Persons Cases 3

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN,respondents.

REGALADO, J .:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraphand Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civilstatus and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of anemployee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily arguesthat what really motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contractedmarriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such aproscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20,1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.

1Under the Reliever Agreement

which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediatelyterminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1,1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent's services as relieverwere again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon whowent on leave during both periods.

2After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever

Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitionercompany as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the

job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated inthe portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted

marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the twosuccessive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in BaguioCity, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded aboutthe company's policy of not accepting married women for employment.

4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was notaware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she hadnot deliberately hidden her true civil status.

5Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvincedby her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the company effectiveJanuary 29, 1992,

6which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal

dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),

before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission inBaguio City.

At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondentvolunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts betweenthe parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. Shethen executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner 7. All of these tookplace in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decisiondeclaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regularemployee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of thecorresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter

being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissingprivate respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had beendiscriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation ofcompany rules.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondentupheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that privaterespondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by heremployer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with thequalification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view ofthe dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, theNLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement ofprivate respondent in her employment with PT & T.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent

NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing theaforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denialresolution of the latter.

1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded withlove and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction withindifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere hasthat prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially onthe matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting,women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or typesof workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislationagainst discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion andretention.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all

phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a fewof the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8 on the Declaration of Principles and StatePolicies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands theState to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII

9(the progenitor whereof dates back to both the

1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to laborand to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, includingan assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of

Article XIII10

mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions foropportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.

2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with morefrequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as PresidentialDecree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the UnitedNations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

(CEDAW).11


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Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 672712

which explicitly prohibitsdiscrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955

13which bans the "mail-order-

bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guaranteeprotection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 14 also known as the"Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women equalopportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission,training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the ArmedForces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322

15

increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No.

787716

which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in theeducation and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042,

17or the "Migrant Workers

and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, thedeployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where theirrights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,

18

women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the r ight against particular kinds of night work while

Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards whichthe Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes oflabor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massageclinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination withrespect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and thisbrings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely byreason of the marriage of a female employee.

3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guaranteeof protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a conditionsine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ,to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and justcause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded asconstitutionally protected property.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls withinthe so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter ofhiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, aswell as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline,dismissal, and recall of employees.

19As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate,

according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "fromhiring to firing," except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be providedby law. 20

In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified fromwork any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the rightagainst, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less thanthe Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent fromemployment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties withthe company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that marriedwomen are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of hersupposed acts of dishonesty.

That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent byDelia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words ofthe latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married womenemployee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you."

21Again, in the termination notice sent

to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand thather severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her marriedstatus but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy againstmarriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [ sic] oraccepted in our company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why itwas made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this caseonly by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise besolidarily liable with the corporation.

23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T

could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act theway she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. Inother words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy intomisrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss ofconfidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated.

24It

must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on theemployer's caprices.

25Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes

which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26

In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent,not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have ahollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequentloss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal.

Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it

nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning,with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well beminded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.

Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policyagainst its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordinationwas inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriageyet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly hasno objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employeescontracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it wouldconsequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If thatemployee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employeeconceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. Thisline of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that weare being regaled with responsible advocacy.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium ofpropositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed,petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against marriedwomen, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelledprivate respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, thatvery policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conductnow complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who isthe cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that shesupposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her fromemployment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondentadmitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections,but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because

of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcationof company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on


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this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is aperceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing thatprivate respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remitthe same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simpleor grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory noteto refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheralissue in the labor case.

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of herdismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about

to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationaryemployee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when herprobationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it wasdone in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. 27 On the other hand, herearlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee,even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essentialor necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T.

28The primary standard of

determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activityperformed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. 29

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissedwithout just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and otherprivileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or theirmonetary equivalent.

30However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in

concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner,

the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate theimpression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to theemployer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act whichwas not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computedfrom the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement,shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three monthssuspension.

4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adoptedby petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for anemployer to require as a condition of employment or continuation ofemployment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulateexpressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall

be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely byreason of marriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of PresidentialDecree No. 148,

31better known as the "Women and

Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679,32

entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penaltiesfor Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679,on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and whichregulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial,agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then PhilippineIslands.

It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al.

vs. Philippine Air Lines,33

a decision that emanated from the Office of the President.There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be

single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry wasdeclared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code withregard to discrimination against married women. Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy orregulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in itscontention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to womenemployed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition againstmarriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flightattendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their

chosen profession.We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent.

All along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doomas early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148,otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, waspromulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unionsin challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain amomentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, whichamended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, revealsthat it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to takeeffect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in

the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegaland therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary ofLabor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health ofwomen employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation requireemployers to determine appropriate minimum standards for terminationin special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that isprecisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. Thestandards have not yet been established as set forth in the firstparagraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulationaffecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards orregulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondentagainst marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 ofthe New Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote fullemployment and equality in employment, ensure equal workopportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate therelations between workers and employees. The State shall assure therights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security oftenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . .

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition thattermination from employment of flight attendants on account ofmarriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their ownhealth, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laidtherefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so muchagainst the continued employment of the flight attendant merely byreason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather

on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed atlength in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on


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flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that thisneeds no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by theSecretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.

In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as faras invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Codeon the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution andthe family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for itspolicy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent predicatesabsence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as

contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture notbased on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world,sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place toanother. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flightattendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstancesand events.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinaryoccupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. Thesweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinaryoccupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135that speaks of non-discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &Industrial Corporation

34considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case,

respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm toconsider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the momentthey get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimedthat complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her serviceswould be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as anexample of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employmentopportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck downsaid employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, PresidentialDecree No. 148 and the Constitution.

Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference orconditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus"discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the sameshould be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual groupwhich is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or

restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have beenheld to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federalstatute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of,among other things, sex.

35

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just againstmarried women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but notagainst married men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful.

36Upon the

other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could bejustified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particularrequirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a generalprinciple, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of thatnature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary forsatisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to bothmale and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was notrelated to the job performance of the flight attendants. 37

5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the LaborCode on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage inconnection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy,tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege thatby all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence,while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, andconditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law,morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

39Carried to its logical consequences,

it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds wouldencourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relationsbetween the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed asthey are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. 40 Itgoes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against theother, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public.

41In the final reckoning, the

danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikesat the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. 42 That it must be effectivelyinterdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conductderogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and TelephoneCompany is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651, O4August 2003, En Banc

(Puno, J.)

FACTS:

The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our constitutionalorder, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion, including themorality it sanctions. When the law speaks of immorality in the Civil Service Law orimmoral in the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or public morals in

the Revised Penal Code, or morals in the New Civil Code, or moral character inthe Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one handand religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind- the morality referred to inthe law is public and necessarily secular not religious. Alejandro Estrada filed acomplaint against Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 253 in Las Pinas, for living with a man not her husband and allegedly having achild from such relationship. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoralact that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remainemployed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritoradmitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit ofmarriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religioussect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible TractSociety, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs through

the execution of Pledge of Faithfulness. The scriptural basis is in Matthew 5:32 thatwhen the spouse commits adultery, the offended spouse can remarry. Once all legalimpediments for both are lifted, the couple can already register their marriage with thecivil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases. In sum, therefore, insofaras the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugalarrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in goodstanding in the congregation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Escritor is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and must beadministratively liable.

HELD:

No. Escritor is not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and must not be heldadministratively liable. It may be true that in a catena of cases, the Court has ruledthat government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful andimmoral conduct for which he/she may be held administratively liable.

Respondent Escritor does not claim that there is an error with such settledjurisprudence. Nor is there an allegation that the norms of morality with respect toillicit relations have shifted towards leniency from the time the precedent cases weredecided. The Court finds that there is no such error or shift, thus there is no reason todeviate from these rulings that such illicit relationship constitutes disgraceful andimmoral conduct punishable under the Civil Service Law. In the normalcircumstances, Escritor having admitted the alleged immoral conduct, she could beheld administratively liable.

However, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar apart from theprecedents. As a defense, respondent invokes religious freedom since her religion,

the Jehovahs Witnesses, has, after thorough investigation, allowed her conjugalarrangement with Quilapio based on the churchs religious beliefs and practices. Thisdistinguishing factor compels the Court to apply the religious clauses to the case atbar .The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in ourconstitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion,including the morality it sanctions. Religious morality proceeds from a persons viewsof his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to Hisbeing and character and obedience to His Will, in accordance with this Courtsdefinition of religion in American Bible Society citing Davis. The Establishment Clauseputs a negative bar against establishment of this morality arising from one religion orthe other, and implies the affirmative establishment of a civil order for the resolutionof public moral disputes. This agreement on a secular mechanism is the price ofending the war of all sects against all ; the establishment of a secular public moralorder is the social contract produced by religious truce. Thus, when the law speaks ofimmorality in the Civil Service Law or immoral in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility for lawyers or public morals in the Revised Penal Code beforemorals in the New Civil Code or moral character in the Constitution the distinctionbetween public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on theother, should be kept in mind The morality referred to in the law is public andnecessarily secular, not religious. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires thatgovernment be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religiousjustification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. Recognizing the religiousnature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the

Philippine constitutions religion clauses prescribe not strict but benevolent neutrality.Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals andinterests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extentpossible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplatedby laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of moralitybased on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit notexclusively - in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, isimportant because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secularmorality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bar should beunderstood only in this realm where it has authority. More concretely, should theCourt declare respondents conduct as immoral and hold her administratively liable,the Court will be holding that in the realm of public morality, her conduct is

reprehensible or there are state interests overriding her religious freedom. For as longas her conduct is being judged within this realm, she will be accountable to the state.However, in so ruling, the Court does not and cannot say that her conduct should bemade reprehensible in the realm of her church where it is presently sanctioned andthat she is answerable for her immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other religionsprohibiting her conduct are correct.

On the other hand, should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the Court willbe holding that under her unique circumstances, public morality is not offended or thatupholding her religious freedom is an interest higher than upholding public moralitythus her conduct should not be penalized. But the Court is not ruling that the tenetsand practice of her religion are correct nor that other churches which do not allowrespondents conjugal arrangement should likewise allow such conjugal arrangementor should not find anything immoral about it and therefore members of these churchesare not answerable for immorality to her Supreme Being. The Court cannot speakmore than what it has authority to say. But while the state, including the Court,


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accords such deference to religious belief and exercise which enjoy protection underthe religious clauses, the social contract and the constitutional order are designed insuch a way that when religious belief flows into speech and conduct that step out ofthe religious sphere and overlap with the secular and public realm, the state has thepower to regulate, prohibit and penalize these expressions and embodiments of beliefinsofar as they affect the interests of the state.

Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, themore difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secularmorality fall under the phrase disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a

government employee may be held administratively liable. The line is not easy todraw for it is like a line that divides land and sea, a coastline of irregularities andindentations. Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugalarrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to anotherwhich Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal. The case atbar being one of first impression, now subject the respondents claim of religiousfreedom to the compelling state interest test from a benevolent neutrality stance -i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondents claim to religious freedom wouldwarrant carving out an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defenseof religious freedom will be unavailing should the government succeed indemonstrating a more compelling state interest. In applying the test, the first inquiry iswhether respondents right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is nodoubt that choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious

belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment andkeeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her freeexercise of religion. The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in herreligious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practiceand is not merely using the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness to avoidpunishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering thejudiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after anadministrative case for immorality was filed against her. The Declaration was issuedto her by her congregation after ten years of living together with her partner, Quilapio,and ten years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her congregationtestified on the authenticity of the Jehovahs Witnesses practice of securing aDeclaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministerstestified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicitconduct but to make the union of their members under respondents circumstances

honorable before God and men. It is also worthy of notice that the Report andRecommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA to therespondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag ceremonyafter Circular No. 62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in the flag ceremony.Respondents request for exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity inpracticing the Jehovahs Witnesses beliefs and not using them merely to escapepunishment. She is a practicing member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Jehovahministers testified that she is a member in good standing. Nevertheless, should thegovernment, thru the Solicitor General, want to further question the respondentssincerity and the centrality of her practice in her faith, it should be given theopportunity to do so. The government has not been represented in the case at barfrom its incipience until this point. In any event, even if the Court deems sufficientrespondents evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her

faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the compelling state interest test.The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the

burdens of proof they should discharge in the Courts use of the compelling stateinterest test.

Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidenceon the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be dischargedby the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given theopportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold inopposing the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral andpunishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court

prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, theCourts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religiousfreedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim ofreligious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. Thegovernment must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity todischarge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which canoverride respondents religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of firstimpression where we are applying the compelling state interest test in a caseinvolving purely religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensableas how we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of therespondent who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J .:

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of theconjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon theground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followedby an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latterappealed.

It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant

cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be byvirtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.

The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, andimmediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, wherethey lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of herparents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage withthe plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious actson his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of thedefendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and validcohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on othersuccessive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife,the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiffexasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deedand inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; andthat, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant todesist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she wasobliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of herparents.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with thesolemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects areconcerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep.,480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriageceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs.Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of

an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a newrelation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of

the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights,duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in itspurity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannotterminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .Thereciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the lawdetermines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the partiesis merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by thestate or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as wellas the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering itscontinuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to thecommunity, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guideus, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the questionunder consideration.

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of CivilMarriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine Islandsby royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44,45, and 48 of this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and tomutually assist each other.

ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The

second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow

him when he charges his domicile or residence.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the courtmay for just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes hisresidence to a foreign country.

And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocallyto the whole extent specified in the preceding article.

1. The consorts.

x x x x x x x x x

ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option,satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving andmaintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to givesupport shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one ofthem.

The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fixthe duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, andsupport each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife mustobey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile orresidence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is

obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension orby receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May the husband, on account of


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his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the pension? Isthe rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court ofSpain in its decision of December 5, 1903, held:.

That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in itsdecisions dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, theoption which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence,between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own housethe party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent casesbeing considered wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the

exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiablecause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying themaintenance, the right of selection must be understood as being therebyrestricted.

Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise tothis appeal was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of theoption granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged tofurnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who isentitled to receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged ordiscussed with regard to the parental authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo,which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural fathersimply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to hermaintenance, no action having been taken by him toward providing the

support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obliged to demandit; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriageof Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintainrelations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a nature asto prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without prejudice tosuch decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questionspreviously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at thistime.

The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of theCivil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a preexisting orpreferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the oneentitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was thenatural father of the child and had married a woman other than the child's mother, andin the second the right to support had already been established by a final judgment ina criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established theproposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercisedin any and all cases.

Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of thesupreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, asa result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his wife, conferredupon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him hegave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accountsreceivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thusdepriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced in consequence to want.Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living inopulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in

reference to the administration and disposal of her property. In her answer the wifeclaimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a situation to claim supportand that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral andcould not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff thedefendant wife appealed to theAudencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgmentwas rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiffappealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of theAudencia Territorial, said:

Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that

the spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannotbut be subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates thefamily organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, amongwhich duties are those of their living together and mutually helping eachother, as provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking thisfor granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish supportto the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to beunderstood as limited to the case where, in accordance with law, theirseparation has been decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, withrespect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered,since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management ofhis wife's property and of the product of the other property belonging to theconjugal partnership; and

Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail,it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separatefrom each other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legalprovision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirelyincompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of theduties inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition towhat the law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.

Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa AdelaGalindo are not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and affordeach other help and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that theformer has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from herwithout the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferringpower upon him to dispose even of the fruits of her property in ordertherewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of hisown support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgmentappealed from, denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has notviolated the articles of the Civil Code and the doctrine invoked in theassignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.

From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quiteclearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreementpreviously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says,"should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married personsto disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." Ifthis be the true basis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, thenthe doctrine therein enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of thespouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or where thehusband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish


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support. That this is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, datedOctober 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought an action for support against herhusband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without anycause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendantupon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:

In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don TeodoroExposito who left the conjugal abode, although he claims, without howeverproving his contention, that the person responsible for this situation was hiswife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results

that it is the wife who is party abandoned, the husband not havingprosecuted any action to keep her in his company and he therefore findshimself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctableobligation to support his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned inarticle 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1 of article 143. In not soholding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the fulfillment of thisduty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in themanner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first threegrounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual supportis compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy spousedoes not create any illicit situation of the court above described.lawphil.net

If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain inits decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel

for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse can becompelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue ofa final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, stillsuch doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for thereason that the substantive law is not in every particular the same here as it is inSpain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in thePeninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties andobligations of husband and wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of CivilMarriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse has, under article 105 of the CivilCode, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in everycase and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wiferesults therefrom; personal violence actually inflicted or grave insults: violenceexercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force her to change her religion;

the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wifeto corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruptionor prostitution; and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor,while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De laRama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced bythis court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject.Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and thejudgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal did not affect in anyway or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only ground for adivorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case inDecember, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is,therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction.

But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to

granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the questionwhether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her

husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in theinstant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. Theweakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in aseparate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is notdependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligationsof the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of thehusband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express orimplied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of thehusband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the stateitself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts indriving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separatemaintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it adebt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for theperformance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is donefrom necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife;as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in thehabit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separatesupport is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded asso sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling aweaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means ofpreserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respectwhatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in thesituation of a feme sole.

The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order forjudgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,

vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG andGENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision1of the Court of Appeals, affirming the

decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring privaterespondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled toinherit from them.

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the

children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,predeceasing their parents.

In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought anaction for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were thelegitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they wereentitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They allegedthat their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents' residenceat Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the propertiesof the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, butthey later withdrew this allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, 2 then 81 years old, mayor ofthe municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavinoand Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. Oncross examination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina becausethey performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and GavinoBalogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino andCatalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiatedand Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy,3 a family friend of private

respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavinoand Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina wassolemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew thisbecause he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to

accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence inCamanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified thatGavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in thepresence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer thatGavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he wasa carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He alsomade the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.4 She testified that

after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriagecertificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that sheand Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely,Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age ofsix. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived incommon law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local CivilRegistrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of themarriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of theTreasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that officeand, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyedduring the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there waslikewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which wereeither lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)

On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified5

that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that herbrother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know privaterespondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) fromthe Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have arecord of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared byAssistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was norecord of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between1925 to 1935.

6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified 7 that Gavino died single in 1935 and that

Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did notknow whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina hadchildren by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know thenames of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that LeonciaBalogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminalcase filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented8to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment forprivate respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render anaccounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate anddeliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva,and to pay attorney's fees and costs.


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Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that thetrial court erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of theMunicipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavinoand Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935.Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for newtrial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturiaswhich did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failedto overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deportingthemselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed tobe legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of natureand the ordinary habits of life. 9Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should havebeen proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage wascelebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the CivilRegistry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, orunless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as

that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife,may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children astheir legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country.10 Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case wasbrought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must bedetermined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed theprovisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,

11andthe rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a manand a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. 12

This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.

13

In thiscase, petitioners' claim that the certification presented by private respondents (tothe effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during thewar) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistantmunicipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not containany entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,14 the defendants, who

questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of therecord of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month ofJanuary, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was heldcompetent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract isconsidered primary evidence of marriage,

15 the failure to present it is not proofthat no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove

marriage.16Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that

Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one ofwhom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died;and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino'sfamily and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannotbe presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavinoand Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were takingeach other as husband and wife.

17An exchange of vows can be presumed tohave been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a weddingtook place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows ofmarital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without anexchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in thepreservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter ofconstitutional concern. As stated inAdong v. Cheong Seng Gee:

18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is thatof marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civilcontract, but it is a new relation, an institution in themaintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towardlegalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparentmatrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in factmarried. The reason is that such is the common order ofsociety, and if the parties were not what they thus holdthemselves out as being, they would be living in the constantviolation of decency and of law. A presumption established byour Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a womandeporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into alawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semperpraesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.S.vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs.

Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely ontestimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been inthe continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art.265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by therecord of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by finaljudgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titlesindicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuouspossession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed bythe Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:


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Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the precedingarticle, the filiation shall be proved by the continuouspossession of status of a legitimate child.

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authenticdocument, final judgment or possession of status, legitimatefiliation may be proved by any other means allowed by theRules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to

the possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate childrenbecause the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but thefiliation of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino andCatalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer ofAsturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed duringthe war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot threechildren, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified thatprivate respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by GavinoBalogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino and CatalinaBalogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbogadmitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As theCourt of Appeals found:

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies theclincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In aninvestigation before the Police Investigating Committee ofBalamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for thepurpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against apatrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified thatthe complainant in that administrative case is his nephew.Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted onthat date (Exhs. "N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:

Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigativebody.

Q. Do you know the complainant in thisAdministrative Case No. 1?

A. Yes I know.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. I know because he is my nephew.

Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew,the complainant?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you mean to say that you are close tohim?

A. Yes. We are close.

Q. Why do you say you are close?

A. We are close because aside from the factthat he is my nephew we were also leaving(sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I

even barrow (sic) from him money in theamount of P300.00, when I return toBalamban, Cebu.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudiosoalthough made in another case. It is considered as a reliabledeclaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly,Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effectsof that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such

silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew ofGaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,vs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner RestitutoAlcantara assailing the Decision

1of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in

CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision2of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent

Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, withoutsecuring the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose oflooking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who,for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister ofthe Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.

4 They got married on the same day, 8

December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremonyat the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. Themarriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. Thealleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriagecontract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went

to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, theyparted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar tocancel the corresponding marriage contract

5and its entry on file.

6

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts thevalidity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued asevidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first child namedRose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel AnnAlcantara on 27 October 1992.

7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three

children.8Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution

for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against

petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10

Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack ofmerit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decisiondisposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five(5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing thepetitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolutionof the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.

12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to beregularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome thepresumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is aprima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rulesof Court.

13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when itruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despitethe evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precisemoment of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when itgave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that thesame was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was notthe Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when itfailed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Syvs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when itfailed to relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote thesubstantial rights of the party litigants.

14

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent wascelebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went tothe Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them .

15The

wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapelwhere Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.

16 He and

respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuminga marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor therespondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil

Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification statesthat "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto
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Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17

but their marriage contract bears the number7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or priorto the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is theCivil Code which was the law in effect at the t ime of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,the absence of which renders the marriage void abinitio pursuant to Article 80(3)

18in

relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19

Article 53 of the Civil Code20which was

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