Who am I?The Problem of Personal Identity in

Modern Philosophy

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Ship of Theseus

• Suppose the Argo is in continuous service betweenAthens and Crete.

• As its parts wear out they are replaced with new onesand the originals are put into storage.

• Eventually all of its parts are replaced.

• There are now two ships – one that has been sailingback and forth every day and one in parts in storage.

• If the parts are reassembled which one is the Argo?

The Problem of Personal Identity

• What makes ME one and the same person inspite of all of the physical and psychologicalchanges that occur to me?

• Is there an underlying source of my identityas one and the same person?

• If so, what could it possibly be?

The Problem of Personal Identity

• What makes ME one and the same person inspite of all of the physical and psychologicalchanges that occur to me?

• Is there an underlying source of my identityas one and the same person?

• If so, what could it possibly be?

The Problem of Personal Identity

• What makes ME one and the same person inspite of all of the physical and psychologicalchanges that occur to me?

• Is there an underlying source of my identityas one and the same person?

• If so, what could it possibly be?

The Problem of Personal Identity

• What makes ME one and the same person inspite of all of the physical and psychologicalchanges that occur to me?

• Is there an underlying source of my identityas one and the same person?

• If so, what could it possibly be?

Who am I?

• A kid in the 1970’s?

• An adult in the 2000’s?

• An old man in the 2040’s?

Who am I?

• A kid in the 1970’s?

• An adult in the 2000’s?

• An old man in the 2040’s?

Who am I?

• A kid in the 1970’s?

• An adult in the 2000’s?

• An old man in the 2040’s?

Who am I?

• A kid in the 1970’s?

• An adult in the 2000’s?

• An old man in the 2040’s?

The Case of Professor McCloskey

• Donald was an economics professor.

• But he had another person inside – Dee.

• But he was still Donald.

• Until the operation turned him into her –Diedre.

The Case of Professor McCloskey

• Donald was an economics professor.

• But he had another person inside – Dee.

• But he was still Donald.

• Until the operation turned him into her –Diedre.

The Case of Professor McCloskey

• Donald was an economics professor.

• But he had another person inside – Dee.

• But he was still Donald.

• Until the operation turned him into her –Diedre.

The Case of Professor McCloskey

• Donald was an economics professor.

• But he had another person inside – Dee.

• But he was still Donald.

• Until the operation turned him into her –Diedre.

The Case of Professor McCloskey

• Donald was an economics professor.

• But he had another person inside – Dee.

• But he was still Donald.

• Until the operation turned him into her –Diedre.

The Case of The Folk Singer

• There once was a man named DmitriGeorgiou.

• But he called himself Cat Stevens andrecorded a bunch of cheesy folk music.

• Until he almost died. Then he became YusufIslam, and disavowed all of Cat Stevens’music.

The Case of The Folk Singer

• There once was a man named DmitriGeorgiou.

• But he called himself Cat Stevens andrecorded a bunch of cheesy folk music.

• Until he almost died. Then he became YusufIslam, and disavowed all of Cat Stevens’music.

The Case of The Folk Singer

• There once was a man named DmitriGeorgiou.

• But he called himself Cat Stevens andrecorded a bunch of cheesy folk music.

• Until he almost died. Then he became YusufIslam, and disavowed all of Cat Stevens’music.

The Case of The Folk Singer

• There once was a man named DmitriGeorgiou.

• But he called himself Cat Stevens andrecorded a bunch of cheesy folk music.

• Until he almost died. Then he became YusufIslam, and disavowed all of Cat Stevens’music.

Descartes’ Solution

• Minds and bodies are essentially differentkinds of substances – we know this becausewe can doubt the existence of bodies, but notof minds.

• Minds are simple, indestructible substances.

• What makes me me is the persistence of thisimmaterial thinking thing.

Descartes’ Solution

• Minds and bodies are essentially differentkinds of substances – we know this becausewe can doubt the existence of bodies, but notof minds.

• Minds are simple, indestructible substances.

• What makes me me is the persistence of thisimmaterial thinking thing.

Descartes’ Solution

• Minds and bodies are essentially differentkinds of substances – we know this becausewe can doubt the existence of bodies, but notof minds.

• Minds are simple, indestructible substances.

• What makes me me is the persistence of thisimmaterial thinking thing.

Descartes’ Solution

• Minds and bodies are essentially differentkinds of substances – we know this becausewe can doubt the existence of bodies, but notof minds.

• Minds are simple, indestructible substances.

• What makes me me is the persistence of thisimmaterial thinking thing.

Locke’s Solution

• The idea of a self is the idea of something “weknow not what” underlying and unifying ourexperiences.

• Consciousness and memory together provide abasis for saying that one and the same personpersists through all of the physical andpsychological changes that person goesthrough.

Locke’s Solution

• The idea of a self is the idea of something “weknow not what” underlying and unifying ourexperiences.

• Consciousness and memory together provide abasis for saying that one and the same personpersists through all of the physical andpsychological changes that person goesthrough.

Locke’s Solution

• The idea of a self is the idea of something “weknow not what” underlying and unifying ourexperiences.

• Consciousness and memory together provide abasis for saying that one and the same personpersists through all of the physical andpsychological changes that person goesthrough.

Hume’s Doubts

• If all ideas must come from impressions, wehave no idea at all of a self, since we do notever experience one underneath whatever wehappen to be experiencing.

• Consciousness and memory won’t workbecause they are full of gaps.

• What we call the self is nothing but a bundleof impressions and ideas bound together bythe weak ties of association.

Hume’s Doubts

• If all ideas must come from impressions, wehave no idea at all of a self, since we do notever experience one underneath whatever wehappen to be experiencing.

• Consciousness and memory won’t workbecause they are full of gaps.

• What we call the self is nothing but a bundleof impressions and ideas bound together bythe weak ties of association.

Hume’s Doubts

• If all ideas must come from impressions, wehave no idea at all of a self, since we do notever experience one underneath whatever wehappen to be experiencing.

• Consciousness and memory won’t workbecause they are full of gaps.

• What we call the self is nothing but a bundleof impressions and ideas bound together bythe weak ties of association.

Hume’s Doubts

• If all ideas must come from impressions, wehave no idea at all of a self, since we do notever experience one underneath whatever wehappen to be experiencing.

• Consciousness and memory won’t workbecause they are full of gaps.

• What we call the self is nothing but a bundleof impressions and ideas bound together bythe weak ties of association.