Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-14683 May 30, 1961JOAQUIN QUIMSING,petitioner-appellant,vs.CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT. NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC Provincial Commander of the Province of Iloilo,respondents-appellees.Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.The City Fiscal of Iloilo City for respondents-appellees.CONCEPCION,J.:Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the petition in this case, as well as the counterclaim of respondents herein, without costs.Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city police force and the Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursdays. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were arrested and then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.Quimsing, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against Major Cesar Lucero, as the then provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio, Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police, respectively, of the Iloilo City Police. In his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action: one for the recovery from respondents, in their private capacity, of compensatory damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the ground that the same were made illegally and in bad faith, because cockfighting on Thursdays was, it is claimed, authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of the City of Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the city mayor of Iloilo; and another for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction, restraining respondents, in their official, capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of said cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith.In their answer, respondents alleged that the raid and arrest aforementioned were made in good faith, without malice and in the faithful discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and that, pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Revised Administrative Code, petitioner cannot legally hold cockfighting on Thursdays, despite said ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents, likewise, set up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as well as respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondents-appellees in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an ordinance of the City of Iloilo;3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 51 series of 1954, as amended by Ordinance No. 58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal;4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner.The first three assignments of error are related to petitioner's second cause of action, whereas the fourth assignment of error refers to the first cause of action. Hence, we will begin by considering the last assignment of error.At the outset, we note that the bad faith imputed to respondents herein has not been duly established. In fact, there is no evidence that Major Lucero had previous knowledge of the raid and arrest that his co-respondents intended to make. What is more, petitioner would appear to have included him as respondent merely upon the theory of command responsibility, as provincial commander of the constabulary in the province and city of Iloilo. However, there is neither allegation nor proof that he had been in any way guilty of fault or negligence in connection with said raid and arrest.As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr., the records indicate that they were unaware of the city ordinances relieved upon by petitioner herein. Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when petitioner invoked said ordinances. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that they were earnestly of the opinion, as His Honor the Trial judge was, that cockfighting on Thursdays is, despite the aforementioned ordinances, illegal under Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although petitioner maintains that such opinion is erroneous, the facts of record sufficiently warrant the conclusion that Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they were faithfully discharging their duty as law enforcing agents.In the light of the foregoing and of the other circumstances surrounding the case, and inasmuch as the assessment of moral and exemplary damages "is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case" (Art. 2216, Civil Code of the Philippines), it is our considered view that respondents herein should not be held liable for said damages. Neither should they be sentenced to pay compensatory damages, the same not having been proven satisfactorily. Hence, the fourth assignment of error is untenable.The first assignment of error is based upon section 64 of the Charter of the City of Iloilo (Commonwealth Act No. 158), pursuant to which the City Fiscal thereof "shallrepresent the city in all civil cases wherein the city or any officers thereofin his official capacity is a party."Although this section imposes upon the city fiscal thedutyto appear in the eases specified, it does notprohibithim from representing city officers sued as private individualson account of acts performed by them in their official capacity,specially when, as in the case at bar, they claim to have acted in good faith and in accordance with a legal provision, which they earnestly believed, as the lower court believed, should be construed in the manner set forth in their answer. Again, under petitioner's second cause of action, respondents are sued in their official capacity. This fact and the circumstances under which respondents performed the acts involved in the first cause of action sufficiently justified the appearance of the City Fiscal of Iloilo on their behalf.We need not pass upon the merits of the second assignment of error, the same not being essential to the determination of this case, for, regardless of whether or not it is proper for the City Fiscal of Iloilo, as such, to assail the validity of an ordinance thereof, it cannot be denied that respondents herein may do so in their defense.Referring now to the third assignment of error, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code provides:The penalty ofarresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon:1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or who organizes cockfights at which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by law.2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable things, or organizes such cockfights at a place other than a licensed cockpit.Respondents maintain that this legal provision should construed be in relation to sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, reading:SEC. 2285. Restriction upon cockfighting. Cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits and, except as provided n the next succeeding section hereof, only upon legal holidays and for a period of not exceeding three days during the celebration of the local fiesta. No card game or games of chance of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit.SEC. 2286. Cockfighting at fairs and carnivals. In provinces where the provincial board resolves that a fair or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, carnival, or any other act which may redound to the promotion of the general interests thereof, shall be held on a suitable date or dates, the council of the municipality in which such fair, exposition or carnival is held may, by resolution of a majority of the council, authorize the cockfighting permitted at a local fiesta to take place for not to exceed three days during said exposition fair, or carnival, if these fall on a date other than that of the local fiesta. Where this action is taken, cockfighting shall not be permitted during the local fiesta unless a legal holiday occurs at such period in which case cockfighting may be permitted upon the holiday.Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these two (2) provisions to the case at bar, upon the ground that said provisions form part of Chapter 57 of the Revised Administrative Code which chapter is entitled "Municipal Law" governing regular municipalities, not chartered cities, like the City of Iloilo, for, "except as otherwise specially provided", the term "municipality", as used in that Code and in said section 2286, "does not include chartered city, municipal district or other political division" (Section 2, Revised Administrative Code). Petitioner's contention is well-taken but it does not follow therefrom that he was entitled to hold cockfightings on Thursdays.Pursuant to section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 158, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Iloilo:Except as otherwise provided by law, theMunicipal Board shall have the following legislative powers . . . to tax, fix the license fee for, and regulate, among others, theatrical performances . . . and places of amusements (par. j) . . . .Moreover, under section 1 of Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 1224:The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each municipality and municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusements within its territorial jurisdiction:Provided, however, That no such places of amusement mentioned herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, except cockpits, the distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or city board or council, from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches:Provided, further, That no municipal or city ordinance fixing distances at which such places of amusement may be established or operated shall apply to those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal or city ordinance, nor will the subsequent opening of any public building or other premises from which distances shall be measured prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and operating, but any such place of amusement established within fifty lineal meters from any school, hospital or church shall be so constructed that the noise coming therefrom shall not disturb those in the school, hospital or church, and, if such noise causes such disturbance then such place of amusement shall not operate during school hours when near a school, or at night when near a hospital, or when there are religious services when near a church:Provided, furthermore, That no minor shall be admitted in any bar, saloon, cabaret, or night club employing hostesses:And provided, finally, That this Act shall not apply to establishments operating by virtue of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred eighty-five nor to any establishment already in operation when Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred seventy-nine took effect.The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section 21 of its charter to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to include "the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance, and operation of . . .cockpits," carries with it the authority to fix the dates on which "cockfighting" may be held. In this connection, it should be noted that said Republic Act No. 938, as amended, applies, not only to "the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city", but, also, to "the municipal council of each municipality or municipal district." Consequently, an affirmative answer to the question adverted to above would necessarily imply, not merely an amendment of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, but, even, a virtual repeal thereof, for then local boards or councils could authorize the holding of cockfighting, not only on legal holidays, but on any day and as often as said boards or councils may deem fit to permit, whether it be during a fair, carnival, or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, or not. Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local governments a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it.Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals and even amendments by implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned. Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most widespread vices of our population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively curbing its evil effects. The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has completely reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local governments. We should not, and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is concerned, is not manifest from the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulatecockpits". Yet, the authority of said council over "cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits", but "illegal cockfighting". What is more, participation in cockfights "on adayother than those permitted by law", in dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at aplaceother than a licensedcockpit." .So, too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to "regulate . . . the establishment, maintenance and operation of . . .cockpits", does not necessarily connote the power to regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and second proviso in section 1 of said Act, regulating thedistanceof cockpits and places of amusement therein mentioned from "any public building, schools, hospitals and churches" and the third proviso of the same section, prohibiting the admission of minors to some of those places of amusement, suggest that the authority conferred in said provision may include the power to determine the location of cockpits, the type or nature of construction used therefor, the conditions to persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be established in each municipality and/or by each operator, the minimumageof the individuals who may be admitted therein, and other matters of similar nature as distinguished from the days on whichcockfightingshall be held and the frequency thereof.In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein, authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.,petitioners,vs.HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL.,respondents.Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.BAUTISTA ANGELO,J.:On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of 1964.On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked: what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not anexpressrepealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals applyex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by atotalban of rice importation and the other by apartialban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption; (2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes importation, by the government.Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn."SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section refers to an emergency where there is anartificial shortagebecause of the apparent hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory Construction,supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compaia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute,supra, p. 631). The clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import riceduring the year 1964. The same, therefore, is nowfunctus officioat least on the matter of importation.Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act 3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not beenimpliedlyrepealed by Republic Act 3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of theuncertaintyof the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No. 2207?SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.x x x x x x x x xSENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by substitution reads:Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions of existing law.I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.x x x x x x x x xSENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 that is the reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice?SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.x x x x x x x x xSENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a national emergency.Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No. 2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future importations.Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in question.WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby dissolved. Costs against petitioners.Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967BARA LIDASAN,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.Suntay for petitioner.Barrios and Fule for respondent.SANCHEZ,J.:The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition forcertiorariand prohibition.On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced inhaec verba, reads:Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality ofBuldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality ofParang, also in theProvince of Cotabatoand not of Lanao del Sur.Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4where the bill, being of local application, originated.5Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth,a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.xxx xxx xxxIn determining sufficiency of particular titleits substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton,in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.Respondent asks us to readFelwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. TheFelwacase is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn toHume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said inHume, may well apply to this case:It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its provisions."Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portionif separablefrom the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portionthat it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, andwhat remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area ofnine barriosin the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if thetwelve barriosin the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.Municipal corporations perform twin functions.Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government.Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the originaltwenty-one barrioswhich comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.143. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.No costs allowed. So ordered.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.,petitioner-appellant,vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,respondent-appellee.Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.BARRERA,J.:On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor: .Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a properinterpretationof the term 'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis,op. cit.,p. 194.) .A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis,op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: .(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so.Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.1wph1.tThe case ofPeople v. Jolliffe(G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular, regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.The case ofPeople v. Que Po Lay(50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCDECISIONJune 30, 1970G.R. No. L-25619DOMINGO B. TEOXON, petitioner-appellant,vs.MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondents-appellees.Ulpiano S. Masallo for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Perfecto O. Fernandez for respondents-appellees.Fernando,J.:The pivotal question raised by petitioner, a veteran who suffered from permanent physical disability, in this appeal from a lower court decision dismissing his suit formandamus, is its failure to accord primacy to statutory provisions fixing the amount of pension to which he was entitled. 1 Instead, it sustained the plea of respondent officials, members of the board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, relying on the administrative rules issued by them presumably in pursuance of their duty to enforce the Veterans' Bill of Rights. We have to resolve, then, whether or not there has been a failure to apply the doctrine to which this Court has been committed that if it can be shown that there is repugnancy between the statute and the rules issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails. Unfortunately, as will be hereafter shown, the lower court did not see it that way. It found nothing objectionable in respondents following a contrary norm and thus disregarding petitioner's legal right for whichmandamusis the proper remedy. We cannot lend our approval then to such conclusion especially so in the light of our decision barely two months ago, Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 2 where we categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof. We reverse.Petitioner, on April 23, 1965, filed his suit formandamusbefore the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights,Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the basic law as thereafter amended. 3 His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. 4 The answer for respondents filed on May 25, 1965, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which cannot prosper without its consent. 5 In the stipulation of facts dated Oct. 13, 1965, it was expressly agreed: "That the petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical disability." 6 Mention was likewise made in the aforesaid stipulation of facts that while petitioner would rely on what is set forth in the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, respondents in turn would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by them.In the decision now on appeal, promulgated on Dec. 4, 1965, the lower court, in dismissing the petition, expressed its conformity with the contention of respondents. Thus: "Upon examination of the issues involved in this case, the Court believes that a case formandamuswill not lie. The respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained." 7 The lower court went even further in its recognition of the binding force to be given the administrative rules and regulations promulgated by respondents. Thus: "As mentioned above, under the provisions of the Veterans Law as subsequently amended, the Board is authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law. In accordance with said law, the Board has promulgated rules and regulations which are considered in the approval of the claims for pension. The court sees no reason why the case of petitioner should be considered as an exception. There is no question that his disability is not complete, and, therefore, he cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance. That the decision of the Board is based on its regulations is also, according to the Court, justified because that is how the Board functions." 8Hence, this appeal, which, as noted at the outset, calls for an affirmative response. Petitioner's contention that his right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable. So our decisions have indicated with unfailing uniformity.1. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias 9 decided in 1908. Then came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, 10 a delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People v. Santos, 11 this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." 12 Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 13 citing Parker, 14 as well as Davis 15 did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom .... On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means."It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 16 No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." 17 Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.We examine, then, the original act approved in 1946 18 and its later amendments. The Veterans' Bill of Rights, as it read when enacted in 1946, insofar as pertinent, provides: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof, who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." The act took effect upon its approval, on Oct. 18 of that year. Then, in 1955, came the first amendment in these words; "[Sec.] 9; The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who permanent incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 19 The present Section 9, as again amended in 1957, reads as follows: "The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 20To the extent, therefore, that petitioner would base his suit on the legal rights thus conferred on him by the above statutory provisions, he is entitled to a favorable judgment. That is what was decided in Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, referred to by us earlier in the opinion as decisive of a controversy of this nature. We do so again. Hence, a reversal of the appealed decision is indicated.2. The affirmative defenses as to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as a proceeding of this character being a suit against the State were considered and rejected in the aforesaid Begosa decision.WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and another one entered granting this petition formandamus. Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a pension effective as of May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963 until the statutory rate has been satisfied. Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the amount of P100.00 a month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to costs.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933ALLISON G. GIBBS,petitioner-appelle,vs.THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,oppositor-appellant.THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA,respondent-appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.BUTTE,J.:This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila to cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code has been paid.The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto, California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein.It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife in case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,1930, filed anex partepetition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs", describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of giftsmortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of the tax discovered by them. . . .Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said order of September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition. The case is now before us with the supplementary evidence.For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts as established by the evidence or the admissions of the parties: Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July 1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva Johnson Gibbs".2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which it states "that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband, the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitionsmortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question for determination in this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with thelex rei sitae. There is not the slightest doubt that a California married woman can acquire title to land in a common law jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of Columbia, subject to the common-law estate by the courtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the common law right of dower, the prerequisite conditions obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of the Philippine Islands).The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as regards the determination of private rights, grants practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the principles and rules of private international law (conflicts of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs. Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied here as law were there any question as to her status.But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code which is as follows:Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.In construing the above language we are met at the outset with some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the person whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa, vol. 1,Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Micianovs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United States. (Cf. Babcock Templetonvs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130, 137;In reEstate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee be heard to sa