The Concept of Personal Identity

7/29/2019 The Concept of Personal Identity

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The Concept of Personal Identity

Author(s): Steven Rieber

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 3, (Sep., 1998), pp. 581-594

Published by: International Phenomenological Society

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653757

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LVIII, No. 3, September 1998

The Conceptof PersonalIdentitySTEVEN RIEBERGeorgia State University

Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarilyconsists in, but frequentlyleave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paperisconcernedwith conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personalidentityin terms of a definite description.The analysis coheres with out judgments aboutclear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate.The apparent nde-terminacyresults from attempting o apply a definitedescriptionto a situationin whichmore thanone objectwould satisfy the description.The definitedescriptionanalysis alsoexplains the strengthsof the influentialno-branching heory, while avoiding the prob-lems with thatview. The no-branching heory is in effect a second-orderanalysis, i.e., acombination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russelliananalysisof the definitedescription.

It is widely agreed that a theory of personal identity ought to explain, asDerek Parfitputs it, what the identity of a person necessarily involves orconsists in.1Frequently eft open, however, is whattype of necessity-meta-physical, nomological, or conceptual-is at issue.2This essay is concernedwith conceptual necessity. Its aim is to explicate the concept of personalidentity:what it is to believe, think, or assert thatx and y at different timesare the sameperson.As in otherconceptual nvestigations,the data are the intuitivejudgmentsabout cases real and hypothetical. An explication of the concept ought tocoherewith andexplainthesejudgments.Amongthe imaginarycases are cer-tain puzzle situationsin which a persondivides in two andquestionsof per-sonal identityseem to have no answer.Faced with such apparentndetermi-nacy, the theorist has a choice. One alternative s to devise an account thatyields a definite verdict even where intuition is indefinite,thus purgingtheconcept of indeterminacy.This implies sharpeningor otherwisealteringtheconcept,and indeed some philosophersexplicitly acknowledgeanintention omodify the concept of personal identity.3However, if ouraim is to explicatethe actualconcept, our analysis ought to explain, ratherthaneliminate, theindeterminacyin the puzzle cases. That is the route this papertakes. Both1 Parfit1984,p. 203.2 On this methodological ssue, see Shoemaker1984, section 15.3 See e.g. Brennan 1988.

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projects are of course legitimate; in fact, they are complementary. Anyattempt o modify the conceptof personal dentity by drawingprecisebound-aries ought to begin with an understandingof where the actual (imprecise)boundaries ie and what the source of the indeterminacy s. Moreover,bothprojectsmay help answerthe much-discussed question of whether personalidentitymatters.4

Theories that seek to modify the concept of personalidentityhave somedegreeof latitude, or differentmodificationsmay suit differentpurposes.Butan analysis of the actualconceptis more narrowlyconstrained. n particular,it must take seriouslythe requirementnot to be ad hoc. Every componentofthe analysismustmakeindependent ense; nothingshould be includedwhichserves merelyto save the analysisfrom an objection.

In what follows I proposewhatI shall call the definitedescriptionanaly-sis, which explains both our clear intuitions about ordinarycases and ourinabilityto forma determinateudgmentaboutdivision. The definitedescrip-tion analysis also explains both the strengths and the weaknesses of theinfluential no-branching theory of personal identity. I argue that the no-branching heoryis in effect an attemptata second-orderanalysis.The notionof a second-orderanalysiscan be illustratedas follows. Consideran analysisof knowledgethatcombinesundefeated ruejustifiedbelief togetherwith thecorrespondence theory of truth.Thus S knows thatP is analyzed as: (i) Sbelieves thatP, (ii) S is justified in believing thatP, (iii) S's justificationforbelieving that P is undefeated,and (iv) P corresponds o the facts. Now thissecond-orderanalysisof knowledgewould face objectionshavingnothingtodo withknowledgeper se, namely,objectionsto thecorrespondenceheoryoftruth.Similarly, I will show that the no-branching heory is a combinationof the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russelliananalysisof the definitedescription.The no-branchingheoryhas a numberofimplausibleconsequences.The definitedescriptionanalysis shows that thesedifficultiesfor the no-branchingheorystem ultimatelyfrom Russell's theoryof descriptions.Theproblemsdo not arisefor the definitedescriptionanalysisitself, shornof the Russellianaddition.

In additionto diagnosingthe difficultiesfor the no-branching heory, thedefinitedescriptionanalysisalso suggests a strategyby which the no-branch-ing theory might solve these problems.Once it is seen that the problemsforthe no-branching theory are ultimately problems for Russell's theory ofdescriptions, the no-branchingtheory can avail itself of resources such asconversational mplicature hathave been used to defend Russell. However,while I indicate how such a defense might proceed, the definite descriptionanalysis is not committed to Russellianism. My thesis, then, is that thedefinite descriptionanalysis provides the correct first-orderanalysis of the

On whether ouridentitymatterssee, for example,Parfit1984, Sosa 1990, Johnston1992.

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concept of personal identity. I leave open the question of what the correcttheory of descriptions s, and hence what the correctsecond-orderanalysis ofpersonal identity mightbe.

The startingpoint for an analysis of personal identity is usually some notionof continuity-mental, physical or some combinationof the two. This paperis not concerned with the physical/mental issue. Indeed, it seems that thisissue is not about the concept of personal identity but about different concep-tions of the concept.' People who apparently ully understand he issues sin-cerely disagree aboutwhetherthey could survive withoutphysical continuity(e.g. teletransportation) r without mentalcontinuity (e.g. total amnesia anda new personality). If this disagreementwere about the concept of personalidentity,we would have to concludeeitherthat one side is simplyconfused orthat the two sides have differentconcepts.But neitherof these is plausible.Iassume, then, that whether the continuity requiredfor personal identity isphysical or mental is not a question aboutthe concept of personal dentity. Ifthis assumption s wrong, then I will have given a partial analysis which canthen be supplementedwiththe word 'mental'or 'physical', as needed.

Let's begin by considering:The No-Branching Theory.To believe/assert that person x at onetime is identical with person y at an earlier time is to believe/assertthatx is continuouswith y andno one else is continuous with y.6

The purposeof the no-branching lause ("noone else is continuous with y")is to avoid the consequencethat in cases of division one personis identicalwith two distinctpersons.7SupposethatA's brain s removedfromA's bodyand divided into two. Each half is then transplanted nto a new (brainless)body which is qualitatively ust like the original body. The results are B andC, each of whom is physically andmentallycontinuouswith A. But B andC5 Nozick 1981, pp. 33-34, takes a similarposition. On the distinctionbetween concept and

conception (appliedto the notion of justice) see Rawls 1971, pp. 5-11.6 The analysis is expressedin terms of what it is to believe or assert something about per-

sonal identity, rather han as a simple biconditional,because my goal is to explicate notjust necessary truths, but conceptual truths, about personal identity. Also, here andthroughout the paper, by "identical" I mean: numerically identical. For psychologicalversions of the no-branching theory, see Parfit 1984 and Shoemaker 1984. See alsoUnger 1990, which does not appeal to continuitybut does employ a no-branchingclause.Most discussions of puzzle cases concern the division of one personinto two, rather hanthefusion of two personsinto one. Perhaps his is because it is not clearthatin the case offusion the resultingpersonis continuouswith both of the original persons.But if fusion isconceptuallypossible andif the resultingpersonis continuouswith bothoriginals,then theno-branchingtheory ought to contain anotherclause: To believe/assert that person x atone time is identical with person y at an earlier time is to believe/assertthat x is continu-ous with y, no one else is continuouswith y, andx is continuouswithno one else.

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are clearly not identical to each other.Thus we do not want to say thatbothare identical to A, for thatwould violate the transitivityof identity.' Hencethe no-branching lause.

But while the no-branching heory preservesthe transitivityof identity,ithas otherproblemsas an analysis of the actualconcept of personalidentity.For one thing, it does not account for the fact that when we thinkaboutthequestion of personal identity in division, there seems to be no right answer. Itdoes not seem correct to say either that B or C is identical with A, or thatboth are, or that neither s.9 Indeed,it is just this apparentack of a determi-nate answer that makes the case so puzzling. Yet the no-branchingtheorysays thatthere is a determinateanswer, namelythat neitherB norC is identi-cal with A. On the no-branchingheory,to ask

Is B identicalwith A?is to ask

Is it the case that B is continuouswith A and no one else is contin-uous with A?

to which the answer s determinatelyno. And since there is no relevantdiffer-ence between B andC, the no-branching heory implies that neither B norCis identicalwith A. Thus the no-branching heorydoes not explain why noneof the answers(includingthis one) seems right.

Moreover,since there s no otherplausiblecandidate or someoneidenticalto A, the no-branching theory implies that afterdivision, A does not exist.Yet this does not seem correct;division does not seem to be cessation ofexistence.

Now, a theoryof personal dentity may wish to extend or modify the con-cept precisely to deal with hard cases such as division. As MarkJohnstonsays,When a case necessarily violates some principle relatively central to our conception of per-sons and their identity over time, the concepts of a person and of being the same person overtime may not determinatelyapply in the case, so that there may be no simple fact about per-

This of course assumesthatB and C are not the same continuer.It also assumes that A'sbody belonged to only one person prior to division-which has been denied by Perry1972, Lewis 1976, and Mills 1993, who claim thatthere were two people all along. Millsadds that there were two streamsof consciousnessall along.This point is acknowledgedby Unger 1992, p. 136: "it's not (determinately) rue that onesurvives fission," and by Johnston1992, p. 603: "the fission case (i) violates the ordinarypresuppositionof essential unity, (ii) is as a result an indeterminate ase."Parfit 1984, pp.253-60, shows that there are problemswith each of the answers to the question of whathappenswhen a persondivides. He concludes that the questionis "empty".If so, then ananalysis of the actual concept of personal identity should explain why this is an emptyquestion.

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sonal identityin thatcase. This is how it is in the fission case. Thus,the variety of philosophicalaccounts of who is who in the fission case are best seen as proposalsabout how to extend ourpracticeto a case where it presently gives no answer.10Thus when Parfitwrites, "Since I cannotbe identical with two differentpeo-ple, and it would be arbitrary o call one of these people me, we can bestdescribe the case by saying neitherof these people will be me," he is appar-ently recommendingan extensionof the conceptof personal dentity."How-ever, if our goal is not to modify the concept of personal identity, but toexplicateit as it actually s, then ouranalysisshould not include a no-branch-ing clause, but should instead explain why division is intuitively a difficultcase.

Anotherproblemis thatthe no-branching heoryseems ad hoc.12The no-branchingclause preserves the transitivityof identity, but it has no otherindependent motivation. Cases of division are, as far as we know, purelyimaginaryandarerarelyeven entertainedoutside of philosophyand sciencefiction. It is difficult to see why the conceptof personalidentityshouldhavea componentspecificallyto issue a verdict about such reconditecases. Thereis no problem with ad hocness, of course, if the aim of the analysis is toextendthe conceptto deal with difficult cases. The ad hoc objectionhas forceonly againstthe claim that the no-branching heory explicates the concept asit actuallyis.

Finally, one much-discussed difficulty is that the no-branchingtheoryimplies thatthe existence of a person can conceptuallydependon whathap-pens to anotherperson.Thatis, the theoryviolates the

Intrinsicness of existence. If x and y are distinct, then whether xexists cannotconceptuallydependon whathappens o y.13

Johnston1992, p. 603.Parfit 1984, p. 262. Cf. Garrett1990, p. 182; Noonan 1989, p. 138; and Sosa 1990, p. 299.Andrew Brennancalls this process 'conceptual development'; see Brennan1988, pp. 62-64; 345-48. Garrett1991 accepts this claim of Parfit's andarguesthat it implies thatper-sons cannot be ontologically reducedto bodies and experiences.12 This objection is made by Brody 1980, p. 58.13 It has also been claimed that the no-branching theory contradicts the Intrinsicness ofidentity: If 'x' and 'y' are rigid designators, then whether x is identical to y cannotdepend on anything but x and y. The intrinsicnessof identity(also known as the 'only xand y' principle) is a consequence of the Necessity of identity:If x and y arerigid desig-nators, then "x is identical to y" expresses a proposition that is necessarily true or false.Thus a violation of the intrinsicnessof identity would be more serious thana violation ofthe intrinsicness of existence. However, Shoemaker1984 has shown that the no-branch-ing theory does not in fact violate the intrinsicnessof identity.Garrett1990 triesto defusethe intrinsicnessobjectionin both forms, but Heckmann 1994 shows that Garrett'sargu-ment does not adequatelyanswer the objectionfrom intrinsicnessof existence. See alsoNoonan 1989, pp. 152-57, 233-37.

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The no-branching heory mplies that,when A divides intoB and C, A ceasesto exist. But it also implies that if the operationon C had not succeeded, theperson with B's body would have been identical to A, and hence A wouldhave existed. That is to say, on the no-branching heory, the following twostatementsarebothtrue:

A does not exist.If the operationon C hadnotsucceeded,A wouldhave existed.

So A's existence dependson what happensto C. Since on the no-branchingtheoryA and C are distinct,the theorythusviolates the intrinsicnessof exis-tence. To be sure, defendersof the no-branching heorymightclaim thatdivi-sion is a counterexampleo the intrinsicnessof existence.14Nevertheless,thisprinciplehas some intuitivesupport; hereis a cost to abandoning t.

The no-branching heorythusfaces a numberof problems.It implies thatthereis a determinateanswerto personal dentity n division andthata personwho divides does not survive; it appearsto be ad hoc; and it violates theintrinsicnessof existence.

III shall argue that the correct analysis of personal identity is in terms of adefinite description.The no-branching heory is, if anything,a second-orderanalysis:the definitedescriptionanalysisof personal dentitycombinedwitha Russellian analysis of the definitedescription.The difficulties for the no-branchingtheory are ultimatelyproblemsfor Russell's theory, for the first-orderanalysisis immuneto theseproblems.Whether he no-branching heoryis correctas a second-orderanalysisthusdependson whetherRussell's theorycan solve theseproblems-which is a questionI shall leave open.First,let's define a continueras follows: To say that x is a continuerof yis to say that x is continuouswith y. I proposethe following first-orderanal-ysis:

The Definite DescriptionAnalysis.To believe/assertthatpersonx atone time is identical with person y at an earlier time is tobelieve/assertthatx is the continuerof y.15

It might be objectedthat the analysis is circular,for in saying "x is the con-tinuerof y" we are presumablyusing the 'is' of identity. It is true that the14 For othercounterexamples, ee Sosa 1990, p. 304; and Unger 1990, p. 165.15 Again, if fusion is a conceptualpossibility and if the resulting person is continuouswith

both originals, then the definite descriptionanalysis ought to contain another clause: Tobelieve/assert that person x at one time is identical with person y at an earlier time is tobelieve/assertthatx is the continuerof y and y is thepredecessor of x.

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definite descriptionanalysis leaves the notion of identity itself unanalyzed.That is because an analysis of personal identity is not primarilyan analysisof identity. Rather,as Shoemakerwrites, "If one is analysing any concept ingiving an accountof personal identity, it is the concept of a person."'16Thusthe definite description analysis is not viciously circular, since it is notintendedto explicatethe concept of identity tself.

The first problemfor the no-branching heory was that it did not explainwhy there seems to be no right answer to the question of personalidentity indivision. The definite description analysis can explain this. Suppose, asbefore,thatA divides intoB and C, and considerthequestion:

Is B identicalwithA?Accordingto thedefinite descriptionanalysis,thisquestionasks the same as

Is B the continuerof A?Now, there are two continuers of A. Hence this question contains animproper definite description, i.e. a description of the form 'the F' wherethere is more than one object that is F. In general, if there is no contextualreason to favor one of the objects over the other as the denotation, such aquestion will seem intuitively to have no determinateanswer.For example,Bolivia has two capitals:Sucre and La Paz.Consider hequestion:

Is La Paz the capitalof Bolivia?Neither 'yes' nor 'no' seems right.Similarly,in division,

Is B the continuerof A?seems not to have an answer.Thus, the definitedescriptionanalysisexplainswhy there seems to be no answerto

Is B identicalwithA?The definite descriptionanalysis by itself is thus consistentwith the intuitivejudgmentsaboutdivision.

The no-branching theory runs into trouble because it in effect gives aRussellian analysis of the definitedescriptionthe continuer,andis thus sub-ject to all the difficultiesfacing Russell's theory.Russell's theoryof definitedescriptionsclaims thata sentence of the form"Ais the F" means:

16 Shoemaker1984, p. 122.



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Exactly one entity is F, and thatentityis A."7Thus, "x is the continuerof y" means, according o Russell:

Exactly one entity is continuous with y, andthatentityis xor, in otherwords,

x is continuouswith y and no one else is continuous with y-which is the no-branching heory.In short:

The definite description analysis of personal identity + Russell'sanalysisof descriptions= The no-branching heoryof personal den-tity.

It is only when the definitedescription analysis is combined with Russell'stheoryof descriptionsthat trouble arises. When we combinethe two, we getthe no-branching heory, which, as we saw, implies that the answer to "Is Bidentical with A?"is determinatelyno. For on Russell's theory, this questionmeans the same as

Is it the case thatB is continuous with A and no one else is contin-uous with A?

The answer to this questionis definitelyno. In general,Russell's theoryhastroublewith improperdefinitedescriptions.On Russell's theory, "Is La Pazthe capitalof Bolivia?"means

Is it the case that Bolivia has exactly one capitalandeverythingthatis a capitalof Bolivia is La Paz?

The answer to this questionis determinatelyno-which does not accordwithourjudgmentsabout"Is La Paz the capitalof Bolivia?"As we will see in thenext section, a defenderof Russell andthe no-branching heoryis not withoutresponses to these difficulties. Notice, however, that there is no problem atall for the definitedescriptionanalysis by itself.

The no-branching heory implied that to divide is to cease to exist. Whatabout the definite description analysis: does it imply that A does not existafter division?To ask this is to ask whether

The continuerof A does not exist

17 Formally: (3x)(Fx & ((Vy)(Fy D y=x) & x=a)). See Russell 1905. As Neale 1990, pp. 44-47, shows, Russell's theoryof descriptions s not committed o this particular ormalism.

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is true after division. Intuitively, it does not seem that this statement s true.Analogously, it does not seem that

The capitalof Bolivia does not existis true. Thus the definite description analysis explains why it does not seemcorrect to say that after division A does not exist. Again, it is only when wecombine the definite description analysis with Russell's theory that we getinto trouble. This combination (i.e. the no-branching theory) implies that"Thecontinuerof A does not exist" says

It is not the case that A has exactly one continuerwhich is true. And again, the difficulty is a general problem for Russell'stheory,which also implies that"Thecapitalof Bolivia does not exist" says

It is not the case that Bolivia has exactly one capitalwhich of course is true.18

Thus the definite description analysis explains both the intuitive judg-ments about division and why the no-branching heory seems to go wrong.Can the definitedescription analysis be shown not to be ad hoc? Is there anexplanationof why the conceptof personal dentityshould contain a definitedescription?I thinkthere is. The firststep is to point out thatas a matter ofempiricalfact we implicitlyassume thateach of us has and can have at mostone continuer.Indeed,it is because we assume this thatwe aresurprisedandpuzzledwhen we first confronta hypotheticalcase like division in which thisassumption s false. The second step is to notice that it is natural o use 'theF' when it is assumed thatthere is only one F. Forinstance, since-despite afew counterexampleslike Bolivia and South Africa-most of us typicallyassume that a countryhas only one capital,we naturallyspeak and thinkof'the capital', rather han 'a capital'.Even if we knew virtually nothingaboutNigeria,we would say or think,"IsLagos the capitalof Nigeria?"rather han"IsLagos a capitalof Nigeria?"Similarly,becausewe assume that each of uscan have only one continuer,we find ourselvesthinking,"Is the continuerof ?" rather than "Is a continuer of ?" That is to say, it is natural forour thoughts about continuity of persons to contain a definite description.Thus it is not surprising hata definitedescriptionshould occurin the analy-sis of the conceptof personal dentity.

18 Actually, Russell's analysis implies that there is a scope ambiguity in "The capital ofBolivia does not exist". But since the wide-scope reading ("Bolivia has exactly one capi-tal, and every capitalof Bolivia does not exist") is self-contradictory,t is unlikely to bemeant and can be ignoredhere.

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How does the definitedescription analysis standin relation to the intrin-sicness of existence? Recall that the no-branching heory implied that the fol-lowing are true afterdivision:

A does not exist.If the operationon C hadnot succeeded,A would have existed.

This violates the intrinsicnessof existence. The definitedescriptionanalysisby itself does not have this problem.It implies that to make the above twostatements s to say, respectively:

The continuerof A does not exist.

If the operation on C had not succeeded, the continuer of A wouldhave existed.

Although the second of these is true, it is far from clear, as we have seen,that the first is true. So the definite description analysis does not by itselfviolate the intrisicness of existence. Were it combinedwith Russell's analy-sis of the definitedescription, t would violate thisprinciple.But thatcombi-nationis not mandatory.

Another benefit of the definite description analysis is to explain why theconceptof personal dentityseems to presuppose uniqueness. Our udgmentsaboutpersonal identityseem to presupposea single continuerbecause thesejudgments involve a definite description, which as Strawson points out,seems to presuppose-rather than to assert-uniqueness." This is not to saythat Strawson is correctin claiming that definite descriptionsmake this pre-supposition. The point is simply that they seem to do so, and thus thedefinitedescriptionanalysiscan explain why the conceptof personal dentityseems to do so as well.

IIIThe definitedescriptionanalysis explainsour intuitive udgments,it is not adhoc, andit avoids the problemsfacing the no-branching heory.We can con-clude that it is the correct first-orderanalysis of personal identity. Still thequestionremains:What is the truthabout division? The definitedescriptionanalysis explains why "B is identical with A" seems neitherdeterminatelytrue nor determinatelyfalse. But what in fact is its truth value? To answerthis question, we need to know what the correct theory of descriptions is.Thatis to say, we needto know the correctsecond-orderanalysisof personalidentity. The theory of descriptions is a large issue which cannot be fully19 Strawson 1950.

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adjudicatedhere. In this section, however, I will brieflyconsider, first, whatStrawson's theory would say and, second, how Russell's theory might bedefendedagainstsome of theobjectionswe haveraised.

Let's assume that the definite description analysis is the correct (first-order) analysis of personal identity. On Strawson'sview, a definite descrip-tion 'the F' does not assert thatthere is exactly one F. Rather, t implies orsignals this.2"When this implication is false, the sentence containing thedefinitedescriptionassertsno propositionand thus has no truthvalue, accord-ing to Strawson.Considerthe sentence

B is identical with Awhich, on the definitedescriptionanalysis,is analyzedas

B is the continuerof A.On Strawson's theory, this last sentence implies (but does not assert) thatthere is exactly one continuerof A. Since this implication is false in divi-sion, Strawsonwould say that the sentenceexpressesno propositionandthushas no truth value. So if Strawsonis right there is in fact no answer to thequestion, "Whathappenswhen a person divides?" Thus Strawson's theorytogetherwith the definitedescriptionanalysis can explain the intuitivejudg-ment that the question of personal identity in division has no answer, for itholds that this judgment is correct.

Alternatively,we could use the definitedescriptionanalysis as a basis fordefendingthe no-branching heoryas a second-orderanalysis. Again, we areassumingthedefinitedescriptionanalysis.Hence to say that

B is not identicalwith Ais to say that

B is not the continuerof A.Now it might be argued that, despite appearances,this last statementis infact truein the case of division. One relevantconsiderationhere is that state-ments like the following seem quite acceptable:

B is not the continuerof A because there is more than one contin-uer.21

20 Strawson 1950. Latertheorists have understood his special type of implying as a presup-position. Like other theoriesof descriptions,Strawson's has been much criticized. For agood overview, see Neale 1990.21 This consideration s mentionedby Grice 1989, p. 270.

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B is not the continuerof A.However, it is also incumbenton the defender of the no-branching heory toexplain why "B is not the continuerof A" utteredby itself with no stressdoes not seem true.Herewe can draw on Grice's defense of Russell's theoryof descriptions.Gricearguesthat Russell's theoryis correctand thatsome ofits counterintuitive consequences can be explained away as the result ofa conversational implicature.22According to Grice, a sentence of the form" is not the F" conversationally implicates (but does not actually state)

that there is exactly one F.23Hence, if it is not the case that there is exactlyone F, the sentence " is not the F", while true, will not seem acceptablesince it conversationally implicates something that is false. So if Grice isright, "B is not the continuer of A" in the context of division, while in facttrue, conversationally mplicates somethingthat is false, namely, that A hasexactly one continuer.Thus"Bis not the continuerof A" is not heard as trueeven though it is. Hence, since we are assuming the definite descriptionanalysis,the same goes for "Bis not identical with A."

By showing that the problems for the no-branchingtheory result fromproblemsfor Russell's theoryof descriptions, he definitedescriptionanalysisthus shows how the no-branching theory might be defended, namely, byemploying arguments such as Grice's)which have been used to defend Rus-sell. Again, while the definitedescription analysis is consistent with such adefense of Russell, it is not committedto Russell's theory any more than itis committed to Strawson's.

What, then, is the truthaboutdivision?Accordingto the definitedescrip-tion analysis, the answerdependson the theoryof descriptions.If Russell isright, both "B is identical with A" and "C is identicalwith A" are determi-nately false; hence to divide is to go out of existence. If, on the other hand,Strawsonis right,these sentences express no propositionand hence have notruthvalue, and so thereis no answer to the questionof personal identityindivision.

Finally, recall that the main motivationfor the no-branching heory wasto preservethe transitivityof identity.Is the definitedescriptionanalysiscon-sistent with the transitivityof identity? Again, the answer depends on howdefinitedescriptionsare analyzed.But if either Russell or Strawson is right,then the answer is yes. This is obvious in the case of Russell, since thedefinitedescription analysis and Russell's theory togetherconstitutethe no-branchinganalysis. So we only have to consider Strawson'stheory.Transi-tivity of identitywould be violatedonly if, afterdivision, both of the follow-ing weretrue:22 Conversational mplicaturesare meantby the speakerbut are not partof the conventional

meaning of the sentence. See Grice 1989, ch. 2.23 See Grice 1989, pp. 269-77.

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B is identical with AC is identical with A

Accordingto the definitedescriptionanalysis,theseare analyzedas:B is the continuerof AC is the continuerof A.

Now, if Strawson is right, these sentences have no truthvalue. Thus there isno violation of the transitivityof identity.

The definitedescriptionanalysis offers a simple and non-adhoc explica-tion of the actualconceptof personal dentity. By itself it does not answer thequestionof whathappenswhen a persondivides. But it does tell us where theanswer is to be found, namely, in the theoryof descriptions.It also explainsboth the advantagesand the drawbacksof the no-branchingtheory, and itshows how thattheorymightbe defended.24

24 Many thanks to Robert Almeder, Anne Bezuidenhout, Mark Daley, James Humber,Eugene Mills, ChristianPerring,George Rainbolt, and Greg Ray for discussion and criti-cism. A version of this paper was presentedat a colloquiumof the American Philosophi-cal AssociationPacific Division meetingin April 1996.



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