sense of 20 th century

philosophy). This appeared weird. How it is possible that two different courses cover the same period? Why theyare not just one course? Like for instance course Modern philosophy: Empiricism and Rationalism. Very soon Idiscover that on both sides some huge differences were pointed out at first lectures (for instance: Kierkegaardhas nothing in common with Frege).

Since my high school was scientifically oriented I was naturally more attracted to analytic philosophyfor the reason that it seemed at least a little bit clearer what were the basic issues, problems, arguments, andstandpoints. Some of the philosophers were claiming that they are engaged in scientific philosophy. Well, usingthe predicate scientific doesnt make the philosophy scientific more then it is. Yet something was bothering me. Isaw much dissimilarity clearly because they were emphasized in textbooks of both courses, but also many

similarities that were not mentioned at all. Most of these were of course accidental, irrelevant, and simply mymistakes. So, it was clear that my overall direction in philosophy is going to be analytic. However, since the

professor of the course was an expert in Wittgenstein I started to read his major works and discovered great


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divides not just within Wittgensteins philosophy ( a propos the professor argued in favour of continuity of his philosophy), but within analytic philosophy as well (between Vienna Circle and Oxford School, betweenWittgenstein and Quine, between Kripke and later Putnam, etc.). It is beside the point to mention divides inContinental philosophy since they were obvious enough.

However, some similarities I saw were correct, but as some argued, clearly irrelevant, and since it wasobvious that I will be doing philosophies of some members of Oxford school and Wittgenstein, I thought that it

would be useful to get to know Continental philosophy in more detail. At that time The Phenomenology of Perception by Murice Merleau-Ponty seemed to me the most clear of all Continental philosophy that I read andadditional reason was that even a hard-core positivist A. J. Ayer in one of his books was not so critical about it.So I did my BA on this topic. Of course I had to read at least some works of other continental philosophers andsome introductions to other schools. So I discovered many strange connections, for instance betweenKierkegaard and Heidegger, the former being the real founder of existentialism, between Goethe, Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein from TLP and PI, between Brentano, Husserl, and Frege, and many others. Of course, theseconnections can be irrelevant, yet, and at least concerning language and theories of meaning, there were manysimilarities that seem to be relevant more then accidentally, they seemed to shape some crucial topics on all sidesincluded.

In the same time I continued my studies and I had no time to do many things alongside analytic philosophy, my MA thesis on Moore and Wittgenstein, and afterwards a PhD completely crazy thesis onWittgensteins pragmatism in OC that is to say was he or was he not a pragmatist of some sort? Afterwards, I

had enough time to return to Continental philosophy, and I did, but I discovered that there are philosophers whoin one way or another combined all mentioned sides and created something new, interesting, and inspiring suchas R. Rorty, J. Habermas, U. Eco, or P. Bruckner. The first two I trust since they are completely aware of thesituation (see Rorty 1967:1-41), and very precisely build their standpoints, while the last two I trust since theywere excellent novel writers and philosophers in the same time compared to other more famous contemporary

philosophers who tried to compare analytic and Continental philosophies like K. O. Apel, E. Tugendhat, A. J.Ayer, P. Riceur, and others. So I came up with the idea to formulate some similarities and connections in moresubstantive way. Some ways were already exploited more, some less. Analytic philosophy led me among manydirections to linguistics, semiotics and cultural anthropology. Semiotic approach seemed to be the most

promising one but I didnt have the starting idea. Now I have it and I will try to describe it. It all started with asign.

Another, perhaps more objective reason, is that the idea that the philosophy of language is the FirstPhilosophy (perhaps after metaphysics and epistemology historically speaking) nowadays would be acceptedonly by few no matter if many are still engaged in it (Hale and Wright 1999:viii-ix). It will surely continue todevelop. One can contribute to its relevance by making it relevant to other classical disciplines which meanwhile

become important again in analytic philosophy (such as ontology, epistemology, applied ethics, etc.). Yet, thedivide still exists; say more between analytic and Continental ontology and epistemology, and perhaps less

between ethics and various issues in applied ethics. Now, one can try to make it relevant to the whole of philosophical field, to change the aspect of looking at it and this is the goal of the present paper.

A note on terminology

A technical note concerning terminology should be supplied here. The central concept is that of a sign butcontrary to the common use for its function which is signifying, I prefer signing. I prefer it partly because itis a matter of a joke. Because humans are signing documents and signatures are rarely signs of anything

semiotically speaking although they are signs of individual physical persons (that is in case of overlap of Greek words smeon and noma ), and especially in cases in which particular human is a significant person , and because it seemed funny to alter the quote form the movie Shining.

However, there are two half-serious reasons. First serious reason is that it is a matter of the word signand understanding that signifying has its origin in signum but signum means much more (especially if oneincludes the line from Stoic smeon , Latin signum , and our sign the line of translations that hides manydifferences in intension and extension of the term, see Eco 1986:14-46), and sometimes something completelydifferent from contemporary meaning of the word sign even in general semiotics not to mention difficulties inapplied semiotics concerning with various natural, cultural, artificial, linguistic, and non-linguistic signs in whichthese differences appear as extremely relevant. Second serious reason is that it is important for the topic of the

paper to differ between human intentional and artificial signs like pointing to the right at a crossroads, andunintentional and automatic signs like bodily symptoms for instance. Therefore, one has to choose betweensignifying (for intentional signs) and signing (for unintentional signs). Since, the topic does not include

discussion on names and signatures, yet it includes discussion on primal signs, and since there is no additionalreason to follow the common practice except the common practice itself, I chose signing. Signifying soundsmore artificial and intentional then signing which in the present context sounds more primal and primordial,

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and since I try to point to primordial pattern of all signs rooted in a group of primordial signs semioticallyspeaking, signing seemed more convenient. For example, cave paintings of hands from 31,000 years ago likein Chauvet cave in France, one could say that these are closer to signing then to signifying because thesehands represent not just signum but symbol and signature as well.

An introductory note

This means something. This is important. [Contemplating thelump shape] (Roy Neary in Close Encounters of the Third Kind)

If one approaches to the core and currently discussed topics in the philosophy of languagefrom the semiotics as the starting point, as it was done for instance by Umberto Eco in hisSemiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Eco 1986), then one can see that there are nosignificant differences between say different if not radically opposed theories of meaning, (for example between causal and contextual theories), further on between different schools in

philosophy of language in analytic philosophy, even between analytic and continentalapproach, and finally between say philosophical, linguistic, semiotic, cultural anthropological,

physical anthropological, psychological and other approaches to the very conception and thewhole issue of language. On the other hand, any expert in the field of the philosophy of language can list some traditional and current discussions and standpoints on which thefundamental debates rest, or without which the great deal of these discussions doesnt makesense anymore. In other words, they become completely different discussions.

Another way to say the same thing is to say that some elements of the semioticapproach to the philosophy of language reveal that between mention debates, standpoints,theories, schools, overall approaches to philosophy, and finally different disciplines andsciences there are no fundamental differences and that a kind of unified source, method, goals,scope, and limits of philosophical inquiry can be established. Yet, in the present paper thiscannot be done for the field of semiotic in general, but it can and it will be done concerning alist of definitions of some crucial concepts and their differentiations that can lead to mentionmethodological and other differences between theories, schools, and approaches. The mostelegant way to limit the subject matter of the present research and some modest proposals thatwill be made at the end of the paper is to present it with certain classical differentiation whichis called the Porphyrian tree. The analysis and criticism of such way of differentiation isuseful, leaving aside historical research, only if it can expose the roots and some issues of the

present discussions, and this seems to be the case. Now, the actual example which will be presented here isnt really present in any

particular work, but it tends to embrace as many as possible of similar differentiations madefrom Porphyry to the end of the 19 th century (as shown in Table 1). The topic of the paper is

the phenomenon and the concept of a sign.

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Table 1: Classical divisions from signs to words and languages

Only two things will be analysed and criticized in what follows, namely: thedescriptions of the phenomena and concepts, especially on the right column of Table 1, andthe differentiations or divisions of the phenomena and concepts on all levels. This willhopefully reveal that some current discussions in 20 th century philosophies of language are if not seriously meaningless, then at least in some part dangerously misplaced if they claim thatother approaches are completely wrong. What follows can be viewed only as a set of examples and objections to some easily accepted and presupposed definitions, anddifferentiations of some basic concepts.

1. Phenomena: non-significant and significant and not-signifying and signifyingsomething

A little bit of alternation of one of many memorable quotes from the Stanley Kubricks classic psychological horror The Shining could be used as a leitmotif for the present issue inquestion. So, the alternate quote runs as follows:

I can remember when I was a little boy. My grandmother and I could holdconversations entirely without ever opening our mouths. She called it shining[ signing ]. And for a long time, I thought it was just the two of us that had theshining [ signing ] to us. Just like you probably thought you were the only one.But there are other folks, though mostly they don't know it, or don't believe it.How long have you been able to do it? ( Dick Hallorann )

The quote, alternated as it is, highlights the topic of place of signing in living our lives as welive them as humans. However, the topic is more closely related to some central issues inclassical philosophy of language. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, like in adozen of other places, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes on the relation of language and life. Thequote runs as follows:

Language, I should like to say, relates to a way of living. (RFM 335)Precisely this relation is the topic of the present essay in terms of an introduction to the

philosophy of language as part of the wider issue that is a philosophy of human action or even

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more wider in terms of a philosophy of culture. So, the place of speaking in living in case of humans is in fact the prime subject matter here.

The following discussion consists of the next parts in all of which classical differencesare criticized, namely, the difference between significant and non-significant phenomena inthe first part, between natural and artificial signs in the second, between non-linguistic and

linguistic signs in the third, and finally between words and languages (language-games,discourses, texts, speech-acts, and dialogues). Criticism of all of these differences from themorphological point of view, that is to say, creating a kind of net between mixed types of these allegedly strongly opposed sides which will present a kind of pattern, in some wayinfluences our strong inclination to clearly define the subject matter of the philosophy of language in the manner that the subject matter itself is internally and externally vague whichseems to be fine for all tasks of the discipline itself. In addition such approach gives the

philosophy of language certain inter and trans-disciplinary nature which makes it relevanttheoretically and practically and internally for other philosophical issues and externally for other sciences. Some consequences of such approach are to be mentioned only passingly,consequences such as quite porous internal differences between different theories of meaning,

between different approaches to philosophy of language (say in continental and British-US philosophy), and quite porous external differences between philosophy of language anddifferent disciplines in various sciences (for instance in philosophy, linguistics, semiotics,cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, etc.).

Compared to the present state of the art in the philosophy of language, expressed invarious companions, handbooks, anthologies, and the most important journals, the presentapproach to the topic could seem to be, if not outdated and nave, then surely out of themainstream discussions. This is so not because the author belongs to this or that school or

prefers particular philosopher of the philosophy of language, or because it is more amicableto, say linguistic, logical, cultural anthropological, biological, or any other grounding of the

philosophy of language. On the other hand it need to be said that the philosophies of later L.Wittgenstein and Oxford school of ordinary language are a kind of seeds from which issuesdiscussed here grew.

In my case, the core issue of the philosophy of language, which is the theory of linguistic meaning, during years step by step, was peeled like an artichoke, and finally therewas nothing left. Therefore, I needed to take more seriously the method change, and to use themethod that was coined by Wittgenstein as looking at similarities and dissimilarities andseeing connections (PI 66), or by P. F. Strawson as the connective analysis, or morphology as I prefer to call it (following Goethe and Spengler at least terminologicallyspeaking). Taking it more seriously, it meant that the whole viewpoint should be changed, andso I started with signs. This does not mean that the one should study semiotics in order to

solve the problems of linguistic meaning, yet some elements of semiotic analysis are going to be used as natural background of such research, namely parts of cultural semiotics, but nomore or less then some parts of cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, neurology, and

psychology as well. The rough ground of the present discussion surely is notinterdisciplinary, yet its background of understanding is by all means.

The world consists of phenomena epistemologically speaking. Concerning various principles of their differentiation they can be differed in various ways. On the occasion suchas this it seem fairly convenient to make differentiation of all phenomena on the basis of their significance where the word significance is taken in the broadest possible sense. Classicaltheory of difference suggests that the differentiated whole or the concept should becompletely exhausted in divided parts. Therefore, all phenomena are divided into non-

significant and significant phenomena. Significant phenomena can be further divided into not-

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signing and signing phenomena. Signing phenomena are signs and opposed to non-signing phenomena they are somehow ordered, arranged, formatted, and interpreted as signs.

Signs always consist of signifier which is the sign itself or the form the sign takes, and thesignified or that what it represents or signifies. For instance rainy clouds are signifiers of the rain which they signified. The sign itself is always the whole consisting of signifier

and signified and their interdependence or signification (as shown in Diagram 1.2, seeJohansen, Larsen 2000).

However, Diagram 1.2 shows the structure of a sign applicable for all signs, whileDiagram 1.1 shows the structure of a sign only for linguistic signs. The Diagram 1.1shows what is commonly called Ogden/Richards Triangle because it was first publishedin their book The Meaning of Meaning (1923), yet idea of the triangle can be traced toB. Bolzanos work Beitrge zu einer begrndeteren Darstellung der Mathematik (1810).The elements are symbol, reference and referent and relations are: the relation of referenceand a symbol can be correct or incorrect, the relation between a reference and a referentcan be adequate or inadequate, and the relation between a referent and a symbol can betrue or false.

Some further modifications were made by J. R. Searle. He introduces the term direction tofit between world, (writers) thought (intended), and word (encoded), and between word,(readers) thought (extended), and a referent (decoded). However, the Diagram 1.1 will be of use in section on linguistic signs.

Diagram 1.1: Semiotics: sign and its elements for linguistic signs

Diagram 1.2: Semiotics: sign and its elements for all signs

However, is this division of the phenomenon and the concept of significant reallycomprehensive? Surely there are phenomena that werent, arent and will never bear anysignificance whatsoever, and on the other hand there are phenomena that if they are

phenomena they eo ipso signify something. Nonetheless, there are phenomena that aresignificant during a period of time in particular cultures.

Say that The Black Spot is historical fact and not a literary device invented byRobert Louis Stevenson in his novel Treasure Island . Therefore, a pirate presented with a

black spot is officially pronounced with a verdict of guilt or judgment, and any other pirate

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can kill him on site. Now, one can suppose that pirates and pirate culture existed for a certain period of time in history. Therefore, The Black Spot wasnt a significant phenomenon inthis particular semiosis before pirate culture and ended to be such after the end of that cultureand practices. This is perhaps an odd example, yet one can list a series of phenomena thatwere significant only for some time. Of course, historical ancient symbols, which are

nowadays out of use for various reasons, will be the most obvious and vivid examples. Yet,there are nice examples from 20 th century. At the beginning of car production cars that wererunning on electricity were majority compared to cars running on gasoline. In the mostoptimistic interpretation having a car was a status symbol in these days while nowadays tohave a car running on electricity and gasoline is a symbol of ecological awareness of their owners and such cars symbolize the significance of environment preservation and

protection. Interesting fact is that the popularity of electric cars went down because as electricthey were quite limited for greater distances. Such examples show that the division of

phenomena into non-significant and significant is useful but only for particular practical purposes and that other different divisions are also possible and that they are not just usefulfor other practical purposes but also that they are dynamic and contextual in various ways andthat as such they are more comprehensive.

2. Signs: natural and artificial

Let us continue with movie quotes as nice leitmotifs for the present discussion. The followingis perhaps not the most memorable like for instance Swing away Merrill. Merrill... swingaway. but surely is an important one from the movie Signs and it runs as follows:

Caroline: What kind of a machine bends a stalk of corn without breaking it?Graham: It can't be by hand, it's too perfect. (Police Officer Caroline Paskiand Reverend Graham Hess)

The phenomenon of sings in corn fields tickles our imagination for at least half of a century,yet it is interesting concerning the present topic since it raises the issue are these signs naturalor artificial (human or extraterrestrial isnt the issue at the moment). So, let us turn to sings.There are phenomena that sign. Following the previous, little bit altered movie quote we cancall it signing and that is what makes them significant phenomena. On the other hand, thereare significant phenomena that are not signing and therefore are not signs. For instance, WW2historically speaking is a significant phenomenon of the 20 th century, yet it is not a sign.Perhaps the whole WW2 can be described with a series of carefully chosen signs, meaning acombination of various quotes, symbols, signals, symptoms, gestures, etc.) One could say,OK, so there are significant phenomena some of which are signing and some which are not,and those which are signing are signs. Well yes if one is looking for a simple administrative

categorization for a simple practical purpose. In order not to confuse the reader it should besaid that our goal here is in a way pragmatic but not administrative or even bureaucratic. The basic difference between phenomena concerning signing is the following:

There are phenomena that are never signing anything, they are simply non-signs, There are phenomena that are always signing something, they are natural signs, they are

signing causally such as symptoms, or mental signs of the mind, and There are phenomena that sign sometimes only to some group, they are conventional

signs.Only second and third groups are significant phenomena. However, the whole sector

of significant phenomena is essentially a dynamic one meaning that it has porous borders andvarious overlaps (externally) with other sectors which can be called sectors of non-significant

phenomena for the present purpose, and it has porous borders (internally) between itssubsectors, parts, or aspects. These aspects can change by their very nature, their structure, or

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by some external influence one into another and that is what makes the whole sector dynamic.Particularly, among significant phenomena some signs can die, or be killed in a way and turninto non-signs and be reborn again, and the same goes for non-signs. Some signs can have thesame material form but be different concerning what they sign what they signify in differenttimes, places, or cultures. In the Indian religion swastika is the sacred symbol of good luck,

while during and after the WW2 it became a symbol of something a totalitarian regime.Varieties of such changes are virtually innumerable. This dynamism of significant phenomenarequires from us to observe it as a whole, in all its details, and in its complete structure in

precise time and place in order to isolate signs and their morphology.The underlying idea of the morphology not as a phenomena structure but as

phenomena method of observation and comparisons, no matter how radical it may look like,is the following: there is no pure identity and pure difference among groups of phenomena,

pairs of phenomena, or between aspects of phenomena. These are only formally (in factadministratively) construed ideal points. What we experience and what we can describe basedon our experience are only aspects of similarity or dissimilarity. If this is OK, then any further difference made is the difference not in kind (say subsets for instance) but in level, shade,intensity, some proportion (which implies certain rhythm and tempo change which meanscertain dynamics of phenomena). The application of this assumption or the example will besupplied in the next part.

To say that signs are significant phenomena that are signing doesnt say much if anything at all. It seems that the core of the phenomenon of a sign (lat. signum ) is hidden butthis is wrong since it is not. Signs are pointing, intending to, directing to something, givingcourse, and this seems to be one of their important aspect. They are completely revealed or they completely reveal that what they are sign of. What is in a way hidden is perhaps the wayof reading sings. One need to learn to read signs first and foremost by observing and imitatingothers who understand them and are able to read them. A sign is always signing somethingelse different from itself, even in cases in which a sign seems to point to itself it points fromone of its aspects to its other aspect.

However, what about the difference between signs? Administrative differentiationsuggests that signs can be differed as natural, artificial, and some strange exceptions (as showin Table 2). Such manner of differentiation can be and is useful, yet we are concerned notwith usefulness primarily but with how something is actually used. It can be said that suchdifference is practical, yet it is not pragmatic.

Table 2: Practical (or useful) differentiation of signs

Now, in the contrast to practical differentiation between signs, the pragmaticdifferentiation suggests that there is no clear principle of differentiation, and that what seemsto be a small amount of exception is in fact vast majority of quite important cases. And suchdifferentiation perhaps is not useful, however it is de facto used, anthropologically speaking.Say that we have a patch of red color as a sign of a danger or a threat. The color red taken insuch way presents an essentially (in various ways) mixed (culture-nature) sign. It is a

primordial sign of danger (of course in particular context) which is a certain mixture or proportion between natural and cultural aspects of it, yet we are using it as a whole and in the

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same time as a simple sign. Compared to it there are extremes, namely, on one hand there arealmost pure natural signs, for instance blood as a danger, threat, or trauma, and on the other hand there are almost pure artificial signs, for example red traffic light as a dander, threat, or caution (as shown in Diagram 2).

Diagram 2: Pragmatic (or de facto used) differentiation of signs

Mixed signs seem to be not more abstract, rather more primitive or primordial then thenatural or artificial (cultural, produced) signs. However, mixed signs are onlyanthropologically primordial since natural ones are surely biologically primordial andartificial ones are culturally primordial. Here the difference between culture and anthropologyis that the culture is wider concept (some non-humans surely have culture), while the conceptof anthropology is here reserved for human cultures. When it is said that mixed or primordialsigns are de facto used, this is not pure experiential remark, rather an axis remark (OC 152),the third kind in Wittgensteins differentiation between grammatical (hinges) and experientialremarks. There are such primordial human signs actualized in various ways in various humancultures, namely signs for various essential differences, say enemy friend, danger security,edible/drinkable poisonous, barrier passage, etc. Some of these are very similar indifferent culture yet some are quite dissimilar depending on various further elements of development of particular cultures.

Ways of mixtures and their variety in mixed signs is enormous and cannot beelaborated here. Perhaps one of the reasons why one can consider this particular morphological connective analysis (as shown in Diagram 2) as non-intuitive, contrary toadministrative one (as shown in Table 1) is the fact that the analysis itself is observed andanalyzed by the members of our Western developed and highly differentiated (administrative)cultures in which for practical purposes the majority of signs are strictly differentiated asnatural or artificial because of the historical developments of our cultures. Nevertheless, evenin our contemporary cultures, in order to fully comprehend and understand the significance of a sign, say the sign of danger, one need to understand its mixture aspects as well as pureaspects and above all their relations of similarities and dissimilarities and finally the whole netand the pattern of a sign.

Another reason is the following. Natural and artificial signs are easily differed. For instance, a big, dark grey, heavy cloud or meteorologically speaking a cumulonimbus signifiesrain because such clouds are rainy clouds for one who knows how to read the sign. Naturalsigns bear a causal relation to their objects, e.g. lightning is a sign of a thunder, and a thunder

is a sign of a storm, while conventional signs signify by agreement. Signs point to inweaker sense, while for example symbols point to in stronger sense, like flags or coats of

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arms. The relation between a sign and a phenomenon is called the semiosis which brings uscloser to semiotics and philosophy of language which will be to topic in the next part.Therefore, we have the following relations: Semiosis or signing (semiotics, cultural anthropology, biology), Significance or importance (of events, characters, and similar), and Signification or linguistic signing (semantics, philosophy of language).

No matter if the relation between a sign and a phenomenon or semiosis is problematicone; even more problematic is the difference between natural and artificial signs and this issuecan help solving the issue of the nature of semiosis. The difference in question seems to beincomplete. Namely, as shown in Diagram 1, the amount and the importance of mixed signsmake them far more then simple exceptions not even included in classical division in Table 1.For instance many facial expressions, gestures, bodily movements, and even someexclamations are, with some dissimilarity, universally recognized as signs and they are assuch natural and cultural in the same time, i.e. certain mixture. For instance, there are fivevital signs which are standard in most medical settings: b ody temperature , pulse rate or heart rate , r espiratory rate , b lood pressure , and pain. These signs are by all means natural signs or symptoms of various diseases and disorders. Some of them appear only in certain social,socio-psychological, and mental environments. Therefore, concerning vital signs as signifiersthey are natural, but some aspects of what they signify can be cultural. These signs are mixedand in the same time crucial for our health.

In fact all interactions and results of a mixture of culture and nature, in many differentways, results with in such way mixed signs. Since, such signs are of utmost importance for humans, our survival, and different cultural patterns, as we said previously, one can suspectthat they are anthropologically primitive, primal, or primordial, while more natural or moreartificial signs are secondary or derived as a kind of special cases. For the end of this shortand incomplete note on signs it seems necessary to answer to the question why is this

important at all for language and linguistic meaning? It is so because it perhaps points to themorphological nature of all levels of signing and so to linguistic meaning as well.

3. Artificial signs: non-linguistic and linguistic

Surely there are purely non-linguistic signs and purely linguistic signs. Obviously linguisticsigns, words like for instance, connectives "and" (conjunction), "or" (disjunction), "either...or"(exclusive disjunction), "implies" (implication), "if...then" (implication), "if and only if"(equivalence), "only if" (implication), "just in case" (equivalence), "but" (conjunction),"however" (conjunction) etc. are purely linguistic signs no matter if they can be represented

by words or by symbols such as: n egation (not) ( or ~), c onjunction (and) ( , &, or ),

material implication (if...then) ( , or ), biconditional (if and only if) (iff) (bi-implication) ( , , or = ), etc. The only difference here is that the first are linguistic signs of a natural language while the second are signs of the formal language.

Concerning artificial signs the same can be claimed. Namely, there are purely non-linguistic signs apart from what they signify. The problem with artificial signs is that they can

be completely conventional meaning that they have no inherent relation to what they signify,for instance the artificial sign (in fact symbol) for biohazard (as shown in Picture 1).

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Picture 1. Symbol for biohazard as completely conventional

Artificial signs vary greatly since they can be icons, symbols, signals, symptoms, andeven significances (in terms of values). Some of them are purely non-linguistic, but some arenot. Many artificial signs are in fact in one way or another mixtures or intermediate cases

between non-linguistic and linguistic signs. For instance traffic sign for STOP is acombination of red octagon with the white rim and white word STOP in the middle (as shownin Picture 2).

Picture 2: Traffic sign for STOP as partly non-conventional

Therefore, many artificial signs are in fact intermediate cases which are quiteimportant. In fact for a series of such signs or isotypes a credit must be given to Otto Neurath,the important member of Vienna Circle. The most obvious linguistic sings are letters, words,expressions, sentences, texts (and/or discourses). This leads us naturally to the nextdifference, i.e. between words and languages as artificial linguistic signs. They surely deservea part on their own if we understand them not just as words, sentences, and texts, but asutterances, speech acts, and conversations.

4. Words and languages: on the Continentalanalytic divide and the referential contextual divide among analytic theories of meaning

How a word, or a sentence, or even a text can mean something? Why words or even sentencesare rarely bearers of linguistic meaning? Because, to some extent their meaning depends onelements which transcend them; sometimes these are linguistically broader elements such as

language-games, sometimes non-linguistically different elements such as non-linguistic signs,and sometimes even contexts of facial expressions, gestures, bodily movements, typical bodily actions, and even cultural routines. Of course, the subject matter of our inquiry must bemethodologically strict and isolated, yet is there a special reason why one while investigatingthe meaning of the word table for instance should not take into account not just the elementsof the description of the table, but also many different contextual elements which would shownot just that such a definition is only a kind of preliminary or starting point and eventuallyincorrect, but also the place of the word in language and in life. 4.1. The Continentalanalytic divide

The first issue which should be addressed is the Continentalanalytic divide, before the WW2symbolized by the channel between England and Europe, and after the WW2 the divide was

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bridged, and a kind of communication between opposite sided was made and symbolized byGrand Canyon which is almost completely dried out and can be crossed on foot. The secondissue will tackle some principle controversies regarding differences between different theoriesof meaning.

Let us turn to first issue. The analytic/Continental divide is a product of analytic not of

Continental philosophers. However, if this is true then it seems to be auto-referentiallyinconsistent since this is a historical not a systematic note. Namely, analytic philosopher cannot claim the divide strictly without contradicting it. On the other hand, Continental

philosophers rarely claim the divide. There are some difference, yet they seems to be the issueof methodological style and a way of writing, therefore two texts, each of one tradition can betranslated one into another (work of R. Rorty, concerning some crucial philosophical conceptis an excellent example). In his book The Origins of Analytic Philosophy M. Dummett(1993) claims that analytic philosophy is strictly post-Fregean, that it concerns only

philosophy of language, precisely analytic philosophy and its linguistic turn , and that this turnstarted precisely with 62 nd paragraph of Freges Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Later on,the linguistic turn was in many ways confronted with the interpretative turn of hermeneutic

philosophy. However, precisely standpoints of Oxford school of ordinary language and later Wittgenstein, functioning as an intermediate standpoint, shows that besides dissimilaritiesthere are many similarities between philosophies of linguistic turn and philosophies of interpretative turn . The concept and the activity of an interpretation show a long list of dissimilarities between Heidegger and early Carnap, while it shows some similarities betweenlater Wittgenstein and Gadamer. Another example would be to compare various interpretationof the concept of an interpretation in analytic philosophy of science and phenomenology andhermeneutics and to compare these comparisons. However, only few philosophers made suchcomparisons, but it is not odd to do it nowadays in times of post-analytic philosophy(Rorty). Therefore, this obviously not so obvious radical statement about drastic, deep-stated,and unbridgeable divide led to debates within analytic and continental philosophies. Some of starting points and premises of such debates were even factually mistaken; some were moresophisticated nevertheless wrong in their arguments and conclusions.

Many of analytic philosophers disagree with Dummett since they want to include other philosophers which cannot be subsumed under such strict, and some suggest even self-contradictory in so strict standpoint. Some of them differentiate between linguistic turn andanalytic philosophy (such as P. M. S. Hacker), some go even further claiming that there areContinental philosophies that are so analytic that they are closer to analytic then to someschools of Continental philosophy (such as D. Fllesdal). However, the Dummetts radicalclaim opened the relevant discussion which resulted with many reviews, papers, and books

perhaps the most interesting of which is the one by H. J. Glock (ed.) The Rise of Analytic

Philosophy with highly critical papers by D. Fllesdal, H. Sluga, R. Monk, P. M. S. Hacker,and J. Skorupski (Glock 1997). Some philosopher go even further claiming that philosopherssuch as Wittgenstein or Rorty, no matter if they started as analytical philosopher ended assurely not analytical but with something new which is a half-way to some Continentalschools.

On the other side, concerning language and meaning, there were and are schools of Continental philosophy that were perhaps not by their affiliation to particular school, but bytheir approach, issues, and solutions much closer to analytic philosophies then to someschools of Continental philosophy. Yet, there were and still there are philosophers that strictlyand combatively insist on analyticContinental divide. They emphasize only one aspect, theaspect of dissimilarities, and do not see, or do not want to see a series of important similarities

on which many contemporary philosophies are founded.

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In comparing Continental and analytic philosophy there are two obvious sides, namelyContinental and analytic. Therefore, many approaches to the issue of their comparison aremore or less obviously biased. Both are commonly claiming that there are importantdifferences that cannot be neglected. Often the other side is completely wrong. However,there are exceptions. For one thing there are always minority reports by third minor parties

which do not see any relevant differences, therefore, for them they are identically wrong.Another approach sees possible interrelations; namely, how both sides can learn from eachother. (Jones 2009:12-5) A special issue here is that there are historical approaches as well.However, these approaches are perhaps lesser biased yet still biased enough simply becausethe same division appears in study of history (think for instance about differences concerning20 th century history of international relations by Anglo-American school and German school),and consequently in philosophy of history as well.

On the other hand, there are philosopher who belong to both traditions in various ways(simultaneously, sooner-later, part of this-part of that, etc.) by their education or by their ownchoice. They could be regarded as eclectics (historically speaking perhaps there are somesimilarities between great systems of say Plato and Aristotle and schools that followed, andgreat systems of say Heidegger, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Quine and schools that followed, butthis is only an uneducated augury). However, if they come up with something new, then thisis a kind of advancement. The same thing can be said in a way that such philosophers do not

belong to these traditions at all. Nevertheless, the truth is not in the middle. Simple existenceof philosophers who do not belong to main different and opposed schools or do belong to allof them does not prove anything. However, perhaps the study of differences and similarities

between these schools and particular philosophers regarding their focal points can show thatthese are only aspects of the same issue.

Let as go a little deeper into this group of philosophers. As we said, there are philosophers who saw the obvious differences between generally speaking Continental andanalytic traditions but they saw similarities too and they tried to discover the pattern. One can

be wrong when making exact list of such philosophers yet some of them are obviouslyenough on it. Is their work sufficient and relevant in order to create a third tradition is cannot

be of lesser importance than it really is since it is completely irrelevant are they mutuallyinterrelated or not. Even if they would create such tradition, this would prove nothing, at leastnothing of importance concerning the present topic which is problematic more thenhistorically speaking. Some of them could be the following: L. Wittgenstein, G. H. vonWright, D. Fllesdal, K. O. Apel, J. Habermas, R. Rorty, and others. Of course, there aremilitant wings on each side. I personally know many Hegelians and postmodernists whoconstantly make jokes on analytic philosophers, and for the other side it is enough to see whosigned the letter sent to the Times in 1992 to oppose Cambridges proposal to grant and

honorary doctorate to J. Derrida (Levy 2003:286). However, on the conceptual level,especially concerning the issue of language and linguistic meaning and on all levels of theapproach to the issue of sources, methods, problems, discussions, goals, and of course resultscertain difference can be traced (as shown in Table 3, see Rorty 1979:357-89, 1982:211-33).

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Table 3: General differences between Continental and analytic approach to language andlinguistic meaning issues (a very simplified differentiation)

I would like to continue a small personal intermezzo from the beginning if allowed. As being raised on Wittgensteins philosophy as my starting point, with BA on M. Merleau-

Ponty, MA on Moore and Wittgenstein, with PhD on Wittgensteins On Certainty , and as a professor of analytic philosophy and epistemology, personally I am not to much concernedwith these discussions, and for that matter not even with minute exegesis of Wittgensteins

philosophy since there is the army of Wittgenstein scholars who take care of that issue withthe highest quality possible concerning which many other historians doing philosophy of other great philosophers could be jealous with good reasons. Perhaps this is partially thereason why I do not see the whole fuss as an important. I simply recognize differences (muchmore discussed in literature), and similarities (substantially less discussed), but I always startwith investigating both differences and similarities and making a kind of net. I am not a prig

believing that I can discover the whole pattern of 20 th century philosophy, but sign approachor sign aspect, after years of studying almost all schools of 20 th century philosophies down tocompletely irrelevant philosophers on the grand scale, an undertaking that with some right can

be called a complete waste of time, revealed that there must be such pattern. Now, the samething surely can be done from other starting points, say epistemological, ontological, or ethical, yet the subject matter of meaning and language seems to the most suitable based on

previously stated reasons some of which are even historical (Baldwin 2001).

4.2. The syntactic-semantic-pragmatic divides concerning language and referential-contextual divide concerning theories of meaning

Let us continue with the second issue on the previous one as its background or a kind of context because the previous one was so boring. The following historical observations could

be of some importance. The differences between Continental and analytic schools were moreobvious in the first half of the 20 th century then in the second. In the second part of the centurythey were discussed as the topic of its own and many similarities appeared (think for instancehow Heidegger was opposed to Wittgensteins TLP as a kind of new Chinese and howCarnap was opposed to later parts of TLP (and for that matter to some Heideggersexpressions), yet Wittgenstein completely understood both Heideggers and Carnapsintentions and goals no matter if he disagreed with them both because he tried to form adifferent standpoint. If he really tried to do so, then we have at least more then twostandpoints. Let us compare these three standpoints in their most simplified forms. Thesewould be the following:

(a) Language is essentially logical language of science (Carnap, at least in his earlywritings)(b) Language is essentially activity (speaking) actualized in language-games (later Wittgenstein)(c) Language is essentially the house of Being (Heidegger, at least in some of hiswritings, Being as Sein ).For the first thing, these standpoints are not just oversimplified but perhaps incorrect.

Namely, a language is means of communications (this doesnt prove that (b) is correct because of some further arguments). What is a communication? The common conception of communication simply views communication as a means of sending and receivinginformation. The strengths of this model are simplicity, generality, and quantifiability. The

Shannon/Weaver model is based on the following elements (as shown in Table 3.1)

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Table 3.1: The Shannon/Weaver model of communication

Precisely this and similar communicative conceptions of language make the mixed and newstandpoints at least equal and relevant to radical programs (as shown in Table 3). Another

point with communication deserves emphasis too. Namely, types of communication, at leastthe basic types lead to the same point. Differences between types of communication fromsemiotic and morphological point of view are not strict (as shown in Table 3.2). There arealways important intermediate cases and this fact speaks for itself (see definitions d, e and f).

Table 3.2: Basic types of communication

However, there are other reasons for possible incorrectness. For instance, formallanguages of sciences, especially of logic, mathematics, linguistics, and others are, as itseems, not more artificial then the language of for instance poetry or sci-fi literature.

However, in the first case being artificial means syntactically reduced for further practical purposes, while in the second case it means semantically reduced because they want toexpress something in the particular way and to produce a particular effect on the reader. Thesecond thing is that this divide (a, b, c) really represents oversimplifications since there arehuge differences and varieties within (a), (b), and (c). Within (a) there is a variety of standpoints leading from Frege to Quine, Putnam, Kripke, and Davidson; within (b) a varietyleading from members of Oxford school of ordinary language, Moore, and Wittgenstein tomany contemporary philosophers shearing some elements of their standpoints (such asPutnam, Habermas, and Rorty) or being completely followers of some of them (likeWittgensteinians for instance); and finally within (c) there is the greatest variety in Germanschool from Husserl (perhaps Brentano and Bolzano as well) and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Gadamer, in French school from Bergson and Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Foucault,Lyotard, and others. Comparing these philosophers one could say they have nothing in

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common, yet concerning issue of the nature of language there are important similarities anddissimilarities. Therefore, one can research, metaphilosophically speaking, the history of discussion about Continental-analytic divide, and discover the third kind (group b). Another way to define language is to say the following:

(d) Language is the mental faculty that allows humans to undertake linguistic

behavior : to learn languages and produce and understand utterances (N. Chomsky, J.Fodor).(e) Language is a formal system of signs governed by grammatical rules tocommunicate meaning = ideal language (B. Russell, early Wittgenstein, G. Frege andA. Tarski).(f) Language is a system of communication that enables humans to cooperate =ordinary language (G. E. Moore, later Wittgenstein, P. Grice, J. L. Austin, J. R.Searle, and P. F. Strawson), (Rorty 1967/1992:1-41, especially 15-23).

In this context it seems plausible to say something on the nature of the very subject matter of the present paper, namely on linguistic signs. Signs are threefold related to what they signify(as shown in the Table 4).

Table 4: The basic relations between signs and what they signify

The relation between semiotics and semantics was the primary subject matter of theories of meaning or the question how words mean something, or for example, how theEnglish sign dog means a member of the genus Canis? In the context of this relation (asshown in Table 4), some even suggest (P. F. Strawson for instance, Harrison 1979:199-202)that the basic divide of all theories of meaning of words is between:

(g) Referential theories of meaning and(h) Contextual theories of meaning.

Now in the first group there are:(g1) Truth theories of meaning (descriptive),(g2) Verification theories of meaning (descriptive),(g3) Causal theories of meaning (causal),

While in the second group there are:(h1) Speech act theories(h2) Speakers meaning (intention) theories,(h3) Language-game theory and others (all being contextual).It should be noted that there are many other divisions of these theories. Some differ

between only three groups of theories: of communicative intention, truth theories, and causaltheories. One can, by comparing simple divisions from analytic and semiotic points of viewsee the relevant differences (as shown in Table 4.1). For instance, the issue of the nature of metaphor can show the same Continental-analytic divide, the divide in theories of meaning,and finally divide in understanding language.

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Table 4.1: Different divisions of theories of meaning, from analytic and semiotic point of view

However, let us return to simple g-h division. Referential theories of meaning (g1-g3)are characterized by the fact that the meaning must be described in some kind of reference

between a word and what it refers to, but is it the idea, any object (even fictive), the realobject, or something different. They are characterized by the belief that the basic function of alanguage is to describe facts. Frege suggested that a word has its meaning only in the contextof a sentence. Now, this point reduced the discussion to statements, even to propositions,composed of a subject and predicates in their most basic form, for example The snow iswhite. The word snow is the subject of the statement and it refers to the snow as a thing(what follows can be various descriptions of snow), and the word white is the predicate andit refers to the whiteness as the property of a thing (what follow can be various descriptions of

white). The whole is affirmative meaning that the snow IS white, not, for instance that it is NOT white, and the statement The snow is white refers the fact that the snow is white (heresome elements of g1 and g2 theories are obvious. They can be divided into descriptiontheories since predicates describe subjects and such descriptions are meanings of the subject,and causal theories since it is possible to trace the causal relation from the thing to the wordin question. For such theories for instance exclamations such as The snow is white! have nosignificance. This is in a way strange since for instance the exclamation Eureka! is thesymbol of a scientific discovery which is at least an important part of the scientific processand these theories are claiming that the form of scientific discoveries is a statement formwhich really is, yet the whole process includes more then just statements but also questions,suggestions, demands, requests, exclamations, etc. This is partly solved with introduction of formal scientific languages but it does not solve the problem of language of scientific process

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and scientific discovery. These issues lead to some far topics in the philosophy of science thatcannot be discussed here.

On the other hand, contextual theories of meaning (h1-h3) in various ways areinterested in a kind of outside or wider context of language. They essentially hold thedescriptive fallacy meaning that it is wrong to presuppose that the basic function of a

language is to describe facts ( constatives ), because a language has many other functions withwhich it is a part of wider context and with which we humans perform various linguistic,mixed, and essentially non-linguistic acts ( performatives ). Some of them include speakersintention (h2), some of them (h1) include even some bodily actions, right persons andutterances, which make the use of a sentences, like I christen this ship Osama bin Laden,successful and by that meaningful as well, and finally some of them (h3) take that themeaning of a word or of a sentence (statements, and utterances) is, in majority of cases, its usein a language-game which can be understood as a complete language for a particular practices

but which is essentially interrelated to many other language-games (Hale and Wright 1999).The debate between these groups of theories can be formulated as the debate on the nature of statements. So, let us take an example of the pros and cons for statements as the fundamentalkind of sentences according to referential theories:Some pros are: statements are about reality and this language-world relation is important, statements transfer information and this is important for human knowledge, if knowledge aspect is a prerequisite for emotional and willing relation to things then

statements are the most important of all sentences.Some cons are: statements are not primary in the course of language learning but expressions of emotions

or needs, statements have no primacy in the course of understanding reality, statements are not the only way of use of indicative sentences since perhaps these just

look like being nice cases for statements because there are other ways of using indicativesentences which does not have anything to do with knowledge, transfer of information, or stating the facts.

Therefore, for one thing, the debate between approximately speaking referential andcontextual theories of meaning can be reduced to the debate about the nature andimportance of statements, but to the linguistic debate about the primacy of kinds of sentencesas well. This seems odd since no matter if this issue can be interesting linguistically speaking,yet it seems that it does not address the basic question how words mean anything?

Another topic is meaning in broad sense, as the meaning of the world we live in.Mentioned theories do not make account for this. However, this is also important fromsemiotic and psychological points of view (as shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3).

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Table 4.2: Significance as meanings - world meaning theories

Meaning is here understood as significance. They can be interpreted as meaningfulness (asshown in Table 4.2) and as values (as shown in Table 4.3). In the first case (4.2) the basicquestion is why and how do humans make sense of their existence in the world or how dothey make it meaningful? In the second case (4.3) the question is which are our primordialvalues and is there an order between them? We cannot enter into discussion here but itseemed important to mention in some detail these non-linguistic signs which are sometimesforgotten.

Table 4.3: Significances as values

On the other hand, all kinds of words and sentences have their place in language andany theory of meaning has to take that fact into account. Perhaps another problem is that eachtheory spontaneously, or simply being understood as a theory, has a natural inclination toinclude all kinds of words and all kind of sentences, yet they are mostly unsuccessful at leastin cases of natural languages. Semiotic approach tries to take into account words and perhaps expressions, sentences,

and utterances as signs and by that the whole discussion is located around the question what is a sign and how it signifies, which seems to be more plausible. It is approach thatrecognizes variety of signs and tries to find the pattern of all signs.

Another advantage concerns the nature of language because semiotics can take intoaccount a language as a passive phenomenon i.e. as a system of words, sentences, texts,

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and discourses, but as an active phenomenon as well, that is as a system of expressions,utterances and conversations (this difference partially rests on Saussures difference

between langue and parole from his classic A Course in General Linguistics , 1916). Thestatement aspect and the utterance aspect, for example, are equally important from thesemiotic point of view.

5. Instead of conclusion: the basic idea

All previously said can be understood as a short overview of some carefully chosen elementsof semiotics, philosophy of language and the Continental-analytic dispute as the relevantcontext of the simple idea that will be suggested in what follows. Let us start from the obviousand gradually move to new as it was professed by Aristotle as the right method.

Human languages have very distinct and useful feature, which is displacement (Stein,Rowe 1996:290-1). It is an ability to speak about events at distant times and places, not justabout what is here and now. Displacement enables humans to learn form the past and to planfor the future. Some signs like symbols and icons make that much easier. More to that, thefeature of displacement is responsible for imagination and creativity which also contributes tocreation of some signs.

Of course, nature is signing, non-living things, plants, and animals. But this signs asall other non-signing phenomena have to be interpreted, and signs have to be interpreted assigns. Among living non-human species signs among animals are the most complicated (saysigns of bees, ants, predators, monkeys, etc.). In the most general sense these signs arenecessary and sufficient for survival. Among humans there are a lot of even more complicatedsigns and among them some are more primordial then others. Now, say that Homo SapiensSapiens or modern humans have some basic signs that enable them to survive (origin,structure, and uses of such signs may or may not have some connections to Chomskys theoryabout The Universal Grammar , (Chomsky 1972), in a way that one can hypothesize about theuniversal signing pattern), for instance signs basic for surviving techniques such as signs for: Eatablenon-eatable Drinkablenon-drinkable Safetydanger Passage obstacle (see Picture 3) Shelteropen space, My groupothers, Opposite sexmy sex, and similar.For the present purpose there is no need to factually know which of these signs were and are

primordial, and how much of them were really necessary. However, their structure and actualuse can be relevant. First of all they seem to be mixed signs composed of the followingaspects: sounds (various exclamations for instance), facial expressions (eyes, mouth, etc.), gestures and other bodily movements (hands, etc.), possibly of artificial signs (say made of stone, wood, bones), etc.

Some basic signs have various aspects. They can be signs in terms of being natural,artificial, non-linguistic, linguistic, expressed in various natural languages, artificiallanguages, etc. Say they a group of humans while traveling encounter some kind of danger or an obstacle because of which, concerning their point of an arrival, they should move to the

right . There is a variety of signs that humans are using (as shown in picture 3).

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Picture 3: Variety of signs for moving right (from natural to linguistic) as a direction of passage

Picture 3 shows not just the variety which is important, but a kind of process anddevelopment, yet there is a huge difference between the traffic sign (in the middle) andlinguistic sign (on the right). Yet, if one can interpret the traffic sign (in the middle), then thecorrect expression in English would be precisely the linguistic sign on the right, i.e. rightturn only. On the other hand, the process going from the natural sign for going right (leftside up), which can be a part of a gesture or even combined with a facial expression, to

pictorial symbol (left side middle), and to the artificial sign (left side down) is obvious.Basic signs could be easily learned (culturally, Stein, Rowe 1996, Kottak 1999), andon various occasions they could be used in one of their aspect for various purposes (for instance hunting or battle gestures are better then sounds, and in some cases silence can beinterpreted as a sign too). Now, the point is that really such basic signs are not real but ideal.They are a hypothesis of an essence because we tend to think that if there are so manydifferent signs say for danger (and words as well) there must be something identical to all of them.

On the other hand, the present idea is precisely the opposite one. One shouldinvestigate different cultures and their signs for say eatablenon-eatable, drinkablenon-drinkable, etc. in their most developed forms and in small isolated cultures in their most

primordial forms. Therefore, the research is in cultural anthropology and social linguistics,and it is morphological. Then, one should observe and compare various actual signs cross-culturally and their analogies and disanalogies, similarities and dissimilarities, and nets of these will slowly appear. Finally, one would see the pattern, for instance signs for danger. Onewould easily recognize that something is a sign for danger in one culture and in the other nomatter how different they actually could be since one would see their place in pattern.

Nothing connects hand signal for pointing to the right and traffic sign RIGHT TURNONLY, yet the series of intermediate cases make connections of similarities.

Now, one can ask what this has to do with the philosophy of language, theories of meaning and differences between various approaches to these issues. The idea of such futureresearch in the philosophy of language is the following. A linguistic meaning, no matter if understood in terms of word (referential and causal

theories), sentence (Frege, Dummett), text, and discourse theories (semiotics), or in termsof speakers-intention, conversational implicatures (Grice), speech-acts (Austin, Searle),dialogues, monologues (literary theories), and language-games (Wittgenstein), alwaysmust take into account: that language (and consequently the meaning) is a living process

phenomenon of using signs by humans (not only by humans of course) among other living process phenomena, and that as such is essentially manifested in various mixtures(intermediate cases) of natural and cultural aspects of signs, from primordial to highlydeveloped signs still using for communicating important massages, no matter how simpleor complex and sophisticated they can be.

Consequently, any interdisciplinary, comparative, holistic, or whatever fancy word onemight use research of signs, meaning, and of linguistic meaning as well, must take into

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account their context among other living procedural phenomena especially thoseanthropologically basic (in natural and cultural sense) on one hand, and their internalnature which is always a mixture of all levels, differences or in short of all aspects of

phenomena.For instance, there can be a pattern for a sign for danger, a pattern which is very delicate

combination of nets and of similarities and dissimilarities between various cultures and their characteristics. The whole pattern is the background of the sign for danger in various culturesand environments, background of recognition of various signs (and words, speech-acts, etc.)and their place in system of signs, in a system of particular culture, but how it is actualized isthe rough ground from which we must always start our simple observation. There areconsequences for philosophies of language too. For great majority of signs, words, expressions, and sentences, even for some dialogues,

their meaning is their use in language-games to which they belong (not their usefulness but their use ).

But to understand their use one needs to understand the place of language-games as anactivity among other activities of humans , and the place of all of these activities in their lives as a series of very delicate and variously actualized mixtures of nature and culture.

All of theories of meaning in a way emphasize only one or two aspects of the meaning of linguistic artificial signs belonging to significances , and only some of them recognize the

position and place of linguistic meaning among significant phenomena , among phenomena crucial for lives of humans . And precisely this should not be forgotten, thatwords and languages are signs , signs of life in a way. They shouldnt be blamed for thismistake of not applying synthesis as a legitimate philosophical method in terms of surveyable presentations (Wittgensteins term), conceptual mapping (Ryles term),linguistic phenomenology (Austins term), or connective analysis (P. F. Strawsons term).Origins of this mistake are twofold. On one hand, there is, perhaps justified revolt against

idealism and some of its obviously unjustified exaggerations, and on the other hand, thereis that nave idea that scientific methods can be completely copied in philosophical proceedings. The radical example is Carnaps idea that philosophy is logical analysis of scientific language and therefore philosophy of science only.

Such research, here described and explicated only in a nutshell, should help tounderstand not just the issue of meaning in philosophy of language, but the place of languagein life, helps that the present diversification of sciences, disciplines, schools, and theoriesconcerning meaning doesnt help much. Such approach helps us to understand better not just

past and present cultures, but probable changes in the near future. Therefore, the Porphyriantree as shown in Table 1 should be completely differently observed, even imagined, andconsequently represented (as shown in Table 5 and 6).

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Table 5: Proposal of a new aspect on meaning from semiotic point of view: position of basic

signs as mixed between more bodily signs, more linguistic signs, pure linguistic, pure non-linguistic, and the position of theories of meaning in the context of artificial signs.

Table 5 shows the position of theories of meaning between basic mixed signs, purelinguistic and pure non-linguistic signs. Theories of meaning, semiotically speaking: Most directly overlap with basic mixed signs (or they should if they want to be relevant), While less directly overlap with more bodily, yet still mixed signs, and With more linguistic, yet still mixed signs.Via basic mixed signs, their more bodily aspects, and more linguistic aspects theories of meaning are indirectly connected to all kinds of pure linguistic and non-linguistic signs withwhich they share many interconnections. Consequently, there are many intermediate caseswithin and between these groups which are not as strictly divided as shown in the Porphyriantree in Table 1. This representation, with many conceptual and graphical mistakes still seemsto point to another way or aspect of meaning in the semiotic context.

Now is the moment at least to mention some ontological, epistemological, and ethicalaspect of signing. These are obviously different for signs and for singing. Concerningontology, signs are wholes while signings are events or actions. Further on, natural signs areevents and actions, while signings are mostly actions. Formation of a rainy cloud is an event,while reading this as a sign or rain is an action. Perhaps this stands for symbols too. On theother hand, artificial sign are actions, e.g. symbolizing, hand and facial signs, speaking anatural language, etc. Mixed signs are prototypical actions. A hand sign for right turn, aspeech act such as Tom: I take you Jill to be my lawfully wedded wife, or signing thatsomething isnt eatable are obviously enough actions. Therefore, some further ontology of signs is needed.

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Concerning epistemology the basic question is what is knowledge of a sign whichcomes down to the issue what does it mean to know-how to use a sign? First question isabout propositional knowledge, while second is about an ability or technique of using signs.Therefore, what is needed isnt just propositional theory of knowledge but an overview of know-how as well. Finally, concerning ethics there are two groups of issues. Internal issues

about the very morality of a signs. Some signs can be regarded as immoral for variousreasons, while other can be moral or simply neutral. Some conversational implicatures will dofor that matter. External issues are about applied issues of signing, meaning that signing is a

part of complex actions which are regarded as moral or immoral. Here again, the very use of asign determines its morality. There is nothing inherent to a sign which makes it morally rightor wrong, or for that matter signing as human action.

Another thing is that the semiotic approach to signs enables us to understand, to have aconceptual background and the context of the idea that there is no strict boarder betweenmodern humans and say apes and monkeys concerning sign use. Research on baboons,indicates that they can use symbol combinations as a means of specifying more then a singlesymbol can express (Savage-Rumbaugh 1990:615). Of course there are differences, yet theyare not sufficient for strict boarders concerning signing and linguistic signing as its aspect. If one operates with a very strict concept of linguistic meaning and language then thesesimilarities simply cannot be counted as relevant, yet they seem to be. In Table 6 there aresome possible relations between principally different groups of signs.

Table 6: Proposal of a new aspect on meaning from semiotic point of view: position of artificial signs in the context of human signing, natural non-human signing, etc.

More to that, Table 6 on the other hand shows even wider context of the Table 5 sincethe later shows only aspects of artificial human signs. Therefore, it seems important at least tomention this wider context of artificial human signs as more or less intentional as similar and

dissimilar with human natural and more or less unintentional signing. Even wider context ishuman signing as similar and dissimilar with non-human signing (divided into non-human

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natural signing, i.e. non-living things, for instance as rainy clouds sign rain, plant signing, andnon-human animal signing). Here there are also many differences and similarities. Some

plants and animals have signals and signs. Some of these signs are obviously very similar tosome human basic mixed signs, some are obviously very dissimilar. Further wider context isthe one of significant and non-significant phenomena.

However, the difference between unintentional and intentional signing is interestingone as well. Intuitively, one could say that signing is always intentional. For one thing itseems very outlandish to claim that a rainy cloud has an intention to sign anything. OK, let usturn to humans. Symptoms, like a body temperature for instance, are typical cases of unintentional signs. There are surely some events going on in human bodies in suchsituations, yet it is highly questionable are they human actions. So, let us take a bitcomplicated example. Say that there are two bushes say 50 meters one from another, and thata man with a spear is running from one to another after which there is an open space. Thissigns nothing except if one says that it signs that a man is running from a bush to a bush. Butif you are a hunter you can interpret this situation as a sign that he is running from adangerous animal and that he needs help. If he doesnt know that you can see him or that youare nearby, then he is unintentionally signing. But let us add two elements to this event. Saythat while running the man turns toward you and with his thumb points to the bush he runsfrom. This can be interpreted in a way that he is running from something. Since he has a spear one can reasonably suppose that he is a hunter and that he runs from a dangerous animal

because something went wrong. This can be interpreted as a call for help if you are a hunter too. Many interesting intermediate cases can be presented in order to show that the descriptionin Tables 5 and 6 are much more used then description extracted from Table 1 which is usefulonly for one purpose, that is to say an administrative classification. However, it cannot bedone here.

Here we return to the beginning of the paper. Some, in fact many phenomena do notsignify anything to anyone regardless of their interpretation. Yet some are significant. And thelast interrelatedness between this level of significant phenomena and human significance asan aspect of pure non-linguistic signs (as shown in Table 5) is that something can besignificant phenomena for the environment, some species, or some ecological system yet itdoes not bear significance for humans directly. However, if the protected natural environmentis one of the basic human significances, like protections of various sorts, like life, justice,democracy, etc. then it is not just significance in terms of a non-linguistic sign , for instance,that some humans by some actions obviously and unambiguously signify significance of natural environment, but significant phenomenon in terms of a basic sort of phenomena.There are many intermediate cases, and important interrelatedness between these aspects, butthere is no time to describe them at the moment.

As promised at the beginning of the paper, it seems that the basic idea is sufficientlydescribed, made clear, criticized, and defended, namely the idea that the semiotic approach toall theories of meaning, to each of them particularly, and to all of them as a whole of solutionsto the one common question, how our words mean something, enables approaching in new,interesting way which can reveal many mistakes, and open many new ways of answering thisvery question. That is to say, our words mean something because they are essentially signs, and by

having the structure of a sign they act like signs. Therefore, semiotic approaches to thequestion how words mean something makes possible for one to approach and hopefully toanswer the question with some completely new insights, and from completely new

perspectives and aspects.

Many of other questions are presupposed as answered in a particular way, for instance thatthe meaning of a word is its use in a language-game as a kind of explicit Wittgensteinian

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approach to the issue, and many are bypassed because they do not belong to the subjectmatter, limits and the scope of the basic idea and the argument of the present paper, such asmany discussions about the correct definition of semiotics, of a sign, of various differences

between kinds of signs, between various theories of meaning, about the relation of thisapproach to linguistics, to cultural and physical anthropology, etc. and these are obvious

limitations which need to be asked and if not answered then at least clarified in some further research.

References

Philosophy of language

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Continental-Analytic Divide

Babich B. E. 2003 On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's LyingTruth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy, C. G. Prado, ed., A House Divided:Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, Amherst, NY: Prometheus/HumanityBooks, pp. 63-103.Cooper D. 1994 Analytic and Continental Philosophy, Proceeding s of the AristotelianSociety, 94:1-18.D'agostini 1997 Analitici e Continentali, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore.Dolcini N. 2007 The Analytic/Continental Divide, Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies,

No. 16, (August, 2007), pp. 283-302.Dummet M. 1993 Origins of Analytical Philosophy, London, Duckworth.

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Engel P. 1997 La Dispute: Une introduction a la philosophie analytique, Paris, Minuti.Glock H. J. 1997 The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell.Jones K. 2009 Analytic versus Continental Philosophy, Philosophy Now, 11, July/August,2009, pp. 12-5.Levy N. 2003 Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences, in

Metaphilosophy, Vol. 34, No. 3, April 2003, pp. 284-304.

Semiotics and linguistics

Chandler D. 1994 Semiotics for Beginners, URL:http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semiotic.html, (Retrieved 24. 8. 2011)Chomsky N. 1972 Language and Mind, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.Eco U. 1986 Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Bloomington, Indiana, IndianaUniversity Press.Johansen J. D. and Larsen S. E. 2000 An Intorduction to Semiotics, (in Croatian), ZagrebCroatia Liber.Shannon C. E. 1948 A Mathematical Theory of Communication, The Bell System TechnicalJournal, Vol. 27, pp. 379423, 623656, July, October.

Anthropology

Buck R. and VanLear C. A. (2002) Verbal and Nonverbal Communication: DistinguishingSymbolic, Spontaneous, and Pseudo-Spontaneous Nonverbal Behavior, Journal of Communication, September, 2002, pp. 522-541.Kottak C. P. 1999 Mirror for Humanity, Boston, McGraw-Hill College.Savage-Rumbaugh E. S. 1990 Language Acquisition in a Nonhuman Species: Implicationsfor the Innateness Debate, Developmental Psychology, 23Stein, P. L. Rowe B. M. 1996 Physical Anthropology, New York, The McGraw-HillCompanies, Inc.

Internet sources for quoted movies and actors quotes

Police officer Caroline Paski, character played by Cherry Jones and Reverend Graham Hess played by Mel Gibson in the movie Signs, 2002, director: M. Night Shyamalan,http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0286106 /quotes, Retrieved 25. 8. 2011.Dick Hallorann, character played by Scatman Crothers in the movie The Shining, 1980,director: Stanley Kubrick, http://www.imdb.Com/title/tt0081505/quotes, Retrieved 23. 8.

2011.Groucho Marx, URL: http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/g/groucho_marx.html,Retrieved 23. 4. 2011.Roy Neary, character played by Richard Dreyfuss in the movie Close Encounters of theThird Kind, 1977, director: Steven Spielberg, URL:http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0075860/quotes, Retrieved 23. 4. 2011.

Philosophy of Language - Lecture 1

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